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10 entrenched themselves in the region, claiming ever larger swathes of land, expelling and/ or killing those who appear not to conform to the ideologies they espouse. Meanwhile, the international community watches uneasily from the side-lines, seemingly reluctant to act, disillusioned as to the merits of intervention – military and non-military alike. A consensus between global heavyweights on how to engage the crisis is wanting. As a result, the risk of spillover into adjacent regions is a constant – and ever increasing – con- cern. Stability can only return when the controlled, well-orchestrated commitment to engender and maintain peace trumps the powerful anarchy of war – a prospect which, in light of recent events, seems fairly remote. Meanwhile, to the North, the spectre of war has also returned to Europe. That which began as a peaceful protest in several parts of the Ukraine soon deteriorated into the proverbial powder keg scenario. The transition from acts of violence between hostile factions to full blown struggle involving a multitude of actors – domestic and interna- tional – was less of a stretch than might be desired. Indeed, the perceived large-scale external interference has led to a relative breakdown in relations between regional pow- ers – involving, to a degree, more distant players also. East and West sit once more on opposite sides of the negotiating table, apparently unable to resolve the situation in the Ukraine. And while the impasse remains an impasse, the many challenges with which the international system is faced become just that degree more difficult to solve. Numerous conflicts beset the world – far beyond those we have attempted to outline; still more are in the making. All, however, contribute to undermine the workings of the interconnected global corpus (The Global) – potentially even threatening the very model of the society of states as an institutionally and politically predominant structure. As such, all members of the international community share a stake in confronting the agents of conflict and political instability, if only in the dispassionately functional in- terest of ensuring that the good working order of said community remains intact. The tools and means through which this securitisation might be brought about, however, is cause for seemingly ceaseless disagreement. The progressive erosion of political and financial capital that has resulted from recent global engagements has led some of the A European–South American Dialogue A European–South more active policing states to tone down their commitments to world affairs; to recoil into a posture of relative seclusion. This apparent shift towards disengagement on the part of once vigorously active members of the international arena has, in turn, resulted in a diminished sense of global spirit and leadership. The withdrawal of what was once firm, resolute direction acts, moreover, as both consequence and causation to the above- International Security described surge of global instability: perpetuating the conditions for its expansion and in so doing further reducing previous international leaders’ desire (if not ability) to re- gain their stabilising positions at the helm. XI Conference of Forte de Copacabana of Forte XI Conference Multilateral Security Governance 11 Reversing the impetus of this worrisome loop is no simple endeavour. The underlying Hobbesian wilderness of the international system constantly threatens to overwhelm the potential for cooperation and concerted action within and among the society of states. Yet it is understandable that states should fear to act when all they see before them are perilous paths, ridden with pitfalls and characterised by uncertainty – a sce- nario in which the potential dangers far outstrip the sparse rewards. Factoring the re- cent series of revelations pertaining to the cyber sphere into this sorry picture and mat- ters become just that degree bleaker; interstate relations, infused with further mistrust. Overcoming this obstacle in which cyber activities are both the threat and the method of protection constitutes, thus, a key component of an overall global strategy to return the world to a state of comparative tranquillity and order. Only by reaffirming the commit- ment to negotiation, improving information-sharing and trust-building can progress be made. Exchanging views perspectives, experiences and concerns is – in today’s digitally interconnected-but-mistrustful world – more important than ever. Promoting dialogue, stimulating debate, and furthering knowledge of world affairs is the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s sine qua non. The Foundation’s fruitful coopera- tion with the Brazilian Centre for International Relations and partners is a particularly happy illustration of this fact. It is an undeniable fact that prior knowledge of the field improves one’s chances in battle. It is, thus, desirable that prior to positive concerted ac- tion an effort be made to thoroughly comprehend the challenges at hand and the wider contexts in which they are inserted. In other words, it is our view that a full analysis of political and geopolitical considerations ought to precede decisive and targeted coopera- tion ventures. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and partners aim to here contribute to this effort. In the present volume writers were invited to ponder the complex and shifting storm- clouds of the world today. This includes analyses of the recent surge in security threats; the emergence of challenges to the international community itself; individual perspec- tives both from and regarding Brazil and Europe; the continuous rise of new actors, changing the global landscape of influence; the transformation of the international sys- tem; and the meaning and role of cyber-related hazards. We find ourselves at an interesting historical moment - precisely one hundred years since the start of the First World War, two hundred years since that of the Congress of Vienna. 2014 is an anniversary, thus, of both the descent into anarchy and strife, and the restoration of order and balance, in two different cycles of the constant ebb and flow of the tides of power. As such, we consider it to be a good time to reflect upon current challenges taking lessons from both the errors and the solutions of the past. 14 an inadequately secured northern border. And finally, American-produced weapons, which flood the Americas in untold numbers annually, also enter Brazil via Panama and Mexico. 2 With the world’s attention focused on Brazil for international soccer’s premier event, it was inevitable that the country’s struggle with a burgeoning trafficking culture would tragically come to the fore. The incident outside of the Estádio is emblematic of a growing threat posed by porous borders, set in a neighborhood where drugs, traffickers, arms, and cash are able to move seamlessly across international boundaries owing to a toxic combination of a vast geography, vacuums in governance at the frontiers, and ill-equipped and sometimes under-motivated partners on the opposite side of Brazil’s border. Beyond the immediate human toll—an estimated 36,000 people are killed in Brazil each year as a result of violent crime 3 —it is further believed that armed violence in Brazil’s sprawling cities has potentially dramatic implications for national achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 4 Despite the tragic human and economic toll on Brazil, what is clear is that these prerequisites for insecurity and underdevelopment are not isolated to the Brazilian context—or even to that of South America. Across the hemisphere and around the globe, there is a growing convergence of transnational security threats—proliferation, environmental crime, counterfeiting, narcotics, dirty cash, arms and human trafficking, and terrorism—whose roots are linked to an enduring inability of governments to control their borders. The most extreme example is Honduras—the hemisphere’s most dangerous country where homicide rates peaked in 2011 at 91.6 per 100,000, according to the Organization of American States (OAS). 5 Meanwhile, Honduras remains the second poorest country in Central America, facing significant challenges, with more than two thirds of the population living in poverty and five out of ten suffering from extreme poverty (2012). According to the World Bank, in rural areas 6 out of 10 households live in extreme poverty. 6 Even more distressing than these individual trafficking threats in isolation is the growing interconnectivity between once isolated criminal or terrorist acts. We now know for A European–South American Dialogue A European–South instance that the 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 people and wounded another 1,800 were financed in part by the Moroccan hashish trade. 7 Likewise, the 2 Bandeira, Antonio Rangel. “Parliamentary Commission of Investigation (CPI) Denounces the Deviation of Arms in Brazil.” Viva Rio media release. Brasilia: Viva Rio. November 29, 2006. Accessed July 24, 2014. http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/ International Security citation/quotes/2090. 3 Armed Violence, Urban Spaces and Development in Brazil By: Sérgio de Lima, R. and Maura Tomesani, A. Unpublished Background Paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 2010. 4 More Violence, Less Development: Examining the relationship between armed violence and MDG achievement. Geneva: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, September 2010. Accessed July 24, 2014. http://www. genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/MDG_Process/MoreViolenceLessDevelopment.pdf.