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2017 Annual Assessment - Jewish People Policy Institute

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT The Situation and Dynamics of the Jewish People 2017 5777

The Rise of Nationalism vs. Globalization

Shi ing Trends in the West The U.S. Election and Inner Polarization The Western Wall Controversey

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE (Established by the Jewish Agency for Israel) Ltd. (CC) www.jppi.org.il Givat Ram Campus • P.O.B. 39156 Jerusalem 9139101 [email protected] Tel: 972-2-5633356 • Fax: 972-2-5635040

ISBN 978-965-7549-15-5 Partners and Members Board of Directors and Professional About JPPI of the General Meeting: Guiding Council:

Sandy Baklor and Arlene Kaufman Co-Chairs The Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) is an independent professional policy planning think tank Stuart Eizenstat incorporated as a private non-profit company in Israel. The mission of the Institute is to ensure the thriving David Breakstone Dennis Ross of the Jewish people and the Jewish civilization by engaging in professional strategic thinking and planning as Deputy Chairman of JAFI on issues of primary concern to world Jewry. Located in Jerusalem, the concept of JPPI regarding the Jewish Associate Chair people is global, and includes aspects of major Jewish communities with Israel as one of them, at the core. Lester Crown and Charles Goodman Leonid Nevzlin on behalf of Crown Family Philanthropies JPPI’s activities are action-oriented, placing special emphasis on identifying critical options and analyzing their Members of the Board William Davidson Foundation potential impact on the future. To this end, the Institute works toward developing professional strategic and Elliott Abrams long-term policy perspectives exploring key factors that may endanger or enhance the future of the Jewish Nathan and Frances Kirsh Sandy Baklor People. JPPI provides professionals, decision-makers, and global leaders with: on behalf of the Kirsh Family Foundation Yohanna Arbib Irwin Cotler • Surveys and analyses of key situations and dynamics Irina Nevzlin Wendy Fisher • “Alerts” to emerging opportunities and threats on behalf of Nadav Foundation Sami Friedrich • Assessment of important current events and anticipated developments Robert Kapito and Jeffrey Schoenfeld Misha Galperin • Strategic action options and innovative alternatives on behalf of UJA Federation of New York Eric Goldstein • Policy option analysis Dan Halperin • Agenda setting, policy recommendations, and work plan design Michael Siegal Steve Hoffman as Chairman of the JAFI Board of Governors Alan Hoffmann JPPI's publications address six main areas of Jewish People challenges and well-being: Geopolitics Ratner Family Vernon Kurtz Impacting World Jewry; Community Bonds; Identity and Identification; Demography; Material Bernard-Henri Lévy Resources; and, Intellectual and Cultural Achievement. A full set of major publications can be found on Natan Sharansky Glen Lewy our website: www.JPPI.org.il. as Chairman of the JAFI Executive Judit Bokser Liwerant JPPI is unique in dealing with the future of the Jewish people as a whole within a methodological David Silvers Isaac Molho framework of study and policy development. Its independence is assured by its company articles, as Chairman of the JAFI Budget Steven Nasatir with a board of directors co-chaired by Ambassadors Stuart Eizenstat and Dennis Ross - both have and Finance Committee Jehuda Reinharz served in the highest echelons of the U.S. government, and Leonid Nevzlin in Israel - and composed Doron Shorer of individuals with significant policy experience. The board of directors also serves as the Institute’s The Judy and Michael Steinhardt Foundation Jerry Silverman Professional Guiding Council. Michael Steinhardt Our thanks to UJA Federation of New York, Marc Utay The Jewish Federations of North America, Aharon Yadlin The Jewish Federation of St. Louis, The Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, President and Founding Director The Jewish Federation of Cleveland, Avinoam Bar-Yosef Art Samberg, Mike Segal and Wilf Family, Projects Coordinator Alex Grass z"l and Jack Kay z"l Ita Alcalay for their support. Founding President (Emeritus) Yehezkel Dror Annual Assessment 2017 5777

PROJECT HEAD Dr. Shlomo Fischer

contributors Avinoam Bar-Yosef, Yossi Chen, Chaya Ekstein, Dan Feferman, Matthew Gerson Avi Gil, Inbal Hakman, Michael Herzog, Dov Maimon, Gitit Paz-Levi, Steven Popper, Uzi Rebhun, Shmuel Rosner, John Ruskay, Noah Slepkov, Shalom Salomon Wald

JPPI, Givat Ram Campus, P.O.B 39156, Jerusalem 9139101, Israel Telephone: 972-2-5633356 | Fax: 972-2-5635040 | www.jppi.org.il

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be translated, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without express written permission from the publisher. Printed and Distributed by the Jewish People Policy Institute

Graphic Design: Lotte Design Cover Design: Shlomit Wolf, Lotte Design

ISBN 978-965-7549-18-6 Table of Contents

Introduction by Stuart Eizenstat and Dennis Ross ...... 5 PART 1: Suggested Policy Directions Integrated ‘Net’ Assessment Recommended Policy Directions ...... 13 2017 Integrated Net Assessment ...... 15 Selected Indicators of World Jewry – 2017...... 32 PART 2: Dimensions of Jewish Well-Being Geopolitics The Geopolitical Landscape - Growing Uncertainty in light of the Trump Presidency . . . . . 39 JPPI’s 2017 Brainstorming Conference – Integrative Summary ...... 67 Comprehensive Three-Dimensional Anti-Semitism Index ...... 85 Demography Israelis Abroad ...... 97 Bonds Within and Between Communities Putting the Kotel Decision in Context – Implications and Steps Forward ...... 117 2017 Structured Jewish World Dialogue – Interim Report ...... 130 Identity Formation and Expression The Rise of Orthodoxy and Political-Cultural Polarization within the Jewish Community in the U.S...... 131 The Ongoing Debate Concerning Jewish Identity, Jewish Marriage Patterns, and Jewish Children ...... 143 Re-Emergence of a Diasporistic Jewish Identity in Europe ...... 147 Material Resources Jewish People Ways and Means ...... 157 People of the Book Creativity and the Factors that Drive Intellectual and Cultural Achievements ...... 173 PART 3: Feature Articles The Arabs of Israel between “Israelization” and “Palestinization” ...... 195 Introduction by 1 Stuart Eizenstat and Dennis Ross

The idea of doing an Annual Assessment of the and Trump votes. The reality of globalization – state of the Jewish people was novel when JPPI driven by technologies that continue to accelerate first decided to produce it 14 years ago. While the pace of change, generate and exploit big the scope of each year’s report has changed and data, create new supply chains, and shrink the the measures used to evaluate basic trends have planet – cannot be denied or wished away. But been developed, the annual assessment has the social and economic dislocations created by provided a good yardstick to judge how Israel and globalization have not been sufficiently taken into the Diaspora fared in the preceding year. Initially, account, particularly in the Western democracies. at least, there was not an expectation that there Not surprisingly, distrust of elites and populist, would necessarily be dramatic changes from year nationalist appeals to those most negatively to year – even though the metrics used to make affected by the impact of globalization have been judgments (geopolitical realities, demographics, the result. identity and identification, inter-communal Traditionally, the emergence of populism and its bonds, and resources) offered the possibility of xenophobic companion have been accompanied identifying such changes or developments if they by a growth in anti-Semitism. JPPI held a had taken place. brainstorming conference to discuss the current That said, 2016-2017 certainly stands out as a year international setting, the social, economic, of surprising developments. The backlash against political, and ideological shifts in the West, globalization figured prominently in the Brexit indicators of increased anti-Semitism, and how

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 5 Israel and the Diaspora could deal with potential “differentiate between developing a good working new dangers and leverage possible opportunities. relationship with the Trump administration and Six main areas posing policy dilemmas and projecting an ideological affinity to it.” challenges to decision-makers in Israel and the Other recommendations relate to particular Diaspora communities were identified in the developments in Israel and the United States. conference discussions and are included in this Given the pace of scientific change in today’s year’s assessment. One key factor that stands out world – and the hard and soft power that accrues is that the liberal international order is under to Israel because it is seen as the “start-up nation” threat, raising questions about whether the -- it is essential that Israel continue to develop the United States will continue to play the role it has human resources that keeps it developing cutting- in preserving that order, the need to take account edge technologies. To that end, it is essential that of the rise of non-Western powers, the importance the State of Israel “fulfill governmental resolutions of formulating a policy toward the rise of far- mandating all schools” include “a high level of core right parties in Europe, and positioning Israel and curriculum instruction.” Diaspora communities in light of increasing polarization in Western societies. As for the United States, the Assessment points out that the demographic profile of the Jewish The recommendations in this year’s assessment community is shifting in light of the “growing reflect these considerations. For example, in the weight of the Haredi community.” Given that, Trump administration one sees proponents of the Assessment recommends that the Israeli the U.S. continuing to fulfill its responsibilities government “encourage the leadership of internationally and those more prone to favor this community to engage” far more with the U.S. withdrawal from commitments – with mainstream Jewish organizations, and that those Israel’s deterrence far stronger in a world where organizations seek to increase the involvement America remains powerful and willing to stand of the Ultra-Orthodox in communal life and against aggression. Hence, one recommendation leadership. in the Assessment suggests that Israel encourage those voices in the administration “calling for In this connection, increasing the involvement the United States to reassert itself as the leader of the Haredi community in broader Jewish of the free world.” Similarly, given the intense communal life could affect one of the key political polarization in the U.S. today, another measures we use in the Annual Assessment. For recommendation calls for preserving Israel’s strict example, the state of intercommunal relations is bipartisan approach, ensuring that Israel does one of the barometers we use in evaluating how not become either a Republican or Democratic the Jewish people are doing – and in this year’s cause but remains an American interest. To that Assessment we have not changed our evaluation end, the Assessment suggests that Israel should of it. However, the shifting demographic weight

6 the jewish people policy institute of the Ultra-Orthodox has potentially major Evangelical Christians and some Catholics on both implications for the cohesion of the Jewish controversial domestic issues, like abortion, same community in the United States, the relationship sex marriage and gay rights, and on foreign policy of major Jewish organizations and the broader issues from the threat of Iran to support for Israel, Jewish community, and the relationship between including its settlement policy. the world’s largest Diaspora community and At a communal level, this has many advantages, the State of Israel: the growing influence of the and if they wished, the Orthodox community Orthodox communities in the U.S. and Israel, could help lead the broader Jewish community combined with the nationalist movement in Israel. into a greater engagement with the Jewish religion Although the 2013 Pew Research Center study and tradition, and with the State of Israel. But of American Jews indicates that only about 10 their greater numbers and influence also present percent of American Jews identify as Orthodox, Jewish Federations and other institutions with that number is growing. The Orthodox community a challenge, because most Orthodox Jews stay in the United States is becoming more numerous, within their own communities and institutions, due to higher birthrates and the attractiveness, and often do not become leaders and financial in a troubled world, of an emphasis on tradition, supporters of broader Jewish organizations. These and more influential, with growing prominence institutions are already buffeted by more secular in the business, legal and political communities, Jews, particularly younger Jews, who do not especially in the greater New York area. They identify with Jewish organizations. proudly emphasize their Orthodox way of life, The dilemmas are most evident at the political its values and traditions. They are increasingly level, with implications for the unity of the forming their own policy research institutions and American Jewish community, and for Israel. In the consulting firms. last four presidential elections, Orthodox voters As the Annual Assessment notes, this is a sea preferred Republican candidates, in contrast with change from the implicit liberal Jewish model non-Orthodox Jews who generally supported that has guided much of the Jewish community, Democratic, more liberal candidates. This came in which Jews were increasingly integrated into into stark relief in the 2016 presidential campaign, American society, but kept their Jewish identity when non-Orthodox Jews voted overwhelmingly more private. for Hillary Clinton, by over 70 percent, while almost The Orthodox community is generally more 40 percent of Orthodox Jews supported Donald politically, culturally, and socially conservative Trump. But in some Orthodox neighborhoods, than the majority of less traditional American he received over 50 percent support, and over 90 Jews. This has encouraged a political and percent in some Haredi neighborhoods. cultural identification and collaboration with

the jewish people policy institute 7 In the Trump administration, the Orthodox concern for minority rights, and for the two- community is represented in his own son-in-law state solution. These views are especially held by and senior adviser; his special representative for young Millennials. They must not be made to feel international negotiations, including the Middle they have to choose between their own liberal, East peace process; and the U.S. ambassador democratic principles and Israel. Likewise, they do to Israel. As more appointments are made in not hold the views of the dominant parties in the departments and agencies, we can anticipate Israeli coalition government. that of the Jewish appointees, there will likely be This creates a dilemma for many major a disproportionate percentage of Orthodox Jews. Jewish organizations. They should, and must, The Orthodox community is not only making maintain positive relationships with the Trump common cause with socially and politically administration, although many of their members conservative Evangelicals and Catholics, but may have other thoughts. with the conservative coalition government in Likewise, the more the Israeli government is seen Israel, which combines Orthodox and nationalist as implementing conservative policies and as parties, who support a one-state solution, and being unwilling to implement the compromise have less concern for minority rights in Israel and Jewish Agency Chairman Natan Sharansky the Palestinians in the territories. The rise of the negotiated to open a third, egalitarian, section at Orthodox segment of American Jewish society, is the Western Wall (Kotel), or acting contrary to mirrored by a similar phenomenon in Israel, with what many perceive to be liberal norms, the more the rise of the religious nationalist right. In 1990, it may alienate a significant segment of American the population share of Haredim in Israeli was a Jewry. mere 3 percent; today it is 10 percent and rising. Already for the more general American public, This creates a challenge to the triangular Israel for the first time in its history may become relationship between Washington, Jerusalem, a partisan issue. Among the grassroots, the decline and the American Jewish community. Trump’s in support for Israel is troubling. As the JPPI triumph and his support in Israel, and many of Annual Assessment notes, the deepening divide the actions by the Israeli government, are at odds between parts of the liberal Jewish community with the views of the majority of American Jews. and a conservative Israeli government requires The problem is that the overwhelming percentage sophisticated responses. of American Jews are non-Orthodox and many do not share the same worldview as the Orthodox There is no question that, in its early months, community in the U.S. or in Israel. the Trump administration has been friendlier to Israel than the Obama administration had been Among many, President Trump is highly perceived to be by many Israelis. That perception unpopular, rightly or wrongly; there is a greater has permitted the administration to take steps

8 the jewish people policy institute that have not drawn criticism from Israelis even Every annual assessment has offered insight though they reflect a continuation of Obama into the direction of Israel and the Jewish world, administration policies: the Trump administration and important recommendations to ensure recently signed a certification that Iran was that world Jewry thrives. In our view, this year’s complying with its nuclear obligations under Assessment may be one of the most important the JCPOA; the president signed the necessary JPPI has produced. In a world where the basic rules waiver to prevent the U.S. Embassy from moving of the game are now being questioned, in which to Jerusalem; and President Trump has not given the post-World War II institutions and global Israel an open door to unlimited settlement order are under siege, and the threat of boycotts expansion, though many within the Israeli hang over Israel, it is important that the Israeli government had expected him to do so. government and American Jewish leaders act with One of JPPI’s broad objectives has been to promote sophistication to build bridges of cooperation policies that enhance acceptance of pluralism between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox in Jewish life, and, in particular, to identify better communities within the U.S., and between the ways of fostering tolerance and accommodation of American Jewish community, the U.S. government, all the different streams of observance. Readers of and the Israeli government. this year’s Assessment will see that theme figures We believe that JPPI has the capability to help the prominently once again, especially as it relates to Diaspora communities and the Government of its emphasis on Jewish values. Israel constructively consider these challenges and formulate action oriented policies to overcome them successfully.

Dennis Ross and Stuart Eizenstat

the jewish people policy institute 9 PART 1

Suggested Policy Directions Integrated ‘Net’ Assessment

2 Recommended Policy Directions

1. JPPI recommends Israel be committed to also relates to advancing ties with foreign strictly maintaining bi-partisan support in right-wing governments who tolerate anti- North America. Considering the polarization Semitic elements and even encourage such trend in the United States, Israel is advised elements, as they make a distinction between to differentiate between developing a Israel and the Jewish People in the Diaspora. good working relationship with the Trump 3. The beginning of President Trump’s presidency administration and projecting an ideological has evinced contradictory evidence aﬃnity to it. It is highly recommended that concerning his determination to serve as the Israel maintain close relations with both major principal leader in the international arena. political parties, and make a parallel effort to It is to Israel's advantage to encourage those cultivate ties with liberal elements (minorities, voices within the administration calling for the millennials), in the general society and the United States to reassert itself as leader of the Jewish community even if they have a critical free world (with a special emphasis on Iran, view of its policies. Syria and the Israel-Palestinian negotiations.). 2. The Government of Israel is advised to weigh If America focuses on domestic affairs while the implications of its decisions for Jews in the neglecting its global leadership role, it could Diaspora and consider their concerns even harm Israel, encouraging other international when it seeks to advance its purely strategic actors to replace the U.S. in leading the peace and political interests. This recommendation process and erode the Israel’s deterrent power.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 13 4. Israel’s movement toward more market- to encourage the leadership of these groups oriented policies while also retaining several to engage with the activities of the general aspects of the prior centralized decision- organized Jewish community, and at the making structure may uniquely position it same time to encourage the major North as an exemplar of how it may be possible American Jewish organizations to increase to shepherd modernizing change while the involvement of the Orthodox and Ultra- maintaining social stability. The apparent Orthodox in general communal life and discontinuity between systems may be leadership. converted into a strength. The government is 8. Concerns in the U.S. about Israel’s living up advised to focus on human capital building as to liberal values (rule of law, liberty, justice, its main vehicle for fully effecting transition, democracy, religious pluralism, human especially in all levels of formal education. rights, and minority rights), should draw the 5. Jerusalem constitutes the central bond attention of decision makers as these values between the Jewish people and the State are an important component of Israel’s special of Israel. Israel should find a way to engage relationship with the United States. Diaspora Jews – including those who fear that Jerusalem is developing in “the wrong direction” – in shaping the future of the city so this powerful bond can be maintained. 6. Conservative and Reform Jewish groups worldwide should increase their investment in Israel with the aim of increasing the Reform and Conservative presence. The expanded funds should be invested in outreach and infrastructure, including expanding synagogues and community centers, high quality schools, kindergartens, and summer camps. 7. In recent years, the demographic profile of the Jewish community of North America is shifting in the light of the growing weight of the Orthodox and Haredi communities. The President of Israel, the Prime Minister and the Knesset should extend their best efforts

14 the jewish people policy institute 2017 Integrated Net Assessment 3 Geopolitics

A series of developments over the past year, chief M among them the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, join long-term trends T P currently underway that, to a certain extent, have improved Israel’s geopolitical position. However, this D T could change as a result of a possible problematic settlement in Syria, the uncertainty surrounding Geopolitics the Palestinian issue, regional instability, and the still unclear direction the emerging world order will Israel does not face an immediate regular take. In addition, President Trump’s contradictory military threat from a neighboring country actions and rhetoric and lack of a coherent or coalition of Arab countries, as it has foreign policy doctrine, have potentially negative in the past. Together with its strategic implications for Israel’s interests. strength and a sympathetic administration The United States – Trump’s rise to power brings in Washington, this opens a window of with it an American administration friendlier to opportunity for a strategic move that will Israel than its predecessor and enables “turning a ensure the character of Israel's future as new page” in relations with Israel’s most significant both Jewish and democratic. In light of all ally. After the strained relations of the Obama these factors, we are moving the needle administration, Trump’s visit to Israel four months moderately in a positive direction. into his presidency and the warmth and friendship he expressed signaled a positive turning point. Despite the visit’s harmonious atmosphere, central

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 15 issues at the heart of Israel’s strategic interests – The United States faces many challenges across the the settlement that is crystallizing in Syria, the globe, from the escalating nuclear threat posed by Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s continual regional North Korea to Putin’s aggressions and subversions aggression and possible noncompliance with the as he attempts to rebuild Moscow’s international nuclear agreement – could lead to frictions between standing. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Jerusalem and Washington down the road, and to this end, called for a “post-West world order” should not be ignored. Moreover, Israel faces other (February 2017). At this time, the relationship dilemmas, such as the degree to which it should between Washington and Moscow, although publically embrace the new president and the increasingly strained, has yet to take a clear shape. sentiments and ethos that helped get him elected. Nonetheless, the U.S. – Russia relationship is an The fact that most American Jews do not support essential shaping factor of the to the emerging this president only sharpens this dilemma. Given the 21st century world order. So, too, is America’s polarization inside the United States, Israel’s problem relationship with China, which continues to assert of maintaining bi-partisan support grows, as does itself internationally (One Belt, One Road initiative, the need to guard the Jerusalem – Washington – South China Sea, etc.). American Jewry triangular relationship. It is difficult to predict whether President Trump World Order – Ahead of the start of Trump’s will continuously consider a priority in keeping tenure, there were growing suspicions that the the United States at the top of the international United States, guided by a narrow definition of its order. American isolationism would be harmful to interests, would further isolate itself internationally Israel, possibly eroding its ability to project strength and limit its focus primarily to domestic matters. and deterrence. Europe’s internal cohesion crisis, Some observers predicted that America would aggravated by waves of migrants and deadly ISIS further relinquish the mantle of global leadership. terror attacks, further fogs the future direction The dozens of cruise missiles fired at a Syrian of the new order. Although ISIS is in decline, and military base in response to the use of chemical has lost important territorial holds, it maintains weapons by Assad’s military forces in Idlib (April its capacity to unleash terror attacks (in fact, it 2017), on the contrary, seemed to signal the becomes more reliant on international terrorism to new president’s determination to reestablish bolster its image as it suffers losses in Syria and Iraq). the American deterrence that had deteriorated The Peace Process – President Trump continues during the previous administration, and to act as to express his aspiration for the “ultimate deal” a leading power in the international arena. Yet, his that would settle the Israeli – Palestinian conflict announcement that the U.S. would pull out of the and bring peace between Israel and the broader Paris Climate Accord (June 2017) only exacerbated Arab world. Implementation of Trump’s promise to uncertainty about Trump’s commitment to world move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem leadership. was delayed so as not to hobble the chances

16 the jewish people policy institute of advancing peace negotiations. Continued Mediterranean. Such a corridor would constitute a American leadership of the peace process creates space for direct Iranian influence and also enhance an opportunity for Israel to advance an agreement Hezbollah’s power as a military surrogate of Iran. with a more sympathetic interlocutor. But it Israel’s security relationships with Egypt, Jordan, could also pressure Israel into painful concessions and the moderate Sunni states are expanding. Israel that would result in friction with the Trump is even seen as a partner and asset in the struggle administration, supportive as it may be. against key threats: Iran’s regional subversion, and The Palestinians are split both geographically radical Islamic terror. Iran’s path to a nuclear arsenal and organizationally, and a durable, genuine has been put on hold, even pushed back, but the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas is not threat has not been totally eradicated. The nuclear expected anytime soon. The governing systems in agreement relieved some of the pressure on Iran both Ramallah and Gaza dysfunctional (especially and allowed it to deepen the reach of its regional in Gaza). In the event that Abu Mazen (who is activities and influence, and it has scored gains in 82) resigns his presidency, a power struggle for Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Whereas Obama succession would likely erupt, possibly imperiling was willing to allow Iran a hand in shaping the new security cooperation with Israel. Recent changes regional order, and questioned Saudi Arabia’s value in the Hamas leadership and the revision of their as an asset, President Trump has demonstrably charter do not yet signal a substantive change. stood with the Sunni state against Iran. The combination of these factors taken together The situation in Syria continues to present Israel with the chasm between Israeli and Palestinian with considerable challenges, especially because positions, testify to the scope of the “ultimate deal” Iran has established itself as a key actor there – in challenge President Trump has taken on himself. such close proximity to Israel. With the help of U.S. abdication of its leadership role in the peace Russia and Iran, Assad is expanding the territory process would constitute a potential threat, as it under his control. This reality could bring Hezbollah would open the door to other international actors and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps very close to that are not as sympathetic to Israel. Israel’s Golan Heights border. Threats and Opportunities – At a time when Israel will need to continue rebuffing these the Middle East is wracked by turbulent violence, developments, including through enlisting the help Israel is not, as in the past, facing conventional of the United States and continued coordination military threats from a neighboring Arab state’s with Moscow. Until now, Israel has managed to regular army or a regional Arab coalition. However, build an effective working relationship with Russia this encouraging situation could change if Iran that allows it to protect its interests. Positioning succeeds in establishing a military presence in the the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems in Syria Syrian Golan and succeeds in its ambition to create highlights the caution Israel must exercise as a strategic corridor between Teheran and the it continues to intercept arms shipments to

the jewish people policy institute 17 Hezbollah without coming into conflict with rising powers of Asia and Africa. Narendra Modi’s Moscow. Although Hezbollah, Israel’s most state visit to Israel, the first visit ever of an Indian significant military threat, is mired in Syria, and prime minister, was a watershed in these growing Hamas is isolated and weakened, it is still possible relations. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to China that a round of conflict could break out with either (March 2017) reflected the same trend. Israel’s gas of them. Moreover, the “Lone Wolf” Intifada has finds, including the expectation of discovering and yet to fully subside and could take a new, more developing additional reserves, have generated deadly turn especially as it has assumed a religious leverage for relations and influence in the Eastern character (as seen on the Temple Mount in July Mediterranean (in early 2017 Israel began supplying 2017). gas to Jordan). Lastly, despite decreasing successes Israel’s relations with Turkey illustrate how volatile in eroding Israel’s standing through BDS and other the Middle East is; it is imperative that Israel handles de-legitimization activities, and Israel’s expanding itself cautiously and with strategic acumen. The capacity to rebuff them, Jerusalem remains reconciliation agreement with Ankara (June 2016) vulnerable to such attacks. UNESCO’s decisions to and the possibility of deepening the relationship disregard the historical Jewish connection to the (including gas exports) did not prevent President Temple Mount (October 2016) and to name the Erdogan from verbally berating Israel, blaming it Cave of the Patriarchs (Mearat HaMachpela) and for the “Judaification” of Jerusalem and accusing the Old City of Hebron as Palestinian Heritage Sites it of apartheid policies (May 2017). Despite the under severe threat of harm (July 7, 2017) make it possibility that regional actors will soften their clear that the battle against de-legitimization is not approach to Israel, Jerusalem found the massive yet won. $110 billion U.S. arms sale to Saudi Arabia (May Alongside the challenges and threats, Israel also 2017) disconcerting. Israel express it concern that has considerable opportunities: to improve its the deal could erode Israel’s Qualitative Military relationship with the United States; to deepen its Edge. Indeed, the improvement of America’s relationship with the moderate Sunni world; and relations with its traditional Arab allies in the region to implement a diplomatic initiative that would – a positive development from Israel’s perspective prevent Israel from becoming a bi-national state – could, in certain circumstances, come at Israel’s and losing its Jewish identity. The fact that Israel expense. is not facing military threats from a neighboring Arab state’s regular army, together with its strategic International Standing – Israel’s international standing draws from its military, economic, and strength and a sympathetic administration in strategic strength, as well as from its “soft power.” Washington, opens a window of opportunity for Israeli technologies (especially hi-tech, cyber, hydro a strategic move that will ensure the character of and agricultural technologies) bring it international Israel’s future as both Jewish and democratic. appeal. This has enhanced its relations with the

18 the jewish people policy institute 4 Demography

In Western societies today, demographic events and fertility and mortality patterns aggregate and processes tend to unfold slowly. Changes in and gain significant influence only after several the size of a population, scope of immigration, years. This is no different for the world’s Jewish population, concentrated mostly in Israel, the Americas, and Europe. Therefore, although Jewish M demographic patterns are stable overall, reflecting T P very moderate trends of growth and improvement along a few key measures, we have decided to D T leave the demographic gauge as is. Demography For 2016, approximately 100,000 individuals were added to the Jewish population of the world, which stands today at 14.5 million1. Changes In Western societies today, demographic in the size of the Jewish population worldwide events and processes tend to unfold highlight the growth of the number of Jews in slowly. Changes in populationsize, scope Israel and the numerical stability of Jews in the of immigration, and fertility and mortality United States (the two largest Jewish communities patterns aggregate and gain significant today). Indeed, according to Absorption Ministry influence only after several years. Therefore, statistics, the number of new immigrants to Israel although Jewish demographic patterns are in 2016 was 4000 individuals fewer than in 2015, stable overall, reflecting very moderate but higher than in either 2013 or 2014. trends of growth and improvement along a few key measures, we are leaving the The fertility rate among Jewish women in Israel demographic gauge unchanged. continues to rise: from 3.09 in 2014 to 3.11 in 2015. The migration balance of Israelis, namely

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 19 the number of those that leave minus the number the global Jewish population is expected to of those that return after spending more than grow to 16.1 million by 2050. The bulk of this one year abroad, rose from 6.8 thousand in 2014 growth will take place in Israel, where the Jewish to a loss of 7.8 thousand in 2015. Even the rate community is expected to increase to 8.2 million of emigration, that is the number of those that during this period. The number of U.S. Jews will, leave relative to the size of the Jewish population until mid-century, shrink by about 300,000 (to in Israel, climbed from 1.9 for every thousand 5.4 million), and is expected to remain stable residents in 2014 to 2.5 in 2015). throughout the rest of the Diaspora at about 2.5 It is noteworthy that, the Pew Research Center million Jews. recently published an update and expansion of its demographic projections, including in regard to the world Jewish population. For Israel, the Endnotes projection employed the halachic definition of who is Jewish, whereas for Diaspora Jews 1 Sergio DellaPergola. (Forthcoming). “World Jewish the criterion was self-definition. Assuming a Population, 2017”. American Jewish Year Book 2017. continuation of the recently prevailing patterns, Arnold Dhasefsy and Ira Sheskin (eds.). Springer.,

20 the jewish people policy institute Bonds Within and Between 5 Communities

The dynamics of Jewish bonds have changed in the last year. Long-term trends recognized in M previous years are still in place in in Israel and T P the Jewish world, but there have been a few major developments in the last, the three most D T notable are: 1) The election of Donald Trump. 2) The crisis in Israel-Diaspora relations in the Bonds wake of Israeli government decisions regarding the Kotel and conversion, which were perceived Donald Trump’s election, and trends such as provocations, especially by non-Orthodox as rising anti-Semitism bring a dimension Jews worldwide. 3) Unusual expressions of anti- of uncertainty to Israel–Diaspora Semitism in North America and the outrage relationsbecause their long-term influence they set off among American Jews. These is unclear. Israeli government decisions developments are impacting the relational regarding the Kotel and conversion have dynamics, especially between Israel and U.S. Jews. sharpenedIsrael–Diaspora tensions. In light of these decisions and their reactions, The most immediate and dramatic impact, at we are moving theneedle in a negative least in the short term, was the June 25, 2017 direction. Israeli cabinet decision to freeze the Kotel Compromise Agreement that had been struck in January 2016. At the same time, a new, more

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 21 onerous conversion law was proffered – a decision persistent problems remain: Israel’s political stance that has since also been frozen. Many Jewish concerning its relations with the Palestinians is leaders, especially but not exclusively in North anathema to many liberal Jews. Its impotence in America, interpreted these government actions resolving the Western Wall controversy continues as evidence that Israel does not give adequate to anger non-Orthodox Jews. A triumphalist consideration to their needs and perspectives. undertone of Orthodox Jews who feel that they As a result of the Kotel decision, a discussion grow in power both in Israel (as the current was ignited throughout the Jewish world on the political coalition maximizes their influence) and very nature and character of the bonds between in other communities (notably in the U.S., where Diaspora Jewry and the State of Israel. Orthodox Jews have more access and ties to the The most immediate impact Trump’s election new administration) have also contributed to has had is the reduced pressure on Israel from heightened tensions between Jewish communities. the U.S. administration. It also created a set Demographic trends in Diaspora communities of circumstances that caused the U.S. Jewish widen the gap between traditionally committed community to focus primarily on domestic Jews – who see strong ties with Israel as an American affairs. The polarization within the essential component of their identity – and more general American society following the results of distant Jews who do not have the same instinctive the November 2016 presidential election has not need for keeping ties with Israel strong. subsided, and is diverting more political energy The following table briefly describes developments toward domestic U.S. affairs. However, a Trump in 2016-17 that have contributed to either the administration decision to focus its attention strengthening or weakening of bonds between on an Israeli-Palestinians peace process could Jewish communities worldwide – with an alter that dynamic in the coming months in one emphasis on Israel-Diaspora bonds. of several possible directions: It could focus the spotlight again on Israel; it could enter Israel into a peace process that would improve its image. or difficulties in the peace negotiations could perhaps cause damage to Israel if she would be perceived as responsible for their failure. 2017 and 2018 provide Israel with opportunities to educate Jews around the world about its creation (70th anniversary) and great victory (50th anniversary) – and hence attempt to recover some of the sentiments that made Israeli and Diaspora Jews partners in building the Jewish state. Yet

22 the jewish people policy institute Developments Strengthening Bonds Developments Weakening Bonds

1 Donald Trump’s election makes criticism Trump’s election puts Israel and majority of Israel less a focal point perhaps because of U.S. Jews at odds: Israelis can work with of the overriding focus on the President Trump, liberal U.S. Jews find it hard to fathom. himself.

2 Growing expressions of anti-Semitism, Anti-Semitic incidents make public including in the U.S., strengthen the sense identification with Israel/ Jewish community of shared destiny, and dependence on less appealing. global Jewish unity.

3 The increase in the political power of the The strengthening of the Orthodox Orthodox community in the US, which community, both in Israel and the U.S. causes has strong ties to Israel (and to the Trump estrangement among non-Orthodox Jews. Administration). This was brought into sharp relief in the wake of the government decisions regarding the Kotel and conversion.

4 Israel’s two milestone anniversaries – 50 Israeli policies on many issues, including those years since the Six-Day War and 70 years related to the Palestinians, do not line up with since its establishment – provide an views of many Diaspora Jews (hence the Six- educational and emotional opportunity Day War anniversary could also an occasion for bonding. for dissent and controversy).

5 Continued Israeli excellence in different Some political developments in Israel seem fields (particularly hi-tech) contributes to alien to many Diaspora Jews. Notably its its positive image among Jews. legislation against NGOs that “delegitimize Israel”

As a result of these factors we are moving the needle in an unfavorable direction toward “troubled.”

the jewish people policy institute 23 6 Identity Formation and Expression

In the past year we have witnessed, in regard to One trend that seems to have intensified is the Jewish identity among Jews of the United States, declining Jewish middle. That is, non-Orthodox both the intensification of existing trends and the Jews who are affiliated with synagogues, religious emergence of new trends. denominations and Jewish organizations. This trend is expressed in declining numbers of Jews who belong to non-Orthodox denominations. M According to a recent study by PRRI, “America’s Changing Religious Identity,” since the Pew T P Center’s study of American Jews published in 2013 (“A Portrait of Jewish Americans”), The number D T of Jews belonging to the Reform movement has declined by 7 percent – from 35 percent in the Identity Pew Study to 28 percent in PRRI – and for the The decline of the Jewish Middle and Conservative movement, a decline of 4 percent. increased polarization within the Jewish The Conservative Movement now constitutes 14 community present critical challenges but percent of American Jews, just 4 percent more also opportunities for the Jewish people. than the Orthodox (10 percent). At the same In light of these contrasting trends, we are time, the number of Jews who identify as having leaving the identity and identification gauge no denomination is growing. The number of Jews unchanged. who answered that they are “just Jewish” was 37

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 25 percent as opposed to 30 percent who answered communities around the world. As written in that fashion in the Pew study. in JPPI’s 2014 Annual Assessment, Jews of No This trend is especially pronounced among Religion accept their Jewishness as a matter of fact, younger Jews. In the 18-29 age cohort, just 8 It does not enjoin much of a sense of solidarity percent identified as Conservative. In contrast, or any normative commitment to the welfare 15 percent identified as Orthodox, almost as or continuity of the Jewish people or to Jewish many as Reform (20 percent). The large number culture. Other researchers have argued that this of younger Orthodox Jews can be attributed to population, and populations that overlap with the much larger Orthodox birthrate – “More than it, such as children of intermarriage, respond to six in ten (62 percent) Orthodox Jewish parents targeted educational programs and as a result say they have at least three children living in their become more Jewishly engaged. They cite studies household, compared to 17 percent of Jewish showing that the very youngest cohorts of such parents who identify as Reform who say the Jews, who were the beneficiaries of such programs same.” At the same time, Reform and Conservative (conducted since the Pew study), evince more 2 numbers are much stronger in the 65+ age group. Jewish engagement. It seems too early to draw Thirty-five percent of this cohort identify as firm conclusions in this regard. Furthermore, it is Reform and 20 percent as Conservative. not clear what brings about such engagement. Is it the provision of Jewish meaning or the re-drawing The corollary of the declining Jewish middle of social boundaries between Jews and non-Jews? is growth at the “poles” of Jewish identity and Perhaps it is a combination of the two. identification. The Orthodox seem to be growing, at least in the younger cohorts. At the other end, One of the new trends might be termed the “Rise the PRRI study indicates that Jews PRRI identifies of Orthodoxy.” Just as Jews of No Religion are as "cultural Jews"1 also seem to be growing. In the different from what used to be the mainstream Pew report, Jews of No Religion constituted 22 of American Jewry, so are the Orthodox. They percent. If the PRRI study reflects a similar group are different, first politically and culturally. In the they are about a third. Here again the trend is last four U.S. presidential elections they tended to much more pronounced among younger Jews (a vote Republican as opposed to other American majority – 53 percent). Jews who overwhelmingly voted Democrat. A much higher percentage say that they “lean As the Pew study showed, Jews of No Religion Republican” (55 percent according to Pew) than are much different from Jews by Religion. They other American Jews, and they have much more are much less engaged – as a group they do not conservative political and social views. (See belong to synagogues or Jewish organizations, chapter “The Rise of Orthodoxy and the Political- they do not contribute to Jewish organizations, Cultural Polarization of the American Jewish nor are they very attached to Israel or to Jewish Community.”)

26 the jewish people policy institute The rising predominance of Jews of No Religion, Endnotes who are basically disconnected from Jewish life and engagement, is a critical challenge for the 1 The following is a quote from the PRRI's study "America’s Changing Religious Identity", Daniel Cox, Ph.D., Jewish community. The rise of Orthodoxy poses a Robert P. Jones, Ph.D., 09.06.2017: "To identify culturally different set of challenges. On the one hand they affiliated Jews, we asked all respondents who claimed are among the most committed and engaged Jews. no formal religious affiliation the following question: However, they are less engaged with the organized 'Do you consider yourself to be Jewish for any reason?' Jewish community and with the general American Any respondent who said 'yes' or 'half' was classified society. it also increases political and cultural as culturally Jewish." https://www.prri.org/research/ polarization between them and the vast majority american-religious-landscape-christian-religiously- unaffiliated/ of liberal non-Orthodox American Jews, which weakens the Jewish community overall. As a result 2 Theodore Sasson, Janet Krasnic Aronson, Fern of these contrasting trends we are leaving the Chertok, Charles Kadushin, Leonard Saxe, “Millenial Children of Intermarriage: Religious Upbringing, needle in the Jewish Identity gauge unchanged. Identification and Behavior Among Children of Jewish and Non-Jewish Parents, Contemporary Jewry, April 2017, 37:1, 99-123.

the jewish people policy institute 27 7 Material Resources

Positive Factors

• Israel’s economic growth is steady, aided performance at the end of 2016 while by domestic demand and improved export maintaining a sound macroeconomic balance. • Israel’s hi-tech sector continues to be a world leader: M T P • With more than 3,500 high-tech companies and start-ups, Israel has the highest concentration of high-tech D T companies in the world (apart from the Resources Silicon Valley). • Israel is ranked #2 in the world for Even though Jewish and Israeli economic venture capital funds right behind the activity remains resilient, there are signs United States. of economic segmentation in Israel and possible threats to Jewish economic • Israel leads the world in the number activity in the Diaspora. In light of of scientists and technicians in the these factors, we are leavingthe material workforce, with 145 per 10,000, as resources gauge unchanged. opposed to 85 in the U.S., over 70 in

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 29 Japan, and less than 60 in Germany. of adequately trained personnel, thus raising With over 25 percent of its work force concerns about its sustainability. employed in technical professions. Israel • Educational access and achievement, places first in this category as well. differentials in wealth, and protectionism • Israel produces more scientific papers per in domestic markets remain areas of policy capita than any other nation by a large concern. margin – 109 per 10,000 people – as well • Israel’s continuing housing crunch puts as having one of the highest per capita a squeeze on the young and those in the rates of patents filed. lower and middle portions of the income • Indicators of Arab participation in Israel’s work distribution, with effects going beyond issues force and in skill training continue to increase. of housing alone. • Increases in perception of anti-Semitic currents surrounding large Diaspora Factors to Watch communities do not appear to have affected wealth creation within those communities • Israel and major Jewish communities have nor affected allocation toward Jewish been substantial beneficiaries of globalization community institutions and interests. over the past few decades. Changes in trends • Similarly, despite indicators of generational and sentiments toward more nationalist change also affecting the natures of Diaspora and protectionist economic policies should community philanthropy, large changes in be monitored for their potential impact on giving toward Jewish causes have not yet both. appeared. • Last November, Israel’s Haredi leadership achieved massive government funding for Negative Factors their community institutions. This was intended to keep Haredi youth in full- • Strong consumer demand in Israel may have time study. Nevertheless, the trend toward been occasioned by impending changes increased Haredi professional, academic, in regulations with resulting indications of and military integration does not appear to declining consumer confidence. be significantly slowed, (Haredi IDF officers increased from 97 in 2016 to 113 in 2017 (75 • Israel’s hi-tech sector remains its principal in 2015)). Opinions are divided within the engine of growth but is limited by the supply community; it is still unclear whether the conservative or the pro-integration trend will prevail.

30 the jewish people policy institute • Although Diaspora Haredi communities socioeconomic groups and will the wellsprings possess wealth and have leaders in business, of this economic dynamism continue to provide real estate, and law (especially in the New for future growth. The nexus for both concerns York City area), a significant portion of may be found in education. Although Israel’s Haredi Jews are poorer than other Jews, some 2015 PISA performance improved from its 2012 living below the poverty line. Demographic scores, they still remain below the OECD average. shifts may have a future effect on wealth While the OECD average share of low achievers and income disparities within Jewish in all three tested subjects (science, mathematics, communities outside Israel as well. and reading) was 13 percent (similar to the U.S. The Material Resources indicators associated score), in Israel the share was more than 20 with “Progressing” (moderate Israeli economic percent. This is only one indicator among many growth; relative growth in Diaspora community to be considered in weighing future economic resources; leadership in technical fields) accord dynamics. Yet, given the increasing importance most closely to current circumstances. While the of innovation-led growth and knowledge-based aggregate indicators of Israel’s economic activity, industries as sources of national wealth, it is one especially relative to other developed economies, that bears watching. are strong, this is offset by OECD-leading rates As in the Sherlock Holmes story of the dog that of poverty and other troubling indicators of did not bark, perhaps the headline regarding economic segmentation. Particularly troubling Jewish communities abroad is that there is the continued non-participation of Arabs and have been no large discontinuities. Despite Haredim in the work force, despite the recent generational change, the dizzying dynamics of progress that has been made on these issues. industry growth and decline, and the haunting Israel’s economy continues to provide rates of specter of resurgent anti- Semitism the story growth that, while not of the same magnitude has been one of continuity. Jewish institutions as its most dynamic recent period, are none the and activities are weathering the transition less solidly based, apparently sustainable, and to new patterns of Jewish giving, and Jewish compare well to most others in the developed communities are continuing to concentrate West. Israel’s macroeconomic management has in and play active economic roles in the most been, on the whole, good. As will be true into developed economies. This could all become the foreseeable future, however, the questions subject to change. Those forced to make facing Israel are how much is the access to significant changes through emigration or the economic opportunity resulting from curtailment of participation, either in direct this economic performance available across response to anti- Jewish pressures or through fear

the jewish people policy institute 31 of possible changes to come, may find themselves but is none the less a possible game changer in subject to considerable dislocation. This is far what would otherwise be a continuing ability by from being a major prospect at this time, even in Jewish communities to surmount the dynamics some of the communities hardest hit by recent of change. violent incidents and vociferous defamations,

Characterization of Key Drivers Aﬀecting the Jewish People in the Year 2016-17

Geopolitics

Demography Bonds

JPPI Identity Resources

2016 2017

32 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Ukraine 777,000 56,000 8,305 84 80 6,886 - Rest FSU Europe 312,000 23,600 - - 65-75 - - FSU Asia 254,000 18,000 - - 50-75 - -

Asia (rest) 104,000 19,300 - - - - -

Africa 195,000 74,500 - - - 394 - Ethiopia - 100 1,945 174 - 91 - South Africa 118,000 69,500 13,225 119 15-24.9 189 3/400p Morocco - 2,300 8,330 123 - 95 - Other countries - 2,600 - - - - -

Oceania 70,000 120,600 - - - - - Australia 65,000 113,000 48,899 2 15-24.9 6/150q

r New Zealand 5,000 7,600 37,293 13 15-24.9 111 1/121 and other countries a. Source: Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. b. Source: DellaPergola, Sergio, World Jewish Population, 2016. In: Arnold Dashefsky and Ira Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2016 (Appendix) c. Source: Website for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook for 2014. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), per capita (world currency). d. A measure of a country’s development based on public health, educational level and real income level. Source. Human Development Report 2016, Work for Human Development, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). e. Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics in Israel, January 2016. f. Based on previous year’s statistics, unless otherwise specified. g. Does not include “without religion”, includes East Jerusalem, Golan Heights and West Bank. h. According to population predictions from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (medium alternative), by the year 2025, Israel’s Jewish population will grow to 7.3 million (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2014, Table 2.10, p. 111). i. Source: Knesset website. j. Aside from this measure of 5.7 million Jews, the Pew Jewish People Survey from 2013 found another one million people (600,000 adults and 400,000 children) who are partial Jews. k. A Portrait of Jewish Americans, the Pew Research Center’s 2013 survey of US Jews. Figures are based on current, intact marriages l. Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-members-of-the-114th-congress-2 m. Statistics were updated with the generous assistance of David Cooper, Director, Government Relations, CIJA, Canada (2015) n. Source: Jews in couples- Marriage, intermarriage, cohabitation and divorce in Britain, David Graham, 2016. http://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR_2016.Jews_in_couples.Marriage_intermarriage_cohabitation_and_divroce_in_Britain.July_2016.pdf o. Statistics were updated with the generous assistance of Richard Pater, Director of BICOM in Israel p. Statistics were updated with the generous assistance of David Saks, Senior Researcher at SA Jewish Board of Deputies q. Statistics were updated with the generous assistance of The Hon. Michael Danby, MP, Parliament of Australia r. Statistics were updated with the generous assistance of Steven Goodman, Head of the Council of Jewish Communities in New Zeland Selected Indicators oF Selected World – 2017 Jewry United States Germany L Canada N W Country United Kingdom France Other countries Other I Romania Hungary Bulgaria E Mexico Brazil Argentina Other EU Other FSU Other non-EU Other Russia sr a ur o rth o rld tin a el o pe A A

meric n o meric - FSU a a 12,633,000 1,331,000 5,686,000 2,582,000 5,400,000 2,151,000 286,000 390,000 530,000 107,000 514,000 282,000 171,000 140,000 808,000 30,000 70,000 35,000 90,000 1970 - - Jewish Population (Core Definition) a 5,959,200 14,410,700 5,700,000 1,113,300 6,088,100 117,000 388,000 290,000 460,000 381,400 180,700 158,800 277,100 179,500 66,500 47,600 40,000 94,200 38,300 2016 2,000 9,300 b g,h j PPP Intl $ GDP per capita, 48,110 46,437 42,480 42,313 57,436 35,178 20,326 22,347 27,481 18,938 15,241 20,047 26,489 2016 ------c Development – World Rank Index Of Human 2015 10 16 21 10 19 77 79 45 43 56 50 49 4 ------d Most recentMost Recent Out- marriage Rate (%) 15-24.9 25-34.9 45-54.9 25-34.9 25-34.9 15-95 33-75 50-80 1-4.9 26 58 60 80 5 ------n K Aliyah 27,908 2015 6,628 2,451 6,632 338 623 114 404 262 71 13 21 81 ------e / Seats In Legislature/ Seats In Number of JewishNumber Legislature 2015-2016 Members 103/120 13/443 19/650 32/535 ------m o l i f

the jewish people policy institute 35 PART 2

Dimensions of Jewish Well-Being Geopolitics Demography Bonds Within and Between Communities Identity Formation and Expression Material Resources People of the Book

The Geopolitical Landscape - Growing Uncertainty in light 8 of the Trump Presidency

Introduction The strategic challenges facing Israel are largely the international arena’s already great uncertainty, unchanged from the previous year. The Middle especially in areas related to Israel’s resilience. East remains volatile. The cornerstones of the Decisions made in Jerusalem, including not to old regional order are crumbling, and a new, decide, can influence a limited part of the total more stable order has yet to take its place. The strategic picture, but could also be fateful for Israel international arena, as it applies to the Middle East and the Jewish people. and to Israel’s strategic resilience, is also enduring Key developments from the past year that stand shockwaves and is far from projecting stability. against the backdrop of the main strategic Israel faces a geopolitical map filled with “moving challenges and dilemmas facing Israel include: parts” that mutually affect one another. These • The implications of Trump’s election for the create a range of scenarios, each of which contains international arena, particularly the Middle different, and at times conflicting, challenges East. for Israel. This includes the entrance of a new and significant actor with great influence over • The possibility of cultivating and leveraging the geopolitical equation: U.S. President Donald Israel’s relationship with a sympathetic Trump. The trends that led to his election are American administration alongside significant in and of themselves, but his personality the emerging threats to the vitality of and unpredictability add a unique dimension to the triangular relationship: Jerusalem – Washington – U.S. Jewry.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 39 • The emerging strategic reality in the These challenges are growing across a number of wake of the nuclear agreement with Iran strategic circles that interact with each other: a) (JCPOA), characterized by Israeli Prime the international system and the global standing Minister Netanyahu as a “mistake of historic of the United States, specifically in the Middle proportions.” East, b) U.S.-Israel relations and the strength of the • The implications of the efforts to reach an triangular relationship: Jerusalem – Washington agreement on Syria and how they reflect on – U.S. Jewry, c) the threats and opportunities the the standing of Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, the regional system places in front of Israel, d) the United States, Turkey, and others. Palestinian system. • The possibilities open to Israel to advance its These circles exert a great influence on Israel’s relations with the region’s moderate Sunni strategic resilience, and the analysis that follows states, who are, at this time, showing greater will explore them. openness in light of the threat Iran and radical terror groups pose to them. A. The International System and • The threat of a security deterioration – on U.S. Standing the northern front (Hezbollah and possibly Israel’s strategic might is significantly influenced Iranian forces in the Golan and in Lebanon), not just by its relationship with Washington and the southern front (Hamas and terror but also by the global standing of the United elements in the Sinai). States, including the role it chooses to play in the • The threat of escalating violence in the international arena, the strength and influence West Bank, due to a flare-up over religious of rival powers, and the characteristics of the issues (Temple Mount), or as a result of the emerging world order. continued “Lone Wolf Intifada.” An erosion of U.S. standing internationally – the • The Trump administration’s efforts to superpower whose friendship and assistance examine restarting Israeli-Palestinian peace to Israel is critical and which is also home to a negotiations. prosperous Jewish community that constitutes • Efforts to harm Israel through BDS and de- almost half the Jewish people – could lead to an legitimization measures. erosion in the deterrence power and strength attributed to Israel itself. If the perception • The emerging opportunities for Israel to that the U.S. is in a process of decline and is further develop its relations with new rising abandoning the Middle East takes hold, it could powers like China and India alongside the deepen the strategic vacuum in the region (which potential to nurture relations with countries demands U.S. involvement as a stabilizing power). across Africa. This would attract additional forces that are

40 the jewish people policy institute problematic from Israel’s perspective and may “America First,” will shape U.S. foreign policy. Will exacerbate the existing instability. the Trump administration neglect American President Trump and the role of the U.S. in leadership and focus on domestic affairs? Will international affairs – The election of Donald the business world’s principles of profit and loss, Trump as president adds formidable uncertainty which are devoid of ideological considerations, to the position of the United States in the guide U.S. actions? international arena. Trump inherited a geopolitical Trump’s meetings with European leaders evoked reality in which the U.S. remains the strongest acute concern as to his commitment to the trans- world power even though the “American Atlantic alliance. German Chancellor Merkel moment” created after the breakup of the Soviet proclaimed that once again, “Europe cannot fully Union, when the U.S. enjoyed hegemonic status in depend on anyone else” (May 25, 2017). Despite a unipolar system, has passed. the haze, it seems that – at least on a rhetorical The lack of a stable, functioning world order leads At least on to weakened international institutions, diminishes level – a Trump Doctrine is taking shape, one a rhetorical the ability to navigate global challenges, and level. A Trump contributes to destabilizing the central authority markedly different from the Obama Doctrine. Doctrine is in different countries (which terror and criminal taking shape, organizations exploit). This further increases the Compared to President Obama’s “Cairo Speech” markedly risk of escalation in simmering conflicts in the different various flashpoints around the world (Syria, North (June 4, 2009) in which he stressed the importance the Obama Korea, South China Sea, Ukraine, Balkans, India- Doctrine China border, and more). of democratic values and human rights and Ahead of Trump’s inauguration, there were proposed turning a new growing fears that the U.S. intended to withdraw page in U.S. relations with Iran, Trump’s “Riyadh from global affairs and focus on domestic matters, speech” outlining his worldview before the leaders act according to a narrowed definition of interests, and representatives of 50 Muslim nations, differed rely on expected U.S. energy independence, and significantly.1 be reluctant to exhibit a commitment to global leadership and to shaping a functioning global Trump mollified his audience and stated in order. Trump’s actions and rhetoric thus far have no uncertain terms that he sees Iran behind communicated contradictory messages making it the instability and terror in the region: “It is a difficult to discern a coherent guiding doctrine for government that speaks openly of mass murder, U.S. role in international affairs. It is not yet clear vowing the destruction of Israel, death to the extent to which the defining campaign slogan, America, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room.” Trump vowed to support U.S.

the jewish people policy institute 41 allies and stipulated that this support would influence around the world.”6 The pair explain not be conditioned upon meeting standards President Trump’s remarks as the ideological base of human rights, democratization, etc. “We will of his foreign policy: “The president embarked make decisions based on real-world outcomes – on his first foreign trip with a clear-eyed outlook not inflexible ideology… And, wherever possible, that the world is not a “global community” but an we will seek gradual reforms – not sudden arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and intervention.”2 businesses engage and compete for advantage. We These words reflect a significant shift – at least bring to this forum unmatched military, political, on the rhetorical level – from President Obama’s economic, cultural and moral strength. Rather position, which saw the potential of developing than deny this elemental nature of international 7 relations with Tehran, 3 and urged Saudi Arabia to affairs, we embrace it.” find an “effective way to share the neighborhood Although these articulations shed greater light and institute some sort of cold peace”4 with Iran. on a real-politick worldview devoid of illusions, This had further fostered Sunni concern that the it is not enough to definitively assess how it will U.S. was planning a grand bargain that would translate into actual policy when the rubber hits grant Iran significant regional status and allow it the road. The first months of the Trump presidency to deepen its subversive activities and achieve provide conflicting indications as to how the U.S. regional hegemony. intends to interact in world affairs. Trump’s inner circle, National Security Adviser H.R. Thus, for example, as opposed to President Obama McMaster and National Economic Council (NEC) who avoided a military response even after the Director Gary Cohn, articulated the president’s Syrian regime crossed his “red line” by using foreign policy principles in a jointly written article chemical weapons, Trump responded to a similar asserting that the president’s May 2017 trip to the incident by launching 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian Middle East and Europe signified a “strategic shift.” 5 air base in eastern Syria (April 7, 2017). Trump did McMaster and Cohn promised that the United not flinch from the expected Russian criticism States would no longer “lead from behind” (as during the attack (Russia condemned the attack attributed to President Obama) and that the and cautioned that it might harm the relations slogan “America First” does not mean “America between the countries). This response pattern was alone.” Rather, in their view, “’America First’ signals reiterated when Trump did not hesitate to drop, the restoration of American leadership and our the “Mother of All Bombs” for the first time – government’s traditional role overseas—to use on an ISIS target in Afghanistan (April 13, 2017). the diplomatic, economic and military resources Ostensibly, these steps should clear the fog as of the U.S. to enhance American security, promote to whether President Trump views the U.S. as a American prosperity, and extend American proactive leader in the international arena.

42 the jewish people policy institute However, in other instances, the message has been within a year8, President Trump’s commitment to markedly different. Thus, for example, Trump’s preventing this emerging threat is expected to be decision (June 1, 2017) to withdraw from the Paris tested. Climate Accord to fight global warming, which In light of Kim Jong Un’s threats, Trump promised 195 countries signed, noting: “I was elected to to respond with “fire and the fury like the world represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.” has never seen” (August 8, 2017)9. War with North Similarly, there were hard feelings among the Korea would affect the interests of other powers G-20 summit participants in Hamburg (July 7-8, (China and Russia) and could lead to hundreds of 2017) when Trump announced that he was not thousands of casualties. Pyongyang has a massive thrilled to shoulder the burden of international military (the fourth largest in the world), nuclear commitments, and that he had few warm capability, thousands of tons of chemical weapons, sentiments for the alliance with Europe. (It was and over 20,000 artillery pieces, many of which difficult to extract a willingness from Trump to are pointed at Seoul, the South Korean capital, mention Article 5 of the NATO charter, which and could cause mass devastation. (North Korea requires member countries to come to the defense missiles could easily hit Tokyo, not to mention of any attacked member state). U.S. naval base in Guam). Trump’s handling of the The international arena presents President Trump situation so far does not allow us to assess with with challenges that require tough decisions. great confidence how the U.S. will respond to Iran The manner in which he decides these will be or how it will deal with the North Korean threat. formative milestones that further influence The decisions made regarding these two situations administration policy on other foreign policy could have great impact on the character of the issues. Chief among these are the future of the emerging world order. JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran (discussed Undermining the values at the base of the later), and the North Korea crisis. The latter is Western world order – The geopolitical question conducting provocative tests that bring it closer to marks are not confined to the structures of the possessing a ballistic missile fitted with a nuclear prevailing world order, but also to the values at its warhead capable of targeting the U.S. (On July 28, foundation. Certain forces asserting themselves 2017, North Korea launched an inter-continental on the global stage today do not draw their values ballistic missile (ICBM), apparently capable from the liberal-democratic legacy that guided of hitting the West Coast of the U.S., and on American actions after WWII in shaping the world September 3, 2017 it conducted an underground order in a way that increases stability, encourages test of what it claimed to be a hydrogen bomb.) freedom and allows free trade. The appeal of these Based on warnings from American intelligence values weakened as a result of the 2008 financial experts that North Korea is expected to gain the crisis, the deepening socio-economic inequality capacity to fit nuclear warheads on these ICBM's brought on by globalization, the dashing of hope

the jewish people policy institute 43 that had been sparked by the Arab Spring, the Union weakened following Emanuel Macron’s crisis washing over Europe, all of which found defeat of Marine La Pen in the French presidential expression in the Brexit referendum results in the elections (May 7, 2017). Right-wing populists were UK (June 23, 2016). We are now witnessing the rise also defeated in Holland and Austria. However, of reactionary forces at odds with the humanistic doubts surrounding the liberal and humanistic values of the modern Western order: isolationism values that stood at the base of the EU founders’ and national seclusion, bolstering borders, vision remain. economic protectionism, anti-globalization, an This phenomenon has not skipped over the erosion of liberal norms, populism, xenophobia, United States. Many commentators see Trump’s and the rise of the radical right. election as an expression of the empowerment of Europe, which largely embodied the liberal values considerable groups in the U.S. who feel that the at the base of the Western existing political structure and world order (with world order in its actions a focus on globalization), harms and deprives The right’s and experiences, is them. Therefore, these groups are devoid of momentum undergoing a simultaneous any commitment to those liberal values at the in Europe crisis of identity, structure, foundation of the existing order. weakened and values. after Macron’s Russia and China’s strategic assertiveness – victory in The continent’s discomfort Russia and China do not accept the logic of a France and the with the inability of world order that does not reflect and respect defeat of right traditional politics to deal their power and capabilities. They are acting with wing populists with various challenges growing assertiveness on the global stage and in Holland and – including economic expressing their aim to bring a new multi-polar Austria crises, migration waves order based on inter-power competition, in which (affecting other continents the legitimacy of their status and interests are not as well), and terrorist subordinate to those of the United States. attacks – undercut the concept of open borders, While China leans on its economic power, Russia the cosmopolitan sensibility, and sense of personal compensates for its weaknesses with aggression security, fomenting political radicalization on both and by projecting its military power and the right and the left. sophisticated cyber-warfare capabilities. Russian The countries of Europe are finding it difficult to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s calls to bring an agree on a plan for absorbing a million migrants end to the Western-led world order, which took from the Middle East and the possibility that shape after the Cold War, and bring about a new many more will arrive. The momentum of the right world order that is not West-centric.10 Russia is in Europe and its push to dissolve the European taking advantage of U.S. reticence and Europe’s

44 the jewish people policy institute weakness and the challenges it faces in defining a At the same time, China is raising serious concerns unified and committed policy. Russia is increasing among its neighbors as it challenges international its involvement in Syria, completing its annexation law through vigorous efforts to assert sovereignty of the Crimean Peninsula, and continuing its over disputed islands in the South China Sea. destabilization efforts in eastern Ukraine. With China is building artificial islands in the area and this behavior, Moscow is proving that a nominal positioning missile batteries and military forces summation of military capabilities is not enough there (the South China Sea is rich in minerals and in measuring actual power. A critical variable is fishing resources, and hosts an important maritime how willing one is to actually use force.11 route for trade amounting to $5 trillion annually). The strategic vacuum created by the U.S. during Although, in 1992, Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping President Obama’s tenure, who preferred to clarified that his country needed “to maintain a “lead from behind,” sent a clear signal not just low profile and never lead”; today’s Chinese leader, to Moscow. China is offering autocratic leaders Xi Jing Ping, does not shy around the world an alternative guiding model away from the challenge China is offering to follow: rapid and consistent economic of leading the global autocratic development without the need for democracy. economy and declared leaders a In 2015, China became the largest oil importer (January 17, 2017) that guiding model in the world, most of which comes from China should be the – rapid and the Middle East. China is set to establish its one to “guide economic consistent first foreign naval base at the end of 2017, in globalization.” Israel has economic Djibouti, which will allow it to secure maritime an interest in developing development routes around the entrance to the Red Sea and its relations with China without the Suez Canal, an area critical to Chinese trade. and Russia, but in both need for China is Africa’s largest trade partner and sees cases, it must navigate democracy the Middle East as a promising market for its these relationships goods (in the decade between 2004 and 2014, cautiously given the inter- China’s trade with the Middle East grew six- power rivalry and the preeminent interest of not fold). It is not for naught that China includes harming its strategic relationship with the United the region in the framework of its “One Belt States. One Road” initiative intended to connect China with Europe and Asia encompassing a giant marketplace of 4.4 billion people in 26 nations. The Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established by China to facilitate this regional integration program.

the jewish people policy institute 45 B. U.S. – Israel Relations and This puts them between a rock and a hard place, the Resilience of the Triangular and could erode the resilience of the Jerusalem – Relationship: Jerusalem – Washington – U.S. Jewry triangular relationship, a Washington – US Jewry bedrock of Israel and the Jewish people’s strength. Israel also faces a dilemma as to how much it The agreement renewing U.S. military assistance should openly identify with the new president to Israel (MOU) – 38 billion dollars over the next and the sentiments and ethos that brought him decade, starting at the end of 2018 – was signed to power. The American Jewish community’s in the closing days of the Obama administration. reservations about the president sharpen how Despite this profound testimony to the depth of sensitive this dilemma is. Given the polarizing relations between the two countries, the Obama trends within the U.S., the challenge for Israel to years also included worrying trends vis-a-vis the maintain bi-partisan support and its connection future of U.S.-Israel relations, in regard to the with American Jews only increases. Relatedly, one depth of bi-partisan support for Israel and the cannot ignore the warnings issued by some of changes brought by a foreign policy doctrine that Israel’s best friends within the American Jewish could harm Israel’s interests. community following the Israeli government’s Unlike his predecessor, President Trump is seen by decisions regarding the Western Wall (Kotel) and Israel as a loyal and warm friend. Thus, Israel has conversion bill. According to these voices, Israel an opportunity to correct the problems that arose could alienate many of its Jewish supporters, erode during the Obama presidency and “turn a new their commitment to Israel, and thus cause great page” in its relationship with the United States – long-term harm to Israel’s strategic interests. its most significant and only true ally. The geopolitical reality presents President Trump Trump’s visit to Israel very early in his presidency, with a series of strategic dilemmas, some directly and the level of friendship he exhibited, signaled relating to Israel’s security interests: a genuinely positive turn. However, despite the • The Regional system: Will the understanding warm atmosphere during the visit, it is hard to that the Middle East is of dwindling ignore that the main points of strategic interest importance to the U.S. also define the Trump for Israel – the nuclear agreement with Iran, the administration’s foreign policy? Will the U.S. Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the future of Syria allow Russia to become a key player that fills – could spark disagreements down the road. This the vacuum it created in the Middle East? is due to both conflict interests and the president’s Does the U.S. intend to rebuild the trust it unpredictable nature. An increase in tensions lost with many in the region, and if so how? between the two countries could weigh heavily Will the U.S. invest resources in order to step on American Jews, 70 percent of whom voted for up the momentum of the relations forming Hillary Clinton and reject Trump’s policy path. between Israel and the moderate Sunni states?

46 the jewish people policy institute • The Iranian challenge: What will the fate and lead? Will President’ Trump’s ambition to of the Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) be? broker the “ultimate deal” bring pressure to Despite his campaign promise to “rip up” bear on Israel should there be disagreements the agreement, Trump authorized (July over core issues of a final status agreement? 17, 2017) Iran’s compliance with the terms How will the American administration prepare of the agreement and, therefore, allowed for the expected leadership change within the the continued easing of nuclear program Palestinian Authority? related sanctions. Will the U.S. continue in The list of challenges mentioned (a more detailed this direction given Iran’s growing regional discussion follows below) is, of course, partial. subversion and the strong public positions The inability to assess the American president’s Trump has taken against Iran? How will moves as the logical outcome of a thought out Washington respond to Iran’s provocative and coherent foreign policy doctrine frustrates activity in areas not mentioned in the nuclear even the best analysts. Some claim that Trump’s agreement: regional subversion, support for interest in foreign affairs will wane, particularly terror groups, and continued development of with respect to the Middle East. They believe that ballistic missiles? U.S. involvement in the international arena will rise • The future of Syria and Iraq: Will the U.S. be and fall according to businesslike considerations dominant in shaping Syria’s future so that it of profit and loss. Trump, who they predict will does not become a forward base for Iran and become increasingly disappointed by the lack of anti-Israel jihadists? Will the U.S. play a lead quick results on the global stage, may prefer to role in determining what the day after ISIS’ direct his energies to more domestic challenges: will look like? Will the U.S. allow Russia, Iran, gaining legislative achievements at home, and Turkey, and Hezbollah to shape the future fending off the repeated attacks against him. of Syria and Iraq? Will the U.S. allow Iran to Other commentators dismiss this forecast and establish a land corridor through Syria to argue that Trump cannot disconnect from the Mediterranean? Will the U.S. allow those international affairs, especially the Middle East, forces beholden to Iran to take up positions due to the inherent potential it would have on Israel’s border in the Golan? to create global instability, harm U.S. interests, • The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Will the instigate war, or cause a global economic crisis. U.S. continue to take the lead in the Israeli- The coming months will show the extent to which Palestinian peace process, or will it recoil from Trump’s approach to issues of importance to the difficulties it encounters and acquiesce Israel differs from that of his predecessor. Despite to “internationalizing” the efforts to find a the friendship and warmth Trump has exhibited solution to the conflict? And if it does persist, toward Israel, the true test will likely have less what sort of diplomatic process will it shape

the jewish people policy institute 47 to do with mere rhetoric but rather on practical C. The Regional System: Threats matters. Jerusalem’s ability to manage an ongoing and Opportunities strategic dialogue with the Trump administration that produces positive practical results will Israel cannot expect a quick improvement in largely depend on Israel’s willingness to fulfill the violent and unstable region in which it must Washington’s expectations, even if only partly. operate. Two-thirds of the region’s residents are 29 or younger. The unemployment rate among In this regard, one cannot underestimate the those capable of work stands at 30 percent (twice impact of the polarizing processes and changes the global average). The regional economy is underway in the United States, and how they may crawling, tribal and clanship affiliation is rising affect American public opinion vis-a-vis Israel. In at the expense of civil commitment to the state. recent years, Israel has become an increasingly Central rule is failing and the nation-state system partisan issue. The is weakening. The phenomenon of “failed states”, Pew Research Center where sovereignty over territory is nominal at In the U.S., determined that the best (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Yemen), is support for American public largely increasing. the Palestinian supports Israel in the side within the Palestinian conflict, (54 The harsh disillusionment that resulted from the Democratic percent versus 19 percent failure of the “Arab Spring” has yet to subside. party has nearly for the Palestinians). Regional shifts have created a power vacuum doubled since However, support that allows for the rise of radical armed and 2014, and is for Israel decreases violent non-state actors – local militias, terror gaining steam significantly withinorganizations, and movements guided by radical the liberal wing of the Islamist ideology. These forces, which at times Democratic Party where form new alliances, erode the power of the central 40 percent support the Palestinians versus 33 authority, destroy economies and infrastructure, percent for Israel. Support for the Palestinian side and render some national borders irrelevant. within the Democratic Party has nearly doubled The civil wars in Syria and Yemen and the since 2014 (a jump from 21 to 40 percent) – and murderous terror of ISIS have created millions is gaining steam. 12 of refugees: Over 2.5 million have found shelter in Turkey, 1.4 million in Jordan, and a million in Lebanon (a quarter of its population). The problem-laden reality of the Middle East – social, economic, political, and religious – has not improved. In states without central rule capable of enforcing its authority in the territory under its

48 the jewish people policy institute sovereignty, even more murderous groups than capacity to project deterrence differs from when ISIS could arise in the wake of the severe setbacks the opposite side is a functioning country. Even it has suffered. though Assad’s forces are exhausted from years of Despite the Middle East’s violence and instability, a continuing civil war, Hezbollah is deeply mired Israel does not face any immediate military on Syrian battlefields, and Hamas is isolated threat from a neighboring country or coalition and weakened, there is still the possibility that a of Arab countries, as it has in the past. However, conflict with any of these could occur. this encouraging situation could change if Iran The Palestinian “Lone Wolf” intifada has yet to succeeds in establishing a military presence fully subside. The wave of violence that began in in the Syrian Golan Heights, and actualizes a October of 2015 has claimed over 50 Israeli lives strategic land corridor between Tehran and the so far. The Temple Mount shooting attacks (July Mediterranean. 14, 2017) and the violent escalation that ensued This corridor would open a space of direct After 6 years Iranian influence and empower Hezbollah as after Israel installed metal detectors there illustrate of fighting, the a military surrogate of Iran. Egypt, Jordan, and death toll of the Sunni camp view Israel as a partner that the potential for an even more violent escalation, the civil war in can assist in pushing back these key threats, Syria stands at and are increasing their security cooperation especially if fueled by religious fervor. around half a with Jerusalem. However, one cannot ignore the million fact that the advanced weapons systems Arab Israel also must prepare governments who fear Iran have purchased from for threats arising from the United States for very large sums of money the 1400-year-old Sunni-Shia conflict and as well could one day pose a threat to Israel’s Qualitative as those that result from new technologies and Military Edge (QME). These arms, theoretically, cyber warfare. could one day be turned on Israel in the event of policy or regime change. Syria Israel’s immediate security threats emanate primarily from terror organizations that operate After six years of fighting, the death toll from the from ambiguous territorial realities (Hamas) or Syrian civil war stands at around half a million. from the territories of failed states (Lebanon, Five million have fled and an additional seven Syria). These terror organizations employ an million are internally displaced. The average life asymmetric strategy and operate from within expectancy in Syria dropped from 70 to 56. With dense civilian populations. The IDF must assistance from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, Assad therefore contend with a reality in which its was saved from the jaws of defeat and his status has been reinforced since.

the jewish people policy institute 49 This reality caused the U.S. and the West to modify Despite warnings that Putin would “drown in the their policy vis-a-vis Assad. They have come to Syrian swamp,” the Russian leader has managed terms with his continued tenure in power and to achieve his main goals, at least for the time the inevitability of including him in any political being. These include bolstering Assad’s position talks regarding Syria’s future. Given the anarchy and creating a reality in which Russia, as the that would likely ensue if he were deposed, Assad dominant actor, sets the tone and has the defining is now regarded as part of the solution, the best role in resolving the Syrian crisis. Moreover, Russia of several bad options. Assad’s growing self- is now perceived in the Middle East as an actor confidence may trigger a possible change in his that is prepared to use force, loyal to its allies, and attitude toward and response to Israeli air force therefore cannot be ignored. Russia has leveraged strikes on Syrian territory (Syria’s air defense its position in Syria to sign a 49-year agreement command launched a number of missiles at Israeli giving it exclusive and autonomous use of its naval planes on March 17, 2017). base at Tartus. Russia can dock submarines and Currently, hundreds of armed factions, organized large nuclear-powered battleships there, and can according to regional, tribal, ethnic, ideological also deploy a comprehensive and independent or religious affiliations, are operating in Syria. defense system over the port facilities. Regional powers (Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey, and Israel has managed to develop an effective working Saudi Arabia) and outside powers (Russia and relationship with Russia, even convincing Moscow the U.S.) are also playing roles in Syria. Russia’s to respect its “red lines” vis-a-vis Syria (especially intervention significantly swayed the battle in preventing Iran from transferring strategic arms favor of Syrian government forces and halted the to Hezbollah and allowing Hezbollah and Iran to rebels’ momentum, a favorite target for Russian establish bases in southern Syria). Russia, so far, airstrikes. has not obstructed Israel as it enforces these lines. The fall of the rebel stronghold in Aleppo However, it would be a mistake to interpret this as (December 2016) – after repeated shelling of a sign of the depth of relations: Russia cooperates civilians, instituting a state of siege, starving with Israel’s enemies in Syria (Assad, Iran, and the population, and creating a humanitarian Hezbollah) and is engaged in a great power rivalry catastrophe – was a milestone of the war. with Israel’s key ally, the United States. President Putin surprised everyone when he Russia’s positioning of S-300 and S-400 air defense announced (March 14, 2016) that his forces had systems in Syria highlights the caution Israel must completed their mission in Syria and were pulling exercise in continuing to intercept arms transfers out. However, in actuality, Russian jets are still to Hezbollah without creating friction with targeting rebel forces and Russia continues to Moscow. However, Russia has its own interests, maintain a naval base in Tartus and an air force and summoned the Israeli ambassador for a base in Latakia.

50 the jewish people policy institute reprimand after IAF jets struck targets deemed too sensitive for Israel and Jordan, not to mention that close to Russian forces. Iranian forces would be involved in enforcing the A key Israeli concern is that Iran will succeed in de-escalation under the Astana agreement. creating a land corridor between Iran and the In response to these fears, a separate agreement Mediterranean controlled by Iranian troops was reached between Washington, Moscow, and Shia militias under Iranian command. and Amman for a cease-fire in southern Syria Undoubtedly, if Iran establishes itself as Israel’s (July 7, 2017) intended to ensure that Iranian neighbor, putting it in a stronger position to back forces stay away from the area. However, this Hezbollah, there will be friction. Iran signaled its agreement caused Israeli concern because it does intentions and capabilities when it fired ballistic not preclude Iran from entrenching itself in Syria, missiles against ISIS targets 600 km from its border, which could eventually lead to the presence of even if they were not all that accurate (June 18, Syria, Iran or Tehran’s surrogates, like Hezbollah, 2017). very near Israel’s border. Israel does not deny the fact that it takes military Despite Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s action in Syria from time to time. The outgoing air attempts to dispel Israeli fears by promising that force commander, Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel, revealed Russia and the U.S. would do everything possible in that in the last five years, Israel attacked weapons consideration of Israel’s security needs, Israel does convoys in Syria intended for Hezbollah and other not trust Russian oversight on the ground (Russian terror organizations nearly 100 times.13 Prime military police battalions are already deployed Minister Netanyahu noted: “We are operating in in southern Syria to oversee the agreement), Syria from time to time, working to prevent Syria not to mention that their presence will limit from becoming a front against us.”14 Israel fears Israel’s ability to act.15 Prime Minister Netanyahu a ceasefire agreement that will strengthen the expressed Israel’s complete opposition to the Iranian camp in Syria, but its ability to influence agreement arguing that it does not take Israel’s the content of any agreement is limited. security interests into account, which demand pushing Iran and Hezbollah back from Israel’s On May 5, 2017, an agreement was struck at the Ramat HaGolan border, preventing a permanent Astana Summit, the capital of Kazakhstan, to Iranian presence in Syria, and deterring Hezbollah establish four de-escalation zones; Russia, Turkey, from arming itself with accurate missiles. and Iran were signatories. This was the fourth attempt in the past year to achieve a cease-fire Israel’s discomfort could bring a change in its policy, in Syria. The plan could hold the framework for a which until now has been to avoid involvement future agreement that would end the fighting in in the fighting, except for limited assistance to Syria and define the areas of influence within Syria. moderate militias near its border that formed a The zone nearest the Golan Heights is especially buffer between Israel and the fighting in Syria.

the jewish people policy institute 51 Israel’s ability to protect its security interests in Resolution 2231, at least in spirit. Furthermore, Syria depend in large part on the United States. the nuclear agreement did not put an end to Iran’s However, the U.S. has yet to articulate clear regional subversion. positions on the end game it envisions there, or the It seems that during the Obama presidency, Iran strategy it endorses to deal with Iran’s ambition to even felt a surge of self-confidence to increase its create a strategic corridor and base itself in Syria. drive for regional hegemony, taking advantage of Nor has it delineated the scope of the resources Obama’s reluctance to use force and his penchant it is willing to invest over time in addressing these to “lead from behind,” if at all. issues. Recent reporting on President Trump’s orders to stop training rebels raises doubts that There was a widespread perception that Obama Washington will take the lead in defining Syria’s was prepared to tolerate Iran’s problematic post-war future, or whether, as it seems now, it will regional behavior as long as it didn’t abrogate allow Syria to be divided the nuclear agreement, which he regarded as a During Obama’s up into Russian, Iranian, key legacy achievement. On the eve of Trump’s presidency Iran and Turkish zones of inauguration, Iran exercised significant influence felt a surge of influence. 16 in four Arab capitals: Beirut, Sanaa, Damascus, and self-confidence Baghdad. to increase Iran’s influence in Iraq is growing, and Saudi Arabia its drive for Iran cannot seem to achieve a decisive victory in regional A key question following Yemen against the Shia tribal Houthi militias Iran hegemony Trump’s election is to what supports. The IDF is preparing for the day when extent his presidency will Iran’s efforts to deepen its influence in the region signal a strategic pivot in will intensify. Iran will continue to act through U.S. policy on Iran. The nuclear agreement (JCPOA, terror and proxy militias. July 14, 2015) delayed Iran from becoming a nuclear Indeed, Iranian military officers are in Syria power, but, at the same time, granted it legitimacy commanding combat systems, and Tehran as a threshold nuclear power and permitted it to continues to fund terror groups, transfer advanced maintain its nuclear production capacity. arms to Hezbollah, and smuggle arms into the After 15 years, Iran will be able to reduce its Gaza strip. “breakout time” to a military nuclear capability The coming months will show whether Trump’s to a critical threshold of weeks, or even days. The declarations turn from rhetoric into an actual nuclear agreement further allows Iran to increase strategic turning point. In stark contradiction to funding to its armed forces. It continues to develop his predecessor’s policy, Trump is totally in line its ballistic missile array and conducts missile with the Saudi-led Sunni camp and has clearly tests. As such, it has breached the terms of UNSC blamed Iran for the terror and instability in the

52 the jewish people policy institute region. Trump has not canceled the nuclear U.S. out of the agreement with Iran and will he agreement, and has allowed its continued formulate and implement a strategy to block Iran implementation. The terms of the agreement from filling the void left in the region after ISIS require the president to certify Iran’s compliance is defeated? Each of these carries considerable every 90 days. However, critical decision points escalatory potential. Passivity from the Trump are expected down the road, and Trump’s administration in the face of Iran’s efforts to original intent to cancel the agreement could still establish itself in Syria could cause tension in the materialize. U.S.-Israel relationship (see Israel’s public criticism In parallel to this dilemma, Congress is moving of the de-escalation agreement in southern Syria, ahead with additional sanctions against Iran in of which the U.S. is a party). response to its role in regional terror, its support of Assad, and its continued development and testing Hezbollah of ballistic missiles. The IDF considers IDF: Hezbollah The question as to whether the timeout created Hezbollah the most is the most by the agreement, 10-15 years, will allow the serious military threat to serious military moderate in Iran camp to defeat the radical camp Israel. The Iran-backed threat to Israel and pave the way for a more moderate regime organization has an remains open. Sixty percent of Iran’s population annual budget of around is under the age of 30 and the religious Islamist one billion USD. Hezbollah’s support for Assad revolutionary ideology does not appeal to many of eroded its standing in the Arab world and the them. The re-election of President Hassan Rouhani Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) even designated (May 20, 2017) and the fact that he defeated it a terror organization (March 2, 2016). However, Ebrahim Raisi, a more conservative opponent, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah’s success in defeating highlights the influence of less radical elements. the rebels and leaving Assad in place, put However, Israel cannot base its security policy Hezbollah on the winning side. At least 5000 on such hopes. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Hezbollah soldiers are fighting alongside Assad’s Eizenkot described Israel’s challenge clearly: troops; it is estimated to have suffered at least “Pushing Iran back and limiting its influence in 1500 dead thus far and around 5000 injured, the immediate circle around Israel is no less an significant numbers for an organization with an important challenge than defeating ISIS, and for estimated 30,000 full time fighters (and around Israel perhaps the most important challenge.”17 25,000 reservists). There are two main, interconnected questions The Arab world views Hezbollah’s standing regarding Trump’s Iran policy that have strategic alongside the hated Assad as joining the Shia front implications for Israel: Will Trump steer the against the Sunnis, which contradicts the image

the jewish people policy institute 53 Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah has tried to It was reported recently that in order to avoid cultivate over the years, as defending the interests dispatching weapons convoys vulnerable to IAF of all Lebanon against Israel. However, Hezbollah’s attacks, Iran is establishing underground arms involvement in Syria has not slowed its growth production facilities in Lebanon to supply rockets within Lebanon. Lebanese President Michel and advanced arms for Hezbollah. IDF Military Aoun said (Feb 12, 2017) that there is a need for Intelligence (AMAN) Chief Maj. Gen. Herzi HaLevi Hezbollah as “a complement to the Lebanese stated: “We see that Hezbollah is establishing an army’s actions.” 18 arms industry on Lebanese soil with Iranian know Although Hezbollah is shedding its blood in Syria, how,” and warned “Israel will not remain apathetic 19 it is, at the same time, gaining valuable military to such a development.” experience fighting in a complex war. From many Israel is preparing for the possibility that Hezbollah standpoints, the IDF will face a foe with the will try infiltrating Israeli territory to conquer areas operational capabilities of a modern military force near the northern border in the next escalation, in the next conflict. Hezbollah has been deterred and strike at critical infrastructure such as Israel’s from opening another front against Israel, as it maritime gas platforms. However, intelligence has been for the past decade since the Second analysts agree that Hezbollah has no interest in Lebanon War. The group even refrained from opening a second front against Israel in the near significantly responding to IAF attacks against its future. The group is still fighting in Syria and has strategic arms convoys from Iran through Syria. suffered heavy casualties. Of course, one cannot However, Hezbollah’s continued efforts to arm exclude the possibility of an unintended escalation itself with advanced weapons and base itself in that could lead to a war, even against the interests southern Syria, together with Israel’s tenacity to of both sides. thwart these efforts, could escalate to revenge IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot noted, attacks against Israel and Jewish targets abroad, “The effort to prevent Hezbollah from upgrading and eventually another direct armed conflict. the accuracy of its missile and rocket array is one Hezbollah is currently deployed in around 240 Shia of the top operational priorities for the IDF.” 20 It villages in southern Lebanon. It has an array of over is not unfounded to imagine a security escalation 120,000 rockets, some of which can strike deep in the wake of one of these IDF pre-emptive into Israel and with greater accuracy than those operations. Experts assess that the next war in the Hamas launched in Protective Edge (August 2014). north will be harder on the Israeli home front than Nasrallah even threatened (February 16, 2016) any war in the past. that in the next conflict, his forces, by launching

missiles at the chemical facilities in Haifa Bay, will have the effect of a nuclear strike on Israel.

54 the jewish people policy institute ISIS ideas and spirit ISIS represents – in the Middle East and beyond. Many ISIS fighters in Syria and ISIS was not able to withstand the onset of the Iraq are expected to return to their countries of coalition of forces allied against it in recent origin where ISIS’ message still resonates for many months. The group lost 50 percent of the territory Muslims. As the demise of ISIS nears, so does the it had captured in Iraq and Syria, including its question mark around the day after: Who will fill stronghold in Mosul, the most significant city it the void left in Syria and Iraq, and will they be controlled in Iraq. The expected fall of its Syrian able to impose order and stability? Fulfilling this capital, Al-Raqqa, would signal a final defeat, but challenge seems almost utopian. will not end the organization’s ability to continue to wreak havoc. In any case, the defeats ISIS has We will likely witness additional shocks to regional suffered broke its halo of invincibility, and eroded stability. For example, the Kurdish decision to the force of attraction it held for young Muslims hold a national referendum (September 25, 2017) around the world. It will likely try to increase its in northern Iraq on secession and independence murderous terror attacks abroad – outside the could exert a destabilizing effect that energizes the Middle East and within it in – to compensate for central government in Baghdad’s resolve to keep these losses. ISIS-inspired terror elements are still these oil rich territories. Other countries fear that operating in Sinai. Although focused on fighting this move could encourage separatist demands the Egyptian army, they have conducted some in their own countries, especially Turkey and Iran attacks on Israel and could attempt more. Even in where there are considerable Kurdish populations. southern Syria, an ISIS presence could turn its guns on Israel if pressed. Saudi Arabia Washington has identified ISIS as a main threat. U.S. bombers strike ISIS targets and provide The crowning of the Saudi King Salman (January intelligence to coalition fighters (which has 23, 2015) has brought significant changes to the created a sort of indirect cooperation between kingdom. Muhammad bin Salman, the 31-year- the U.S. and Iran, which also considers the Sunni old son of the king who is simultaneously Defense ISIS a dangerous threat). Achievements in the fight Minister and Chair of the Economic Development against ISIS do not guarantee the destruction of Council, and who was recently named first crown its social and religious infrastructure, the network prince (June 21, 2017), is leading these changes. through which its ideology spreads. Even if its Saudi Arabia has adopted a more assertive territorial bases in Syria and Iraq fall, ISIS – or its foreign policy and has become more aggressive heirs – could continue to prove a practical threat toward Iran and its allies. Based on current low and significant ideological challenge. After all, oil prices and the sense that the country requires there is still a core of significant support for the comprehensive reforms, the crown prince

the jewish people policy institute 55 launched (April 25, 2016) a long-term plan, “Saudi Qatar and enacted a boycott on air, sea, and land Vision 2030,” to diversify the Saudi economy’s transportation between them and the kingdom. revenue sources – to free it of its dependence They are demanding Qatar significantly decrease on oil and place it on a development and its ties with Iran, halt its support for terror groups, modernization path. label the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia is exhibiting its determination to block and Hezbollah terror organizations, shut down Iran from achieving regional hegemony. Riyadh was Al-Jazeera, and put a stop to Turkey’s military taken aback by President Obama’s comments that presence there. it would have to get used to a reality that offers Iran While Iran, Turkey, and Russia are waiting to a legitimate space for regional influence. Riyadh exploit the crisis to deepen their grasp on the rich sees Iran’s moves to broaden its reach with the kingdom, the U.S. is trying to mediate between the aid of Shia militias in Iraq, parties. It is safe to say that the aggressive line Saudi Syria, Lebanon and Yemen Arabia is taking was reinforced by President Trump’s Half of Egypt’s as an existential threat, and official visit to the kingdom (May 21, 2017) and his population it is determined to block sweeping support of Riyadh in its conflict with Iran. subsists on less that threat. The Saudi air This visit helped secure a massive 110 billion USD that 2 dollars a force is conducting an arms sale from the United States, which has the day air campaign in Yemen, potential to threaten Israel’s QME. and Saudi financial aid Muhammad Bin Salman is seen as more open to is backing rebel forces in the possibility of advancing relations with Israel Syria. than his predecessors. However, he is reluctant Inspired by Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi to take official steps to publically normalize Arabia is not deterred from taking aggressive cooperation with Jerusalem as long as there is no action, most recently against Qatar, the tiny real progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue (see kingdom that possesses some of the biggest gas below). fields in the world. Riyadh seems to have lost all patience for Qatar’s double game. Egypt Qatar, which hosts the giant U.S. air force base Al Udeid with its 11,000 troops, is developing Egypt continues to struggle with difficult security its relations with Iran while also providing and economic challenges. Unless there is a drop sympathetic media coverage of the Muslim in its birthrate (2.6 percent), Egypt’s population Brotherhood and Hamas through Al Jazeera. Saudi is expected to reach 180 million by 2050. Half of Arabia and the UAE, together with Egypt, Bahrain, Egypt’s population subsists on less than 2 dollars and Yemen, have severed diplomatic ties with a day. The IMF conditioned aid to Egypt (12

56 the jewish people policy institute billion USD) on significant economic reforms. Jordan The Egyptian government, which agreed to float Jordan absorbed 1.4 million Syrian refugees, its currency and cut subsidies for basic goods, 13 percent of the kingdom’s population. These faces difficult dilemmas. If it moves to privatize refugees are draining Jordan’s already fragile its economy, it would harm the military, which economy and are a source of instability. These controls considerable parts of the economy. are in addition to the hundreds of thousands of Therefore, the Egyptian government is required to refugees already there from Iraq. Together, they harm its greatest source of support. use up almost 20 percent of Jordan’s budget. King At the same time, lifting subsidies – a key Abdullah ll warned that his country could reach a requirement of the IMF – would lead to “boiling point… sooner or later as the dam could skyrocketing prices of basic goods and could result burst.”21 in public unrest, a public already living under a The Jordanian economy regime whose record on democratic principles further suffers from and human rights is perhaps worse than under The Jordanian trade limitations with Mubarak. The Egyptian government continues to economy suffers its neighbors who are hunt the Muslim Brotherhood, which it regards from trade mired in violent domestic as a grave threat. It has, further, yet to defeat limitations with conflicts – Syria is in terror groups either loyal to ISIS or inspired by its neighbors a civil war and Iraq is it, or Islamist elements from the fringes of the who are mired fighting ISIS. Tourism has Brotherhood who became radicalized and violent. in violent decreased due to security They have struck sensitive targets, such as the domestic concerns. Its supply of double attack on Coptic churches in Tanta and conflicts subsidized gas from Egypt Alexandria in which 45 were killed (April 2017), has been cut off because or the suicide bombing in northern Sinai (July 7, of pipeline attacks in Sinai, which has caused 2017) which killed 27 Egyptian soldiers. Jordan to turn to more expensive alternatives. The threats from terror and Islamist actors, These problems come on top of preexisting the chaos in Sinai due to ISIS, and the danger difficulties undermining the Jordanian economy: emanating from Iran’s growing regional presence, just 36 percent of working age Jordanians are create a situation that invites greater cooperation employed, only 15 percent of women are in the with Israel. labor force, and the youth unemployment rate is 40 percent. The Jordanian regime must prepare for outside security challenges such as ISIS attacks and spillover from the Syrian Civil War into Jordanian

the jewish people policy institute 57 territory. A ceasefire agreement in Syria could a moment of great significance in the relationship harm Jordan’s security interests as it would place of the two neighboring states. hostile forces on its border, either ISIS or Iran Despite the mutual interest Jordan and Israel have loyalists. in closer relations, especially in security matters, Additionally, the Jordanian regime must contend there is also a fragility due to the Palestinian with domestic radical Islamists (about 2500 context. Disturbances on the Temple Mount, and Jordanians joined the jihadi ranks in Iraq and Syria, the killing of a Jordanian attacker and bystander and many are expected to return home) as well by an Israeli embassy security guard (July 23, a reality in which over half the population is of 2017) exposed this fragility. King Abdullah issued Palestinian origin and influenced by the upheavals a warning (July 27, 2017) that the way Israel deals of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In an interview in with the embassy guard will directly impact the Washington Post (April 6, 2017) King Abdullah relations between the countries. spoke about incidents in which his forces killed 40 terrorists, 96 percent of whom were of Palestinian origin. The king’s conclusion: “So if we don’t move Turkey the Israeli-Palestinian process forward, that is a The failed coup attempt (July 15, 2016) allowed major recruiting [opportunity] for disenfranchised President Erdogan to declare a state of emergency 22 and frustrated people.” (which he has yet to lift), to get rid of opponents The foreign media have reported on widespread and to shore up his rule. In his extensive purge security cooperation between Israel and Jordan. campaign, some 50,000 people were arrested and Israel came to Jordan’s rescue and provided a 100,000 lost their jobs. Erdogan also achieved his solution to its crippling water shortage. In addition goal of switching the regime from a parliamentary to the 50 million cubic meters Israel transfers each system to a presidential one in which he has the year to Jordan according to the peace accords, key powers. The decision was reached with a Israel has transferred an additional 50 million cubic slim majority in a national referendum (April 16, meters of water from the Galilee. In exchange, 2017), Erdogan lost in Turkey’s three main cities – Jordan agreed to transfer a similar amount to Israel Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. from a desalination plant north of Aqaba. The two Erdogan’s personality and demeanor have led to counties are cooperating in planning the water sharp polarization within Turkey and widened conveyance system from the Red Sea to the Dead existing divisions with the West. During the Sea, and have signed an agreement for a 15-year campaign prior to the vote, Erdogan called gas supply from Israel valued at 10 billion USD. Germany and Holland “Nazi remnants” when When the first gas supply began flowing from the they refused to allow his ministers to disseminate Tamar gas field to the potash plant in Jordan in election propaganda in the Turkish immigrant the southern Dead Sea area (January 2017), it was

58 the jewish people policy institute communities in their countries. Despite whatever response, Erdogan warned Israel from trying to aversion to Erdogan, the West cannot ignore the wrench Al Aqsa from Muslim control: “The Israeli strategic importance of Turkey, its membership in soldiers defile the ground of Al Aqsa with their NATO, significant involvement in Syria, and as the combat boots…”24 This was the same Erdogan gatekeeper controlling the flow of refugees into who justifying the rapprochement agreement Europe. to journalists argued the utility of normalized Turkey has suffered a series of terror attacks, relations with Israel: “This normalization process some perpetrated by ISIS and others by Kurdish has a lot to offer to us, to Israel, to Palestine and 25 separatists. But the bulk of Turkey’s concerns lie in also to the region. The region needs this.” the threat posed by Kurdish nationalism. Turkey On the Israeli side, there are no illusions that fears that pressure from its Kurdish citizens to relations will return fast, if at all, to the high levels secede and declare independence will rise if an of security and intelligence cooperation that independent Kurdish state is established on its existed before the crisis. Indeed, in the wake of this border. These form the background to Ankara’s diminished cooperation with Ankara, and in light opposition to the referendum on Kurdish of the need to secure the gas fields and prepare for independence in Iraq, and tensions with the marketing their output, Israel has been working to United States as it supports the Kurdish forces strengthen relations with Greece and Cyprus. in Syria (YPG) in its fight against ISIS. Even its relationship with Russia, although remediated from the plummet that followed the downing of a Russian jet in its airspace (end of 2015) and D. The Palestinian System despite cooperation to de-escalate Syria, is mired President Trump once again stated his aspiration in mutual suspicion and conflicting interests. to achieve the “ultimate deal” and broker a peace Relations with Turkey show how mercurial the agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Middle East is and demands that Israel conduct He called for Israel to restrain settlement itself with caution and strategic acumen. The construction and delayed his campaign promise rapprochement deal with Ankara (June 28, 2016) to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem so as not and the possibilities it opened for deepening to hobble chances to advance Israeli-Palestinian relations (including gas exports) did not prevent negotiations (June 1, 2017). Continued American President Erdogan from sharply rebuking Israel, leadership over the peace process grants Israel accusing it of the “Judaification” of Jerusalem the opportunity of working with a sympathetic and conducting an apartheid policy: “Each day interlocutor, but American pressure to make Jerusalem is under occupation is an insult to painful concessions could eventually sour relations us.”23 After the Temple Mount terror attack with the Trump administration, supportive as it and Israel’s installation of metal detectors in may be.

the jewish people policy institute 59 Trumps steps, thus far, reflect a strategy to involve push American legislation that would withhold a the Sunni moderates in a regional deal that significant portion of aid to the PA.) includes the Palestinians. Arab League members At the same time, the right-wing faction of the stepped up to the president’s challenge, and governing coalition is working to obstruct any final reiterated, in the summary statement issued by status negotiations. HaBayit HaYehudi’s proposed the League summit in Jordan (March 30, 2017), amendment to the Basic Law on Jerusalem their commitment to peace with Israel based on passed a first ministerial vote (July 26, 2017). the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The Saudi king, The bill stipulates that a minimum of 80 Knesset during Trump’s visit, committed his country’s help members (two-thirds) must vote affirmatively in these efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian before any transfer of Jerusalem territories to a 26 conflict (May 20, 2017). However, the Arab foreign entity. The Israeli political right is even world is in no hurry to publically show signs of pressing limitations on the prime minister’s power normalization with Israel, to enact “confidence building measures” with the Continued and demands real progress Palestinians. The cabinet decision to freeze the settlement with the Palestinians as a September 2016 plan to build 6000 housing units construction precondition. The harsh for Palestinians near Qalqilya is an example of this. raises doubts anti-Israel responses of (A positive development in Israel’s relationship about the the Arab states after the with the Palestinians was the joint announcement sincerity Temple Mount incident (July 13, 2017) of an agreement that will allow of Israel’s (July 2017) illustrate the the Palestinian Authority to purchase 32 million intentions limits the Palestinian cubic meters of water at a discounted rate, as conflict places on part of their participation in the pipeline project, advancing relations with transferring water from the Red Sea to the Dead Israel. Sea.) At this stage, the Trump administration has yet to Continued settlement construction is the issue formulate a path to success; all its predecessors that draws the most international criticism failed. Formidable gaps between Israeli and and raises doubts about the sincerity of Israel’s Palestinian positions show just how daunting intentions. The Israeli government is maneuvering the challenge really is. The passing time does not between Trump’s demands to restrain settlement increase mutual trust, and both sides doubt the construction in Judea and Samaria and domestic sincerity of the other’s intentions. Prime Minster political pressures to build. Thus, when the Netanyahu has demanded that the PA prove its government authorized planning and construction commitment to peace by stopping payments to of 2500 units in Judea and Samaria, and the the families of terrorists and security prisoners prime minister announced, “We build – and will 27 held by Israel. (Netanyahu’s stance could help continue to build,”28 the White House released

60 the jewish people policy institute a statement saying that settlement expansion The lack of mutual trust between Israel and the could interfere with the peace process. The EU Palestinians is not the only hurdle the American responded to the construction and to The Judea mediator will have to overcome. The Palestinians and Samaria Settlement Regulation Law (intended are split both geographically and organizationally, to retroactively legalize the status of settlements and a reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas is built on private Palestinian lands) by delaying not on the horizon (although there may be some a planned diplomatic summit with Israel.29 In cosmetic unification steps taken, as in the past). protest of the Regulation Law, Chancellor Merkel The American side is debating a basic question cancelled a planned Israeli-German government about the viability of a “two-state solution” if summit.30 Pressure brought by President Trump Gaza functions as a separate state. In practice, the forced the Israeli government to limit construction Palestinian centers of government, split between as much as is possible to within existing settlement Ramallah and Gaza, function poorly (especially in blocs. As Netanyahu explained to his cabinet Gaza). A regime change ministers: “This is a very friendly administration (Abu Mazen is 82 and On the and we need to take the president’s requests into seems to be nearing the Palestinian consideration.”31 end of his reign), could side, calls are At this stage, the sides are waiting until the Trump spark succession struggles growing to administration initiates a diplomatic plan. It is still and might harm security demand full unclear what the plan will look like, how it will cooperation with Israel. rights and involve the regional actors, and how insistent the The West Bank Palestinian equality in one White House will be in light of the considerable public is disappointed in state gaps between the two sides. Jared Kushner, the Palestinian Authority’s Trump’s son in law and senior adviser, expressed performance and is doubt in a leaked conversation with White House doubtful that the current interns (July 31, 2017): “We’re trying to work with leadership can effectuate an end to the Israeli the parties very quietly to see if there’s a solution. occupation. And there may be no solution…”32 The title of an essay by two Palestinian professors If the U.S. demurs from advancing an Israeli- (August 6, 2017), Hussein Agha and Ahmad Palestinian agreement and abandons its leadership Khalidi, who were for many years involved in of the peace process, Israel could be at risk as Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, illustrates the level it would allow less sympathetic international of frustration: “The End of this Road: The Decline 33 actors to take control in America’s stead. On the of the Palestinian National Movement.” This Palestinian side, there are growing calls to drop atmosphere of frustration – especially among demands for an independent state, insisting younger Palestinians – set the stage for the instead on full rights and equality in one state. outbreak of the “Lone Wolf” intifada. The violence

the jewish people policy institute 61 that erupted in Jerusalem in October 2015 and Special forces that can infiltrate Israel have been spread to the West Bank and then other parts of trained, and the manufacture of arms locally – of Israel has yet to fully subside. Israel must contend rockets, mortars, and UAVs – has become more with spontaneous outbreaks of violence that sophisticated. occur without prior warning. The perpetrators Hamas’ ground forces commander Yahya Sinwar are not connected to known terror organizations, was elected to head the movement in Gaza in and the organizational challenge of obtaining early place of Ismail Haniyeh (February 13, 2017), an intelligence is difficult. But diplomatic stagnation is indication of the growing strength of the most not the only element behind this violence. Among militant line within the organization. Haniyeh younger Palestinians, there is deep frustration with himself was elected to replace Khaled Mashal as their own shaky social reality, the high levels of head of the Hamas Political Bureau (May 6, 2017). corruption and general failure of the Palestinian These developments illustrate the dominance leadership and its governance. of the “domestic” leadership in Hamas over its The Palestinian prisoner hunger strike, initiated on “foreign” leadership. Due to growing pressure April 15, 2017 by senior Fatah member Marwan from Egypt – and possibly to try to appease the Barghouti, ended without sparking a new uprising, US, Hamas even published a modification of its as many feared. This fear was renewed by the charter (May 1, 2017), according to which it will gunning down of two Israeli police officers in a accept the establishment of a Palestinian state Temple Mount terrorist attack (July 14, 2017). In within 1967 borders, but not recognize Israel. The response, Israel placed metal detectors at the site document does not portend a change in Hamas entrances. The Palestinians claimed the move was policy anytime soon, and its charter still maintains meant to entrench Israeli sovereignty over the the commitment to an armed struggle to free all of holy site and responded with violent protests that Palestine. President Trump was also not impressed led to the deaths of three Palestinians. Abu Mazen by Hamas efforts to project moderation. In then announced that he was cutting ties with Israel his speech in Saudi Arabia (May 21, 2017) he (July 21, 2017). In accordance with the Palestinian mentioned the group in the same breath as ISIS, Waqf’s demands, Israel relented and removed the AL-Qaeda, and Hezbollah. metal detectors and security cameras (July 21, Egypt sees Hamas as a branch of the hated Muslim 2017) it had installed, allowing the Palestinians to Brotherhood and, although highly suspicious of celebrate what they viewed as a major victory over it, is prepared to reach understandings with it. the Israeli government. The Egyptians are taking advantage of Hamas’ Hamas – Since the end of “Operation Protective weakness and its dependence on the Rafah Border Edge” (August 26, 2014), Hamas has worked to Crossing as its only connection to the outside rebuild its capabilities, especially its rocket arsenal world. They deal harshly with it, demand it cut and the tunnels that lead into Israeli territory. ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, and extradite

62 the jewish people policy institute Sinai terrorists taking shelter in Gaza, and those Abu Mazen is fighting against Hamas with suspected of abetting them. The Egyptians economic pressure on Gaza. He cut the salaries created a buffer zone on the Egyptian side of of PA employees in Gaza, stopped payments to the Gaza border, flooded the smuggling tunnels Gaza’s health system, and aggravated the existing with seawater, and succeeded in significantly electricity crisis by withholding payments to Israel diminishing arms smuggling into Gaza through for the power it supplies to Gaza (30 percent of Sinai. In order to appease the Egyptians, Hamas Gaza’s electricity comes from Israel). has also begun establishing a buffer zone on its Egypt and Muhammad Dahlan, Abu Mazen’s side of the border in order to deny terrorists free political nemesis, brokered a deal with Hamas, passage and to prevent arms from flowing from in which Egypt will help ease the electricity and Gaza into Sinai. medicine shortages and reconstruct the Rafah Hamas, which is under heavy external pressure Crossing with an aim to reopen it. In exchange, (from Israel and Egypt), is also the object of Hamas agreed to establish a buffer zone on its domestic criticism and unrest over the ruins border with Sinai (mostly to cut off ties between that remain from Protective Edge in 2014, the Gaza and ISIS in Sinai). To Abu Mazen’s dismay, poverty and continued siege, the harsh economic this allowed Dahlan to deepen his involvement in conditions, and high unemployment (in the 20- Gaza’s affairs. Hamas’ readiness to accept this deal 24 age cohort, unemployment in Gaza stands is also partly the result of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to at 67 percent while it is 30 percent in the West isolate Qatar, which has the side effect of causing Bank). Gazans have access to electricity just a few the Gaza Strip and Hamas harm through the hours each day, and the quality of their water is drying up of an important funding source. getting worse. At the same time, Hamas rewards Hamas generally works to maintain quiet on its its cronies with housing and jobs, and siphons off border with Israel, but at the same time encourages part of the international humanitarian aid coming terrorist acts from the West Bank. Recent rocket into Gaza for its own uses. The situation is dire fire from Gaza has usually been launched by rebel and leaves a fertile ground for the rise of more jihadi groups, but the danger of an escalation extremists Jihadist groups. leading to a military conflict with Hamas hovers in The difficult situation in Gaza has been the air. The IDF assesses that a military conflict is a exacerbated in the months since Abu Mazen possibility given the harsh economic situation in decided to take advantage of Hamas’ strategic the Gaza and the comprehensive Israeli program weakness and pressure it into accepting his terms to uncover and block terror tunnels into Israel, for a reconciliation. He presented this to the which deprives Hamas of a strategic asset. Trump administration as evidence of his efforts in the war against Islamic terror.

the jewish people policy institute 63 Summary combined populations constitute a third of the world’s total population, recognize an interest in Israel is currently in the midst of an uncertainty cultivating relations with Israel and have not been laden strategic environment, in both the global deterred by pressure from the Muslim world, as dimension relevant to Israel’s security and, perhaps in the past. However, despite a certain decrease more urgently, the regional dimension. The in efforts to wear away at Israel’s international injection of President Trump as an influential actor standing with boycotts and de-legitimization into global and regional affairs only compounds campaigns, Israel is still vulnerable to the damage the uncertainty. such efforts could inflict. A case in point are the Israel’s growing might does not solve the recent UNESCO resolutions ignoring the historical underlying lack of security stability in the Middle Jewish connection to the Temple Mount (October East. Regional stability could be disrupted at any 13, 2016), and which designated the Cave of the time, even if the parties involved have no interest Patriarchs and Hebron’s Old City Palestinian as in a violent escalation in the foreseeable future. heritage sites in grave danger of being harmed It is easy to imagine scenarios that lead to a new (July 7, 2017). intifada in the territories, or another war with Along with the challenges and threats, Israel has Hezbollah, or even war with Syrian and Iranian considerable opportunities ahead of it: to develop forces in the north, or against Hamas in the its relations with the United States; to deepen south. The threat of a rapid and violent escalation cooperation with the moderate Sunni states; and requires Israel to carefully consider each move it to make use of its assets to further develop its makes. network of international connections (including Alongside these troubling challenges, the past year in Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union). offered evidence of Israel’s improved international Israel’s strategic strength and the existence of a standing. This is the result of Israel’s military, sympathetic president in Washington open a economic, and strategic prowess, as well as its window for diplomatic activity that would block “soft power.” the danger of Israel moving toward a bi-national reality that would threaten Israel’s Jewish identity. Israeli innovation (especially in hi-tech, cyber, Israel can act now, under relatively favorable hydro, and agricultural technologies) has garnered conditions, to ensure its future as a strong and a world-class reputation. Based on this, Israel is attractive Jewish and democratic state. Israel fast developing relations with the rising powers should not dally in taking advantage of this of Asia and Africa. Headlining this trend was the strategic window of opportunity; there is no first ever state visit of an Indian prime minister guarantee it will remain open. – Narendra Modi – to Israel (July 2017). Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to China (March 2017) reflected the same trend. These two giants, whose

64 the jewish people policy institute Endnotes 1 Delivered on May 21, 2017 23 Haaretz, May 8, 2017 2 Ibid. 24 Haaretz, July 25, 2017 3 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine,The Atlantic, 25 Hürriyet Daily News, December 14, 2015 April 2016 Issue. 26 Haaretz, May 20, 2017 4 Ibid. 27 According to the PA’s criteria, a prisoner sentenced 5 Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017 as a terrorist by Israel for over 30 years earns a monthly stipend of 3000 USD. This is four times the average salary 6 Ibid. within the Palestinian territories 7 Ibid. 28 Haaretz, January 24, 2017 8 New York Times, July 28, 2017 29 Haaretz, February 7, 2017 9 Guardian, August 8, 2017 30 Haaretz, February 13, 2017 10 Independent, February 18, 2017 31 Haaretz, March 31, 2017 11 Thus, Russia spent 68 billion dollars on military 32 Wired, August 1, 2017 expenditures in the previous year while NATO’s European members spent a combined 265 billion. Russia’s 33 The New Yorker, August 6, 2017 population is shrinking and stands today at 144 million, while Europe passed the half billion marker. Total Russian GDP is 2 trillion dollars while Europe’s stands at 16 trillion. 12 Pew Research Center, 5 facts about how Americans view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, May 23, 2016 13 Haaretz, August 16, 2017 14 Haaretz, December 1, 2015 15 Haaretz, July 17, 2017 16 New York Times, July 19, 2017 17 Haaretz, July 5, 2017 18 Al Monitor, March 3, 2017 19 Haaretz, June 22, 2017 20 Haaretz, July 5, 2017 21 Al Monitor, May 16, 2017 (quote from an interview with King Abdullah in BBC from February 2016) 22 Al Monitor, May 16, 2017.

the jewish people policy institute 65 The Challenge Facing Israel and the Diaspora Given the Shifting Trends in the West JPPI’s 2017 Brainstorming Conference – 9 Integrative Summary

Introduction JPPI’s 2017 Conference on the Future of the and the Jewish people, this issue was discussed Jewish People (Feb. 28 – March 1, 2017) as well and its relevant trends are included in assessed the social, political, economic, and Part 2 of this report. Part 3 lays out a set of policy ideological shifts taking place in the Western challenges and dilemmas generated in Conference world that could influence the future of the discussions and offers decision makers some key Jewish people. In addition to identifying key policy recommendations. (The original report was trends and gauging their possible ramifications, updated ahead of the publication of JPPI’s Annual the Conference framed policy dilemmas and Assessment of the Jewish People.) formulated potential policy recommendations to help mitigate negative trends and leverage new Shifts in the West – Challenges and opportunities. The following paper is a summary Dilemmas that Call for Policy Measures outlining the Conference’s main insights. Since in Israel and the Diaspora the shifts taking place in the West are surrounded Shifting trends in the West may have significant by uncertainty, it must be noted that the possible implications for Israel and the Jewish people. These avenues of influence are at times contradictory. developments require shaping policy measures As developments taking place within Israel itself to both mitigate potential negative effects and affect the Western world’s approach to Israel leverage new opportunities.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 67 Six main areas posing policy dilemmas and challenges to decision makers in Israel and Diaspora Jewish communities were identified in conference discussions: 1. Formulating Israel’s policy vis-a-vis the Trump administration on diplomatic and ideological matters. 2. Formulating policy with respect to far-right parties in Europe. 3. Shaping a strategy in response to the changing world order and the rise of non-Western powers. 4. Improving Israel-Diaspora relations in light of trends of polarization and alienation in the West. 5. Taking steps to strengthen Diaspora Jewry given current trends challenging the centrality of communities and institutions. 6. Monitoring illiberal internal Israeli trends and curbing initiatives negatively affecting the values and image of the Jewish state.

Part 1 relationship with America. A number of elements led to the destabilizing of these cornerstones: A. Upsetting the Existing International American “exhaustion” from being the global Order policeman (including investing in expensive wars It is clear that in recent years there has been a in the Middle East); the Obama Doctrine which weakening of the cornerstones at the base of the limited the intervention of American forces world order as we have known it since the collapse while prioritizing dialogue and acting within of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. multi-lateral frameworks; “the Putin Doctrine” This order was based on American dominance which took advantage of the diminished U.S. (even while the international system tilted toward role (seen as a show of American weakness) and multi-polarity), institutions of “global governance” strengthened Russia’s global position; China’s (such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, IAEA and rising power; Europe’s weakening and the growing others), trans-Atlantic cooperation between the doubts over its collective identity and future; and United States and Europe, expanding globalization the upsetting of the domestic-political order. and international trade and free markets based on The Middle East provided an important liberal values. contribution to this trend as the old order In the framework of this world order, the United collapsed, turning Syria into a blood-soaked States was the dominant external actor in the catastrophe, sending waves of terror and refugees Middle East, and Israel benefited from its close to Europe, testing both the Obama and Putin

68 the jewish people policy institute Doctrines. This upset of the world order has American deterrence that had deteriorated during created dangers for Israel and troubling fissures in the previous administration, and act as a leading its relationship with the United States on the one power in the international arena. That said, it hand, while on the other hand Israel has managed is difficult to assess at this time to what extent to maintain working relations with Russia and President Trump will persist with this policy. China and to develop regional alliances. Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris In the emerging international reality, we are Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), and the reasoning witnessing: rising nationalism and populism and he presented: “I was elected to represent the a growing critique of globalization; the aggressive citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris”, can be interpreted moves of Moscow in Eastern Europe and the that he is not rushing to shoulder the burden of Middle East; strategic Chinese assertiveness global leadership. (South China Sea, penetrating deep into Africa, It’s possible that Trump In the emerging establishing a naval port in Djibouti, and its will try to reach a grand international economic infrastructure initiative framed as bargain with Putin to reality, we are its “One Belt One Road” policy” (a modern Silk implement a new world witnessing Road)); cracks in the EU (Brexit) which is also order. This will not be rising under the heavy strain of terror and refugees; the a simple task given the nationalism, strengthening of right-wing nationalist parties many areas of contention populism and in Europe (despite their losses in France, The between the two powers. a growing Netherlands and Austria); the rise of alternative The range of possibilities criticism of regional institutions (the Chinese Infrastructure as to the future of globalization Investment Bank and the Shanghai Europe Asia Washington-Moscow Alliance); and the rise of Turkey and Iran’s weight relations is wide: tight as regional powers. cooperation at one end and a new Cold War on The ascendance of the Trump administration the other. As for the United States and China, is the most conspicuous expression of how the there is the possibility of an escalation into a trade domestic-political order is being upset and how war. The Trump administration could also weaken it can dramatically influence the current world the UN, NATO, and other American alliances. order. It is not yet clear how the United States (That is, in the framework of a general American will navigate between an isolationist trend and trend of moving away from a sense of American possible impulses for international aggression. The exceptionalism and responsibility for world peace dozens of cruise missiles fired at a Syrian military and to maintaining it, which has characterized base (April 2017) in response to Assad’s use of American foreign policy in the past.) chemical weapons in Idlib sent a clear message as to the new president’s intention to reestablish

the jewish people policy institute 69 Possible Implications for Israel and • American-Russian understandings could Diaspora Jewry limit Israel’s maneuvering room. At the same time, an American-Russian or American- Israel Chinese conflict could generate new risks and The disruption of the established world order dilemmas for Israel. and the possibility that a new order will coalesce • Presently, it is difficult to assess how the presents challenges but also opportunities for emerging international reality will influence Israel: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At this stage, • In a world in which nationalist and isolationist the U.S. continues to take a leading role in tendencies seem to be on the rise, the achieving a settlement; however, only time will inclination to intervene in Israel’s affairs tell if Washington will maintain its leadership could diminish. On the other hand, this role or relinquish it to other actors. development may also erode the inclination • The continued American leadership of the to come to Israel’s aid in times of need. peace process creates opportunities for Israel • The growing influence of nationalism over to advance an agreement under a sympathetic cosmopolitanism could lead to greater interlocutor. However, it could also invite acceptance in the West of Israel’s position: a pressure to offer painful concessions that state seeking to maintain and assert its Jewish would eventually cast a shadow over the national identity. relationship with the Trump administration, • It is reasonable to assume that the relationship as supportive as it may be. with the American administration will • In a world that increasingly relies on scientific strengthen and maybe even become a force and technological innovation, Israel has the multiplier for improving relations between potential for significant achievements. In Israel and key countries in the Middle East. addition to the economic benefits, meeting • If the United States’ tendency to decrease its this potential will strengthen Israel’s “soft commitment to a moral global vision grows, power” in the West (and in the world while employing a narrow test of what falls generally) and strengthen Israel’s image as the within the “American interest”, it could decide “Start-up Nation.” not to support Israel on issues that it deems to • Cutting-edge technologies could help close be in contradiction with its material interests. the qualitative gap between Israel and its • The U.S. focus on domestic issues while enemies, who could equip themselves with neglecting its role as global leader, especially advanced arms that do not require a special in the Middle East, would harm Israel and infrastructure of quality education and even erode its deterrent force. training (which is required today to operate an advanced military force).

70 the jewish people policy institute Diaspora Jewry forces and globalization trends, new technologies • Innovative technologies engender social and robotics, have diverted many blue-collar atomization and could thus further imperil jobs overseas, hurting mostly the working class Jewish solidarity (“the end of the community and leading to growing economic polarization. campfire”). Alongside the erosion of the Migration, from Latin America to the United role of veteran organizations, closed virtual States, and from Africa and the Middle East dialogue groups are developing that isolate to Europe, including illegals, has exacerbated them from society at large. frustrations as many fear these immigrants will compete for scarce jobs. Beyond this, the • New technologies – those that make immigration and resulting demographic trends intercontinental travel more efficient and have fed into a sense of cultural displacement affordable as well as social networks – allow among white Christians, who feel increasingly a strengthening of connections between like a minority “in their own country.” As Muslim Diaspora and Israeli Jews. Virtual Jewish minorities expand demographically and become dialogue communities are expanding. At the more assertive and integrate into local politics, so same time, individuals have greater exposure does the fear and concern in Europe. The wave of to alternative identities. The deepening of refugees, the largest since the end of World War “leisure culture” reinforces the potential for II, is seen in Europe as a demographic, cultural, such developments. and security threat. At the same time, the wave • A dynamic world characterized by scientific of terror rooted in radical Islam is striking at the and technological innovation tends to reward heart of Europe and adding to a sense of fear and excellence. This opens new horizons for the disorientation. The formation of ISIS, and the Jewish people, which has a long record of thousands of young Muslims from Europe who achievement and excellence in these areas. have gone off to join its ranks, signaled to many Europeans the failure of the open border, multi- B. Upsetting the Existing Domestic cultural system, and the failure of current political Political Order in the West structures to deal with the threat. Alongside the upheaval in the existing world These issues have strengthened “fear based order, in recent years we have also witnessed an politics,” turning people against the other, those erosion of the stability of the political order in the who are different (nationally, socially, economically West as the doubts surrounding the validity of or religiously). its foundational values grow: the liberal-capitalist economic system based on free markets and The social media discourse encourages short, globalization. blunt and violent messages that attract attention. In many cases, information reaching the public is The continued effects of the 2008 economic biased or twisted to serve a specific agenda. Even crisis, combined with free-market capitalist

the jewish people policy institute 71 worse, the lines between “real” and “fake” news and parties espousing – with an Islamophobic have been blurred and “alternative facts” are widely soundtrack – populist economic, immigration, disseminated and often left unchallenged. Social and security policies. media based information sources and partisan Potential Impacts on Israel and Diaspora news outlets do not allow adequate filtering, fact Jewry checking, or balanced reporting. Dialogue has become over simplified. Nuanced discourse has Israel been replaced by simple messages powered by • Israel’s strategic standing improves due to emotional rather than intellectual forces. Political the rise of the new U.S. administration, which rhetoric has evolved into a repetition of black publicly proclaims its support of Israel and and white slogans aimed at the lowest common expresses hostility toward Israel’s enemies. denominator. • At this stage, the U.S. has blocked the political There is a feeling in the impulse of some of Israel’s right wing elements Israel’s strategic West that traditional to take advantage of what they consider a standing has elements of governance “window of opportunity” opened by Trump’s improved due – the political system, election: to annex West Bank territory – in to the new parties, parliaments – do part or in its entirety – and foreclose the American not represent the interests possibility of a two-state solution. However, administration, of a significant segment of only time will tell if Washington keeps this which expresses the population that feels “window” shut. hostility toward alienated from political • Rise in support for Israel given the strength Israel’s enemies elites and traditional of right-wing populist parties in Europe that political structures, mostly support Israel (not Le Pen’s party, and powerless to effect which lost the presidential elections, and change, even through elections. The fact that supports banning, for example, external political leaders can speak to tens of millions Jewish symbols such as the kippa from the instantaneously and gauge their responses public sphere). immediately, contributes to a weakening of the institutions of representative democracy. • Increased support for Israel based on the growing fear of Islamic terror and immigration. This, combined with a general frustration and Increasing openness to Israel’s claims that disappointment with the traditional ruling classes, there is no difference between terror aimed at seen as corrupt or out of touch, has fueled the rise Israel and terror aimed at the West. of populist parties and politicians seeking to take on the ruling elites. One trend we are watching is • Increased legitimization of nationalistic trends the rise of nationalistic right-wing political figures in Israel.

72 the jewish people policy institute • Radicalization among the most liberal influence of American pro-Israel organizations elements of the Democratic Party in the U.S. (despite this, support for Israel continues to (minorities, millennials) accompanied by a remain one of the few bi-partisan issues). negative approach to Israel. It must be noted • The deepening the divide between parts that this group increasingly includes many of the liberal U.S. Jewish community and young American Jews likely to choose their Israel, which is becoming more right-wing, allegiance to liberal democratic principles nationalistic, and religious. over a commitment to Israel. • A decline in the political power of American • Continued erosion of Israel’s bi-partisan Jews, given their lack of unity and the internal support in the United States (based on Jewish polarization with respect to Israel. domestic polarization in the U.S. on one hand, and the strengthening Israeli right on the • A potential decrease in the power of U.S. other). Jewish organizations – on both the local Economic Diaspora Jewry and national levels pressures on • Societies that shy away from liberal and – given the general the middle cosmopolitan values, tilting instead toward disappointment class could turn nationalism and the development of their with the current the Jews, who internal identity, could evince hostility toward leadership and are relatively minorities including the Jewish community. systems. Alternatives successful • Economic pressures on the middle class (in posed by social media economically, the U.S. and Europe) could strengthen anti- help propel this trend into scapegoats Semitic outbursts and turn the Jews, who and create space are relatively successful economically, into for virtual dialogue scapegoats. communities, which tend to self-isolate. • The preferential treatment Jews have received • Given the general increased political and in Europe since the Holocaust (additional social polarization, the potential exists for rights, direct access to political leaders, a similar polarization within the U.S. Jewish increased economic support) could be community. threatened. • A widening divide between parts of the • The continued undermining of Israel’s bi- American Jewish community and the Jewish partisan support, and the growing gap organizational leadership that must cooperate between Democrats and Republicans with with the Trump administration. respect to Israel, could further erode the • Most of American Jewry (about 70 percent)

the jewish people policy institute 73 has historically been affiliated with the liberal Part 2 Democratic base and the values of human Shifts in Israel that Could rights, equality, and opposition to racism Influence the West’s Approach and discrimination. This means that most to Israel and the Jewish People American Jews are firmly on the losing side of the last election cycle. This creates a double dilemma for some Jewish leaders: first, how A. The Rise of the Religious Nationalist to oppose Trump and his ideas but maintain Right in Israel the identity of a loyal minority; and second, how to oppose Trump and his ideas without In recent years, we have seen the rise of right- harming the interests of the State of Israel, wing religious nationalism in Israel. This trend which sees him as a close friend. is growing due to several factors: demographic trends in Israel; the crisis of the Israeli left; growing • The 20-30 percent of U.S. Jews – mostly doubts over the legitimacy of ruling elites; the Orthodox – that supports Trump are offering collapse of the Oslo peace process; the increasing a new strategy for Jewish American integration solidification of the notion among Israelis that into the larger society. For the last 200 years, “there is no Palestinian partner for peace”; an the model was based on the internalization erosion of the self-confidence of Israeli secularism; and affirmation of civic values – pluralism, and the general violence raging throughout the tolerance, and egalitarianism – while erasing Middle East, which is seen by many as reaffirming outward cultural markers that had signified the right’s worldview. the Jewish community (today identified with Orthodox Judaism). The changing In this sense, developments in the National- characteristics of the new American Christian Religious sector are especially interesting. This right and the growing population proportion sector’s leadership has in recent years focused on of the Orthodox change the rules of the game: openly and aggressively seeking to provide moral rather than the civic creed these add a new and political leadership for the state and for Israeli moral, religious component, which is thicker. society. The National-Religious sector adheres Conservative Judeo-Christian morality, which to a nationalistic version of Zionism with some to Orthodox Jews includes such principles prominent characteristics: it sees the return to as fairness (reward and punishment), loyalty, Zion and the establishment of a Jewish state not sanctity, and authority, which are generally necessarily in Herzlian terms (as an answer to the less emphasized by liberal America and liberal Jewish problem) as its goal, rather as the necessary Jews. (Interestingly, this development has fulfilment of National-Religious ideals. It believes led to potential alliances on specific issues that the State of Israel should reflect Jewish between Jews and Muslims in the U.S.). interests. The National-Religious sector seeks to

74 the jewish people policy institute reshape the normative intellectual and moral basis distinguishes religious Zionism is that it provides of authority on which the Israeli legal system rests. a complete ideological vision and intellectual In this framework, they imbue a greater authority anchor that posits a coherent alternative to the to values that draw from the religious world and ideology of secular Zionism that has ruled the Jewish legacy, rather than from the secular-liberal- country since its founding. cosmopolitan world. Possible Implications for how the West The National-Religious sector seeks to implement Relates to Israel this goal – its push for the moral and political • As the West itself is highly polarized, dynamics leadership of the country – through the Jewish in Israel could lead to contradictory results. Home Party, prominent religious figures in the For liberal segments in the West, Israel Likud Party, and through its attempt to garner could be seen to be moving away from the influence in the ranks of the civil service, the shared values it was once thought to have. press, and the military leadership where National- However, this is not necessarily the case with Religious officers are increasingly prominent. conservative elements in the West, who stress The National-Religious worldview is expressed, nationalism over cosmopolitanism and are first and foremost, in trying to settle and annex averse to the existing order. West Bank territories. With its current control of • We can expect increasing criticism from liberal the justice and education ministries (Ministers voices in the West over Israel’s perceived Ayelet Shaked and Naftali Bennett respectively), lack of commitment to resolving the Israeli- it is advancing policies and legislation that Palestinian conflict on the basis of a two-state emphasize Jewish identity and the interests of solution; its attempts to push legislation seen the state as the nation-state of the Jewish people. as illiberal, and ever increasing demands to There are those who see these initiatives as anti- include religious content in the education liberal and a threat to the principles of equality system (there is a greater sympathy for such and civil rights. In the educational sphere, they are efforts among Republicans in the United advancing curricula that emphasize Jewish identity States and right-wing elements in Europe). and nationalism, and weaken the commitment to liberal and universal values. Although only • Among liberal groups in the United States, a fifth of the entire population considers itself there may be growing perception that as “belonging” to the National-Religious camp, the principles that traditionally formed broad segments of the population identify wholly the foundation of the special relationship or in part with National-Religious policies on between Israel and America are eroding issues of politics, security, and education. What in Israel (equality under the law, personal freedoms, social justice, ethics, democracy,

the jewish people policy institute 75 religious pluralism, human rights, and the fair political power of these groups and their ability treatment of minorities). to influence and shape the Israeli agenda and its societal characteristics. B. Strengthening Israel’s Jewish A more complicated trend relates to a growing Characteristics realization, especially among traditional elites and secular Israelis, of the need to “take ownership” Demographic, social, and cultural trends in over Israel’s Jewish character – after years in which recent years have led to a deepening of a range this was neglected and left to Orthodox religious of phenomena and world-views that stand under groups. A clear majority of Israeli Jews (90 percent a unified umbrella: the strengthening of Israel’s according to the latest Pew survey) say that Jewish character. These are long-term structural being Jewish is “very important” (54 percent) or trends; signs of them can be found in public “somewhat important” (36 percent). Thus, it is opinion polls and in data not surprising that in recent years there has been a High birth relating to behavior and noticeable expansion and deepening of the “Jewish rates among life style. These trends renewal” discourse. This discourse connects the Haredim take on different forms various sub-groups: secular and Reform, liberal continue to in different populations Orthodox, the formerly religious, participants in strengthen – usually according to various pre-military courses, and those exposed their ability to religiosity level – and are to programs such as Taglit Birthright during their influence the not distinct to any single military service. All these are active to some Israeli agenda group. The easiest to degree in an expanding effort to shape Judaism explain are those coming in a manner that is not specifically religious and is from the demographic more suitable for Israel in the 21st century. These increase of the “religious” groups take a sympathetic approach to aspects and “Haredi” sectors in Israel. In recent decades, of religion and tradition in the public sphere, the number of Israeli Jews we can identify as yet are wary of religious coercion and claim the having a strong connection to Jewish culture/ freedom to decide personally on religious matters. religion, in the cognitive and the practical sense, Accordingly, the number of Israelis seeking new has grown. The percentage of Haredim within approaches to the Jewish holidays and the number Israel’s Jewish population has increased from three of pre-military seminaries merging Jewish studies percent in 1990 to ten percent today. with a pluralistic approach is growing. High birth rates among the Haredi and other Despite trends of Jewish renewal, and expansion religious sectors continue to increase their of Jewish learning among secular Jews, Orthodox proportion in the overall population. This Judaism still defines many aspects of the Jewish necessarily leads to a strengthening of the state up to a point that some say that Israel is the

76 the jewish people policy institute only democracy in the world in which Jews do Jews lived in Israel; today there are ten times not have freedom of religion. Israeli Jews grew up that number. Israel is ranked 11th on the World in Jewish state, and do not know any other way of Happiness Index, its birth rate is the highest life. They do not fully understand what it means to among developed countries, and life expectancy live as a Jewish minority, which deepens the gap is the fifth highest in the world for men and between Israeli and Diaspora Jews. ninth highest for women. Israel’s per capita GDP ($37,000 a year) is higher than those of Italy and Possible Implications for how the West Spain. Israeli hi-tech is world class and several Relates to Israel multinational corporations maintain R&D centers The inclination of many Israelis to create a fusion of in Israel. The natural gas fields discovered off Jewish and Israeli culture could have contradictory Israel’s shores promise energy security for years outcomes: to come and have turned Israel into an energy • The formation of a unique Jewish-Israeli exporter. Iran’s attempts culture could further widen the gap with to produce a nuclear The exclusion of Diaspora Jewish culture. As this trend unfolds, weapon have been pushed non-Orthodox it will weaken the connection between Israeli back, at least for the near Jews from the and Diaspora Jewish identity in the eyes of the future. Exports to Asia Jewish-Israeli West (and thus also the power attributed to have grown significantly. culture could the Jewish people generally). Moreover, the peace distance them treaties with Jordan and from Israel • It may distance non-Orthodox Jews from Egypt are stable despite Israel if they are excluded from the formation the regional turmoil. As of a unique Jewish-Israeli culture. a result of Iran’s regional subversion, jihadi terror, • It may reinforce Israel’s image as pluralistic, and the rise of ISIS, the mutual interests between i.e. able to include under an updated Jewish Israel and the moderate Sunni countries in the cultural umbrella various Jewish streams in region have grown and security cooperation with a non-coercive manner. This process could Egypt is better than ever. Given the collapse of strengthen the connection between the Syria and Iraq, there is no longer a conventional mostly liberal Diaspora and Israel. military threat to Israel (Iran’s efforts to establish a land corridor to the Mediterranean, and the possibility of an Iranian presence, or that of C. Shifts in Israel’s Strategic Position and militias subordinate to it on Israel’s Golan border, Power raise doubts as to the validity of this claim). From an historical perspective, Israel is something Despite such encouraging statistics, it is possible to of a strategic miracle. At its founding, 650,000 draw contradictory assessments when examining

the jewish people policy institute 77 Israel’s strategic power. This is due to the strategic process; the attempt to harm Israel through uncertainty that characterizes much of the world, boycotts and de-legitimization efforts. and certainly the region. The Middle East remains Alongside these various challenges, which hold turbulent. The cornerstones of the old regional considerable risk, there are also considerable order are crumbling, and a new reality has yet to opportunities for Israel: opening a “new page” emerge that can promise stability of any sort. The in relations with the United States following international arena relevant to the Middle East the election of President Trump; deepening and to Israel’s strategic resilience is undergoing relationships with the Sunni moderates who significant shifts as well and is far from radiating are showing increased openness to Israel given stability. the Iranian threat and radical terrorist groups: Meanwhile, Israel faces significant strategic implementing a strategic plan that would stymie challenges: the nuclear agreement achieved the threat of losing Israel’s Jewish character as between Iran and the international community, Israel may head toward a bi-national reality. described by Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu as a “mistake of historic proportions”; The emergence of a new order in Syria that threatens Israel’s Implications for how the West Relates to security and brings Iran-led forces close to Israel’s Israel and the Jewish People Jewry border, the danger of a security escalation in the • If Israel’s strategic stature is seen in the West north (Hezbollah, ISIS, and other radical Islamist as strong and it remains a close ally of the U.S., actors in Syria, or retaliatory strikes by Assad’s it diminishes the West’s appetite for forcing forces over Israeli actions intended to intercept diplomatic solutions on Israel that it opposes arms shipments to Hezbollah) and in the south (an agreement with the Palestinians and other (Hamas or terror cells in Sinai); the danger the strategic issues). “Lone Wolf Intifada” continues to pose, and • The failure of renewing the peace process the outbreak of tense violence with religious that Trump initiated could drag Israel into underpinnings (similar to the July 2017 events on a diplomatic and security escalation with the Temple Mount)); the uncertainty regarding the Palestinians and negatively influences continued U.S. willingness to maintain a presence Israel’s international standing as well as its and leadership role in the Middle East; the impulse relationships with Arab states. to transform the model for solving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict (from direct negotiations D. Demographic Shifts under American leadership to a coercive solution The population of Israel has grown steadily. pushed on Israel by the UN and led by a multi- Recently, it has overtaken the United States as national coalition); that could increase if the the largest Jewish population in the world. By the US decides to abandon leadership of the peace middle of the 21st century, most of the world’s

78 the jewish people policy institute Jews, more than half, will live in Israel. At the same over the West Bank, and potential future time, the composition of Israeli Jewish society Israeli decisions to annex territories or parts is also changing. Most Jews in Israel today are of such, and their impact on Israel’s Jewish and native-born. The significance of this is that they democratic nature. are raised in a common environment, learn in the • There is some interest in the shifts of the Israeli education system, have compulsory military relative weight of various groups in Israeli service (for the most part), and are exposed society as well. Especially, there is much throughout their lives to the cultural, social, and attention given to the growth of the religious political advantages of the state. and Haredi sectors of society given the At the same time, the composition of Israeli tendency of these groups to hold right-wing society is also shifting according to religiosity. The political positions. Moreover, given the lack Haredi and National-Religious sectors are growing of separation between religion and state in while the traditional center and, to a lesser extent, Israel, these sectors’ desire to strengthen the the secular are weakening. To compare: The religious nature of the Israeli public sphere, Diaspora is largely characterized by demographic could be perceived negatively by considerable stability with a slightly negative trajectory due segments of the liberal West. to low birth rates and an aging population. In • Another demographic focal point that the United States, as in Israel, the proportion of draws the West’s attention is the influence Haredim in the Jewish population is also growing. of immigrants from the former Soviet High intermarriage rates in the Diaspora distances Union on Israeli politics and society. On one some Jews from Jewish institutions and from Jewish hand, this large wave of immigration has expressions in the personal and familial spheres. had a moderating effect on processes that On the other hand, mixed marriages expand the threatened to erode Israel’s Jewish majority; circle of non-Jews who have some familiarity with on the other hand, these immigrants are someone Jewish, and through them familiarity largely right-wing in their political positions. with Judaism and Israel. Moreover, as a Russian diaspora, they influence and can help improve Israel’s diplomatic Implications for how the West Relates to relationship with Russia. Israel and the Jewish People • The West takes a particular interest in issues related to the demographics of Jews and non- Jews in the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. That is, regarding the significance of continued Israeli control

the jewish people policy institute 79 Part 3 House. The majority of American Jews disagree Challenges and Dilemmas that with the president’s views, which brings the Call for Policy Measures sensitivity of this diplomatic dilemma into sharp focus. Shifting trends underway in the Western world • Given the polarization trend inside the United may hold significant implications for Israel and States, Israel should tread cautiously and world Jewry. These developments demand shaping strive to maintain bi-partisan support. Israel policies to both mitigate negative consequences should differentiate between developing a and leverage new opportunities. We present here good working relationship with the Trump insights and recommendations expressed during administration and projecting an ideological JPPI’s 2017 Conference on the Future of the Jewish affinity to it. It should not neglect relations People irrespective of the views and positions of with the Democratic Party, especially its more the Institute. liberal elements (minorities, millennials) who In light of the Conference discussion currently tend to have a negative view of Israel. polarization groups highlighted six • Given the ability to improve the relationship trend inside the areas that pose policy with the American administration and given US, Israel should dilemmas and challenges its interest in advancing an Israeli-Palestinian tread cautiously for decision makers in peace process, Israel should utilize this and strive to Israel and the Diaspora: maintain bi- strategic advantage to counteract the threat

partisan support of its sliding into a bi-national reality, and as a force multiplier to the improving relations with the moderate Arab states in the region. Formulating Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the • The initial stage of Trump’s presidency is Trump administration on diplomatic characterized by steps and rhetoric that lead to and ideological matters conflicting conclusions as to his determination to rehabilitate American deterrent power and The election of President Trump carried the take a lead role in international affairs, Israel promise of a friendlier, more sympathetic should exercise caution in its geopolitical administration than its predecessor. Alongside the conduct due to the possibility that the U.S. possibility of turning a “new page” in U.S.-Israel could decide to isolate itself and decrease relations, there are also some dilemmas as to how support for Israel on issues that do not line up much Israel should publicly identify with the new with its own material interests. administration’s ideology and the sentiments and ethos that helped Donald Trump take the White

80 the jewish people policy institute Formulating policy toward Europe’s far- and, at the same time, favor Israeli interests with right nationalist parties respect to others. In a world where nationalistic and isolationist trends seem to be on the rise, Shifting trends in Europe include rising populism, the impulse to intervene in Israel’s affairs could sharp polarization, and the strengthening of diminish. On the other hand, this might also right-wing political elements, who sometimes weaken the inclination to come to Israel’s aid express their support of Israel. This phenomenon in times of need. The growing influence of is reinforced by the growing fear of Islamic terror nationalism over cosmopolitanism could lead and new (mostly Muslim) immigration waves. to greater acceptance in the West of Israel’s There seems to be a greater acceptance of the predicament: a state seeking to maintain and Israeli claim that there is no difference between assert its Jewish national identity. terrorism that targets Israel and terrorism aimed at the West. At the same time, there is a growing • Israel should legitimacy granted to the political rise of the Israeli encourage those Israel should be right. voices within the administration that wary of granting • Israel should be wary of granting legitimacy to call for the United legitimacy to the radical far-right parties gaining currency States to reaffirm and radical far- in Europe. Even though they may seek the fulfill its role as leader right parties in support of Israel and Jews, and at times of the free world. Europe express pro-Israel positions, Israel should be America’s focusing on careful not to “take the bait” and must not domestic affairs while express its support of these parties. neglecting its global leadership role, in general • Israel should stand against Islamophobia in the and in the Middle East in particular, could international arena, and in so doing express its harm Israel and erode the might and deterrent values and loyalty to its own Muslim citizens. power attributed to it. Shaping a strategy that considers • Israel should encourage Washington to disruptions of the current world order continue taking a leading role in mediating and the rise of new non-Western powers the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. A lack of American leadership would create a vacuum The disruption of the existing international for other international actors, who are not as order and the possibility that a new order will sympathetic to Israel, to fill. emerge presents Israel with both challenges and opportunities. For example, certain American- • Developing relations with the rising non- Russian understandings could limit Israel’s Western powers (China, Russia, India) should maneuverability with respect to some issues proceed with care and transparency vis-a-vis

the jewish people policy institute 81 the United States. Israel’s diplomatic moves and sensitive to the double bind facing the should be undertaken with the fundamental Jewish American leadership: on the one hand understanding that there is no alternative to – how to contend with ideologies of the its strategic alliance with Washington. Trump administration while maintaining the • Israel should increase its investment in status of a loyal minority. On the other – how cutting edge science and developing new to maintain the liberal values objectionable technologies. In a world in which these fields to the more radical elements of the are highly regarded and rewarded, Israel has administration without harming the interests the potential for significant achievements. of the State of Israel, which considers the new Alongside the economic benefits, realizing this administration a dear friend. potential will strengthen Israel’s “soft power” • Israel should differentiate between “love” of in the West (and in the world writ large) and Israel and “blind support” of its government’s reinforce Israel’s image as the “startup nation.” policies. Many young Jews in the Diaspora feel deeply connected to Israel, but reject some of Improving Israel-Diaspora relations its policies. Israel needs to be able to accept in light of trends of polarization and them as they are, as the real threat is that alienation in the West younger Diaspora Jews may become apathetic Polarizing trends in the West have not bypassed and disconnected from Israel. Israel or Diaspora Jewry. Much of American Jewry • Israel should strive to be more pluralistic on (about 70 percent) historically identifies with personal and family matters, and work to be the liberal-Democratic base recently trounced in more open to the non-Orthodox streams. the U.S. elections. Right wing, nationalistic and Jewish communities in Israel and abroad need religious tendencies in Israel are also growing. As to adapt to a new reality of greater diversity, these trends continue, liberal Diaspora Jews may multiplicity of views, complex identities, become more alienated from Israel. If these gaps conflicting narratives and acknowledge a widen within the Jewish people, its political power broader array of organizations that reject the will diminish accordingly. hegemony of any single organization. • In this time of polarization, Israel should focus • Israel should initiate direct and constant on its potential as a unifying force. It should connections with Jewish groups and increase its investment in strengthening organizations, even if they are not usually connection with the Diaspora and make a considered part of the current establishment. special effort to assist in healing divisions among polarized Diaspora communities. • Israel should support joint projects with the Diaspora based on Jewish values (such as a • The Israeli government should be aware of Jewish Peace Corps).

82 the jewish people policy institute • Israelis should be encouraged to get better • Diaspora Jewish institutions should focus on acquainted with the Jewish communities of renewal and reinvention initiatives, with a the Diaspora. primary focus on educational programs, in • The trend of forging a new Jewish-Israeli order to halt the erosion of their centrality culture could widen the gap between Israel and reinvigorate their currency in the and Diaspora Jewry (and thus erode the power communities they serve. of the Jewish people). Therefore, Diaspora • The Jewish community should be aware of and involvement in such “renewal” efforts should discuss the implications of a relatively new be encouraged as much as possible. trend in the United States – an ideological • As many Jews consider leaving Europe, connection between Orthodox Jewish Israel must work to improve its absorption communities and (mostly Christian) social infrastructure (including employment conservatives (characterized by the trends opportunities). At the same time, Israel must and sentiments that helped bring Trump to avoid loud and conspicuous Aliyah persuasion power). The building blocks of this bridge are campaigns so as not to draw negative not the classical liberal values once thought pushback from certain governments. to be the common base between the Jewish community and the American ethos. • Jewish organizations need to enlist state Steps to strengthen Diaspora Jewry given authorities to actively counter anti-Semitism. the trends challenging the centrality of They should demand that their various communities and institutions governments deal effectively with anti-Semitic Polarization in the West is among the shifting incidents. trends that may erode the power of Diaspora • Jewish communities should promote Jewish- Jewish communities and institutions. Social media Muslim dialogue initiatives based on their contributes to this trend by stimulating personal common status as minority groups. atomization and weakening social cohesion, which endangers Jewish solidarity. Closed virtual dialogue • Given the significant demographic growth of groups that self-isolate from the larger society are the North American Haredi and Orthodox also on the rise. All this is happening while voices communities (and the growing involvement opposed to liberal values and advocating greater of some of their members in public and nationalism and hostility to minorities grow economic positions of influence), there is louder – at times, hostility toward Jews seems to a growing need to appeal to the spiritual be increasing. and rabbinic leaders of these communities to convince their members to take a more active role in ensuring the future of the Jewish

the jewish people policy institute 83 people. At the same time, leaders of the major who prefer nationalism over cosmopolitanism and Jewish organizations should encourage Haredi are dissatisfied with the prevailing order. participation and leadership in the broader • Growing doubts among left-wing groups Jewish community. about Israel’s commitment to liberal values • There should be a special effort focused on (rule of law, liberty, justice, ethics, democracy, bringing Russian-speaking Jews and Israeli religious pluralism, human rights, minority expats living in the West into the fold of the rights, and fighting racism), should worry established Jewish community. Israeli decision makers on two levels: one • New technologies should be harnessed – relates to the ideological essence of the Jewish including those that allow more efficient state and the other relates to the values at the and affordable intercontinental travel as well foundation of Israel’s special relationship with as social networks – in order to strengthen the United States and liberal American Jewry. connections between Israeli and Diaspora • Israel, which has faced the challenge of Jews. striking a balance between its “Jewish” • An effort should be made to strengthen and “Democratic” characteristics since its the political influence of European Jewish founding, can offer the West a model for a communities in light of a possible erosion of successful coexistence between nationalism the special status granted them in the decades and liberalism. following the Holocaust (direct access to political leaders, increased financial support, etc.). 5. Monitoring illiberal internal Israeli trends and curbing initiatives negatively affect the image and values of the Jewish state As the West itself is highly polarized, dynamics in Israel, where right wing, nationalistic and religious tendencies are on the rise, could lead to conflicting influences. Western liberals tend to perceive Israel as abandoning some of the core values it has traditionally shared with the West. But this is not the case for conservative elements in the West,

84 the jewish people policy institute Comprehensive Three-Dimensional 10 Anti-Semitism Index

The Need for an Integrated Index 2016 U.S. presidential election, anti-Semitism seemed to be primarily a European problem. In light of both a resurgence of anti-Semitism in Economic malaise, fear of immigrants, and Europe and the efforts of EU member country the ghosts of the 20th century had combined governments to redress it, there is a need for an to produce a particularly toxic resurgence of integrative Anti-Semitism Index that can provide nationalism. This year, we start to provide a Israeli policy-makers and the leaders of Jewish framework to apply the same three-dimensional organizations worldwide with a policy tool methodology to address the anti-Semitism in the to monitor developments, facilitate decision- United States. making, and assess the efficacy of implemented Attempting to use the index for American Jewry is interventions. challenging in two ways, one fundamental and the Existing measurement tools have been limited to other technical. discrete aspects of the phenomenon, single pieces 1. First and foremost, it is essential to point of the anti-Semitism puzzle. Some examine public out that European anti-Semitism is of a opinion while others count and verify incidents of different magnitude – both the threat and the violence against or harassment of Jews. Occasional discomfort it induces – than anti-Semitism in field studies have examined how Jews themselves the United States. North American Jews, on perceive anti-Semitism. the whole, are more “openly Jewish” within JPPI’s Anti-Semitism Index for Europe is presented their professional and social circles than their here for the third consecutive year. Prior to the European counterparts. In Europe, being

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 85 Jewish is an often freighted biographical Jewish organizations entrusted with security (such element that evinces a self-conscious as CST in the UK and SPCJ in France), and research discretion of disclosure.1 Some of what is findings regarding perceptions of anti-Semitism regarded as anti-Semitism in America, such as among Jews. jokes about Jews, goes unnoticed in Hungary As summarized in the Kantor Centre’s Annual or Poland (countries with high expectations Report on Anti-Semitism in the world, Anti- of cultural conformity where many of those Semitic incidents in 2016 reflect two parallel with Jewish roots are reluctant to divulge their yet contradictory trends. On one hand is the ancestry). These differences complicate the continuing decrease in the number of incidents, compilation and comparison of statistics from especially violent ones, in most European countries the two different continents. with large Jewish populations. On the other is 2. While there is quantitative data regarding a continuing widespread increase, sometimes anti-Semitism as perceived by Jews in Europe, dramatic, in verbal and visual expressions of no such data exist for America. Therefore, anti-Semitism on social media and during our anti-Semitism index for the United demonstrations. Beyond precise quantification, States is based upon indirect indicators, the internet has become the main platform for such as anecdotal reports, survey questions the trafficking of bigotry and hate, a not-so- relating to the comfort levels of Jews within virtual reality where anti-Semitism is unleashed in their professional and social circles, and the abusive, unhinged language. number of references to anti-Semitism in both France the general and Jewish press. On March 30, 2017, the French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights Part One – A Three-Dimensional (CNCDH) published its annual report on racism, European anti-Semitism Index anti-Semitism and xenophobia in France, which This integrated index aims to measure the showed a 58 percent drop in anti-Semitic discomfort of European Jewry and the threat levels incidents in 2016. According to the CNCDH the against it. It is meant to be a tool for policy-makers total number of anti-Semitic incidents in 2016 that relates to three complementary dimensions was 335 compared to 808 the previous year — the of anti-Semitism affecting individual Jews and sharpest year-to-year drop recorded since 2001. At communal Jewish life. JPPI’s index integrates data the same time, they report, “Anti-Semitic biases from the Anti-Defamation League’s (ADL) Global persist, linking Jews to money and power and 100 survey of attitudes toward Jews, compiled in condemning them for their attachment to their cooperation with various research institutes, anti- community and to Israel.” Semitic harassment figures collected by local

86 the jewish people policy institute JPPI's Anti-Semitism Index

Attitudes towards Jews

Europe’s Muslims A Average Europe T T I T France T R U E Germany D N E D

S UK S 10% USA Anti-Jewish Attitudes in 2016 Sources: ADL, Pew, Fondapol, CAA, WZB.

+36% Incidents -13%

Ch an Ch g a e n ge fr f o ro m -60% m l 2 a France la s s t

t y Germany y e e a a UK r 0.2 r USA +34%

Number of incidents per 1,000 Jews and % of change compared to last year Anti-Jewish Incidents in 2016

Sources: :Kantor Center, SPCJ, CST, ADL.

Perceptions among Jews 48% 61% 65%

Average Europe 84% France Germany UK Anti-Semitism is a Serious Problem in My Country in 2016 Source: FRA , AJC.

the jewish people policy institute 87 Table 1. Anti-Semitism in Western Europe 2016-2017

Europe Trend average France UK Germany PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD JEWS

Harbor anti-Semitic attitudes (%)2 24 (26) 17 (37) 12 (8) 16 (27) -- as above, among Muslims (%)3 62 (55) 49 (83) 54 54 (62) ANTI-SEMITIC BEHAVIOR (number of incidents as reported to official agencies) Increase/Decrease (%) -58 +36 -13 Violent assaults 2 (32) 11 (41) 3 (4) Total incidents (extreme violence, assaults, damages, 335 1,309 644 desecrations and threats) (808)4 (960)5 (740)6 Number of physical attacks per 1,000 Jews 2 (5) 6 (8) 5 (7) Per cent of attacks that are not reported7 77 72 73 72 ANTI-SEMITISM AS PERCEIVED BY JEWS8 Have been personally assaulted (%) 11 5 Anti-Semitism is a very or fairly big problem (%) (67) (86) (48) (25) Have considered emigration because they do (32) 49 (80) (19) (26) not feel safe in their country (%) Avoid places in their neighborhood because (27) (20) (35) (28) they would not feel safe there as a Jew (%)

Note: Latest available data. Numbers in parenthesis are from 2014.

The decrease in attacks on Jews “is primarily due schools and other institutions — have been under to security measures applied by the authorities constant army protection since the January 2015 as part of the Vigipirate plan, to protect Jewish attacks. As of July 2017, a total of 10,000 soldiers institutions and neighborhoods in France” have served in enforcing the state of emergency. [initiated in 2015, following the murder of four Jews emerged in the CNCDH report as the most Jews at the Hyper-Cacher kosher supermarket accepted minority in France (with 81 percent near Paris by an Islamist]. It should be noted acceptance), compared to Muslims and Roma. that 800 Jewish buildings — from synagogues to

88 the jewish people policy institute We can mention two main reasons for the In previous years, record highs stemmed from decreased anxiety of French Jews, which is vividly sudden, specific ‘trigger events,’ particularly expressed in the sharp decrease in French Aliyah between israel and its neighbors. The 2016 high in 2016 and the first half of 2017: comprised consistently high monthly figures and 1. In France, anti-Jewish assaults have reflected no obvious connection to the Middle traditionally been almost exclusively East. Instead, domestic events appear to have perpetrated by resentful youth of fomented an atmosphere ripe for anti-Semitic Maghrebian descent. The government’s visible incidents, which were also more likely to be commitment to protect Jews and severely reported. These included high-profile allegations punish their attackers has proved, thus far, to of anti-Semitism within the Labour Party; a be an effective deterrent. perceived increase in racism and xenophobia that resulted in and followed the Brexit referendum, 2. In 2016, although there was no terror attack including an increase in recorded racial and motivated by anti-Semitism per se, Jews were religious hate crimes; and regular, high-profile killed alongside non-Jews in the Bataclan discussion of anti-Semitism, racism, and hate theater massacre in Paris and the weaponized crimes in the mainstream media, the political truck that plowed into a group of pedestrians discourse, and on social media. The CST stressed in Nice. One can conjecture that these that the number of anti-Semitic incidents rose and incidents contributed to making French Jews remained at a high level in 2016 despite the fact feel less singled out and relatively less anxious. that there was no military conflict between Israel United Kingdom and the Palestinians. British Jewry recorded 1,309 anti-Semitic incidents In Britain, attacks on Jews are mostly committed in 2016, a 36 percent increase from the 960 by white ethnic Europeans motivated by a radical incidents recorded in 2015 and the highest annual right-wing racist ideology. Despite the excellent total the Community Security Trust (CST), the working relationships between CST and various communal organization charged with protecting government agencies, an appropriate response to British Jews from anti-Semitism and terrorism, has deter anti-Semitic crime has yet to be found. ever recorded. Despite this significant increase, the Germany CST also noted a 13 percent decrease of violent incidents and an 11 percent decrease in acts of In Germany, official sources pointed to a decrease vandalism. In Britain as many other countries, we from 740 cases in 2015 to 644 in 2016, yet a non- have observed this year less violent incidents and governmental monitoring agency reported higher more rejection feelings. numbers, especially in Berlin where a 16 percent rise was detected.

the jewish people policy institute 89 According to the European Union, more than 2.5 The concern expressed in liberal circles is that million refugees entered Europe during the last such an atmosphere is endangering Europe’s two years, 1.7 million of whom landed in Germany, democratic values. As the refugee crisis continues, and fear of the newcomers is still lingering. So far, it the discourse around it becomes increasingly seems that the new immigrants have not effected virulent and violence against them, and minority an increase of anti-Semitism acts, even though groups in general, grows. they came from countries with deep anti-Semitic The Reaction of the Jewish Communities views. These new immigrants are busy surviving, finding ways to make a living, acquiring language The decrease in the number of violent incidents skills, and acclimating to a new environment and against Jews has not resulted in a feeling of security culture. within the Jewish communities. On the contrary: the conspicuous police and military presence The perpetrators continue along with other stepped up security measures, to be from the radical welcome and necessary as they may be in the fight The decrease circles of previous waves against terror, also contribute to the prevailing in the number of Muslim immigration anxiety — if those measures are necessary, there is of violent or from the extreme right. good reason for alarm. incidents The 16 percent increase against Jews has of anti-Semitic activity Even though the wave of immigrants, most of not resulted in Berlin, for instance, whom come from countries with embedded anti- in a feeling of was not attributed to the Semitic and anti-Israeli ideologies is not the source security within newcomers despite the (at least for now) of an increase in anti-Semitism, the Jewish fact that most physical it has brought some Jews, both individuals and communities attacks on Jews were communities, to see a storm gathering over Europe perpetrated by Muslims. and rethink the viability of Jewish existence on the Acts of desecration continent. In addition, the decrease in the number against Jewish cemeteries and monuments were of violent incidents does not compensate for the mostly attributed to far right vandals. Violence ongoing increase in verbal and visual expressions perpetrated by the extreme left remained low. of anti-Semitism and the hostile atmosphere they engender. In parallel, as a people that knows what However, the presence of the immigrants has it means to be a refugee, the Jewish communities had a notable albeit indirect influence: the feel an obligation to reach out to the newcomers. strengthening of the extreme right does not seem Therefore, some Jews find themselves between the to have been accompanied by stronger or more proverbial rock and hard place.9 frequent public anti-Semitic statements. Still, the growing atmosphere of xenophobia and populism has a constant potential of becoming anti-Semitic.

90 the jewish people policy institute Part Two – A Three-Dimensional pot” with its attending notions of equality and American anti-Semitism Index tolerance versus the nativist ideal of an America free from foreign entanglements abroad and JPPI’s Annual Assessment this year addresses the foreign influences domestically. It will not be easily tension between nationalism and globalization. resolved, and no one currently knows the answer In the Assessment’s various chapters, we have to the three questions asked above. Unable to examined the implications of the nationalist determine absolutely the validity of differing backlash in the economic, geopolitical, and views concerning these questions, our role will cultural arenas. be to provide a similar integrated methodology Although still a marginal phenomenon of the for measuring American anti-Semitism. Given the conservative backlash, the so called alt-right inherent differences from European anti-Semitism, is a noteworthy cause of Jewish concern. One we will keep these analyses separate and provide primary question and two secondary ones have Jewish professionals and fueled debate: organizational leaders Although still with a tool to assist their a marginal 1. Is the emergence of the alt-right a transitory decision-making. phenomenon fringe phenomenon or the beginning of a of the cultural backlash that will imperil 70 years The JPPI integrated anti- conservative of Jewish prosperity and successful social Semitism index relates backlash, the so integration in America? as mentioned to three dimensions: called alt-right 2. Can the white supremacists imprint their is a cause of anti-Semitic rhetoric on the white, blue- Dimension 1: Public Jewish concern collar disenfranchised masses who view opinion and attitudes themselves as having suffered from economic toward Jews. globalization and may be susceptible to Dimension 2: Anti-Semitic incidents of different scapegoating the Jews and other minority sorts (extreme violence, assault, vandalism and groups? desecration of Jewish property, threats, abusive 3. Is President Trump’s relatively complaisant behavior, literature), including harassment in the attitude toward this movement a sign of cyber sphere. support, or only lip service to one of his most Dimension 3: Anti-Semitism as perceived by ardent bases of political support? Jews. The events in Charlottesville on August 12 were Data exist for both the first dimension (ADL and symptomatic of a century-long cultural war that Pew reports) and the second one. Systematic data pits two visions of America against each other for the third dimension, which relates to the degree – the vision of the immigrant friendly “melting

the jewish people policy institute 91 Table 2. Anti-Semitism in the United States

Trend 2017 2016 2015

PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD JEWS Harbor anti-Semitic attitudes (%)10 10% 9%

ANTI-SEMITIC BEHAVIOR (number of incidents as reported to official agencies)11

Increase/Decrease (%) +86% +34%

Assaults 36 56

Vandalism 510 377

Harassment 720 509

Total 1,266 942

Number of physical attacks per 1,000 Jews 0.2 0.13

ANTI-SEMITISM AS PERCEIVED BY JEWS (according to AJC)12

Is anti-Semitism currently a very serious problem in the 41% 21% United States?

Is anti-Semitism a somewhat of a problem in the 52% 43% United States?

Is anti-Semitism currently a very serious problem or 69% 56% 74.2% somewhat of a problem the American college campuses?

Is anti-Semitism currently a problem in Europe? 86% 89.9%

92 the jewish people policy institute of anxiety about anti-Semitism among American issue.15 To the question: “Is anti-Semitism currently Jews, is definitively lacking. We will, therefore, a problem in the United States?” 84 percent of utilize indirect information sources and our key respondents answered affirmatively (it is a very recommendation will be to produce systematic serious problem [41 percent]; or somewhat of a data, possibly inspired by the work of the European problem [43 percent]). Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). To the question: “Is anti-Semitism currently a Dimension 1: Public opinion toward Jews problem on in the American college campus?” 69 According to ADL findings, 9 percent of American percent of respondents answered affirmatively (it adults in 2014 and 10 percent in 2015 harbored is a very serious problem [29 percent] or somewhat anti-Semitic attitudes. According to the Pew of a problem [40 percent]). In the survey of Research Center (2014), half of U.S. adults rate August 2015, there was no general question about Jews “very warmly” (over 67 percent on the Pew anti-Semitism in the United States (the fact that a “feeling thermometer”). Only 9 percent of U.S. general question was added in 2016 and 2017 may adults rate Jews “very coldly” (under 33 percent on indicate that the anxiety is on the rise), but it did the Pew thermometer). Assuredly, the Pew data include the question regarding campuses as well and the ADL data converge.13 as two questions about anti-Semitism in Europe. In 2016 the anti-Semitism on the American college Dimension 2: Anti-Semitic incidents campus question was answered affirmatively Data from an ADL audit show that Anti-Semitic (23 percent said it was a serious problem, and 34 incidents in the United States surged in 2016-17.14 percent that it was somewhat of a problem, for a total of 57 percent). In 2015, the total was 74.2 Dimension 3: Anti-Semitism as perceived by Jews percent (53.8 and 20.4 percent respectively). As We cite below findings from an AJC poll conducted this counterintuitive decrease (from 74.2 in 2015 late this summer. It seems likely that poll responses to 57 percent in 2016) occurred without any reflect the perceptionamong Jews that after years of noticeable structural change, we may suppose total unacceptability ofanti-Semitism in the public that the more concrete emergence of alt-right discourse, a new space, how ever marginal it may anti-Semitism eclipsed the campus issue. In 2015, be, has opened to countenance it.This concern has anti-Semitism was a less acute issue for American become heightened in the wake of the polarization Jews, addressed through the wide-angle campus that emerged following the U.S. presidential election. lens, and through the telephoto lens trained on The events in Charlottesville with the media storm distant Europe. Indeed, in 2015, 89.9 percent of of torch bearing neo-Nazis shouting “Jews will not respondents were worried about developing anti- replace us,”fomented aspike ofdisquiet. Semitism on the old continent.16 As the main AJC’s August 2017 Survey of American Jewish anti-Semitism on campuses has traditionally been Opinion included two questions related to the attributed to a relatively small number of activists

the jewish people policy institute 93 on the political left and from the BDS movement, 2. Strong condemnations of anti-Semitism by the decrease may indicate that the greater visibility top-level political leaders matter of alt-right anti-Semitism worries respondents One interesting element we can identify in Europe more than the familiar leftist anti-Semitism. and the United States is that the actions of top- The integrated index illustrates the fact that level political leaders are of utmost importance. both anti-Semitic incidents and anxiety among As we have mentioned, the far right comprises American Jews about anti-Semitism seem to be diverse sub-groups (white supremacists, extreme on the rise. As we will follow the evolution of the nationalists, neo-Nazis and other racist anti- index and obtain reliable data on anti-Semitism as Semites) in Europe and the United States the perceived by American Jews, we hope to be able to anxiety the far right engenders is more than elaborate concrete directions for action. everything else related to the disposition of those in power toward these xenophobic and Discussion of Implications reactionary forces. The more toleration they are shown by those in power, and the more space they 1. Downturn of anti-Jewish violence in France are allowed to hold in the public sphere, the more versus its rise in the United Kingdom and anxious Jews rightly become. When top-level Germany decision makers react loudly and unequivocally to As we integrate the data of the three dimensions, anti-Semitism, as shown in the French case, anti- an aggregate picture emerges. While the number Jewish behaviors decrease and Jewish comfort of anti-Semitic incidents and the resultant anxiety increases. are on the rise in both the United Kingdom Drawing on the European case study, we can and Germany, they are decreasing in France. elaborate a recommendation: Israeli and Jewish Despite similar economic and geopolitical trends political figures should encourage political and throughout Europe, we observe a major difference top-level civic leaders to take a clear stand against between the three West European countries anti-Semitism and demonstrate their commitment examined here. A government’s commitment to the security of Jews. Declarations backed by to combatting anti-Semitism is the single most visible actions are useful with respect to the three important factor in the decline of anti-Semitism. components of the index: (1) Anti-Semites get As mentioned as a supposition in last year’s the message that expressions of Jew hatred are Assessment, and more fully confirmed this year, unacceptable; (2) Commitment to stand by the it is thanks to French government’s unambiguous Jews and to vigorously pursue perpetrators deters statements and concrete actions that, in 2016, the anti-Semitic acts; (3) Jews regain trust in their number of anti-Semitic incidents decreased and country’s commitment to their security and feel French Jews began to regain confidence in the comfortable as full citizens. French government’s resolve to protect them.

94 the jewish people policy institute Endnotes 1 See in this 2017 Annual Assessment, our analysis 10 ADL Global 100 (2014) and update on 19 countries of Jewish developments in Europe. “Re-Emergence of a (2015), Anti-Defamation League, An Index of Anti- Diasporistic Jewish Identity in Europe,” pp. 120-130. ??? Semitism, Executive Summary. http://global100.adl.org/ 2 ADL Global 100 (2014) and update on 19 countries 11 U.S. Anti-Semitic Incidents Surged in 2016-17. (2015), Anti-Defamation League, An Index of Anti- April 2017. ADL. https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/ Semitism, Executive Summary. http://global100.adl.org/ documents/Anti-Semitic%20Audit%20Print_vf2.pdf 3 Reynié, Dominique. L’antisémitisme dans l’opinion 12 AJC’s 2016 Survey of American Jewish Opinion, publique française. Nouveaux éclairages, Fondapol, http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=7oJI November 2014. http://www.fondapol.org/wp-content/ LSPwFfJSG&b=8479733&ct=14924017 uploads/2014/11/CONF2press-Antisemitisme-DOC-6- 9 See Prof. Dina Porat, 2016 Kantor report, p. 9. web11h51.pdf, Koopmans, Ruud. “Fundamentalism and out-group hostility Muslim immigrants and Christian 13 Pew research center, Religion & Public Life, February natives in Western Europe.” WZB Berlin Social Science 201?. Center, WZB Mitteilungen, December 2013. http://www. http://www.pewforum.org/2017/02/15/americans- wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u6/koopmans_englisch_ express-increasingly-warm-feelings-toward-religious- ed.pdf. See also “Türkische Migranten hoffen auf groups/pf-02-15-17_thermometer-04/ muslimische Mehrheit,” Die Welt, August 2012, http:// 14 op. cit. U.S. Anti-Semitic Incidents Surged in 2016- www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article108659406/ 17. April 2017. ADL. https://www.adl.org/sites/default/ Tuerkische-Migranten-hoffen-auf-muslimische-Mehrheit. files/documents/Anti-Semitic%20Audit%20Print_vf2.pdf html 15 AJC’s 2016 Survey of American Jewish Opinion, 4 Commission nationale consultative des droits de http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=7oJI l’homme (CNCDH), Rapport 2016 sur la lutte contre le LSPwFfJSG&b=8479733&ct=14924017 racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie, March 2017, 16 The explanation presented here can be questioned, 5 Community Security Trust (UK), 2016 Annual and the surprising decrease is certainly worth further Review, p. 9. https://cst.org.uk/data/file/d/f/CST_Annual_ investigation. A first guess would be that there were Review_2016.1486995234.pdf methodological problems or a shift in how surveys were 6 Source: Kantor Center - European Jewry and conducted from one year to the next. A second guess Antisemitism Database http://kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/ would be that something did change structurally on general-analysis-2016 campuses. Perhaps administrators at more universities 7 FRA: “Discrimination and hate crime against Jews made firmer statements, analogous to the statements by in EU: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism”, elected governmental leaders in Europe. Perhaps a few key Fundamental Rights Agency, November 2013, European BDS motions were defeated. This gap illustrates the need Union. http://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and- strenuously stressed by JPPI for a consistent, widespread resources/data-and-maps/survey-data-explorer- and policy-relevant measurement of anti-Semitism. discrimination-and-hate-crime-against 8 FRA, op. cit.

the jewish people policy institute 95 11 Israelis Abroad

1. Introduction reason for migration. People weigh the advantages and disadvantages, both individual and familial, This chapter discusses and analyzes one in many realms that lead them to the decision to demographic phenomenon among the many move, as well as the choice of a specific destination. issues mentioned in the demographic dimension Israeli emigrants do not necessarily set out having of the Integrated Net Assessment of the Jewish decided to leave permanently; many move to people: emigration from Israel. This phenomenon another country for a few years after which some does not operate in a vacuum; rather, it involves will settle permanently, others will move to yet many ideological, social, and identificational another country, and still others will return home. components. Likewise, it has important policy Many of those who remain abroad will continue implications. to define themselves as Israeli. More specifically, and similar to many other A salient development of recent years is changing Western societies, Israel has a diaspora of people attitudes, of the Israeli public and the Israeli who have moved their permanent residence establishment, toward both emigration per se to another country. The departure from Israel and the Israelis who live abroad. After many years (sometimes called yerida i.e., descend) is driven of negation and condemnation, there is, today, a by various considerations – from rejection of the greater openness to, and understanding of, the economic, cultural, or political conditions in Israel, right and desire of individuals to choose where to the pull factors of professional opportunity or they live. This acknowledgement is part of the lifestyle in other places. Often there is no single process of normalization of the Israeli society

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 97 after laying the foundation for nation building. Jewish holidays and Israel’s Independence Day, the Likewise, the Israeli leadership has become publication of Hebrew newspapers in both written aware of the potential asset of Israelis abroad as and electronic versions, and activities in Israeli a resource for advocacy, political lobbying, and Houses (sponsored by the Jewish Agency), several fundraising. Hence, the attitude toward them is independent Israeli organizations operate in major more sympathetic than before. For example, at Diaspora countries today. One, especially large the February 2015 conference of Israeli Leadership organization, is the Israeli-American Council (IAC) in the Diaspora held in Israel, President Reuven which has ten branches in the United States. (Rubi) Rivlin sent his greeting to the participants in This chapter first describes the Israeli diaspora by a letter he wrote “in the name of the State of Israel” looking at its size and geographic distribution, its where he noted the challenge facing Israelis abroad demographic and socio-economic characteristics, to maintain their Israeli and Jewish identity. He and analyzing the Jewish identification of Israeli expressed his appreciation expats and their attachment to Israel. Based on scholars for their efforts to fresh data from JPPI’s Pluralism Project, we then and official maintain ties to the State describe the attitudes of Israelis toward their institutes alike of Israel and its culture. peers living abroad. Finally, we offer some policy agree that In his letter, President recommendations aimed at strengthening ties approximately Rivlin emphasized the between Israel and its citizens residing outside the half a million communal and political country. Israelis are significance of the Israeli living abroad community abroad for permanently the bonds between 2. Numerical Data Jewish communities in Despite a lack of uniformity in the definitions of the world, and between who is an Israeli emigrant, the use of different the State of Israel and those countries with Israeli sources, and regional variations in data quality communities. He referred to Israelis abroad as and comprehensiveness, there is a significant 1 “relatives” who are overseas. As Israel softens consensus among scholars and official institutes it stand vis-a-is its citizens abroad, local Jewish alike that approximately half a million Israeli Jews communities in their places of settlement are are living abroad permanently (Table 1).2 This more comfortable opening their doors to Israeli estimate includes native-born Israelis as well as newcomers. Jews who were born abroad, immigrated to Israel, More recently, we have also witnessed initiatives and later either returned to their country of origin by Israeli expats to establish and institutionalize or moved to a new country. In addition, there are various activities in their places of residence. Along several tens of thousands of children born abroad with social and cultural events around major to Israeli citizens.

98 the jewish people policy institute Table 1. The Number of Israelis Abroad, Despite some fluctuations, emigration rates 1989-2015 (number of emigrants relative to the size of the Israeli Jewish population), until recently tended to decline from 2.1 per thousand inhabitants in 6 Year Number 2010 to 1.9 in 2014. In other words, the rate of emigration was slower than the pace of population growth in Israel. Likewise, in those five years, the 1989 300,000 migration balance i.e., the differential between the number of Israelis who moved abroad and 1999 480,000 lived there continuously for a year or more and the number of Israelis who returned after an 2009 542,000 uninterrupted stay abroad of a year or more, was significantly lower as compared to the previous quintile (Figure 2.1). However, data released by the 2015 575,000 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics7 just a few days before this publication went to print, show that Sources: in 2015 migration balance of Israelis (differential Cohen, 2011; The Knesset, Center for Research and Information, 2012; CBS, Statistical Abstracts3 between departures and returns) once again increased to 7.8 thousand which is the highest since 2008. Likewise, emigration rate of “Jews and Similar to other immigration absorbing countries, Others” in 2015 was rather high of 2.5. Notably, some immigrants to Israel do not adjust to their about one-fourth of the recent emigrants who are new society. In fact, slightly more than half of defined “Jews and Other” belong to the “Other” the Israelis abroad were not born in Israel, but group, namely people who are not Halachically rather are immigrants who returned home or re- Jewish. Overall, given the composition of the Israeli migrated to a new country.4 The rate of native- population (high proportion of foreign-born) and born Israelis who reside abroad out of the total the tense security conditions in the region it can native-born Israeli population is about 6 percent. be asserted that the rate of Israelis leaving their This rate is only slightly higher than the average for country is rather low.8 OECD countries, but lower than that of countries According to different estimates, between one-half such as New Zealand, Switzerland, Austria, and the UK. Emigration rates for the foreign-born are significantly lower than that among immigrants in the United Kingdom or the United States.5

the jewish people policy institute 99 Figure 2.1: Departures and Returns of Israelis Staying Abroad Continuously for One Year or More and Migration Balance (In Thousand)

25 22.4 21.5 21.2 19.1 20 15.9 15.6 16.2 15.9 16.2 15.7 15 9.6 9.3 10.5 10.6 11.0 10.2 9.5 8.8 8.9 8.9 10 11.5 12.8 11.9 8.5 5 7.1 7.3 4.9 5.4 6.7 6.8 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Departures Returns Balance

Source: CBS, Statistical Abstracts, various years.

and two-thirds of Israeli emigrants have settled in The extent of emigration is strongly tied to Israel’s the United States. Other major concentrations security and economic situation. This is reflected of Israelis are found in Canada, Australia, the UK, in jumps in periods such as after the Yom Kippur France, and more recently also in Germany (Figure War or during the peak of the Second Intifada 2.2). Likewise, several tens of thousands of the (Palestinian uprising) at the beginning of this Soviet Jews who moved to Israel and hence hold century. However, looking at their demographic Israeli citizenship, returned to their countries of and socio-economic characteristics, it is revealed origin.9 that Israeli emigrants are not spread evenly across their areas of settlement.

100 the jewish people policy institute Figure 2.2: The Geographic Distribution of Native-Born Israeli Jews Who Live Abroad, by Major Areas and Countries (Percentages)

2.6% 3.2% 3.1% US

Canada

20.8% Rest West Europe

57.0% East Europe 5.4% Far East 7.8% Africa

Adopted from: Cohen, 2011

3. Affinities – 69 and 55 percent respectively. If classified by 3.1 Demography major geographical areas, the rate of Israelis aged 25-54 varies from a low of 61.6 percent among Israeli emigrants are not a representative segment those who settled in East Europe to a high of 72.8 of the Israeli Jewish population. Despite their percent in Scandinavia (Figure 3.1). The share of demographic and socio-economic diversity, it those aged 25 to 54 varies even more by country of can generally be stated that they are a positively residence: from 55 percent of those aged 25-54 in selected group. First, they are young. In 2014, New Zealand to as high as 84 percent in Norway.11 among those who were continuously abroad for a year or more, 41 percent were aged 20 to 39 while In Germany, Israelis are a relatively new group who the share of this group among the total population attracted much public attention. Among adult in Israel (“Jews and Others”) was only 27 percent.10 Israelis there, approximately 80 percent are aged Insights into the composition of native-born between 18 and 35 while this group constitutes Israeli populations in OECD countries shows that only about a third of the adult Jewish population the proportion of those aged 25-54 is higher by in Israel12. In other words, among Israelis abroad 14 percent than the proportion of this age group there is an overrepresentation of young people. among the native-born Jewish population in Israel

the jewish people policy institute 101 Figure 3.1: Age Composition of Native-Born Israelis Abroad and of Total Jewish Population in Israel (Percentages)

100 10.8 16.2 16.7 10.9 17.2 13.6 19.8 90 80 70 60 55.2 69.0 59.1 68.3 66.7 72.8 61.6 50 40 30 20 10 34.0 14.8 14.2 20.8 16.1 13.5 18.6 0

Source: Cohen, 2011 15-24 25-54 +55

Also, among young Israelis who recently emigrated reflecting a known phenomenon of marriages from the country there is a high proportion of between Israeli men and Scandinavian women) men than women: 59 and 41 percent respectively and among Israelis in East European countries such (as opposed to gender parity among the young as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In Jewish population in Israel).13 For native-born contrast, the gender ratio in Germany is even. It is Israelis in OECD countries, the gender ratio is 55 interesting to note that about 2 percent of Israelis percent male and 45 percent female (Figure 3.2). in Germany indicate their gender as “other.”14 A significant surplus of men over women was observed in Scandinavian countries (perhaps

102 the jewish people policy institute Figure 3.2: Gender Composition of Native-Born Israelis Abroad and of Total Jewish Population in Israel (Percentages)

100 48.5 44.6 44.9 46.2 42.7 34.3 31.0 80

20 51.5 55.4 55.1 53.8 57.3 65.7 69.0

Source: Cohen, 2011 Men Women

3.2 Citizenship eight out of every ten Israelis in Australia, Canada, Some two-thirds of native-born Israelis in OECD and Poland.15 We propose three explanations countries hold citizenship of their countries of for inter-country variation in citizenship: (1) residence (Figure 3.3). Especially high rates were differences in tenure, whereas a higher proportion found in English-speaking countries and in West of veteran immigrants increases the likelihood of Europe (including Scandinavian countries). having local citizenship, and vice versa; (2) inter- Rates of citizenship range from as low as one- country differences in criteria for citizenship; and fifth in Luxemburg, one-fourth in Germany, (3) family background, i.e. the offspring of people approximately one-third in Spain and Portugal, born in the specific country have an easier process one-half in Austria and Denmark, and reaches of receiving citizenship.

the jewish people policy institute 103 Figure 3.3: Native-Born Israelis Abroad by Citizenship (Percentages)

100 33.8 32.2 32.0 73.9 62.4 34.3 56.4 80

20 66.2 67.8 68.0 26.1 37.6 65.7 43.6

Source: Cohen, 2011; Rebhun, Sunker, Kranz (in preparation). Yes No

3.3 Education and Employment contrast, those with lower educational attainment may have preferred to return home and take On average, Israelis abroad are well educated. advantage of their acquaintance with the local Further, educational attainment improves with labor market, as well as their roots in informal prolongation of time in the destination country. In social networks, to find a job and get along 1980, Israelis aged 20-29 in the United States had financially. an average of 12.4 years of education; a decade later, when they were already 30-39, they had a Israel’s so-called brain drain has strengthened over score of 13.3 years of education; and by 2000, time; the proportion with academic education when they were 40-49, their level of education among more recent immigrants is significantly was 14 years.16 This increase partly attests to post- higher compared to their earlier counterparts. For secondary studies in the United States. However, it example, although a 20ll study by Cohen, which can also be the result of selective preference to stay relied on data from 2000, found that half of the in the US of people with higher education which is Israelis in the United States had a bachelor’s degree likely to determine their economic attainment. In or higher, findings from the 2013 Pew survey of

104 the jewish people policy institute Figure 3.4: Educational Attainment of Native-Born Israelis Abroad (Percentages)

100 26.5 49.5 51.2 36.9 59.6 45.3 32.2 48.7 80

40 73.5 50.5 48.8 63.1 40.4 54.7 67.8 51.3 20

Source: Cohen, 2011; Rebhun, Sunker, Kranz (in preparation). Less than academic degree B.A. and Over

Jewish Americans showed that 72 percent of the a university diploma this was true for about a native-born Israelis in the United States had a quarter of their counterparts in Israel.18 Another university diploma (JPPI’s data analysis of the Pew figure suggests that 3.7 percent of the native-born survey). The increasing tendency of Israelis with Israelis in OECD countries hold a Ph.D. versus university education to move abroad is especially less than one percent of the native-born Jewish salient in respect to destination countries where population in Israel (in similar age cohorts).19 there is a significant economic premium for the Variations in educational attainment exist by 17 highly educated. areas of settlement. High levels are particularly Israelis abroad are more educated than those prominent among Israelis in English speaking remaining in Israel. For example, in 2000, the countries including the United States and Canada; average years of education of Israelis in the United in East Europe; and Germany. On the other side, States was 13.1, as compared to only 11 years the educational profile of Israelis in Scandinavia among the Jewish population in Israel. Similarly, and France is low in comparison to Israelis while 60 percent of the Israelis in Germany have elsewhere in the diaspora.

the jewish people policy institute 105 Figure 3.5: Occupation of Native-Born Israelis Abroad (Percentages)

100 65.9 48.8 49.3 41.1 38.1 38.3 64.6 25.9 80

20 34.1 51.2 50.7 58.9 61.9 61.7 35.4 74.1 0

Source: Cohen, 2011; Rebhun, Sunker, Kranz (in preparation). White Color Other

Also of interest is the high proportion of About half of the Israelis in OECD countries work in immigrants with doctorates in Switzerland (one- professional, technical, or managerial occupations. third of all native-born Israelis there), Italy (12.3 Higher rates than the average were found in percent), and East Europe (10.4 percent).20 We Canada, the UK, Australia, France, Switzerland and raise the possibility that this group of Israelis Germany, while the rates are below the average in includes a large number of physicians; many the United States (with a small differential) and the Israelis who cannot find places in Israeli medical Scandinavian countries.21 The rate of Israelis abroad schools study in countries such as Italy, Romania, working in white collar positions is about 20 percent Hungary, and perhaps some stay put. However, higher than among their general host society; this others are likely to be working as researchers in is true for almost all countries, with the exception other scientific fields. of Scandinavia. Occupation largely corresponds Consistent with education, Israelis abroad are with earnings, which jointly attest to the economic heavily concentrated in white collar occupations. achievement of Israelis in their new countries.

106 the jewish people policy institute Table 4.1: Jewish Identification among Israelis Abroad and in Israel (Percentages)

USA Germany France Latin FUSSR Jews in America Israel

Synagogue attendance 24.0 4.6 22.4 34.2 21.1 45.1 (once a month +)

Lighting Sabbath candles (always) 34.0 14.8 - - - 53.6

Fast on Yom Kippur 62.0 14.3 68.5 69.6 57.6 68.1

Seder attendance 90.0 67.2 85.9 85.0 71.6 94.8

Keep dietary laws 42.0 - 33.3 32.1 35.1 71.4

Sources: 2013 US Pew survey; 2014 Israeli Pew survey; Rebhun and Pupko, 2010; Rebhun, Sunker, Kranz (in preparation)

4. Group Identification

4.1 Jewish Identification Substantial variations in Jewish identification exist The Jewish identification of Israelis abroad is according to country of settlement. High levels weaker than that of Jews in Israel. This is especially were found among Israelis in the United States so in regard to ongoing religious behaviors such as and South America. Jewish identification of Israelis keeping the dietary laws, synagogue attendance, in the FSU, many of whom are return migrants (i.e., and lighting Sabbath candles. The differences Jews who immigrated to Israel and later returned between Jewish Israelis abroad and those in Israel to the origin country) is slightly lower. Jewish are much less pronounced with respect to the identification is especially weak among Israelis in intermittent rituals of fasting on Yom Kippur and Germany. This can be attributed, among other Passover Seder attendance (Table 4.1). One major things, to their socio-demographic profile: young, explanation for these differences is the low rate unmarried, of secular familial background, and of religious and ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) Jews left-leaning political attitudes.23 among Israelis abroad.22

the jewish people policy institute 107 Jewish identification strengthens with the with a tenure of less than a decade. The proportion prolongation of time abroad. Insights into Israelis of synagogue membership and of those who keep in three large U.S. communities (Boston, Miami the Jewish dietary laws is 25 to 30 percent higher and Los Angeles) show that among those who are among veteran Israeli emigres than the more in the United States for more than ten years the recent Israeli arrivals. The differentials by tenure Jewish Community Center (JCC) membership rate for lightening Sabbath and Chanukah candles is 12 is 75 percent higher than for their counterparts and 10 percent, respectively (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Ratio of Percentage of Jewish Ritual and Communal Affiliation among Veteran Israelis (More than 10 Years) and Recent Israeli Immigrants (10 Years or Less) in the United States

2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 1.76 1.30 1.25 1.12 1.10 1.01 0 Membership Synagogue Keep Light Light Attend in JCC Membership Dietary Friday Chanuukah Passover (At Least Once Laws Candles Candles Seder A Month)

Source: Rebhun and Lev Ari, 2010

108 the jewish people policy institute 4.2 Israeli Identification is true for about two-thirds of the Israelis in the United States and France. Among Israelis in other Israelis abroad have various ways of maintaining countries, less than half travel to Israel on a yearly contacts with Israel. The major and most common basis (Table 4.2). one is through family: between two-thirds of Israelis in Latin America to as high as 98 percent Approximately half the Israelis in the United States of Israelis in the UK maintain ongoing contacts belong to informal Israeli social networks. Among with relatives in Israel. Contacts with friends in Israelis in the United Kingdom the rate is slightly the home country are less frequent, albeit quite lower, about 40 percent. In other countries Israelis intensive: approximately half of the Israelis in mainly integrate either into local Jewish social the United States and close to three-fourths of circles or the general non-Jewish society. Between Israelis in the United Kingdom reported that they one-third and one-half of Israelis abroad regularly have constant contact with their friends in Israel. surf Israeli websites with only slight variations About eight out of every ten Israelis residing in between Israeli communities (Table 4.2). the UK pay a visit to Israel at least once a year; this

Table 4.2: Israeli Identification among Israelis Abroad (Percentages)

Latin USA UK France Germany FUSSR America

Contacts with family 90.6 97.8 73.3 91.3 81.6 67.1 in Israel

Contacts with friends 52.3 72.5 53.9 59.9 68.0 43.0 in Israel

Visits to Israel 64.2 86.8 67.8 47.8 47.8 36.9 (once a year or more)

Israeli friends (most/all) 51.3 40.7 16.5 16.5 19.0

Surf Israeli websites (a lot) 45.2 35.2 49.5 30.0 46.7 51.3

Sources: Rebhun and Pupko, 2011; Rebhun, Sunker, Kranz (in preparation)

the jewish people policy institute 109 As time abroad elapses, ties to Israel weaken. and political situation in Israel are 92.3 and 69.8 While about 85 percent of Israelis living in the percent respectively; and for defining oneself United States for ten years or less indicated that as Israeli – 88.5 and 62.8 percent respectively. they are strongly attached to Israel, this was true Similarly, among Israelis in Germany, the intensity for only 79.1 percent among the more veteran of contacts with family and friends in Israel immigrants with a tenure of 11 years or more. declines over time as does the frequency of visiting The respective rates for familiarity with the social Israel (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Israeli Identification among Israelis in the U.S. and Germany by Tenure (Percentages and Ratio)

0-10 Years 11 Years + Ratio

US: Attachment to Israel 84.6 79.1 0.93

US: Acquaintance with situation in Israel 92.3 69.8 0.76

U.S.: Israeli identity 88.5 62.8 0.71

Germany: Contacts with family 93.0 83.9 0.90

Germany: Contacts with friends 62.7 45.8 0.73

Germany: Visits to Israel (twice a year+) 50.1 37.2 0.75

Sources: Rebhun and Pupko, 2011; Rebhun, Sunker, Kranz (in preparation)

5. Attitudes of Israelis toward pluralism conducted in the winter of 2017 by JPPI their Peers Abroad in the framework of its broader pluralism project. We focus on three major aspects: attachment A complementary perspective on Israelis abroad to Israelis who live abroad, assessment of the can be gained by examining the attitudes of the contribution(s) of Israelis abroad to the State of Israeli public toward them. To this end, we present Israel, and granting Israelis abroad the right to vote findings from a survey on Israelis attitudes on in the Israeli elections.

110 the jewish people policy institute One of every ten Israelis feels attached to Israelis Ultra-Orthodox take an inclusive and embracing abroad, another 25 percent feel somewhat approach to any Jew regardless of his or her attached, and the remaining 65 percent feel no specific characteristics, such as place of residence. attachment at all (Table 5.1). Attachment to Israelis We may further speculate that the Ultra-Orthodox abroad varies by religious identity. Ultra-Orthodox denominations, especially Chabad, have emissaries are the most strongly attached while Modern abroad, hence they may be thinking of them when religious Jews express the weakest attachment to asked about their attachment to Israelis abroad. Israelis abroad. This can be interpreted vis-à-vis Attachment to Israelis abroad also depends on the Zionist orientations of these two groups in political orientation: those who define themselves Israel: weak among the Ultra-Orthodox and very on the right side of the political spectrum strong among the religious. Accordingly, sympathy exhibit stronger attachment to Israelis abroad as toward those who choose to leave the country compared to those on the left of the Israeli political and settle elsewhere is inversely proportional to continuum (12.4 and 5.5 percent respectively).24 Zionist orientation. Likewise, it is possible that the

Table 5.1: Attachment of Israelis to Their Israeli Peers Abroad (Percentages)

Somewhat Attached Not at All Attached

9.8 25.4 64.7

Secular 7.5 22.0 70.5

Traditional 12.3 27.3 60.4 Religious Identity Religious 8.8 12.8 78.4

Haredi 20.6 59.8 19.6

Left 5.5 20.6 73.9 Political Center 8.3 29.9 61.9 Orientation Right 12.4 25.0 62.6

the jewish people policy institute 111 Table 5.2: Attitudes Regarding the Contribution of Israelis Abroad to the State of Israel (Percentages)

Negative Somewhat Somewhat Positive Negative Positive

14.6 27.1 39.8 18.4

Religious Secular 14.8 25.9 41.5 17.7 Identity Traditional 9.3 33.1 39.0 18.6

Religious 13.0 23.5 40.9 22.6

Haredi 25.0 25.0 31.8 18.2

Political Left 14.8 22.7 44.5 18.0 Orientation Center 12.7 26.3 42.4 18.6

Right 14.7 27.8 39.2 18.3

The majority of Israelis (58.2 percent) hold the camps regarding the extent of the contribution of view that Israelis abroad make a positive or Israelis abroad to the State of Israel, with very small somewhat positive contribution to the State of variations between left and right. Israel (Table 5.2). Among all sectors of the Israeli Despite the positive appreciation of the Jewish population i.e., secular, traditional, religious, contribution of Israelis abroad to the country, less and the Ultra-Orthodox – more than half perceive than one-third of the Jewish population in Israel the contribution of Israelis abroad to the state as favors granting them voting rights in Knesset positive or somewhat positive. However, somewhat elections; a clear majority of 61.4 percent oppose surprisingly, religious Jews have the strongest this, and 10 percent have no opinion on the appreciation while the Ultra-Orthodox have matter (Table 5.3). The distribution of attitudes the lowest appreciation, perhaps reflecting their among the secular sector pretty much resembles general anti-Zionist stand. In any event, there is a that of the general national profile. Among wide consensus among Israelis of different political traditional Jews, the proportion in support

112 the jewish people policy institute Table 5.3: Granting Israelis Abroad Voting Rights in Knesset Elections (Percentages)

Favor Oppose Don't Know

29.0 61.4 9.7

Secular 28.9 60.7 10.3

Traditional 33.7 56.7 9.6 Religious Identity Religious 25.6 67.2 7.2

Haredi 27.4 62.7 9.8

Left 26.7 65.5 7.9 Political Center 27.3 63.7 9.0 Orientation Right 30.6 58.8 10.6

of granting voting rights to Israelis abroad is assumption that Israelis abroad lean toward the slightly higher than the national average, but the political center or even right, a higher proportion proportion is slightly lower among the religious of Israelis on the right, compared to those on the and the Ultra-Orthodox. It is possible that the left, support allowing Israelis abroad to participate differences between secular and traditional on in elections (30.6 and 26.7 percent respectively). one hand, and religious on the other reflect a Finally, it should be noted that data not presented (correct) perception that most Israelis abroad are here attest to a strong and consistent relationships secular and traditional, and hence could increase between the three attitudes toward attachment, the electorate of the non-religious and non-Ultra- contribution, and voting rights. The stronger the Orthodox parties. Yet, when taken as a practical attachment to Israelis abroad, the greater the “political” consideration, i.e. the possibility of appreciation for their contribution(s) to the State strengthening the weight of the Jewish electorate of Israel and the stronger the support of granting (vs. the non-Jewish electorate), and given the Israelis abroad voting rights in Knesset elections.

the jewish people policy institute 113 6. Discussion and Policy in comparison to other immigrant receiving Recommendations countries such as the United States. These observations show that Israelis are often This chapter analyzed and discussed major attached to their country, wish to stay, and that affinities of Israelis who live abroad. We focused new immigrants are well absorbed. Still, given on the size of this population, its demographic what we know about the major push factors and socio-economic characteristics, as well as for emigration, there are three areas of possible patterns of Jewish identity and attachment to governmental intervention that might somewhat Israel. We also provided insights, to the best of our diminish the volume of emigration from Israel: knowledge never before researched and certainly improving the security situation and personal most up to date, on the attitudes of Israelis toward safety of the country’s inhabitants, limiting the their peers abroad, including with respect to the involvement of the religious establishment in the highly disputed issue of granting Israeli expats the daily life of Israelis, and increasing employment right to vote in Knesset elections. opportunities, especially for young people in The empirical observations have five major white collar occupations. implications for policy: 2) Despite the relatively small overall number 1) The cumulative number of Israelis abroad has of emigrants, there is an over representation of increased over time. This means that there are young people. This age cohort is a major reservoir more Israelis leaving the country than Israelis of Jewish population growth and generational returning after being a way for a significant replacement in Israel. It is likely that many of duration (at least one year). Israel’s emigration rate them will marry abroad and raise their children in – the number of emigrants relative to the size of their new country. Hence, the demographic loss the population – is not exceptional compared to for Israel is not only reflected in the number of other developed countries. those who left but also their children. Moreover, Notably, about half the emigrants are people who young people are the most productive sector were born outside of Israel, immigrated there, and of the work force and constitute a major part of later left – either returning to their country of the army reserves. It is also likely that they have origin or relocating to a third country. This figure parents living in Israel who, when elderly, would has two important aspects. The first is that among like to have their children and grandchildren native-born Israelis the number of emigrants is close by; with their absence, the burden of caring rather small. The second is that the number of for their elderly parents increasingly depends foreign-born Jewish immigrants, who failed to on local welfare services. The young profile of acclimate to Israel and left the country, out of the Israeli emigrants requires special attention to number of total immigrants, is small, certainly the needs and expectations of this age cohort in Israeli society, in areas such as higher education,

114 the jewish people policy institute employment, housing, and the educational system But the focus should not just be directed at Israelis for their children in order to diminish the push who are already abroad. Careful attention should factors of their emigration from Israel. be given to providing infrastructure and support 3) Many Israelis abroad are highly educated. for the elderly whose children live far away, as well Hence, they are concentrated in jobs in areas as to their children who return to Israel. Obviously, such as high-tech, research and development, this would also strengthen the attachment of and academia. Some acquired their human Israeli expats to the country. capital in studies and internships abroad. This 5) From time to time, proposals to grant Israelis group has a special potential to contribute to the abroad the right to vote in Israeli elections are prosperity of Israel. Concerted efforts should be raised. Some reject the idea outright, others made to stem the brain drain. For example, the suggest limiting voting rights to the first four or budgets of Israeli institutions of higher education five years of being away, and still others advocate should be increased, allowing them to expand conferring voting rights irrespective of duration faculties. Similarly, positions for medical doctors abroad.26 It appears that the majority of Israeli Jews in Israeli hospitals should be increased. Similarly, are against providing Israeli expats with the right ways to increase investment in Israel’s high-tech to vote. This objection crosses different segments industries should be explored in order to create of the Israeli society and crosses religious and additional jobs. political orientations. 4) Israelis abroad are concentrated in large cities. They increase the local Jewish population there and the potential for expanding Jewish communal activities. Communal institutions, on their part, should be more open to embracing Israeli immigrants and involving them in organizational activities. At the same time, ways to prevent the erosion in their attachment to Israel should be explored. Such efforts, should be supported by the Israeli government (Ministry for Diaspora Affairs) and major institutions like the Jewish Agency and should include, among other things, ongoing social and cultural events, educational activities in Jewish pre-schools and day schools with strong Israeli orientations, dissemination of information about Israel, and engaging Israeli expats in Israel advocacy.25

the jewish people policy institute 115 Endnotes 10 Central Bureau of Statistics. 2016. Statistical Abstract, 2016. Jerusalem. 1 President Reuven (Rubi) Rivlin letter, 26 January 2016 11 Cohen, 2011. to the participants of the conference on Israeli leadership abroad. 12 Rebhun, Uzi, Heinz, Sunker, and Dani, Kranz (in preparation). Double Burden: Israeli Jews in Contemporary 2 Nathan, Gilad. 2015. The OECD Expert Group on Germany. Migration. Annual Report: International Migration Israel 2015-2016. Ruppin Academic Center: The Institute for 13 Central Bureau of Statistics. 2015. Immigration and Social integration. 14 Rebhun et al. (in preparation). 3 Cohen, Yinon. 2011. “Israeli-Born Emigrants: Size, 15 Cohen, 2011; Rebhun et al. (in preparation). Destinations and Selectivity”. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 52 (1-2): 45-62. The Knesset, 16 Rebhun, Uzi and Lilach Lev Ari. (2010). American Center for Research and Information, March 11, 2012. The Israelis: Migration, Transnationalism, and Diasporic Identity. Number of Israelis Who Live Abroad. 7 pp. Central Bureau Leiden: Brill. of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts. Various Years. 17 Cohen, 2011. 4 Cohen, 2011. 18 Rebhun et al. (in preparation). 5 Cohen, 2011. 19 Cohen, 2011.

6 Central Bureau of Statistics. 2015. Annual Abstract, 20 Cohen, 2011. 2015. Jerusalem. 21 Cohen, 2011. 7 Central Bureau of Statistics. 2015. Announcement 22 Noted that there are, indeed, religious and ultra- to the Media, 14.8.2017 Orthodox Israelis abroad, especially in the US. However, 8 Cohen, 2011. their relatively small sample in surveys carried out among 9 Tolts, Mark. 2016. “Demography of the Contemporary Israelis abroad prevent from assessing the size of these Russian-Speaking Jewish Diaspora,” Z. Gitelman (ed.), The two sub-groups. New Jewish Diaspora: Russian-Speaking Immigrants in the 23 Rebhun et al. (in preparation). United States, Israel, and Germany. New Brunswick, NJ: 24 See also: “After the Zionist Revolution: Patterns of Rutgers University Press, 2016, pp. 30-31. Tolts M. 2016. Jewish Collective Identity among Israeli Jews”. Annual “Post-Soviet Jewish Demographic Dynamics: An Analysis Assessment 2016. Jerusalem: Jewish People Policy Institute . of Recent Data”. Demoscope Weekly (Moscow), 2016, No. 693-694, pp. 18-20 (in Russian). 25 See also: Yogev Karasenty, On Israelis Abroad. JPPI, 2014. Rebhun Uzi and Israel Pupko. 2011. Fars Close: Migration, Jewish Identification, and Attachment to Homeland 26 See discussion on this topic at Karasenty, above. among Israelis Abroad. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ministry of Absorption, and the Jewish Agency.

116 the jewish people policy institute Putting the Kotel Decision in Context – Implications and 12 Steps Forward

Summary The Israeli government decision on June 25, 2017, Navigating these issues with sensitivity and to freeze the Western Wall (Kotel) agreement and resolving them quickly is important for advance a conversion bill was dramatic, as were the maintaining Jewish unity, in Israel and between responses from Jewish leaders and organizations in Israel and the Diaspora. the United States, Israel and other countries. This, We note that this analysis reflects primarily an of course, did not occur in a vacuum and should Israeli viewpoint and focuses upon the resultant be understood in the proper Israeli political, social consequences in Israel, since these decisions, and demographic context. regardless of their impact on world Jewry, These events highlight the importance of were made within Israel’s political system. It is conducting two serious and related discussions. equally important to examine the issue from The first is within Israeli society regarding the a perspective of the Diaspora communities, nature of the relationship between religion and specifically American Jewry. An early conclusion state. The second regards Israel’s relationship with concerning this matter, and one Israeli decision the Diaspora: what does it mean on a symbolic makers should consider, is that decisions and a practical level for Israel to be the “homeland regarding religion and state in Israel affect, and are for all the Jews”? stirring a debate about the continued centrality of Israel to Jewish identity in the Diaspora.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 117 Background later – when the plan was not yet implemented because of the political hurdles involved – and to On January 31, 2016, after years of delicate the surprise of many, the government announced negotiations, the Reform and Conservative (June 25, 2017) that it was shelving the plan. movements, Women of the Wall, the Israeli government represented by the Prime Minister’s On the same day, the ministers’ committee on office, the Jewish Agency for Israel and the Jewish legislation approved a controversial “conversion Federations of North America – reached an bill”. This was somewhat overshadowed by the agreement to designate the southern part of the Kotel developments but is no less significant for Western Wall officially as an area for non-Orthodox non-Orthodox, as well as modern Orthodox, prayer.1 The agreement, called “historic” by some Judaism in Israel. This was a move by the of the participants, was to upgrade and expand ultra-Orthodox parties to tank the Reform the current platform (in and Conservative movements’ (and liberal Orthodoxy’s) efforts, in the High Court of Justice if the conversion use for egalitarian prayer since 2000 and which has to have conversions conducted outside of the bill is approved Chief Rabbinate be recognized for the purpose of by the Knesset, received some gradual physical upgrades over gaining citizenship. If the conversion bill becomes Reform and law (which requires Knesset approval), Reform Conservative the years), create a visible and official entrance and Conservative, as well as all other conversions, conversions of non-Israelis conducted in Israel and outside the would not be on par with the main “Orthodox” sections official Orthodox conversion system, would not be recognized by recognized by the state for citizenship purposes. the state for of the wall, and grant citizenship public funding for the purposes site. Most importantly What these decisions do and do for the Reform and not mean Conservative movements, the agreement would have defined the southern On the practical level, freezing the agreement section as officially a part of the Western Wall and means that the inclusion of the site as a part of as a holy site, which it currently is not, as well as the Western Wall, and defining it as a holy site establish a governing council that would include (including the legal protections inherent in such a representatives of their respective movements. move), and the establishment of a visible and equal entrance, as well as of a governing council including Following approval by the cabinet, an outcry Reform and Conservative representatives, will not in ultra-Orthodox circles forced the political happen, at least not under the current government. leadership of their parties to wage a fight to cancel (A court discussion scheduled for late August could 2 the plan. The result was that a year and a half change the situation.)

118 the jewish people policy institute However, headlines aside, this does not mean So what will change? Based on a March 2016 High that liberal Jewry has no place to pray near the Court precedent that ruled the state must recognize Western Wall. The current site, although not private Orthodox conversion courts for the sake of ideal, and legally vulnerable, has been and will, granting citizenship, the Reform and Conservative for the time being, continue to be in use for movements sought similar recognition for their egalitarian prayer. Moreover, it will likely receive conversions for non-citizens within Israel. To date, some important physical upgrades through the matter of conversion in Israel has never been government funding, albeit less than what was defined by law, unlike marriage, which by law is agreed upon, as announced by Cabinet Secretary run by the Orthodox Rabbinate. The bill aims to Braverman. Relatedly, Women of the Wall, prevent such a court decision as well as to overturn who had already won the right to pray on the the ability of private Orthodox conversions to women’s side with prayer shawls and phylacteries confer Israeli citizenship, establishing for the first (tallit and tefillin) and read from the Torah, time a legal monopoly will continue to pressure the ultra-Orthodox over conversion in Israel. "the bill will administration of the site in the Courts. It should The bill’s supporters cite the ensure that be noted that the government is currently need to maintain oversight migrants and seeking to adapt the legislation to force Women over a process that grants political asylum of the Wall to conduct their prayers in the citizenship, particularly to seekers cannot 3 egalitarian section, once upgrades are in place. ensure that migrants and take advantage Regarding the conversion law, if it passes (and political asylum seekers, of lenient as of this writing it is not clear whether it has such as from Africa or the conversion majority support in the Knesset – and if it does Palestinian territories, who processes pass, it will likely be amended, though it is not are not considered sincere to gain clear how), it will do little to change the de- convert applicants, cannot citizenship" facto status of the Reform and Conservative take advantage of more movements in Israel today. Currently, Reform lenient or even fake conversion processes to gain and Conservative conversions conducted abroad citizenship. Conversely, the heads of the Reform and are recognized by the Interior Ministry for the Conservative movements in Israel note that they sake of citizenship (Law of Return) but not by had already agreed to criteria as to the conversion the Rabbinate; and the new law will not affect applicants and that they would not conduct such conversions. Furthermore, Reform and conversions on such asylum-seekers. They further Conservative conversions conducted in Israel for fear that were the Rabbinate to gain greater control Israeli citizens are currently recognized for the over the conversion process, it could eventually Interior Ministry’s registry but again, not by the attempt to overturn the ability of community rabbis Rabbinate (marriage). abroad, of any denomination, to convert for the sake of making Aliyah.

the jewish people policy institute 119 Numbers and politics Conservative movements (as opposed to secular Judaism) as threats to Judaism, since from the With much of the discussion centering on the Orthodox point of view these movements moral, symbolic, and international implications redefine the very meaning of Judaism and Torah of these recent moves, it is important to observance while lacking the authority to do so. acknowledge that demographic changes and the It is also important to keep in mind that the more resulting political power won the day. Though progressive forms of Judaism are not widespread recent developments have been perceived by in Israel. Non-Orthodox forms of Judaism barely some as part of a pattern pointing toward the existed in Israel until the 1970s and only really direction of Judaism in Israel or Israel’s desired began to take root over the past couple of decades. relationship with Diaspora Jewry, the underlying Until recently, Israelis tended to be secular, political context must also be taken into account. traditional, Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox. The old The political calculation is simple: Prime Minister saying goes that “the synagogue the average Israeli Netanyahu’s current governing coalition has 66 does not attend is Orthodox.” While this dynamic of 120 Knesset seats. The ultra-Orthodox parties is in the process of changing, as a growing number (Shas and United Torah Judaism) hold a combined of secular and traditional Israelis are connecting to 13 seats in this coalition and remain firmly Judaism through non-Orthodox options, there are opposed to any move that a) breaks the state/ still today only around 30,000 formally affiliated religion status quo or b) grants recognition, in members of the Reform and Conservative any way, to non-Orthodox Jewish movements. A movements in Israel (12,000 adult members).4 segment of the Jewish Home (HaBayit HaYehudi) Add to this a small group of egalitarian liberal party’s 8 seats is also opposed to such moves. This Orthodox activists, and perhaps a few thousands means that there is an opposition to such moves committed to the separation of religion and state, of 13 to possibly as many as 18 members within and you are still left with a wildly lopsided field. the coalition. This represents a significant group Israel’s Jewish population today, which stands within a 66-member coalition that the Prime at 6.5 million people (out of 8.7 million citizens) Minister, for a variety of reasons, wants to preserve. is roughly 9 percent ultra-Orthodox, and 13 It is important to note that the opposition of percent National-Religious (half the latter of the Haredi parties to changing the status quo whom tend to espouse more conservative is not only a power-play. There is deep ideology social views).5 On matters of religion and state, involved as the representatives of these Haredi these groups often enjoy the tacit support of parties genuinely believe in the need to guard a significant group of “traditional” Israelis (29 the “true” traditional Judaism from what they percent), whose Jewishness is Orthodox, even view as corrupting forces of “modernization if they do not practice it fully. Anecdotally, one and assimilation.” They see the Reform and only needs to show up at the Kotel at random

120 the jewish people policy institute times and count the black-hat clad worshipers at issue high enough on their political agenda and the main (Orthodox) section, compared with the are far more concerned with day-to-day issues number of Reform and Conservative worshipers such as marriage freedom or transportation and at Robinson’s arch, or witness the size of an shopping options on the Sabbath. That said, the ultra-Orthodox demonstration as compared to largely secular Israeli electorate has shown that the Reform and Conservative one following the when frustrations rise, it is capable of coalescing recent government decision (which attracted around its opposition to what it sees as the undue no more than 1,500 people), to understand the influence of the ultra-Orthodox over public affairs preponderance of power. The numbers, beyond in Israel. The Yesh Atid party taking 19 seats in the their symbolic aspect, belie commitment to the 2013 elections is the most recent example, with cause. the ultra-Orthodox avoidance of military service Things are, of course, slowly changing. Polling as one of the main issues in its platform. in recent years does show that anywhere from 5 The hard truth, regardless of which side of the percent 6 to 12 percent 7 of Israeli Jews, with the debate one supports, is that the Reform and most accurate figures probably around 7 percent Conservative movements do not at this time have 8, identify with the Reform and Conservative widespread political power in Israel. In lieu of this, movements if given such a choice. Indeed, the they have worked deftly to play weak political Reform and Conservative movements each hands, gaining victories mainly through two report that a few hundreds of thousands of venues: Israelis regularly attend (at least a few times each • Battles in courts provided the movements year) their religious services, life-cycle events and with public funding for rabbis, access to the cultural programming, without officially belonging education system, some budget allocations to a community. These are significant numbers (although these pale in comparison to what no doubt, and would be especially so were they the Orthodox are granted) and more. to translate into political weight. However, at this time they do not. Beyond that, most Jews • Support from their American counterparts who identify with the Reform and Conservative provides the other pillar for Israel’s Reform movements support the parties in opposition to and Conservative movements. While not the current ruling coalition. possessing much local power, in the U.S. Reform and Conservative Jews comprise a full Beyond that, while a majority of Israeli Jews half of the six million strong community and (over 60 percent) and a vast majority of secular are a source of significant activity, philanthropy Jews (over 80 percent) support the original Kotel and pro-Israel political influence.11 Worldwide, decision and the establishment of an egalitarian there are an estimated four million Reform 9 section , few have been willing to do much about and Conservative Jews and probably more it, as only 11 percent 10 of Israeli Jews place the

the jewish people policy institute 121 who do not belong to a community but to compete with foundations and organizations would attend such synagogues as a fallback who have their own, sometimes-contradictory option. 12 13 agendas. Moreover, due to Israel’s much grown But things are changing with these two levers of economy the U.S. community has also become influence. And the decision by the PM to cave in less influential in its ability to wield power through to the ultra-Orthodox demands might be a hint of massive philanthropy. Add to these facts the rising things to come. numbers of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews in the U.S. who will less questioningly support The current government under Likud’s Netanyahu Israel while non-Orthodox Judaism seems, at and with The Jewish Home’s Ayelet Shaked as least from the perspective of many Israelis, to Justice Minister, has made it its mission to restrain be on the decline (low birthrates, intermarriage, and weaken the High Court’s ability to influence etc.) and you have a weakening of the second government policy. This arrow in the non-Orthodox movements’ quiver. there seems to is not necessarily a move Moreover, in the eyes of many Israelis, when the be a decline in aimed at changing the U.S. Jewish community does come together to the collective relations between religion influence Israeli policy, it at times does so in ways power of and state but rather the that contradict Israel’s interests, at least as defined American Jewry result of the belief in by the supporters of the current government. to influence some government circles There is even some sentiment within the current Israeli decision- that the High Court – government that Evangelicals and non-Jewish making beginning in the 1990s conservatives are today, perhaps a greater – asserts its authority in source of support for Israel and especially this ways that a) usurps the government’s policies, than is mainstream Jewish electorate’s role in making policy, and b) erodes America. 14 Israel’s Jewishness and prioritizes individual rights at the expense of the collective Jewish good. The That is not to say that these two forms of leverage coalition is diligently working to alter the course are now irrelevant, and far from it. The courts are of the Court and has received the support of its still able to wield significant effect (in fact, both voters as it moves in this direction. the Kotel decision and the proposed conversion law came in response to court procedures). In addition, there seems to be a decline in the Similarly, the uproar from the mainstream U.S. collective power of the U.S. Jewish community Jewish community was clearly felt in Israel. The to influence Israeli decision-making. Once unified degree to which the government is taking this around larger organizations, this community has issue seriously shows it is not dismissive of the U.S. become more diffused in recent years. Politically, Jewish community, even if it preferred to acquiesce the once close-to-monolithic major groups have to the ultra-Orthodox this time around.

122 the jewish people policy institute Next moves despite their small numbers. Still, in the case of the Kotel this could necessitate a slight change Israeli politics are fickle and so non-Orthodox of course. Plans are in place to physically upgrade movements still have many paths for achieving the Robinson’s Arch platform. And a subsequent their goals. However, recent developments effort could aim to turn this area into a magnet for should make it clear that there is no substitute both world Jewry and Jewish Israelis. Paradoxically, for political power – plain and simple. The the movements could realistically use the recent Reform and Conservative movements are, in fact, crisis as an opportunity for increased government already working to lay the grassroots foundations funding and support on a range of practical for having a more Jewishly diverse society, on the (though perhaps not symbolic) matters – as the community level where they conduct lifecycle government will likely seek non-controversial and events for thousands of Israelis each year, and in practical measures to ameliorate Diaspora anger. the school systems. If they can mobilize anywhere As for American and near that 12 percent (or even 5 percent) of Israeli world Jewish groups, this American Jews to support their agenda actively and not could be an opportunity groups could just offer tacit support – or to mobilize secular for them to demonstrate repurpose Jews to join forces against the ultra-Orthodox their commitment to the philanthropy control over certain areas of Israeli life – things growth of non-Orthodox as a tool for might look much different down the road. The Judaism in Israel. Rather advancing the recent tumult has led to an uptick in support from than pull philanthropy Reform and across the political spectrum in Israel, such as the from Israel, as some Conservative opposition Yesh Atid party putting forward a bill have threatened, they presence in that would turn the Kotel agreement into law.15 could repurpose it as a Israel This development could be used to increase the tool for advancing and visibility and political clout of these movements growing the Reform and Conservative presence. and their demands. The movements currently have a yearly budget of Yet the current political power map leads one around $5-7 million each (around 10 – 20 percent to conclude that the Reform and Conservative of that from government funding) – a paltry sum movements still have a lot of political power compared to the largesse enjoyed by the ultra- building to do – which ought to focus on creating Orthodox and Orthodox groups, estimated at “facts on the ground” rather than achieving around $1 billion each year if not more.16 Were symbolic victories. This is not say that the these sums to be even doubled and invested in symbolic aspects are not important. Indeed, it is outreach and infrastructure, including expanding incumbent upon Israel to officially make room synagogues and community centers (which have at the table for the non-Orthodox movements, doubled in recent years), high quality schools and

the jewish people policy institute 123 kindergartens (which the movements already run Additional thoughts: with great success), summer camps and more, Judaism in Israel they could have a real effect in winning over sympathetic Israelis to their cause. The domestic The unescapable irony of all this is that as debate has yet to be decided if pluralistic Judaism is the ultra-Orthodox and the institution of less prevalent in Israel because enough Israelis just the Israeli Rabbinate which they control have aren’t that interested, or because the movements become increasingly forceful in maintaining and can’t compete with respect to resources. This expanding their monopoly over Jewish practice, could help settle the matter. a growing number of Israelis become more distanced than ever from “that” Judaism and As for the government, it is a political reality that alienated from, and resentful of, the Rabbinate. short-term political survival often trumps long- Israeli Jews are more interested in Judaism term ideological moves. Still, the government than ever, just not under the auspices of the ought (and seems) to recognize that the insult felt Rabbinate.18 19 As an illustration, a recent survey by a vast majority of Diaspora Jews is real and cuts shows that 80 percent of Israeli Jews believe deep. It will take serious damage control and no that the Rabbinate’s control over marriage small degree of a political balancing act to mollify and divorce “increases the number of Israelis Israel’s Jewish friends in the U.S. and elsewhere who choose to wed … abroad”, and 56 percent abroad and by extension the movements in Israel. feel that the “amount and content of religious Among liberal American Jews, there are signs that legislation…is distancing Israeli citizens from support for Israel is already weakening, and these Judaism”, including 74 percent of secular Jews. 20 recent government actions could very well be the proverbial backbreaking straw. In lieu of civil marriages (which do not exist in Israel), Israelis by the thousands have been flying The six-month freeze announced by the Prime overseas to marry in ceremonies of their choosing Minister’s office on June 30, meant to create a (but, still, cannot avoid the Rabbinate in the space for a compromise “arrangement” on both event of divorce). Alongside this phenomenon, the Kotel and conversion issue, and the more there is a growing trend of couples conducting recent appointment (August 16, 2017) of a unofficial ceremonies in Israel and registering as former senior cabinet minister to review Israel’s a common-law union, thereby totally skirting conversion policy, were positive moves and must the Rabbinate. Today, 6 percent of Israeli be fully utilized. 17 couples are not officially married, and the past year has seen more than 1300 such unofficial wedding ceremonies (as compared to roughly 40,000 official Jewish marriages each year).21 Of note is that the majority of these alternative

124 the jewish people policy institute ceremonies were Jewish ceremonies, be they Additional thoughts: Reform, Conservative, non-denominational or Israel-Diaspora relations liberal Orthodox. Relatedly, Tzohar, the modern- Orthodox organization that seeks to reform the The latest crisis in Israel-Diaspora relations serves Rabbinate from within the system, weds a full as a strong reminder of just how important, and 10 percent of Jewish couples in Israel (while on fragile, “Jewish unity” is. Israeli and Diaspora leaders matters of conversion, Tzohar is acting in a more must engage in a serious and earnest dialogue subversive manner to challenge the institution, about what it means for Israel to be a “homeland such as through its “giyur k’halacha” conversion for all Jews” on a real and practical level, and to courts 22).23 what extent the Israeli government should consider Diaspora perspectives in domestic decision-making, Additional research hints that attitudes toward especially when there are implications for Diaspora Orthodoxy itself are also changing. Just to Jewry. This discussion should happen in Israel, in the flesh this point out, JPPI’s 2017 Pluralism in Diaspora, and between Israel and the Diaspora. It Israel Survey found that over half of Israeli Jews will not be a simple one. would prefer to attend synagogues with mixed- gender seating (including 52 percent of liberal The publication (July 9) of the supposed “blacklist” Orthodox) rather than traditional gender- of 160 rabbis from around the world whose segregated seating Orthodox synagogues. As conversions were deemed insufficient for the the ultra-Orthodox and the Rabbinate fend off Rabbinate, including a number of prominent alternatives to their version of Judaism, a growing (liberal) Orthodox rabbis, added fuel to the tensions number of Israelis, including the more liberal between Israel and the Diaspora.24 Revelations that Orthodox, are gradually creating an alternative the list was never official and that the Rabbinate world of Jewish institutions from marriage and had never compiled, endorsed or published such a conversion to kosher certification. It is hard to list (a mid-level official at the Rabbinate compiled say if Israeli society has reached a tipping point the list after a freedom of information request by on this matter, but it is not difficult to imagine an Israeli NGO, ITIM), made little difference as the day when the Rabbinate is largely obsolete the clarification came out a full two days after.25 for a sizeable segment of Israel’s population. The incident, which took place on the heels of the much-publicized Kotel agreement abrogation, even garnered the interest of foreign media outlets, and could negatively affect Israel’s image in the U.S. and throughout the West.26 Thus, all sides would be advised to proceed with caution. Israel needs American and Diaspora Jewry on its side, as they are both cultural partners

the jewish people policy institute 125 and a strategic assets. Conversely, American and Diaspora Jews are recognizing more and more how much they still need Israel, despite its complexities and polarizing nature, as a point of connection to Jewish identity; the success of Birthright is a prime example of this. The Israeli government, Israeli society including the Reform and Conservative movements and the ultra-Orthodox, and Diaspora Jewry must conduct these discussions soon and with an abundance of sensitivity. All factions will need to make important choices and compromises in order to maintain Jewish consensus around what it means for Israel to be both Jewish and Democratic, and what it means for Israel to be a home (even if away from home) for all Jews.

126 the jewish people policy institute Endnotes 10 Hiddush. “ 71% Israeli Jews attach importance to marriage & divorce freedom. 11% attach importance to 1 Maltz, Judy. “Israeli Government Approves New the battle over the Western Wall plaza area.” December Egalitarian Prayer Space at Western Wall”. Haaretz. 2016. http://hiddush.org/article-16875-0-71_Israeli_ Jan 31, 2016. http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/. Jews_attach_importance_to_marriage__divorce_ premium-1.700530 freedom.aspx 2 The ultra-Orthodox lawmakers, who voted against 11 According to the 2013 Pew Survey, the U.S. Jewish the plan, initially did not seek to actively prevent its community is 35% Reform, 30% non-denominational, implementation. 18% Conservative, 10% Orthodox and 6% other. 3 The Kotel administration forbids bringing in 12 Wolff, Laurence. “The Reform Movement in Torah scrolls from outside the compound, so as to Israel: Past, Present and Future.” Institute for Israel prevent Women of the Wall from reading Torah Studies, University of Maryland. January 8, 2015. http:// publically. In response, the courts ordered that the www.israelstudies.umd.edu/Larry%20Wolff%20 women cannot be searched for scrolls, leaving the Research%20Paper%20-%20January%202015.pdf situation ambiguous for the time being. 13 Cohen, Steven M. “Conservative Jewry’s numbers 4 As reported by the movements themselves. plummeting, but core engagement steady.” JTA. 5 Pew Survey of Israel, 2016. “Israel’s Religiously November 10, 2015. http://www.jta.org/2015/11/10/ Divided Society”. http://www.pewforum. news-opinion/united-states/op-ed-for-conservative- org/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/ jews-smaller-numbers-but-steady-engagement 6 Pew Israel study, 2016. 14 Shimoni-Stoil, Rebecca. “Netanyahu: Evangelical Christians are Israel’s best friends”. Times of Israel. July 7 Hiddush. The 2016 Israel Religion and State Index. 18, 2017. http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu- http://www.hiddush.org/article-16967-0-The_2016_ evangelical-christians-are-israels-best-friends/ Israel_Religion__State_Index.aspx 15 Attali, Amihai. “Yesh Atid tries to pass Western 8 Hermann, Tamar and Cohen, Chanan. “Reform Wall Plan into Law.” YNet News. June 28, 2017. http:// and Conservative Jews in Israel: A Profile and Attitudes”. www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4981918,00.html The Israel Democracy Institute. June 30, 2013. https:// en.idi.org.il/articles/6869 16 As reported by the movements themselves. 9 Hoffman, Gil. “Majority of Jewish Israelis want 17 Times of Israel. “Netanyahu taps ex-justice minister Egalitarian Prayer Site at Kotel.” The Jerusalem Post. to review conversion policy.” Times of Israel. August 16, September 16, 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/ 2017. http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-taps- Majority-of-Jewish-Israelis-want-egalitarian-prayer- ex-justice-minister-to-review-conversion-policy/ site-at-Kotel-467815 18 Sharon, Jeremy. “Poll shows high religious sentiment among religiously traditional and secular Israelis.” Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah. August 10, 2016. https://toravoda.org.il/en/poll-shows-high-religious- sentiment-among-religiously-traditional-secular- israelis/

the jewish people policy institute 127 19 Keissar-Sugarmen, Ayala. “A Portrait of Israeli Jews: 22 Which are strictly Orthodox but operate outside Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009”. of the official conversion system. The Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/ 23 Tzohar marriage statistics are from Tzohar. media/5439/guttmanavichaireport2012_engfinal.pdf 24 Sales, Ben. “Here is the Chief rabbinate’s ‘Blacklist’ 20 Sharon, Jeremy. “Poll shows high religious of 160 American Rabbis”. Forward. July 9, 2017. http:// sentiment among religiously traditional and secular forward.com/fast-forward/376557/here-is-the-chief- Israelis.” Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah. August 10, 2016. rabbinate-s-blacklist-of-american-rabbis/ https://toravoda.org.il/en/poll-shows-high-religious- sentiment-among-religiously-traditional-secular- 25 Maltz, Judy. “The Israeli Chief Rabbinate’s Blacklist: israelis/ and http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/ A Guide for the Perplexed.” Haaretz. July 10, 2017. http:// Poll-shows-high-religious-sentiment-among-religiously- www.haaretz.com/jewish/news/.premium-1.800609 traditional-and-secular-Israelis-463722 26 AP. “Israeli list of unrecognized US rabbis points to 21 Marriage statistics are from the Central Bureau of rift.” ABC News. July 9, 2017. http://abcnews.go.com/ Statistics and original JPPI research. amp/International/wireStory/israeli-blacklist-us- rabbis-points-widening-rift-48529474 2017 Structured Jewish World Dialogue – Interim Report 13 Jerusalem and the Jewish People: Unity and Division

2017 marks the 50th anniversary of Jerusalem’s In this short interim report (the full version of it: reunification, the result of the Six-Day War. It http://jppi.org.il/new/en/article has also been a decade since JPPI’s last major jersualemdialogue/#.WS_XhBN97Vo) report on Jerusalem. Therefore, JPPI dedicated we highlight some of the findings from the this year’s annual Israel-Diaspora Dialogue to an Dialogue we conducted with 39 groups in 19 examination of Jerusalem’s status. Jerusalem is, of Jewish communities in seven countries around course, considered holy by the three monotheistic the globe. This is the fourth year of JPPI’s Israel- religions. However, JPPI’s 2017 Dialogue dealt Diaspora Dialogue, and a comprehensive report with Jerusalem as understood, interpreted, and on Jerusalem and the Jewish People will join analyzed by Jewish stakeholders with an interest in the three previous reports: Israel as a Jewish and the city’s future. Democratic State (2014); Jewish Values and JPPI’s 2007 policy paper, A Strategic Plan for the the Use of Force in Armed Conﬂict (2015); and Strengthening of Jerusalem as a Civilizational Exploring the Jewish Spectrum in a Time of Capital of the Jewish People, argued that there Fluid Identity (2016). was an urgent need to close the gap between For each of these Dialogues JPPI conducted the visions, perceptions, and ideals people have discussion seminars in many dozens of with respect to Jerusalem and the actual reality Jewish communities worldwide – this year, of the city. Ten years later, some elements of this 2017, included the many participants in the argument stand. Conference of Presidents of Major American

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 129 Jewish Organizations’ annual mission to Israel. Main findings of JPPI’s interim report: All Dialogue sessions included a survey and a • Jerusalem is a crucially important place structured discussion. We include in this report to engaged Jews worldwide, and a primary findings from a JPPI survey of Israeli opinions on point of connection between Diaspora Jews Jerusalem. and Israel. Some of the questions we put to participants • Many Jews around the world and in Israel were specific: Is it essential that Jerusalem have a feel that Jerusalem is not moving “in the clear Jewish majority? How important is it for the right direction.” Mainly due to concerns city to be Jewishly diverse? Would you support a about Jewish-Arab relations and religious division of Jerusalem in exchange for peace with pluralism. the Palestinians? What role should Diaspora Jews play in determining Jerusalem’s future? • Many non-Israeli Jews feel “at home” in Jerusalem Our aim was to better understand the following: • Diaspora Jews feel their views should be 1. How connected Jews and Jewish leaders[1] taken into consideration as the political and around the world view Jerusalem’s current cultural future of Jerusalem is shaped. situation – culturally, demographically, and politically? Is it viewed as a thriving city or as • A small majority of engaged Jews the world one in trouble? Do they feel pride in how it is over agree that Jerusalem “should never be developing, or anxiety about its future? divided.” A significant majority wants it to be a city “with a clear Jewish majority,” and that 2. How important is Jerusalem to these Jews – “the Temple Mount must remain under Israeli especially Jews who do not live in Jerusalem, jurisdiction.” and, even more so, those who live outside Israel (visitors and tourists usually see only a small • However, in a seemingly contradictory part of Jerusalem, and are not always familiar statement, a small majority also argues that with the full complexity of the city) – and how “Israel should be willing to compromise on invested they feel in its future? the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction.” 3. What is the vision of connected Jews and Jewish leaders for Jerusalem, and what are the policies • A clear majority of engaged Jews the world and priorities they would support in the over believe that “all countries ought to move fulfillment of that vision? their embassies to Jerusalem.” 4. The survey of Jews worldwide represents the average views of a self-selected group of mostly Jewish leaders and highly engaged Jews who chose to take part in the dialogue.

130 the jewish people policy institute The Rise of Orthodoxy and Political-Cultural Polarization within 14 the Jewish Community in the U.S.

The relationship of Jews and Jewish identity to Revolutionary War). In Harvard College orations the surrounding non-Jewish society is one of were delivered in Hebrew, starting in 1642 at the the drivers that shapes Jewish identity in the first commencement ceremony until the end of Diaspora, in a number of ways. Liberal, Non- the eighteenth century. It would seem that over Orthodox and Modern Orthodox Jews have in the years it was the humanist values embedded in part shaped the parameters of their values and the Jewish tradition that had the most impact in identity to facilitate their integration into non- shaping America's Judeo-Christian heritage over Jewish society or a strategy to accommodate to the years. The recognition that America enjoyed a non-Jewish culture. This effort has intensified in a Judeo-Christian humanist heritage facilitated America in the light of the significant impact that the influence of such Supreme Court justices Jewish culture has had on the general American as Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter and the general culture. Indeed, one of most significant adoption of Biblical verses on central American catalysts of the acceptance of Jews and and symbols such as the Statue of Liberty ("Proclaim their place of the Jews in America is the fact that Liberty throughout all the Land" – Lev. 25:10). American values and culture have Judeo-Christian Conversely, in reaction to the attractions of non- underpinnings. The Puritans saw themselves as Jewish society, some traditional and Orthodox latter day Hebrews, and a serious proposals were Jews have raised and hardened the boundaries of made to make Hebrew the official language of their Jewish identity, and even non-Orthodox and the new nation (first in 1620 by William Bradford Reform have become more explicitly and boldly and then again in 1780 in the midst of the Jewish.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 131 This year’s Annual Assessment examines this opposed to 21 and 25 percent respectively among dimension of Jewish identity in relation to Reform and Conservative Jews. If one looks at the recent election in the United States. The real voting results in neighborhoods with large 2016 election cast light on increased political concentrations of Modern Orthodox and Haredi and cultural polarization between Orthodox Jews (which some writers claim is more accurate and liberal elements in the American Jewish than exit polls), the result is even more dramatic. community. This chapter describes this In five Modern Orthodox neighborhoods in polarization vis-a-vis voting patterns, political Greater New York, Chicago, and Florida, Trump party affiliations, and social and political views. In received between 45 and 90 percent of the vote, addition, it discusses visible connections between and in Haredi neighborhoods in Brooklyn, New the Orthodox Jewish community with the Trump Jersey, and Ohio, he received between 56 and 94 administration and the contrasting, sometimes percent.2 It must be borne in mind that, as of now, vociferous opposition to the administration and the Orthodox are about 10 percent of the Jewish its policies by some liberal Jews and rabbis. Finally, population and the non-Orthodox 90 percent. it argues that these different political orientations This shift to support for Republican candidates on appear to be connected to two alternative implicit the part of the Orthodox is not a one-time “blip.” strategies, one liberal and one conservative- It represents a consistent voting pattern in the four Orthodox, of Jewish integration into American life. presidential elections since 2004. In fact, in many places Trump received fewer Orthodox votes American Jewish Voting Patterns than either Romney or McCain had. Furthermore, in the 2016 Election according to the 2013 Pew survey of American Jews, over 55 percent of Orthodox Jews say that The American Jewish vote in the presidential they lean Republican. This shift to Republican election was bifurcated. According to exit polls, support is not arbitrary; both Modern Orthodox approximately 70 percent of U.S. Jews voted for and Haredi Jews exhibit more conservative political Clinton and 25 percent voted for Trump (the attitudes that non- Orthodox Jews. A much larger remaining 5 percent voted for Gary Johnson or percentage of Orthodox Jews disapproved of Jill Stein). Behind these overall numbers lies a President Obama (over 50 percent) than other significant difference in pattern between Orthodox Jews (29 percent), and a majority of Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews. Exit polls showed that Jews favor smaller government.3 over 70 percent of Reform and Conservative Jews voted for Clinton (76 and 71 percent respectively).1 Among the Orthodox, the number was lower, only 56 percent supported Clinton. Thirty-nine percent of Orthodox Jews supported Trump, as

132 the jewish people policy institute Liberal Jewish Opposition to the This liberal attitude also expresses itself in Trump Administration literature among younger writers who started publishing in the new millennium. This liberal If we look to the other side of the spectrum, approach has especially expressed itself in as we have indicated, 70 percent of the Jewish criticism of what is perceived as the mainstream community voted for Clinton. Moreover, the Jewish community and “mainstream Jewish more liberal a community is religiously, the more values.” In the titular story in Nathan Englander’s it voted liberal politically. Seventy-six percent 2012 short story collection, What We Talk About of Reform Jews, cast their votes for Clinton.4 When We Talk About Anne Frank, the centrality of Furthermore, many non-orthodox younger Jews the Holocaust and its symbols in American Jewish voted for and supported Bernie Sanders in the identity is examined and even to a certain extent Democratic primaries. Again, the liberal nature of lampooned. In a somewhat similar vein, Jonathan the Jewish electorate represents a long-standing Safran Foer’s 2017 novel, Here I Am, considers trend. The majority of Jews have consistently American Jewish objections to, and demurral from, voted liberal, left or Democratic since the start the perceived roughness and brutality of Israelis. of the 20th century.5 Furthermore, the 2013 Pew This novel looks at the trajectory of American report declared that “Jews are among the most Jewish solidarity with Israel and how it has evolved liberal, Democratic groups in the population.” It into a relationship characterized by increasing is noteworthy, though, that within this pattern, complexity and ambivalence. These works join the less that one is religious or emphasizes Michael Chabon’s The Yiddish Policeman’s Union in particularistic Jewish identity and attachment, its critique of religious Zionist Messianism, right- the more liberal are one’s social and political wing Israeli government policy and Christian right- attitudes. Thus, while 70 percent of all U.S. Jews wing movements in America. are Democrats or lean Democrat, among Jews Thus, the current crop of young Jewish writing, of No Religion, Reform Jews and Jews of No continues the tradition of American Jewish Denomination the percentages are 78, 76, and liberalism and social critique but with a tone 75 respectively. Similarly, 82 percent of all Jews that is somewhat more far-reaching and critical said that homosexuality should be accepted than previous writing especially as concerns by society, but percentages were recognizably Israel. This tone seems to be in accord with the higher for Reform Jews (92 percent), Jews of current polarization in American politics between No Denomination (89 percent), and Jews of No liberal and conservative/populist camps. One Religion (91 percent). Insofar as millennials have central expression of this polarization was the high representation among Jews of No Religion, 2016 election and its aftermath. Not only was these very liberal views probably characterize the campaign extremely acrimonious, but the many of them as well. acrimony continued after the election results

the jewish people policy institute 133 were announced. One of the main expressions of this country closed to us in 1924 with very of this continuing conflict was the prominence catastrophic consequences during the Holocaust,” of street demonstrations protesting the Trump Rabbi Jill Jacobs of T’ruah said. “We know that administration and its policies.6 Many Jews have some of the language that’s being used now to participated in these as individual citizens of the stop Muslims from coming in is the same language United States. However, beyond this, many Jews that was used to stop Jewish refugees from and Jewish organizations have participated in coming.”8 these demonstrations as Jews and on the basis of While most leaders of Reform, Conservative and their Jewish identity. One such issue was the Trump other Liberal groups deeply believe that their administration’s effort to ban U.S. entry by citizens liberal perspectives on social issues emerge from from seven predominantly Muslim countries. their deeply held Jewish values, many observers The three major Jewish religious denominations believe that there is a strong tendency among issued statements some liberal groups to conflate Liberal and many Jews protesting the ban, with progressive values with Jewish values. Thus, Rabbi and Jewish the Reform statement Dara Frimmer, in 2009, characterized the attitude organizations being the harshest of her young age cohort as follows: “Don’t keep have rebuke: “The Reform kosher, that’s fine, don’t keep Shabbat, that’s fine, participated movement denounces marry a non-Jew – whatever. But understand that in anti-Trump in the strongest terms it will take away your Jewish identity if you don’t demonstrations the horrifying executive fight for justice.”9 In a similar vein, in September as Jews and order on immigration 2016, a Jerusalem Post op-ed opposing the Trump on the basis and refugees,” it said. immigration policy on Jewish grounds bore the of their Jewish Even more pointedly, 20 title: “Jewish Values are to Welcome Strangers, identity rabbis, affiliated with the Something Trump Doesn’t Stand For.”10 liberal movements, some wearing talitot (prayer- It is practically certain that these developments shawls), protested the ban, and were arrested for were influenced by the polarization in the politics obstructing traffic on Columbus Circle in New and culture of the general American society that York. The protest was organized by T’ruah: The found significant expression in the last presidential Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, a non-profit election. The religious, values related, cultural, and group whose mission is to “bring together rabbis economic concerns of the central swath of the and cantors from all streams of Judaism, together population that is white, religious (Evangelical or with all members of the Jewish community, to act Catholic) and working or lower middle class found on the Jewish imperative to respect and advance strong expression in the victory of Donald Trump. the human rights of all people.”7 “We remember To a large extent, Orthodox Jews share these our history, and we remember that the borders concerns.

134 the jewish people policy institute Different Implicit Strategies of in the framework of this strategy: In exchange for Integration into American Society less explicitly expressed Jewish identity, they could achieve enhanced integration and achievement in Underlying these differences between the the surrounding non-Jewish society. Jewish groups Orthodox and liberal groups seems to be the differed as to the extent that they would accept growing crystallization of two different strategies the deal. Many Jews shed their particular cultural of Jewish integration into general American society and religious characteristics and, indeed, achieved and identity. The first, liberal Jewish strategy is outstanding integration and achievement in the classic model Jews in the West have adopted Western societies. Other (Orthodox and Ultra- since the end of the 18th century. The liberalism Orthodox) groups retained more particularist of the majority of the Jewish community and their characteristics, and as a group, attained less tendency to conflate liberal values with Jewish integration. values is not simply the subjective preference of Today with the rising individual Jews. Rather, it seems to be related to prominence of Orthodox the liberalism the historical position of the Jews as a minority Jews in the Trump of the majority and the strategy that the Jews crystallized over the administration and in of the Jewish last 200 years for integration into the non-Jewish certain business, real community societies in which they lived. This classic strategy, estate and legal circles we is related to which had been in use since the Enlightenment may be witnessing the rise the historical and the Emancipation, involves the adoption of of an alternative strategy position of the liberal civic virtues of tolerance, pluralism, of Jewish integration and the Jews as a civil and human rights, civic equality etc. and the an alternative “deal.” This minority minimizing of cultural and religious characteristics strategy would likely entail that mark the Jews as different from the general alliances with other, non- population. In the American case, it prefers that Jewish religious and conservative groups based American national identity be based upon the upon a shared moral culture which is religiously American civil creed (“dedicated to the proposition based. that all men are created equal”) without too much emphasis on the Christian or Anglo-Saxon ethnic Like the original deal, the emerging alternative or cultural bases for American identity.11 To this strategy comprises several levels. In what follows very day, liberal Jews are one of the most vigilant we parse these levels and compare the liberal groups with respect to the separation of church strategy of Jewish integration with the emerging and state in the United States. conservative one. According to the classic strategy, the Jews expected that they would become part All Jews commonly understood the nature of the of a “neutral” or “semi-neutral” society,12 that “deal” that modern Western society offered them is, a general society, or at least a public sphere

the jewish people policy institute 135 in which religious and ethnic identities would religious, conservative groups because of the not be present or, at least, prominent. Religious pronounced pro-Israel orientation of these groups. and ethnic identities would be relegated to the Not only are these groups pro-Israel in a general private sphere, if they existed at all. They similarly way, but they also support Jewish right wing expected or hoped, that non-Jews would be and religious policies in regard to the settlement likeminded liberals, committed to the values and incorporation of the Greater Land of Israel. of equality, tolerance, pluralism etc., and would Beyond the question of shared interests, there share, at least in the public sphere, a common, might also be a level of shared moral culture and secular, liberal identity. shared identity.14 In the last decades of the twentieth century and This brings us to the next two levels of the the first decades of the the twenty first, some of respective integration strategies. As indicated the groups which had been associated with this above, the liberal strategy of Jewish integration liberal strategy such as reform, conservative and prefers that American national identity be even modern Orthodox groups underwent a based upon the American civil creed. without change. Under the impact of the multi-cultural too much emphasis on the Christian or Anglo- celebration of different ethnic and cultural Saxon ethnic or cultural bases for American groups, which started with "black is beautiful", identity. In contrast, the conservative-Orthodox these groups have given more emphasis to strategy seems to accept the general conservative explicit Jewish religious symbols such as publicly position (articulated, for example, by Samuel marking Jewish holidays and making their services Huntington15) that American national identity less "Protestant" and more Jewish (more use of is not only narrowly based upon Civil Creed Hebrew, talitot etc.). but also upon a shared moral culture, which It may be suggested that some Orthodox groups rests upon a religious (Protestant/Christian or 16 are going beyond this and developing an alternative Judeo-Christian) culture. This moral culture strategy. In contrast to the liberal strategy, the which Jewish conservatives (especially Orthodox Orthodox, conservative strategy builds upon religious conservatives) share with non-Jewish, alliances with other, non-Jewish religious groups, especially Christian conservatives seems to rest built, at the first level, upon shared interests. These upon different assumptions than liberal morality. would include increased government funding of This is the final level or aspect of the respective religious education and the exemption of religious integration strategies we will compare. organizations, individuals and communities from The social psychological research of Richard the imposition of progressive mores (such as same Shweder and especially Jonathan Haidt points sex marriage and the free availability of abortion) to the fact that different cultures and population by force of law.13 Furthermore, Orthodox groups groups have different underlying conceptions and wish to ally themselves with other non-Jewish approaches to morality. Haidt talks about two

136 the jewish people policy institute main approaches: a “contractual approach” and conservatives and traditional people in general a “beehive approach.” “The contractual approach have a larger list of moral concepts and understand takes the individual as the fundamental unit of key notions somewhat differently.19 They tend, value. The fundamental problem of social life as well, to emphasize as moral values norms and is that individuals often hurt each other and so behaviors that promote the survival and well- we create implicit social contracts and explicit being of the group. laws to foster a fair, free, and safe society in In addition to the virtue of care (for small children which individuals can pursue their interests and and helpless animals and by extension for all develop themselves and their relationships as they unfortunates) and liberty from oppression that 23 choose.” The rules the contractual approach they share with the liberals,20 Conservative moral develops largely focus upon not harming other concepts also include: people and caring for them, especially the helpless and the oppressed. They also value fairness and 1. Fairness as proportionality –. i.e. people reciprocity. should get their just desserts, or as St. Paul put it “he who does not work neither shall he eat.” "The beehive approach, in contrast, takes the People who work and contribute deserve their group and its territory as fundamental sources benefits. Freeloading is a moral sin. Hence of value. Individual bees are born and die by the they tend to question whether the recipients thousands, but the hive lives for a long time, and of welfare or government benefits actually each individual has a role to play in fostering its deserve them.21 Liberals, in contrast, think of success. The two fundamental problems of social fariness in terms of privileged people taking life are attacks from outside and subversion from advantage of non-privileged groups. Hence within. Either one can lead to the death of the they insist that wealthy people should pay hive, so all must pull together, do their duty, and their fair share of taxes or that dis-privileged 18 be willing to make sacrifices for the group.” The people should get higher, that is fairer, benefits beehive approach will propound within its system that provide minimum income, shelter, health of moral rules and values, as we shall see, other etc.22 issues beyond harm/care and fairness/reciprocity. 2. Loyalty – One should support and contribute Liberals consider the individual the regnant unit to the immediate groups that one belongs to: of value. Hence, their moral assumptions are family, community, nation and country. Dante mainly “contractual.” Conservative and traditional put the betrayers in the lowest circle in the groups tend to view the group as the regnant unit Inferno. Conservatives are more comfortable of value. Hence, While liberals tend to think that being part of a group than liberals are and will something is morally wrong only if it harms or tend to enforce group loyalty even if it comes oppresses other people, according to the research at great cost to individuals. of Jonathan Haidt and other social psychologists,

the jewish people policy institute 137 3.3 Sanctity – There is a “higher” side to man’s Orthodox Jews who believe in reward and nature and one’s body should be treated punishment (and who think of themselves as as a temple not as an amusement park. deserving middle class people); who believe Normatively speaking, one’s bodily and sexual in unquestioning loyality to their families, behavior is not entirely determined by oneself communities and people (Am Yisrael) and as an autonomous individual. (despite traditional Jewish reserve towards 4. Authority – Human beings like other Gentile governments) are developing a form animals are organized into hierarchies of right-wing patriotism towards their nation 25 that are not by definition oppressive – i.e. (America); who respect the authority of parents and children, clergy and laymen.23 parents and of rabbis and who try and live their Conservatives and religious traditionalists lives in accordance with Kedusha (sanctity) will demand respect and obedience for seem to share this moral culture. Through authority even if it is not entirely rationally their membership in this shared moral culture, justified, such as authority that is age and they claim membership in American society and gender based. American identity. It is important to emphasize that according to this strategy, they claim their Because of their individualistic orientation, American membership not despite their Orthodoxy liberals tend to think of morality in universalistic (as liberal Jews believe), but because of it. Their terms. The idea that one should give preferential Orthodoxy makes them part of the moral culture treatment to members of one’s ethnic or religious – which they share with evangelical Protestants group (or even one’s family) is embarrassing to and (white) believing Catholics – which, in the eyes 24 certain liberals. None of the above arguments of these groups, grounds American democracy. In should be taken to imply that liberals are not loyal other words, they seem to be proposing a new deal: or disrespectful to authority However, they tend Become American by emphasizing your Orthodox to give these concepts a more individualistic and way of life and the values that this embodies. rational interpretation. American identity according to this Orthodox Of course, from a liberal point of view, much of approach is achieved upon a higher level of conservative and traditional morality smacks of abstraction. Jews, Evangelicals and (white, irrational adherence to tradition and superstition, devout) Catholics share the same moral/ and values such as group loyalty at the expense religious culture and the same moral values. of individual fulfillment, blind obedience to However, they actualize these values in parallel authority, and traditional restrictions on human fashion in their respective faith traditions and sexual behavior and orientation often seem to be communities. A certain reservation is in order immoral suppressions of human autonomy and here. In the context of the “new deal”, Haredi and interpersonal oppression. especially Hassidic Jews, having much less secular

138 the jewish people policy institute education, command of English and income than the Orthodox community in the United States is the American Jewish norm, might not achieve the strengthening demographically. This demographic same level and quality of influence on the general strength is translating, unsurprisingly into political society that Jews today enjoy. Nevertheless, Haredi strength. For the most part, the Orthodox and and Hassidic groups have proven over the years to especially the Ultra-Orthodox utilize their political be enormously resourceful and resilient and they power to obtain benefits for their own communities., might find other, new channels for maintaining including state support for religious education access to power centers of American life and and the exemption of religious organizations, influence upon them. In fact, in recent years individuals and communities from the imposition of Haredi and even Hassidic groups have established progressive mores by force of law. To a certain extent policy research institutes and consulting firms. its also seems to include the promotion of a socially 26 If there really are two strategies for Jewish conservative agenda for general American society. integration into American society, then that In pursuit of these goals implies a deep difference between the Orthodox they are forming alliances Orthodox and the liberal streams of the American Jewish with similar religiously groups are community. Until around conservative groups such forming as Evangelicals and devout alliances with 2000 it was reasonable to assume that Orthodox Catholics. At the same other religiously and liberal Jews had similar interests and time, the ultra-Orthodox conservative aspirations vis-a-vis American society. The especially, are not groups. differences between them had to do with the much engaged with the lengths that each community was willing to go in general organized Jewish order to achieve them and the manner in which community and, as we each accordingly approached the Jewish tradition. have seen, they are a lot less involved with general If each community, though, is developing different American life and their ability to influence it seems or even opposing aspirations vis-a-vis American lower than the Jewish norm. society and their place within it, that represents a new level of dissent and even polarization with the Thus the three groups that constitute the American community. Jewish community each present significant challenges: The group that is distancing itself from Jewish life and community (often the children of Conclusion intermarriage, and who often say that they have no As we have written in previous Annual Assessments, religion) needs to be reengaged and reconnected with the Jewish people and the Jewish community as well as with Jewish life and culture. Secondly, the group that had until now constituted the backbone

the jewish people policy institute 139 of the Jewish community in America, the Jewish 20-rabbis-protesting-Trump-travel-ban-480811. "middle – the Reform and Conservative Jews who 8 Colin Moynihan, “About Twenty Rabbis Arrested belonged to synagogues and Jewish organizations, During Protest Over Trump Travel Ban,” New York Times, gave money to Jewish causes, and were very Feb. 6, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/ attached to Israel and the Jewish People are nyregion/rabbis-arrested-protest-trump-muslim-ban. shrinking. Thirdly, the Orthodox and in particular, html?_r=0. the Ultra –Orthodox who are among the most 9 Jewish People Policy Institute, Annual Assessment committed to the Jewish People and Jewish life are 2010, p. 169 insufficiently engaged with the general organized 10 Michael M. Adler, “Jewish Values are to Welcome general Jewish community and do not seem to have Strangers, Something Trump Doesn’t Stand For”, the wherewithal for continuing the legacy of Jewish Jerusalem Post, Sept. 11, 2016. http://www.jpost.com/ influence on the larger American society. Opinion/Jewish-values-are-to-welcome-strangers- something-Trump-doesnt-stand-for-467470. 11 To be sure, in the late nineteenth and during the Endnotes twentieth Century, the dominant form of Christianity in America was liberal (“Mainline”) Protestantism 1 The 70-30 split among the Jewish vote goes back to that embraced liberal values. The liberal Protestant the last decades of the twentieth century. Only in recent American ambience, which was not altogether secular, years however, has the split been largely according to encouraged the liberal Jewish strategy of integration. denominational lines. 12 Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto, Syracuse University 2 Rocklin, Mitchell. “Are American Jews Shiftiing Their Press, Syracuse New York 1973. Political Affiliation?” Mosaic Magazine, January 18, 2017. 13 Cohen, Eric and Aryana Meisal. “Jewish Conservativism: A Manifesto.” Commentary, April 7, 3 A Portrait of Jewish Americans, Pew Research 2017. Center, 2013. 14 Of course, one of the factors encouraging the 4 Maltz, Judy. “Clinton Won Overwhelming Majority Orthodox approach is the significant strengthening of of Jewish Vote, Polls Say.” Haaretz, November 9, 2016. conservative and evangelical Christianity in America 5 In 1920, 38% of the Jews voted for Eugene V. Debs, since the 1980’ and the decline of liberal Mainline the socialist candidate. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary. Protestantism. org/jewish-voting-record-in-u-s-presidential-elections. 15 Huntington, Samuel. Who We Are: The Challenges 6 The street demonstrations of the weeks after to America’s Nationai Identity. New York: Simon and the election have in the meantime petered out . To a Schuster, 2004. certain extent they have been replaced by meaningful 16 Cohen and Maisal, op. cit. political organization. 17 Jonathan Haidt, “Moral Psychology and the 7 “New York Police Arrest Some 20 Rabbis Protesting Misunderstanding of Religion”, The Edge, Sept. 21, 2007. Trump Travel Ban”, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 7, 2017. http:// https://www.edge.org/conversation/jonathan_haidt- www.jpost.com/Diaspora/New-York-police-arrest-some-

140 the jewish people policy institute moral-psychology-and-the-misunderstanding-of-religion Anger and Mourning on the American Right. New York (Accessed Aug. 2, 20017) and London: The New Press, 2016. 18 Ibid. 23 Haidt, op. cit. 19 Haidt, Jonathan. The Righteous Mind: Why Good 24 President Obama: “In the eyes of God, a child People are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York : on the other side of the border is no less worthy of Pantheon Books, 2012. love and compassion than my own child,” Obama said. “You can’t distinguish between them in terms of 20 Two caveats are here in order. The first is that we their worth or inherent dignity.” http://edition.cnn. are talking about conceptions, values, and norms, not com/2017/05/25/politics/obama-merkel-germany/ behavior. In any moral system individuals will deviate index.html in their behavior from the accepted norms and values. Nevertheless, we still consider that they adhere to the 25 See for example “Patriotism is our Value, Editorial, moral system if they recognize the normative force and The Jewish Star, (Orthodox newspaper published in claim of the moral values and norms in question. In Long Island), Nov. 23, 2011. other words, individuals in a given culture who affirm 26 Ben Protess, Danielle Ivory and Steve Eder," Where the moral value of marital fidelity might still commit Trump’s Hands-Off Approach to Governing Does adultery. They remain in the moral system or culture Not Apply", New York Times, Sept. 10, 2017. https:// if, despite their behavior, they recognize the normative www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/business/trump- force of the prohibition and recognize (on some level) regulations-religious-conservatives.html?_r=0. that their own behavior was wrong or deviant. The second caveat is that we are dealing with ideal types, that is “pure” ideal constructions that have an inner logic to them. These generally do not characterize real populations and real people. Real populations generally carry a mixture of two or more ideal types, even if one ideal type is dominant. Finally, it should go without saying that our approach is purely descriptive and analytical. We make no claims and stake no position with respect to the moral superiority of one group or approach over another. 21 Exactly who is a freeloader is a politically loaded and contested concept. Some conservatives who focus upon this value tend to stereotypically label whole populations, such as minorities, welfare mothers, youth etc. as freeloaders. See Hochschild, Arlie. Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right. New York and London: The New Press, 2016. 22 Hochschild, , Arlie. Strangers in Their Own Land:

the jewish people policy institute 141 The Ongoing Debate Concerning Jewish Identity, Jewish Marriage Patterns, 15 and Jewish Children

Another aspect of the bifurcation of the Jewish future of the non-Orthodox Jewish community. community in the United States is expressed in Analyzing the 2013 Pew study of Jewish Americans terms of demography, marriage and reproductive data, they have drawn attention to the fact patterns, and their relation to Jewish identity. that only 21 percent of Jewish adults between Whereas the Orthodox, and especially the Ultra- 25-54 are raising children as Jews by Religion,1 Orthodox, marry young, overwhelmingly marry that is, as Jews who exhibit a high rate of Jewish Jewish spouses, and have significant numbers of engagement: membership in synagogues and children (Modern Orthodox, average 3 children; Jewish organizations; Jewish philanthropy; Ultra-Orthodox, almost 6 per family), non- attachment to Israel and feeling of solidarity with, Orthodox Jews marry late, have a high incidence and responsibility toward, other Jews. They have of intermarriage, and have far fewer children (on also stressed that that children of intermarriages average, 1.4). and Jews of No Religion exhibit much lower levels Demographers and social scientists are divided of Jewish engagement and sense of connection to, over the meaning of this situation, especially and responsibility toward, other Jews. the pattern of Jewish identity and reproduction At the same time, a number of writers have of non-Orthodox Jews. Some researchers and taken issue with this pessimistic outlook.2 commentators, looking at the small number of They have argued that spiritual quality and the children, the high number of households without meaningfulness of Jewish life are more important children, and the high rates of intermarriage have than numbers. Above all, they have pointed to drawn pessimistic conclusions regarding the data that show that among those under 30, a

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 143 majority of the children of intermarriages identify in-marriage and larger families. Many of the as Jewish. interventions these researchers advocate are The real question undergirding this debate is: aimed at forming and/or reinforcing Jewish social What does it mean to be Jewish in 21st century networks, which are viewed as key in establishing America? The pessimistic camp (who prefer Jewish families with children and encouraging to describe themselves as “deeply concerned”) Jewish engagement. In connection with this, some represented by Steven M. Cohen and Sylvia researchers in this camp stress that in order for Barack Fishman3, others, holds a vision of Jewish ethnic (or religio-ethnic) groups to exist they must membership and belonging that until recently maintain some sort of social boundaries vis-a-vis 5 characterized the “Jewish middle” – Conservative non-members of the group. and Reform Jews who were very committed to the Members of the other, more optimistic group take Jewish people (worldwide) the disappearance of primordial sacred ethnicity and to Israel and expressed as a given in contemporary America. They take the youngest this commitment it for granted that belonging there will take the cohorts the through membership in form of individual choice. They are encouraged majority of synagogues and Jewish by the fact that in the youngest cohorts among children of organizations and through the majority of children of intermarried families intermarried Jewish philanthropy. identify as Jewish. This, of course is a new families identify The backbone of this development in modern Jewish history. It seems to as Jewish approach is a commitment stem, in part, from the high esteem that Judaism to the well-being and and Jews enjoy in contemporary America, possibly flourishing of Jewish to the fact that so few of this cohort have yet “sacred ethnicity.”4 On married, and that intermarriage is so widespread a deep level, Jewish identity is conceived as that far more committed Jews (their parents) belonging to a primordial, given community of are intermarrying. Researchers with this point of faith characterized by a high degree of mutual view have also argued that research of the past solidarity and responsibility. The pessimistic camp year or two, shows enhanced Jewish identity also is alarmed because it sees this form of Jewish among young Jews of other groups characterized identity as disappearing. They are seeking to find in the past by low identification and engagement ways to promote a pattern of active engagement (such as Jews of No Religion) due to educational in the religio-ethnic community characterized programming targeting them.6 by subjective commitment, religious practice, In line with this, certain writers and observers have informational association, and formal affiliation, stressed the need for programs that individuals either through educational interventions or will find engaging and meaningful. Participating in by somehow encouraging earlier marriage, such programs, and communities – camps, youth

144 the jewish people policy institute groups, Israel trips – will (ideally) demonstrate choose Judaism and Jewish engagement. They, that Jewish engagement can be meaningful for of course, also think that “connected Jews” can individuals. Such participation can help children benefit from these programs insofar as the Jewish of intermarriages and Jews of No Religion choose identity of connected Jews is also, today, ultimately to identify and engage Jewishly. Thus, writers such based on individual choice. as Len Saxe and his colleagues have published The “deeply concerned” are more explicit about the research showing that intermarried couples who need for best practices and creative programming are married by a rabbi, or children of intermarriages for connected Jews and their children (the Jewish that participate in Jewish programming in college middle). However, they agree that the issue is or go on Birthright trips have higher levels of Jewish not binary and that there is a lot of fluidity in 7 engagement. The challenge, though, in regard to who benefits from programs like Birthright Israel, the population of the marginally affiliated and the Jewish college courses, and successful initiatives children of intermarried couples is not that they for unmarried younger Jewish adults. do not respond to meaning-laden or immersive programming, but in getting them to participate in such programs in the first place. Furthermore, a few researchers have suggested that such programs work because they construct social boundaries as well as provide meaning.8 The two approaches do not really generate policy alternatives. Everybody seems to agree that we should prepare programs for both the Jewish core or “middle’ and the marginally affiliated and intermarried. There do seem to be somewhat different emphases between the two camps. The more optimistic camp advocates investment in the marginally affiliated and the intermarried group, claiming that, in fact, this group is becoming paradigmatic for Jewish identity writ large in America. This camp would like to foster the development of meaning-laden and immersive programs, and strategies for marketing them, so that those whose connection to Judaism is based entirely on individual choice will be inclined to

the jewish people policy institute 145 Endnotes

1 Sylvia Barack Fishman and Steven M. Cohen, Family, 7 Leonard Saxe, Fern Chertok, Graham Wright, Engagement and Jewish Continuity among American Jews, Shachar Hecht, “Under the Chuppah: Rabbinic Officiation Jewish People Policy Institute, Jerusalem 2017. and Intermarriage”, Cohen Center for Modern Jewish 2 Fishman and Cohen op. cit. p. 8-10. Studies, Theordore Sasson, Leonard Saxe, Fern Chertok, Michelle Shain, Shahar Hecht, Graham Wright, “Millenial 3 Fishman and Cohen, Op. cit. Children of Intermarriage: Touchpoints and Trajectories 4 Worlds Apart: Systems of Jewish Identity in Israel and of Jewish Engagement”, Cohen Center of Modern Jewish the Diaspora, The Annual Assessment of the Situation and Studies, http://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/noteworthy/ Dynamics of the Jewish People, No. 10. Jewish People Policy intermarriage.html Institute, Jerusalem, 2014. 8 Fischer, Rebhun and Slepkov op. cit. 5 Shlomo Fischer, Uzi Rebhun, Noah Slepkov, “Patterns of Jewish Identification Among Jews in America”. 17th World Congress of Jewish Studies, August 9, 2017. 6 Theodore Sasson, Janet Krasnic Aronson, Fern Chertok, Charles Kadushin, Leonard Saxe, “Millenial Children of Intermarriage: Religious Upbringing, Identification and Behavior Among Children of Jewish and Non-Jewish Parents, Contemporary Jewry, April 2017, 37:1, 99-123.

146 the jewish people policy institute Re-Emergence of a Diasporistic Jewish 16 Identity in Europe

“Against All Odds, We Are Here self-interest. In this context, there is a difference To Stay” between Western and Eastern Europe. In countries with large Muslim minorities, especially in West Throughout modern history, Jews have been Europe and Scandinavia, Jews are routinely the ultimate “other” in Europe, and they have called on – for the sake of the public quiescence constituted a symbolic reference baseline for – to make sacrifices in order to avoid provoking all subsequent “others.”1 This unique situation resentful radicalized Muslim youth and fascism provides them with a set of duties, but also certain revivalists with conspicuous displays of their prerogatives. Neither migrants nor fully natives, particularism. In Hungary, Poland and other post- the question of dual allegiance lingers unresolved, communist states, in East Europe, the expectation whatever the claim. As the standardized reference of cultural conformity is implicit and most for European democracies’ governmental people with Jewish roots avoid disclosing their decisions regarding minorities, they receive ancestry. Jews in North America, are open about frequent media exposure and privileged access to their belonging to the Jewish people with their political leaders. professional and friendship circles, but on the old Today, in an era of mass migration of non- continent, being a Jew is a freighted biographical European newcomers and weakening collective element and Jews are careful with whom they identity, European Jews are often expected to share this information. behave as role model citizens, fully allegiant to the Existential discomfort, leads many Jews to adopt dominant ethos at the cost of their particularistic one of the well-known Jewish strategies: some,

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 147 with the means to do so, emigrate to friendlier was to present themselves as exceptionally loyal environs; a significant population, not ready to pay citizens, models for all future newcomers.2 the price of emigration, avoid the public sphere Jews learned to prosper under these conditions. and settle into homogeneous enclaves. This is German Jews excelled in demonstrating full particularly true of those who follow traditional, allegiance to the Kaiser and French Jews to the stringent Jewish religious practices. But the vast Republic. Similarly, Hungarian and British Jews majority, who are less committed and more were champions of patriotism. By the 1920s, secular, have no desire to positively affirm their despite the opposition of conservative elites, Jews otherness: They decrease their Jewish profile and in most European countries succeeded in making adopt an assimilationist stance, which, based the most of the opportunities liberal nation-states upon historical experience, leads in the end, to offered, and many of them reached key positions Jewish decline. in various fields. The last years have brought challenges, crises and European Jews achieved relative success despite a self-questioning atmosphere to Europe. The the ambivalence and hostility of their non-Jewish European Union and the various governments it counterparts. Despite their attempts, the issue of comprises have been shaken by a wave of protests dual loyalty has never been resolved. Again and forcing them to examine and define their place again, they were accused of playing a double game, within the continent, and within the world. The of hiding their “true” affiliations (to capitalism, ramifications of these processes for the Jewish to communism, to international orders) while communities of Europe are numerous. We will pretending to be good national citizens. describe them in the following paragraphs. Following WW2, a rejection of the nationalistic discourse emerged and collective identities Historical Background (either religious, ethnic, national) were regarded Despite the fact that Jews have lived in Europe suspiciously. This new post-national worldview for 2,000 years, often settling there well before underpinned the construction of the European today’s majority ethnic groups, the position of Union. Jews were, once again, a point of reference Jews in Europe has historically been precarious. in this process: “Rising from the ashes,” the The emergence of the nation-states in the 18th European integration process, espousing a and 19th centuries created a political context that peaceful and hatred-free vision, took the fate of demanded the full allegiance of Jews to the nations European Jewry and the Holocaust as one of its accepting them as citizens. Neither migrants important symbols as they underpin the liberal 3 nor fully native, their specificity placed them in order and the centrality of human rights. an in-between situation and the only way to be As the archetypal victims of nationalistic considered fully part of the national community ethnocentrisms, many Jews became the champions

148 the jewish people policy institute of the European idea and the construction of a and his PVV party in Holland, whose campaign supranational entity, an ameliorating counterforce was based on opposition to immigration and the to the racial, ethnic and religious discrimination European Union, and the election of Emmanuel consubstantial to the nation-state. As the nation- Macron president of France over the far right state ethos was accompanied by xenophobia, candidate Marine Le Pen, prove that the people of antisemitism, conservatism and opposition Europe are still attached to the European Union. to social mobility, Jews were among the most Moreover, while the election of Donald Trump in ardent supporters of the new ethos. In concrete the United States had been seen as the possible terms, over the last seven decades, Jews have beginning of a nationalistic populist wave that taken advantage of globalization and identified would also sweep Europe, the reality appears, on themselves with the post-war post-nationalist the contrary, to be characterized by a sense of European ethos. If we, for just a moment, alarm at events unfolding in the United States and disregard the horrific Nazi period, European Jews a rejection of the U.S. president’s ideas.4 over last two and a half centuries have successfully In short, last years’ political and social adapted themselves first to the emancipation, developments in Europe reveal the complexity of then the modern nation-state, and, most recently, the continent’s situation, where opposing trends European post-nationalism. and projects face each other, without a clear dominance of any one of them. These changes in The New Choice the European political world have led to a new balance of power in European politics. Europe may be at a turning point in its history. Recent seismic events in European politics have shown two contrasting tendencies on the Economic Globalization Vs continent. On one hand, several signs point to a Cultural Globalization crisis of mistrust or outright rejection of globalism. Differentiating between two different facets of Brexit is, so far, the most visible symptom of this, the globalization process – the economic and but other phenomena like the December 2016 the cultural – is useful in both analyzing the new constitutional referendum in Italy and the rise of challenges and recommending directions for the right-wing AfD party in Germany reinforce this intervention. The political distribution in Europe idea. In Eastern Europe, many consider partnership is not anymore a continuous spectrum from far with Russia a viable and attractive alternative to left to far right but a dual-axis map. As presented the European Union. in the following matrix, the four main political On the other hand, it would be premature to streams can be arranged according to their conclude that the European idea and its liberal support of economic and cultural globalization. orientation are dead. The failure of Geert Wilders

the jewish people policy institute 149 Economic Globalization Vs Cultural Globalization

FAR LEFT Multiculturalism CENTER Multiculturalism State Interventionism Moderate Left Free Market Multiculturalism

Nationalistic Identity Nationalistic Identity Cultural GlobalizationCultural FAR RIGHT LIBERAL State Interventionism Moderate Right Free Market Nationalistic Identity

Protectionism Free Market Economic Globalization

Far Right: All over Europe, and beyond, far right Moderate Right: in line with the ethos of parties oppose both economic and cultural economic liberalism that made Europe a global globalization. In the economic field, they support actor, the moderate right supports economic nationalistic economic protectionism in order globalization but opposes multi-culturalism and is to protect local traditional industries from reluctant to accept and integrate migrants. international low-cost competition. Culturally, Center / Social Democrats / Social Liberals / they want Europe to remain Christian, avoid Moderate Left: both Macron and Merkel, who international cultural influences, and keep the belong to this moderate camp are avid supporters economic and political leadership in the hands of of the E.U. and the Globalization. They wish to elites of ethnic European origin. preserve national identities while also integrating Far Left: Claiming that the economic cultural elements and promising elites of Muslim competitiveness of the non-European industries descent in the public sphere. results from the subjugation of local workers, The European political history of the last decade the far left, ironically, supports economic can be seen through the prism of competition protectionism similar to that proposed by the far between these four camps. One could argue that right. However, the similarity does not carry over the continent’s fate will be linked to the outcome to the cultural realm. The far left camp advocates of this competition. The camp that ultimately the acceptance and integration of non-European claims power will determine the European migrants, and believes the countries of Europe outward strategy toward the world and the should become multi-ethnic, multicultural and inward disposition toward its own minorities, multi-faith societies. including its Jewish communities. In Western

150 the jewish people policy institute European countries, the far left has held a more • The rise of fervent nationalism brings with it the dominant place in society than can be observed potential for xenophobia, Christian and racist anti- in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the far right, Semitism, pressure for cultural conformity, and the though present throughout the continent, has rejection of Jewish exceptionalism. Jewish ritual much more influence in the political discourse practices (such as external markers of religious in Eastern European countries. However, despite belonging, circumcision, Jewish slaughter) may be these regional differences, every political actor in subject to prohibition, Jews may be expected to Europe falls into one of the four camps. lower their Jewish profile and avoid expressions of solidarity with world Jewry or Israel. The Social Implications Of The • On the other side, the multiculturalists envision Globalization Process Europe as multi-ethnic society and question the hegemonic hold Thanks to globalization, 1.5 billion people in of the traditional underdeveloped countries have been lifted out Judeo-Christian Current of extreme poverty in the last two decades. The heritage. As most immigration borderless world has brought unprecedented migrants in Europe inflows, opportunities to individual and collective players. come from Muslim coming mostly For various historical reasons, the Jewish people countries with non- from Muslim and the State of Israel were culturally prepared democratic systems, countries, have for and have greatly benefitted from this process. and, frequently, worrisome Yet, this rapid destabilization of the world order institutionalized implications for has been met with backlashes, and what appears anti-Jewish/anti- Europe's Jewish to be a concomitant rise in anti-Semitism with Israeli attitudes and communities the potential to harm Jewish life in Europe and resentments, current elsewhere in the West: pauperization of Western immigration inflows working classes, social downgrading of the have worrisome implications for Europe’s Jewish middle-classes, intrusive influence of international communities. economic actors, inability of politicians to protect their constituents, and massive migration. Last but • Proponents of both cases above, tend to not least, populist backlash against elites and post- associate the Jews with international finance nationalists. and globalization in its different dimensions, and their ascendency to power would pose Among the four political camps, the far right significant threats for European Jews.5 and the far left are, from the point of view of the Jewish people and their institutions, the most problematic:

the jewish people policy institute 151 Today, European states are torn between two The New Emerging Non-Totalizing antithetical constitutional projects: either Diaspora Identity becoming a unified political entity or returning to the good old days of entrenched nationalism. Milton Friedman is famous for his “pool player” analogy, according to which the player wins without Constitutional Project 1: The implications for knowing all the mathematical and physical theories European Jews of a return to the nationalistic that explain his shots. The economist uses this narrative are somewhat predictable. In such a analogy to underline that economic agents act in scenario, while the most religious Jews will relocate accordance with economic theories without being to Israel or self-segregate in closed neighborhoods, aware of them. The same can be said, in our study, we may expect that European Jews will re-adopt of European Jewish social agents. Without knowing the well-known low Jewish profile, characterized the models explicated here, and only by reacting by a very privatized, non-exteriorized and non- to their social environments, European Jews have totalizing Judaism. While the ultra-orthodox built strategies enabling them to adapt to possible Jews built self-segregated enclaves, socially and evolutions of the wider European societies. culturally integrated Jews adopted this strategy for two centuries in Western Europe prior to In a context of fluid and post-national identities, the Second World War. This strategy has been geographical mobility and Jewish transnationalism, a slippery slope to assimilation, but in the new an interesting new kind of Jewish activist is context of a vibrant Jewish nation-state in Israel emerging in Europe, one that teaches, launches we may imagine a new sustainable model. innovative projects and breathes new life into centuries-old communities. Some are professionals Constitutional Project 2: On the other hand, and businesspeople, some are teachers in the the implications of a scenario in which European hundreds of Jewish schools, and some are active in countries were to become one unified political cultural and social Jewish and non-Jewish projects. entity with fewer national prerogatives are more Even if they are, at this point in time, small in ambivalent. Many believe that without national number among the young generation, they inspire governments to protect them, in a context of others and embody a new existential stand that increased presence of non-European migrant can be described as a non-totalizing model of populations in a multi-ethnic scene, Jews’ status may Jewish identification. Judaism and Israel constitute be at risk. However, others associate this scenario only part of their fields of interest. They support with possible positive consequences. Delving into European multiculturalism and readily confront the historical precedent of the ancient empires that the daunting European challenges alongside their often accepted Jewish particularism, the partisans non-Jewish counterparts. They reject the view of this perspective believe that such a multicultural of some Israeli and American Jews that the old entity may offer the Jews a kind of normality: to be continent is a Jewish cemetery in the making and one cultural group among a multiethnic project.

152 the jewish people policy institute that European Jewry is holding on blindly to a them even see Israel as the ultimate Jewish place sinking ship. to be but, reluctant to total commitment and Despite rumors of their imminent demise, they responsibility, they are not sure they want to live aren’t going anywhere and are instead developing in such a place and enjoy not being in charge. proud Anglo-Jewish, French-Jewish, Polish- Furthermore, they feel better in the borderless Jewish, and Swedish-Jewish identities. Mostly fresh European environment and dislike the Israeli well-educated and often the products of a highly Jewishness that they see as too much a matter affiliated upbringing who have experienced both of sociological identity and too less a matter of Israel and America, they are well aware of the positive content. growing difficulty in affirming a strong Jewish They try to set-up innovative cultural initiatives identity in Europe. But still, they have consciously to provide Jewish content to their challenging chosen to remain in Europe and establish their existential position. In an effort to encourage families there. They are aware of the unfavorable and foster this positive trend, much has been trends. They know about the demographic written about these courageous but often limited- shifts, the continuing economic decline, the scope initiatives, the best known of which are rise of far right and far left parties, the growing the Limmud events, the Krakow’s and Budapest’s anti-Semitism and the anti-Israel stand of the festivals of Jewish culture, the annual “European local media. They know that this new model of Day of Jewish Culture,” the multiple Jewish films identity will include compromises regarding their festivals, and the few programs launched in Jewishness, and that on many occasions they will the non-Shoah oriented Jewish museums that have to adapt to the dominant assimilationist have opened in most European capitals. Even European ethos. Reductively describing this non- if each initiative allows a significant number totalizing identity as merely “symbolic ethnicity” of unaffiliated Jews to rediscover their roots, would be counterproductive.6 reconnect to their identity, and this is therefore a Unlike the assimilationists, they do not deny their noticeable accomplishment by itself, at the end of interests in the Jewish heritage but, on the other the day, from a strategic perspective, it is hard to hand, they do not want to be reduced to the see how these local limited initiatives may be able Jewish part of their identity and see Europe ethos to reverse the European Jewry decline in the old as full part of their DNA. continent. As Europe is in the middle of a political, economic, identity and demographic turmoil, the Unlike the old-model anti-Zionist diasporists who European Jews who may expect to maintain Jewish opposed Diaspora as an open society to Israel as continuity in the next generations are mostly the a huge ethno-religious ghetto, the new European ones who become religiously observant or the diasporists love to visit their “Jewish homeland” ones who have quitted the old continent. frequently and have many friends there. Some of

the jewish people policy institute 153 Conclusion and Perspectives with the dozens of Chabad houses make Europe a tourist destination even for observant Jews. Thanks Most analysts who carefully read the different to this flow of visitors, many of the Eastern Europe scenarios presented here will be pessimistic about communities that lack a demographic critical mass the Jewish future in Europe. And this pessimism of engaged Jews can sustain a year-round Jewish life. has been evident in several previous JPPI papers From a Jewish policy perspective, this renewal on Europe. Yet, as we have seen throughout has to be encouraged and supported financially. Jewish history, reality sometimes defies the It will probably not transform back Europe to the analysts and we observe instead the emergence nurturing soil that it had been for centuries, but it of new and creative modes of Jewish engagement. will allow individual second- and third-generation Not surprisingly, the emergence of a new non- disaffiliated Jews an entry point to reconnect to totalizing Jewish positioning which mixes selective their heritage, and this is certainly valuable in itself. attachment to Jewish identity, prominence of individual accomplishment and profound local patriotism, is in line with the socio-cultural In many ways, these new types of European tendencies which prevail in Europe. Jews prefigure an emerging type of Israel- Three game changing elements stand behind the Diaspora relationship: these new European emergence of this surprising renewal: (1) social Jews acknowledge Israel as the vibrant center of networks that allow isolated Jews to establish and the Jewish life and decide for personal reasons participate in support groups and mobilize their to live their life in the Diaspora. Despite the fact peers. (2) Israeli businesspeople, either commuters that Judaism is peripheral to their daily life, or full time residents, who run companies in when they want to reconnect to their heritage, Europe while remaining connected to Israel. We they take a plane and jump to Ben-Gurion may add to them another population, composed airport: Tel-Aviv is their most attractive JCC, of the few dozens of thousands of Israeli-born Jerusalem is for them a kind of homeport and Jews who, for a variety of reasons, have relocated they get real-time news from Israel on their to European capitals. Even if they rarely interact smartphones. More and more this new model with the local Jewish communities, whether they of relationship resembles that of twenty- remain in insular groups or assimilate actively into first expats with their core country. Without the general society, they strengthen the population doubt, this was made possible because of the with some Jewish or Israeli roots. (3) The growing proximity of Europe to Israel but, who knows, Israeli and American Jewish roots tourism industry, we may imagine that in the coming years, with which makes Jewishness more and more part of Israeli life becoming more and more vibrant, the landscape. All over Galicia and Ukraine, non- we will see such a relationship developing European born Hassidim settle and re-open small in more remote places such as South Africa, Jewish nodes that collectively and interconnected Canada and even Australia and USA.

154 the jewish people policy institute Endnotes

1 In an article dedicated to the analysis of the function 4 Stacy Meichtry, Anton Troianovski and Marcus that anti-Semitism fulfils in the construction of Western Walker, “ European Populists Who Aped Brexit and Trump collective identities, Henri Zukier highlights the fact that Rethink Their Approach,” Wall Street Journal, August 21, The Other, the “outsider”, is psychologically constructed as 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-populists- the projected image of the negations and repressions of back-on-their-heels-rethink-anti-eu-stance-1503334431 every society. Once constructed on this basis, and having 5 Antisemitism is mainly present among Muslims, undergone a process of demonization, The Other becomes Far Right and Radical Left supporters. See Report on an emotionally charged object that may be “manipulated, Antisemitism in 2016, overview, trends and events. preserved and called up at will” by the members of the Ministry of Diaspora. Http://www.mda.gov.il/EngSite/ dominant group, and also has the capacity to trigger Lists/HomePageBanner3Icons/Attachments/1/ powerful “mechanical” feelings and reactions. See Henri reportENG.pdf Zukier, “Transformation of Hatred: Antisemitism as struggle for group identity,” in Demonizing the Other: 6 See Winter, J. Alan (March 1996). “Symbolic ethnicity Antisemitism, Racism and Xenophobia, edited by Robert or religion among Jews in the United States: a test of S. Wistrich, Harwood academic publishers, Amsterdam, Gansian hypothesis”. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 37, 1999, p. 120. Psychologist Edward E. Sampson goes even No.3. Connecticut College. further, asserting that the entire Western project is marked by the construction by dominant groups of “serviceable others”, whose lives are negated through control over how they are defined, as well as by the reality in which they live. See Edward E. Sampson, Celebrating the Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1993, p, 4. Quoted in Martina L. Weisz, “Micro- physics of otherness: Jews, Muslims, and Latin Americans in contemporary Spain,” in Antisemitism International 5-6, 2010, edited by Robert S. Wistrich. 2 The statement of Comte Clermont-Tonnere in the National Assembly during the debate on the status of Jews in the French Republic (23 December 1789) is well known: ‘ We must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to Jews as individuals". 3 For an historical account see: Merte, M., “Rising from the Ashes: The Shoah and the European Integration Project,” The Jewish Contribution to the European Integration Project, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2013. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36349-1522-1- 30.pdf?131211155732

the jewish people policy institute 155 17 Jewish People Ways and Means

In this part of JPPI’s Annual Assessment, we economic norms that have ruled policy in most consider the influence of several forces for Western capitals for decades does appear to run change upon the ability for Jewish communities through the presidential election in the U.S., the to maintain a material basis for their families, Brexit vote, the subsequent upset of Teresa May’s institutions, and communities to continue Tories in the U.K. general election that followed, sustaining traditional interests while reacting and many of the nationalist resurgences in France, to external change. In the first section, we look Germany, and elsewhere. Often loosely referred specifically at the reaction against “globalization” to as “globalization,” the more recent rhetoric has that appears to have been so strongly expressed been a reaction to an international order perceived in the political turmoil of 2016-17. What does as being based on highly mobile capital flows, this portend for the Jewish people and for Israel? low tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and the We then look at the institutions of the North expanding influence of multi-national business at American Jewish community in the face of no less the expense of home industries and their workers. forceful social and financial upheavals and assess It is too early to tell how firmly the reaction to their resilience in the face of change. the policy shibboleths of the past will take hold and how much it may transform the realities of Anti-globalization and the Jewish international economic relations, but the rhetoric People and political forces being harnessed to the more nation-centric perspective are real enough to take 2016 saw unexpected political transitions seriously in themselves. How have the post-World reverberate throughout most of the industrialized War II trends toward a more open international Western democracies. The attempts to provide order affected Jewish communities and Israel and a generalized explanation for the various local how much does the vitality of these communities upsets are numerous. Yet, an openly expressed depend on the continuation of the norms that desire to move away from the international have been the hallmark of the past 50 years?

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 157 The Jews – an Ancient Modern globalized economy and that were, until the People recent rise of East Asia, its principal beneficiaries. Jewish emigration to the “coming” economies In many respects, the Jews (along with the of South America – Buenos Aires, Montevideo, overseas Chinese) were among the first modern Sao Paulo – was considerable during the same peoples in the sense that for at least a millennium years that North America became a lodestone, before the modern era they embodied many and for the same reasons: a perception not of the appurtenances of modernity: they were only of opportunity but the possibility of wider both literate and urbanized, they understood connection to global opportunity. That these how money worked and they were networked same communities have proven less of a magnet internationally. Combined with a sophisticated since the 1920s has something to do with their approach to money and the need to rely on trade failure to achieve their perceived potential as when craft professions and land tenure were future international economic hubs. denied them, Jews were early beneficiaries and Moving forward, there is no reason to believe artificers of a nascent global trading culture. This that Jewish communities will be exceptionally has worked to the benefit of Jews economically disadvantaged if more autarkic and nativist by allowing them to thrive and, when necessary, thinking becomes a major driver of economic move persons and assets with some facility.1 But policies both nationally and internationally. Neither this has been a double-edged sword, providing is there much reason to believe that they would precisely the lightning rod for charges of “rootless somehow be immune from the consequences if a cosmopolitanism” to be leveled against Jews more protectionist policy stance around the globe when nationalist, nativist, or xenophobic stirrings results in what most professional economists have become exacerbated indirectly or actively would expect to be a downturn in both trade encouraged by political currents. and national incomes. It is probably the case that Jews are today distributed predominantly and because of educational attainment, orientation disproportionately in the major urban centers of toward trade, and family tradition Jews are the leading Western democratic societies. This is a involved more directly in pursuits that constitute considerable transformation from the turn of the active participation in the globalized economy prior century when the experience of the broader than is true for their non-Jewish compatriots. Jewish communities of Eastern Europe and the Certainly, the high degree of professionalization Middle East – and even locales such as the U.S. – that has become a characteristic of Jewish labor was a considerable measure of isolation, exclusion, force participation since Second World War makes or poverty. It is not coincidental that these new Jews inherently better connected to the global horizons were in the centers that themselves were knowledge economy that has grown massively. taking the leading role in bringing about a more While not often the focus of globalization’s

158 the jewish people policy institute opponents – and, indeed, even in many cases The Open (and Closed) Economy the designated engine that policy makers in most of Israel countries seek to mobilize to enhance their nation’s posture in a globalized economic environment, this How have the trends toward a richer and more trade in knowledge resources and its embodiment integrated global economy affected Israel and its in the migration of the technically highly trained prospects? How would a general move away from to centers of global excellence may be impinged globalization influence its prospects? indirectly by other measures designed to limit Founded in 1948, Israel was created precisely at the flow of immigration more generally. At the the dawn of the international system that was same time, if Jewish communities experience framed to nurture and sustain such a global the consequences of a more general economic economy. Its elements include the Bretton downturn from more restrictive national trade Woods arrangements for currency and financial policies, their successful accumulation of wealth transactions between states; international over the years of economic liberalization should organizations such as the International Monetary provide something of a cushion. Fund, Bank for International Settlements and The conclusion is that while Jews may well be World Bank; and the early measures that would affected by a shift away from globalization of world become established in the form of the World trade and a global orientation of economies in the Trade Organization. countries in which they reside, they are unlikely Despite this, at the time of Israel’s founding, to do so disproportionately. Quite the opposite; there were few historical examples of deliberate while seeing traditional avenues for economic economic development policy to draw upon. advancement become more constricted and, The two most obvious candidates, the military- therefore, possibly lowering growth or even leading focused transformations of Meiji-era Japan and toward economic stasis, Jewish communities the extreme collectivization and centralization might be better placed than others to weather of the Stalinist security state in the Soviet the consequences – economically. The political Union, were the most successful examples but consequences of such a radical turn in the minds hardly the most practicable or desirable for the of the citizens of the democratic, developed West young state to emulate. Instead, what came to that would predispose such a reversal from the be the conventional wisdom among the newly course that had been previously followed may independent states of the post-colonial order was have considerable effect on the sense of well-being the need for import substitution: native industries and security perceived by Jewish communities – should be protected and provided with both and perhaps even on the reality of their social and centrally funded resources and state management physical acceptance within the nations in which to reduce and eventually remove dependence they reside. on former colonial rulers to build the economic

the jewish people policy institute 159 sinews of a modern, independent state. This was Kong.) In contrast to the strategy of import the course charted by such leaders of the non- substitution (building new indigenous industries aligned movement as India and followed in large from scratch in mild defiance of the economic measure by the socialist founders of the state of doctrine of comparative advantage,) the new Israel. While not so rooted in autarkic principles model emphasized export promotion. Rather as those that emerged victorious in the Soviet than reduce the flows of imports and therefore Union from its industrialization debates of the engagement in international trade, this policy 1920s, there was a distinct family resemblance. encouraged precisely the opposite: build on This period saw the foundation of the economic inherent advantages to increase exports and institutions of an Israel determined to stand on vastly outweigh imports while, at the same time, its own feet with everything from its own arms moving up the value chain as more competence industry to a complete value chain for automobile was gained in manufacturing and greater presence manufacturing. was gained in the international marketplace. Israel ranked In none of the countries Following the 1977 political revolution of near the top that employed these Likud’s rise to power, this more modern view of third (27th principles was rapid appropriate policy for economic development out of 75 economic development became more preponderant in Israel. (But as we economies) realized in any degree shall see, the vestiges of the former orientation in the commensurate with were never completely eradicated.) Today, Israel international expectations. This was as would be characterized as an open economy, open markets true in Israel as elsewhere. one in which trade – both exports and imports index for 2017 Economic growth was – account for a substantial share of national large during the decade income. While the actual scale of trade as a following independence, component of Israel’s economy is below the but it started from a comparatively minimal average of the countries evaluated for openness base of economic activity and was largely driven by the International Chamber of Commerce, Israel by extensive means –greater amounts of inputs, nonetheless ranked near the top third (27th out particularly of labor during the early waves of of 75 economies) in ICC’s Open Markets Index for immigration – rather than intensive means 2017.2 This constitutes a movement from 38th place of enhancing productivity and innovation. By in the initial index in 2011. The result was owed the 1960s, the engine was sputtering. At the largely to reforms that had ostensibly transformed same time, what became the new dominant the country’s actual trade policies as well as its model for economic development emerged openness to foreign direct investment (FDI). This from the examples of the so-called Asian Tigers latter fact points out that openness and global (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong connection involves flow of capital (and people) as

160 the jewish people policy institute much as flows of goods. Indeed, the extraordinary graduate students to work with him or her. These growth of Israel’s high technology sector has been contacts are notoriously difficult to quantify. In a very much driven by FDI contributed by multi- world that becomes more nationally focused with national firms and foreign institutional investors. more restricted work opportunities for foreigners, There are other, less formal ways to consider the this important flow may become attenuated to degree of Israel’s globalization, albeit more difficult the net harm of Israel’s research and innovation to reduce to numbers. The most significant in enterprise. affecting Israel’s material well-being is participation While global commerce and openness to in the global knowledge economy. This term may participation in international efforts brings be applied more widely to less formal avenues for its benefits, economic openness can clearly knowledge transfer than just to sales of patents also foment local discomfort. It is largely the and licenses. An important aspect of these more unwillingness or inability informal pathways is that they result in the to recognize the potential phenomenon of “knowledge spillovers,” value for individual harms on While global that spreads beyond exclusive control by targeted the part of governments commerce recipients. Knowledge is embodied in the minds interested in promoting brings its of individuals and in the collective interaction globalized economies benefits, among individuals who may each bring their own that have led to the economic expertise to achieve a collective cross-product not recent anti-globalization openness can attributable to any single constituent of the group. backlash coursing through clearly also This knowledge is notoriously difficult to formally the developed West. The foment local codify, especially in its early stages, yet this losers demand redress discomfort represents among the most important flows in or retrenchment of the the commerce of ideas leading to innovations and policies of openness. This their wide diffusion. Israel has been extraordinarily is especially true in the case of a relatively small globalized in this sense. Not only do others bring economy such as Israel’s and while there have their skills to work in Israel, but Israel has been a been few if any popular demonstrations, in several large exporter of technical expertise in the form subtle ways Israel’s openness has been offset by of its expatriates working abroad. These are not policies and practices that move in the opposite losses to Israel in some mercantilist accounting direction albeit with little public notice. As policy of “brain drain” but rather each represents a decisions have moved Israel in the direction of a potential human bridge of knowledge that flows more liberalizing strategy, politics at the local level strongly in both directions.3 An Israeli working have adhered more closely to local interests. It is as a professor in a U.S. university is in contact these which have led to retention of a good deal of with colleagues in Israel and may bring promising the structural relationships built during the earlier

the jewish people policy institute 161 Figure 1: Diversification in Exports, OECD Countries (1990-2010 averages)

3.5 CHL More Diversified 3.0 ISR IRL 2.5 MEX KOR AUS NZL FIN 2.0 LVA EST PRT JPN CAN TUR SVK CHE HUN GRC GBR SWF POL SVN ESP DNK 1.5 DEU USA CZE FRA AUT ITA BEL NLD 1.0 5000 15000 25000 35000 45000

Source: IMF, 2017

period of more inward-looking development. industry illustrates this. Five banking groups For one thing, the orientation toward exports has (themselves often associated with large family- been limited to a few sectors. Figure 1 shows how owned business conglomerates) account for 95 little diversification there is in Israel’s bundle of percent of all assets with two accounting for over exports. Israel’s exports are highly concentrated 60 percent. There have been almost no banking 5 in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, diamonds, and market entrants in nearly 50 years. With market electronics (representing in total more than two- power comes a certain degree of political influence. thirds of all exports) and in each case only a few Owners of firms within industries exhibiting firms tend to account for the greatest flows.4 Israeli high degrees of concentration and cartelization exports are considerably less diverse than in other can become natural allies of workers who, in countries at similar income levels. common with those in the U.S. and elsewhere, fear seeing their jobs eliminated by either foreign This points to an underlying paradox between goods displacing local products or manufacturing policy direction of openness and the realities moving elsewhere. So, despite a certain embrace of Israel’s economy which tends toward of globalization and even a formal government concentration, cartelization and resistance to the stance pointing in that direction, there are still competition that would come from greater import forces that while originating in local concerns and access into many consumer markets. The banking interests nevertheless push in the same direction

162 the jewish people policy institute as anti-globalization activists. The aggregate result competition. But instead of having two weaker of the inevitable political pressures on many small players compete in a small, protected market, a specific decisions is (as we have seen) relatively different approach might have been to keep the low trade openness, a regulatory structure that company whole so that it could operate more often functions as a non-tariff barrier to entry and, widely in the competitive Mediterranean regional as has been seen in the past year in several high- market for refined petroleum products, while profile legal prosecutions, a susceptibility to anti- opening the local market to greater access from competitive insider dealings that keep prices high, elsewhere. efficiencies low, and productivity below the levels Such decisions are typical of those faced by a of peers at a comparable level of development. small-market country forced to play a global This suggests that even in a country that has game. Israel has relatively few global business benefited considerably from globalization and is champions of major size. A significant exception well-poised to continue to do so, its relative small is its dominant player in pharmaceuticals, Teva, size serves to magnify interests that militate against which generates $22 billion in net revenues from movement in that direction. The small scale of 57,000 employees worldwide. Of these, fewer than Israel’s home market has always bedeviled those one in eight works in Israel.6 There is little else in seeking to enhance competition. When the Bazan Israel to compare with Teva for size and degree oil refinery, previously a state-owned enterprise, of globalization as represented by dispersion of was privatized in 2006, the regulatory authorities its workforce. Two other major exporters, Israel insisted that its two locations (Haifa and Ashdod) Chemicals and Israel Aerospace, present quite be sold to different groups to enhance domestic different profiles (Table 1).

Table 1. Comparisons of Leading Israeli Manufacturing Exporters

Israeli Exporter Income ($millions) Total Employees Israel Share of Workforce Teva Pharmaceuticals 21,903a 56,960 12% Israel Chemicals, Ltd. 5,363b 13,414 35% Israel Aerospace Industries 3,700c 15,734 >60%d

NOTES: a) 2016 Net revenue; b) 2016 Sales; c) 2015 Sales; d) Conjectural SOURCES: U.S. Security Exchange Commission 20-F filings for Teva and ICL; IAI:https:// www.duns100. co.il/en/rating/DUNS_Premium/Israels_100_Leading_Enterprises; https://www.duns100.co.il/ en/Israel_Aerospace_Industries_Ltd

the jewish people policy institute 163 The dichotomy between the sectors of Israel’s protection and is characterized by slower growth economy that are active in the global economy and and less productivity than is the case for the more those that are less engaged owing to various policy globalized sectors. and regulatory factors maps directly into the “Two Were the net result of the upheavals of 2016 Israels” debates discussed in previous JPPI Annual to become embodied in a wide international Assessments. It is true that 48.5 percent of Israel’s inclination to turn away from the globalization $43.5 billion exports in 2016 fell into the “high course of the past half century and instead 7 technology” category. But these figures exclude focus on national interests, this may reduce the the biggest single export, diamonds (nearly $15 opportunities that so far have existed for Israeli 8 billion in 2016) and so the effective share is less businesses. But the true casualty might be that the than usually reported. And of the total in the high- balance of forces in Israel between more and less tech category, approximately one-third would competitive practices and structures could well include pharmaceuticals, shift away from the former and the growth of the North American that is largely exports latter. This may well then lead to a paradox: the Jews continue by Teva. Especially if case of Israel suggests that a less global stance in to be among aircraft exports are also the name of greater national interests could well the most highly deducted, this means have precisely the opposite effect on domestic educated and that the electronics, economic outcomes than was intended. financially communications, and strong ethnic computational exports, group what comes most often Transformation in the Material to mind when thinking Resource Base of the North about Israel’s high-tech American Jewish Community export sector, actually represents a smaller share It is useful to differentiate North American Jews of exports than might have been thought. To be and the North American Jewish community. The certain, this sector is highly integrated with the economic status and health of North American global economy. It might almost be viewed as Jews continues to be exceedingly strong. While a relatively isolated economy within the larger poverty persists in parts of the Jewish community economy with relatively few hybridizations with – particularly among first and second-generation other potential partner sectors such as health, immigrant groups, the elderly, and the ultra- agriculture, education, and so forth. But this religious (Haredi) community – North American also means that a considerable share of Israel’s Jews continue to be among the most highly industry and economy are less outward looking educated and financially resourced ethnic and than might otherwise seem to be the case. This religious group on the continent.9 less globalized Israel stands behind various walls of

164 the jewish people policy institute Looking forward, the challenges facing all and participate in Jewish communal life by Americans will affect the next generation of becoming members, clients and or/users. American Jews. The complex issues advanced There also exist the national Jewish organizations: industrial societies face may well make it difficult umbrella organizations for affinity groups of for today’s middle and upper middle-class Jewish local institutions cited above – denominational youth to easily replicate the economic status of organizations of synagogues, national coordinating their parents. Many have observed that this is the or servicing bodies of JCCs, Hillels, Jewish day first generation of Americans that will struggle school organizations, social service agencies and to retain the socioeconomic status in which they the like. In addition, at the national level there are were raised. One can assume that the factors also significant advocacy organizations – defense challenging so-called millennials – globalization agencies that lobby or engage in advocacy on and its counter-reaction; declining opportunities behalf of North American for high-income employment – will also present Jewish communities, significant challenges for the next generation of “Jewish needs,” the State Leaders of other North American Jews. That said, North American of Israel, and far more. The ethnic and Jews continue to hold significant positions of organizational structure religious groups leadership in a broad array of high-income fields of the North American look with awe including financial services, real estate, media/ Jewish community at the immense entertainment, and technology. Large segments of remains exceedingly structure of North American Jews continue to enjoy economic impressive. Leaders of the organized and social achievement unrealized to such an other ethnic and religious Jewish extent by any prior generation of Jews. groups continue to community If North American Jews remain comparatively look with envy and awe healthy in material terms, the health of the North toward the immense American Jewish Community is more complex. structure and influence of the “organized Jewish For this discussion, the North American Jewish community” and ponder how it was created and community consists of the complex web of local how they might emulate it. and national organizations which provide the The North American Jewish community is also institutional framework for Jewish communal life. confronting problems associated with accelerated On the local level this includes organizations such change. With new forms of communication and as synagogues and yeshivot, Jewish day schools, technology, the positon of virtually every national Jewish community centers (JCCs); campus Hillels, agency has been eroded as local institutions can and social service agencies that care for the increasingly easily and directly access expertise 10 poor, seniors, and others in need. It is in these and resources. Many local institutions resist institutions where Jews most actively experience paying dues that national bodies have long

the jewish people policy institute 165 depended upon for core financial support. The based UJAs established in virtually every Jewish national bodies of the religious denominations community in North America. National and local are especially challenged. As are others: during UJAs raised funds for “overseas needs” – primarily the past decade, two longstanding national for the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) and the bodies--the National Foundation of Jewish Culture American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (NFJC) and the Jewish Education Society of North (JDC). These two global agencies provided essential America (JESNA) have both gone out of business, care for Jewish communities throughout the world unable to sustain their work financially. That and rescued Jews enabling them to create new lives said, it should also be noted that a range of new in Israel. Between l948 and l952, in just the first five national organizations have emerged including the years of the country’s existence, the Jewish Agency Birthright Israel Foundation, the Foundation for rescued nearly three-quarters of a million Jews, Jewish Camping and Prizma (supporting Jewish resettling them in Israel. By l985, the community Day schools) among others. based Federations and UJAs had merged in all Locally, the much-noted high cost of Jewish communities. living and the disinclination of millennials to join As both direct giving emerged in American institutions has created membership challenges philanthropy and “American friends of” groups (hence budget shortfalls) for some Reform and were established by Israeli universities, hospitals, Conservative synagogues, which have in turn and cultural institutions, many sage observers led to a number of congregational mergers anticipated a concomitant substantial weakening and consolidations. While noteworthy, these of Federations. Despite such concerns, the l48 occurrences are still rare. Membership dues, Federations continue to raise close to a billion user fees, and philanthropy from constituents dollars via their annual campaigns and well over continue to be the main funding sources for local $2 billion from all sources (annual campaigns, institutions. Despite the challenges mentioned, capital campaigns, donor advised funds, planned most of the institutions that provided the giving, etc.).11 While the total amounts raised framework for Jewish life 20-plus years ago remain have surpassed most predictions, the numbers intact. of Federation donors has declined significantly, In the world of Jewish community-wide although most of this decline has taken place at philanthropy, local Federations emerged in the early the lower levels of giving (under $1,000) with the 20th century as central bodies for coordinating decline in efficacy and increased costs associated fundraising and planning to address the growing with direct marketing (direct mail, telemarketing, needs that emerged as waves of European Jewish e-philanthropy). Said differently, Federations’ immigrants reached America’s shores between l880 funding – although challenged on many fronts -– and l920. In the late l930s, the national United Jewish has remained far stronger than virtually all pundits Appeal (UJA) was created along with community- predicted in the l990s.

166 the jewish people policy institute Following the l967 Six Day War, when Federations significant American university, cultural institution, exploded philanthropically and became the and hospital – many of which precluded Jewish primary vehicle for North American Jews to participation until the middle of the 20th century.13 express their support for and solidarity with In most areas of North American life, the borders Israel, Federations grew and for several decades that once excluded Jewish participation have dominated the central square of North American evaporated, including in philanthropy. Jewish Philanthropy. Beginning in the l980s and An additional trend influencing North American l990s, many significant Jewish communal donors Jewish philanthropy is the explosion of direct – virtually all prior and continuing leaders and giving. In a culture that celebrates individualism, contributors to Federations – established family this attitude has also become foundational for foundations, the largest often professionally many philanthropists. Whereas communal giving managed. The foundations they established are was heralded in the early and mid-20th century, 12 now well known in the Jewish world. While we are now in an era in which individuals are virtually all these foundations continue to provide encouraged to express themselves including via support for their local Federations and local their philanthropy. Hence, increasingly engaged institutions, they have also forged significant high Jews gravitate to support institutions in which they visibility initiatives – some national – reflecting actively participate, or institutions that reflect their their interests and their view of what is required to values and particular areas of interest. address what they consider the most serious issues facing the Jewish community. To cite but three, the As a result of these and other factors, North various Wexner leadership programs, Birthright, American Jewish philanthropy has become less and PJLibrary were planned and launched by family centralized and far more diffuse over the past two foundations, which in turn sought and established decades. Significant initiatives are now forged by funding partnerships with Federations, other Federations, family foundations, and by individual foundations, and in the case of Birthright, with the donors. Partnerships are then sought linking such Government of Israel to sustain these and other initiatives with community-based organizations initiatives. and local institutions – synagogues, JCCs, Hillels, summer camps, schools, and social services In parallel to these new trends, many of the agencies – where Jewish life is lived. largest donors to Jewish communal purposes were increasingly becoming involved in major American How may we then assess the material health universities, cultural institutions, and hospitals. Jews of the North American Jewish community and of wealth and influence were recruited to serve its resilience in coping with the changes that on the boards of these institutions and expected currently surround it and those to come? As to contribute. And they did. The names of major noted, North American Jewish philanthropy is Jewish donors now adorn the walls of virtually every undergoing a transition from a highly centralized

the jewish people policy institute 167 system to one that is more diffuse. It remains renewal and decline are taking place. Major new true that membership dues, user fees, and fund- initiatives have been launched: a growing number raising at the local level continue to provide the of synagogues, JCCs, and Hillels are working to largest income streams for the core local gateway become more compelling and engaging Jewish life institutions where Jewish life is lived. But we are spaces; Birthright has now brought over 550,000 far from being able to predict with confidence young men and women to Israel, and Masa, the the course of trends and the implications of the most successful follow-up program to Birthright, changes underway in North American Jewish is now bringing over 12,000 participants to philanthropy for understanding the financial Israel each year for extended periods of study, reality of contemporary Jewish life and the volunteering, and service. College campuses offer evolving roles of Federations, foundations, far more Jewish programming than was the case individual clients and members, and other sources just 20 years ago, and Jewish Studies programs that sustain the essential have proliferated on North American university Colleges and institutions of North campuses. New start-ups on both the supply and universities American Jewish life. demand sides of philanthropy are emerging in are offering But in keeping with every sphere. far more the famous song, “the And yet, simultaneously, North American Jews Jewish Studies fundamental things continue to exhibit high levels of assimilation and programs than apply as time goes by.” intermarriage. North American Jewry, despite 20 years ago As in past generations, living in a society at the apex of technological Jewish identity and Jewish and economic proficiency, finds itself confronting philanthropy will continue the full experience of modernity. All the former to be intrinsically linked. Living in the most open borders and boundaries between North American societies in which Jews have ever found themselves, Jews and the broader culture have been sundered. individual Jews will only provide financial support With the exception of those who have consciously and invest in Jewish life and Jewish communal chosen to live in more isolated contexts, most institutions if their identification as Jews carries American Jews find themselves in the Open positive individual reinforcement and with that Society. In a practical sense, all North American the commitment to sustaining and strengthening Jews are Jews by choice, not just those who convert the Jewish people. During the past three decades, from outside the fold. The work of the next few Federations, foundations and individual Jewish decades will challenge North American Jewish donors have elevated the priority and increased leaders to create the architecture for compelling funding for the purpose of strengthening Jewish Jewish lives. This alone under such circumstances education, various enhancers of Jewish identity, has the prospect of leading far larger numbers of and Jewish life in general. At present, both Jews to a fulfilling self-identity and engagement

168 the jewish people policy institute in Jewish life. Not because they are forced to; they the underlying phenomena. This is a pre-requisite are not. Not because of guilt; they have none. But to applying the analytical perspective that would because of the meaning and purpose they find allow us not only to fully understand change, but in experiencing Jewish life. This is a prodigious perhaps gain early warning capabilities as well. challenge, but also an opportunity. The outcome Several measures would be of value in allowing remains uncertain. But the material strength this more informed stance. of North American Jews and North American • Gain greater understanding of the streams of Jewish philanthropy will be a critical determinant Jewish philanthropy supporting the institutions of that outcome. where most Jews experience Jewish life: Synagogues, JCCs, Hillels, summer camps, Need for Historical Perspective -- Jewish day schools (as well as the national and Forward Reconnaissance organizations that support these institutions: denominational bodies, national Hillel; As in the Sherlock Holmes story of the dog that JCCNA, etc.) and national Jewish advocacy did not bark, perhaps the headline regarding organizations. Jewish communities in North America, and more generally abroad, is that there have been • Evaluate how North American Jewish no large discontinuities on the financial front. philanthropy has been re-contextualized by Despite dire predictions, generational change, the the remarkable growth and success of the emergence of new forms and methods of both Israeli economy. While no longer significant Jewish and general philanthropy, and dramatic in amount, it still does good in Israel. But changes in technology and communication, the how has the diminution of Israel’s centrality primary Jewish financial story remains one of as a project wrought indirect changes in the remarkable continuity. North American Jewish financial basis of North American Jewish institutions appear to be weathering the multiple people concerns? transitions to new patterns of Jewish philanthropy • Seek to elaborate in detail and in aggregate exceedingly well. the mix of funding streams for major North But this is not necessarily going to be true moving American organizations and institutions. In forward. There may be aspects of transition particular, gain insight on the changing streams already underway, not currently detected nor of user fees, membership dues, philanthropic necessarily being looked for, that might prove support from members, Federations, family to be deleterious over time. As JPPI has urged in foundations, government (federal, state, city) prior Annual Assessment examinations of the and other evolving sources. sources and uses of Jewish wealth in pursuit of Ideally, we would like to be able to track and Jewish people goals, it behooves us to enhance evaluate changes over time. Hence, it would be our ability to observe and gather information on

the jewish people policy institute 169 useful to gain sufficient data to benchmark 10-year 6 Teva Pharmaceuticals Form 20-F, U.S. Securities and intervals beginning in the 1990s. The challenges are Exchange Commission, data as of 31 December 2016. large. Accessing financials of synagogues and Jewish (http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW 50SUQ9MzY3MDgwfENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t= day schools, for example, is difficult when not 1&cb=636228527216394377 ) required to file public documents. Denominations may have information on synagogues; boards 7 Central Bureau of Statistics, press release 185/2017, June 2017 (http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/ of Jewish education on day schools. But as JPPI hodaot2017n/16_17_185e.pdf ) has pointed out in the past, not even those with publicly available financials, such as federations, use 8 Website: Simoes, AJG, CA Hidalgo (2011). The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for a common taxonomy for how income and outflow Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development. is denominated. This, in effect, further reduces (http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/isr/ ) transparency. Once again, an important step 9 According to the Pew Research Center, the most toward gaining the understanding and perspective highly educated religious grouping in the U.S. are Hindus, needed to ensure matching Jewish funding and 48 percent of whom have post-graduate degrees with a Jewish people needs in the future would be for further 29 percent completing college. For Jews, the next North American Jewish institutions to take steps most educated group, the post-graduates represent a 31 allowing for greater transparency and sharing of percent share with 29 percent completing college. This vitally important information. performance, especially in completion of post-graduate degrees, makes the two religions substantially different from almost all of the other groups surveyed. Jewish Endnotes households have the largest share of those earning over $100,000 a year (44%) followed by Hindus (36%) and more 1 Baruch Spinoza’s Jewish community of Amsterdam distantly by other groups. (http://www.pewforum.org/ consisted almost entirely of a transplanted Jewish and religious-landscape-study/educational-distribution/ ; last converso community from Portugal. accessed 28 July 2017.) 2 International Chamber of Commerce (2017). ICC 10 Hospitals and senior adult facilities, in most Open Markets Index Fourth Edition 2017: Economy communities established by Jews and the Jewish Profiles, pp. 59-60 (https://cms.iccwbo.org/content/ federations and originally funded by Jewish philanthropy, uploads/sites/3/2017/06/2017-ICC-Open-Markets-Index- are now primarily funded by local and federal government. Economy-Profiles.pdf#page=49 ). While hospitals, social service agencies, and senior adult 3 Compare the chapter on Demography, “Israelis facilities continue to receive substantial philanthropic Abroad” in this volume for a different approach to this support from American Jews, there is debate about question. whether they ought to be considered integral to the North American Jewish community even though it is clear that 4 International Monetary Fund (2017). “Israel 2017 relationships persist and such ties strengthen both the Article IV Consultation—Staff Report”, IMF Country Jewish community and the medical/senior adult facilities. Report No. 17/75, March. 11 JFNA Annual Report, 2014 (https://jewishfederations. 5 Ibid. org/about-jfna ).

170 the jewish people policy institute 12 These would include, but are by no means limited to, the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Foundation, the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies, the Wexner Foundation, the Samuel Bronfman Foundation, the Steinhardt Foundation for Jewish Life; the Jim Joseph Foundation, the Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, the Adelson Family Foundation, Genesis Philanthropy, the Ruderman Family Foundation, the William Davidson Foundation, the Harold Greenspoon Foundation. 13 Otto H. Kahn was the principal financial guarantor of the Metropolitan Opera in New York City during its crucial period of growth in the early twentieth century, providing the backing that allowed the company to see off its rivals – but, of course, he was prevented from purchasing a family box in the theater owing to his Jewish origin. See, Sachs, Harvey (2017). Toscanini: Musician of Conscience (New York: Liveright Publishing,) p. 230.

the jewish people policy institute 171 Creativity and the Factors that Drive 18 Intellectual and Cultural Achievements

This chapter is the first iteration of a work in supporting environment), for example material progress. It discusses the links between creativity resources or fame and popularity. But enabling and its drivers on the one hand, and Jewish conditions alone do not bring about creativity if achievement particularly in non-material fields: the other factors are not present. It might look culture, science, technology, and the arts, on artificial to separate a complex phenomenon like the other. Our underlying assumption is that creativity into four boxes. However, separating creativity in all fields was essential to the survival the conditions and triggers will facilitate the and thriving of the Jewish people in the past, and formulation of policy recommendations at a later thus, Jews have an interest in promoting creativity stage. The relative weight of each factor and their in the future as well. combinations vary from case to case, and different Creativity is generally defined asthe ability authors offer their own assessments of the weight to synthesize knowledge from different of each factor. (including subconscious) sources to produce It is difficult to demonstrate with precise statistics innovative ideas or products. In many known whether and how the four factors mentioned civilizations, there have been two basic pre- affect creativity. The tools to answer such conditions of creativity and if these two are met, questions are the traditional tools of the historian there are two factors triggering creativity. The and sociologist: studying relevant literature as well pre-conditions are: I. education and II. cultural as biographies of creative individuals, collecting versatility, the triggers are III. stress or necessity available data, looking for precedents and parallels and IV. curiosity. One might add to these in history and using common sense to identify the factors enabling conditions (another term for a most plausible factors.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 173 If we define creativity as the ability of a person or Religious demands, the obligation to study the a people to innovate, change and transform itself Torah is the best known and most compelling in order to survive or achieve any other goal, the reason for Jewish education and literacy. The definition is valid for Jews and many others, but it Talmud reports that the High Priest, Joshua Ben is not universally valid. Some cultures and societies Gamla, who lived before the destruction of the have survived well, apparently by resisting change Temple, ordered teachers to be appointed in each or by changing very slowly. This too may require town and children to enter school at the age of six its own kind of creativity. Haredi Jews in Israel and or seven.2 If the Talmudic story is true, it would the Diaspora are quite creative in their own ways have set up the first compulsory primary school in resisting change and innovation, so it seems.1 A system in the ancient world. When a few hundred more famous example is Pharaonic Egypt. Egypt’s years later Jews moved from agriculture into skilled ancient civilization lived and often flourished crafts and trades, their literacy, although acquired during 3000 years without any lasting, profound for religious reasons, conferred advantages to changes in its language, script, religion, art, dress, them in other, particularly economic fields.3 political structure and patterns of behavior. There were equally powerful socio-economic The Jewish creativity reviewed here is that of the reasons compelling Jews to acquire education. In last 200 years, but modern creativity could also the Middle Ages and later, their minority status, have roots in pre-modern history. The following their connections across borders, and social reflections include historical, religious, and socio- or economic discrimination attracted them to economic causes that could have affected the four commerce and long-distance trading, which factors mentioned above. required much more knowledge and education than, for example, farming, the main occupation Education of the majority population. The history of German Jewry in the 19th and The connection between knowledge acquired early 20th centuries, and of American Jewry in the through education, and creativity as demonstrated 20th century, shows continuous improvements by various accomplishments seems obvious, in general education. These preceded, and although, as said, it is not easy to statistically prove arguably preconditioned, the subsequent rise of a direct correlation between level and quality of Jewish economic, cultural, scientific and other education and later achievements at a collective achievements – bursts of creativity in many fields. level. Education is an indispensable but not singularly For most of their known history, the Jews were sufficient driver of creativity, but it is easier to among the most highly educated peoples in identify and measure than other factors, and thus, the world. This has given them a competitive trends in education might be useful indicators of advantage in their non-Jewish environments. future trends in creativity.

174 the jewish people policy institute Germany years was the direct result of the initial fast rise in general education. It is equally clear that the long This chapter attempts to evaluate American delays between educational and socio-economic and Israeli Jews of the 20th and 21st centuries, and cultural improvements were due to anti- not German Jews. However, there is important Jewish discrimination, which never completely research literature, including statistical data that disappeared in German society. Whatever other document the history of German Jewry from 1800 factors contributed to German Jewish creativity to 1933.4 This research supports our hypotheses – stress and discrimination were certainly critical about the factors driving creativity, at least in the triggers – education was ultimately the key factor. German case. The rise of German Judaism and the enormous contribution of Jews to German culture, 5 science, and its economy occurred in several stages. The United States At the end of the 18th century, most German Jews The educational, economic, cultural, and political were poor and many were destitute, living from rise of American Judaism since 1945 is spectacular begging, hawking, junk dealing and petty crime. and unmatched in any other country or period of In 1800, almost 20 percent of all Jews had no Diaspora history. Like in Germany, education took profession at all; only 2 percent were wealthy. Their off first. situation began to change after Napoleon decreed American Jewish Educational Attainments their emancipation, but their economic conditions improved gradually. What changed more radically 1945: was their education. Jews understood quickly Jewish educational attainments more or less on that any real betterment of their socio-economic par with U.S. average. situation depended on a substantial elevation of 1957: their general education. From 1810 on, dozens of Jews have 1.7 years more education than national Jewish schools teaching general subjects sprang up average, 16% of Jews are college graduates; across Germany, and in a short time Jews became national average is 9%. fluent in literary German, which few had mastered 1972-80: before 1800. It took approximately one generation, Jews have 2.6 years more education than national until the mid-19th century, for a considerable average; 39% of Jews are college graduates, national improvement of Jewish economic conditions to average is 13%. become visible, and one more generation, until the late 19th century, for Jews to move out of 1983-84: commerce into many other professions and begin 56% of Jews are college graduates. their extraordinary contribution to all sectors of 1991-2002: German culture and science. It is uncontested that Jews have 2.6 years more education than national the rise of German Judaism over more than 100 average; 61% of Jews are college graduates.

the jewish people policy institute 175 Figure 1 / Average Years of Formal Schooling, by Religion

Jews 13.4 years

Christians 9.3 years

Unaffiliated 8.8 years

Buddhists 7.9 years

Muslims 5.6 years

Hindus 5.6 years Note: Adults ages 25 years < 7.7 years Global avg. and older as of 2010

Source: Pew (2016), Religion and Education Around the World

The figures show that Jewish educational period of approximately ten years after the 1980s attainments in relative terms levelled off from the when educational attainments were levelling 1972-80 period on. The numbers for the 1990s off. The 1999 peak resulted from much earlier are almost the same as those for the 1970s and educational investments. 1980s. This was also the period when complaints Jewish Contributions in Science, Literature, Art, about the high cost of education in Jewish schools Culture, Finance, Politics became more frequent. 1924-25: American Jewish Income Jews contribute 70%, relative to national average 1957: of 100%. Jews relative income 126% of Protestants; 140% of Jews contribute 43%, relative to English-American Catholics. average of 100%. 1972-80: Jews relative income 147% of Non-Jews. 1944-45: 1999: Jews contribute 79%, relative to national average Jews relative income 246% of Protestants; 243% of of 100%. Catholics. Jews contribute 53%, relative to English-American Jewish earnings began to pick up soon after average of 100%. increases of educational attainments, but the 1974-75: most massive earning increases (1999) followed a Jews contribute 245%, relative to national average of 100%.

176 the jewish people policy institute Jews contributed 216%, relative to English- If this is so, it stands to reason that the relative American average of 100%. educational levelling-off that began in the 1980s 1994-95: will have long-term consequences. It could show Jews contribute 468%, relative to national average itself in a levelling off of Jewish earnings and of 100%. cultural contributions relative to other parts of the American population. Many Jews will remain Jews contribute 587%, relative to English-American wealthy, creative, and influential, but other average of 100%. minorities, such as Indian Americans and other These figures, taken from Who’s Who in America, Asian Americans are catching up and are about show a sharp rise of Jewish American creativity to reach similar levels. The relative levelling off of in all sectors, relative to other segments of the American Jewish earnings, influence, and cultural American population. Thus in 1974-75 Jews creativity may have already started, although it contributed almost two and a half times as will take years before it is much as the national average and a little over reflected in the statistics. The relative twice as much as English Americans. This rise was levelling off of enormous already in the 1970s, and became wildly American Jews disproportional in the 1990s. The disappearance Israel in earnings, of various discriminatory practices which held Linking educational influence back Jews before the war can partly explain performance to creativity as and cultural these figures. It is also likely that Who’s Who expressed by contributions creativity may editors became more open to acknowledging to science, culture, art, have already Jewish contributions after the war whereas they etc. and following trends started might have been biased against Jews before. both in education and However, it is plausible that the main reason creativity is much more for the steep rise in both creativity and earnings difficult for Israeli Jews than it is for American is the substantial educational investments of Jews. A quarter of Israeli Jews were not born American Jews that started in 1945 and preceded and educated in Israel, and on the other hand, all other rises by several, if not many years. The there is no internationally comparable and sociologist Paul Burstein examined these data and relatively unbiased measurement of Israel’s general arrived at similar conclusions: it is “social capital,” creativity. However, it is possible to measure with accumulated by networking, e.g. in Jewish schools, a high degree of objectivity, Israel’s performance families and meeting places, and together with it, in science and technology, and to evaluate how “human capital” accumulated by education that this performance is related to Israeli schools and explains American Jewish creativity and success. universities.

the jewish people policy institute 177 One of the accepted measures of educational seventh out of 188 countries with an average of attainment is the estimate of average years of 12.8 years.6 education attained by the population. According In the 2016 Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) to a report by the OECD for 2015 that measures statistical yearbook, it is noted that Israel "is one of social welfare, the average years of education for the more highly educated countries in the OECD."7 Israel’s population aged 25-64 is 11.4, which is This claim rests upon the number of university very close the OECD average. This average masks educated individuals, another important large gaps of inequality, especially as it includes measurement. Both in 2014 and 2015, Israel was the Arab population (whose average educational ranked fourth among developing nations in attainment is 9 years), and the Haredim (10.3 the number of university educated individuals years). A 2016 United Nations Development between the ages of 25 and 64 (see figure 2 below). Programmes (UNDP) report shows a slightly different picture. The report shows that as of 2015, When one examines the data for the 25-34 age when estimating the educational attainment cohort, Israel loses its high ranking, even though it is of the population above 25 years of age, Israel is still above the OECD average. One of the hypotheses

Figure 2 / Percentage of 25-64 year-olds with tertiary education, by level of tertiary education (2015)

178 the jewish people policy institute for the lower ranking is connected to the older age world in 2015 is as follows: at which Israelis begin higher education stemming 51 American universities from mandatory military service and the tendency 9 British universities of Israeli youth to go on extensive post-army trips before starting their academic studies. 4 universities from each of the following: Switzerland, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, Not only is the number of years of education an Holland, and Japan important measurement but so too is the quality 3 Swedish universities of education. In Israel, seven universities engage in research and teaching. According to the ranking 2 universities from each of the following: Denmark, of the ARWU (Academic Ranking of World Belgium, and Israel Universities, also known as the Shanghai Rankings) 1 university from each of the following: Finland, two Israeli universities, the Technion (69) and Norway, and Russia Hebrew University of Jerusalem (87) were among The Weitzman Institute, which had been in the the 100 top universities in the world in 2015.8 The top 100 in 2012-2013, has declined somewhat in distribution among the top 100 universities in the the last few years. In August 2017, new rankings

Figure 3 / Israeli University Rankings in the Shanghai Rankings 2007-2016

57 53 59 69 64 65 64 72 70 67 0-100 78 77 77 87 78 93 92 101-200 201-300 301-400

400+

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Technion – Israel Institute of Technology Weizmann Institute of Science Tel Aviv University Ben Gurion University of the Negev Bar Ilan University University of Haifa

the jewish people policy institute 179 were published and Hebrew University was not top 100 (76), and in Biology, no Israeli university among the top 100, leaving the Technion as the ranks among the top 100. In regard to the last two only Israeli institution on the list. Nevertheless, disciplines, five Israeli research institutes are in the one should emphasize that controversy attached leading 500. to the rankings, and the need to look at long term Patent registration is a measure of creativity that is trends make it difficult to draw conclusions from very difficult to obtain for Jews around the world, this short terms data alone. but it is accessible for Israelis. In order to register It is useful to look at rankings in specific disciplines. and approve a patent it has to meet certain criteria Thus, in Mathematics for example, four Israeli of innovation and usefulness. Therefore, analyzing schools are ranked in the top 100 – the Hebrew the pattern of patent registration provides useful University is ranked 11th, and the Technion, insight into the dynamics of innovation. There are Weitzman Institute, and Tel Aviv University are various measures of patent registration. One of ranked in the 51-75 group. In Chemistry, two them that reflects the intensity of the innovative Israeli universities are found in the top 100 – the dynamics of a country is the proportion of patent Technion and the Weitzman Institute. In Physics, applications relative to the population. Such an though, only the Weitzman Institute is in the inquiry was conducted by the Shmuel Neeman

Figure 4 / PCT Applications per 100,000 residents by country

5 inhabitants 100,000 per PCT applications

0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Israel Sweden Switzerland Finland Japan Germany Denmark Korea Netherlands Austria

180 the jewish people policy institute Institute in their reports which present indices Cultural Versatility of science, technology, and innovation in Israel. According to the Neeman Institute’s analysis as The term “cultural versatility” is used here as seen in Figure 4, in 2012 Israel was listed as fifth the ability to look at a problem from diverse in patent applications PCT (Patent Cooperation perspectives, rooted in different traditions, Treaty) in proportion to population size (23.9 per cultures, and languages. This ability helps people 100,000). understand that there is more than one response to a problem. Cultural versatility often results This data shows a positive correlation between from a broad-based, open-minded education, the achievements of Israeli education and the having foreign friends, and travel. Some of the high degree of innovation. Israel ranks high roots of this ability could be very old. Rabbinic when demographic and economic data are Judaism values argument more than uniformity of integrated. Though, as we pointed out in the 2016 thought. The Talmud reports unending arguments Annual Assessment, the overall picture of Israeli between two schools interpreting the Torah, the education as reflected in the data is complex and House of Hillel who tended to facilitate the law cannot be summed up as either one of increased and the House of Shamai who tended to make success or decline. This very complexity brings it more stringent. The Talmud states that the several researchers and experts to suggest that opinions of both sides, though conflicting, are the situation today reflects successes and trends of equally valid – “words of the living God” – but that the past (for instance, the Russian Aliyah) and not only Hillel’s interpretation will become law. Why? to current efforts. If this argument turns out to be Because he quoted the contradictory opinion of accurate, the future may bring a decline in many Shamai together, and even before his own, thus of the indices. Because of the relatively young showing respect for his opponent’s arguments.9 age of the State of Israel, and because many of In other words, often there is not one, absolute, the indices are relative and depend upon parallel uncontestable truth, two “truths” are possible and trends in other countries, there is an objective both must be examined side by side. difficulty in testing this claim. However, whether accurate or a mistaken hypothesis, it is clear that The philosophical and moral implications of this in order to advance Israel and to bring it to the principle are enormous. It encourages diversity top of the rankings, long range strategic thinking and versatility of views widely beyond the religious is needed along with high levels of material and sphere. Even the proverbial argumentativeness of cultural investment in education and human Jewish politics could partly be influenced by this development. Talmudic precept. Chinese academic scholars are studying Judaism in order to understand the sources of Jewish creativity. Why are the Chinese less creative in spite of their huge numbers and

the jewish people policy institute 181 their enormous efforts in education? One scholar engineers, architects, educators, writers, artists incriminates the traditional Chinese quest for and entertainers, approximately 30 percent of uniformity. He advises his people to emulate the the U.S. work force, while the “super-creative Jews: “In the Talmud there is no one answer or core” comprises 12 percent. Their creativity is opinion to one question. Different answers to the distinguished by diversity, individuality, tolerance, same question could be true at the same time, and talent (with the latter not excluding education and all could be valid. This kind of thinking could for which Florida shows less interest). Conferring be qualified as distinct in its encouragement of the creativity label to such a large percentage of diversity and negation of uniformity.”10 the population is excessive. Many members of Apart from religious tradition, the location and each of these professional categories do repetitive, socio-economic situation of Diaspora Jews also uncreative work. The true creators and inventors encouraged diversity of are much fewer. thought and culture. Jews Florida pays attention to the geographic location Until not lived in many different of creative people. They tend to congregate and live so long ago, places. A Frenchman in close proximity. Similar observations were made creative people visiting Turkey and long before when many creative people wanted tended to Egypt in the 16th century to live near the sources of power and money. The congregate and marveled at the linguistic Renaissance painter and art historian Giorgio live in close and cultural versatility Vasari offered a thought-provoking explanation proximity of the local Jews: “They for Florence. When a man of exceptional talent speak, it might be emerges, “nature” tends to create a second one “to Greek, Slavonic, Turkish, encourage mutual emulation and inspiration” – Armenian or Italian…and so they speak every but also competition and rivalry.12 Today, location language and have been of great service to us, not is less of a concern because the information and only in translating for us but in communicating to transportation revolution has obviated the effect us how things are in that country.”11 of geographic distance, but until not so long ago, Richard Florida’s 2002 classic, The Rise of the Creative location was an important supporting factor of th Class: And How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Jewish as well as non-Jewish creativity. In the 19 th Community and Everyday Life, regards cultural and early 20 centuries, Odessa became a magnet versatility as the dominant source of creativity. for rich Jewish businessmen, creative thinkers, Creative thought, and the innovations that flow writers, poets and politicians because Jews from it, flourishes in some environments but not enjoyed more freedom there than in any other in others. It thrives in places that are diverse, open, part of the Czarist Empire and because it was a and tolerant – particularly toward unconventional city of many minorities. It was probably the most people. Florida’s creative class comprises scientists, “multicultural” city of the Empire. Bialik, Mendele

182 the jewish people policy institute Mocher Sforim, Ahad Ha-Am, Isaac Babel, Shaul Illuminating in this story is that Rich inherited Tchernichovsky, Ze'ev Jabotinsky and Leon Trotzky from his parents and upbringing an innovative all came from Odessa, or lived, were educated or spirit wide open to the whole world, which he published there. All of them were multi-lingual used much later in a field that could not have been and felt at home in various cultures. more remote from his family’s life and interests. Biographical case studies demonstrate the links But if his versatile mind encouraged Ben Rich to between cultural versatility and Jewish creativity tinker with radically new aero-frame designs, it today. An entertaining example is that of an took a special trigger to produce the Blackbird. unusual, brilliant Jewish aerospace engineer, Ben This is what we call “stress”: America’s fear of the Rich (1925-95), who played a lead role in the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. conception and development of the Lockheed Yuri Slezkine called the 20th century “The Jewish SR-21 Blackbird Mach 3 Long-Range Strategic Century” because Jews Reconnaissance Aircraft. The Blackbird made in the West and in Russia th its first flight in 1964. It was one of the most both absorbed and “In the 20 successful military planes ever developed by the affected all surrounding century, Jews United States. It kept flying over the Soviet Union cultures in major ways. in the West and was never shot down. It was the first stealth This was the basis of and in Russia plane, based on radically new designs. Aerospace their own, and of the both absorbed experts regarded it as the most important aircraft modern world’s creativity. and affected innovation since the jet-engine and called Ben The 20th century was all surrounding Rich “the father of stealth.” This is how Ben Rich unprecedented in Jewish cultures in describes his family background and upbringing: history when it comes to major ways” ...[M]y own stern father, Isidore Rich, [was] a British creativity. The move from citizen who had been…the superintendent of a marginality and exclusion hardwood lumber mill in Manila, the Philippines to participation and involvement, the march out where I was born and raised. The Riches were among of the ghetto, explains the burst of modern Jewish the first Jewish families to settle in Manila, and after creativity. one of my paternal grandfather’s business trips to It is difficult to measure and compare cultural Egypt, he brought back a snap-shot of the beautiful versatility objectively, in contrast to educational young daughter of one of his Jewish customers to attainments that can be measured. Foreign show to my bachelor father…Marriage followed a few language fluency might allow for an approximation years later. My mother, Annie, was a French citizen, of cultural versatility. In principle, knowing several born and raised in Alexandria, a brilliant linguist who languages should open the polyglot’s mind to spoke thirteen languages fluently, a free spirit who different cultures and different ways of problem pampered me...13 solving.

the jewish people policy institute 183 What can be said about the evolution of cultural number of Israelis travel to and work in foreign versatility among Jews today? There are differences countries. Israel’s culture absorbs large numbers of between the United States and Israel. Fewer and foreign books, films, theater performances, music, fewer American Jews are born abroad and have a art exhibitions and more. Can one conclude that life experience comparable to that of Ben Rich, and Israel is becoming more culturally versatile? fewer and fewer master any of the languages their The over-proportional growth of the Orthodox grand-fathers, and sometimes fathers, brought population both in Israel and America could to America. But many, particularly younger reduce overall Jewish cultural versatility, at least Jews are travelling, absorbing new cultures and, in the short and medium term. This population occasionally, languages and also know enough respects and often knows one culture only. Long- of Judaism or Israel to be able to see issues from term consequences are not predictable. Religious different perspectives. An interesting sub-group are beliefs may prohibit some artistic production, the Russian Jews who immigrated to America over but not necessarily scientific and technological the last 20 years, today almost half a million. They innovation. Within the religious population and are bi-cultural and bi-lingual. To draw conclusions especially among the newly religious (Hozrim about current American Jewish cultural versatility B’tshuva), there are individuals who have an based on so few, and sometimes contradictory, intimate familiarity with both Western and Jewish data and some conjectures is hazardous. Maybe Orthodox culture. Some of these individuals make one can say that cultural versatility as a condition significant contributions both in the arts and of creativity among American Jews survives but humanities, and in science and technology. probably does not increase compared to the past. However, their versatility like their education is probably still higher than that of America’s general Stress or Need population. “Stress” is a semantic shortcut for a number of Measuring the evolution of cultural versatility incentives: reactions to or fear of discrimination, in Israel difficult as well. It may be argued that persecution and threats, frictions due to religious, young Israelis born in Israel generally exhibit social or political struggles, sub-conscious tensions less cultural versatility than Israelis of a previous due to forgotten traumas, and economic or social generation who were largely immigrants and were pressures. familiar with the cultures and languages of their Life responds to adversity – predators or a home countries. However, today, there are signs changing environment – by evolving new and pointing towards greater openness among Israelis better adapted organisms. Paleontologists are compared to the situation some decades ago. A discussing what caused the “Cambrian Explosion,” growing number of Israel’s young learn foreign the revolution in the history of life that took place languages, particularly English, and a growing 540-520 million years ago. During the preceding

184 the jewish people policy institute billions of years, all life was single-celled, and then stress and difficulties. Diaspora Jews were often suddenly, the first vertebrates and the ancestors a “middleman minority.” They made their living of all animals alive today appeared. A frequent bridging the difference between consumers and explanation attributes this development to producers and were often at risk of triggering the predation, and the stress predation creates. The enmity and envy of one side or the other, if not first fossil records of the Cambrian period show both. When emancipation began to ease but not true predators – animals that catch and eat other completely abolish the burden of discrimination, animals.14 Life forms had to become creative in Jews flocked to and helped set up new economic order to survive and avoid being eaten. So much sectors, such as department stores, electrified for a biological concept of creativity. transport, journalism, and the film industry. The most creative and far-reaching transformations While external conditions – war, persecution, of Judaism and Jewish history occurred in the discrimination – were the dominant stress and wake of the three greatest catastrophes of Jewish need generators in Jewish history, Jewish religious history, the destruction of the First and the Second changes and infighting since Biblical times created Temples and the Holocaust. Each catastrophe no less stress. Whether this stress was creative or created enormous stress and new needs. The three destructive could depend on the position and “major” prophetic books – Jeremiah, Isaiah, and beliefs of later observers. Was the emergence of Ezekiel – all address the destruction of the First Christianity, splitting off from Judaism as a “heretic Temple and the Babylonian exile. Their written sect” as the historian Salo Baron called it, creative words explain how the Jewish people could make or destructive? sense of the catastrophe. They have become an In 1919, Thorstein Veblen, one of the most integral part of Judaism, Jewish ethics and liturgy. respected American sociologists of his generation, The destruction of the Second Temple led to published a paper that is rarely quoted now the development of Rabbinic Judaism. Rabbinic because its title offends current political Literature, mainly the Talmud responded to the correctness: “The Intellectual Pre-Eminence of danger that Judaism would splinter or disappear Jews in Modern Europe.”15 Veblen argues that without a temple. Rabbinic Judaism has shaped Jewish “intellectual pre-eminence,” which he calls Jewish faith and history until today. And finally, indisputable, is the direct result of discrimination the foundation of Israel was, among others, a and persecution. It is the defense mechanism of creative response to the acute awareness, in the the Jews, their creative response that protects wake of modern anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, them from being “devoured” Veblen privileges that the Jewish people could not be protected discrimination, fear, and stress as the true sources without a Jewish state. of Jewish creativity, not education or cultural Apart from these three “mega-stress” events, there versatility. Logically then, he predicts that Jewish are many specific socio-economic reasons for pre-eminence will disappear should Zionism

the jewish people policy institute 185 succeed in creating a Jewish state where Jews want to notice it (but nevertheless can also feel would become a “normal,” not discriminated stress sub-consciously). The Ephrussis of Vienna against people like every other people. In fact, did notice it and responded in grand style. The his prediction was quite similar to the hopes of Ephrussis originated in Odessa, spoke at least Theodor Herzl and other early Zionists. four if not five or six languages, and created in the second half of the 19th century one of Jews had to develop creative ways to survive, Europe’s great banking empires, an innovative, prevail, and if possible, thrive. There are many multinational finance institution that helped examples that show modern Jewish survival drive European economic development. There creativity as a response to hostility and stress. were Ephrussi banks in Paris, London, and Vienna. Anti-Jewish hostility can be overt, crude, and The Vienna family remained formally Jewish but violent. Chaim Weizmann was assimilated. They consorted less with the remembers in his Jews of Vienna than with each other and with Many examples memoirs his childhood the Austro-Hungarian nobility they had joined at demonstrate years in a Russian school. the discretion of Emperor Franz Joseph. He made that modern His teacher of Old Church them “Von Ephrussi.” They seemed fully integrated Jewish creativity Slavonic, a very difficult and accepted. They owned the largest palace is a response language, was an anti- on Vienna’s prestigious Ringstrasse. Edmond De to hostility and Semitic Russian priest. Waal, a late descendant of the family and also stress Weizmann and the other their biographer, recently visited the pre- First Jewish boys made a World War Palace Ephrussi in Vienna and made a particular effort to be the significant discovery in the ballroom. best in Slavonic in order to outdo the Christian Here, on the ceiling…there is a series of paintings boys. They knew this would infuriate their anti- of stories from the Biblical book of Esther: Esther Semitic school master. They succeeded beyond crowned as queen of Persia, kneeling in front of the expectation. This is a good example of the sources chief priest in his rabbinical robes…. And then there of Jewish “intellectual pre-eminence” as explained is the destruction of the sons of Haman, the enemy by Veblen. Little Weizmann developed a creative of the Jews, by Jewish soldiers. It is beautifully done. response to open hostility that was typical for It is a long-lasting, covert way of staking a claim for what occurred in many other cases.16 who you are…. This is the only Jewish painting on 17 But in America and Western Europe, apart from the whole of the Ringstrasse… the Nazi period, modern anti-Semitism is more What De Waal discovered was a residual anguish often disguised, smug, and insidious. Some Jews and a hidden ancestral pride behind the financial notice it and feel stress but others don’t or don’t creativity and social success of the Von Ephrussi

186 the jewish people policy institute family. Even they were still not entirely sure of Judaism? Science, but also beauty in art convey a their position. universally valid, objective ethics which religion However, not all stress, fear, and pressure is could no longer do. generated by external enemies. The long march Veblen tried to identify a particular character trait of emancipating Jews “out of the Ghetto” was that could explain Jewish creativity. He called it accompanied by internal social and psychological “creative skepticism.” This is his argument: when stress. An extreme, but probably not isolated Jews were discriminated they tended to question illustration of how violent internal Jewish pressure the validity of the established “truths” of the could be and how it might push creativity is the life societies in which they were living – not only story of the painter Chaim Soutine. Today Soutine the political and social traditions that excluded is regarded as one of the most brilliant and unusual them, but all “truths,” including those in science members of the “School of Paris” of the 1920s and culture. Jews are and 1930s. His paintings sell for millions. Soutine “skeptical” – at least the was born to pitifully poor traditional parents in emancipating Jews of the Many a Lithuanian shtetl, the tenth of eleven children. 19th and 20th centuries. In innovations His father wanted him to become a cobbler or fact, many innovations by Jews tailor, but he liked to draw. His biographer writes: by Jews represented represented a “Two of his older brothers constantly taunted a complete break- complete break- him, saying ‘A Jew must not paint,’ and beat him away from established away from mercilessly. Their cruelty almost became a ritual.”18 traditions. Such breaks established As can be seen in the comprehensive catalogue require considerable traditions of Soutine’s hundreds of published landscape and courage, which cannot portrait paintings, there is not a single one with a always be found among Jew or a Jewish subject, but there are many with well-respected members of the ruling majorities. churches and catholic choir boys. Soutine never It took years before Einstein’s overturning of felt free of stress. traditional physics became – hesitantly – accepted, The march out of the Ghetto was accompanied and decades before the twisted landscapes by new Jewish search for excellence in science, and human bodies in Soutine’s paintings were art, literature, and economic activity. A simple appreciated. In his lifetime the French art critics explanation for this is that the emancipation ridiculed him. opened new professions for Jews that were Veblen had predicted hundred years ago that in closed to them before. There is a more complex a Jewish state where Jews would become a people explanation. Was this search for excellence in like all others, the Jewish creativity driven by stress, science etc., a search for a new “truth” that had hostility and skepticism would come to an end. He to replace the old, increasingly invalid truth –

the jewish people policy institute 187 was surely wrong in regard to the Jewish state. There, Curiosity for external and internal reasons, tension is obvious. Though stress is not the only driver of creativity, Israel’s greatest economic success, its innovative it probably is the dominant one for Jews. But high-tech sector, is a direct result of its struggle for there are other motivations that drive humans survival supported by its defense research. Nearly to discover what is new and unknown, inside and all of the best-known Israeli novelists are driven outside of themselves, or to create art not seen by, and write in permanent anger about their before. To summarize these motivations under country’s Palestinian policies, and few Israeli movies the term “curiosity” is simplistic. We do so for are comedies. Most focus on conflict. But maybe lack of a better term. Curiosity is the impulse Veblen’s prediction will turn out to be correct for inherent in all humans (and animals) to acquire much of American Jewry? The ease and unease of knowledge. Thirst for knowledge, “curiosity,” is being a Jew in America in the 20th and 21st centuries part of the human condition, but more often than is a huge subject that cannot be examined quickly. not, it is survival knowledge, knowledge with a The data show that Jews, apart from Indian purpose – economic, military, medical, religious, Americans remain the best educated, well-to- or otherwise. In this case it also belongs to the do, successful, respected minority of the United category of “stress” or “necessity.” Knowledge States. Identified and even Orthodox and Ultra- for knowledge’s sake is comparatively rare. Orthodox Jews are now to be found in important There was such a thirst for knowledge in ancient and responsible positions in all branches of the Greek science, and there is a lot of it in modern economy and in leading law and financial firms, “pure science” generating fundamental research. including those that did not hire Jews in the past. Likewise, some art was and continues to be Young Americans of Jewish origin but without commissioned by paying customers, but some any Jewish links or commitment, and without any also reflects an artist’s search for meaning and interest in Israel, should be free of the stresses that beauty and nothing else. Certainly, many Jewish plagued Jews across the centuries. But American contributions to modern science, art and culture Judaism is a politically torn community, Israel is an were born in this search for pure knowledge, embarrassment to some, and outside hostility to beauty, and significance, which is difficult to define Jews continues to emerge in new forms. Stress and and prove and impossible to measure. tensions – triggers of creativity for Veblen – have One could see this, too, as a result of the not disappeared. His prediction that normalization Jews moving out of the Ghetto and entering will put an end to Jewish intellectual and cultural professions that had been closed to them. Or “pre-eminence” may be premature for America’s one could see it as a secularized continuation of Jews too. an ancient Jewish drive. Jewish religious tradition greatly values learning, the search for knowledge.

188 the jewish people policy institute But it is knowledge with a purpose, knowledge can also encourage creativity. But for policy of the Torah. While an important purpose of makers, financial support is the most obvious and Torah knowledge was to guide correct religious direct way to do so. practice, another important value of Torah study is "Torah study for its own sake." This value Summing Up has been variously interpreted, but there is a central tradition of theoretical study and Torah It will take more study and research to substantiate knowledge as a value in its own right. Furthermore, the statements, illustrations, and hypotheses central traditions of Torah study stress hiddush – advanced in this paper with precise data, and innovation in interpretation and jurisprudence.19 to formulate policy proposals to encourage Further research is necessary to establish to what creativity. Also, there are possible genetic and epi- degree if at all these traditions have contributed to genetic sources of creativity that have not yet been modern Jewish creativity. discussed. What is clear so far, is that the explosion of Jewish talent in the West and Russia from the th th Enabling Conditions of Creativity: late 19 to the late 20 century was a direct result of the emancipation, of Jews leaving the ghetto. Material and other Support The historical conditions of the emancipation Material resources to support creativity by public period will not be repeated, except perhaps for and private sources is often essential. They are a thin trickle of Ultra-Orthodox Jews joining the enabling conditions. Money alone cannot produce modern world. creativity, but poverty can stifle it. Yet the opposite Todays’ assimilated Jews, for whom Jewish can be true also. Poverty and want – stress – can identity has little or no meaning and who have also encourage creativity. Leonardo Da Vinci and never experienced discrimination, have nothing Rembrandt are two of the greatest painters of to prove, do not need to compete with their all time. Leonardo was rich, funded by kings and non-Jewish c ounterparts. Does this mean that popes until the end of his life. He never knew want. the “Jewish century,” as Slezkine called the 20th Rembrandt, in contrast, did not benefit from his century, was a unique historical period that will country’s economic “Golden Age” and was never never come back? Jewish creativity is not limited to able to husband his resources. Once, he had to the 20th century. Biblical, Hellenistic, and Spanish sell his belongings to avoid bankruptcy. There is a Judaism during the so-called “Golden Age” were deep sadness in his late self-portraits that express rich in creativity. During these periods, some of his life’s miseries. Did poverty damage or enrich the conditions identified for the 20th century were his creativity? Apart from money, the promise of also met: high levels of education, multicultural fame, the respect of one’s peers and other factors perspectives, and abundant stress.

the jewish people policy institute 189 In the next few decades, American Judaism and has the potential to produce more in the future. Israel could go in different directions. Levels To encourage their emergence, a high level of and quality of education vary between the two. education, a versatile, multicultural perspective, American Jews are probably better off now, but and some stress would appear to be essential. Israeli education is improving. Cultural versatility Policies can help with the first two, and history seems to be growing in Israel, but perhaps less so and human nature, for better or worse, will see to in the United States. The stress factor is very strong it that the third will not disappear, at least not in in Israel, but weaker for young American Jews. Israel. Can we say that Jewish creativity will fare better At the end of this reflection, we have to return in Israel than in America, not least because Israel to a comment made at the beginning. Why is it needs creativity for its sheer survival and American good for the Jews to be creative? Jewish and Israeli Jews don’t? No, it would be too hasty. We can contributions to science, technology, and medicine test past conditions and have facilitated Jewish and Israeli prestige and Luck and triggers of creativity defense, no doubt. In the humanities and the arts coincidence with all the yardsticks the situation is more complex. Jewish creativity play a decisive and data we can get, but and innovation in literature, art, philosophy, and role in the exceptional creativity jurisprudence has challenged, according to some, presence is ultimately a mystery or enriched according to others, many established or absence that cannot be planned. majority traditions. It has gained respect, but is of creative Luck and coincidence has also triggered enormous hostility. Anti-Semitic individuals play a decisive role in literature mentions Marx and Freud as proof of the presence or absence the alleged evil influence of Judaism on Western of creative individuals. civilization. It is an old phenomenon but difficult Mozart contracted smallpox at the age of eleven. to explain because it is unique to the Jews. Is th In the 18 century, up to a third of the infected creativity also a double-edged sword? died of the disease. Had Mozart died then, the history of Western music would be radically different. Or, had the Nazis come to power in 1900 rather than 1933, Einstein would not have had time to develop and publish his relativity theory, and the history of science and technology in the 20th century would have followed a very different course. What can be said is that a people that produced many creative individuals in the past arguably

190 the jewish people policy institute Endnotes

1 It must be noted though, the Haredi Judaism is itself 12 Giorgio Vasari, Vies des Artistes, Paris : Grasset, 2007. an innovation. See 13 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works – A Personal :Memoir of my Years at Lockheed, Boston/New York משה סמט, החדש אסור מהתורה: פרקים בתולדות האורתודוכסיה, ,Little, Brown and Company, 1994, 109. Morris Steinberg .ירושלים 2005 (Moshe Samet, Innovation is Forbidden by the Torah: fm. Director of Technology Transfer of the Lockheed Chapters in the History of Orthodoxy. Jerusalem, 2005. Corporation, drew the author’s attention to the critical importance of his colleague Ben Rich. 2 Bavli Baba Batra 21a. 14 Bob Holmes, “Sparks of Life”, New Scientist, 28 3 See Maristella Botticini and Zvi Eckstein, The Chosen February 2015. Few – How Education Shaped Jewish History, 70=1492, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012. 15 Thorstein Veblen, “The intellectual pre-eminence of Jews in modern Europe”, Political Science Quarterly 34, 4 See Avraham Barkai, Juedische Minderheit und No.1, March 1919. Industrialisierung, Tuebingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1988. Simone Laessig, „How German Jewry Turned Bourgeois: Religion, 16 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography Culture and Social Mobility in the Age of Emancipation“, of Chaim Weizmann, Westport Conn.: Greenwood Pub GHI Research, German Historical Institute Washington, Group, 1972, Chapter 2. GHI Bulletin 37, Fall 2005. 17 Edmund De Waal, The Hare with the Amber Eyes – A 5 Paul Burstein, “Jewish Educational and Economic hidden Inheritance, New York: Picador, 2010, 125. Success in the United States: A Search for Explanations”, 18 Maurice Tuchman, “Chaim Soutine (1893-1943). Sociological Perspectives 50, Nr.2, 2007. All statistics in the Life and Work”, in M.Tuchman, E.Dunow, K.Perls, Soutine. text are taken from or based on Burstein. Catalogue Raisonne, Koeln-London: Taschen, 2001, 13. 6 Before Israel come: Switzerland (13.4 years), the UK 19 See (13.3), Australia (13.2), United States (13.2), Germany .אברהם בורנשטיין, ספר אגלי טל, פיעטרקוב, and Canada (13.1). 1905 (13.2) Avraham Bornstein, Sefer Eglei Tal, Piotrków Trybunalski, 7 http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton67/np4.pd 1905, introduction. 8 http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2016.htm 9 Talmud Bavli, Eruvin 13b. 10 Fu Youde, „Distinctiveness: A Major Jewish Characteristic”. The Image of Jews in Contemporary China, ed. James Ross and Song Lihong, Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016, 42. 11 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II, Suffolk NY: Collins, 1982, Vol.2, 809.

the jewish people policy institute 191 PART 3

Feature Articles

The Arabs of Israel between 19 “Israelization” and “Palestinization”*

The outbreak of violence on the Temple Mount On July 14, 2017, three young Israeli Arab men, this past summer and the tensions around the residents of Umm Al Fahm, entered the old city “Lone Wolf Intifada” that preceded it, raised the unarmed, followed by a collaborator carrying a bag need to examine relations between Jews and Arabs containing two submachine guns and a handgun. within Israel in this year’s Annual Assessment. They met at the Al Aqsa mosque, took the three On one hand, the bloody civil war in Syria and weapons and opened fire on the Israeli border the deepening of the Shia - Sunni conflict have police officers at the site, leaving two officers dead intensified the signs that Israeli Arabs aspire to and another injured. Additional police returned integrate into Israeli society and share the fabric fire, killing all three attackers. This was considered of life with the Jewish majority. On the other an especially rare incident, as it was carried out by hand, tensions between Jews and Muslims around Israeli citizens. the holy sites, and the identification of the Arab The three attackers were connected to the Islamic minority with the Palestinians in the West Bank Movement in Israel, which clearly identifies with and Gaza, threaten to increase the nationalist- Hamas. One served as a preacher at his local religious elements of the conflict. These trends mosque. The attack was an obvious result of have led Arab politicians and religious leaders to religious sentiments in the air created by Islamic engage in incitement and profit politically at the fundamentalism, which the Islamic Movement expense of coexistence, and were met with similar cultivates, especially in its northern branch, even responses from right-wing Jewish groups and if it does not give operational orders. One should controversial legislative initiatives. not underestimate the movement’s power or

*A broader, more detailed paper on this subject is forthcoming as part of JPPI's Pluralism Project THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 195 influence, despite that it is not the dominant force yet to witness any follow-up attacks or “side in Israeli-Arab society. effects” in the positions or actions of the Arab The Israeli public was surprised, even shocked to “street.” learn the attackers were Israeli citizens. This put the The Al Aqsa mosque is the third most important Knesset members from the “Joint List” (combined religious site in Islam. Its control by a non-Muslim Arab Knesset parties) who see themselves as the authority (especially a Jewish one, an inferior leaders of the Arab-Israeli public in a dilemma. religion according to Islam) is a constant source The Jewish public and authorities expected their of bitterness and anger among devout Muslims. clear condemnation of the attack, but they feared At the same time, it rests on the Temple Mount, accusations of servility or even treason from their which once housed both Jewish temples, and constituents. A number Joint List MKs posted according to some, will one day hold the third weak, ambiguous responses that mostly blamed temple. Due to these competing narratives, it is the “occupation.” The two Arab MK’s who did regarded as the most volatile place in the Middle publish clear condemnations are not Joint List East. members (one is a member of the Zionist Union The “Lone Wolf Intifada” that began on the and the other of Meretz). Jewish New Year two years ago (October 2015), As for the “Arab street” in Israel – there were no erupted after a series of events on the Temple public expressions of joy. In Umm Al Fahm itself, Mount that caused Palestinians to claim that Jews residents distanced themselves from the incident, were inciting friction. some feared reprisals. Radical Islamist actors, including clerics who However, within a few days, things took a turn, preach during Friday prayers (the most important following the police decision to install metal worship of devout Muslims), claimed these detectors at Temple Mount entrances. The Waqf, frictions reflected a hidden agenda of the Israeli the Palestinian body responsible for the religious authorities to undercut the “status quo” on the administration of the site, claimed the decision Temple Mount as part of an effort to “Judeify” was a clear violation of the “status quo”. This the site. The Palestinians found Israeli government position was adopted throughout the Arab and denials of this unconvincing. Muslim world. Among the many friction points between the After a few days of hesitation, the Israeli government State of Israel and Jewish majority and the Arab decided to remove the metal detectors, but minority, the Temple Mount (in Israel’s view) and announced it would seek other methods to prevent Al Aqsa (in the Arabs’ view), is the most sensitive weapons from entering the site. and loaded issue of all. It should be noted that, thus far, the July 14 attack It is clear that Israeli Muslims are an integral seems to have been an isolated event. We have and inseparable part of the Arab and Islamic

196 the jewish people policy institute world, whose spiritual connection to it will In 2006, the High Follow-Up Committee and not be compromised (regardless of diplomatic the National Committee of the Heads of Arab agreements one way or the other). However, until Localities published a joint manifesto, The Future now, even in instances of violent confrontation Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. This between Palestinians and Israeli security at Al document demands full socio-economic equality Aqsa, including those with casualties, Israeli and calls for redefining Israel from a “Jewish Arabs have not taken to the streets. Harsh verbal state” to a “Consensual Democracy”1. While this condemnations by their leadership have sufficed. increased fear and suspicion among some Israeli The term “Israeli Arab” refers to Arab minority Jews, it never had practical expression within citizens of Israel (Muslim or Christian) living within Arab-Israeli society. the 1949 Armistice Lines. Most have a strong The Influence of the “Arab Spring” – a series of Palestinian identity. The Arabs of East-Jerusalem revolutions, attempted revolutions, civil wars, and are not considered Israeli-Arabs and define continued unrest that began in 2011 in a number themselves solely as Palestinian. The Israeli Druze, of Arab states shaped positions and raised although Arab in language, ethnicity, and culture, questions and dilemmas among Israeli Arabs. have a different religion, and are considered a These mostly related to Arab society itself, with separate group for political and historical reasons. the State of Israel only playing a small role. Arabs (Muslims and Christians) constitute 15.5 The Syrian Civil War – which started as part percent of Israel’s population, the vast majority of of the Arab Spring, deepened the divisions and whom are Muslim. Israel’s Muslim citizens (within polarization among Israeli Arabs. While Hadash/ the Green line) number 1,178,000 individuals, or Maki (the Israeli communist party) expressed 14 percent of Israel’s citizenry (not including East support for the Assad regime, Balad opposed it, Jerusalem Arabs who are not Israeli citizens). Arab as it disrupted Arab unity. The Islamist groups Christians make up less than 1.5 percent of the within Israel’s Arab community, chief among country’s population. them the northern branch of the Islamic Since the 1967 Six-Day War, and especially, since Movement, fiercely oppose Shia Islam, which they the First Intifada, Israel’s Arabs are caught in an see as heretical, and therefore distance themselves ongoing dilemma between “Palestinization” and from and have an aversion to Iran and Hezbollah. “Israelization.” That is, between choosing a political The “Arab street” in Israel, as much as it is path that focuses mostly on the Palestinian issue possible to identify trends within it, does not and the continued struggle over the national accept Assad’s repression of the Syrian people character of the State of Israel (a “Jewish state” (particularly the Sunni sector), and certainly versus a “state of all its citizens”) and a civil path despises the massacres conducted by it in Aleppo – which includes striving for civil equality and and elsewhere in northern Syria. At the same time, integration in all aspects of life in the State of Israel.

the jewish people policy institute 197 it also rejects and despises the radical violence of of living than most Palestinians enjoy, and its ISIS and the radical ideology of the Salafists. The economic and political connectedness within recruitment of a few dozens of Israeli Arabs into Israel, has had an effect over the past 70 years. ISIS ranks seems anomalous, not something that On the one hand, they feel discriminated against indicates a widespread reality. by Israeli Jews and oppose this double standard. At this time, it can be said that the Arab Spring did On the other hand, they prefer seeking remedies not elicit direct demands by Israeli Arabs from the within the framework of the State of Israel, state. However, it is quite likely that in the future, and not outside of it. They express (sincere) this will have implications for the continued support for the Palestinian cause, and wish for a formation of an Israeli Arab civil society and public two-state peace agreement that would “end the sphere. occupation.” The positions of Israeli-Arab politicians are The more moderate Arab parties – Hadash and not monolithic. Arab politicians in Israel serve Ra’am – Ta’al – support a two-state solution. primarily under one parliamentary list due to Conversely, the more radical Balad, supports the political constraints (a law passed raising the establishment of “a single, secular democratic threshold to a minimum of four electoral votes state,” expresses support for the Palestinian per party). Between the four parties represented struggle, and does not see the principle of “two on the list, there are deep political, ideological, states for two peoples” as a solution to the and personal divisions. There is almost no doubt conflict. The Islamic Movement advocates for that were the law to be changed and the threshold the establishment of an Islamic state that would lowered, most of the Joint List members would include all of the territory west of the Jordan prefer to run as smaller parties again. River, which is also part of the Hamas platform. A majority of Israeli Arabs reject this. Thus, it is difficult to speak ofclear a Arab-Israeli Opposite the aspirations of the Islamic Movement, leadership. In practice, since the establishment of the state there has not been a single Arab- Arab nationalist sentiments, and the rage over Israel leader who all Arab-Israelis, or at least most, perceived discrimination, there stands a general recognize. However, there is a group of Arab-Israeli outlook common to most of Israel’s Arab citizens. politicians in positions of leadership, and there Its key elements include: are issues around which they unite, albeit with • The state of Israel and its international nuances and varying levels of intensity. standing are solid and stable. Israel’s Arab citizens share a common identity • The fear of a response from the “Jewish street”. with the Palestinian people, in a historical, • The economic aspect – the understanding cultural, and ethnic sense. At the same time, that “there is much to lose”. their Israeli citizenship – with its higher standard

198 the jewish people policy institute • The realization that even if actual disconnect increases the foreclosure of the Arab discrimination exists, Israel’s Arabs enjoy life participation in Jewish society, expressed, for under a democratic regime with a fair legal example, in the refusal to employ Arab workers, system – conditions that do not exist in any especially those with academic education, in Arab country. sensitive and security related industries. • The understanding that no Arab country will Most experts who study Israel’s Arab population lift a finger for Israel’s Arabs, and that they agree that although the “street” is generally must prosecute their own battles, while taking interested in integration into Israeli society, advantage of the democratic regime and legal the politicians (except the minority of whom system Israel offers them. are members of Jewish-Zionist parties) take A large majority of Israeli Arabs set for themselves confrontational and aggressive positions against the Israeli authorities, and at times Jewish society a goal to seek civil equality within the State of as a whole. The reasons for this seeming disconnect Israel. Advancing toward this goal has met with difficulties, some expected and familiar. The between the leadership and the “street” have yet tension and gaps between the Jewish and Arab to be fully analyzed. It is safe to assume that the populations, which exist in any case, intensify politicians are motivated mostly by the fear that following incidents involving Israeli Arabs, such expressing moderate positions and a desire to as the confrontation during the demolition of the integrate would brand them as collaborators. Bedouin village Um Al Hiram, in which a resident Of great concern to most Israeli Arabs are the land being evacuated was killed as well as a police swaps of populated areas proposed by leading officer, and, of course, the Temple Mount terrorist Israeli public figures and politicians in the event attack. To this, we add the stances and silence of a peace agreement, including transferring of a majority of Arab politicians. This led to a Umm Al Fahm and the surrounding villages to situation in which each groups fears that the other the Palestinian Authority. Some Israeli politicians threatens its personal security. Among the Arabs, assert that these swaps should be a condition there is also a fear of punishment or revenge by for any agreement, whereby the Israeli territory the Jewish majority. transferred to the Palestinian Authority is matched Experience shows that the disconnect between by Israeli annexation of parts of Judea and the Jewish and Arab sectors of society tends Samaria. The Israeli-Arab elites understand that to be temporary (due to the aforementioned such a move would be difficult, even impossible moderating elements). At times tensions intensify to implement, but wonder if raising it is meant in a specific place or area, while at other times to potentiate the existing trend (in their view) of it cuts across the entire sector (such as after maginalizing them them and their membership in the events of October 2000). However, each the state. Even the Basic Law currently proposed: “Israel – a Nation State for the Jewish People,” has

the jewish people policy institute 199 caused anxiety and fear among Israeli Arabs, who 2. Israeli-Arab politicians will continue to take an interpret this as legislation meant to enshrine and aggressive line on national political issues, and perpetuate their second-rate status. focus less on civil issues such as achieving civil rights and equality. Summary 3. There will continue to be a disparity between the Arab-Israeli society (the Arab street) and A clear majority of Israel’s Arab citizens support a the stances of Arab politicians, as the “street” two-state solution, while emphasizing that they will continue to be more moderate and see their place in the State of Israel, in which they balanced. will continue to strive to achieve civil equality and equal opportunities. 4. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue to top the political agenda of Arab politicians, Despite the voting patterns that express a strong but will not be the leading issue on the “Arab identification with the Palestinian struggle to street,” unless there are dramatic upheavals, achieve independence, there is no widespread such as violent confrontations that result in recruitment among Israeli Arabs against the Jewish significant Palestinian civilian casualties or state – not in terror activities or public protests. what is perceived as jeopardizing Muslim holy This issue exists and is palpable on the political, sites, especially Al Aqsa (and perhaps also the public, and parliamentary level, but does not Cave of the Patriarchs). represent a central component of everyday life for Israel’s Arabs. However, the issue of holy sites 5. Developments in Syria – the stabilization of (Temple Mount/ Al Aqsa/ Haram A Sharif) the Assad regime and/or the defeat of ISIS will that stands apart from all others and arouses only marginally affect Israel’s Arabs (although especially strong emotions, and could lead to individuals may join ISIS or its heirs again in violent confrontations in the future. the future). 6. Israeli Arabs are very concerned by a number What Next? of legislative initiatives that directly affect them. They see these as a continued attempt 1. Most Israeli Arabs will continue to vote for the to exclude them from the Israeli system, from Arab parties, which are regarded as the proper society and from the job market (especially framework for their representation, despite from desirable jobs). Arab politicians, in large the fact that these parties do not place part, will do almost anything to exploit these improving the lives of Arab-Israelis and their sentiments to advance their own interests, day-to-day interests at the top of their agenda. even if it means further distancing the Arab “street” from integration in Israeli society.

200 the jewish people policy institute Endnotes 1 The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, 2006, p. 10. https://www.adalah. org/uploads/oldfiles/newsletter/eng/dec06/tasawor- mostaqbali.pdf

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