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In Defence of Leninism

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In Defence of Leninism In Defence of Leninism John Molyneux The contemporary defence of Leninism mean he still matters, matters involves two tasks: first, the defence of to the bourgeoisie and matters the political record of the historical Lenin; for socialist practice today. second the demonstration of the continu- ing relevance and applicability of Lenin's The single most serious chal- key political ideas today. This article will lenge to the world capitalist or- mainly focus on the second task but I will der in its whole history was begin with a few remarks about the first. that posed by the Russian Rev- olution of 1917 and the interna- tional revolutionary wave that followed in its wake. For a few short years the survival of the system literally hung by a thread and if we were to iden- tify a single moment on which the fate of humanity hinged and when history turned, it would be the failure of the Ger- man Revolution in 1923. Obvi- ously there can be no certainty in such matters, but if the Ger- man Revolution had succeeded there is an excellent chance that there would have been no Stalin, no Hitler and a fair chance that today we would be living in a socialist society. Lenin symbolises the Russian Revolution and that historical moment. More than that, it was Lenin's politics and orga- nization that led the Russian 1 1. The historical Lenin Revolution to victory . As I have written elsewhere: Lenin matters. I don't mean For this reason it has always been he mattered in Russian history especially important to the bourgeoisie or in the history of the twenti- and its academic apologists to discredit eth century - that's obvious. I Lenin. This has involved a fair amount of 1John Molyneux, `Lih's Lenin', http://johnmolyneux.blogspot.com/2006/11/lihs-lenin- review-of-lars-t-lih-lenin.html 27 personal character assassination2 but the peasantry; Stalin imposed it at the main charge has been that Leninism led, cost of millions of lives. This list more or less inevitably, to Stalinism and could be continued almost indefi- that the principal factor in this continuity nitely. was the Leninist Party. Crafted by many hands over the years, ranging from former 2. There was very little continuity in Mensheviks to American and British cold terms of personnel between the Bol- war `scholars', this argument has achieved shevik leadership in Lenin's day and a remarkable consensus right across the po- the party leadership under Stalin. In litical spectrum from right wing conserva- October 1917, just before the insur- tives through liberals and social democrats rection, the party central committee to anarchists. In their own way even Stal- elected a Political Bureau of seven - inist communists agreed. Trotskyists were Bubnov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Lenin, practically the only dissenters. But ma- Sokolnikov, Stalin, Trotsky. Only jorities, even large ones, are frequently one survived - Stalin, who murdered wrong and there are powerful factual and the rest with the exception of Lenin. theoretical arguments against what I shall Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Smilga, call the Lenin/Stalin continuity thesis. Preobrazhensky, Shlyapnikov, Py- First the facts: atakov, Radek, Krestinsky were all leading members of the CC in 1. In terms of their political ideas and Lenin's day and all played impor- policies there was a vast gulf between tant roles in the party, the revolution Lenin and Stalin. Lenin was a strict and the Civil War; all were killed by internationalist and discounted the Stalin in the purges. As were many possibility of socialism in one coun- thousands of other prominent Old try; Stalin adopted socialism in one Bolsheviks and Communists. When country and encouraged Russian na- Trotsky said Stalinism was divided tionalism. Lenin was an egalitar- from Bolshevism by `a river of blood' ian opposed to privileges for bureau- it was literally true. crats and party leaders; Stalin sys- tematically encouraged such inequal- 3. Nearing the end of his life, in late ities. Lenin detested racism and anti- 1922, Lenin turned against Stalin, semitism; Stalin made subtle and broke off relations with him and was not-so-subtle use of it. Lenin pas- looking to remove him from his posi- sionately defended the rights of op- tion as party General Secretary, as pressed nations to self determination part of an overall struggle against (including directly against Stalin); growing bureaucracy in the party Stalin crushed these rights. Lenin and the state. was absolutely in favour of women's emancipation; Stalin made a point 4. The Bolshevik Party functioned of restoring the traditional family. highly democratically, from its foun- Lenin was opposed to forcing the dation to well after the revolution collectivization of agriculture on the - at least until 1921, when factions 2The idea that Lenin was, from the start, bent on personal power has always struck me as silly. If as a young man in Tsarist Russia in 1893 your aim was maximum personal power you would join the Tsarist bureaucracy, not as Lenin did, the Emancipation of Labour Group, with about 30 members and no prospect of getting anywhere except Siberia. 28 were banned, and in many respects Russia which argued that socialists should until in 1923. At no point was it confine themselves to supporting workers' in any way the personal dictatorship economic demands) in which he `bent-the- of Lenin, who was quite often out- stick'. Moreover Lars Lih, in a work of voted - for example on participating monumental scholarship, Lenin Rediscov- in Duma elections in 1907, on unity ered - 'What is to Be Done?' in Con- with the Mensheviks in 1910, on boy- text, comprehensively refuted the notion cotting the Democratic Conference that Lenin had a negative attitude to the in September 1917, and on post- working class. On the contrary, Lih shows, poning elections to the Constituent with an abundance of evidence, that Lenin Assembly in December 1917. On was consistently the most enthusiastic of a number of crucial occasions when all the Russian Marxists about the politi- Lenin did get his way, it was only cal capacities and potential of the Russian after vigorous debate in which he working class. succeeded in winning a majority to It should also be noted that as well his point of view; for example over as being historically false, the proposition breaking with the Provisional Gov- that a whole social order of the dimensions ernment and orienting on workers' and duration of Stalinist Russia (and re- power in April 1917, on launching member similar regimes were established the Insurrection in October 1917 and across Eastern Europe, China, North Ko- on signing the Brest-Litovsk Peace in rea etc) could be `based on' or `caused by' January 1918. And in each of these a `theory' developed thirty years earlier is, cases Lenin's victory was not just a in fact, crude and rampant idealism. It matter of his personal authority or holds no more water than the notion that the power of his arguments but the capitalism was based on or caused by the fact that over a period of time they doctrines of John Calvin or Adam Smith, were seen to correspond to the objec- or that we that we can explain the nature tive logic of events. of Nazi society mainly by means of Mein The theory: Kampf . The academic myth that Leninism was What is required is rather a histori- elitist and authoritarian from the start as cal materialist analysis which takes as its demonstrated by his 1901 statement in point of departure the development of the What is to Be Done? that `socialism has forces and relations of production in Rus- to be brought to the working class from sia and internationally and then examines the outside' is been answered many times3. the class forces at work in Russia after The formulation, taken directly from Karl the revolution and the struggle between Kautsky, was indeed 'biased therefore er- them. What such an analysis shows is roneous' as Trotsky put it4. but it was re- that in 1917 the material basis for social- vised by Lenin in 1905 and not at all typi- ism, in terms of the level of economic de- cal of his thought - indeed it was never re- velopment and the strength of the work- peated in his later work and he specifically ing class, existed internationally and espe- cautioned that What is to Be Done? was cially in Western Europe and North Amer- a polemic against `economism'(a trend in ica, but it did not exist in Russia taken by 3 See for example, John Molyneux, Marxism and the Party, London 1978, Chs 2 and 3, and Tony Cliff, Lenin:Building the Party, London 1975, especially Ch.4. 4L. Trotsky, Stalin, London 1968, p58. 29 itself. This was common ground among all Of course, on this basis the actions of the Russian Marxists including both Lenin the Bolshevik Party and the deeds and and Trotsky; as Lenin put it with charac- ideas of Lenin are both factors that play teristic bluntness, `It is the absolute truth a role in the whole process and, provided that without a German revolution we are they are not taken as the starting point of doomed.'5 the account, need to be assessed. Lenin's strategic orientation, as made clear during Moreover, if the material prerequisites the debate over whether to sign the ex- for socialism were lacking in Russia in1917, tremely onerous peace terms imposed at the situation rapidly got much, much worse Brest Litovsk in late 1917, was to take such due to the Civil War inflicted on Rus- measures as were necessary for the revolu- sia by the alliance of Western imperial- tion to survive until such as time as the ism and the White Guard generals.
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