Iran: World's Largest Untapped Frontier Market
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A WAY FORWARD with IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy
A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy THE SOUFAN CENTER FEBRUARY 2021 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy THE SOUFAN CENTER FEBRUARY 2021 Cover photo: Associated Press Photo/Photographer: Mohammad Berno 2 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY CONTENTS List of Abbreviations 4 List of Figures 5 Key Findings 6 How Did We Reach This Point? 7 Roots of the U.S.-Iran Relationship 9 The Results of the Maximum Pressure Policy 13 Any Change in Iranian Behavior? 21 Biden Administration Policy and Implementation Options 31 Conclusion 48 Contributors 49 About The Soufan Center 51 3 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BPD Barrels Per Day FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization GCC Gulf Cooperation Council IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IMF International Monetary Fund IMSC International Maritime Security Construct INARA Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act INSTEX Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods Force JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action MBD Million Barrels Per Day PMF Popular Mobilization Forces SRE Significant Reduction Exception 4 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Iran Annual GDP Growth and Change in Crude Oil Exports 18 Figure 2: Economic Effects of Maximum Pressure 19 Figure 3: Armed Factions Supported by Iran 25 Figure 4: Comparison of Iran Nuclear Program with JCPOA Limitations 28 5 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. -
Country Report Iran March 2017
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Country Report Iran Generated on November 13th 2017 Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square London E14 4QW United Kingdom _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For 60 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square The Economist Group London 750 Third Avenue E14 4QW 5th Floor United Kingdom New York, NY 10017, US Tel: +44 (0) 20 7576 8181 Tel: +1 212 541 0500 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7576 8476 Fax: +1 212 586 0248 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Hong Kong Geneva The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 1301 Cityplaza Four Rue de l’Athénée 32 12 Taikoo Wan Road 1206 Geneva Taikoo Shing Switzerland Hong Kong Tel: +852 2585 3888 Tel: +41 22 566 24 70 Fax: +852 2802 7638 Fax: +41 22 346 93 47 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] This report can be accessed electronically as soon as it is published by visiting store.eiu.com or by contacting a local sales representative. -
Federal Register/Vol. 83, No. 221/Thursday, November 15, 2018
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 221 / Thursday, November 15, 2018 / Notices 57529 (dba Ameron Missouri) for use as sub- placed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Street 8th, Ghaem Magham Farahari Ave., station. On October 22, 2018, the FAA Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the Tehran 1586868513, Iran; website determined that the request to release ‘‘SDN List’’) based on OFAC’s www.calcimin.com; Additional Sanctions property at the St. Louis Lambert determination that one or more Information—Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [IFSR] (Linked To: IRAN ZINC International Airport (STL) submitted applicable legal criteria were satisfied. MINES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY). by the Sponsor meets the procedural All property and interests in property Designated pursuant to section 1(c) of E.O. requirements of the Federal Aviation subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these 13224 for being owned or controlled by IRAN Administration and the release of the persons are blocked, and U.S. persons ZINC MINES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a property does not and will not impact are generally prohibited from engaging person determined to be subject to E.O. future aviation needs at the airport. The in transactions with them. 13224. 4. QESHM ZINC SMELTING AND FAA may approve the request, in whole DATES: See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION or in part, no sooner than thirty days REDUCTION COMPANY (a.k.a. QESHM section for applicable date(s). ZINC SMELTING AND REDUCTION after the publication of this Notice. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: COMPLEX), 20 Km Dargahan-to-Loft Road, The following is a brief overview of OFAC: Associate Director for Global Qeshm Island, Hormozgan, Iran; website the request: Targeting, tel.: 202–622–2420; Assistant www.gzsc.ir; Additional Sanctions St. -
Iran Case File (April 2021)
IRAN CASE FILE April 2021 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 Executive Summary .....................................................................................4 Internal Affairs ........................................................................................... 7 The Ideological File .............................................................................................8 1. Women and the “Political Man” ............................................................................... 8 2. Khatami and the Position of Women ......................................................................10 The Political File ............................................................................................... 12 1. The Most Notable Highlights of the Leaked Interview .............................................12 2. Consequences and Reactions .................................................................................13 3. The Position of the Iranian President and Foreign Ministry on the Interview ..........14 4. The Implications of Leaking the Interview at This Time..........................................15 The Economic File ............................................................................................. 16 1. Bitcoin’s Genesis Globally and the Start of Its Use in Iran ........................................16 2. The Importance of Bitcoin for Iran -
Biden, Congress Should Defend Terrorism Sanctions Imposed on Iran
Research memo Biden, Congress Should Defend Terrorism Sanctions Imposed on Iran By Richard Goldberg, Saeed Ghasseminejad, Behnam Ben Taleblu, Matthew Zweig, and Mark Dubowitz January 25, 2021 During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing to consider Antony Blinken’s nomination for secretary of state, Blinken was asked whether he believed it is in America’s national security interest to lift terrorism sanctions currently imposed on Iran, including sanctions targeting Iran’s central bank, national oil company, financial sector, and energy sector. “I do not,” Blinken responded. “And I think there is nothing, as I see it, inconsistent with making sure that we are doing everything possible – including the toughest possible sanctions, to deal with Iranian support for terrorism.”1 Bipartisan support for terrorism sanctions targeting Iran goes back to 1984, when the United States first designated the Islamic Republic as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Since then, every U.S. president2 – Republican or Democrat – and Congress have taken steps to reaffirm U.S. policy opposing Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and tying sanctions relief to Iran’s cessation of terror-related activities. President Joe Biden has pledged to rejoin the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), if Iran returns to “strict compliance” with the agreement.3 Terrorism sanctions on Iran, however, should not be lifted, even if the Biden administration opts to return to the deal, unless and until Iran verifiably halts its sponsorship of terrorism. This memorandum provides an overview of Iran’s past and ongoing involvement in terrorism-related activities, a review of longstanding bipartisan congressional support for terrorism sanctions on Iran, and a list of terrorism sanctions currently imposed on Iran that should not be lifted. -
The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC: a Major Iranian Intelligence Apparatus Dr
רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו רטל ( למ ו מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ו רטל ו ר The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC: A Major Iranian Intelligence Apparatus Dr. Raz Zimmt November 5, 2020 Main Argument The Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has become a major intelligence apparatus of the Islamic Republic, having increased its influence and broadened its authorities. Iran’s intelligence apparatus, similar to other control and governance apparatuses in the Islamic Republic, is characterized by power plays, rivalries and redundancy. The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC, which answers to the supreme leader, operates alongside the Ministry of Intelligence, which was established in 1984 and answers to the president. The redundancy and overlap in the authorities of the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization have created disagreements and competition over prestige between the two bodies. In recent years, senior regime officials and officials within the two organizations have attempted to downplay the extent of disagreements between the organizations, and strove to present to domestic and foreign audience a visage of unity. The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (ILNA, July 16, 2020) The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, in its current form, was established in 2009. The Organization’s origin is in the Intelligence Unit of the IRGC, established shortly after the Islamic Revolution (1979). -
Takfiris in Tehran: the Sectarian Face of Iranian Counterterrorism by Mehdi Khalaji
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2637 Takfiris in Tehran: The Sectarian Face of Iranian Counterterrorism by Mehdi Khalaji Jun 24, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mehdi Khalaji Mehdi Khalaji, a Qom-trained Shiite theologian, is the Libitzky Family Fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis While the severity of the Sunni extremist threat inside Iran is debatable, the regime's recent operations against suspected terrorists highlight its pattern of exploiting sectarian sentiment to bolster its regional adventurism. n June 14, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence launched a series of operations leading to the arrest of ten O "Wahhabi takfiri terrorists" in Tehran and three other provinces. Following the initial announcement of the crackdown on June 19, Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi provided further details about the captured suspects two days later. According to him, "their plan was to attack several crowded spots using remote bombs and car bombs"; they had prepared a list of fifty targets in all. Agents also reportedly seized about one kilogram of explosive material and used "sophisticated measures" to prevent the delivery of two tons more to "terrorists." Video clips claiming to show the sting have been posted to the website of Fars News , a media outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The actual scope and severity of this threat remain uncertain for now, but the rhetoric surrounding the regime's response holds clear domestic implications. In addition to treating terrorist infiltration as a political football in recent years, various officials have been using loaded words like "takfir" to rally the public behind Tehran's sectarian regional agenda. -
In the Name of God HISTORY
In The Name of God HISTORY The Packman Company was established in February 1975. In that year it was also registered in Tehran›s Registration Department. Packman›s construction and services company was active in building construction and its services in the early years of its formation.In 1976 in cooperation with (Brown Boveri and Asseck companies) some power plant mega projects was set up by the compa- ny.The company started its official activity in the filed of construction of High-Pressure Vessels such as Hot-Water Boilers , Steam Boilers , Pool Coil Tanks Softeners and Heat Exchangers from 1984. Packman Company was one of the first companies which supplied its customers with hot- water boilers which had the quality and standard mark.Packman has been export- ing its products to countries such as Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates and other countries in the region. It is one of the largest producers of hot-water and steam boilers in the Middle East. Packman Company has got s degree from the Budget and Planning Organization in construction and services in the membership of some important associations such as: 1. Construction Services Industry Association 2. Industry Association 3. Construction Companies› Syndicate 4.Technical Department of Tehran University›s Graduates Association 5. Mechanical Engineering Association 6. Engineering Standard Association Packman Product: Steam boiler ( Fire tube ) Hot water boiler ( Fire tube ) Combination boile Water pack boiler Steam boiler ( water tube ) Hot water boiler (water tube) Boiler accessories Pressure vessel Water treatment equipment SOME OF CERTIFICATION ARE Manufacturer of Boilers, Thermal Oil Heaters, Heat Exchangers, Pressure Vessels, Storage Tanks & Industrial Water Treatment Equipments ,.. -
Federal Register/Vol. 85, No. 11/Thursday, January 16, 2020
2814 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 11 / Thursday, January 16, 2020 / Notices SPECIAL PERMITS DATA—Continued Application Regulation(s) Number Applicant affected Nature of the special permits thereof 20988–N ....... I-k-i Manufacturing Co., Inc ..... 173.306(a)(5) ........................... To authorize the transportation in commerce of inner recep- tacles containing flammable gas that are eligible for the lim- ited quantity exception in 49 CFR 173.306(a)(5). (modes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). 20990–N ....... Psc Custom Lp ........................ 172.101(i)(3) ............................ To authorize the transportation in commerce of methane gas in nurse tanks. (mode 1). 20991–N ....... Veolia ES Technical Solutions 173.51, 173.54(a), 173.56(b), To authorize the one-time, one-way transportation of unap- LLC. 173.21(b). proved cartridges for tools for the purpose of disposal. (mode 1). 20992–N ....... Daicel Safety Systems Amer- 173.302a(a)(1), 178.65(c)(3) ... To authorize the manufacture, marking, sale, and use of non- icas, Inc. DOT specification cylinders (pressure vessels) for use as components of automobile vehicle safety systems. These pressure vessels may be charged with non-toxic, non-lique- fied gases or mixtures thereof. (modes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). [FR Doc. 2020–00604 Filed 1–15–20; 8:45 am] interests in property subject to U.S. 6. PEREZ LINARES, Conrado Antonio, BILLING CODE 4909–60–P jurisdiction of the following persons are Trujillo, Venezuela; DOB 24 May 1982; blocked under the relevant sanctions Gender Male; Cedula No. V–15584063 (Venezuela) (individual) [VENEZUELA]. authorities listed below. Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii)(C) of DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Individuals: E.O. -
Leadership Divided? Nima Gerami
The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate LEADERSHIP DIVIDED? NIMA GERAMI LEADERSHIP DIVIDED? The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate NIMA GERAMI The Washington Institute for Near East Policy www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 134 | February 2014 The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2014 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Tehran newspaper headlines following signing of the Joint Plan of Action in Geneva. Design: 1000 Colors Contents Acknowledgments | v Executive Summary | vii 1. Introduction | 1 2. Limits on Iran’s Nuclear Debate: Secrecy and Self-Censorship | 3 3. Contextualizing Nuclear Decisionmaking: The Key Stakeholders | 9 4. The Political Landscape: Elite Factionalism and the Nuclear Debate | 19 5. Critical Junctures: Internal Divisions and Nuclear Policy Shifts | 31 6. Conclusion: Lessons Learned | 40 About the Author | 42 Figures Fig 1. Overview of Nuclear Decisionmaking in Iran | 11 Table 1. Formal Members of the Supreme National Security Council | 12 Acknowledgments I would like to express my gratitude to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, particularly Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt, and Mehdi Khalaji, for their encouragement, insights, and support during the preparation of this study. -
Country Report Iran May 2017
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Country Report Iran Generated on November 13th 2017 Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square London E14 4QW United Kingdom _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For 60 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square The Economist Group London 750 Third Avenue E14 4QW 5th Floor United Kingdom New York, NY 10017, US Tel: +44 (0) 20 7576 8181 Tel: +1 212 541 0500 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7576 8476 Fax: +1 212 586 0248 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Hong Kong Geneva The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 1301 Cityplaza Four Rue de l’Athénée 32 12 Taikoo Wan Road 1206 Geneva Taikoo Shing Switzerland Hong Kong Tel: +852 2585 3888 Tel: +41 22 566 24 70 Fax: +852 2802 7638 Fax: +41 22 346 93 47 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] This report can be accessed electronically as soon as it is published by visiting store.eiu.com or by contacting a local sales representative. -
Iran Equity Guide 2015 Turquoise Partners - Firouzeh Asia
Iran Equity Guide 2015 Turquoise Partners - Firouzeh Asia About Turquoise Partners and Firouzeh Asia Turquoise Partners is an investment group based in Iran. Turquoise creates financial products and offers financial services to select clients and investors who are interested in the Iranian market. Having a qualified and diverse management team with a wealth of international expertise enables Turquoise to benefit from coupling a network of global know-how with an enviable reputation for local knowledge and professionalism. Firouzeh Asia is the brokerage arm of Turquoise Partners Group which, as a fully licensed brokerage acquired by Turquoise Partners Group in 2011, offers various brokerage and investment banking services to its clients. Iran Equity Guide 2015 - Tehran Stock Exchange Top 30 Equities First edition Date produced: May 2015 Turquoise Partners No. 10, 7th St. Khaled Eslamboli (Vozara) Ave. - Tehran, Iran Tel : +98 21 887 26 681 Fax : +98 21 887 26 680 Email : [email protected] To find out more about Turquoise Partners, visit our website at: www.turquoisepartners.com Firouzeh Asia Brokerage 5th Flr. No. 11, Mirza Hasani St. Ghaem Magham Farahani Ave. - Tehran, Iran Tel : +98 21 881 06 106 Fax : +98 21 881 07 746 Email : [email protected] Production team: Radman Rabii - VP International Clients Tina Alaei - International Clients Representative Ali Karbalaee - International Department Research Analyst © 2015 All rights reserved 2 Turquoise Partners - Firouzeh Asia Table of Contents: 4 Country Overview 6 Resources