Defence Strategic Communications
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 DEFENCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS DEFENCE STRATEGIC 12 Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 DEFENCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS The official journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence AUTUMN 2018 The Acoustic World of Influence: How Musicology Illuminates Strategic Communications Hostile Gatekeeping: the Strategy of Engaging With Journalists in Extremism Reporting The ‘Fake News’ Label and Politicisation of Malaysia’s Elections Brand Putin: an Analysis of Vladimir Putin’s Projected Images What Does it Mean for a Communication to be Trusted? Strategic Communications at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics: a Groundwork Study ISSN: 2500-9486 DOI: 10.30966/2018.RIGA.5. Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 ISSN 2500-9478 1 Defence Strategic Communications Editor-in-Chief Dr. Neville Bolt Managing Editor Linda Curika Editor Anna Reynolds Editorial Board Professor Nancy Snow Professor Nicholas O’Shaughnessy Professor Mervyn Frost Professor Žaneta Ozoliņa Dr. Agu Uudelepp Dr. Nerijus Maliukevicius Thomas Elkjer Nissen, MA Matt Armstrong, MA Defence Strategic Communications is an international peer-reviewed journal. The journal is a project of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It is produced for scholars, policy makers and practitioners around the world. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. The journal and articles may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of NATO StratCom COE. NATO StratCom COE does not take responsibility for the views of authors expressed in their articles. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Kalnciema iela 11b, Latvia LV1048 www.stratcomcoe.org Ph.: 0037167335463 [email protected] Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 2 ISSN 2500-9478 Defence Strategic Communications Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 FOREWORD 3 What are we to make of competing approaches to strategic communications today? Do they help or confuse our attempts to find common ground when trying to say what we mean? Driven out of terrain that until recently they had held, yet far from defeated, ISIS (Daesh) sought to squeeze out ambiguity from the world they surveyed. Their communications were uncompromisingly binary. An embryonic state (as scholars of order and governance interpret the emergence of states), its com- municators chose to occupy a world where right and wrong, good and evil were counterpoised to force an unambiguous choice on observers. Daesh with their take on Islam, good: everyone else, evil. For all the West’s desire to discourage further recruits from succumbing to their appeals, its response shaped a rhetoric of rebuttal—the countering of one right with a superior right. Although latterly discredit and disdain (counter-narratives) have given way to reasserting values of freedom and justice (alternative narratives). Nevertheless, such a black-versus- white confrontation appears almost manageable when compared to what would soon claim its place in the media spotlight. Almost in the blink of an eye, Western attention and government funding have switched to Russian disinformation. Substantial evidence supports the view that agencies in Moscow and St Petersburg are engaged in systematic subversion of Western publics by disseminating erroneous and divisive information. The strat- Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 4 egy, according to a consensus of experts, is being pursued on an industrial scale with the aim of exploiting fractures that recently have become all too apparent in democratic polities. ‘Subversive confusion’ best captures Russia’s strategy, rooted in flooding media outlets with a stream of stories containing multiple versions of the ‘truth’, from the absurd to the mildly credible. From conspiracy theories to staring down the truth, evidence-based truth telling is being worn away at the edges. Unfortunately, a populist lexicon of ‘alternative facts’ and ‘fake news’ echoing throughout Western capitals only serves to legitimise this process. Targeting vulnerable electorates in the West may be argued away as fair game in a geopolitical landscape that has witnessed a return to Great Power politics in the last decade. Russian scholarship and policy thinking may not have a direct translation for the term ‘strategic communications’, preferring to call it simply ‘foreign policy’. But dezinformacija is all too familiar. Sitting within an his- torical trajectory that dates back at least a century to the Bolshevik Revolution, it speaks to how nation-states should mobilise ideas and information to destabilise and defeat their opponents. Strategic opportunism that exploits social, political, and economic fissures across NATO and European Union states by employing the subversive confusion of multiple messages will continue as long as those populations show themselves to be vulnerable and short on natural resilience. There’s a third trend strategic communicators struggle to see through. It is wrapped up in parallel conversations around economic stimulus and currency stabilisation, as China’s President Xi chooses to frame it. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, he says, will embrace ‘close to 3 billion people and represents the big- gest market in the world with unparalleled potential’. On the surface, it displays all the hallmarks of soft power projected through trade and economics. To con- struct a global infrastructure of ports and resource-supply routes may yet prove to be nothing more than self interest; understandable in the context of China’s dramatic rise from poverty and continued desire to enrich its nation. In 1990, 750 million Chinese lived in poverty. Today less than 10 million do. However, if China’s Belt and Road Initiative is to become the 21st century’s soft power equivalent of America’s Marshall Plan in the 20th century, then its message must be unequivocal. That means resolving tensions on a number of fronts. Purported cyber penetration of intellectual property, key technologies, and in- frastructures by Chinese manufacturers divides opinion across states hungry for trade and investment in their declining economies. It goes further. Infiltra- tion into politics, culture, and business has prompted one Australian observer Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 to write of China’s ‘silent invasion’ into his country’s institutions. At the same 5 time, infringing on neighbouring states’ sovereignty in the East and South China Seas, through frequent naval encounters and challenges to international legal rulings (Spratly Islands, Senkaku Islands, and the Nine-Dash Line) only encour- ages suspicions of expansionism and hegemonic ambitions, increasingly filtered through the discourse of the Thucydides Trap. All the while President Xi holds to a belief that Western democracy is no longer fit for purpose and that China’s one-party political model is more suitable for export. In this context should Belt and Road be viewed as a global platform for stra- tegic ambitions? What is China attempting to say through its investment as an act of strategic communications? Are outside observers inferring too much or too little from the mixed messages emanating from Beijing? Perhaps the answer lies in our need to re-evaluate what we mean by strategic communications and the different forms it now takes in a multipolar 21st century and aggressively contested global politics. It may be nothing more than coincidence. Or maybe it’s a sign of the times. But several initiatives are running concurrently, variously seeking to standardise language across strategic communications: the British military’s Joint Doctrine; Canada’s Department for National Defense joint terminology panel; the Ter- minology Working Group at NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Ex- cellence; and separately NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine projects. A direct benefit will be more than one glossary of terms to which every user can turn in expec- tation of sharing a common understanding. Provided, of course, their editors come up with similar and compatible definitions. Consensus around key words is long overdue in the NATO alliance made up of overlapping civilian and military language communities. The first group moves in and out of geopolitics amid the wider population of language users; the lat- ter engages in technical and acronym-charged exchanges that exclude outsiders from engaging—a familiar accusation levelled against most expert scientific and bureaucratic groups in society. Using English, nevertheless, as a lingua franca, overlaying multiple national languages across NATO’s 29 member states, only highlights the scope for confusion in today’s turbulent politics. Underlying this discussion are the many incongruities between languages. Certain are rich in nu- ance, displaying many shades of grey in a range of synonyms, while others have no word that directly corresponds to an English term. This doesn’t mean there is an absence of meaning, just not a direct translation. After all, the idea is to Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018 6 translate meaning not words. Take the word ‘narrative’, perhaps one of the most used, if not abused, words in the political lexicon: what does it suggest? When strategic communicators speak of