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Politician​​Ahmad Jannati Is the Current Ayatollah, Or the Shiite

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Politician​​Ahmad Jannati Is the Current Ayatollah, Or the Shiite Ahmad Jannati - Politician Ahmad Jannati is the current Ayatollah, or the Shiite religious ​ ​ leader in Iran, under President Hassan Rouhani. Jannati is seen as the most radical member of the Guardian Council because of his extremely conservative viewpoints. Ali Rabei - Ali Rabei, a politician and sociologist, is the current Minister of Labor and Social ​ ​ Welfare for Iran under President Hassan Rouhani. He has connections to the Islamic Republican Party and its leading members. Mohammad Jahromi - Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, an engineer and network security ​ ​ officer, is the current Minister of Communications for Iran under President Hassan Rouhani. Because of his extensive experience in the communications realm, Jahromi is quite familiar with the politics surrounding around telecommunications. Moosa Majik - Moosa Majik is the ambassador to the American Embassy. Majik is responsible ​ ​ for keeping diplomatic peace between the Iranian and American government and is a liaison between the two. Minister of Health - Hassan Ghazizadeh Hashemi He is mostly known for being the designer of the “Health Evolution Plan” which is also called “Rouhani-Care” which is designed to reform Iran’s healthcare system, a founder of Noor Ophthalmology Complex. He is in charge of the “Arash” robots that are social robot friends for an educational and therapeutic involvement of children with cancer-based on their interests and needs. Jurist Guardian Council Member - Siamak Rahpeyk He is a jurist and the Speaker of the Guardian Council of the Constitution of Iran in the Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He teaches law, expertise being in civil liability, sub-sub-specialty: basic rights and security strategy. The founder of the Strategic Studies Research Institute, which belongs to the Ministry of Intelligence Majority Leader of the Majlis - Ibrahim Mohammed Solih He has maintained steady political power over the past decade. He is greatly in favor of the clerics and mullahs of the region. A leader among the conservative party. He has a great power of persuasion within ambassadors from China and India. Mohammed Shariatmadari Mohammed Shariatmadari is the business and industries minister ​ of Iran. He is a reformist but also harbors a few conservative views. He is the current minister of Cooperatives, Labor, Social Welfare. He served as the minister of commerce from 1997 - 2005 Eshaq Jahangiri- He has been the First Vice President of Iran since 2013, and ran for president ​ in 2017 before dropping out of the race. He has a bachelor’s degree in physics and a PhD in industrial management. Mahmoud Alavi- Mahmoud Alavi is the Minister of Intelligence, in charge of seeking out and ​ eliminating terrorist groups. He has held this position since 2013. Previously he was the head of the political and ideological body of the Iranian Army. Mohammed Bathaei- Mohammed Bathaei is an educator and the Minister of Education. He was ​ trained in education at Shahid Rajee Teacher Training University and was a teacher for many years before becoming the vice education minister in 2014. Chief of Staff - Mahmoud Vaezi - He is the current deputy for Iran’s Center for Strategic Research for the departments of International Relations and Foreign Policy. He is Iran’s face and representative in the absence of the president. Minister of Defense - Amir Hatami - Amir Hatami currently holds the position of Brigadier General in the Irani army and is one of the most respected and influential members of the armed forces. Minister of Foreign Affairs - Mohammed Javad Zarif He has been the voice of Iran on multiple international platforms and was the permanent delegate of Iran to the United Nations from 2002 to 2007. He has been part of many deals Iran has made over the years with other foreign powers. Jurisprudence Guardian Council Member - Mohammed Yazdi A Twelver Shia Cleric and political activist who unofficially leads the Front of Islamic Revolutionary Stability. In most people’s eyes, he is Iran’s most powerful and most conservative Oligarch in Iran’s city of Qom which is a center for religious learning. Speaker of the Majlis - Abdullah Maseeh He is the speaker of the Majlis which makes him a highly respected individual in the far right and even respected by the liberals. Jurisprudence Guardian Council Member - Mohammed Yazdi Has been the head of Iran’s Judiciary system making him one of the most influential members of the Majlis holding lots of favors with important individuals. A strong opposition to Iran’s bilateral relations with the US. Minister of the Interior - Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli is an Iranian conservative politician and interior minister of Hassan Rouhani's government. He was the president of Supreme Audit Court from 2008 to 2013. Minister of Agriculture - Mahmoud Hojjati A prominent Iranian civil engineer and former Minister of Roads and Transport under ex-president Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Hojjati serves as the current Minister of Agriculture for Iran. He continues to be praised for his efforts on Iranian self-sufficiency in wheat production, decreasing water usage and prioritizing privatization. Reza Ardakanian - Minister of Energy Reza Ardakanian currently serves as the Minister of Energy after stepping down from the United Nations University FLORES program in Dresden, Germany. Currently, he has been working with the Iranian government to resolve the ongoing drought that poses to be Iran’s most pressing humanitarian challenge. Alireza Avayi - Minister of Justice Both a former public prosecutor and a judge, Alireza Avayi has been the current Minister of Justice since the Rouhani administration. While his position represents the demands of reformists, Avayi’s reputation has been tainted with a history of past human rights violations, particularly following the resignation of the former Minister of Justice, Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Minister of Culture - Abbas Salehi- (RAGHAV) Born in 1964, Mashhad, Iran, he is an Iranian scholar and journalist who is currently holding office as the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Vice Minister from 2013-2017 and acting cultural minster from 19th October to 1st November 2016. On 20th August 2017, he was made the minister of culture when President Rouhani got elected. Minister of Finance - Masoud Karbasian- (RAGHAV) Born in 1956,Ishafa,Iran, Masoud Karbasian is an Iranian economist who is the minister of finance from August 2017. Karbasian headed the Islamic Republic of Customs Administration. He holds a PhD,in commercial management and has served as a vice minister of heavy industries, petroleum, and commerce government ministries. Minister of Petroleum - Bijan Namdar Zanganeh JAHNAVI (JANU)- ​ Bijan Namdar Zanganeh is an Iranian politician He currently serves as the oil minister since in the cabinet led by Hassan Rouhani. He is also the head of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum ​ (GECF). Minister of Science - Mansour Gholami-(RAGHAV) ​ Born 1953 in Hamedan, Mansour Gholami is an Iranian professor, politician and the current Minister of Science, a position he held since 29 October 2017. He has B.S. and M.S. degrees in agriculture from Iranian universities and a Ph.D from Australia. He was Chancellor of Bu-Ali Sina University in two terms, first from 1997 until 2004 and the second from 2014 until 2017. Deputy Speaker of the Majlis - Moosa Manik JAHNAVI (JANU)- Moosa Manik, more ​ ​ popularly known as Reeko Moosa, is a prominent politician, actor, and businessman in the Republic of Maldives. ​ Minority Leader of the Majlis - Nihan Hussain Manik JAHNAVI (JANU)- Nihan Hussain ​ Manik is a well-renowned parliament member for the Republic of Maldives. He is currently the majority leader of the 18th Republic of Maldives, and has been holding this position for four years. .
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