Court File No.: 02-CV-229203CM3 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE B E T W E E N:
DALE BROOMER, on his own behalf and as litigation guardian for KYLA BROOMER, EMILY BROOMER and TRAVIS BROOMER, PAULETTE DUKE, on her own behalf and as litigation guardian for KEENAN HUGHES, MADISON HUGHES and ETHAN DUKE and ROBERT BEAUPARLANT
Applicants
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, THE DIRECTOR OF THE ONTARIO DISABILITY SUPPORT PROGRAM, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NIPISSING SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION BOARD and THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE KAWARTHA LAKES/HALIBURTON SOCIAL SERVICES ALLIANCE
Respondents
APPLICATION UNDER Rule 14.05(3)(g), (g.1) and (h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE LIGHTMAN
I, Ernie Lightman, of the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario MAKE OATH AND
SAY as follows:
1. I hold a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley.
Between 1972 and 1974 I taught in the economics department at the London School of
Economics and Political Science in England. I began working at the University of 2 Toronto as an Assistant Professor in 1974, and am presently a full Professor cross- appointed to the Faculty of Social Work, the Centre for Industrial Relations and the
Graduate Collaborative Program in Women’s Studies. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A’.
2. My general area of professional interest and competence involves the relationship between economic and social policy, including the impact on the social welfare system of governmental economic policy. I have written and published extensively on these topics and consider myself knowledgeable about the professional and academic literature in this area. In 1988, I authored a study which forms the basis for a report of the Social Assistance Review Commission called “Transitions”. For a period of time, I was also principal author of the report. To date, “Transitions” remains the only comprehensive review of welfare ever done in Ontario and the most comprehensive review of welfare ever done in Canada.
3. I am also currently the principal investigator for a three year project entitled
“Social Assistance in the New Economy.” The project is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada, and is being conducted with the assistance of the City of Toronto Social Services Department. The study will explore the links between social assistance and work, using both primary and secondary forms of data collection and analysis.
3 4. As a result of my personal research, my review of the relevant literature, and my
professional inquiries of persons in government and in practice in the field, it is my
informed and considered view that the regulation at issue in this proceeding, colloquially
known as the “lifetime ban,” amounts to poor social policy based on ill-considered
theories and regressive ideals. Social assistance, consisting of Ontario Works (“OW”)
and the Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”), is a fundamental social institution
designed to ensure that no Canadians will be left without the minimum conditions for
health, well-being, family life, and the ability to participate as free and equal members of
a democratic society. The lifetime ban permanently bars certain Ontarians from
accessing social assistance, thereby exposing them and their dependents to the risk of
enormous harm.
Poor People: A History of Disadvantage at the Hands of Relief Programs
5. At various times throughout history, poor people have encountered society’s indifference, disapprobation and even disdain. Poverty has always had myriad causes, involving a complex interplay between economic, societal and health-related factors.
However, in attempting to identify and address the root causes of poverty, certain governments and charitable organizations have tended to overlook these systemic factors and instead focused on the supposed moral deficiencies of poor people themselves. One of the earliest examples of this phenomenon took place in
Elizabethan England. Elizabethan policy makers believed that there was a subset of poor people - typically the able-bodied poor - who could be presumed to have caused 4 their own poverty by their own maladaptive and immoral behaviour. Given this understanding of the causes of poverty, it was said that poor people deserved to suffer.
Hence, the belief evolved that society has little or no obligation to these ‘non-deserving’ poor, who are the authors of their own misfortune, or alternatively, that society has an obligation to police and to punish the behaviour of poor people.
6. As a result, the Elizabethan concept of deservedness related to the perceived moral qualities of poor people, not to their actual level of need. The fact that many so- called non-deserving poor may be unable to meet their most basic needs was either a subject of indifference to Elizabethan policy makers, or was seen as a justifiable outcome. The deprivation caused by poverty was historically seen as an appropriate punishment for the qualities that the poor were said to choose, such as laziness, drunkenness, and slovenliness.
7. 16th Century England saw a marked deterioration in standards of living. High prices combined with a decline of real wages to produce hardship for large portions of the population. At the same time, the supply of charitable assistance (monasteries, religious guilds, fraternities, almshouses, and hospitals) diminished under the anti-
Catholic reign of Henry VIII. These economic trials reached a crisis in 1595 to 1598, when four consecutive poor harvests led to famine conditions, and those left without employment or a reliable source of food were left to beg for their survival.
5 8. The English government responded with the country’s first legislation aimed at addressing poverty on a wide scale. The Poor Law of 16011 placed each local parish under an obligation to relieve the aged and the ill, and to provide work for the able- bodied poor.
9. Unfortunately, along with a new attitude of public responsibility for the poor came an attitude of suspicion toward anyone seeking to avail themselves of the benefits of the poor laws. For example, a 1697 amendment to the existing poor laws aimed to distinguish the so-called ‘genuinely deserving’ recipients from “the idle, sturdy, and disorderly beggars.”2 Accordingly, a provision of Act required all people who received poor relief, both parents and children, to wear the letter ‘P’ in red or blue cloth on the right shoulder of their uppermost garment. Refusal to wear the badge resulted in a reduction or elimination of relief, or imprisonment at hard labour up to twenty one days.
In this way, the amendment reflected the view that there is a subset of poor people who are not deserving of public relief because of their perceived moral deficiencies, regardless of their need. Furthermore, the amendment introduced the notion that it is legitimate to subject all beneficiaries of public relief to stigmatizing and humiliating treatment, both as a means of deterring the poor from relying on public relief, and in order to ensure that the non-deserving poor do not receive relief.
1An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 7 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 37-37 (Danby Pickering ed., 1762).
2An Act for Supplying Some Defects in the Law for the Relief of the Poor of This Kingdom, 1696- 97, 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 30, § 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 10 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 106 Danby Pickering ed., 1762), amending Poor Relief Act 1662, 14 Car. 2, ch. 12 (Eng.), reprinted in 8 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.) 94-95 (Danby Pickering ed., 1762). 6
10. The Poor Relief Act of 17223 introduced a new dimension to poor relief: the
workhouse. While the workhouse provided some food, clothing, and shelter to the old,
the sick, the unemployed, and their children, they were also plagued with filth,
overcrowding, epidemics, and early death of both adults and children. Workhouse
residents were also placed under a strict regime of control, under which their movement
was restricted, their social and family relations were manipulated, and the consumption
of alcohol or tobacco was prohibited. Children who lived in the workhouse were
streamlined through an apprenticeship system, which purported to train them in work
habits, but in reality, was “little more than ‘thinly disguised slavery’ in cotton mills, mines,
and, in what is probably the most infamous chapter of child exploitation in English
history, the employment of pauper children as chimney sweeps.”4
11. The deplorable conditions that characterized the workhouse did not arise solely
through inadvertence or insufficient public funds, but rather, were deliberately designed
to serve a distinct regulatory purpose. This purpose has been described as “[making]
the receipt of aid so psychologically devastating and so morally stigmatizing that only
the truly needy would request it.”5 In other words, the workhouse was a “test of
3The Poor Relief Act, 1722, 9 Geo., ch. 7 (Eng.).
4Guest, D, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 3rd Edn. Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1997 at p.12.
5Posner, EA, “Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract” (1995) 24 J. Legal Stud. 283 at p. 310. 7 destitution,”6 designed to distinguish the so-called ‘deserving’ poor from the ‘non-
deserving poor,’ who could presumably be identified not by their level of need, but by
their refusal to enter the workhouse. The desires to deter the poor from reliance on
public relief and to ensure that the non-deserving poor did not receive relief in error
were seen to be so pressing that it legitimized subjecting the residents of the workhouse
to deplorable, punitive, and degrading treatment. The drafters of the 1722 law did not
make any provision for those who, while in need, refused to enter the workhouse. This
category of poor people were simply deemed not to be deserving.
12. Workhouses gradually fell out of favour as the 18th century drew to a close, but
were soon revived as the economic conditions of the early 1800s lead once again to
widespread poverty, dislocation, and reliance on poor relief. The industrialization of the
English economy displaced a large number of tradespeople, leaving them without work.
At the same time, the privatization of the common land reduced the access of rural
households to land for growing food, grazing animals, and gathering fuel.
13. In 1832, the English government appointed the Poor Law Commission to
investigate the issue of poverty and to come up with recommendations for addressing
the issue. In their 1834 Report, the Commission expressed the view that “paupers who
accepted relief...were lazy, dirty, dependant, and grasping.” In contrast, stated the
Commission, the working poor were “industrious, clean, independent and thrifty.”
6Quigley, William P., “Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834: Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor,” (1996) 30 Akron L. Rev. 73 at p. 110. 8 Accordingly, the Commission recommended that “all relief whatever to able-bodied persons or to their families, otherwise than in well-regulated workhouses...shall be declared unlawful, and shall cease, in manner and at periods hereafter specified, and that all relief afforded in respect of children under the age of 16 shall be considered as afforded to their parents.”7 The government followed many of the Commission’s recommendations in enacting the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834,8 which reinstituted the workhouse and the workhouse test.
14. The English poor laws, or the principles they reflected and entrenched, were imported into colonial Canada. In 1763, Nova Scotia passed poor law legislation modeled on the Elizabethan statutes. New Brunswick followed suite in 1786, and by the
19th century, the poorhouse had become a feature of New Brunswick’s poor relief system.
15. In contrast to some of the Maritime provinces, Upper and Lower Canada did not pass any legislation aimed at providing relief to the poor. At a governmental level, there were no social programs. Parents were expected to look after their children, who, in turn, would care for their aging parents. Families constituted the basic operational units of society with little outside support or assistance. However, poor relief did exist in
Upper and Lower Canada, albeit in a patchwork and informal fashion. Charities,
7Report From his Majesty’s Commissioners for Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws, 1834. England: Darling & Sons Ltd., 1905.
8An Act for the Amendment and Better Administration of the Laws Relating to the Poor in England and Wales. [4 & 5 Will. IV cap. 76]. 9 churches and prisons all played a role in the lives of the poor. Many of these systems
reflected the values and assumptions that underlay the English Poor Laws.
16. The Charity Organization Society (“COS”) model was brought over from England
to Canada around the turn of the 20th century. The COS held the view that poverty in able-bodied people stemmed not from social conditions, but from immorality and laziness. Providing material relief to the able-bodied poor, far from being a form of beneficent assistance, was seen as a cause of pauperism and dependency. The
Associated Charities of Winnipeg put it this way in 1912: “If material assistance was all that was needed, if the families seeking it could in all cases be relied upon to use it in such a way that they would quickly become self-supporting the work of this department would be easy. Unfortunately, the large majority of applications for relief are caused by thriftlessness, mismanagement, unemployment due to incompetence, intemperance, immorality, desertion of the family and domestic quarrels. In such cases the mere giving of relief tends to induce pauperism rather than to reduce poverty.”9 The COS’s
practical solution to the problem of poverty was to send ‘visitors’ (typically middle class
women) into the homes of the poor in order to teach them the value of hard work and thrift.
17. The COS model was premised on the Elizabethan notion that the moral deficiencies of poor people were the main cause of their poverty. To this extent, poor
9Artibise, AFJ. Winnipeg: A Social History of Urban Growth, 1874-1913. Montreal: McGill and Queen’s University Press, 1975 at p. 188; Guest, supra note 4 at p. 39. 10 people were not only not deserving of relief, but in need of moral supervision and
edification by the middle and upper class (whose morals were seen to be superior).
The COS model was unconcerned with the potential consequences of ignoring the
actual material needs of the poor.
18. Another early 20th century charitable organization, the House of Industry,
adopted a philosophy based on the English workhouse. In exchange for basic food
staples, such as flour, eggs, and dried milk, those seeking relief were required to work
at such tasks as breaking rock or sawing wood. If people in need refused or were
unable to complete the required tasks, they were considered frauds and denied relief.
Houses of Industry thereby reflected the Elizabethan view that there is a class of non-
deserving poor people - the ‘frauds’ - who are not entitled to relief because of a perceived moral quality, and not because of a demonstrated lack of need. The House of Industry also reflected the workhouse’s philosophy that it is legitimate to subject all poor people to back-breaking, degrading treatment in order to deter reliance on public relief and to separate the frauds from the ‘deserving’ poor.
19. Despite the ongoing prevalence of Elizabethan attitudes toward the poor, the early 20th century saw the beginning of a change in the way poverty was understood.
The rapid industrialization that was taking place, coupled with a series of recessions,
resulted in low wages, unemployment, and a rise in poverty. This economic
consequences had an impact on society as a whole, as slums grew, the crime rate
increased, and diseases and infant mortality became serious concerns. Some people 11 were beginning to look at the causes of poverty differently, and there was a growing
understanding that unemployment could be caused by forces beyond the individual’s
control. Following from this understanding, there was a small but emerging consensus that the solution to poverty lay in a collective sense of responsibility to the poor, rather
than in ignoring or punishing the poor. However, Elizabethan understandings of the
causes of and solutions to poverty continued to endure, and the tension between the
older Elizabethan view and the more modern humanistic view played itself out in
Canada’s approach to poverty throughout the 20th century.
20. In 1920, the province of Ontario enacted the Mothers’ Allowance, a program that provided a small monthly benefit to widowed mothers with two or more children. The
Mothers’ Allowance was progressive in two important respects. First, it aimed to be
responsive to the needs of the rising number of women who had lost their husbands in
World War I and in the flu epidemic of 1918. In this regard, it defined the problem of
women’s poverty in terms of economic and social factors, and not in a way that blamed
the individual. Second, its purpose was to enable poor mothers to remain at home with
their children. Thus, it recognized, at least at face value, the value of poor women’s
work in their own home.
21. Notwithstanding its progressive aspects, the Mothers’ Allowance also reflected
Elizabethan attitudes toward the poor, coupled with sexist attitudes toward women. As
one commentator describes, “As women living on their own at the expense of taxpayers
they were always morally suspect and the conditions of their entitlement required 12 unremitting attention to their standards of character, homemaking, sexual behaviour,
thrift, and industry. Deviations from these standards, or simply inability to cope, could
and did result in loss of control over their allowance or, in extreme cases, in loss of their
own children.”10
22. In 1927, the federal government enacted the first limited old age pension
scheme, in which Ontario began to participate in 1929.
23. Apart from the Mothers Allowance and a pension for those over 70, there were
no other social security programs in Canada and in Ontario at the onset of the Great
Depression, and therefore Canada and Ontario were completely unprepared for the
Depression’s economic and social impact. With only some funding from the federal
government, municipalities rushed to administer relief programs on an ad hoc basis.
24. Depression-era relief programs, while recognizing the obvious economic causes
of the unemployment crisis, continued to regard those seeking relief with deep
suspicion. In a manner that echoed the workhouse, able-bodied recipients were
required to perform labour in exchange for their relief, failing which they and their
families would be turned away, regardless of their actual need. When it became
apparent that the cost of these make-work programs was exceeding the cost of simply
providing relief, relief began to take the form of in-kind support (food hampers, clothing,
coal and wood) or of vouchers which could be exchanged for these items. The prospect
10Struthers, J. The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1979. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994 at p. 49. 13 of providing poor people with cash relief was seen by authorities as too great a risk, as
poor people were not trusted to spend their relief money appropriately.
25. Ultimately, the Depression did change Canadians’ views of the causes and
solutions to poverty. In the face of an international economic collapse, it was difficult to
sustain the ideology that poverty was brought on by the moral failings of individuals. As
one commentator describes, “the Depression...brought home to the average Canadian the interdependence of citizens in an industrial society. Unemployment was seen less as a result of personal inadequacy and more as a common and insurable threat to the livelihood of the average citizen.”11
26. In 1940, the federal government enacted the first Unemployment Insurance Act.
The Act was the first to recognize that the market, left to its own devices, would not
create full employment, and that government had a crucial role in alleviating hardship.
On the whole, a new post-war social consensus argued that society could do better than
before. The individualism that had informed economic and social life before the war
was joined with new ideas about collective responsibility.
27. With the lessons of the Depression in mind, the early 1940s marked the
beginning of an era of unprecedented government activity in the area of social security,
and the growth of the welfare state.
11Guest, supra note 4 at p. 93. 14
The Growth of the Welfare State
28. The welfare state grew in response to two lines of thought emerging after the
Second World War. First, there was the recognition that the post-industrial capitalist
market could not, in itself, be relied on to insure against hardship. While capitalism has
the potential to produce enormous economic and social wealth, it also has the capacity
to produce stunning inequalities in the distribution of these goods. Poverty, far from
being the result of the individual immorality, was understood as the inevitable by-
product of a capitalist economy. Governmental activity, in the form of a social safety
net, was required to protect against the predictable injustices caused by the market.
29. The second line of thought which inspired the creation of the welfare state related to advances in medical, social, and political sciences. It involved the recognition that without a basic standard of living, health and well-being suffers, and consequently, citizens are deprived of the chance to fully participate in society’s social and democratic
institutions. In the post-Depression era, scientists were able to note the impact of
economic deprivation on the health and well-being of individuals, and on the growth and
cohesion of the nation as a whole. A politically guaranteed economic minimum was
seen as an essential component of an equal, free and democratic society.
30. The new way of thinking about poverty in Canada in the post-WWII era did not occur in isolation. Rather, there was an emerging international consensus that 15 governments owed their citizens an obligation not only to protect their fundamental rights, but to guarantee the material conditions necessary for these rights to be
exercised. Article 25 of the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights
guaranteed that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”12
31. In 1943, a Research Adviser named Leonard Marsh was commissioned to draft a report for submission to Parliament on the future of Canada’s social security system.
Marsh was heavily influenced by both the economic ideas of Keynes and the social
ideas of the English reformer, William Henry Beveridge, whose 1942 report formed the
basis for post-War social reform in the United Kingdom. While Marsh’s report was
initially ignored by Parliament, it went on to serve as the blueprint for the modern
Canadian social security system. By 1966, most of Marsh’s recommendations had
become law.
32. Marsh did not believe that poverty was an individual problem, but rather an
inevitability bred by market forces and common contingencies. In his words:
12GA res. 217 A (111), UN Doc. A/810 at 71. 16 “In modern economic life there are certain hazards and contingencies, which
have to be met, some of them completely unpredictable, some of them uncertain
as to time but in other ways reasonably to be anticipated. They may be met in
hit-and-miss fashion by individual families or they may be met by forms of
collective provision. Some of the risks may never strike any individuals or
families; but we know from experience that, collectively speaking, these problems
or needs are always present at some place in the community or among the
population...For a large proportion of the population, incomes are not sufficient to
take care of these contingencies through their own resources.”13
33. In Marsh’s view, modern governments have an obligation to disperse the risk of economic hazards and contingencies through the implementation and maintenance of a social safety net, involving a combination of contributory and tax-funded programs designed to alleviate hardship:
“Social insurance is the application on a much larger scale of the principle of
pooling which has long been the basis of insurance in the more restricted
sense...A great number of people may be liable to a certain risk, but only a few of
them at any one time. At the time the hazard strikes, they may draw on the
resources gathered through the contributions of many, including their own.”14
13Marsh, L. Report on Social Security for Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975 at pp. 9-10.
14Ibid at p. 10. 17 34. Moreover, Marsh introduced into Canadian politics the concept of the ‘social minimum’: the view that there a certain minimum conditions without which health, well- being, and success in life are impossible. Thus, according to Marsh, minimal entitlements under social security programs should be devised not only in light of budgetary considerations, but also “by reference to the minimum quantities of the essentials of life sufficient to maintain the nutrition, health, and decency of the family as a unit.”15
35. Marsh did not view the establishment of a social safety net simply as an act of kindness for those in need, or as practical measure to address the pitfalls of capitalism.
Rather, the social safety net was understood as a means of nation building, through which the strength and values of the whole country would be enhanced. In his words,
“social security payments are not money lost. The social insurances, and even
some straight-forward disbursements like children’s allowances, are investments
in morale and health, in greater family stability, and from both material and
psychological viewpoints, in human productive efficiency. They demand
personal and community responsibilities; but in the eyes of most of the people
who are beneficiaries, give a more evident meaning to the ideas of common
effort and national solidarity. It has yet to be proved that any democracy which
underwrites the social minimum for its citizens is any the weaker or less wealthy
for doing so.”16
15Ibid at p. 33.
16Ibid at pp. 273-4. 18
36. Following Marsh’s report, and in keeping with its philosophies, a web of social programs were implemented on both a national and provincial level, including the following:
• 1944: The federal Family Allowance Act (improved in 1973)
• 1951: The federal Old Age Assistance Act (as well as an improved old-age
pension system)
• 1956: Unemployment Assistance Act (a national cost-sharing scheme for the
provision of welfare benefits)
• 1958: The General Welfare Assistance Act (Ontario’s first general welfare
scheme)
• 1965: The Canada Pension Plan
• 1967: The Family Benefits Act (Ontario’s first benefits scheme designed
specifically for families with children and disabled people)
• 1968: national medicare
• 1969: a new Unemployment Insurance Act
• 1971: key improvements to the Unemployment Insurance Act, including maternity
benefits
1. In 1967, the federal government entered into a cost-sharing agreement with the provinces for the provision of various social services, including welfare, child care, legal aid, and other social services. The legal basis for cost sharing was the Canada 19 Assistance Plan, or CAP. In order to receive CAP transfers, provinces had to sign an agreement committing themselves to a number of principles, the most notable of which was the obligation to provide benefits to any person in need. No conditions, such as the obligation to perform unwaged work in exchange for welfare, were permitted. Other principles included an obligation to have a social assistance appeals system and a prohibition against discriminating against people from other provinces.
2. The CAP represented a culmination, at least in principle, of the new and evolved way of thinking about poverty. CAP contemplated that social assistance would be provided as a matter of right to any person in need and that need, not moral deservedness, would be the basis for entitlement to social assistance. The notions that poor individuals are the authors of their own misfortunate and that the State has no reason to care about the material needs of the ‘non-deserving’ needy were discredited, along with the views that it is the role of relief programs to monitor and edify the poor, or that relief programs should be stigmatizing and punitive.17
Current Justifications for the Welfare State
3. In the 1940s, it was observed that in a post-industrial capitalist market,
individuals could not reasonably be expected to privately insure against life’s
17CAP was repealed in 1995 and replaced with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), which made it possible for the provinces to make the receipt of welfare conditional on certain factors other than need. 20 contingencies, but should be able to turn to the welfare state when necessary.
Economic conditions continue to produce extreme income disparities. In 1998, the wealthiest 20 per cent of the population earned 50 per cent of all income in Canada,
while the lowest quintile earned just 1.8 percent. For every dollar earned by someone in
the lowest quintile, someone in the highest quintile earned $27.30. This high-low ratio of 27.3:1 represents a 55 per cent increase in the measure of income inequality since
1989, when the high-low ratio was 17.6:1.
4. On average in 1998, individuals in the lowest quintile earned less than $4,000 in
market income, a decrease in constant dollars of $1,800 from 1989. In contrast,
individuals in the top quintile earned on average $109,000 in market income, an
increase in constant dollars of $6,175 from 1989. That is, over the decade, the incomes
of those at the top increased modestly in constant dollars, while the incomes of those at
the bottom declined by nearly a third: the gap between rich and poor widened by more than one-half over the decade.
5. Transfer payments, in the form of welfare benefits and other benefits, play an important role in the survival of the poor. By 1998, the poorest quintile of Canadians received $6,696 from transfers and $3,993 from work (i.e., just under two thirds, or 63 per cent, of their total income came from government transfers). During a decade when their incomes from work dropped substantially, the poorest Canadians depended increasingly upon government transfers, which increased only slightly in dollar terms, but increased significantly in importance, given their reduced total incomes. 21
6. Transfer payments, despite their utility, have failed to keep pace with the drop in
income of the poorest Canadians. Even when transfer payments are taken into
account, the gap between rich and poor continues to widen: after all income taxes and
transfers, the average incomes of the poorest 20 per cent of Canadians still dropped by
more than $1,400 in constant dollars over the decade, a decrease of about one-eighth.
The average incomes of the top quintile grew by more than $3,600, an increase of
about 4 per cent. The poorest 20 per cent of the population received only 5 per cent of
the total income after all taxes and transfers in 1998, while those at the top held 43 per
cent of the total. The gap between top and bottom widened over the decade, rising
from a ratio of 7.2 in 1989 to 8.6 in 1998. In other words, in 1998, for each dollar
received by a person within the bottom quintile, a person from the top quintile received
$8.60.
7. Attached hereto as Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’ are tables illustrating the points made in paragraphs 39-42, above. Exhibit ‘B’ shows the average market income, transfer payments, total income, income tax, and after-tax income for the lowest and highest income quintiles for the years 1989 and 1998. Exhibit ‘C’ shows the share of total market, total, and after-tax income earned by each income quintile for the year 1998. I prepared these tables for a book that I recently wrote.18
18Lightman, E, Social Policy in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003 at pp. 8 and 11. 22 8. The simple conclusion is that welfare state interventions in Canada have been, and continue to be, important. Transfer payments play a key role in protecting the poorest Canadians from utter destitution as their market incomes have shrunk to dangerously low levels.
9. Furthermore, although scientists in the 1940s were only beginning to understand the importance of a basic standard of living for a healthy society, this connection is beyond doubt today. Countless studies link poverty to poor physical, mental, familial, and social health outcomes, in adults, children, and adolescents, to the extent that a federal government report has stated:
“when poverty is reduced, income support programs cost less, and the health
status of the population improves, reducing health care costs....In the nineteenth
century, school promoters often argued that schools were cheaper than jails. In
the twenty-first century, we might develop a similar argument, that social and
economic inclusion is cheaper than hospitals.”19
10. There is also a growing recognition a basic standard of living is a precondition to
the ability to make and effect fundamental decisions about the most important and
intimate aspects of one’s life. As a United Nations report states:
19Guildford, J. Making the Case for Social and Economic Inclusion (Prepared for the Population and Public Health Branch, Atlantic Regional Office). Halifax: Health Canada, 2000. 23 “poverty can mean more than a lack of what is necessary for material well-being.
It can also mean the denial of opportunities and choices most basic to human
development - to lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent
standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-esteem and the respect of others.”20
11. A basic standard is essential to the development of a functional, supportive
family life. Not having enough food or adequate shelter can place family relations under
an enormous amount of stress. In a recent study,21 adults who could not afford to buy
enough food for themselves and their families reported experiencing heightened levels
irritability and anger toward their spouse and their children. Mealtimes, which at one
time were a happy gathering opportunities for families, had become infrequent and
stressful. Parents reported spending less time with their children, both because of the
increased time required to procure food, and because of the shame associated with their incapacity to feed them adequately. Preliminary results from my own SSHRC study also demonstrate the negative impact of extreme poverty on family life.
12. Similarly, households that are homeless, or are at risk of being homeless, or which live in homes that are too small or in a poor state of repair, also experience a
tremendous amount of tension. Children whose parents are unable to meet their basic
20United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report, 1997. New York, U.S.A, and Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1997.
21Tarasuk, V, “Food Insecurity: Consequences for the Household and Broader Social Implications” Symposium: Advances in Measuring Food Insecurity and Hunger in the U.S., (1999) Supp. to The Journal of Nutrition 525S. 24 needs come to see their parents as powerless, and themselves as powerless by extension.
13. Extreme poverty also threatens family life in the sense that parents who lack resources to feed, house, and clothe their children risk losing custody of their children.
A recent study shows that inadequate housing was a factor in one out of five cases in which children were taken from their parents into the care of the Children’s Aid Society.
In almost 12% of the cases, the return home of a child from care was delayed due to a housing-related problem.22 Parents with inadequate resources therefore live with the constant fear that their children will be taken away from them, which puts an even greater strain on family relations.
14. Extreme deprivation is also a barrier to social and cultural life for both adults and children. Those who cannot afford a telephone find it difficult to communicate with extended family or friends. Without the funds to take public transit, it is impossible to visit friends or get to social events. Restaurants, shows, and sports events, which are sites of social and cultural activity for most Canadians, are not attended by those who cannot afford admission fees and babysitting costs. Extremely poor parents are not able to afford the costs associated with sending their children on school trips, enrolling them in most extra-curricular and recreational activities, hosting birthday parties, or taking them on excursions. If invited to another family’s home for a meal, families who lack adequate housing and food are unable to reciprocate in kind or with a gift. Adults
22Chau, S, Fitzpatrick, A, Hulchanski, D, Leslie, B, Schatia, D, “One in Five...Housing as a Factor in the Admission of Children to Care” (2001) Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Research Bulletin #5. 25 and children who are forced to appear publicly wearing unclean, ill-fitting, or threadbare
clothes are likely to experience humiliation. The process through which extremely poor individuals become alienated from society and culture is known as “social exclusion.”
15. Living in extreme poverty without a social safety net can make it very difficult to
conduct a job search. Indeed, for the able-bodied, one of the most fundamental functions of welfare is to serve as a bridge to employment. Without a telephone, access to transportation, child care, or an address, it is impossible to communicate with
potential employers or attend job interviews. A person who cannot afford to maintain a clean, well-kempt physical appearance is not likely to pass the scrutiny of a job interview.
16. Living in extreme deprivation also makes it difficult to participate in various forms of political activity. Participation in advocacy and lobby groups is nearly impossible without a telephone, a means of transportation, or child care. Hunger pangs, or the health problems associated with hunger and homelessness make it difficult for those without the capacity to meet basic needs to participate in an effective, consistent manner. Finally, those who cannot afford to maintain a clean, well-kempt physical appearance will be vulnerable to the prejudices of voters, who may assume that they are not credible enough to assume a leadership role. Without the ability to make a meaningful contribute to the political process, those who are unable to meet their basic needs are highly vulnerable to having their needs overlooked in the formation of public policy, including policies that will affect their lives. 26
17. Studies clearly demonstrate that children of parents who live in extreme poverty
are at greater risk of experiencing educational difficulties. Children’s capacity to learn is
significantly impaired by hunger, illnesses caused by poor living conditions and
inadequate nutrition, and clothing which is inappropriate to the climate. Their parents
are unable to afford adequate school supplies and learning aids, such as notebooks,
pencils, dictionaries, computers and a quiet room in which to do homework.
Furthermore, moves occasioned by evictions are likely to require frequent changes of school, with resulting delays in academic and social development.
18. The poverty of families deprives children of equality of opportunity. Studies show that the children of poor parents are likely to experience problems as adults, including interactions with the criminal justice system, physical and mental illness, unemployment, and poverty.
19. Thus, to the extent that Canadians in need lack access to a social safety net, including a welfare system that provides its recipients with a basic standard of living, not
only will the health of adults and children suffer, but their capacity to lead meaningful
lives will be severely compromised. In turn, the children of poor parents will deprived of
the opportunities to develop and to pursue their life’s ambitions.
The Lifetime Ban
27 The Lifetime Ban is Reflective of Elizabethan Ideology Toward the Poor
20. The philosophies underlying the lifetime ban mirror those of the Elizabethan poor
laws. The lifetime ban embraces the notion that there is a subset of poor people who
are not entitled to social assistance, not because they are not in need, but because of a perceived moral attribute. In a press release issued in 2000, John Baird, then Minister of Community and Social Services, explained that: “[the government’s] welfare fraud measures are designed to ensure that you hard-earned tax dollars go to the needy, not the greedy.”23 In other words, those who commit a welfare-related offence, even once, are disentitled from applying for social assistance for the rest of their lives on the basis
that they have proved themselves to be the wrong sorts of people - “greedy” people.
The lifetime ban utterly fails to acknowledge the reality that a person who commits a
welfare-related offence may very well still be in need, as the welfare laws themselves
define ‘need.’ Even if such a person is not in need at the time of the offence,
contingencies may occur in the future that will place this person in need. In the middle
of the 20th century, the creators of the welfare state rejected the notion that public
assistance should be reserved for those seen as morally worthy by the government.
The lifetime ban revives the notion of morality as the marker of true need, and thus constitutes a reversion to the philosophies underlying the Elizabethan poor laws.
23Ministry of Community, Family and Children’s Services, News Release, “Ontario’s Zero Tolerance Policy on Welfare Cheats Effective Today” (April 1, 2000). 28 21. The lifetime ban also places all recipients of public assistance under scrutiny,
and under the constant threat that their benefits could be cut off for life. Drawing on a false stereotype that persons receiving social assistance are more likely to be dishonest and that fraud is rampant in the welfare system, to the point that the government is fighting “a battle against welfare fraud,”24 all recipients of public assistance are treated
with heightened suspicion. For example, a welfare fraud hotline has been set up to
encourage the landlords, employers, friends, and neighbors of social assistance
recipients to monitor the behaviour of social assistance recipients and to report their
behaviour to the government. Targeting recipients of social assistance to scrutiny in
this way is a deliberate humiliation reminiscent of the Elizabethan law requiring all
recipients of relief to wear a “P”, or requiring anyone in need of assistance to adhere to
the cruel, paternalistic conditions of the workhouse. This way of treating the poor was
rejected more than half a century ago, when the framers of the Canadian welfare state
stopped seeing dependency as an individual moral failing, and began to understand that
need was the inevitable by-product of our chosen economic model. With this
understanding came an end to the assumption that poor people are more likely than
others to be greedy, lazy, or duplicitous. This assumption that has been revived by the
fraud detection machinery of which the lifetime ban is a crucial component.
22. The lifetime ban is utterly inimical to some of the most fundamental principles of
Canadian society and the welfare state. The economic justification for the welfare state
24Ministry of Community, Family, and Children’s Services, News Release, “Harris Government Winning the Battle Against Welfare Fraud” (November 22, 2000). 29 is that the risks to an individual’s social security are part of the social costs of operating
an economic model that has provided higher standards of living for more people than
ever before in our history. In this context, many individuals cannot reasonably be expected to self-insure against life’s contingencies and hazards. By barring certain people from accessing some of the most important benefit programs which comprise the welfare state, the lifetime ban places a disproportionate share of the costs of progress on such individuals, and assigns them the task, which was recognized to be unmanageable half a century ago, of self-insuring against life’s contingencies and hazards. It is important to realize that the lifetime ban is permanent and irreversible, such that if a person is subject to it at the age of 18, he will be unable to access Ontario
Works or ODSP at the age of 63, even if he becomes severely ill.
The Lifetime Ban Will Cause Harm
23. The lifetime ban will undoubtedly expose those subject to it to the risk of harm.
Without access to social assistance, those subject to the lifetime ban could be left without any income whatsoever. Although some individuals who are subject to the lifetime ban from Ontario Works and ODSP may continue to be eligible for other benefit programs, such as, for example, Workers’ Safety Insurance or the Canada Child Tax
Benefit, these programs are not designed to provide for a person’s subsistence needs, but rather to compensate them for a discrete and limited form of economic disadvantage, such as a workplace accident or the high costs of caring for children.
30 (i) Those Subject to the Lifetime Ban are Unlikely to Find Employment
24. In all probability, most people who are subject to the lifetime ban will be unable to
replace their social assistance benefits with employment income. The Ontario Works
caseload is disproportionately comprised of families with children, single parents,
persons with physical and mental disabilities, and those with less than a high school
education. These are some of the province’s most disadvantaged and vulnerable
members who are known to encounter considerable difficulties finding and maintaining
employment.25
25. The Ontario Works caseload is predominantly family-based. In Toronto alone (as
of May, 2001), about 31,548 families with children were Ontario Works recipients,
representing 51 percent of the total caseload for the city. 22,900 of these families,
making up nearly 40% of the city’s total caseload, were headed by single parents.
Moreover, families tend to rely on Ontario Works for longer periods of time than single
individuals. While single persons tended to remain on Ontario Works for an average of
20 months, single parent families tended to stay for an average of 30 months, and two parent families for an average of 31 months. Additionally, approximately 65 percent of
the cases on Ontario Works for three years or more are families with children, with over two thirds of this group comprised of single parents.26
25MacVicar, H. Recent Changes in the Profile of Toronto’s Ontario Works Caseload (the “Recent Changes Report”). Toronto: Report of the City of Toronto, Community and Neighbourhood Services, June 21, 2001.
26Ibid. 31
26. Persons with disabilities are also overrepresented within the Ontario Works
caseload. In Toronto alone (as of May, 2001) people who were ill or who had a disability
constituting a substantial barrier to employment comprised 16% of the caseload, an
increase of 2% over the previous 16 months.27
27. It is well-known that parents of small children, persons with disabilities, and
persons with lower levels of education are among the groups who are most likely to face
long-term unemployment (i.e. unemployment of 52 weeks or more).28
28. In Toronto as of May, 2001, 40% of the Ontario Works caseload had less than a
high school education. Furthermore, approximately 45 percent of single parents
receiving Ontario Works had received their highest level of elementary or high school
education outside of Canada. It is known that newcomers to Canada face tremendous
difficulties having their credentials recognized in Canada.29
29. It is to be noted that many Ontario Works recipients have experienced a combination of factors that adversely affect their employability (e.g. disabled single parent with less than a high school education). Individuals facing multiple forms of
27Ibid.
28See for example Wong, G, Henson, H, Roy, A. Long-term Unemployment, Worker Profiling and Program Evaluation Issues. Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, 1999 at pp. 17-26.
29Recent Changes Report, supra note 25. 32 disadvantage face even greater obstacles to employment than those experiencing one form of disadvantage.
30. In light of the foregoing, the Recent Changes Report concludes that there is “a
core OW caseload in Toronto comprised of individuals that face greater obstacles to
obtaining employment.”
31. In addition to the obstacles to employment faced by individuals on Ontario
Works, Ontario’s job market present barriers of its own. Throughout 2002, the
unemployment rate hovered around 7.2%. Moreover, the nature of the economy is
shifting to a more polarised structure, with more low-paid and high-paid jobs, but fewer
in the middle. Temporary employment now makes up 10 percent of all employment in
Ontario. Part-time employment is higher than historical levels, representing
approximately 15-16% of all jobs in Toronto.30
32. It is therefore not surprising that among Ontario Works recipients who secure
employment, a significant portion of them are unable to maintain adequate or stable
30Workfare Watch, Bulletin 1:14, “Ontario Works and Jobs in the Ontario CMA” (December, 2001). 33 jobs. A recent Toronto study surveyed people leaving Ontario Works regarding their
subsequent job status.31 The study reported that:
• The most common types of jobs at which the survey respondents worked, are
characterized by high turnover rates, low wages and susceptibility to fluctuations
in the economy.
31MacVicar, H. Survey of People Leaving Ontario Works: Key Findings and Implications (the “Leaving Ontario Works Survey”). Toronto: Report of the City of Toronto, Community and Neighbourhood Services, May 14, 2002. 34 • One third of respondents were without permanent employment, which is triple the
10 percent of the province’s labour force in temporary jobs. Nearly one in four
respondents reported working part-time (less than 30 hours per week) in 2001,
well above the 15 percent of the City of Toronto’s labour force who are employed
on a part-time basis (Similarly, a 1998 survey conducted by the Ontario Ministry
of Community and Social Services found that 28% of the jobs found by those
who left Ontario Works were temporary, and 31% of the jobs found by this group
were part-time32).
• Only 43 percent of respondents said that things had improved financially since
leaving OW, and 33 percent were in a worse situation financially.
• The average wage for OW leavers ($432.27) was 31 percent below the average
wage for the City of Toronto as a whole ($627.55).
• 68 percent of respondents had annual wages below Statistics Canada 2001 Low
Income Cut-Off, the point below which people may be said to be living in
“straitened circumstances.” Below the LICO, people spend more than 70 percent
of their income on shelter, food, and clothing.
• 49% of those employed did not have employment benefits.
32Ministry of Community and Social Services, Survey of Individuals who Left Social Assistance. Toronto: Ekos Research Associates, 1998. 35
• Families encountered more difficulties than single persons: the proportion of the
LICOs achieved by respondents decreased as family size increased, a reflection
of the reality that employment wages are not paid on the basis of family size.
• Survey respondents continued to face hardships after leaving: late rent or
mortgage payments were more prevalent when respondents were off the
caseload (40 percent) than when they were on (27 percent). Food shortages
were still frequent, with 33 percent of respondents experiencing them (as
compared to 39 percent on those on OW).
1. Many of the individuals in the Leaving Ontario Works Survey were unable to maintain their job status, and were forced to return to Ontario Works. Specifically, 17 percent of respondents were back on OW at the time of the survey, a period of 8 -11 months after leaving. The primary reasons for which former OW recipients returned to
OW were “illness/disability”, identified in 33 percent of cases, and “lost job/reduced hours” in 21 percent.
2. The foregoing suggests that even if some of those who are subject to the lifetime ban are able to find employment in the short-term, there is no guarantee whatsoever, or even a likelihood, that this employment will be permanent or adequate to meet their subsistence needs, or those of their families. This group of people is extremely vulnerable to periods of unemployment in the future in which they will be forbidden from 36 claiming social assistance in order to withstand these periods without any earned
income.
(ii) Those Subject to the Lifetime Ban will not be Able to Subsist
3. Without social assistance income or employment income, it is beyond doubt that those who are subject to the lifetime ban will be unable to afford even the most basic
needs, such as shelter and food. The most recent statistics from the Canadian
Mortgage and Housing Corporation indicate that the average rent for a one-bedroom
apartment in Ontario range from $513 in Sudbury to $891 in Toronto; for a two-bedroom apartment the average rent ranges from $647 in Sudbury to $1047 in Toronto.33
4. The Ontario Ministry of Health has estimated the minimum weekly costs required to purchase nutritious foods for 23 age and gender groups. Known as the “Nutritious
Food Basket,” this data “has been hailed as one of the most meaningful tools available
to raise awareness about the cost of healthy eating and to assess the adequacy of
social assistance or minimum wage incomes.”34 The Nutritious Food Basket for a reference family of four (a man and woman, each aged 25 to 49 years; a boy, 13 to 15 years of age; and, a girl, 7 to 9 years old) is $118.95 per week for the year 2001. The
33Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, News Release, “Average Rental Vacancy Rates Rise to 1.7 Per Cent,” (November 26, 2002).
34Monitoring the Cost of a Nutritious Food Basket Protocol (the “Protocol”). Ministry of Health (Chronic Disease Prevention Program), 1998 at p. 23. The Protocol was prepared in accordance with the Ontario Ministry of Health Mandatory Health Programs and Service Guidelines, which are published pursuant to section 7 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. H.7. 37 weekly cost of a Nutritious Food Basket for a pregnant or lactating woman is higher than
the cost for a non-pregnant or non-lactating woman, and ranges from $30.49 to $34.35
per week, depending on age and trimester of the woman in question.35
5. A recent study demonstrates that it is impossible for most individuals and families
in Toronto to meet their basic needs while on Ontario Works.36 It necessarily follows
that an individual who is forced to live on no income whatsoever, or in any case on a
budget that is less than the benefit levels set by Ontario Works, will be unable to
survive. In light of the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that those who are subject to the lifetime ban will not be able to afford to pay market rents, nor will they be able to meet their minimal nutritional needs, as the province’s Ministry of Health has defined these
needs.
(iii) Those Subject to the Lifetime Ban will be Unable to Meet their Needs through
Charitable Organizations
6. In all likelihood, those who are subject to the lifetime ban and who are left with
little or no source of income as a result will be unable to meet their basic needs through
other forms of public assistance and through the charitable sector.
35“Weekly Cost of a Nutritious Food Basket, Ontario (Years 2001, 2000, and 1999). Prepared pursuant to the Protocol, ibid.
36Tarasuk, V. “The Affordability of a Nutritious Diet for Households on Welfare in Toronto” (2002) 93:1 Canadian Journal of Public Health 36. 38 7. Those who are homeless may find temporary respite in shelters. However,
shelters are not designed to provide permanent housing for homeless people. As the
Golden report explains, “hostels have become permanent housing for far too many of their users. In our view, emergency hostels have two roles to play: refuge from the
streets (emergency) and preparation for permanent housing and earning opportunities
(transition to housing). Hostels should not provide permanent housing.”37
8. Shelters are frequently plagued by poor conditions, such as overcrowding, safety
issues, cleanliness problems, and the spread of disease. This renders them particularly
inappropriate long-term housing solutions for children, women fleeing abusive
situations, the disabled and the elderly.
9. It is extremely unlikely that those who are subject to the lifetime ban and who are
left with little or no income as a result will be able to secure subsidized housing, with
rents geared to their income (or lack of income). In Ontario, the demand for subsidized
units dramatically exceeds the supply. In Toronto alone there are, on average, 1,400
new applications every month. However, between January 1999 and November 2000, an average of only 348 households were housed each month. As a result, the waiting list grew from 51,428 to 63,110 households - an increase of 23%.38
37Golden, A, Currie WH, Greaves E, Latimer JE, Taking Responsibility for Homelessness: An Action Plan for Toronto. Toronto: Mayor’s Homelessness Action Task Force, 1999 at p. 40.
38The Toronto Report Card on Homelessness 2001. City of Toronto, 2001 at p. 14. 39 10. There is also a shortage of supportive housing for those with mental or physical health problems. In 1999, the mayor’s Homelessness Action Task Force estimated that about 600 people were on waiting lists and about 4,400 chronic hostel users need some form of supportive housing. In 2000, the province funded 762 units of new supportive housing, most of which are currently occupied.39
(iv) The Lifetime Ban will Harm the Dependents of Those Subject to it
11. It is important to realize that the lifetime ban will not just harm those who are subject to it, but will also harm those peoples’ dependents, including their spouses and their children. Under social assistance legislation, families are treated as units. Social assistance rates are calculated to provide each family with the minimal amount of benefits required for that family to subsist. Under the lifetime ban, it is only the individuals who are convicted of a social assistance-related offence who are cut off social assistance. Social assistance continues at a reduced rate for the remainder of the family unit. So, for example, for a couple with children, if one of the spouses is convicted, social assistance will continue for the non-convicted spouse and the children.
However, since the convicted spouse will continue to live with his or her spouse and children, the non-convicted spouse and children will be forced to share their portion of the benefits with the convicted spouse. As a result, every person in the family unit, including the non-convicted spouse and the children, will be required to live on less than
39Ibid at p. 16. 40 what the provincial government defines as the minimal amount of benefits required for them to subsist.
There is Widespread Opposition to the Lifetime Ban
12. It is important to note that at least sixteen municipal councils, committees, and commissioners across Ontario have expressed opposition to the lifetime ban. These include the Council of the City of Toronto (minutes attached hereto as Exhibit ‘D’), the
City of Toronto Community Services Committee (reports attached hereto as Exhibit ‘E’), the Regional Council of Ottawa-Carlton (minutes attached hereto as Exhibit ‘F’), the
Region of Ottawa-Carlton Social Services Commissioner (report attached hereto as
Exhibit ‘G’), the Municipal Council of the City of London (letter attached hereto as
Exhibit ‘H’), the Council of the County of Simcoe and the Simcoe County Social and
Children’s Services Committee (letter and report attached hereto as Exhibit ‘I’), the
North Bay City Council (letter attached hereto as Exhibit ‘J’), the North Bay & District
Health Unit (press release attached hereto as Exhibit ‘K’), the Council of the Regional
Municipality of Waterloo (resolution attached hereto as Exhibit ‘L’), Windsor City Council
(resolution attached hereto as Exhibit ‘M’), the County of Brant Council (minutes attached hereto as Exhibit ‘N’), the Health and Social Services Committee of the
Regional Municipality of Sudbury (minutes attached hereto as Exhibit ‘O’), the Thunder
Bay District Social Services Administration Board (resolution attached hereto as Exhibit
‘P’), the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth Community Services and Public Health 41 Committee (minutes attached hereto as Exhibit ‘Q’), and the Medical Officer of Health
for the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth (report attached hereto as Exhibit ‘R’).
13. The reasons underlying the opposition to the lifetime ban have been expressed as follows:
• It constitutes “harsh and unfair treatment of citizens of this province” (North Bay
City Council, Exhibit ‘J’)
• “London City Council deems this regulation to be cruel and unusual punishment
of citizens of this province” (Exhibit ‘H’)
• “A lifetime ban for social assistance fraud could result in extreme consequences
for individuals and families such as loss of accommodation, inability to properly
and adequately feed the family unit and breakup of the family unit” (Council of the
Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Exhibit ‘L’)
• “The lifetime ban may cause significant consequences to individuals, children,
and families, [and is] unnecessarily harsh and disproportionate to other more
serious crimes” (Thunder Bay District Social Services Administration Board,
Exhibit ‘P’).
• “The North Bay & District Board of Health has expressed concern for the future of
children affected by the Ontario Government’s zero tolerance policy for welfare
fraud. The Board is concerned that permanent ineligibility for social assistance to
parents convicted of fraud could further increase the risk of children and their
families for poor health due to poverty, as well as loss of accommodation, lack of 42 proper nutrition, family breakup and placement of children in the care of Family
and Children’s services” (Exhibit ‘K’).
• “Such an action would cause untold suffering on people with severe mental and
physical disabilities, and drug benefits coverage would be denied for people with
terminal illnesses (such as AIDS)” (City of Toronto, Community Services
Committee, Exhibit ‘E’)
• “In permanently denying certain citizens’ access to a key part of the social safety
net, the proposed policy does not seem proportional to either the scale, or the
gravity of the problem of social assistance fraud in Ontario.” (City of Toronto,
Community Services Committee, Exhibit ‘E’)
1. Following the inquest into the death of Kimberly Rogers, the Coroner’s counsel and the Coroner’s jury recommended first and foremost that the lifetime ban be eliminated. In particular, the jury explained its rationale for its position as follows:
“Evidence indicates that [the lifetime ban has] a devastating and
detrimental effect on our society. [The lifetime ban should be eliminated in
order to] prevent anyone [from] having to go without food and/or shelter, to
be deemed homeless and therefore and most importantly, to prevent the
death of impoverished individuals.”40
40“Verdict of the Coroner’s Jury” (http://dawn.thot.net/Kimberly_Rogers/kria118.html). 43 2. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other benefit schemes in Canada that
permanently disqualify a person from access. Even in the United States, where lifetime limits have been established restricting the period one may receive social assistance, there are potential options for continuing support including other federally funded welfare programs, such as food stamps and Medicaid, and state delivered programs.
Recipients of social assistance in Ontario are the only category of people who are presumed to be so incorrigible and so prone to dishonesty that nothing short of a lifetime penalty of extreme deprivation (for a first offence) is necessary to deter them from misuse or abuse of the system.
SWORN before me at the City of Toronto in )
the Province of Ontario on February , 2003 )
)
______) ______
) Ernie Lightman
)
A Commissioner for Taking Oaths Etc.