COUNTRY RE PORT Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.

AFGHANISTAN NILS WÖRMER

October 2014 Unity Government in Kabul www.kas.de AFGHAN HANDOVER UNDEMOCRATIC BUT PEACEFUL www.kas.de/

The Afghan constitution barred serving the brink of collapse – agreed to form a Na- President from standing tional Unity Government. again in 2014. Thus, many Afghans hoped that the third presidential election since The inauguration of Ashraf Ghani followed the fall of the in 2001 would bring on 29 September and ended the almost 13- the first democratic handover in the coun- year presidency of Hamid Karzai, who ini- try’s history. But when a victor was finally tially served as interim president for two announced almost six months after the years from December 2001 and then won first round of voting, there was little men- the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections. tion of democracy in Kabul. Large parts of the population were simply relieved to see The IEC sent result of the second round of what appeared to be a peaceful handover, voting on 14 June to the election teams of and glad that the economic stagnation both candidates on 21 September, after the and political and personal uncertainty of agreement on forming a National Unity the election period were over. Yet the Government had been signed and the head election process, which some observers of the Commission, Ahmad Yousuf Nuri- made into a milestone of the transition stani, had declared Ghani the winner of the phase or a litmus test of the current state presidential elections. While sources close to of democracy, did (especially in the early Ghani disseminated the results to the press phases) demonstrate democratic advanc- and social networks the very same day, no es and a string of positive aspects. De- official announcement of the final second- spite its strange origins, and the diversity round result has ever been made. The IEC of the rival political and social groups in- lists released by Ghani’s team show volved, the National Unity Government is 3,935,567 valid votes for Ghani (55.27 per- not automatically condemned to failure. cent) and 3,185,018 for Abdullah (44.73 But it does face a string of daunting chal- percent). lenges. The total of 7,120,585 valid votes in the fi- On 21 September, Afghanistan’s Independ- nal second-round count compares with ent Election Commission (IEC) declared Dr. 7,972,727 in the provisional result an- Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai the winner of the nounced by the IEC on 7 July (4,485,888 or 2014 presidential vote – without presenting 56.44 percent for Ghani and 3,461,639 or an actual election result. This ended an 43.56 percent for Abdullah). So the audit election process that had actually been sup- process funded and supervised by the Unit- posed to pave the way for the first demo- ed Nations, which was concluded on 5 Sep- cratic handover in the country’s history, but tember, led to the disqualification of had become bogged down for months. Just 852,142 votes, but no decisive change in a few hours earlier the two rivals from the June 14 run-off, Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. , had – after weeks of hard negotiations that repeatedly went to

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Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. the distribution (Ghani -1.17 percent, Ab- cent),3 ultimately reflected the will of the dullah +1.21 percent).1 voters. Many voters and Afghan and inter- AFGHANISTAN national observers regarded the outcome of NILS WÖRMER Evaluation of the election process the first round as acceptable, and in some respects better than expected. In the eyes October 2014 The first-round campaign conducted in Feb- of numerous Afghans it boiled down to the ruary and March by initially eleven, later conclusion that the first round had produced www.kas.de eight candidates was noticeably more pro- two losers and no winner. On the basis of www.kas.de/afghanistan fessional than in 2009. Even if personal the unexpectedly high turnout and its inabil- networks and alliance-building still dominat- ity to decisively disrupt the election, many ed the campaign, interest in the candidates’ Afghans saw the Taliban as the real loser of political ideas and policies was more intense the first round. The second loser was in- than in previous Afghan elections, especially cumbent President Karzai, after his failure on the part of the media. A surprisingly high to secure , whom many Af- turnout on 5 April 2014, despite serious ghans regarded as his preferred candidate threats and intimidation by the Taliban, and possible future “puppet”, a place in the confirmed the level of interest in political run-off.4 Ultimately, the simple fact that the participation and the wish for change. The election was held as planned on 5 April and unexpectedly stable security situation on the original election timetable broadly election day was regarded as a great suc- speaking observed had to be regarded as a cess for the Afghan National Security Forces success. (ANSF) and enhanced their reputation in sections of the population. Before the final Straight after the second round on 14 June, result of the first round was announced on “only” 17 days behind a timetable that had 15 May, representatives of independent Af- always been regarded as optimistic, the ghan election monitoring groups put the hitherto positively connotated election pro- number of fraudulent votes at about 10 per- cess began to fall apart. Within 48 hours of cent of the total turnout of 6,892,816.2 polling stations closing, the Electoral Com- They also expected that electoral fraud had plaints Commission received more than been committed on behalf of almost all the 2,500 complaints of fraud and the Abdullah candidates and that manipulation had not camp in particular raised serious allegations decisively benefited or disadvantaged any against his opponent’s side, whom Abdullah one candidate. Thus the final result that put accused of “industrial-scale” manipulation. Abdullah Abdullah (45.00 percent) and Ash- Evidence of significant ballot-stuffing quickly raf Ghani (31.56 percent) far ahead of relativised initial euphoria about what was third-placed Zalmai Rassoul (11.37 per- again an unexpectedly strong turnout. On

29 June the head of Abdullah’s campaign team announced that they would regard any 1 Thomas Ruttig, “The Not Yet Officially An- further action by the IEC as illegal. After the nounced Results – Electoral Maths with Un- IEC published a provisional result on 7 July knowns”, Elections 2014 (52), Afghanistan showing Ghani ahead by something more Analysts Network, 28 September 2014, https://www.afghanistan- analysts.org/2014-elections-52-the-not-yet- 3 Independent Election Commission of Af- officially-announced-results-elections- ghanistan, “Presidential and Provincial maths-with-unknowns/ . Councils Elections: Afghanistan 2014 Elec- tions”, 2 Meaning that the 6,604,546 votes counted http://www.iec.org.af/results/en/finalresults in the final result after verification by the /presidential/1. Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commis- 4 The extent to which Karzai really did at- sion would have still included about 400,000 tempt to support Rassoul and set him up as fraudulent ballots. successor or “puppet” is debatable.

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Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. than one million votes (56.44 percent for The audit process began by having all the Ghani, 43.56 for Abdullah), the situation approximately 23,000 ballot boxes flown to AFGHANISTAN escalated dramatically. Before the day was Kabul with the assistance of ISAF. The veri- NILS WÖRMER out, two former warlords among Abdullah’s fication of more than eight million ballot pa- most powerful supporters – Atta Moham- pers began in the capital on 18 July, under October 2014 mad Noor, the governor of Balkh, and Ab- the oversight of the IEC and the United Na- dullah’s vice-presidential running mate Mo- tions. The process was a de facto recount www.kas.de hammad Mohaqiq – declared that the Ab- involving hundreds of national and even www.kas.de/afghanistan dullah camp was entitled to form a govern- more international observers. It was inter- ment, raised the possibility of forming a ri- rupted several times by disagreements val government, and announced demonstra- about the verification criteria, which were tions.5 On 8 July Abdullah even declared largely stipulated by UNAMA and the IEC. himself the victor of the presidential elec- Until the end of August observers from both tion, leading to fears that this could provoke election teams participated in the audit. Af- violent clashes between the camps. Abdul- ter Abdullah withdrew his team in protest at lah’s supporters did indeed hold demonstra- what he said was grave electoral fraud, tions during the following days – in Kabul UNAMA insisted on also excluding the Ghani up to 10,000 – but they remained far small- team, so from that point the process was er than the Abdullah camp had hoped and conducted exclusively by “independent” Af- the international community feared.6 After ghan and international personnel. Finally, US President Barack Obama called Abdullah on 5 September, the IEC announced that on 9 July to urge restraint and moderation, the audit of all the second-round ballot pa- Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated pers had been completed the previous with both candidates in Kabul between 10 evening. and 12 July. After tough negotiations and constant toing and froing between Abdullah, Some of the international observers believe Ghani and the outgoing President Hamid that despite considerable fraud Ghani most Karzai, Kerry and the two presidential can- likely gained more votes than his rival. Oth- didates announced at a joint press confer- ers admitted – although often not openly – ence on 12 July that they had agreed on to that the scale of manipulation precluded any hold a comprehensive audit of the run-off meaningful correction of the result. The po- and then form a National Unity Govern- litical situation in Kabul was extremely ment. tense before, during and after the roughly seven-week audit process.7 It was rarely

Audit and National Unity Government

7 Carlotta Gall, “Disputes Threaten to Derail Audit of Afghanistan Vote”, New York Times, 5 Matthew Rosenberg and Azam Ahmed, 3 August 2014, “Tentative Results in Afghan Presidential http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/world Runoff Spark Protests”, New York Times, 7 /asia/disputes-threaten-to-derail-audit-of- July 2014. afghanistan-vote.html?_r=0; Carlotta Gall, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/world “In Afghan Election, Signs of Systemic /asia/afghan-preliminary-results-put-ashraf- Fraud Cast Doubt on Many Votes”, New York ghani-ahead-of-abdullah- Times, 23 August 2014. abdullah.html?_r=0. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/world /asia/in-afghan-election-signs-of-systemic- 6 Some of Abdullah’s younger supporters in fraud-cast-doubt-on-many- Kabul said they stayed away from the votes.html?action=click&contentCollection= demonstrations because of the heat, or be- Asia%20Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage& cause they were fasting for Ramadan or region=Marginalia&pgtype=article spending their nights watching the football World Cup.

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Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. clear whether the regular reports about a unofficial channels shortly after the signing possible complete collapse of the election of the agreement on a National Unity Gov- AFGHANISTAN process, imminent clashes and even specu- ernment on 21 September, trouble broke NILS WÖRMER lation about a (military) coup were based out again, which lasted until shortly before completely on rumour or contained a grain Ashraf Ghani’s inauguration on 29 Septem- October 2014 of truth. There were phases where this ber. Until the end there was speculation greatly unsettled parts of the population that Abdullah might stay away from the www.kas.de and caused months of stagnation in the a l- ceremony. www.kas.de/afghanistan ready sickly Afghan economy. The situation also strengthened the sceptics and oppo- The agreement signed by Abdullah and nents of democratisation and buttressed the Ghani on 21 September provides for the es- militant opposition in the eyes of many Af- tablishment of four new posts: Chief Execu- ghans. tive Officer (CEO), the CEO’s two deputies and a leader of the opposition.8 The CEO Before Abdullah and Ghani signed the presides over a new Council of Ministers and agreement on a National Unity Government is under the wording of the agreement re- on 21 September, there were weeks of ne- sponsible for the implementation of cabinet gotiations staged in parallel to the recount. decisions. He also has a right of nomination In advance of the run-off most of the candi- or consultation on appointments to key dates eliminated in the first round came government posts, although the last word down on one side or the other, for Abdullah appears to lie with the president. The or for Ghani. Between them they eventually agreement, which deals almost exclusively mobilised most of the relevant actors in Af- with the position and powers of the CEO, ghan society, from prominent individuals basically provides almost equal influence for through political parties, youth and women’s both the top positions of state.9 The presi- organisations to tribal councils. This gener- dent’s powers still stem largely from the Af- ally occurred not on the basis of political ghan constitution but are now constrained convictions or programmes but in return for by the new arrangement. This state of af- promises of positions, posts and access to fairs is to be legitimised within the next two resources. Such pledges were made on the years by the loya jirga (grand assembly) assumption that – if they had to be fulfilled and will mean amending the existing consti- in the event of a victory – the entire state tution. Cabinet posts and other key offices apparatus would be available for the distri- in the new government have apparently bution of posts and influence. When it be- been shared out equally between Abdullah came apparent that power-sharing would and Ghani. The first five weeks following the mean only being able to deliver half, both inauguration of the two rivals saw great candidates found themselves under strong speculation about the division of ministries internal pressure. On top of this came ex- and posts, although few personnel decisions ternal pressure from the international com- were made during this phase. Almost all munity, especially the United States, to achieve an agreement and bring the elec- tion process to a conclusion come what 8 Immediately after appointing Abdullah may. Many donors made their medium- and CEO, Ghani named his vice-presidential long-term funding promises conditional up- running mates, Mohammad Khan and Mo- on this. Apart from the two candidates’ pat- hammad Mohaqiq, as his deputies. ronage problems, the talks concentrated 9 above all on three complexes: how to deal For a detailed analysis of the agreement with the election result, the powers of the (and the text itself in the appendix), see new post of Chief Executive Officer (which Kate Clark, “Finally, a Deal, But Not Yet will later become “prime minister”), and the Democracy”, Elections 2014 (51), Afghani- division of cabinet seats and other key posi- stan Analysts Network, 21 September 2014, tions in the new administration. One of Ab- https://www.afghanistan- dullah’s demands was for the election result analysts.org/elections-2014-51-finally-a- to be kept secret. When it was released via deal-but-not-yet-democracy/.

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Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. ministers and provincial governors remained Media and popular attention have been in office in an acting capacity, and Abdullah grabbed above all by the president’s nu- AFGHANISTAN and Ghani appear to have agreed to leave merous, sometimes unannounced, visits to NILS WÖRMER the heads of the three security services – army bases and police stations, as well as the defence minister, the interior minister hospitals, the biggest prison and other civil- October 2014 and the head of the National Directorate for ian government agencies. This new type of Security (NDS) in office for the first six supervision from “the very top” and Ghani’s www.kas.de months. sometimes blunt manner with civil servants www.kas.de/afghanistan with whom he finds fault initially earned the First moves by the new president president recognition and the approval of large sections of the population. In the A few hours after his inauguration, Ghani meantime some Afghan observers also criti- appointed as his special cise their new head of state’s behaviour as envoy for reform and good governance and micro-management and merely “cosmetic former interior minister Hanif Atmar to suc- or symbolic interventions” and wish he ceed Rangin Dadfar Spanta as national se- would focus on forming a cabinet and then curity adviser. At a ceremony on 30 Sep- tackling the big political questions like eco- tember (just one day after the inauguration) nomic development, the peace process and officiated by Ashraf Ghani and attended by relationships with neighbouring states, the new government, Atmar signed the Bi- above all Iran and Pakistan.10 lateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the Afghan and US governments and the Summary Status of Forces Agreement with NATO. This ended almost a year of argument between Representatives of the international com- the two governments and paved the way for munity often cited the 2009 presidential setting up the planned Resolute Support election as the yardstick for success or fail- Mission (RSM) for 2015 and 2016 and se- ure in 2014. From that perspective the elec- curing ongoing financial support from the tions could be regarded as “successful” if international community. they were more transparent, fair, free and inclusive than the 2009 presidential elec- Ashraf Ghani’s first official acts included tions, which were overshadowed by fraud, budget cuts at the presidential palace and abuse of power and violence. redundancies among the presidential staff, as well as a series of decrees and speeches Given that in the end all involved merely to civil servants and members of parliament hoped that the process could somehow be driving at stemming grave waste of state brought to an end without an escalation of resources and abuses of power by top state violence, and that even that required mas- officials. The president immediately an- sive external pressure, it would appear – nounced that the investigation into the Ka- viewed dispassionately – that it failed. In bul Bank scandal, in which almost a billion particular, statements made by observers

dollars were embezzled, would be reopened. This underlines the earnestness of the hard 10 line against widespread corruption that he Azzam Ahmed “Ashraf Ghani Races to repeatedly emphasised during the cam- Make His Mark on Presidency in Afghani- paign, but also places pressure on a number stan”, New York Times, 21 October 2014, of heavyweights in Afghan politics who are http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world directly or indirectly implicated in the scan- /asia/afghanistan-ashraf-ghani.html; Thom- dal. Ghani also announced reforms in the as Ruttig, “The Start into the Better Gov- judiciary, the taxation system and the lead- ernance Marathon: Ghani’s First Days”, Af- ership of the security apparatus, and ap- ghanistan Analysts Network, 11 October pears to be preparing a fresh start for the 2014, https://www.afghanistan- peace process (and in association with that analysts.org/the-start-into-the-better- a reform of the High Peace Council). Few governance-marathon-ghanis-first-days/. details of the latter have yet emerged.

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Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. involved in the audit of the second round government have any experience with the would support that negative assessment. new decision-making process created by the AFGHANISTAN But to label the entire process “failed” or Ghani/Abdullah accord. It is unclear wheth- NILS WÖRMER “unsuccessful” would be too one-sided and er all involved really share the same ideas would negate positive aspects, above all the about how to govern in practice and take October 2014 engagement of many Afghan citizens. Put in decisions, and above all how to proceed if simple terms, everything that occurred be- the president and his CEO disagree. It must www.kas.de fore 14 June, including the process of nom i- also be remembered that the agreement to www.kas.de/afghanistan nating candidates and the election cam- set up a National Unity Government was a paign itself, was acceptable and in many political deal between two presidential run- respects better than five years ago. But off candidates. If, for example, Abdullah when the campaign became a duel of two were to pull out of the agreement and re- and figures from both sides threw all their sign his post it would not be properly clear resources behind their own candidate, state what would come next. Abdullah’s demand and electoral structures were not resilient for power-sharing and his legitimacy as CEO enough to resist grave violations, abuses are rooted in his having had the best result and frauds. Of course in a country at the in the first round and a good second place development level of Afghanistan – facing in the controversial second round. The Na- an extremely delicate security situation and tional Unity Government finds itself facing in the throes of a political, military and eco- immense political and socio-economic pres- nomic transition – nothing else was really to sures with considerable and diverse conflict be expected. But it is positive that many potential. A collapse of the Ghani/Abdullah Afghans were not prepared to participate in coalition would not only create a political demonstrations, still less in violent protests. vacuum, but also raise a series of legal Instead the tenor – especially in the urban questions with respect to the necessity to centres – was that people had already seen form a new or reshuffled government. enough violence during the 1990s and wanted to avoid a repeat of that at all costs. In this connection hope remains that the Afghans will also learn from the considera- ble deficits this time around and draw les- sons with respect to future elections, above all in the areas of voter registration and preventing manipulation by state instances and informal power-holders.

In view of the course taken by the election process and Afghanistan’s troubled econom- ic and security situation, many Afghans will regard the agreement on a National Unity Government as the “least-worst solution”. If Ghani and Abdullah succeed in harmonising at a personal level and truly finding a way to govern together, consolidation of the government, formation of a cabinet and in- stallation of a strong and effective admin- istration would appear quite possible. But this process is yet young and it is quite pos- sible that differences between the camps or lack of personal chemistry between Abdul- lah and Ghani could bring down the National Unity Government. Two aspects are espe- cially relevant in this connection. Firstly, none of the politicians involved in the future