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The Labor Force Experience of Women from 'Generation X'
Women from ‘‘Generation X' The labor force experience of women from ‘Generation X’ Women aged 25 to 34 years in 2000 participated in the labor force in greater proportions, were more educated, earned more, and generally enjoyed more labor market benefits than their counterparts 25 years earlier; moreover, the “earnings gap” between young women and men narrowed substantially over the period Marisa DiNatale uring the 1960s and 1970s, legislation years had completed 4 or more years of col- and and changing social mores dramatically lege, compared with 18 percent 25 years Stephanie Boraas Daltered the choices young women had earlier. about their futures. Girls growing up during this • Young women have substantially closed period were influenced both by the conventions the “earnings gap” with their male coun- of their parents’ generation and by the new op- terparts since 1979 (the first year for which portunities that were becoming available to them. comparable earnings data are available In contrast, girls born in later years grew up in an from the CPS). They earned 82 percent as era in which women often were expected to com- much as young men in 2000 for full-time bine market work1 with family responsibilities. work, compared with 68 percent in 1979. Consequently, women who were aged 25 to 34 years in 2000 had a markedly different relation- • Married women aged 25 to 34 years—par- ship to the labor market than did their counter- ticularly those who had children—were far parts in 1975. more likely to be in the labor force in 2000 The first part of this article focuses on the than 25 years earlier. -
Travelling Law
Draft: cite only with authors permission Craig Jones1 Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Travelling Law Targeted Killing, Lawfare and the Deconstruction of the Battlefield Striking Origins Above the Palestinian village of Beit Sahour on the morning of November 9th 2000 an Israeli Air Force (IAF) helicopter could be heard. Then, an explosion. The Jeep of Hussein Abiyat went up in flames, and with it the senior member of Fatah. The anti-tank missile killed Abiyat and two innocent elderly women. Collateral damage. Later that day, two months after the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Israeli military publically assumed responsibility for the strike: “During an operation initiated by the IDF, in the area of the village of Beit Sahour, missiles were launched from Air Force helicopters towards the vehicle of a senior activist of the Fatah Tanzim. The pilots reported the target was accurately hit. The activist was killed and his deputy, who was with him, was injured."1 The announcement marked the beginning of Israel’s official assassination policy. The justification and legal contention was that Israel had entered what IDF lawyers called “an armed conflict short of war”2 and Israel was thus entitled to target and kill enemy individuals as permitted by the rules of war. Though it might now seem difficult to believe, the European Union and the U.S. condemned the attacks and rejected the Israeli legal justification. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw claimed that the assassinations were "unlawful, unjustified and self-defeating"3. The E.U. said the policy amounted to "extrajudicial killings", while U.S. -
Volume XV, Issue 1 February 2021 PERSPECTIVES on TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 1
ISSN 2334-3745 Volume XV, Issue 1 February 2021 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 1 Table of Content Welcome from the Editors...............................................................................................................................1 Articles Bringing Religiosity Back In: Critical Reflection on the Explanation of Western Homegrown Religious Terrorism (Part I)............................................................................................................................................2 by Lorne L. Dawson Dying to Live: The “Love to Death” Narrative Driving the Taliban’s Suicide Bombings............................17 by Atal Ahmadzai The Use of Bay’ah by the Main Salafi-Jihadist Groups..................................................................................39 by Carlos Igualada and Javier Yagüe Counter-Terrorism in the Philippines: Review of Key Issues.......................................................................49 by Ronald U. Mendoza, Rommel Jude G. Ong and Dion Lorenz L. Romano Variations on a Theme? Comparing 4chan, 8kun, and other chans’ Far-right “/pol” Boards....................65 by Stephane J. Baele, Lewys Brace, and Travis G. Coan Research Notes Climate Change—Terrorism Nexus? A Preliminary Review/Analysis of the Literature...................................81 by Jeremiah O. Asaka Inventory of 200+ Institutions and Centres in the Field of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Research.....93 by Reinier Bergema and Olivia Kearney Resources Counterterrorism Bookshelf: Eight Books -
“A Licenced Troubleshooter” James Bond As Assassin
“A Licenced Troubleshooter” James Bond as Assassin ROGER PAULY If a pollster were to ask the average person on the street “What does James Bond do?” the response would almost certainly be that he is a spy. his is the most ba! sic defnition of the dashing British literary and "lm hero. But is it accurate? #o Bond$s activities represent spying or something else? %ecent studies have borne fruit by looking at the character of Bond outside of the basic parameters of the “spy” persona. &or example, )atharina *agen +,-./0 analysed Bond as a pirate; while #avid 2egram +,-./0 viewed him through the lens of an extreme athlete. 3f particular interest to this essay is Mathew edesco$s observation5 “6t7here$s no getting around it 8 James Bond is an assassin” +,--9( .,-0. edesco does not e'! plore this point in depth however( since his study is primarily devoted to the moral ethics of killing and torture. &urthermore, his characterisation of James Bond as an assassin is a decided anomaly in Bond scholarship and the spy classi! "cation remains predominant. &or example, Liisa &unnell and )laus #odds refer to Bond as a “British super spy” in a recent work +,-.;( ,.<0. his article will de! velop more fully edesco$s brief identi"cation by directly exploring the historical roots of Bond as an assassin. argeting key individuals for murder is an ancient and well-established el! ement of political and military history( and the Second World War was no e'cep! tion. In his capacity as an intelligence ofcer( Ian &leming had knowledge of ?l! Roger Pauly is /n Asso0i/*e Pro1essor o1 2is*or3 /* *he Uni5ersi*3 o1 ,en*r/l Ar6/ns/s% 2e is mos*ly 6nown 1or his 7or6 on *he his*or3 o1 1ire/rms bu* 4/s /lso wri**en on su('ec*s /s di5erse /s 8/r0us G/r5e39 8/u 8/u9 /n+ Mi- ami Vice% Volume 4 · Issue 1 · Spring 2021 ISSN 2514 21!" DOI$ 10%24"!!&'bs%)" Dis*ribu*ed under ,, -Y 4%0 U. -
THE PREVALENCE of GUILE: Deception Through Time and Across Cultures and Disciplines
2 February 2007 THE PREVALENCE OF GUILE: Deception through Time and across Cultures and Disciplines by Barton Whaley “The Game is so large that one sees but a little at a time.” —Kipling, Kim (1901), Chapter 10 Foreign Denial & Deception Committee National Intelligence Council Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 2007 -ii- CONTENTS Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... iv INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 1. In a Nutshell: What I Expected & What I Found 2. Force versus Guile 3. The Importance of Guile in War, Politics, and Philosophy PART ONE: OF TIME, CULTURES, & DISCIPLINES ................................................. 11 4. Tribal Warfare 5. The Classical West 6. Decline in the Medieval West 7. The Byzantine Style 8. The Scythian Style 9. The Renaissance of Deception 10. Discontinuity: “Progress” and Romanticism in the 19th Century 11. The Chinese Way 12. The Japanese Style 13. India plus Pakistan 14. Arabian to Islamic Culture 15. Twentieth Century Limited 16. Soviet Doctrine 17. American Roller-coaster and the Missing Generation 18. Twenty-First Century Unlimited: Asymmetric Warfare Revisited PART TWO: LIMITATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF DECEPTION ............................ 58 19. Biological Limitations: Nature & Nurture 20. Cultural Limitations: Philosophies, Religions, & Languages 21. Social Limitations: Ethical Codes and Political -