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Steht Später Die Headline COUNTRY RE PORT Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. AFGHANISTAN NILS WÖRMER October 2014 Unity Government in Kabul www.kas.de AFGHAN HANDOVER UNDEMOCRATIC BUT PEACEFUL www.kas.de/afghanistan The Afghan constitution barred serving the brink of collapse – agreed to form a Na- President Hamid Karzai from standing tional Unity Government. again in 2014. Thus, many Afghans hoped that the third presidential election since The inauguration of Ashraf Ghani followed the fall of the Taliban in 2001 would bring on 29 September and ended the almost 13- the first democratic handover in the coun- year presidency of Hamid Karzai, who ini- try’s history. But when a victor was finally tially served as interim president for two announced almost six months after the years from December 2001 and then won first round of voting, there was little men- the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections. tion of democracy in Kabul. Large parts of the population were simply relieved to see The IEC sent result of the second round of what appeared to be a peaceful handover, voting on 14 June to the election teams of and glad that the economic stagnation both candidates on 21 September, after the and political and personal uncertainty of agreement on forming a National Unity the election period were over. Yet the Government had been signed and the head election process, which some observers of the Commission, Ahmad Yousuf Nuri- made into a milestone of the transition stani, had declared Ghani the winner of the phase or a litmus test of the current state presidential elections. While sources close to of democracy, did (especially in the early Ghani disseminated the results to the press phases) demonstrate democratic advanc- and social networks the very same day, no es and a string of positive aspects. De- official announcement of the final second- spite its strange origins, and the diversity round result has ever been made. The IEC of the rival political and social groups in- lists released by Ghani’s team show volved, the National Unity Government is 3,935,567 valid votes for Ghani (55.27 per- not automatically condemned to failure. cent) and 3,185,018 for Abdullah (44.73 But it does face a string of daunting chal- percent). lenges. The total of 7,120,585 valid votes in the fi- On 21 September, Afghanistan’s Independ- nal second-round count compares with ent Election Commission (IEC) declared Dr. 7,972,727 in the provisional result an- Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai the winner of the nounced by the IEC on 7 July (4,485,888 or 2014 presidential vote – without presenting 56.44 percent for Ghani and 3,461,639 or an actual election result. This ended an 43.56 percent for Abdullah). So the audit election process that had actually been sup- process funded and supervised by the Unit- posed to pave the way for the first demo- ed Nations, which was concluded on 5 Sep- cratic handover in the country’s history, but tember, led to the disqualification of had become bogged down for months. Just 852,142 votes, but no decisive change in a few hours earlier the two rivals from the June 14 run-off, Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, had – after weeks of hard negotiations that repeatedly went to 2 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. the distribution (Ghani -1.17 percent, Ab- cent),3 ultimately reflected the will of the dullah +1.21 percent).1 voters. Many voters and Afghan and inter- AFGHANISTAN national observers regarded the outcome of NILS WÖRMER Evaluation of the election process the first round as acceptable, and in some respects better than expected. In the eyes October 2014 The first-round campaign conducted in Feb- of numerous Afghans it boiled down to the ruary and March by initially eleven, later conclusion that the first round had produced www.kas.de eight candidates was noticeably more pro- two losers and no winner. On the basis of www.kas.de/afghanistan fessional than in 2009. Even if personal the unexpectedly high turnout and its inabil- networks and alliance-building still dominat- ity to decisively disrupt the election, many ed the campaign, interest in the candidates’ Afghans saw the Taliban as the real loser of political ideas and policies was more intense the first round. The second loser was in- than in previous Afghan elections, especially cumbent President Karzai, after his failure on the part of the media. A surprisingly high to secure Zalmai Rassoul, whom many Af- turnout on 5 April 2014, despite serious ghans regarded as his preferred candidate threats and intimidation by the Taliban, and possible future “puppet”, a place in the confirmed the level of interest in political run-off.4 Ultimately, the simple fact that the participation and the wish for change. The election was held as planned on 5 April and unexpectedly stable security situation on the original election timetable broadly election day was regarded as a great suc- speaking observed had to be regarded as a cess for the Afghan National Security Forces success. (ANSF) and enhanced their reputation in sections of the population. Before the final Straight after the second round on 14 June, result of the first round was announced on “only” 17 days behind a timetable that had 15 May, representatives of independent Af- always been regarded as optimistic, the ghan election monitoring groups put the hitherto positively connotated election pro- number of fraudulent votes at about 10 per- cess began to fall apart. Within 48 hours of cent of the total turnout of 6,892,816.2 polling stations closing, the Electoral Com- They also expected that electoral fraud had plaints Commission received more than been committed on behalf of almost all the 2,500 complaints of fraud and the Abdullah candidates and that manipulation had not camp in particular raised serious allegations decisively benefited or disadvantaged any against his opponent’s side, whom Abdullah one candidate. Thus the final result that put accused of “industrial-scale” manipulation. Abdullah Abdullah (45.00 percent) and Ash- Evidence of significant ballot-stuffing quickly raf Ghani (31.56 percent) far ahead of relativised initial euphoria about what was third-placed Zalmai Rassoul (11.37 per- again an unexpectedly strong turnout. On 29 June the head of Abdullah’s campaign team announced that they would regard any 1 further action by the IEC as illegal. After the Thomas Ruttig, “The Not Yet Officially An- nounced Results – Electoral Maths with Un- IEC published a provisional result on 7 July knowns”, Elections 2014 (52), Afghanistan showing Ghani ahead by something more Analysts Network, 28 September 2014, https://www.afghanistan- analysts.org/2014-elections-52-the-not-yet- 3 Independent Election Commission of Af- officially-announced-results-elections- ghanistan, “Presidential and Provincial maths-with-unknowns/ . Councils Elections: Afghanistan 2014 Elec- tions”, 2 Meaning that the 6,604,546 votes counted http://www.iec.org.af/results/en/finalresults in the final result after verification by the /presidential/1. Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commis- 4 The extent to which Karzai really did at- sion would have still included about 400,000 tempt to support Rassoul and set him up as fraudulent ballots. successor or “puppet” is debatable. 3 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. than one million votes (56.44 percent for The audit process began by having all the Ghani, 43.56 for Abdullah), the situation approximately 23,000 ballot boxes flown to AFGHANISTAN escalated dramatically. Before the day was Kabul with the assistance of ISAF. The veri- NILS WÖRMER out, two former warlords among Abdullah’s fication of more than eight million ballot pa- most powerful supporters – Atta Moham- pers began in the capital on 18 July, under October 2014 mad Noor, the governor of Balkh, and Ab- the oversight of the IEC and the United Na- dullah’s vice-presidential running mate Mo- tions. The process was a de facto recount www.kas.de hammad Mohaqiq – declared that the Ab- involving hundreds of national and even www.kas.de/afghanistan dullah camp was entitled to form a govern- more international observers. It was inter- ment, raised the possibility of forming a ri- rupted several times by disagreements val government, and announced demonstra- about the verification criteria, which were tions.5 On 8 July Abdullah even declared largely stipulated by UNAMA and the IEC. himself the victor of the presidential elec- Until the end of August observers from both tion, leading to fears that this could provoke election teams participated in the audit. Af- violent clashes between the camps. Abdul- ter Abdullah withdrew his team in protest at lah’s supporters did indeed hold demonstra- what he said was grave electoral fraud, tions during the following days – in Kabul UNAMA insisted on also excluding the Ghani up to 10,000 – but they remained far small- team, so from that point the process was er than the Abdullah camp had hoped and conducted exclusively by “independent” Af- the international community feared.6 After ghan and international personnel. Finally, US President Barack Obama called Abdullah on 5 September, the IEC announced that on 9 July to urge restraint and moderation, the audit of all the second-round ballot pa- Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated pers had been completed the previous with both candidates in Kabul between 10 evening. and 12 July. After tough negotiations and constant toing and froing between Abdullah, Some of the international observers believe Ghani and the outgoing President Hamid that despite considerable fraud Ghani most Karzai, Kerry and the two presidential can- likely gained more votes than his rival.
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