Providing security for Afghan populace is key part of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy U.S. Army (Richard W. Jones, Jr.) U.S. Army (Richard W. Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program BY AMIN TARZI n December 2001, the framers of the Bonn Agreement laid out a plan to end conflict in Afghanistan, heal a divided, wounded nation, and bring about lasting peace.1 However, 9 years I later, stability remains elusive, and these goals have yet to be fully realized. Theories abound but are ever evolving as to how to make progress; bright new ideas are mixed with transplanted Dr. Amin Tarzi is Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University. PRISM 1, no. 4 FEATURES | 67 success stories but yield unsatisfactory results. international coalition have made formal and One area that has warranted much attention informal overtures to the Taliban and subse- is the promotion of national reconciliation. quent neo-Taliban to reintegrate them into the Reintegration and reconciliation are recog- Afghan constitutional system. Both the inter- nized as key strategies to conducting a success- national and Afghan-led tactical and opera- ful counterinsurgency. Reintegration focuses tional level reintegration initiations to lure on individuals within enemy ranks who can be neo-Taliban underlings and foot soldiers have incentivized to abandon their allegiance to the reported some successes. However, when seen cause; reconciliation offers amnesty and politi- through the lens of the realities on the ground cal position to enemy leadership to bring them and with the increase in the areas controlled by into the fold. insurgents, the overall picture is not a cause for celebration. Furthermore, these independent, uncoordinated efforts have at times worked at the government, in its peace and cross purposes, leading to confusion and under- reconciliation program, has decided to mining their effectiveness. cast the widest net possible in offering Part of the challenge has been defining talks to almost all segments of the the targets of reintegration and reconcilia- insurgents of Afghan origin tion efforts. According to Robert Crews of Stanford University, between 2001 and 2007, “no clear legal or political guidelines” were Such efforts have been under way in offered to differentiate between “moderates” some fashion since the Taliban lost control of and “extremists” when it came to reconcilia- Kandahar, its last major stronghold. However, tion or reintegration agendas with respect to the lacking a cohesive, cogent strategy, the various neo-Taliban in Afghanistan.2 Afghan govern- local and international promoters of reconcili- ment rhetoric over the years reveals the chal- ation often undermine each other’s efforts and lenge for promoters of reconciliation to direct confuse their target audiences—the Afghan their efforts at the correct individuals. Hamid people and insurgents—emboldening an oth- Karzai, prior to being selected as the chairman erwise fragmented enemy and forcing a large of the Interim Authority of Afghanistan on segment of Afghans to seek alternative measures December 22, 2001, declared a general amnesty for their future safety. A critical eye on the past for all Taliban forces except the “criminal” ele- and frank discussions with senior Afghan gov- ments within the movement. He explained in ernment officials should elucidate the present April 2003 that there was a distinction between and offer lessons learned and insights into how “the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest to realize national reconciliation. sons” of Afghanistan and those “who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and secu- Road to Reintegration rity in the country.” No one had the right, and Reconciliation Karzai warned, to harass or persecute anyone The journey began in December 2001 with “under the name Talib/Taliban” from that the Taliban’s evacuation of Kandahar. Since time onward.3 A year later, in February 2004, that time, both Afghan authorities and the Karzai—perhaps in an attempt to clear some of 68 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 4 the ambiguity surrounding the identity of the make the insurgents a part of the national pro- irreconcilables among the neo-Taliban—fur- cess, or if it is the other way around.7 ther clarified that there were roughly only 150 While the ambiguity continues through problem Taliban leaders who had links with al 2010, there are positive steps toward unit- Qaeda.4 However, the Afghan government has ing under a common vision. Since 2009, the yet to publicly identify these 150 individuals, major players have come to agree that absent and it has not actively pursued them.5 a viable, broad-based reintegration and rec- A further challenge that has been perpetu- onciliation plan, the Afghan conflict will ated by this ambiguity is the lack of a coordi- not end within a politically acceptable time- nated strategy between the Afghan government frame. The Afghan-led efforts on reconcilia- and international coalition. Currently, there are tion and reintegration as outlined by Afghan a number of parallel and at times competing President Hamid Karzai in the January 2010 reconciliation programs. The Government of London Conference have enjoyed backing by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), Afghanistan’s international partners, including in its peace and reconciliation program, has the United States.8 While Washington began decided to cast the widest net possible in offer- in 2004 to support Karzai’s call for reintegrat- ing talks to almost all segments of the insurgents ing former members of the Taliban, and certain of Afghan origin in the country. The criteria by troop-contributing states of the North Atlantic which insurgents can be reintegrated and rec- Treaty Organization (NATO) International onciled, according to the GIRoA-led agenda, Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had reached are renunciation of violence and joining “in a out in one form or another to the neo-Taliban constructive process of reintegration in order since the early days of military campaign in to benefit from a chance at peace, improved Afghanistan, it was not until November 2009 governance, and economic development.”6 But that ISAF officially embraced a reintegration the gap between what is desirable and what is agenda by officially joining the peace and rein- achievable remains wide, and most stakeholders tegration program with the establishment of the are either reluctant to measure the width of this Force Reintegration Cell (F–RIC). To justify gap or, for expediencies beyond the Afghan bor- ders, choose to see it as a trench worth ignoring. The haphazard, divided, and seemingly con- the major players have come to agree flicting nature of the ongoing peace initiatives that absent a viable, broad-based has given the impression among an increasing reintegration and reconciliation plan, number of Afghan leaders and large segments the Afghan conflict will not end within a of the Afghan population that the agendas politically acceptable timeframe of both the GIRoA and foreign peace initia- tives go beyond persuading the neo-Taliban to accept the current constitutional system. The this action, the main argument has been that question asked by many senior members of the the attacks of September 11, 2001, were not Afghan National Assembly’s lower house, the perpetuated by the Taliban, nor was building a Wolesi Jirga (House of the People), is whether functioning democracy in Afghanistan a major the peace and reintegration process is meant to goal of the U.S.-led international intervention PRISM 1, no. 4 FEATURES | 69 Karzai’s peace and reconciliation program for neo-Taliban forces promises political struggle U.S. Navy (Mark O’Donald) there following the attacks. The goal, as articulated by President Barack Obama in March 2009, was (and has remained) to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return in either country in the future.”9 As such, if the neo-Taliban—inclusive of Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG) and other affiliates, but exclusive of al Qaeda or any 70 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 4 terrorist outfit with an international agenda and The United States and a sizable number of reach—come to the table and accept the cur- Afghans both inside and outside the political sys- rent Afghan governing structure, then compro- tem have reservations about reconciling those mises offered by GIRoA would be accepted and members of the Taliban who may be inseparably indeed supported by ISAF. As President Obama linked to international terrorist networks. For stated, other than the “uncompromising core of Washington, the issue of wholesale reconcilia- the Taliban,” the rest of the insurgents should tion has both domestic political and legal hur- be provided an opportunity to reconcile.10 At dles, even if a policy change was put into effect the London Conference, the United States, to align with the GIRoA position more closely. United Kingdom, and Japan, among other As the main vanguard of democracy and human countries, pledged upward of $150 million to rights, the United States would find it difficult support the reintegration process.11 to support a reconciliation program that would But the devil is in the details, and uniting result in curtailment of the rights of women and under a common strategy to achieve the vision minorities, have a noticeable adverse effect on will prove challenging. The GIRoA and some freedom of expression, and lead to the dismantle- ISAF member states believe in a wholesale, ment of democratic institutions. blanket amnesty for all Afghan insurgents. The Leaders of major Shiite and Uzbek- plan for the GIRoA-led strategic level peace dominated political parties stayed away from the and reintegration program was partially laid NCPJ out of fear of appeasing the neo-Taliban out during National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ) held in early June 2010 in Kabul. The aim of NCPJ was to build a national consen- the United States and a number of sus among Afghans to support the reintegra- Afghans have reservations about tion and reconciliation efforts.