An Interview with Joseph L. Lengyel

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Quarter 2017 th Issue 87, 4 87, Issue

Competition Winners Competition 2017 Essay 2017 Joseph L. Lengyel An Interview with with An Interview Doctrine Questioning

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-SEVEN, 4TH QUARTER 2017 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 87, 4th Quarter 2017 http://ndupress.ndu.edu

Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU

Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.

Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.

Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.

Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich

Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell

Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.

Associate Editor Patricia Strait, Ph.D.

Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Interns Aidan M. Low and Victoria Sanker

Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Col James D. Dryjanski, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RADM Janice M. Hamby, USN (Ret.)/College of Information and Cyberspace; RADM Jeffrey A. Harley, USN/U.S. Naval War College; BGen John M. Jansen, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Chad T. Manske, USAF/National War College; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN/Joint Forces Staff College; VADM Kevin D. Scott, USN/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/ Air War College

Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/ The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/ Center for Complex Operations; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/ The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.); Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College

Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Sailor assigned to USS Jacksonville proposes during homecoming arrival at Joint Base Pearl Harbor– Hickam, August 2017 (U.S. Navy/Katarzyna Kobiljak); Marine Captain Kelsey Casey, assigned to “Tomcats” of Marine Attack Squadron 311, speaks to AV-8B Harrier maintainers on flight deck of USS Bonhomme Richard during certification exercise, August 2017 (U.S. Navy/Jeanette Mullinax); Air traffic control journeyman (right) and air traffic control tower watch supervisor give direction to inbound aircraft, June 2017, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska (U.S. Air Force/Westin Warburton) About the Cover In this Issue Soldiers assigned to 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division, engage in crowd riot Dialogue control training at Camp Maréchal 2 To the Editor de Lattre de Tassigny, Kosovo, December 8, demonstrating to 4 From the Chairman representatives of Over the Horizon Forces capabilities of Freedom of Movement Detachment (U.S. Army/ Forum Adeline Witherspoon) 6 Executive Summary 8 An Interview with Joseph L. Lengyel 13 The Operational National Guard: A Unique and Capable Component of the Joint Force 69 Human Terrain at the Crossroads 112 The U.S. Government’s By Joseph L. Lengyel By Brian R. Price Approach to Food Security: Focus on Campaign Activities 18 Open Sources for the By George E. Katsos Information Age: Or How I Features Learned to Stop Worrying 76 Are There Too Many General 122 Joint Publication 5-0, and Love Unclassified Data Officers for Today’s Military? Joint Planning By James M. Davitch By Gregory C. McCarthy By Steve Townsend 26 The Use of Explosives in Cities: 82 Exploring a New System of 124 Joint Doctrine Update A Grim but Lawful Reality of War Command and Control: The By Thomas Ayres Case for U.S. Africa Command Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the 31 Follow the Money: Targeting By Michael G. Kamas, David W. Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship Pope, and Ryan N. Propst joint military and security studies journal designed to Enemy War-Sustaining Activities inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and By Jeffrey Miller and Ian Corey 88 The Role of Space Norms in other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat Protection and Defense terrorism; homeland security; and developments in By Audrey M. Schaffer training and joint professional military education to Essay Competitions transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting 36 Winners of the 2017 freedom today. All published articles have been vetted Essay Competitions Recall through a peer-review process and cleared by the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. 93 Time in War 38 The Risk of Delay: The Need NDU Press is the National Defense University’s for a New Authorization By Phillip S. Meilinger cross-component, professional military and academic for Use of Military Force publishing house. By Travis W. Reznik The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations Book Reviews expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views 46 Butter Bar to Four Star: 101 Destined for War of the Department of Defense or any other agency of Deficiencies in Leader Reviewed by James R. Cricks the Federal Government. Copyright Notice Development This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition By Benjamin Ray Ogden 102 G.S. Isserson and the of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions War of the Future of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted 54 Asadism and Legitimacy in Syria Reviewed by Ofer Fridman without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted By Nathaniel Kahler from or based on its content. 103 How Everything Became Submissions and Communications War and the Military JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Commentary Became Everything research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, 57 Toxic Culture: Enabling Reviewed by Tammy S. Schultz academic specialists, and civilians from the United Incivility in the U.S. Military States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. and What to Do About It Joint Doctrine manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: By Kenneth Williams Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 105 Robotic Swarms in NDU Press 64 Increasing Partner-Nation Offensive Maneuver 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Capacity Through Global By Jules Hurst Washington, DC 20319 Health Engagement Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By Bertram C. Providence, Derek Email: [email protected] JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm Licina, and Andrew Leiendecker 4th Quarter, October 2017 ISSN 1070-0692 To the Editor

2 Dialogue / To the Editor JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 To the Editor 3 General Dunford meets with Japan Self-Defense Force Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, at Ministry of Defense in Tokyo, August 18, 2017 (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro)

Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity

his August, I was in the Pacific to While U.S. global leadership is the strength, freedom of action, or will to act. consult with our South Korean product of much more than our military At the strategic level, our network of alli- T and Japanese allies about the capabilities, the competitive military ances and partnerships does just this. At threat from North Korea. In Sep- advantage we possess is vital to our na- the operational level, our center of gravity tember, I was in Europe for the 178th tional power and the role we play on the is the ability to project power when and North Atlantic Treaty Organization world stage. A primary enabler of that where necessary to advance national (NATO) Military Committee in Chiefs competitive advantage is our worldwide interests; that power projection is enabled of Defense Session. In these meetings, network of allies and partners that has de- by allies and partners. Both strategically as in all my interactions with senior veloped since World War II. That is why and operationally, then, allies and part- political and military leaders around the National Military Strategy, published ners underpin the Joint Force’s ability to the world over the last 2 years, one last year, identifies the network of U.S. execute the National Military Strategy. thing was abundantly clear: The United alliances and partnerships as our strategic Allies are nations with whom we have States is widely considered to be an center of gravity. formal defense agreements for broad, indispensable nation, critical to the That is not just a diplomatic plati- long-term objectives. These can be bilat- maintenance of the international order tude—it’s doctrinally sound. According eral—as with Japan, South Korea, and the that has brought us and our allies rela- to Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, Philippines—or multilateral, like those tive peace and extraordinary economic the center of gravity is the source of that include Australia, New Zealand, and prosperity since World War II. power that provides moral or physical Thailand in the Pacific, and our 28 Allies

4 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 in NATO. Partnerships are structured defense provision in Article 5 for the first through combined exercises that test around narrower objectives and may be time and, in its first operation outside shared doctrine and refine operating less enduring, but they are no less vital. of Europe, immediately brought the concepts so we can fight seamlessly In every case, these relationships are strength of the Alliance to bear against al with our allies. Above all, Joint Force based on common interests and common Qaeda. Sixteen years later, NATO is still leaders at all levels must ensure that our purpose. leading Operation Resolute Support in military-to-military engagements are At the strategic level, alliances and Afghanistan, where 39 nations are con- nested with globally integrated strategies partnerships serve to enhance legiti- tributing more than 13,000 troops. and campaign plans that protect and macy, improve deterrent capability, and Today, we are taking the same part- strengthen our strategic and operational expand our access. Coalitions enhance nered approach to defeating the Islamic centers of gravity. our legitimacy by demonstrating unity of State of Iraq and Syria: we rapidly assem- Since World War II, the U.S. military purpose in the international community. bled a coalition that now stands at 69 has maintained a competitive advantage We attract allies and partners when we nations, 28 of whom are contributing thanks in large part to our network use our military power to defend a rules- troops in Iraq and Syria. Progress there of allies and partners. Today, we fight based international order; the coalitions has been substantial and sustainable, side-by-side with our allies and partners themselves then stand as evidence that even with a modest U.S. footprint. in the Middle East, and we stand shoul- our objectives are greater than our nar- Bilateral relationships are equally key to der-to-shoulder with allies in Europe row self-interest. This unity of purpose other challenges around the globe; at and the Pacific. Given the nature of the also increases our deterrent capacity by the high-intensity end of the spectrum, threats we face today and the challenges demonstrating to potential adversaries our planning for military options on the we are likely to face in the future, I that any aggression will be countered not Korean Peninsula would be vastly more cannot imagine a scenario in which the only by the United States, but also by a difficult without the contributions of our United States would not be standing coalition. And allies and partners expand Japanese and South Korean allies. And it alongside allies and partners across the our reach by providing access to air and is the strength of those alliances that have globe. JFQ sea ports, guaranteeing transit rights and deterred conflict thus far, contributing to allowing the forward positioning of both decades of stability and prosperity in the General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. manpower and materiel. Pacific. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Operationally, this access allows the As effective as our network is, we Joint Force to rapidly and flexibly project should always strive to make it better. power across the globe, effectively cheat- The changing character of war in the 21st ing time and space. In a fight-tonight century demands a networked response world of transregional, multifunctional, from like-minded allies and partners and all-domain threats, this advantage across the globe, from intelligence-shar- cannot be overstated. Because our allies ing through planning and execution. and partners live where we do not, they A fundamental step in expanding and can deepen our intelligence, increase empowering the network is improving in- situational awareness, and provide the formation and intelligence-sharing. This cultural acuity we lack. Standing alliances is true across the range of military oper- like NATO also provide ready-made ations, but especially in the fight against command and control structures that ex- violent extremist organizations; it takes pedite the formation of broader coalitions a network to defeat a network. Within and enable enduring mission support. this network, we need to cultivate a bias And, critically, coalition members increase for sharing. Shared intelligence leads to available combat power: whether they shared awareness that informs plans. If we contribute maneuver units or niche-en- want our allies to fight with us, we should abling capabilities, allies and partners invite them to plan with us from the start. share the burden and make us more That requires transparency at all levels, in effective. every phase of operations. These benefits are not hypothetical— In the execution phase, interoperabil- they are key to how we have operated ity is the key to coalition operations. We for the last 70 years and how we are must continue to pursue technological operating around the globe, across the interoperability with our allies at all range of military operations today. After levels, from the strategic to the tactical. the attacks on the Nation on September Just as important, we need to enhance 11, 2001, NATO invoked the collective the human dimension of interoperability

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Dunford 5 On December 7, 1991, General Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, salutes during Sunset Ceremony for Pearl Harbor survivors at Arizona Memorial Visitors Center (DOD/Gloria Montgomery)

Executive Summary

ll of us would like direct feed- joint environment. He made it clear with senior officers features the 28th Chief back on how we are performing that the journal has been a great success, of the National Guard Bureau, General A our missions. We hope that and it needs to continue its mission. He Joseph L. Lengyel, USAF. He discusses someone would reach out to let us reiterated something I already know: the the implications of gaining a seat at the know our hard work is meaningful and quality of our work is exceptional and table with the other joint chiefs. In his ac- respected. Usually, however, we con- the message promoting jointness is being companying article, he elaborates on how tinue our work without direct encour- heard. His final comments were “Job well the Guard is building on its achievements agement, hoping it will have the impact done. Carry on the mission.” while enhancing its reputation as an op- we want to achieve. General Powell passed on two items erational reserve for the joint force. James I am fortunate to have recently that are included in this issue. The first M. Davitch next discusses how the wealth received feedback directly from the is a letter containing some additional of unclassified data could be a valuable founder of Joint Force Quarterly and detail about the founding of the jour- resource and what would be the best internationally renowned four-star nal—a topic that was previously covered way to use it. Thomas Ayres provides us general and statesman, General Colin in the JFQ 83 Executive Summary. with a review of the law of war in cities, Powell. During this surprise commu- Accompanying this letter is his note to as some have questioned the legality of nication, we discussed JFQ’s history the joint force in 1991, summarizing his fighting in the urban environment—espe- and impact, including the journal’s role views on joint warfighting. cially in current conflicts in which war has in promoting jointness itself. General We continue our tradition of excel- caused a great deal of destruction. Jeffrey Powell’s comments validated my own lence in this issue. In the Forum, the next Miller and Ian Corey lastly investigate feelings about the value of JFQ in the installment in our series of interviews how nonstate actors are able to fund their

6 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 operations and suggest ways to target these activities. JFQ next presents the winning essays from the 11th annual Secretary of Defense and 36th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions, held here at National Defense University, in May 2017. Twenty-seven senior faculty members from 14 participating professional military education institutions served as judges to determine the best student entries among the three categories. The Secretary of Defense National Security Essay winner, Travis W. Reznik, examines the need for a new authorization of the use of military force, as the current authorization dates back to the immediate post-9/11 period. Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Ray Ogden, USA, won the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Research Paper com- General Powell speaks with General Dunford before National Memorial Day Concert at West Lawn of petition with his discussion of significant U.S. Capitol, May 28, 2017 (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro) gaps in how we develop officers in military service. Nathaniel Kahler won the suggesting we consider proportionality the arrival of a revised Joint Publication Chairman’s Strategy Article competition over concerns of other justifications. On such as the JP 5-0, Joint Planning, is a by examining the Bashar al-Asad regime the command and control front, Michael much-anticipated event. Steve Townsend and its control of Syria in the long term. G. Kamas, David W. Pope, and Ryan N. provides us with important updates to Details of next year’s competitions can be Propst, using U.S. Africa Command as an the joint planners “bible.” As always, we found on the NDU Press Web site under example, explore options to reorganize round out the issue with the latest Joint “Essay Competitions.” We look forward the internal workings of the combatant Doctrine Update. to another year of exceptional entries. commands offered in the 2017 National In the fall of 2018, we will observe In Commentary, we take a look at Defense Authorization Act. Audrey M. the 25th anniversary of the inaugural edi- toxic leadership, global health engage- Schaffer discusses how norms can shape tion of Joint Force Quarterly. We would ment, and the Human Terrain System our views of protection and defense like to extend an invitation to all the program. National Defense University’s above our atmosphere as the military friends of the journal. Watch this space chaplain, Kenneth Williams, offers a begins to consider the idea of an indepen- and our Web site for details as we develop glimpse into toxic culture in the U.S. mil- dent space force here on Earth. this event celebrating “the lively interplay itary and suggests remedies. Adding to Our Recall section boasts another among some of the finest minds commit- our robust coverage of global health en- great mixture of thought and history ted to the profession of arms,” as General gagement, Bertram C. Providence, Derek by our long-time contributor Phillip S. Powell stated. In the meantime, keep Licina, and Andrew Leiendecker discuss Meilinger, who offers us the opportunity thinking about the joint force, and write how we can best increase the capacity of to consider the impact of timing in war. to us with your best ideas. JFQ our partner nations to deal with health Accompanying three book reviews, issues. Brian R. Price then assesses the re- our Joint Doctrine section comprises William T. Eliason cord of the controversial Human Terrain three important issues: robots, food Editor in Chief System program and offers recommen- security, and joint planning. In many dations on how it could be employed in popular movies and defense writings, we future conflicts. are warned that robots could potentially Our Features section includes three take over the practice of warfighting, interesting pieces—one resurrects an a subject Jules Hurst will help us un- old argument, and two tackle issues that derstand better as we seek doctrine to are long overdue for discussion by the guide us on this topic. George E. Katsos joint force. First, George C. McCarthy discusses how the U.S. Government deals addresses the topic of how large our with food security as it relates to cam- general and flag officer force should be by paign planning. For many JFQ readers,

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Eliason 7 have watched the Guard mature from a good, solid, and competent contributor to one now that is able to deploy anywhere in the world immediately with our Active component joint force partners. We can play any role that we are asked to play; we have the capacity as a Guard Force contributor to do that. There is nothing like 16 years of continuous combat to put discipline into the training process. Everything stems from the responsibility to come when the Nation needs us. I know that the current discussion is on readiness, and we want a ready force, but as a Reserve component, I am not disappointed with where we are. We are an operational force that regularly and routinely contributes to warfighting. Consequently, I am sitting in this seat, probably with the best relationship I have ever witnessed between the Reserve component (in my case, the National Guard) and the Army and the Air Force. Because the Army and the Air Force get so much value from the Guard—which to them is real combat capability when they want it, when they need it, when they plan for it—they are willing to invest in us and give us upgraded equipment and bring us to training and develop our leaders and give us assignments that broaden and develop the senior leaders of the Army and Air National Guard. Currently, about 18,000 people are mobilized on average by the Guard, down from 60,000 or 70,000 mobilized 10 years ago. The homeland priority is uniquely ours, and when bad things happen, everybody contributes to fixing the problem; An Interview with we think about it, we plan for it. We are where things happen—we are at the local and state levels where things get solved Joseph L. Lengyel for domestic consequence management, whether it is storm-driven, natural disaster–driven, or imposed on us by some bad actor. Whether it’s cyber or bombs in Boston at the marathon, we are uniquely JFQ: When you became chief of the warfighting, homeland security, and part- postured, present, and connected to National Guard Bureau, you stated that nerships. What is your assessment of how make a real impact on whatever might be your focus would be on three priorities: well the Guard is meeting these priorities? happening. The partnership priority is new and General Joseph L. Lengyel: I have never emerging and tied to warfighting and seen a more capable organization that the homeland. Our relationships con- General Joseph L. Lengyel, USAF, serves as the 28th Chief of the National Guard Bureau and as a does those kinds of things in our business tinue to grow, with currently 80 partner Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. model. As for the warfighting priority, I countries. With Malaysia, for example,

8 Forum / An Interview with Joseph L. Lengyel JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 we just signed the newest partnership have imagined the impact of cyber and General Lengyel: Yes, that tension with our state partner piece and have a space on the battlefield and how we need has always been there, but I feel fully strategic impact well beyond what I think to play in that arena and be there as part integrated. As any other member of the people envisioned. When you look at the of the joint force? We are evolving, just Joint Chiefs, I am empowered to give relationships and the trust that it builds, like everybody else. my opinion, to engage and interact in you realize that the program is morphing every conceivable event in the building from “Hey, go make friends, build trust, as a member. My ability to tell the Guard work for interoperability” to real employ- JFQ: How do you see these threats affecting story is stronger. I often ask how I can ment and training. U.S. security domestically and the role of bring value as a senior Service leader the Guard in defending the homeland? who is outside the specific reins of the Army and the Air Force. The thing that JFQ: It is a far different world than when General Lengyel: As I mentioned I think about a lot, maybe more than you joined. earlier, we plan for things happening others, is homeland response. It is the on the home front. For the first time dual-use piece, and it is the connection General Lengyel: Absolutely. I joined a in a long while, we look at our nation with America that is uniquely National unit that was good, but now it is every bit as vulnerable to external threats. We’re Guard. The same question was asked of as, and should be expected to be, ready, vulnerable to some degree to some near- me by one of the Members on the Hill. capable, and competent as an Active peer state actors who would want and I said that in the Pentagon I am treated component unit. could do us harm. We have to be ready like any other Joint Chief, but when you for that. Moreover, internal threats— have folks up here to give testimony, I transnational criminal organizations, was wondering why you didn’t include JFQ: Given the Chairman’s stated security counterdrug threats, terrorism—are all me. You had the other folks up here, and challenges, the so-called four plus one, how things our nation has to be ready to face I thought that’s okay if you want to talk is the Guard preparing and sustaining its as well. The National Guard is, first of Title 10 and specific Service topics. But units to meet the requirements of warfight- all, unique in that it is present in every when you start asking the Services about ing after 16 years of war? area of our nation. specific National Guard questions, it’s Wherever anything bad is happen- something that I would think you’re pay- General Lengyel: When I testified before ing, we will be there. When there is ing me to answer. But in the end, I think Congress, Representative [C.A. Dutch] some requirement for a local sovereign it’s more omission than commission. Ruppersberger [III (D-MD)] asked me, state to deal with, that state can call us For a long time, there was no discernible “The National Guard is in the Baltics. to augment the organic response. We difference between somebody saying, What do you think the Russians see when bring what the Department of Defense “We’re going to have the [Joint Chiefs] they look across and see the National brings. We bring mass, training, leader- come together and we’re going to have Guard?” I replied, “Sir, I do not think ship, organization, communications; we the Service chiefs come together.” That is they see the National Guard; I think they bring all of our essential capabilities to a big difference. Who are you talking to? look across and see the United States help us deal with it. We are, in a sense, The Joint Chiefs? The broad perspective? Army.” And that’s exactly the way it more vulnerable than we used to be, Or are you talking about the specific should be. We have ascended to a place but we are better prepared. We learned Service lanes of Title 10 organization, where there is one standard for training, a lot over the years on how to deal with equip, and train? and we meet it and deploy in it. When we consequence management through the look at the full array of threats, and there national response framework. But we are are many, the “four plus one” are the more plugged in on the [intelligence] JFQ: How would you characterize named threats, but those are an umbrella side, the interagency side, the network your relationship with the combatant under which all the other nations that we side to help maintain the national secu- commanders? interact with, protect, and build partner- rity piece of homeland security. ships with are present. In a four-plus-one General Lengyel: I am chartered to have world, problems are not regional, they a specific and direct relationship with are global. Problems are not restricted to JFQ: How has the elevation of the chief of each of the combatant commanders. We any one domain, they are multidomain. the National Guard Bureau to being a full do provide things to combatant com- Problems are multifunctional as we en- member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff affected manders in Title 32 status; that means gage with them. The National Guard is the Guard? Has it helped you balance the while we’re in our state, nonmobilized just plugged in at every level throughout competing needs of the states of the Active status, we’re able to do some things that the spectrum of threats. What I am learn- force because that tension has always been facilitate our training and enhance the ing and watching is how the character of there? mission for the combatant commanders. war is changing. It is true. Who would One thing we have is a process called the

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Lengyel 9 North Carolina Army National Guardsmen from C Company, 1st Battalion, 252nd Armored Regiment, prepare for next event in General Gordon Sullivan Cup Best Tank Crew Competition, May 2, 2016, at Fort Benning, Georgia (U.S. Army/Jon Soucy)

Federated [Intelligence] Program. Some at the same table with you, and they may how we can support all the Services helps of our targeting and intelligence units, as or may not have had a direct relationship us interact together. Maybe one day I will they come in and train, have learned to with you, or even a reason to talk to you, in have the Marine Corps in a joint billet on reorient to intelligence work for some of the past. What kind of new opportunities the National Guard staff. the combatant commanders. Providing for joint operations and projects have ap- targeting information to commanders peared across the Services for the Guard? has enhanced the mission while we are JFQ: How have the states reacted to the training in state status. All the combatant General Lengyel: Because of our National Guard’s more global viewpoint? commanders have come to rely on the evolution as this operational force, we The states are understandably more state partnership program, and they want do a lot of training now. For instance, concerned with their National Guard more of it. They do all the right things the Marine Corps comes to exercises at members being around to help with a nat- to make sure that these partnership Camp Grayling in Michigan. There is ural disaster, for instance, but you might programs are well aligned with their com- a great exercise called Northern Strike. have them in Bosnia or some other place. mands, goals, and strategic objectives. It is a joint certified exercise run by the How does that balance work? They know what the states are doing Guard. Last year, we brought hundreds when we are there, and they know what of Marines to participate in this exercise. General Lengyel: The National the host nations and partner nations are They have live-fire air exercises, Army in- Guard has changed, and it has changed doing when they are here. fantry on the ground and Marines on the forever. The days of “39 days a year” are ground—I mean collaborative training. It no longer the standard. What we owe was predominantly Reserve component National Guard and Reserve component JFQ: As you have mentioned, the National training last year, but it’s an ever-growing members is important, and we have to re- Guard has a long-established relationship thing. Interactions with the commandant alize that it is a different business model. with the Army and the Air Force, but now of the Marine Corps have been great, and These people do have two lives, so the you have the Marines and the Navy sitting for me to get a better understanding of business model fails if we can no longer

10 Forum / An Interview with Joseph L. Lengyel JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 train and be ready for the warfighting JFQ: How long do you think it will take to know what they’re getting when we show mission while we sustain and get the reach compensation and benefit equity for up—whether it’s at an exercise or whether preponderance of our compensation from the Reserve forces? we show up at an operation. They say, some other source. We have an array of “I know that commander, I know that talented people with civilian experiences General Lengyel: Big kudos are owed leader, I know that force, they are just like in nonrelated military jobs. I have people to OSD [the Office of the Secretary us,” and off we go. When we’re an opera- who are accountants who want to be an of Defense], the Services, and Reserve tional force, those things work together. artillery battery commander. I like to tell components, and the Hill for coming this story to illustrate: The best tank crew together and realizing that all of these at the Sullivan Cup was a National Guard statuses in the Reserve component were JFQ: Many conflict zones are nontradi- crew from the North Carolina Army kind of created one at a time, and they tional and labeling them has become a National Guard. It was made up of a col- were created kind of “Okay, we only have popular industry with names such as “gray lege student, a police officer, and a truck this much money, so how do we build zones,” “asymmetrical warfare,” and driver—and the tank commander was an it within the budget constraints that we “competition short of war.” What role does insurance adjuster. This guy could blow have?” The current timelines that people the Guard play in these environments, and up your house and come settle the claim! talk about are 2 to 6 years to undo the can you gauge the demand signal for these legislation and align this stuff. The key is efforts going forward? that we have to stay committed to it and JFQ: Can you discuss the efforts that focused to it—fix the big ones first and General Lengyel: That’s what the job are under way to make sure that Guard the little ones later. The current mobili- is—to figure out what you need the mil- members are receiving equal benefits to the zation authority that is given to the two itary to be able to do. As we look across Active-duty force? Service secretaries, [Title 10, U.S. Code] the character of warfare and the threats 12304b, is one way the Service secretary that we might face, obviously it’s not as General Lengyel: That is a hugely can deploy you in a predictable fashion simple as it once was during the Cold important issue. I just got back from a to a named exercise in a unit-based con- War where we were going to have to trip visiting the transfer of authority in struct that you then get the same kinds fight those guys or these guys. Now we the Sinai Peninsula. The multinational of pay and benefits that you would get are going to have to fight nonstate actors, force is an observer mission that has under Presidential or voluntary mobili- we are going to have to fight differently largely been supported by the National zation. I think those can be done pretty because we have been a victim of our Guard force structure for a while. It is quickly. We have to find the money to fix own success. The U.S. military became an ongoing journey to assure that the it. We have to just make it right and then one that you would have to be crazy to pay status, entitlements, and benefits the fallout is whatever the fallout is; we want to engage, so you have to compete are commensurate with the duty one is have to adjust it. Some of the other ones in such a way that you don’t engage that doing. While we need to keep a flexible may be harder. It’s not going to happen big, massive, well-equipped, and techno- training process and plan available and overnight, but I think a decade is a rea- logically superior force. The Guard plays pay status to allow people to move and sonable term to fix it. in it as part of the Air Force, part of the work around their civilian lives, we need JFQ: Why is the National Guard inter- Army, and part of the joint force. That’s to make sure that when we have a he- ested in remaining an operational reserve, one way we play in it. licopter and it’s got seven people from and to that, what efforts will be required The other way we play is that events two different Services in it, if tragedy to stay at that level of capability that you happen and we shape the environment happens and they crash and perish, that gained over the last 16 years? through our engagements around the they all get the same kinds of benefits and General Lengyel: I think the biggest world. We have partnerships in 80 coun- entitlements for their families—and for reason we should stay an operational tries with regular and routine interactions members going forward. There’s been a reserve is that it is good for the country. annually where people get to know each realization that the 820,000 people in the We provide real combat capability and other and trust each other. We get to un- Reserve component deserve a standard- have the ability to surge quickly. The derstand the threat, we get to understand ization of benefits and entitlements, so second reason is almost everything works each other, we get to build partnerships that when they deploy, they are entitled better with the Services when we are an and commitments that support our to post-9/11 GI benefits and medical operational reserve. When the Services are alliances. Any future military force will care, all the things that their counterparts using us, when we are deploying, when we have to be flexible, adaptable, and agile. next to them, who happen to be Active- are taking on a real-world mission, the re- The Guard brings another unique piece component Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, lationships with the Services work better, to the joint force. Wherever we go, we or Airmen, get, which the country has and we get new equipment, training, and bring our civilian skill sets that we plug committed. we train together. The Services build an in and now it’s not military to military, it understanding and a trust with us, so they is American to Latvian, it is real civilian

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Lengyel 11 Arkansas National Guardsman completes confidence course of 2017 Army National Guard Best Warrior Competition, July 18, 2017, at Camp Ripley Training Center, Minnesota (Minnesota National Guard/Paul Santikko) skill sets because these are bankers and not about the money or force structure; then. The need and the requirement doctors and lawyers and teachers and it was about the relationship. The Guard to understand the joint force, how it policemen. We bring all of those skill sets is good at building relationships. I do not integrates, how it operates, to be able to when we go. It helps us deal with the full have a command and control relationship have networks across all the Services, not range of threats. with the 54 adjutants-general in the just the Army and the Air Force is ex- 450,000. I am not a commander of them, tremely important. Joint also includes the so by nature, we collegially operate, we interagency community. Sometimes the JFQ: How do your experiences, par- convince, we cajole, we discern which way National Guard brings a good perspective ticularly your time in Egypt, help you we are going, and in kind of a collective on how to work with first responders understand how to best position the Guard body, we go that way. I think working in and interagency partners, particularly to contribute to partnership approaches Egypt helped me see a lot of that. in the homeland, but not just here. We both here and around the world? had [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement] and [the Federal Bureau of General Lengyel: My part in Egypt was JFQ: How do you define jointness and the Investigation], we had all kinds of agen- kind of an out-of-the-box experience Guard’s role in fostering it since you are cies working together. Who’s herding for me. It is one that I never foresaw, now a part of the joint team? all of these people and who understands but it gave me a window into the politi- it? Joint is the way of the future, it’s the cal-military development that I had never General Lengyel: I think that joint current way we are doing it, and it is only expected to get. As with anything, you understanding and joint operations are going to become more and more joint realize the importance of relationships. I the only way we are going to do business going forward. The Guard’s going to be just went over to Egypt to visit some of going forward. That’s the way we fight a part in it, and if we are going to play my old friends when I went to visit the wars. It’s a joint coalition operation now. in it, particularly at the Joint Chiefs staff troops over there. I saw that I still had a As part of the operational force, for the level, we’ve got to be steeped in it, just connection with these folks from having last 15 years for sure and really for the like everybody else. JFQ been there and having worked with the Air Guard, you go back to 1991, we’ve Egyptians. If I learned anything, it was flown combat sorties every day since

12 Forum / An Interview with Joseph L. Lengyel JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Latvian joint terminal attack controllers and joint fires observer perform tactical movements for close air support training mission with C Company, 125th Infantry Regiment, Wyoming, Michigan, July 28, 2015, at Grayling Air Gunnery Range during Northern Strike 15 (U.S. Air National Guard/Scott Thompson)

Violent extremist organizations continue The Operational to persist and evolve as their capabilities and tactics become increasingly more unconventional and as they weaponize technology and commercially available National Guard materials to add new threat dimensions that could bypass our traditional defenses A Unique and Capable in unexpected ways. Demographic shifts also affect the challenges we will face in the foreseeable Component of the Joint Force future. The trend toward greater urbanization and megacities makes populations By Joseph L. Lengyel more sensitive to disruptions, especially as they rely on just-in-time logistics, and our Services are dependent on the infor- ince the attacks on 9/11, we both at home and abroad, with the pace mation grid. Furthermore, the increase have seen a confluence of factors of change accelerating. in the number and intensity of natural S shaping our security environment Major power competition will con- disasters challenge the capacity of civil that presents challenges much different tinue as states such as Russia and China authorities. from the past. Globalization, the rise of test longstanding international customs near-peer powers and regional actors, and engage in activities that are just short Warfight First, sociological changes, and extreme of conflict, yet whose actions provoke, Homeland Always weather are some of the most signif- disrupt, destabilize, and test the limits of As it moves into the future, the U.S. icant factors that make our security the West and its allies. Other states such military will remain a key instrument environment dynamic and complex, as Iran and North Korea continue to in maintaining security and stability threaten the Middle East and Asia Pacific, around the globe and here in the home- respectively, and pursue technologies land. How the joint force adapts to and capabilities that threaten not only the requirements of that environment General Joseph L. Lengyel, USAF, serves as the 28th Chief of the National Guard Bureau and as a neighboring countries and our allies is critically important. It will require a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. but also our citizens in the homeland. military that can rapidly surge forces

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Lengyel 13 Soldiers from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry Regiment, New York Army National Guard, act as opposing force during final battle of Exercise Talisman Saber 17, July 19, 2017, at Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia (U.S. Army National Guard/Michael Tietjen) overseas, protect the homeland from operational deployments are utilized here Both the Army and Air Force will rely emerging threats, and can work hand at home and have transformed the Guard more heavily on the National Guard as in hand with our allies, partners, and a into a ready and capable force. As the first the character of war continues to evolve. multitude of governmental and nongov- military responder in the homeland, the The operational Guard of today has an ernmental organizations. Maintaining National Guard has the necessary unique expectation that it will be utilized and an operational National Guard, which authorities, capabilities, and partnerships deployed. Once mobilized and trained, is approximately 20 percent of the joint to ensure we are ready for the worst the Guard is interchangeable with the force, is essential to this end. night in America. During my time as the Active component, providing the joint As the combat reserve of the Army Chief of the National Guard Bureau, force with greater capacity and capabil- and Air Force, the National Guard and my focus will remain with our three pri- ity for the fight. Reserve component will be a critical mary mission sets: warfighting, securing Thousands of National Guard part to any joint campaign. Since the the homeland, and building enduring members serve around the globe on first Gulf War in 1991, and even more partnerships. These three fundamental any given day. From a current average so since 9/11, the National Guard has missions will guide us as we develop the of 18,000 mobilized, I believe we can evolved into an operational warfighting future National Guard. judiciously increase the number of mo- organization, designed with a balance of bilized members over the next several combat and enabling units that largely Warfighting years to support combatant commands mirrors the Active component. It has During most of the 20th century, the around the world and augment Active provided the joint force with the ability National Guard served as a strategic forces in countering threats wherever to rapidly expand its power overseas via reserve, ready to be mobilized for large- they exist. The right level can be main- the authorities and readiness resources scale conflicts. But in the new security tained if these increased mobilizations granted by Congress. The capabilities environment, the Nation needs a Guard are recurring, rotational, sustainable, and and experience we gain from combat and that is rapidly scalable and accessible. predictable with acceptable dwell times.

14 Forum / The Operational National Guard JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Furthermore, deploying the Guard using These new weapons, once limited Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast mission-assigned readiness, whereby to major powers, have found their way and roughly 50,000 Guard members units are trained to the required read- into states such as North Korea and were called to respond. Concepts such iness level, can also be an efficient use Iran, where work on ballistic missile as the Dual-Status Commander (DSC) of training resources. Leveraging these technology continues today at a rapid and Emergency Management Compacts real-world operations, along with high- pace. Proliferation of nuclear technology, (EMACs) had been instituted on a end training exercises such as Combat biological and chemical weapons, and limited scale prior to Katrina, but it was Training Center rotations and Red Flag, high-yield explosive devices has increased not until Katrina that the importance of affords the Guard challenging training the threat of a WMD attack on the United cooperation among the several states and and global employment opportunities States. Delivery mechanisms for these Federal Government was fully realized. that not only build readiness in the Guard kinds of weapons have also multiplied, EMACs allowed states to help other but also preserves readiness in the Active and our adversaries continue to probe for states with resources and manpower. components. Additionally, programs weaknesses in our defense. In any future Additionally, creating a DSC who re- such as the Army’s Associated Units Pilot conflict, our homeland could become part ported both to the state governor and Program, a multicomponent initiative, of the global kinetic battlespace, with stra- the Federal military chain of command and the Air Force and Air National tegic effects coming from such domains as achieved the necessary unity of effort Guard’s integrated and multicomponent space and cyberspace. We must be able to while giving local authorities control over associate wings ensure we are fighting respond rapidly to widespread disruptions their own resources. During this time, we as a total force. These mobilizations, to our critical infrastructure and posture also improved our domestic command multicomponent programs, and training the country for recovery and resiliency. and control structures by establishing opportunities are fundamental for devel- Perhaps most important, we need the joint force headquarters in each of the 54 oping leaders and retaining unit members processes and plans in place to work with states and territories. Improvements were while also providing predictable and sus- local, state, and Federal authorities to deal made in the ability of these headquarters tainable mobilization cycles that maintain with crises at the right level to provide the to communicate and share information an operational Guard. necessary defense and resiliency capabili- with each other and the national com- ties for the homeland. mand structures. Securing the Homeland The National Guard’s role in the Today, whether working in a Federal The National Guard plays a unique role homeland was greatly enhanced with the (Title 10) or non-Federal status (Title in the homeland. From the Air Guard elevation of the Chief of the National 32 and state Active duty), the National protecting our skies from 15 of the Guard Bureau (CNGB) to become a Guard is able to leverage its unique 16 Aerospace Control Alert sites, to full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorities to provide both essential Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and in 2012. The CNGB was also given the domestic response as well as defense Nuclear (CBRN) Enhanced Response responsibility of being the principal advisor capabilities should the homeland ever Force Packages (CERFP) ready to to the Secretary of Defense, through the experience the worst night in America. battle the effects of weapons of mass Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on The Guard builds its readiness by training destruction (WMD), to our engineers matters involving non-Federalized Guard for its Title 10 missions and has the ca- repairing devastated roads from floods forces. This new designation provides the pability to deploy anywhere in the world. and hurricanes and our aircraft bring- CNGB with the ability to ensure seam- Concurrently, Guard members have ing lifesaving supplies, the National less support during times of crisis when built-in responsiveness in their non-Fed- Guard is the Nation’s primary military coordination is required with the states eral status and are always ready for domestic crisis response force, ready to and North American Aerospace Defense contingencies at home. Both fit squarely augment America’s first responders. Command/U.S. Northern Command within the National Military Strategy. In America has benefited from its geo- (NORAD/USNORTHCOM). This co- addition to the 18,000 Guard members graphic location to defend the homeland ordination is particularly important at the Federally mobilized in Title 10 status, with friendly neighbors to the north and beginning stages of an emergency when a more than 4,000 conduct missions in south. Two large oceans to our east and clear delineation between Federal and state Title 32 (state controlled) status on any west serve as natural barriers that have lines of responsibility may not be evident. given day. made it difficult for hostile powers to In addition to 9/11, Hurricane One of our key advantages is that attack. During the Cold War, U.S. forces Katrina was one of the most significant geographically, the National Guard is primarily had to contend with the ballistic events that shaped the National Guard’s present in approximately 2,600 com- missile and aerospace threat from one capability in the homeland and demon- munities. Leveraging their overseas country. However, we no longer enjoy strated the agility and resilience of our experience from the warfight, our this safe haven due to new technologies force. In 2005, while approximately citizen Soldiers and Airmen return to and weapons that could reach the heart 79,000 Guard Soldiers and Airmen their communities where they take back of America. were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, their readiness, capabilities, and skills to

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Lengyel 15 F-16 Fighting Falcon from Ohio Air National Guard’s 180th Fighter Wing in Swanton, Ohio, stands ready for training exercises at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, February 2, 2017 (U.S. Air National Guard/Joseph Boyer) defend and secure our nation’s skies and National Guard plays a large role com- states. The National Guard is the military borders—and remain prepared for simul- batting transnational criminal activity organization best positioned for syn- taneous contingencies that may occur at such as drug-trafficking. The Guard’s chronizing state and Federal responses to home and abroad. Counterdrug Program is closely tied to ensure there are no unintended gaps. The Units such as the Army National the Department of Defense (DOD) and Guard is evolving and adapting as it con- Guard’s 117th Space Battalion and Office of National Drug Control Policy. tinues to play a more prominent role in Colorado and Alaska’s missile defense Our Soldiers and Airmen play a vital role the defense and security of the homeland. battalions are protecting the homeland in the detection, interdiction, disrup- from the evolving dangers associated with tion, and curtailment of drug-traffickers Building Enduring Partnerships the space domain and from long-range and its related national security threats The joint force cannot fight America’s missile capabilities that could reach the to the homeland. wars or defend the homeland without homeland. In cyberspace, the Guard’s On the CBRN front, nearly 14,000 its partners. Allies and partners, at cyber warriors are situated across the 50 Guard Soldiers and Airmen comprise home and abroad, are what increase our states, our territories, and the District approximately 60 percent of the DOD’s strength and resiliency during times of of Columbia, supporting the National CBRN response capabilities. The crisis and give us an asymmetric advan- Guard’s and U.S. Cyber Command’s National Guard’s capabilities include tage over our adversaries. During the cyber missions. The Guard is expected 17 CERFPs and 10 regionally aligned major wars of the 20th century and in to grow to 43 Cyber Units across 34 Homeland Response Forces. Should our recent wars against al Qaeda and states by fiscal year 2019, in addition to these units ever be needed, we will be the so-called Islamic State, the United the 54 Defensive Cyberspace Operations able to react quickly and efficiently. States has worked in concert with allies Elements located in all of the states, terri- In this domestic threat environment, and partners to achieve its objectives. tories, and the District of Columbia. national defense and homeland security When putting an economic value on Given our unique authorities to are a shared responsibility between the our partnerships and alliances, the work with law enforcement agencies, the Federal Government and the several aggregate gross domestic product for

16 Forum / The Operational National Guard JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 the United States and its European and multiagency approach to all of joint force Conclusion Pacific allies is $44.4 trillion, with just problem sets. This is how we do business. The operational National Guard is a over $1 trillion in military spending. unique component of the U.S. military. This level of economic power among The Minuteman: Innovation As a combat reserve of the Army and voluntary alliances is unparalleled in Is in Our DNA Air Force, the Guard can significantly world history and underwrites global Our three core missions—warfighting, surge the size of the joint force in a security. securing the homeland, and building short period of time to deter major Almost 25 years ago, the National enduring partnerships—could not be powers or conduct smaller operational Guard began its State Partnership accomplished without our citizen war- deployments when required. The ability Program (SPP) to assist the countries riors, symbolized by the Minuteman. to rapidly expand and contract the joint of Eastern Europe reform their defense Our Soldiers and Airmen come from force is an extraordinary capability for sector, improve preparedness, and de- individual states, unique communities, our nation. At the same time, the skills velop leaders. What began as a program and have been answering the call ever and experience that our Guard members of 10 partnerships has spread across five since the first militia was founded in gain from these operations can be uti- continents, and will grow to include Massachusetts in 1636. While the lized here at home. 79 nations in the near future. We have underlying principles of the Minuteman Our members are a part of the total witnessed the fruits of these relationships, remain constant, ready to defend our Army and Air Force, but have unique which are built on trust, the exchange communities and the Nation, the Min- and distinct roles in the homeland, of ideas, and mutual respect. Our part- utemen of the 21st century are a premier which is strengthened by our business nerships are located in strategic regions force that is a key component of the model. We are the military force securing around the world and support the joint force. They are citizens who want the homeland, and proximity to our transition of many nations from security to serve, but also want to go beyond communities allows us to be the mili- consumers to global security providers. and contribute to businesses and their tary’s first responders when it comes to The SPP builds trust and friendships and communities in other ways. They are homeland defense and security. We build assures allies around the world. adaptive and innovative, often bringing resiliency into the homeland. We make The National Guard’s emphasis on diverse and new ideas on how to accom- bad days better, no matter the cause partnerships did not begin with SPP. Our plish different missions. of the catastrophe. With the capability history as an organization controlled While the past 16 years of war forever to easily transition from different state by the several states naturally led us to have changed the National Guard into and Federal statuses and authorities, the build partnerships with state agencies and an operational force, the U.S. military National Guard empowers the President officials. In times of disaster, the Guard deferred much of its research and de- and governors to address each crisis at the supports first responders to provide the velopment as we prosecuted the wars in appropriate level. necessary relief and aid that communities Afghanistan and Iraq. During this period, None of our missions are accom- need. When there is disorder in commu- the rest of the world did not remain plished without the members of the nities, the Guard is called on to support idle, and as a result, our technological National Guard—citizen Soldiers and local and state law enforcement to restore advantage has eroded. As we develop our Airmen, along with their families and peace and guarantee the rights of citizens. next set of competitive advantages for employers, who commit to serving the We are a part of multiagency integrated the military, which will rely on American Nation, states, and communities alike. In playbooks that governors use in planning innovation and technology, the Guard many places across the Nation, we are the for and responding to crises, whether will play a major role researching, devel- face of the military. When you call out the it is a natural disaster, civil disorder, or oping, and fielding innovative systems, Guard, you are calling America. JFQ an attack from an adversary abroad. processes, and operational concepts. This integration with law enforcement Innovation is inherently in the DNA of and first responders also extends to the the National Guard because the scientists, Federal Government, where we work engineers, and computer experts we see together with such organizations as the in the private sector—developing the Department of Homeland Security, game-changing innovations that ensure which includes the Federal Emergency America maintains its military superior- Management Agency. The National ity—are the same individuals who have a Guard is a critical component of the military life serving in the Guard. As we National Response Plan and works closely look for ways to make our military more with NORAD/USNORTHCOM in agile and technologically superior, the defense of the homeland. The Guard Guard’s citizen-warriors will lend their instinctively takes a collaborative and skills and talents and play a critical role in developing the force of the future.

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Lengyel 17 MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, December 16, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/J.M. Eddins, Jr.)

Open Sources for the Information Age Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Unclassified Data

By James M. Davitch

fter years of major spending on absent a change that recognizes the implementation of an open source infor- intelligence, surveillance, and increasing value of open source information–enabled military intelligence force. A reconnaissance (ISR) collection mation, the IC will not realize a return Harnessing the analytic potential in capabilities, the Intelligence Commu- on its investments. open source data, rather than closely nity (IC) is beginning to make a com- This article investigates the origins guarded secret information, is the Big mensurate investment in technology to of the modern IC and its tendency to Data challenge facing intelligence pro- improve intelligence analysis.1 However, rely on classified data to the exclusion of fessionals. Open source information may publicly available information, the utility be the first indication of an adversary’s of open source information and a new hostile intent in what Department of way of thinking about it as the key com- Defense (DOD) leaders call the likely Lieutenant Colonel James M. Davitch, USAF, is ponent for future early indications and future threat environment.2 But the IC the Intelligence Operations Division Chief at Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale Air Force warning (I&W), and a recommended way bureaucracy remains locked in habitual Base, Louisiana. forward for the IC and possible steps for patterns focused narrowly on classified

18 Forum / Open Sources for the Information Age JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 sources. The first step to understanding masses; this, it was presumed, might The reliance on secret data derived why requires observation of the IC’s or- provide insight for the President into from classified sources lends itself ganizational culture. the adversary leadership’s thinking.7 to answering intelligence questions However, the IC’s weight of effort for quantitatively, such as the number of A Culture of Secrets planning and budgeting was geared to- missions tasked and images collected The combination of the Pearl Harbor ward exquisite collection systems. and processed. These data are easy to surprise attack and a decentralized The IC’s focus on classified sources numerically collect and aggregate, but intelligence apparatus divided between owes largely to the way it responds it distracts from investigating qualitative the U.S. Army and Navy led many to to the collection priorities laid out in indicators that might determine whether believe the United States was vulnerable the National Intelligence Priorities the intelligence process is contributing to another unforeseen strike. This led Framework (NIPF). The NIPF’s purpose meaningfully to solving the underlying President Harry Truman to consolidate is to provide senior policy officials a vehi- intelligence problem.14 So the question, the intelligence mission, which, he cle to dictate a prioritized list of “critical “Is our collection posture working to hoped, would identify preliminary I&W interest” issues to the IC.8 But the IC’s learn more about the enemy?” becomes of foreign aggression. Thus the 1947 toolkit is filled mostly with instruments instead, “How many ISR sorties have creation of the Central Intelligence that produce classified data. Therefore, it we flown in support of the leadership’s Agency (CIA) was, in essence, a hedge attempts to address NIPF priorities with priorities?” against future surprises.3 So began the the resources at hand and the methodol- It is important to note that while period of Industrial Age intelligence ogies deemed “proven” by victory in the open sources may provide great utility, running from 1947 to about 1990. Cold War. This perpetuates the acqui- they are not a panacea for all intelligence The IC’s narrow focus on the de- sition and development of new sensors problems. Each situation requires the velopment and capabilities of the Soviet and platforms for the production of more requisite examination of its underlying Union made “national intelligence” the classified information. The IC’s method characteristics. But the failure to address primary feature of collection and report- of responding to intelligence problems open sources’ potential merits by reflex- ing. The Soviet Union represented a by looking predominantly to classified ively dismissing it is, at best, a failure to complicated target and information about sources merits review.9 consider creative solutions. At worst, it was sparse. But as an intelligence prob- Breaking the current paradigm is dif- it signals that the IC is unprepared to lem it was “comparatively less complex” ficult, but essential, if the IC is to assume tackle the emergent complexity of global to today’s globalized, interconnected, a more proactive posture. Barriers to geopolitical dynamics and risks missing and interdependent geopolitical setting.4 this goal include organizational inertia, important I&W of future conflict.15 The Soviet Union’s closed society and the fear of untested alternative methods, The 9/11 attacks provided the impe- impressive counterintelligence architec- and the satisfaction of answering simpler tus for moving open source information ture made necessary the development questions, no matter how illusory their into the forefront of the value proposition of expensive sensors and platforms to utility. Large organizations seldom rein that its ability to significantly augment provide highly sought after puzzle pieces spond to change until after a crisis and traditional forms of intelligence rapidly in this denied environment.5 In the words instead follow established routines and became apparent in the counterterrorism of Gregory Treverton, “In the circum- simple standard operating procedures.10 mission. However, it was not until the stances of the high Cold War, there were Under the prevailing intelligence collec- advent of open source Big Data’s velocity, powerful arguments for targeting intel- tion construct, professionals perpetuate variety, and volume characteristics, which ligence tightly on the Soviet Union, for organizational inertia by engaging only in became apparent with the explosion of giving pride of place to secrets, especially what Ronald Garst defines as descriptive social media, that the potential for greater those collected by satellites and other analysis.11 For example, analytical cells open source analysis in lieu of an exces- technical means.”6 routinely provide statements describing sive focus on classified sources became The primary customer for Cold what happened, when, and where, thereby a realistic possibility. One now might War intelligence was the President and eschewing predictive analysis.12 Not coin- consider using open sources as the entry National Security Council because it was cidentally, U.S. intelligence sensors excel point for the intelligence collection pro- the President who would bear the brunt at providing data that supports descriptive cess and using classified data to augment of the blame if the United States suffered intelligence analysis. But to this end, the the unclassified source, thus flipping the another surprise attack. Sensors and IC is reactionary and fails to address what paradigm upside down. platforms were tailor-made to focus on decisionmakers are often more interested counting Soviet aircraft, ships, and other in: describing what will happen and why. Flaws in the Technical military equipment. When the IC looked Daniel Kahneman refers to this tendency Solution—It’s Not Only to open sources, it observed mostly the as the “substitution heuristic” whereby About Secrets official messages and propaganda sent one simplifies difficult tasks by evaluating a Speaking to the Council on Foreign from the Soviet high command to the related, easier question.13 Relations, former CIA director Michael

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Davitch 19 Hayden described intelligence trade as a able to help us better understand myster- consisting of communications and elec- jigsaw puzzle.16 The metaphor leads one ies and answer specific, defined problems. trical emissions. Intelligence professionals to believe that all the pieces are available Open sources can point to breakthroughs often refer to this data as a “detectable awaiting assembly. Unfortunately, this in a nation’s weapons research and de- signature” of the collection target. Such thinking typically translates to a need velopment timeline, a task formerly the detectable signatures, fleeting during for more collection sensors that, in turn, exclusive province of espionage or techni- the Cold War, have exploded in the promotes the exclusivity of classified cal sensors. Asking questions like “What Information Age. information. All of this perpetuates are the range and speed capabilities of the Wearable technology and the Internet the dubious contention that classified latest generation Chinese surface-to-air of Things provide precise geolocation collection provides a window to truth. missile?” can be addressed through the of an individual and connects one’s Moreover, it rewards both the pursuit lens of open sources.22 Olcott illustrates previously private details to the open and creation of more data, which the commercial, public-sector use of architecture of the Internet. Moreover, burden analytical efforts. The net result open sources, relating what Leonard this information does not have to be is that the exclusivity of secret intelli- Fuld calls the cardinal rule of intelligence: secretly seized by a high-altitude sensor gence becomes the basis for analysis “Wherever money is exchanged, so is or through clandestine espionage. In fact, to the limitation, or even exclusion of, information.”23 individuals willingly make their data avail- creative thinking.17 Considering the likely eventuality that able for observation. As Treverton noted, Intelligence problems, especially intelligence problems of the future will in the Information Age, “collecting infor- as they pertain to vague indications of more resemble mysteries than secrets, mation is less of a problem, and verifying impending hostilities, more resemble analysts will need to employ more cre- it is more of one.”28 The open source en- mysteries than puzzles. Anthony Olcott ative and critical thinking and use a more vironment provides detectable signatures notes mysteries are difficult, if not impos- diverse assortment of information than of the adversary undreamed of prior to sible, to solve definitively, “no matter how before. This will entail a greater mental the advent of the Information Age. much information is gathered,” classified workload for analysts used to the col- The influx of open source data, or otherwise.18 Trying to answer mysteries lect-process-analyze model traditionally including rapidly growing social media usually involves uncertainty, doubt, and centered on the classified collection. The platforms, will only become more vital cognitive dissonance, which most seek to IC’s knee-jerk inclination to accept the sources of information in the future. avoid. But embracing doubt and address- answer offered by classified data satisfies Kerbel notes, “[The IC] must get over ing probabilities are essential because so what Daniel Kahneman calls our System 1 its now illusory belief that its value-added few intelligence problems lend themselves response, a mode of thinking in which the comes mostly from information to which to easy, certain, factual answers. The only mind operates “automatically and quickly, it alone has access—secrets.”29 Several certainty with respect to intelligence with little or no effort.”24 Kahneman con- open source social media companies are mysteries is persistent uncertainty, which trasts this mode with the concentration billion-dollar-a-year companies, to wit: cannot be alleviated by simply throwing required of System 2, which “allocates Instagram. Founded in 2010, it is arguably more surveillance sensors at the problem. attention to the effortful mental activities the fastest growing social media channel, Philip Tetlock described the allure that demand it.”25 The uncertainty cre- reaching 300 million users in 2016.30 Alec of certainty, stating that it “satisfies ated by nebulous mysteries that often do Ross noted, “Today there are roughly 16 the brain’s desire for order because it not lend themselves to prompt answers, billion Internet connected devices. Four yields tidy explanations with no loose and the creative thinking required to solve years from now that number will grow to ends.”19 But Kahneman warns against them, is System 2 territory. 40 billion Internet-connected devices.”31 the overconfidence certainty can provide: The IC’s emphasis on classified Despite these publicly available “Declarations of high confidence mainly information may ultimately be a barrier sources of information, open source tell you that an individual has constructed to creative thinking. Access to classified intelligence remains a lesser form of a coherent story in his mind, not nec- information carries with it the currency intelligence in the realm of intelli- essarily that the story is true.”20 Doubt of prestige and the “need to know” gence disciplines. Treverton counters, can sometimes be mitigated, though restriction, which “fosters compart- “Intelligence now has . . . vast amounts not eliminated, with more evidence that mentalized—reductionist—views of the of information . . . not a scarcity of might even come from classified sources. issues at hand.”26 Josh Kerbel points to information that mainly comes from But pointing to evidence exclusively de- the Cold War era “when [the IC] had a satellites or spies and is therefore re- rived from restricted data while claiming relative monopoly on good information,” garded as accurate.”32 Publicly available to have found truth is like a blind man which “continues to cause analysts to information is not only a valuable describing the colors of a rainbow.21 confuse exclusivity of information with supplement, but it is also redefining While puzzles requiring the acquisition relevance to decisionmakers.”27 During I&W and should be used as the basis of of secret “pieces” do persist, leveraging the Cold War, prized information was future intelligence analysis. In essence, open source information is increasingly often technical and ephemeral, mainly open sources should not augment secret

20 Forum / Open Sources for the Information Age JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Soldiers with 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Italian Folgore Airborne Brigade, Vicenza, Italy, conduct Joint Forcible Entry Operation during Network Integration Evaluation 16.1, September 27, 2015, at White Sands Space Harbor, New Mexico (U.S. Army/Aura E. Sklenicka)

information, but the reverse. Doing so stitute an “end product,” but it could such as we have witnessed in eastern may pay dividends toward gaining essen- be used to direct traditional ISR collec- Ukraine.”37 He continues, “Hybrid tial warning in the nebulous current and tion assets to verify the open source tip. conflicts serve to increase ambiguity, future operating environments. Despite the crushing weight of evi- complicate decision-making, and slow the dence to the contrary, Russian defense coordination of effective responses. Due I&W—The Open Source outlets improbably assigned blame to to these advantages to the aggressor, it is Opportunity in “Hybrid War” Ukrainian forces.35 Russian President likely that this form of conflict will persist In the summer of 2014, “pro-Russian Vladimir Putin, seizing the opportunity well into the future.”38 separatists” began appearing in eastern to win the propaganda war, crisply stated Some have argued the concept of Ukraine. Moscow repeatedly denied as much, declaring the situation could hybrid war in Ukraine is simply a contin- that its regular forces were operating on have been avoided “if Kiev had not uation of conventional techniques and Ukrainian soil, but social media truth resumed its military campaign against procedures.39 Whatever the definition, gave lie to the Russian government’s pro-Russian separatists.”36 These types of what we are seeing is the most likely insistence. Young soldiers posted conventional and unconventional inci- scenario for future conflict because it “selfies” to Instagram that, presum- dents mixed with intense public relations allows the adversary to do as Sun Tzu ably unbeknownst to them, contained campaigns will be the U.S. military’s recommended: capitalize on the adver- metadata that geolocated their posi- most likely, and most dangerous, scenar- sary’s weaknesses while maximizing its tion within Ukraine’s borders. They ios for conflict into the future. own strengths. The U.S. military possesses provided strong evidence of Russia’s General Martin Dempsey, former overwhelming conventional might. But by complicity in the shootdown of Malay- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of- engaging in disinformation and employing sia Airlines Flight 17.33 Initial accounts fered (also outlined in the 2015 National non-official military forces, the adversary rapidly flowed in from open sources to Military Strategy, see figure) an appropri- can keep the conflict below the threshold include pictures uploaded to Twitter ate definition of this type of information where the United States might use its con- and Instagram as well as numerous operation: “State and non-state actors ventional advantage. As some have noted, YouTube videos.34 This type of cueing working together toward shared objec- such hybrid war strategies could “cripple indication in and of itself does not con- tives, employing a wide range of weapons a state before that state even realizes the

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Davitch 21 Figure. Continuum of Conflict decision paralysis as the United States confronts entities falsely claiming non- combatant status. A sub-goal should be to provide decisionmakers with evidence

State Conflict to counter aggressor propaganda. The Employs large-scale military force best tool for these missions in the future and sophisticated military technologies across multiple will likely not be a traditional collection domains to defeat the enemy. platform originally designed to count May include use of WMD, antiaccess/area-denial systems, Soviet tanks; it will be open source–de- global strike systems, undersea rived information. Cold War–era tactics, platforms, advanced cyber tools, and counter-space systems, techniques, and procedures are not among other capabilities. conducive to identifying “little green men,” innocuous fishing vessels, or the Hybrid Conflict Blends conventional and funding, arms, and leadership supporting irregular forces to create them. Therefore, changing the way the ambiguity, seize the initiative, and paralyze the adversary. IC conducts operations is warranted. May include use of both That begins with a focus on open source Conseuence traditional military and asymmetric systems. information augmented by secret-seeking sensors capable of adding detail resulting

Nonstate Conflict in open source intelligence. Employs small units and As the Third Offset implies, there is an networks to undermine governments and gain control important role for human-machine collab- over populations. May include oration in this new open source–focused use of IEDs, small arms, propaganda, and terror. environment, specifically regarding artificial intelligence. While social media outlets like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter are popularly used worldwide, some countries use other social media outlets more predominantly. The social networking Probability sites VKontakte and QZone are the most popular outlets in Russia and China, respectively. Analysts must be cognizant conflict had begun,” and yet it manages As Steven Pifer noted in 2015 testi- of that fact and adept at deciphering not to “slip under NATO’s [North Atlantic mony before the U.S. Senate, irregular only foreign languages but also cultural Treaty Organization’s] threshold of per- forces presaging larger conventional nuances of the society in question. ception and reaction.” movements may be the example of future Automatic machine translation tools are This type of future conflict will not encounters.42 General Philip Breedlove, rapidly improving and can help with both. only be confined to the U.S. adversary the former U.S. European Command In May 2014, Microsoft presented a in Eurasia. Michael Pillsbury describes commander, also articulated these con- computer program capable of translating China’s possible employment of a cerns, insisting NATO must be prepared spoken words in real time.44 Describing military doctrine called “unrestricted war- to respond to “special forces without the application of “deep learning” to ma- fare,”40 which in many ways is analogous sovereign insignia who cross borders to chine translation, Maryam Najafabadi et to these information operations.41 One create unrest” and ultimately destabilize al. relate how Google’s “word2vec” tool possible dangerous course of action in countries.43 However, traditional I&W can quickly learn complex relationships this region might entail the use of “civil- techniques and ISR systems employed by between hundreds of millions of words.45 ian” Chinese fishing boats executing what the IC have historically focused on the Using what are called “word vectors” al- for all intents and purposes is a military deployment of large armed forces. They lows the machine translator to distinguish operation to solidify its assertion of ter- do so at the risk of missing earlier indica- nuance and context rather than literal ritoriality. Such activities are not without tions that might forestall conflict. translation. Artificial intelligence transla- precedent. Small-scale “fishing incidents” The Office of the Secretary of tion tools directed at social media outlets may become the source of increasing Defense’s intention in pursuing the could provide a wealth of insight into naval tensions. They provide China plau- Third Offset concept is to deter potential lower level authority structures. Machine sible deniability while remaining under adversaries from action. To that end, the augmentation will not only allow us to the threshold for spurring greater U.S. IC’s goal should be providing the time- hear what these individuals are saying, but military involvement. liest I&W of impending conflict to avoid also understand what they mean.

22 Forum / Open Sources for the Information Age JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 As part of USS Sampson Oceania Maritime Security Initiative mission, U.S. Navy Sailors and U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Law Enforcement Detachment Team personnel approach Chinese fishing vessel, November 29, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Bryan Jackson)

Recommendations analytic training should include problem Those in leadership positions will often Major changes are required in the way restatement, causal flow diagramming, seek data compatible with the beliefs they military intelligence professionals think weighted rankings, devil’s advocacy, and already hold. Normally, in military oper- about problems. A cultural mindset many other techniques as described by ations, this means a desire for classified change is warranted that values publicly Morgan Jones in The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 information over less glamorous open available information as much as, if not Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving. sources.46 One way to break free from this more so than restricted data. For the The importance of teaching analytical confirmation bias is to use skills inherent military, change will begin at entry-level techniques to Airmen for use with the ava- in applying appropriate analytical tech- education and training venues. “Digital lanche of data cannot be overemphasized. niques. With these skills and knowledge, natives,” the next generation of intelli- First, these techniques allow analysts to the IC will be able to better respond to gence professionals that has grown up “show their work,” making their analyses decisionmakers, rather than wasting time with ubiquitous technology and social transparent to others. Second, they teach and effort on mundane production quotas media outlets, will likely find it easier to language precision, forcing analysts to endlessly seeking puzzle pieces. break from legacy mindsets. However, frame the problem correctly to ensure it is If the IC is serious about developing the lure of the classified source will still answerable and not open to interpretation. critical thinking skills, the right answer be seductive. Intelligence training must Last, they can prevent military analysts is not to dismiss these analytical tech- support the next generation’s inclina- from falling into the System 1 trap that niques out of hand but to experiment in tion to reach for the open source. Kahneman describes. The natural human accordance with proven scientific meth- Additionally, future Airmen will inclination to grab onto the first plausible ods. Tetlock notes, “The intelligence require training in the tools available at explanation is a key challenge for anyone, community’s forecasters have never been that time and encouragement to pursue but especially for intelligence professionals systematically assessed” to determine the their own innovative ideas to best collect confronted with the time constraints of accuracy of their analytic predictions.47 and analyze open source material. Specific military operations. Were the IC to do so, the entire test

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Davitch 23 would be relatively inexpensive compared Just as the military stresses physical and focus on the information that best to the cost of flying and maintaining ISR training (PT) culminating in regular leads to mission success. platforms. Looking at the results of an tests, so should DOD champion regular Machines can assist the analytical open source–based experiment could “cognitive PT” tournaments. Results process but they are not a substitute for it. provide valuable, low-cost information from multiple Good Judgment Project “Machines may get better at ‘mimicking that might better enable future planning competitions revealed, “Prediction accu- human meaning’ and thereby better at and budgetary decisions. racy is possible when people participate in predicting human behavior,”52 but Tetlock But what to do with “legacy” intel- a setup that rewards only accuracy—and argued there is a significant difference ligence analysts? Individuals born prior not the novelty of the explanation, or between mimicking meaning and deci- to the Information Age may be less loyalty to the party line.”50 In other phering the meaning’s original intent. He welcoming of open source material and words, competitions like these foster both concludes, “That’s a space human judg- more disposed to favor traditional sources creative and critical thinking while honing ment will always occupy.”53 To that end of collection. But rather than endure the skills on an individual level. Furthermore, we must invest in the human mind in the slow movement of time while the next competitions may lend themselves to form of analytic training combined with generation ascends to leadership positions, developing and asking questions that predictive forecasting based on publicly forward-thinking military analysts must can be answered, measured, and scored. available information. Targeted invest- break from the classification fixation now. Competitive events are not new for the ments directed toward improving creative They must realize the relevance of open military. For decades fighter pilots have thinking and smartly leveraging open sources to guide collection, not the other trained against rival squadrons during sources will ultimately assist leadership way around. Additionally, individual ana- “turkey shoot” events. Winners receive decisionmaking and give the IC a strong lysts must want to contribute. But how? accolades and the recognition of their comparative advantage in the future. JFQ The Intelligence Advanced Research peers. DOD needs an open source–fo- Projects Activity (IARPA) is an Office of cused ISR turkey shoot, challenging the Director of National Intelligence– participants to form their own conclusions Notes sponsored program that challenges based on publicly available information, 1 participants across the IC to engage in thereby granting agency to the individual I wish to thank Colonel Jeffrey Don- nithorne, Dr. Jon Kimminau, Dr. Lisa Costa, forecasting competitions. A spinoff pro- and allowing motivated professionals to Dr. Robert Norton, Mr. Josh Kerbel, Lieu- gram called the Good Judgment Project best demonstrate their analytic prowess. tenant Colonel Robert Folker, and Majors Kyle involves any willing participant both inside Competition between individuals and Bressette and Seth Gilpin for their thoughtful and out of DOD. The first IARPA tour- units could spur motivation and breed comments and suggestions. All errors found nament began in 2011 and explored the further intelligence excellence. And based herein are my own. See also Adam Lowther and John Farrell, “From the Air,” Air & Space Power potential of crowd-sourced intelligence. on the results of the Good Judgment Journal 26, no. 4 (2012), 61–102. Participants made predictions about re- Project, one might expect open source 2 Marcus Weisgerber, “Dempsey’s Fi- al-world events, which were then judged disbelievers to become converts. At a nal Instruction to the Pentagon: Prepare for by the precision of their forecast. Perhaps minimum, participants will learn that a Long War,” Defense One, July 1, 2015, the most interesting outcome of the Good classified sources matter less than the available at . with access to restricted information had 3 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National no advantage over those without. In fact, Final Points—An Intelligence for an Age of Information, RAND the opposite was true, possibly due to the Opportunity for Success Studies in Policy Analysis (New York: Cambridge cultural bias toward classified information Future success in detecting ambiguous University Press, 2003). 4 Josh Kerbel, “The U.S. Intelligence that may have prevented those individuals clues that may lead to conflict will come Community’s Creativity Challenge,” National from forming more holistic predictions. In through the patient process of creatively Interest, October 13, 2014, available at . 5 specified that individuals without access solutions will increasingly be found in Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism to classified information “performed 30% readily accessible, yet traditionally stig- (New York: Crown, 2002); see also Bruno Ter- better than the average for the intelligence matized, open sources. But as a former trais, review of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story community analysts who could read Operation Enduring Freedom senior of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous intercepts and other secret data.”48 He intelligence officer wrote, “The intel- Legacy, by David E. Hoffman, Survival 52, no. continues, “The NSA [National Security ligence community’s standard mode 1 (2010), 220. 6 Treverton. Agency] obviously operates on the theory of operation is emphatic about secrecy 7 Anthony Olcott, Open Source Intelligence that more data are better . . . but this mad but regrettably less concerned about in a Networked World (New York: Bloomsbury dash for signals lacks the essential quality mission effectiveness.”51 Individuals Intelligence Studies, 2012), chap. 6. of sound judgment.”49 must overcome the classification fixation 8 Ibid., chap. 4.

24 Forum / Open Sources for the Information Age JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 9 One problem with this process is that it below average in CT skills when compared with com/2017/07/mh17-three-years-later-what- results in poor metrics for determining intelli- individuals at the same academic level.” See have-we-learned/>. gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance effective- Adam J. Stone, Critical Thinking Skills of U.S. 34 “What We Know So Far About the ness. Civilian and military collection managers Air Force Senior and Intermediate Developmental Passenger Jet Shot Down in Ukraine,” Foreign prioritize their collection requirements, derived Education Students (Maxwell Air Force Base, Policy, July 17, 2014, available at . the priority of the intelligence needed to support perforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction 35 Ibid. a given mission. Quantitative measures such as (New York: Crown, 2015). 36 Ibid. the number of missions tasked or the number of 20 Kahneman. 37 Weisgerber. images collected and processed are often used as 21 Joseph Nye, noting the challenges facing 38 Ibid. proxy measurements to evaluate the effectiveness foreign policy analysts after the Cold War, 39 Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid War- of meeting prioritized collection requirements. described a mystery as an abstraction that does fare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, These data are easy to numerically collect and not lend itself to quick answers or easy analysis. March 11, 2016, available at . whether the intelligence process is contributing Secrets, on the other hand, are more defined 40 Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year meaningfully to solving the underlying intelli- problems that can be answered via espionage or Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace gence problem. It also speaks to a failure both to technical means. They lend themselves to satis- America as the Global Superpower (New York: critically analyze problems and to devise creative fying seemingly factual answers and descriptive Henry Holt, 2015). solutions. Lieutenant Colonel David Vernal, Air analysis. However, in the future, as more data 41 This is especially true regarding finding War College student, interview by the author, become publicly available, proper employment asymmetries against a conventionally stronger November 15, 2015. of human-machine collaboration applied toward foe. 10 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, the open source information environment may 42 Steven Pifer, “Russian Aggression Against Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile yield insights formerly reserved to classified Ukraine, and the West’s Policy Response,” testi- Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999). sensors alone. mony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 11 Ronald D. Garst, “Fundamentals of 22 This point was further supported in an Committee, Washington, DC, March 4, 2015, Intelligence Analysis,” in Intelligence Analysis: interview the author conducted with Robert available at . 12 The difference between descriptive analysis weapon manufacturing through an adversary 43 “NATO Flexes Its Muscle Mem- describing who, what, and where questions and country’s research and development timeline. ory,” The Economist, August 30, 2014, predictive analysis is that the latter does not easily He noted that foreign universities emphasize available at russias-ag- greater cognitive stress. Addressing predictive much as American higher education centers do. gression-ukraine-has-made-natos-sum- “what will happen” questions forces the analyst Information concerning technical developments mit-wales-most-important>; Dan Gonzales to assume more risk by making subjective can often be observed slowly building and then and Sarah Harting, “Exposing Russia’s Covert judgments amid uncertainty. Moreover, these rapidly disappearing, perhaps marking that a Actions,” U.S. News & World Report, April 29, open-ended questions must be answered with country has reached the appropriate phase of 2014. a range of possibilities, often tied to equally research to begin transitioning a capability to the 44 “Rise of the Machines,” The Economist, subjective probabilities. operational test and evaluation phases. May 9, 2015, 18–21. 13 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 23 Olcott, chap. 4. 45 Maryam M. Najafabadi et al., “Deep (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013). 24 Kahneman. Learning Applications and Challenges in Big 14 Vernal, interview, November 15, 2015. 25 Ibid. Data Analytics,” Journal of Big Data 2, no. 1 15 Kerbel. 26 Josh Kerbel, “The U.S. Intelligence Com- (2015), 1–21. 16 Remarks by Central Intelligence Agency munity Wants Disruptive Change as Long as 46 Kahneman. Director Michael Hayden, Council on Foreign It’s Not Disruptive,” War on the Rocks, January 47 Tetlock and Gardner. Relations, Washington, DC, September 7, 2007, 20, 2016, available at . disruptive/>. 50 Angela Chen, “Seeing into the Future,” 17 As Lieutenant Colonel Adam Stone iden- 27 Ibid. Chronicle of Higher Education, October 5, 2015, tified in a 2016 Air War College study, the Air 28 Treverton, 9. available at . wealth of critical thinking (CT) capability. Point- 30 Matthew Harris, “Marketing with Ins- 51 Michael Flynn, Matthew Pottinger, and ing to the Air Force Future Operating Concept’s tagram, the Fastest Growing Social Platform!” Paul Batchelor, “Fixing Intel in Afghanistan,” desire for the identification of critical thinkers The Medium Well, February 19, 2016, available Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 4 (2010), 62–67. and metrics to track critical thinking skills, Stone at . 53 Ibid. tested a sample of professional military education 31 Alec Ross, “Industries of the Future,” students in residence at the Air Command & Carnegie Council podcast, March 10, 2016. Staff College (ACSC), School for Advanced Air 32 Treverton, 6. and Space Studies, and Air War College (AWC). 33 Ralph S. Clem, “MH17 Three Years Later: His (statistically significant) results indicated, What Have We Learned,” War on the Rocks, July “AF officers attending ACSC and AWC were 18, 2017, available at

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Davitch 25 Marine sets up M18A1 claymore mine during Exercise Cobra Gold, February 14, 2014, at Ban Chan Krem, Kingdom of Thailand (U.S. Marine Corps/Adam Miller)

The Use of Explosives in Cities A Grim but Lawful Reality of War

By Thomas Ayres

efugees flowing out of the Middle explosives in cities, the flow of Syrian in an urban environment. In an effort to East pose a serious humanitarian refugees has caused some to call for a prevent unnecessary suffering and de- R crisis for Europe and the world complete ban on the use of explosive struction, the LOAC attempts to regulate at large. The indiscriminate use of weapons in cities or urban areas. But the conduct of armed hostilities without violence by the so-called Islamic State to what end? Let’s not learn the wrong unduly impeding the proper or allowable (IS), the unlawful actions of the Syrian lessons from this calamity. waging of war. Unfortunately, the current regime, and the conduct of some of The use of military force in cities calls by some nongovernmental organiza- the warring factions precipitated and or urban environments is not a new tions (NGOs) for a complete ban on the continue to fuel this crisis. Consequent phenomenon, nor does it present novel use of explosives in populated areas go far to the indiscriminate use of force and problems for which the Law of Armed beyond what the LOAC requires. Conflict (LOAC) is insufficient.1 For Already, law-abiding nations forced those acting under military necessity, the to fight in populated areas use extreme Major General Thomas Ayres, USA, is the Deputy LOAC demands much from those who caution. Professionalized military forces Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army. must use force against a military objective around the world take extraordinary

26 Forum / The Use of Explosives in Cities JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 precautions to accomplish their complex NGOs have waged a decades-long cam- cause civilian casualties. As an agreement missions while limiting civilian casualties paign to ban landmines, and they have between nations, the LOAC has always and protecting nonmilitary structures more recently followed with a similar if been about finding a balance between from the effects of attacks directed to- idealistically humanitarian desire to ban the need for violence to achieve necessary ward lawful military targets. For instance, cluster munitions. As discussed below, national goals such as self-defense and the former Department of Defense General such efforts have been persuasive and responsibility to prevent unnecessary suf- Counsel Jennifer O’Connor discussed successful in changing public, national, fering. The LOAC also seeks to preserve her recent observations on a trip to Iraq and international perceptions. Although life and humanity and limit suffering and the extreme care taken by U.S. the moral impulse to prohibit these ex- while acknowledging the reality that forces when making targeting decisions.2 plosives in cities is compelling, especially wars are violent. Therefore, the LOAC Existing LOAC obligates military com- as a way to further humanitarian goals, an does not prohibit the use of explosives in manders making targeting decisions to absolute prohibition on these weapons cities. However, as with any use of force, consider the cascading and multiplying would further encourage groups like the LOAC requires a calculated decision effects of explosive weapons on civilian IS to manipulate this well-intentioned based on necessity, proportionality, distin- populations when critical infrastructure control as just a new arrow in their asym- guishing civilians, and limiting suffering. such as power, water, sewage, and hospi- metric quiver. Such calculations are clearly more tals is concerned. difficult for military forces to make LOAC requires the commander or Future Enemies, Future Wars within urban environments crowded with anyone ordering offensive action in an Current violence in the Middle East, innocent civilians. But such calculations urban area to make careful assessments in where the use of explosives in populated still do not preemptively and exclusively order to prevent an impermissible extent areas has been so devastating, continues ban the use of explosives in cities. Where of “incidental loss of life or injury to with no end in sight. However, this would the common enemies of mankind civilians or damage to civilian objects.”3 current long war is also not the last gather if law-abiding national military The International Criminal Tribunal war. Terrorist organizations have made forces could never use overwhelming for the former Yugoslavia underlined their flagrant violations of the LOAC force within populated areas? The Islamic this principle as a transcendent norm in and against the customs of war routine. State has already shown us the answer noting that “certain fundamental norms They fight without uniforms, habitually through its regular use of human shields still serve unambiguously to outlaw use human shields, or purposely place as a means to exploit a nation-state’s (widespread and indiscriminate attacks their highest value weapon systems and practice of minimizing collateral casual- against civilians), such as rules pertaining operations among civilians. They take ties. A complete ban on otherwise lawful to proportionality.” The commander’s these measures purposefully in order tools available to nation-states to combat role is inherently demanding, but the both to improperly hide themselves indiscriminate violence would, ironically, standard remains that only clearly exces- and to incite retaliation by law-abiding increase violence, increase the likelihood sive strikes are per se impermissible. The military forces to cause greater civilian and quantity of innocent civilian injuries important point is that discretion remains casualties. Recent actions in Mosul are and deaths, and make the defense of civil- vested in reasonable persons, normally demonstrative and the United Nations ian populations even more difficult. military commanders, who share a High Commissioner for Human Orde Kittrie, in his thought-provok- professional ethos that obligates them Rights, Zeid bin Ra’ad al-Hussein, ing book Lawfare, discusses the idea of to balance competing goals in complex while noting that IS herds residents compliance-leverage disparity.7 The term is circumstances with incomplete or inaccu- into booby-trapped buildings as human easily understood considering the terrorist rate information.4 Israel’s supreme court shields and fires on those trying to flee, organizations we now face. Their tactics summarized this notion by noting that stated, “This is an enemy that ruthlessly to protect themselves purposely induce the authority of military commanders exploits civilians to support its own civilian casualties. They hide in civilian “must be properly balanced against the ends.”6 These terrorist organizations areas and invariably wear civilian clothes rights, needs, and interests of the local do have limited means and resources, while conducting their operations. Kittrie population: the law of war usually creates but future enemies may not have such contrasts “the painstaking law-abiding a delicate balance between two poles: limitations. Moreover, future enemies practices of the U.S. military and the military necessity on one hand, and hu- with greater resources and far greater dismissive practices of at least some of its manitarian considerations on the other.”5 war-making capacities would make only adversaries.” Kittrie notes that these op- The misguided initiative to go be- greater use of the safe haven of cities. posite approaches originate from different yond what the LOAC already exactingly Although the absence of war is pref- ideologies and tendencies regarding the requires—to implement an unconditional erable, until that utopian vision can be levels, means, and disparity in the transpar- ban on the use of explosives in populated realized, nations must accept the concept ency and accountability in the use of force. areas—must be viewed in the light of re- underpinning the LOAC that wartime The costs of compliance-leverage disparity cent, seemingly laudable NGO successes. violence can unintentionally spill over to are many, with the most insidious result

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Ayres 27 Students march to Nyakuron Cultural Center in Juba, South Sudan, April 2, 2015, during International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action (Courtesy UN/JC McIlwaine) being hesitance by law-abiding armies armies who see the advantage of compli- by the suffering, mobilized the local to use force even when such use is legal ance-leverage disparity will continue to use populace to respond and later founded and required by military necessity. This them in populated areas and benefit from the International Committee of the Red is a great jeopardy to lawful missions and the safe haven of their adversaries’ adher- Cross (ICRC). The ICRC, the only or- ultimately results in lengthier conflicts and ence. Well-resourced armies not intent ganization named within the four Geneva even greater loss of lives. on following the LOAC have historically Conventions, has an exclusive charter and Compliance-leverage disparity can and frequently used urban areas as key unique capacity to protect and advance also be viewed in a broader light. Terrorist defensive positions. Nazi Germany’s forti- the LOAC. Many NGOs seek to limit organizations are not alone in their fla- fication, or Konigsberg, during World War the effects of war, but the ICRC, with grant disregard of the LOAC. Nations II is just one of many examples. Providing its special and sometimes confidential also sometimes flagrantly disregard their even greater incentive to conceal armed relationship with nation-states, has been treaty obligations or customary inter- forces, emplace weapon systems, or fortify particularly balanced as they seek to limit national law limits in order to gain an cities would be creating and amplifying the effects of war on both civilians and advantage. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the conditions for new forms of perfidy in combatants. If wars are ever to be termi- Crimea, Hizballah tactics, Iran’s proxy the urban environment where the risk to nated, violent and deadly actions required in Lebanon, or China’s proclamation of civilians is greatest. by military necessity must be allowed. its Nine-Dash Line claiming territorial The unfortunate reality is that effec- However, with its unique charter, the rights over an outrageous expanse of the tive violence in war brings the war to its ICRC seems poised to take on the issue South China Sea are current examples. end, and when wars end quickly, poten- of banning explosives in populated areas. If explosive weapons in populated areas tial civilian suffering generally comes to a This is troubling. For when the ICRC are preemptively banned, not only will better conclusion. In 1859, the battlefield takes up a cause, international consensus terrorist organizations have easier safe of Solferino was strewn with 40,000 dead builds more quickly. harbor, but future well-resourced national and wounded. Henry Dunant, moved

28 Forum / The Use of Explosives in Cities JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Landmines and Cluster the end of 2018.12 Whether cluster muni- Although the ICRC’s desire to bring Munitions tions will be needed by the United States focus to this issue is laudable, this is no In 1996, the ICRC published a land- before 2018, or whether the technology time to come to the absolute conclusion mark paper, Anti-personnel Landmines: will be developed that would reach the that explosives should be banned in Friend or Foe?8 The humanitarian required dud-rates and allow cluster populated areas. In reality, the current movement to ban landmines had been munition use after 2018, remains to be proposal would protract a conflict, in- a longstanding campaign, and the seen. As the date grows nearer, and near- crease casualties on all sides, to include ICRC’s decision to enter the discussion peer adversaries continue to use cluster innocent civilians, and turn populated so forcefully was not without significant munitions, calls to delay the ban and ex- areas into rubble as a consequence of influence. In 1997, the Convention on tend the use of cluster munitions by the rooting out the enemy house to house. A the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, United States grow.13 ban of this nature is overbroad and might Production, and Transfer of Anti-Per- indeed portend even greater suffering, sonal Mines and on Their Destruction, The ICRC Enters the death, and loss of humanity. It would known informally at the Ottawa Treaty, Explosives in Cities Debate leave those we want civilian populations was adopted. By 1998, 40 nations In February 2015, the ICRC convened to be protected from—those terrorists had ratified the treaty, triggering its a meeting of experts on the dangers and common enemies of mankind—as entry into force. It became binding on of using explosives in populated areas, the only sure beneficiaries. Instead of March 1, 1999. Although the United and they also published a short video banning explosives in cities outright, States was opposed to the treaty and on the topic.14 In June 2016, the nations should ensure that military forces is not a signatory, the treaty has not ICRC published a fact sheet calling using explosives in populated areas con- been without effect. On September 23, on signatories to the conventions and sider in their proportionality calculus the 2014, the Barack Obama administra- parties to armed conflicts to avoid possibility of cascading effects of weapon tion announced it would abide by key using explosive weapons that have a systems use and impacts on infrastructure requirements of the Ottawa Conven- wide impact area in densely populated and the inhabitability that results, further tion with the exception of the Korean areas due to the significant likelihood leading to refugees, to increased loss of Peninsula.9 of indiscriminate effects.15 Whether the life, and to greater human suffering. Such Similarly, the ICRC added its voice ICRC’s added voice to the call to ban diligent and due care is reasonable and to the topic of cluster munitions and explosive weapons in populated areas required by the law of war, and does not its influence to the Cluster Munition will have the same pronounced effect as subvert its intentions. JFQ Coalition to great effect. After the 2005 it had on the debates on landmines and military campaign between Israel and cluster munitions is still to be seen. It is Hizballah, where both sides were accused clear that their presence in the debate Notes of killing civilians with cluster muni- can add significant velocity to the speed 1 tions, the ICRC engaged on the topic. at which the topic will be debated, and The Department of Defense (DOD) defines thelaw of war as “that part of interna- During a November 2006 conference in whether the issue may catch hold in the tional law that regulates the conduct of armed Geneva regarding the 1980 Convention international community. hostilities. It is often called the ‘law of armed on Certain Conventional Weapons, the No person or nation of reason can conflict.’” See DOD Directive 2311.01E,DOD ICRC sought to address the issue of be opposed to the noble goal of limiting Law of War Program, May 9, 2006. See also limiting the use of cluster munitions.10 civilian casualties. Similarly, we should DOD Directive 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Manual, June 2015: “International humani- With work on the Oslo Accords begin- all desire to avoid future refugee issues tarian law [IHL] is an alternative term for the ning in earnest in 2007, the Convention on the scale or scope of the Syrian crisis. law of war that may be understood to have the on Cluster Munitions was adopted on At first glance, many NGOs and nations same substantive meaning as the law of war.” May 30, 2008, in Dublin, Ireland, and would appear only more reasonable 2 Jennifer M. O’Connor, “Applying the was signed on December 3–4, 2008, in and humane by coalescing around such Law of Targeting to the Modern Battlefield,” 11 remarks at New York University School of Oslo, Norway. Once again, the ICRC’s a noble, humanitarian goal. By seeing Law, November 28, 2016, available at . Ms. O’Connor’s remarks impact would be felt in the United States. a war waged within the limited borders include this description of the punctilious nature of reviewing targets: In 2008, despite apparent misgivings of one nation, or combat against one clear from his statement, Secretary of limited foe—even a transnational terrorist At one location, I observed a dynamic strike Defense Robert Gates announced that foe—such calls seem to make sense. But take place. I was in a meeting at the Joint Operations Center. A military lawyer, also the United States would eliminate all the result may be more far-reaching and present in the meeting, got called into the cluster bombs that do not meet estab- dangerous. strike cell to work with the commander who lished safety and dud-rate standards by was the target engagement authority—the

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Ayres 29 14: “Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.” This premise of international law is the articulated principle of proportionality that applies in all armed conflicts at all times as a matter of both treaty law and widespread state practice. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reflects this tenet in Article 8, which addresses war crimes in both international and noninternational armed conflicts. 4 Michael Newton and Larry May, Pro- portionality in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 117–119. 5 Beit Sourik Village Council v. the Gov- ernment of Israel, HCJ 2056/04, ¶34 (2004), available at . 6 “U.S. Sees Probable Role in Mosul Blast, Probe Under Way,” Reuters, March 28, 2017, available at . 7 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 8 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? (Geneva: ICRC, March 1996). 9 Department of State, U.S. Landmine Policy (2014), available at . 10 Lionel Beehner, “The Campaign to Ban Cluster Bombs,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 21, 2006, available at . 11 The Convention on Cluster Munitions, available at . 12 DOD, “Cluster Munitions Policy Re- leased,” press release, July 9, 2008, available at . 13 Bob Scales, “Bring Back Artillery Marine sweeps for signs of improvised explosive devices during training aboard Camp Buehring, Submunitions; Russian Threat Too Great,” Kuwait, November 1, 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Christopher O’Quin) Breaking Defense, October 21, 2016, available at . improvised explosive devices] that were com- scanned to get close-up views and also to pull 14 “Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: pleted but not yet on the move to where they back to provide a wide-angle view in order The Consequences for Civilians,” International would be detonated. Before authorizing the to see if there were other buildings or people Committee of the Red Cross video, 1:49, June strike, the commander methodically worked nearby. This all moved very quickly, and 15, 2015, available at . tions, including what information supported target engagement authority was satisfied, he 15 ICRC, “Explosive Weapons in Populated the assessment that these were VBIEDS, and asked the judge advocate whether he had any Areas—Factsheet,” June 14, 2016, available at that the people near them were ISIL [Islamic remaining legal or policy issues, and when . weapons were available, whether any civilians carry out the strike. were nearby and how his staff reached their 3 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise conclusion to these questions, what the collat- Doswald-Beck, eral effects would be, whether those collateral Customary International Hu- (New York: effects would be proportionate to the concrete manitarian Law, Volume 1: Rules Cambridge University Press, 2005); see Rule

30 Forum / The Use of Explosives in Cities JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 2199 (February 12, 2015) condemning any trade, in particular of oil and oil products, with ISIL (Daesh), Al-Nusrah Front, and any other entities designated as associated with al Qaeda (Courtesy UN/Loey Felipe) Follow the Money Targeting Enemy War-Sustaining Activities

By Jeffrey Miller and Ian Corey

[O]ur attacks on [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] economic infrastructure—from oil wells and trucks to cash storage to ISIL’s financial leaders—is putting a stranglehold on ISIL’s ability to pay its fighters, undermining its ability to govern, and making it harder to attract new recruits.

—Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, April 2016

e see them every day on the taxes are drawn—taxes that ultimately highways and byways of provide the manpower and equipment America—18-wheel trailers for the Nation’s Armed Forces. If Lieutenant Colonel (P) Jeffrey Miller, USA, is W a Strategic Initiatives Officer for The Judge and tankers hauling the goods and the so-called Islamic State (IS) were Advocate General, Department of the Army, at resources that drive the American to attack these vehicles on America’s the Pentagon. Colonel Ian Corey, USA, is a Staff Judge Advocate at U.S. Army Cyber Command at economy. From this commerce, revenue highways, we would call it terrorism. Fort Belvoir, Virginia. is developed, and from this revenue, Take those same tankers, however, fill

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Miller and Corey 31 them with oil drawn from or refined in which has its roots in the American all economic activity within a society IS-controlled fields or facilities, target Civil War when the Union Army tar- could arguably be found to support that them on a north-bound dirt road in geted the Confederate cotton industry society’s ability to make war. The U.S. Syria or Iraq, as U.S. and coalition for destruction, is that this definition position regarding the lawfulness of forces have been doing in Operation is broad enough to include certain targeting of such activities, however, is Inherent Resolve, and what would we economic activities of an enemy due to not absolute and, unlike the majority po- call it? We would call it the lawful use the contribution that such activities may sition that would prohibit such targeting of force against a military objective. So, make upon the enemy’s financial ability under all circumstances, offers signifi- what is the difference? to sustain its war efforts.2 This position, cant flexibility. As stated by the former The difference goes far beyond the however, is far from universally held. Department of Defense General Counsel obvious distinction in the quality and In fact, “prior to the conflict with [IS], in a recent speech, “We do not believe character of actors in these two scenarios. scholarly reviews suggested that the categorically that we can target any and The difference lies in the extreme efforts United States may be alone or almost all cash or revenue-generating objects that U.S. and coalition forces expend alone among States in considering simply because of their nature. Rather, we to identify targets as legitimate military enemy war-sustaining capabilities legiti- consider each potential target on a case- objectives and minimize the potential loss mate military targets.”3 by-case basis and evaluate it in light of of civilian life. In other words, the latter The majority position is generally the information we have available.”6 This represents a lawful use of force because captured by the Commentary of the flexible approach enabled CJTF-OIR to it is in strict compliance with the Law of International Committee of the Red gain a definite and inarguable military Armed Conflict (LOAC). Cross (ICRC) to Additional Protocol I advantage from the targeting of IS oil Recent experience and the successful to the Geneva Conventions regarding trucks that the majority position would execution of a campaign to deprive IS the meaning of “definite military advan- have denied it. of its war-sustaining oil revenue by the tage” within the accepted definition of United States and its coalition partners a lawful military objective. Specifically, Operation Tidal Wave II provide a model for depriving an enemy the ICRC commentary asserts that “it is IS has been characterized as the richest force of the economic activity that it not legitimate to launch an attack which terrorist organization in history. It relies on to sustain its war efforts in a only offers potential or indeterminate is funded in large part by extortion, manner consistent with the LOAC. This advantages.”4 Unlike traditional military seizure of funds from Iraqi state-con- article examines the targeting of enemy objectives, such as enemy command trolled banks that have come under war-sustaining activities through the and control nodes, vehicles, weapons, their control, and sale of looted ancient lens of successful efforts by the U.S.-led, or soldiers, whose destruction, capture, artifacts. Its most significant source of counter-IS coalition in Iraq and Syria— or neutralization on the battlefield pro- income in 2015, however, was from Combined Joint Task Force–Operation vides an immediate and definite military the sale of oil and gas drawn from the Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)—to disrupt advantage, the advantage to be gained fields it captured in Iraq and Syria. The IS ability to generate revenue through from the destruction of economic ac- proceeds from these sales accounted for the sale of oil. Aided by a diligent and tivity that sustains an enemy’s ability to about half of IS’s estimated $1 billion intensive intelligence effort, and guided make war is inevitably less immediate in annual revenue.7 The bulk of IS’s oil by a commitment to the principles of and usually speculative at the time of the income funded its military operations, LOAC, CJTF-OIR demonstrated that attack. Furthermore, such activity is, by including the payment of its fighters the economic activity an enemy relies on its nature if not its use, inherently civilian and the purchase of weapons. There can to sustain its war efforts can be lawfully in nature, raising concerns regarding the be little doubt that this industry was targeted under LOAC, notwithstanding LOAC principle of distinction. For these making an effective contribution to IS’s the skepticism of much of the world reasons, the U.S. position regarding the military action. community. legality of targeting enemy war-sustaining Even before CJTF-OIR stood up activities is a minority one, opposed even in October 2014, U.S. military forces A Minority View by many of our allies.5 and partner nations began targeting IS- Under the LOAC, lawfully targetable Another concern that some have controlled oil facilities. The first strikes, military objectives are “those objects raised regarding the legality of targeting in September 2014, were on modular which by their nature, location, war-sustaining activities is that the U.S. oil refineries that “[provided] fuel to run purpose, or use make an effective con- position could present a slippery slope, [IS] operations, money to finance their tribution to military action and whose ultimately permitting the targeting of continued attacks throughout Iraq and total or partial destruction, capture or virtually any industry that arguably sup- Syria, and . . . [were] an economic asset neutralization, in the circumstances ports an enemy’s warfighting effort, even to support future operations.”8 These ruling at the time, offers a definite if only through the production of taxes. efforts, however, were only marginally military advantage.”1 The U.S. view, After all, taken to an extreme, virtually effective in damaging the IS war effort.

32 Forum / Targeting Enemy War-Sustaining Activities JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Over the course of a year of targeting oil facilities, including major oil fields in Iraq and Syria, the coalition determined that these strikes were having a minimal effect on the enemy. IS was frequently able to repair the damage caused by these strikes within a matter of days, or even hours. Moreover, the strikes did little to disrupt the oil trade itself that continued to fill IS coffers. In October 2015, CJTF-OIR significantly expanded the targeting of IS’s oil enterprise with the execution of Operation Tidal Wave II.9 As a phased operation, Tidal Wave II stepped up the number of strikes; sought effects that would disrupt operations for months instead of days; and, perhaps most significantly, expanded the target set to include the tanker trucks that formed the core of the oil distribution network and without which IS’s oil trade could not flourish. The decision to target the trucks used to haul IS oil represented a significant departure from prior practice and was not without controversy. Prior to Tidal Wave II, oil tankers—sometimes massed by the hundreds or even thousands at IS- controlled oil facilities—were specifically excluded from targeting in an abundance of caution related to concerns regarding the LOAC principle of distinction. This principle requires belligerents to distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and military objectives on the other. The former may not be targeted intentionally, while attacks must be strictly limited to the latter. These tankers presented three concerns regarding the principle of distinction: the trucks themselves, by their nature, were civilian objects; the drivers of these trucks were civilians; and the oil in the tanks became a civilian object that people relied on once purchased from IS. The former reluctance to target these trucks com- ported with the majority view disfavoring the targeting of war-sustaining objects. Given the relative ineffectiveness of the targeting of IS oil facilities and the U.S. position that military objectives may include, under certain circumstances, war-sustaining activities that indirectly “Coalition Airstrike Destroys 283 Daesh Oil Trucks Near Al Hassakah and Dayr Az Zawr, Syria, to but effectively support and sustain the en- Degrade Daesh Oil Revenue,” November 22, 2015 (Screenshot: Combined Joint Task Force–Operation emy’s warfighting capability, CJTF-OIR Inherent Resolve video)

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Miller and Corey 33 began to carefully analyze and reassess the revenue produced by its oil distribution Results targeting of these trucks. Supported by network to fund its military operations, By all accounts, Operation Tidal Wave an intense intelligence effort and consid- this collateral damage would never be ex- II has been a resounding success as of ering potential targets on a case-by-case cessive in relation to the advantage to be this writing. In January 2016, news basis, this analysis revealed the trucks that gained by the disruption of this network. outlets reported that IS was slashing formed the basis of the IS oil distribution Finally, in reassessing the legality of the pay of its fighters by half, a move at networks could become lawful targets. targeting this activity, the status of truck least partly attributed to strikes on its Regarding the status of the trucks drivers presented the greatest concern oil enterprise.12 By May 2016, Assistant as civilian objects, under LOAC if a for CJTF-OIR, which recognized that Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist belligerent uses a civilian object for it was virtually impossible to positively Financing Daniel Glaser estimated that military purposes the object will lose its identify these drivers as members of IS. IS oil revenue had shrunk by half.13 protected status and become a valid mil- Doing so would have rendered them More recently, in December 2016, itary objective. Based on the intelligence combatants subject to targeting. On the after thousands of strikes on IS oil assessments available at the time, there contrary, as the Chairman of the Joint infrastructure and the destruction of was no doubt that IS was using its oil Chiefs of Staff testified before the House over 1,200 oil trucks, the Special Envoy distribution network to primarily fund Armed Services Committee, “We assessed for the Global Coalition to Counter its military operations, and the trucks that the majority of the truck drivers IS, Brett McGurk, briefed reporters by were the critical component of that net- were, in fact, just people trying to make saying, “We’re destroying ISIL’s eco- work. Unlike other traditionally civilian a living in the region.”10 While civilians nomic base. . . . They cannot pay their economic activity, there was nothing can lose their protection under LOAC fighters.”14 speculative or unpredictable about the by directly participating in hostilities, the military advantage to be gained by the act of merely hauling oil purchased from Given the success of Operation Tidal destruction or neutralization of this IS did not constitute such participation. Wave II, it is undeniable that war-sus- network. Accordingly, the trucks used Accordingly, these individuals presented taining activities like the Islamic to distribute IS oil were determined to concerns regarding the LOAC principle State’s oil enterprise could constitute have lost their protected status. CJTF- of distinction. important military target sets. If tar- OIR went to great lengths to identify While LOAC would not permit geted successfully, their destruction or and target only those trucks that could CJTF-OIR to intentionally target these neutralization could severely impact reasonably be associated with an IS- truck drivers, it did not preclude their ac- an enemy’s ability to engage in armed controlled oil facility. This intensive cidental injury or even death as collateral conflict and, hopefully, lead to an earlier intelligence effort enabled CJTF-OIR damage incident to strikes on the trucks cessation of hostilities. This success to distinguish between those trucks that or any other valid military objective and the potentially positive outcome were, by their purpose and use, definitely associated with the oil facilities. As with highlights the value of the U.S. case- making an effective contribution to IS its efforts to identify and target only by-case approach to the targeting of military action and those that may have those trucks associated with IS facilities, war-sustaining activities. Under the been used for purely civilian purposes. CJTF-OIR went to extraordinary lengths majority view, Operation Tidal Wave Similar to the trucks themselves, to minimize civilian losses incidental to II would not have been permitted, CJTF-OIR assessed the oil being hauled the targeting of IS oil trucks. Specifically, despite the entirely predictable military in the trucks as being used by IS for a CJTF-OIR took steps to mitigate the risk advantage that such targeting produced military purpose. Like the Confederate to drivers, providing pre-strike warnings while minimizing civilian losses. While cotton targeted for destruction by Union such as leaflet drops, low aircraft passes, it may well be that the United States forces 150 years before, IS oil was the and strafing runs to encourage the drivers has been “alone or almost alone” in “great staple” funding military operations to abandon their trucks before becoming its position regarding the targeting of and therefore a valid military objective collateral damage.11 Moreover, prior to war-sustaining activities, the success of even once purchased from IS by the truck authorizing any strike, the responsible the operation may represent a critical drivers. This analysis, however, was not commander had the duty under the turning point in the world’s view of the sole basis that CJTF-OIR relied on LOAC principle of proportionality to such actions. Other nations participat- to justify the destruction of the oil being evaluate each target to ensure that the ing in the counter-IS fight have joined hauled in trucks associated with an IS oil anticipated civilian collateral damage was the United States in actively targeting facility. As a fallback position, CJTF-OIR not excessive in relation to the concrete the IS oil enterprise. They include two assessed that even if the oil converted to and direct military advantage anticipated stalwart allies and a peer competitor: a civilian object upon its sale to the truck by the strike. the United Kingdom, France, and drivers, its destruction would constitute Russia. Along with the United States, collateral damage during the targeting these participants represent four of the of the trucks. Given IS reliance on the five permanent members of the United

34 Forum / Targeting Enemy War-Sustaining Activities JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Nations Security Council. If indeed the the House Committee on Armed Forces, YouTube.com, December 1, 2015, available U.S. view remains the minority view, it at . the time has come for the majority to 11 See, for example, Tom Vanden Brook, NDU Press reassess its position. JFQ “Leaflets Prompt ISIL Truckers to Flee,” for the Center for the Study of USA Today, November 19, 2015, avail- Chinese Military Affairs able at . China’s Future SSBN Command and 12 See, for example, Jose Pagliery, “ISIS Control Structure 1 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Cuts Its Fighters’ Salaries by 50%,” CNN. by David C. Logan Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating com, January 19, 2016, available at cnn.com/2016/01/19/news/world/ veloping its Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), Arti- isis-salary-cuts/index.html?sr=fbCNN012016i- cle 52(2). Although not ratified by the United sis-salary-cuts0102AMVODtopLink&link- first credible States, it considers this principle to be binding Id=20506180>. sea-based customary international law. 13 See Daniel L. Glaser’s remarks in “Foun- nuclear forces. 2 Office of the General Counsel,Law of dation for Defense of Democracies Holds a This emer- War Manual (Washington, DC: Department Discussion Entitled ‘State of Play: Combating gent nuclear of Defense, June 2015), paragraph 5.17.2.3, Today’s Illicit Financial Networks,’” May 11, available at . org/content/uploads/documents/FDD_Gla- sile submarine 3 Ryan Goodman, “Targeting ‘War-Sus- ser_Event_Transcript_May_2016.pdf>. (SSBN) force will pose unique chal- taining’ Objects in Non-International Armed Assistant Secretary Glaser attributed this to a lenges to a country that has favored Conflict,”American Journal of Internation- combination of reasons, including a drop in the tightly centralized control over al Law, vol. 110 (June 2016), available at international price of oil and expanded count- . Tidal Wave II. China makes about SSBN command 4 Commentary on the Additional Protocols 14 White House, press briefing, December and control will have important of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 13, 2016, available at . mand and control will be mediated jection of our allies to the U.S. plan to target by operational, bureaucratic, and components of the Taliban’s narcotics industry political considerations. A hybrid in Afghanistan. See Judy Dempsey, “Afghan Drug Fight Will Follow Law’s Letter, NATO approach to command and control, Says,” New York Times, November 1, 2009, with authority divided between the available at nato.4.20119005.html>. be most conducive to supporting 6 Jennifer M. O’Connor, “Applying the strategic stability. Law of Targeting to the Modern Battlefield,” remarks delivered at New York University School of Law, November 28, 2016, available at . 7 Daniel L. Glaser, remarks delivered at Chatham House, London, England, Febru- ary 8, 2016, available at . 8 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” September 25, 2014, available at . 9 The operation was named after World War II’s Operation Tidal Wave, which unsuccess- fully sought to deliver a knockout blow to the German war effort by striking the oil refineries in Romania that produced the bulk of Nazi petroleum products. Visit the NDU Press Web site for 10 “U.S. Strategy for Syria and Iraq and Its more information on publications Implications for the Region,” hearing before at ndupress.ndu.edu

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Miller and Corey 35 NDU Press Congratulates the Winners of the 2017 Essay Competitions

DU Press is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Chairman Strategic Research Paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and JFQ George C. Maerz essay competitions. N NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 18–19, 2017, during First Place which 27 faculty judges from 14 participating professional military education insti- Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Ray tutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place winners in each Ogden, USA of the three categories are published in the following pages. U.S. Army War College “Butter Bar to Four Star: Deficiencies in Secretary of Defense National Third Place Leader Development” Security Essay Competition Colonel Paul Wayne Turnbull, Jr., USA Second Place U.S. Army War College Colonel Jeremiah Monk, USAF “Asian Alliances in the Era of America Air War College First” “End State: The Fallacy of Modern Military Planning” Chairman of the Joint In 2017, the 11th annual competi- Chiefs of Staff Strategic Third Place tion was intended to stimulate new Essay Competition Lieutenant Colonel (P) Owen Gale approaches to coordinated civilian and Ray, USA military action from a broad spectrum U.S. Army War College of civilian and military students. Essays “The Second Wave: Resurgence of were to address U.S. Government struc- Violent Islamic Extremism in Southeast ture, policies, capabilities, resources, Asia” and/or practices and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate This annual competition, in its 36th Strategy Article the core competencies of our national year in 2017, challenges students at security institution. the Nation’s joint professional military First Place education institutions to write research Nathaniel Kahler First Place papers or articles about significant College of International Security Affairs Travis W. Reznik aspects of national security strategy to “Asadism and Legitimacy in Syria” Marine Corps Command and Staff stimulate strategic thinking, promote College well-written research, and contribute Second Place “The Risk of Delay: The Need for a New to a broader security debate among Colonel James McNeill Efaw, USA Authorization for Use of Military Force” professionals. U.S. Army War College “Countering Violent Extremists’ Online Second Place Recruiting and Radicalization” Lieutenant Colonel Brian A. Denaro, USAF Third Place National War College Major Benjamin Paul Wagner, USMC “1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: U.S. College of Naval Command and Staff Strategic Leadership” “The New Great Game: Why India and Pakistan Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Should Matter”

36 Essay Competitions / Introduction JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Joint Force Quarterly Maerz Awards In its second year, the JFQ George C. Maerz Awards, chosen by the staff of NDU New from Press, recognizes the most influential articles from the previous year’s four issues of JFQ. Five outstanding articles were chosen for the Maerz Awards, named in honor NDU Press of Mr. George C. Maerz, former writer-editor of NDU Press. for the Center for Strategic Research Strategic Forum 298 Best Forum Article Best Features Article Cross-Functional Teams in Defense Celestino Perez, Jr. James Hasik Reform: Help or Hindrance? “Errors in Strategic Thinking: Anti- “Defense Entrepreneurship: How to By Christopher J. Lamb Politics and the Macro Bias,” JFQ 81 (2nd Build Institutions for Innovation Inside There is Quarter 2016) the Military,” JFQ 81 (2nd Quarter 2016) strong bipartisan support Best JPME Today Article Best Recall Article for Section Matthew F. Cancian F.G. Hoffman 941 of the “Officers Are Less Intelligent: What Does “The American Wolf Packs: A Case Study Senate’s ver- It Mean?” JFQ 81 (2nd Quarter 2016) in Wartime Adaptation,” JFQ 80 (1st sion of the Quarter 2016) National Best Commentary Article Defense Gregory M. Tomlin Authorization Act for 2017, which “#SocialMediaMatters: Lessons Learned requires the Pentagon to use cross- from Exercise Trident Juncture,” JFQ 82 functional teams (CFTs). CFTs are (3rd Quarter 2016) a popular organizational construct with a reputation for delivering better and faster solutions for complex Distinguished and rapidly evolving problems. The Judges Department of Defense reaction to Twenty-seven senior the bill has been strongly negative. faculty members from Senior officials argue that Section the 14 participating 941 would “undermine the author- PME institutions took ity of the Secretary, add bureaucracy, time out of their busy and confuse lines of responsibility.” schedules to serve as The Senate’s and Pentagon’s dia- judges. Their personal metrically opposed positions on the dedication and pro- value of CFTs can be partially recon- fessional excellence ciled with a better understanding of ensured a strong and what CFTs are, how cross-functional credible competition. groups have performed to date in the Pentagon, and their prerequi- Front row, left to right: Dr. Charles C. Chadbourn III, Naval War College; Ms. Andrea Hamlen, Marine sites for success. This paper argues Corps University; Dr. Carl “CJ” Horn, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Eric Shibuya, Marine there is strong evidence that CFTs Corps Command and Staff College. Middle row, left to right: Dr. Thomas A. Hughes, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman, NDU Press; Dr. Kristin Mulready-Stone, could provide impressive benefits if U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Benjamin (Frank) Cooling, Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National the teams were conceived and em- Security and Resource Strategy; Dr. Anand Toprani, Naval War College. Back row, left to right: Ms. ployed correctly. Joanna E. Seich, NDU Press; Dr. Jim Chen, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Greg McGuire, Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. Laura Manning Johnson, National War College; Captain Bill Marlowe, USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Brian McNeil, Air War College; Dr. Ryan Wadle, Air Command and Staff College; Commander Jeffrey Stebbins, USN, U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Paul J. Springer, Air Command and Staff College. Not shown: Dr. Linda Di Desidero, Marine Corps University; Dr. Antulia (Tony) Echevarria, U.S. Army War College; Dr. Kathryn Fisher, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Rebecca Johnson, Marine Corps War College; Dr. Sorin Lungu, Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Dr. Stephen J. Mariano, National War College; Dr. Bradley J. Meyer, School of Advanced Warfighting; Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College; Colonel Craig J. Price, USMCR (AR), Marine Corps War College; Dr. Michael L. Rupert, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Margaret Visit the NDU Press Web site for Sankey, Air War College. more information on publications Photo by John Briscoe, NDU at ndupress.ndu.edu

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 2017 Winners 37 Ground Zero, New York City, September 14, 2001 (U.S. Air National Guard/Mark C. Olsen)

dozen years earlier: the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military The Risk of Delay Force (AUMFs). Despite specifically authorizing the use of military force The Need for a New against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks and the terrorist threat posed in Iraq, respectively, the 2001 and 2002 Authorization for Use of AUMFs have remained the primary basis for our nation’s counterterrorism Military Force efforts abroad for over 15 years.3 Yet during this period, the world has witnessed the collapse of Saddam Husse- By Travis W. Reznik in’s regime, death of Osama bin Laden, proliferation of new terrorist groups across the Middle East, Southeast n September 2014, President Barack into Syria, and “wherever [the terror- Asia, and Africa, and the international Obama announced a four-part plan ists] are.”1 While President Obama expansion of IS. I to systematically destroy the so-called welcomed congressional support for President Obama’s decision to engage Islamic State (IS), a plan that included the effort in order to show the world IS under the purview of these AUMFs— sustained military operations in Iraq, that America was united in confront- which came on the heels of Abu Bakr ing this new danger, he claimed the al-Baghdadi’s June 2014 announcement executive branch had the authority to of the so-called Islamic caliphate—re- unilaterally approve such use of mili- energized the debate among Congress, Travis W. Reznik wrote this essay while a student tary force against IS.2 The President’s White House, and public regarding the at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. It won the 2017 Secretary of Defense National justification rested on two congres- need for a new AUMF to more appropri- Security Essay Competition. sional resolutions passed into law over a ately and legally authorize U.S. military

38 Essay Competitions / The Need for a New AUMF JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 force against the expanding IS threat. placing Americans in danger and the war on terror and ensure that Washington The Obama administration assessed country at great risk of attack. can lawfully continue using military force that the existing AUMFs sufficiently President Obama’s unilateral autho- to keep the Nation safe. authorized the use of military force rization to use military force against IS against IS based on the group’s former in 2014 highlighted the first two reasons Broad Language: Breaking ties to al Qaeda as well as its presence why a new AUMF is necessary: the Down the 2001 AUMF in Iraq. Members of Congress assessed dangers of the expansion of Presidential Despite specifically authorizing the use the connection between IS and al Qaeda power regarding the declaration of of military force against those responsi- was tenuous at best (since IS had not war, and the international ramifications ble for the 9/11 attacks, the George W. spawned until 2004) and began calling of relying on outdated statutes to use Bush and Obama administrations cited for a new AUMF to specifically authorize military force abroad. The unwillingness the 2001 AUMF8 to initiate or continue the use of force against IS. However, nei- of Congress to compromise on a new military or related action a combined 37 ther side of the aisle could agree on the AUMF contributed to a third reason: different occasions, in countries includ- proper scope, authorities, or limitations leaving a new and inexperienced coming the Philippines, Georgia, Yemen, of a new AUMF, leaving Obama to finish mander in chief who has an unpredictable Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and out his Presidential term by continuing agenda with an unprecedented amount of Somalia.9 Beau Barnes demonstrated to justify the use of military force against pre-existing authority. President Trump’s how this was possible by breaking down IS and other terrorist organizations under vow to bring IS detainees to GTMO the 2001 AUMF based on five reference the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs. Despite produced a fourth urgent reason for points: object, method, time, place, and congressional recognition of the need for Congress to act. purpose.10 Using Barnes’s approach in a new AUMF, given the questionable link After examining how the broad a more straightforward manner—that between the existing AUMFs and the use language of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs is, in terms of who, what, when, where, of military force against IS, the status quo afforded the executive branch the flex- and why the statute authorizes military of relying on the 2001 and 2002 authori- ibility to use military force for so long, force—it becomes clear how Presidents zations seemed good enough—until now. this article expounds on the above four Bush and Obama were able to apply it Under the Obama administra- reasons why a new AUMF is necessary. It so broadly. tion, there was no pressing reason for then examines why previous AUMF draft Regarding the “who,” the 2001 Congress to compromise and draft a new attempts have failed at gaining bipartisan AUMF authorizes the use of force against AUMF because there existed no practical congressional approval and concludes those nations, organizations, or persons context for the courts to interpret the with suggested language that is palatable who planned, authorized, committed, or legality of President Obama’s extension to both sides of the aisle for a new AUMF aided the terrorist attacks that occurred of the AUMF.4 However, with a new in 2017. on September 11, 2001. The resolution commander in chief who has vowed to While the language in a new AUMF text itself is clear that Congress did not ramp up efforts to wipe out terrorism must strike a measured balance between authorize the President to use military and to “load Guantanamo Bay [GTMO] flexibility and limitation, it is the inherent action against terrorists generally.11 with some bad dudes” (including IS message behind passing a new authori- Yet because al Qaeda quickly claimed detainees), the practical context of judi- zation that is now most important. As responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, any cial review now looms on the horizon.5 James Mattis wrote in March 2015, a terrorist group that associates with it (as If President Donald Trump sends an new AUMF resolution supported by a in the case of al Qaeda in the Arabian IS detainee to GTMO, that detainee majority of both parties in both houses of Peninsula) or was subsequently spawned will almost certainly petition for habeas Congress would send an essential message from it (as in the case of IS) can be con- corpus. The courts could then determine of American steadfastness to our people sidered within the scope of the AUMF.12 that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs neither and to the global audience.7 Congress For example, in November 2016, the accurately nor lawfully authorize today’s must act with courage and vigor to reach Obama administration made this deter- broad use of force against IS and other a compromise and send the message that mination for al Shabaab in Somalia, even current terrorist threats.6 Given that the Nation is still committed to the fight though the group had not formed until the use of military force remains an es- against terrorism. The time for partisan 2006. President Obama stated because al sential option to counter these threats to debate and delay has passed. A new Shabaab had publicly pledged loyalty to keep America safe, the country cannot AUMF will not only satisfy the require- al Qaeda, made clear that it considers the risk an adverse judicial determination ment for Congress to be more involved United States an enemy, and was respon- based solely on insufficient and outdated when committing American troops to sible for numerous plots, threats, and statutes that could force a suspension in conflict, bolster U.S. credibility on the attacks against U.S. persons and interests counterterrorism efforts. Such an out- international stage, and help limit the in East Africa, the group was an “associ- come would allow IS and other terrorist new President, but also send a message of ated force” of al Qaeda and therefore groups to regroup and refit, unnecessarily American resolve and unity regarding the within the scope of the 2001 AUMF.13

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Reznik 39 Moving on to the “what,” the foreign country is amenable to U.S. assis- ment, the same act also states that “the AUMF authorizes the President to use tance, the President is legally authorized collective judgment of both the Congress all necessary and appropriate force, to use military force.18 and the President will apply to the intro- clearly meaning military force, and thus The final aspect is the purpose. The duction of United States Armed Forces encompassing the use of lethal force. 2001 AUMF authorizes the President to into hostilities.”22 Section 1542 of the In compliance with international law, use force “in order to prevent any future law clarifies further, stating that the however, the modifiers necessary and acts of international terrorism against President in every possible instance shall appropriate do limit the President’s au- the United States.” While some observ- consult with Congress before introduc- thority and ensure the force employed is ers view the “in order to” clause as a ing the Armed Forces into hostilities, consistent with what is “necessary and ap- limiting function—in that the President and after every such introduction shall propriate” to “prevent any future acts of can only use military force to prevent consult regularly with the Congress until international terrorism against the United future terrorist attacks—others argue they are no longer engaged in hostili- States.” As Barnes explains, “Any force the clause bolsters a rhetorical and policy ties or have been removed from such beyond that which is required to prevent goal and opens the umbrella for a much situations.23 future attacks would be unauthorized,” broader use of military force.19 Others Despite such a clear mandate, the concluding that “if the United States simply claim the “in order to” clause was broad language in the current AUMFs had responded to the 9/11 attacks by included to satisfy the international law does not require the President to seek reverting to the World War II–era prac- prohibition against reprisals.20 collective judgment from, or regularly tice of indiscriminate carpet bombing, After breaking down the 2001 consult with, Congress regarding the that action would have been beyond that AUMF, it becomes clearer how the application of military force. The reper- which was ‘necessary and appropriate’ to statute’s language allowed the ex- cussions have transcended more than prevent future terrorist attacks.”14 ecutive branch much room for broad mere constitutional or academic debate. In terms of the “when,” the AUMF interpretation. In December 2016, just In 2011, for instance, the American contains no explicit reference to duration. weeks before leaving the White House, Civil Liberties Union sued the Obama The only temporal limitation is the nexus President Obama summarized his ad- administration for conducting a missile to the terrorist attacks that occurred on ministration’s rationale in this regard. strike to kill Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, 9/11. As a result, the 2001 AUMF has Arguing many of the points above, the claiming that the United States was seemingly authorized an indefinite use of 66-page memo titled Report on the Legal not at war with Yemen, that Yemen did force, as the mere passage of time (with- and Policy Frameworks Guiding the not fall under the 2001 AUMF list of out any other factors) does not violate or United States’ Use of Military Force and targets, and that the President did not terminate the authorization.15 Conversely, Related National Security Operations out- have a “blank check” to kill terrorists all however, it is nearly impossible for the lined why the 2001 AUMF sufficiently over the world.24 Similarly, in July 2016, AUMF to last forever, as the number of authorized military action against not U.S. Army Captain Nathan Smith filed a actors actually responsible for the 9/11 only al Qaeda and the Taliban but also al lawsuit against the Obama administration attacks continues to diminish.16 Graham Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda for the illegal use of force and targeting Cronogue best captures this catch-22, in Libya, al Qaeda in Syria, al Shabaab, against IS, contending that the President noting that because the conflict is not and IS.21 violated the War Powers Resolution by against a specific nation or well-defined issuing Smith an illegal order given that organization, it is difficult to say when Reasons for a New AUMF Congress never approved a war against the conflict will end or what that end will President Obama’s December 2016 IS.25 These two anecdotes highlight and even look like.17 memo reinforces the first reason a new summarize the first reason for why a new The fourth aspect in examining the AUMF is necessary: the dangers regard- AUMF is necessary: Congress requires AUMF is its geographic scope. When ing the expansion of Presidential power a more active and frequent role in reau- Congress drafted the AUMF immediately to unilaterally wage war. Although the thorizing the President’s authorization of after 9/11, it had an understandable Constitution allows the President as military force.26 lack of precise knowledge regarding the commander in chief to introduce U.S. The second justification for adopting whereabouts for those responsible for Armed Forces into hostilities, the War a new AUMF pertains to the interna- the attacks. It therefore would have been Powers Act of 1979 mandates that the tional ramifications and inherent damage difficult for Congress to have authorized President may only exercise these powers to U.S. credibility as a result of relying military action in certain areas or spe- pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) on outdated statutes and the seemingly cific countries. Consequently, the 2001 specific statutory authorization, or (3) limitless Presidential authority to use AUMF contains no geographic proscrip- a national emergency created by attack military force. 27 As previously noted, tions or limitations. Therefore, if an upon the United States, its territories or the 2001 AUMF is expressly linked to organization that satisfies the 9/11 nexus possessions, or its Armed Forces. While the 9/11 attacks and al Qaeda. As it is located in any foreign country, and that an AUMF satisfies this second require- stands, however, portions of al Qaeda

40 Essay Competitions / The Need for a New AUMF JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Marines move through poppy field on their way to Patrol Base Mohmon in Lui Tal District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, April 17, 2012 (U.S. Marine Corps/Ismael Ortega)

have expanded into new groups not even target people anywhere, anytime—the Obama administration, Trump entered around in 2001, organizations such as IS, result would be chaos.30 As a leading office with the same latitude to wage war al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Boko democracy, the United States cannot af- around the world and can point to the Haram, and al Shabaab.28 Valid connec- ford to act in ways that it is not prepared precedent set by the Obama administrations between these terrorist threats and to see proliferate around the globe. For tion to do so.32 Although Trump has those responsible for the 9/11 attacks are instance, U.S. strategy regarding China pledged to avoid nation-building and already logically stretched. This dilemma focuses on binding China to international regime change, he has simultaneously is certainly not lost on our allies, who norms as it gains power in East Asia. vowed to ramp up efforts to wipe out ter- look to the United States as a legitimate By continuing with the status quo, the rorism and “knock the hell out of [IS].”33 leader on the global stage. Secretary of United States is not only discrediting As Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA) State John Kerry reiterated this mes- its own legitimacy but also potentially highlights, “For an inexperienced sage while advocating for the passage of facilitating similar destabilizing actions by President who tweets and gets angry to President Obama’s 2015 draft AUMF China and countless other nations around have broad war-making power, it’s a dan- against IS, stressing, “I know from talk- the world.31 gerous place to be.”34 ing with many Foreign Ministers all over The third reason for needing a new In his few months in office, Trump the world that they study our debates, AUMF pertains to the recent transfer of signed 25 executive orders—sev- and these public signals matter to them. power from President Obama to Trump. eral of them controversial—and has The coalition itself will be stronger with President Obama had been in office for demonstrated a tendency to lash out passage of this AUMF.”29 more than 5 years when he made the against those who oppose him.35 This Along these same lines, the United calculated decision to take military action behavior has caused concern among States is an international standard bearer against IS under the 2001 AUMF. This even Republican Congressmen. As that sets norms that are mimicked by meant he had 5 years of experience as the Representative Jim Hines (R-CT) admit- other nations. If other states were to commander in chief; Trump has little to ted, “Some of us are really worried about claim the broad-based authority that none. Yet because Congress failed to pass Trump.”36 Trump stepped into the White the United States currently does—to a new AUMF during the final years of the House with an unprecedented amount

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Reznik 41 of pre-existing authority, an unpredict- caused Congress to balk at passing any additional military capabilities was further able agenda, and limited experience as of them into law. underscored by Defense Secretary Robert commander in chief. In the war against The first attempt, the Authorization Gates, who warned that there must be terrorism, Congress must pass a new for Use of Force Against the “boots on the ground” if there is to be AUMF to help define and codify his Organization Called the Islamic State, any chance of success in the strategy limits.37 arose immediately after Obama’s against IS.51 Finally, the most pressing reason lies September 2014 announcement regard- As with the 2014 draft, Congress was in the Trump administration’s drafting of ing his planned use of force against IS.43 again divided. Many Democrats believed an executive order that would direct the The first problem with this draft is that a new AUMF would lead to wider and Pentagon to bring future IS detainees to it set a geographic boundary to that of more extensive military involvement, GTMO.38 As Jack Goldsmith explains: Iraq, which was quite limiting consider- while many Republicans feared an AUMF ing the spread of IS to Syria, east and would be too limited and would tie the President Obama extended the 2001 central Africa, and beyond. Furthermore, President’s hands in the fight against a AUMF to apply to IS over two years ago, because it was only specific to IS, it significant new enemy.52 Even House yet there was no practical context in which mentioned no such repeal of the previ- Speaker John Boehner (R-OH), who had a court could consider the legality of the ous AUMFs and in fact required that the spent months calling on Obama to send President’s interpretation. But if President 2001 and 2002 AUMFs remain intact in Congress his AUMF draft, dismissed Trump follows through on his order to order to continue authorizing military it as being too restrictive.53 As a result, bring IS detainees to GTMO, then sud- force against al Qaeda and its associates. Congress made no effort to pass the denly President Obama’s extension of the Finally, the draft did not contain any tem- legislation, and the bill died within 2 AUMF to IS will be subject to judicial poral limitation or “sunset clause.”44 This months. review. The moment the Trump adminis- meant neither Congress nor the President Several subsequent proposals over the tration brings an IS detainee to GTMO, would be committed to revisit the nature next year similarly collapsed in partisan that detainee will almost certainly seek and scope of the war against Islamic ter- dispute, including Representative Adam habeas review in court.39 rorists on a regular basis.45 Given these Schiff’s (D-CA) December 2015 resolu- shortfalls, Congress remained divided on tion.54 Goldsmith argues the Schiff bill Goldsmith continues, “It is easy to how the bill should read and remained was a great attempt as it remained “sub- imagine a habeas court ruling that the hesitant to make such a serious vote in stantively neutral (it gave the President President does not have the authority to the lead-up to the midterm elections and the same authorities he currently claimed detain a member of IS because the 2001 therefore made no effort to pass the bill.46 to possess) yet procedurally constraining AUMF does not extend to IS.”40 The In February 2015, with 79 percent (it forced the President to communicate United States would then run the risk of of Americans believing that the President more with Congress about the conflict the courts declaring all of the President’s should obtain congressional approval and forced Congress to be more in- military efforts against IS under the 2001 before deploying forces against IS, Obama volved).”55 Schiff’s draft authorized the AUMF to be unlawful.41 Such a determi- submitted his own AUMF draft to use of military force against al Qaeda, nation could force the military to suspend Congress.47 This draft aimed to authorize the Taliban, IS, and associated forces; all counterterrorism efforts against IS— the use of military force against IS until was authorized for only 3 years; and al- therefore allowing the group to rebuild, 2018 and would have superseded the lowed the President to deploy combat refit, and re-attack.42 Since IS remains 2002 AUMF, yet it included no mandate ground troops. It also mandated that the a threat to the United States, Congress for the President to routinely report to President submit to the appropriate con- must ensure the President and our troops Congress where and when he had autho- gressional committees and publish in the maintain the legal authority to degrade rized the use of military force. 48 It also Federal Register a list of entities against and destroy the group—and must act precluded the use of the Armed Forces which such authority had been exercised before Trump brings any IS detainee to in enduring offensive ground combat and the geographic location where such GTMO. operations.49 Republicans cringed at authority had been exercised at least once this limitation; as law professor Robert every 90 days.56 This latter requirement A Divided Congress: Why Chesney explains, “Whether it is con- promotes Presidential accountability to Previous AUMF Drafts Failed stitutional or not, any limitation on the ensure that Members of Congress and For nearly 3 years now, Congress has role of ground forces in the AUMF must the public know precisely against whom, recognized the need to update the not create unnecessary legal uncertainty and where, the United States is at war.57 AUMFs, yet remains unable and unwill- for commanders. [President Obama’s] Most importantly, it superseded both the ing to compromise on how the resolu- vague prohibition on enduring offensive 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.58 tion should ultimately read. This section ground combat operations violates this Despite the progress of the Schiff bill, examines three of the recent AUMF principle.”50 The importance of main- Congress yet again could not compro- draft attempts and highlights what taining flexibility for the possible use of mise. Democrats continued to push for

42 Essay Competitions / The Need for a New AUMF JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Suspected al Shabab militants wait to be taken away for interrogation during joint night operation between Somali security services and African Union Mission in Somalia forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, May 4, 2014 (Courtesy UN Photo/Tobin Jones)

tighter restrictions, while Republicans sary in a new AUMF—a compromise should clearly delineate that if the military were fearful of curbing the President’s from earlier draft attempts that is palat- or Intelligence Community reasonably ability to fight terrorists. Despite recog- able to both sides of the aisle. proves that a group has the capability, nizing the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs were First and foremost, a new AUMF motive, and intent to attack the United not a perfect fit for the campaign against must supersede the 2001 and 2002 States, then the use of military force IS, Congress seemed content to permit AUMFs. Since the inception of those should be authorized. The President—as the de facto war against IS to continue bills, the war on terror has expanded commander in chief of the military— without a formal declaration.59 to new groups and regions. The link along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and between 9/11 and the Iraqi invasion to National Security Council should be the Proposed AUMF the legal justification for using military final arbiters in deciding if this thresh- Language for 2017 force today is becoming only more tenu- old is met. Furthermore, as long as the Having examined the flaws of the exist- ous. The new draft should not include a underlying factors of a group remain ing drafts, while also demonstrating the specific reference to any previous attacks unchanged—such as the personalities, dire need for a new AUMF, the question (as the 2001 AUMF referenced 9/11) activities, affiliation, and goals—any ter- now becomes what does it mean to get but instead should be oriented toward rorist group simply changing its name can a new AUMF right. The answer is not preventing future attacks. likewise be targeted under the AUMF. legislation that would grant the execu- The draft should authorize the use of This would eliminate the possibility of the tive branch unbounded powers more military force against all foreign terrorist enemy using the rules and regulations of suited for traditional armed conflicts organizations that have demonstrated the AUMF to its advantage, which in this between nations, but rather a framework the intent and capability to target the case would be simply changing names in that will support “a series of persistent, United States. At present, this includes IS order to escape deliberate targeting. targeted efforts to dismantle specific net- and its branches, the Taliban, al Qaeda, The new AUMF should clarify that works of violent extremists that threaten as well as their affiliates and associates the geographic reach of authorized mili- America.”60 As such, this final section such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and tary force against terrorists is global—it identifies the components that are neces- al Shabaab in east Africa. The AUMF would reach every country but the

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Reznik 43 to Congress), insofar as the new threats satisfy the aforementioned criteria of both intent and capability to target the United States. Finally, in terms of what force the President is authorized to use, a new AUMF should communicate that while the President has the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force, the United States will only use lethal force as a last resort. Such lethal force would be as discriminating and precise as reasonably possible and would be a partnered effort with the host nation’s counterterrorism strategy.66

Conclusion Over the past several years, the task of adopting a new AUMF has proved easier said than done. With multiple viewpoints and competing arguments th Airman assigned to 340 Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron communicates with KC-135 on the proper scope of a new AUMF, Stratotanker pilots above Southwest Asia, July 20, 2017, in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Air Force/Trevor T. McBride) there may never be a perfect solution. Yet as terrorist groups continue to United States itself. A restriction to cer- Moving on to the temporal limits of operate and proliferate across the globe tain countries is unnecessary and fraught a new AUMF, the statute must include and continue to threaten our freedoms, with diplomatic landmines. While the a sunset clause. Such a provision would the use of military force is often the United States would not likely use mili- satisfy the War Powers Act by ensuring only option to counter these threats. tary force in friendly states permitting that Congress, and not just the execu- Congress must reach a compromise to effective cooperation with authorities, tive branch, would have a say regarding update the law and accurately reflect explicitly excluding allies from the au- when and where the military engages this reality; the time for partisan debate thorization of military force would beg in conflict. A sunset clause of 3 years and delay has passed. Both sides of the the question of why other countries were would keep military options flexible in aisle may not agree on every word or not similarly included. This would force response to threats but would “pressure clause of a new AUMF, but they must the United States to publicly draw lines, the [Office of the President] on a regular acknowledge that a new AUMF will needlessly alienate certain allies, and basis to explain the nature of the conflict send the message that America remains run the risk of creating safe harbors in and the reasons why it must continue, as united and committed to the fight certain areas for terrorists.61 As a limiting well as pressure Congress to exercise its against terrorism. clause to this seemingly blank check, the constitutional and democratic responsi- Congress must replace the 2001 AUMF should include language that the bilities to deliberate about and vote on and 2002 AUMFs with a new statute authorization of force would be limited (or at least face) the issue.”64 that strikes a balance between flexibility only to places where U.S. military force To ensure sufficient oversight, a new and limitation. Doing so will satisfy the could be used consistent with applicable AUMF must mandate that the President requirement for Congress to be more international law concerning sovereignty submit to the appropriate congressio- involved when committing American and the use of force.62 Finally, the new nal committees within 60 days a list of troops to conflict, bolster U.S. credibility AUMF should not include any reference entities and locations against which he on the international stage, and help guide to specific nations; an armed conflict has authorized and exercised military a new and inexperienced President. More with a country poses far too many risks force. Finally, given that the enemy is important, a new AUMF will send a mes- for the executive branch to authorize constantly adapting, a principal challenge sage of American steadfastness and unity alone. If an attack against the United that the new AUMF must overcome is in the fight against terrorism, and ensure States or its allies calls for a response ensuring it does not become obsolete.65 that the United States can continue similar to that of Afghanistan in 2001, The AUMF must therefore include a to lawfully use military force to keep Congress should specifically authorize provision that allows amendments to be America safe. A new AUMF may not that military action independently from added to sufficiently address new and make the war on terror any different, but the AUMF statute.63 unforeseen threats (subject to notification the absence of one most certainly will. JFQ

44 Essay Competitions / The Need for a New AUMF JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 22 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C § 46 James Arkin and Alexis Simendinger, Notes 1541 (1973). Emphasis added. “Approval of War Authorization Against ISIL 23 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C § Uncertain in Congress,” Real Clear Politics, 1 Barack Obama, “Statement by the 1542 (1973). Emphasis added. February 12, 2015. President on ISIL,” Washington, DC, 24 Cronogue, 10. 47 Lauren Leatherby, “Whatever Hap- September 10, 2014, available at . Measure,” National Public Radio, September June 17, 2015, available at . Record 147, daily ed. (September 18, 2001): a-2001-measure>. 48 “Authorization for Use of Military Public Law 107-40; “Authorization for Use 26 Stephen I. Vladeck, “Ludecke’s Length- Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of ening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War Levant,” The White House, 2015, available 2002,” HJR 114, 107th Cong., Congressional Without End,” Journal of National Security at . Public Law 107-243. 27 Barnes, 11. 49 Ibid. 4 Jack Goldsmith, “The Practical Legal 28 Cronogue, 14. 50 Robert Chesney, “HASC Testimony: Need for an ISIL AUMF,” Lawfare, February 29 John Kerry, “Support for Authorization Towards a Better AUMF,” Lawfare, February 8, 2017, available at . February 11, 2015, available at . 5 Ibid. gov/secretary/remarks/2015/02/237384. 51 William S. Castle, “The Argument for a 6 Ibid. htm>. New and Flexible Authorization for the Use 7 James Mattis, “Using Military Force 30 Barnes, 13. of Military Force,” Harvard Journal of Law & Against ISIS,” The Hoover Institution, March 31 Ibid. Public Policy 38, no. 2 (Spring 2015). 4, 2015, available at . Trump’s Warpowers,” The CT Mirror, De- 53 Scott Wong, “GOP: Obama War Request 8 To avoid unnecessary duplication, this cember 9, 2016, available at . gop-obama-war-request-is-dead>. been the primary authorization for the use of 33 Ibid. 54 Adam Schiff, “Consolidated Authori- military force abroad. Many of the same inter- 34 Austin Wright, “Congress Leaves Trump zation for Use of Military Force Resolution pretations hold true for the 2002 AUMF, albeit with Unlimited War Powers,” Politico.com, De- of 2015,” draft, December 2015, available for Iraq versus al Qaeda and the Taliban. cember 29, 2016, available at . to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military tary-force-232815>. 55 Jack Goldsmith, “Representative Schiff’s Force in Publicly Available Executive Actions 35 “President Trump’s Executive Orders,” Good New Draft AUMF,” Lawfare, December and Reports to Congress, Congressional Re- The White House, available at . ton, DC: CRS, May 11, 2016), 2, available at executive-orders>. 56 Schiff. . 36 Radelate. 57 Robert Chesney et al., “A Draft AUMF 10 Beau D. Barnes, “Reauthorizing the ‘War 37 Wright. to Get the Discussion Going,” Lawfare, No- on Terror’: The Legal and Policy Implications of 38 “Protecting America Through Lawful vember 10, 2014, available at blog.com/draft-aumf-get-discussion-going>. Law Review 211, no. 57 (Spring 2002), 4–6. Enemy Elements,” draft executive order, 58 Schiff. 11 Ibid., 4. February 2017, available at . Washington, DC, May 23, 2013, available (Washington, DC: The White House, Decem- 39 Goldsmith, “The Practical Legal Need for at . work.Report_Final.pdf>. 41 Ibid. 61 Barnes, 17. 13 Ibid. 42 Stephen I. Vladeck, “Detention After 62 Chesney et al. 14 Barnes, 5. the AUMF,” Fordham Law Review 82, no. 5 63 Barnes, 17. 15 Ibid. (2014), 5. 64 Goldsmith, “Why a Sunset Clause is 16 Ibid., 9. 43 “Authorization for Use of Military Force Important in Any New AUMF.” 17 Graham Cronogue, “A New AUMF: Against the Organization Called the Islamic 65 Barnes, 13. Defining Combatants in the War on Terror,” State,” SJR 43, 113th Cong., September 8, 66 “Procedures for Approving Direct Action Duke Journal of Comparative & International 2014. Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the Law 22, no. 3 (Spring 2012), 5. 44 Ibid. United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” 18 Ibid., 7. 45 Jack Goldsmith, “Why a Sunset Clause The White House, 2013, available at . 21 Report on the Legal and Policy Frame- blog.com/why-sunset-clause-important-any- works, 5. new-aumf>.

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Reznik 45 U.S. Coast Guard officer candidates aboard Coast Guard Barque Eagle haul on fore upper topsail brace during sail stations at sea in Atlantic Ocean, September 16, 2013 (DOD/U.S. Coast Guard)

Butter Bar to Four Star Deficiencies in Leader Development

By Benjamin Ray Ogden

It’s incredibly easy . . . to work harder and harder at climbing the ladder of success only to discover it’s leaning against the wrong wall.

—Stephen R. Covey The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People

tephen Covey’s insightful insufficient means induce a hefty risk to message reminds us that indi- achieve desired ends. Just such a dispar- S viduals and institutions create ity exists in the U.S. military between inefficiencies when their well-inten- the various officer development pro- Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Ray Ogden, USA, wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Army tioned efforts veer from the direction grams and their ultimate objective: War College. It won the Strategic Research Paper of the desired destination. In national exemplary strategic leaders. Attaining category of the 2017 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs security parlance, unchecked ways and the title of strategic leader depends on of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.

46 Essay Competitions / Deficiencies in Leader Development JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 mastering three advanced competen- Cultural Impacts to This operational fetish also leads cies: conceptual competency dealing Officer Development to anti-intellectualism among Army with specific thinking skills, technical Cultural elements most influential to leaders and their Service counterparts. competency that includes knowledge of officer development center around Diverting from the operational field into external systems, and the interpersonal the overwhelming importance placed assignments that build strategic thinking competency of consensus-building on operational experience as the ability, such as advanced civil schooling, and communication.1 Yet the road mainstream career pathway and the teaching, or fellowships, is traditionally military officers travel to acquire these deep-rooted institutional behaviors undesirable and considered damaging competencies often contains hidden that discourage critical thinking by its to an officer’s career.8 Many officers detours and obstacles that prevent them leaders. Most officers will acknowledge and, to some degree, promotion boards from becoming effective, relevant, the validity of a balanced approach for begin to believe that stepping away from and successful general officers within healthy development, but cultural forces unit leadership assignments to focus on the strategic environment. Operating have eroded this balance, tipping the individual academic development is an in this environment means curbing scale in favor of the operational domain. indictment of the officer’s leadership tactical expertise in order to deal with This particular domain encompasses abilities. A profound example of that as- intense complexity, great uncertainty, training activities that units undertake, sertion emerged recently when the Army unsolvable problems, vast time spans, experiences within an operational or failed to select four company-grade of- interdependent systems, and dissimilar deployed setting, and education gained ficers for promotion when their selection cohorts.2 Fellow stakeholders are often through unit professional develop- for advanced academic scholarships kept civilian professionals with different edu- ment programs and local special skills them from taking the traditional route cational and professional backgrounds, courses.5 It equates to what officers of serving in tactical units.9 This opera- divergent thought processes, conflict- gain while “online” in a unit or, more tionally focused side of Army culture ing interests, and little experience oper- broadly, within their career track. appeared in a broader scope as well. The ating in a tiered structure. Therefore, Prolonged wars in Iraq Army’s operational tempo over the years an officer’s developmental process must and Afghanistan coupled with has caused myopic inclinations toward include mastering civilian-military Servicemembers’ patriotic duty to deploy equipment modernization and readiness aptitude throughout the lifespan of in those wars naturally affect the emphasis over restructuring its own PME system.10 a career, including a shift in standard for operationally focused learning. For These cases reaffirm the belief that time mindset and actions so he or she is a generation of officers, operational operating in units and operational capa- capable of keeping ahead of fast-moving experience, training, and education have bility are more valuable to an officer’s complexity.3 usurped all other forms of development leadership development than intellectu- This article carefully unpacks the ideas and eventually appear as an unofficial ally rigorous opportunities that result in that rigid cultural norms, faulty officer condition in the selection process for strategic capacity. management practices, and significant promotions.6 This promotion indicator Complacency toward officer self- flaws in professional military education uncovers a belief that being tactically and development and assignment culture (PME) generate damaging gaps in the operationally capable equates to being a also enhances the gravitation toward development of commissioned Army of- successful flag officer and explains why operational development. Unlike en- ficers in the Active component. In fact, officers hesitate to take assignments listed leaders who follow a structured the analysis indicates that these discrepan- that are nonoperational for fear of fall- self-development model, Army officers’ cies delicately nudge the Army toward ing behind their peers and jeopardizing self-development consists solely of “self- sculpting its junior officers into tactically the possibility to serve as a flag officer. initiated learning” to meet personal savvy and combat-effective generals A narrow-minded operational pattern training, education, and experiential instead of expert strategic leaders.4 The develops among emerging leaders, even goals.11 Because officers are strictly in article concludes with recommendations though “approximately 65 percent of charge of their own self-development, aimed at reforming complacent systems, one-star billets, 80 percent of two-star they tend to exert more effort toward challenging conventional thinking, billets, 82 percent of three-star billets succeeding in their current or next assign- and rebalancing components of leader and 92 percent of four-star billets are ment versus following a tailored approach development models so all future flag nonoperational enterprise management that nests with long-term career objec- officers emerge as proficient sources positions.”7 In essence, a skewed path tives culminating in strategic aptitude. In of strategic competency. Even though for success, accompanied by misguided fact, over half of surveyed officers confirm the study specifically indicts the Army’s developmental criteria, emerges even that their most selected activities include leader development program, the lessons though comprehensive development professional reading, improving a skill can have implications that each Service remains the gold standard for producing they already mastered such as physical should consider for the developmental future senior leaders. fitness, or networking.12 These data imply well-being of its own officers. that officer self-development basically

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Ogden 47 merges with operational development. and routine immersion of this practice Complementing conformity and Moreover, the length of assignment tours into an officer’s career is paramount, then tradition within Army culture, as well within military culture creates conditions the operating environment and culture as military culture writ large, is the de- where leaders feel compelled to lean need to allow reasonable skepticism to pendence on doctrine and regulations. heavily on operational topics as a matter flourish; however, overt skepticism in any As of the publication of this article, the of immediate self-interest. Officers gener- military setting clashes with conventional Army Publication Directorate Web site ally do not spend more than a year in the and traditional behavior. displays 537 Army regulations and 16 same position and cannot be expected Not unlike the other Services, the Army doctrine publications in inventory, to have immediate proficiency with all U.S. Army thrives on standardization and and that excludes hundreds of volumes aspects of a new job. Becoming proficient conformity, both as official and cultural of joint doctrine, local regulations, as a leader in these positions requires customs, to reinforce disciplined behav- various degrees of standard operating most of an inexperienced officer’s time; ior.17 These norms invariably conflict with procedures, and multi-echelon policy therefore, developmental habits form the freedom to objectively assess an idea letters that lay the operating framework relating to near-term operational tasks. or situation, particularly if the idea is a for Soldiers.22 Providing top-down direc- Cultural aversion to intellectualism and standard practice. In organizations like tives for nearly every aspect of military life neglected self-development end up push- the Army, a fine line exists between being breeds outsourced thinking and makes ing officers toward a singular focus on skeptical in the name of critical thinking it improbable that officers will spend operational skills, leaving them critically and nonconforming to embedded values time objectively questioning why or how shortchanged beyond the tactical realm. such as duty and loyalty. Since pressures something is done. Even if doctrinal While a mindset stuck in operational to conform in a group are substantial, leeway existed, most officers possess an mode impedes officer development, the failure to do so can result in being per- innate aversion to the intellectual explo- unwitting discouragement of critical ceived as insubordinate or undisciplined, ration that enables the critical thinking thinking as a cultural anchor nearly derails or even being sanctioned or expulsed.18 process. Army officers, in particular, tend it. Some psychologists define critical Likewise, military organizations pride to exhibit low levels of openness and high thinking as “reasoned thinking with a themselves on having a steadfast belief levels of decisiveness, traits that benefit purpose” that “depends upon three core in traditions. Some traditions, such as leaders at the tactical level but ultimately abilities: appreciating that your own rowdy military balls, host calling cards, cripple those who reach the strategic opinions may be wrong; accepting state- and unit slogans, represent superficial level.23 In effect, the gross overkill of pre- ments as true even when they conflict and benign experiences. More operative scriptive thinking is both born from and with your own views; and temporarily traditions tend to originate from collec- satisfies the pervasive personality type of adopting an initial position with which tive experiences relating to the creation the officer population while also reinforc- you disagree, and then reason from that and sustainment of an effective fighting ing a rigid and convinced mindset that starting point.”13 Senior military leaders organization that wins wars.19 These types is antithetical to challenging ideas. Even who embrace and master this art should of practices contribute to what makes though the highlighted cultural artifacts have the ability to recognize their own organizations like the Army cohesive, play a large role in an officer’s develop- biases, avoid fallacies, and objectively so an officer showing skepticism toward ment, misguided talent management challenge assumptions when faced with them through critical thinking methods procedures lend further evidence of an new or existing ideas. These skills are vital risks professional isolation and even inefficient leader development system. for leading in the uncertain and rapidly survival in combat situations.20 This phe- changing environment where conven- nomenon could render officers incapable Officer Management tional solutions may be obsolete. But the of divorcing themselves of those norms Practices at Play Army’s track record in this area presents even when overwhelming evidence ex- It is safe to assert that several officer a discouraging pattern.14 Past studies poses a contrary viewpoint. As a current management practices present a differ- presented to the House Armed Services consideration, one need look no further ent but no less serious obstacle to the Committee have uncovered significant than the Army’s continued use of an development of strategic leaders. Assess- officer deficiencies in critical thinking due obsolete physical fitness test established in ments in 2014 found that only “46 to lapses in officer development.15 Being 1985, even though significant advances percent of Active component leaders able to apply objective and reasoned in physical training have emerged as bet- rated the Army effective at supporting thinking requires constant practice, which ter assessments of physical readiness.21 In the development of individuals through expands beyond its use in academic set- the end, the culture of conventionality personnel management practices such tings alone. Even when used in Army and tradition outweighs the urge to truly as evaluations, promotions, and assign- academic institutions, the faculty only examine ideas, leading to a significant de- ment selection.”24 Anyone looking at delivers critical thinking concepts and ficiency in the cognitive methods prized officer management influences must knowledge to students versus instilling in later in a senior leader’s career. begin with the most significant docu- them how to apply them.16 If successful ment in a career’s paper trail and center-

48 Essay Competitions / Deficiencies in Leader Development JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 piece to officer promotions and selec- reinforce the performance outcome assignment paths that will eventually land tions, the Officer Evaluation Report instead. them in the highest strategic-level posi- (OER). Unlike enlisted leaders, officers Alongside ill-constructed OERs rests tions. This level of responsibility gives never personally appear in front of poor utilization of broadening assign- mentors a great amount of influence promotion boards and selection panels. ments as developmental opportunities for over the proper development of an of- Boards and panels in charge of selecting officers. Broadening assignments expand ficer. Yet not all officers subscribe to the officers for ranks and commands only an officer’s experience and introduce idea of having a mentor to assist them conduct file reviews.25 By far, the most new ways of thinking to ensure the de- in their development or career manage- important document in the file that velopment of multifunctional skills. This ment. Army-specific surveys conducted determines the fate of the officer is the technique works, and many private com- in 2014 determined that only 57 percent OER because board members spend panies achieve impressive results by using of company-grade officers and 56 percent the most time reviewing it, and it gives similar initiatives to elevate the thinking of field-grade officers reported actually them insight into the leader’s level of capacity of their leaders. Executives at having a mentor.33 Unlike supervisors performance and potential compared General Electric, for instance, participate who have direct responsibility for coach- to other officers.26 The tyranny of the in programs that immerse them in un- ing their subordinate officer, an officer OER in determining the success of an derdeveloped countries with the purpose protégé voluntarily seeks out and chooses officer should not be underestimated, of exposing them to unique experiences a mentor based on trust and experience so evident flaws within its structure and in order to “promote reflection and self- level. Therefore, this large minority of use have critical consequences for the awareness” as a developmental tool.30 As unmentored officers maneuver through quality of leader that emerges. a result, broadening offsets parochialism their careers alone or with help solely Structural flaws in evaluations dis- and a myopic mindset for those bound from rotating supervisors and assignment courage supervisors and senior raters to lead in unpredictable environments managers. As a result, unilateral manage- from citing potential strategic leadership by opening their mental approach to ad- ment techniques and inexperience cause qualities that go beyond the number of dressing challenges. officers to miss developmental opportuni- tactical tasks accomplished. This defect, Unfortunately, trends for mind- ties or veer off track over a long career, in turn, encourages officers to focus broadening opportunities have been while jeopardizing their full potential to on tasks they accomplish and ignore decreasing for many Army generals since serve strategic positions. the strategic leader attribute of being the beginning of the conflicts in Iraq Those officers who do participate reflective about themselves and their and Afghanistan.31 The most obvious in the mentorship process face differ- experiences.27 The danger of reinforcing conclusion for this shortfall is simply ent challenges to their development. In accomplishments in this manner contrib- that assignments supporting ongoing general, mentors offer many more years utes to the development of an unwanted operations in the two major conflicts took of seniority and experience that greatly fixed mindset versus the more adaptable priority. Operational assignments also benefit junior officers. The vast differ- growth mindset. Someone with a fixed dominate the landscape over broaden- ence in experience should be the most mindset believes their “abilities are pre- ing assignments for cultural reasons as advantageous part in the relationship.34 determined and largely unchangeable,” witnessed through official administrative However, a mentor’s guiding compass while a growth mindset is “the belief directives. Manning guidance issued after entails experiences that assisted in their that one can cultivate and improve upon the announcement of troop withdrawals path to success years before but that may their abilities through practice and ef- in Iraq and Afghanistan still prioritizes no longer be the best path for an officer fort.”28 Constantly being recognized only operational manning and only mentions today. Mentors can unwittingly perpetu- for what one accomplishes causes the broadening opportunities for officers as ate poor choices of assignments because individual to develop a fear of failure and an objective versus a directed manning those types of assignments fit an outdated potentially avoid challenges. Conversely, requirement.32 The tone of these of- career model. In particular, successful being recognized for one’s effort al- ficial documents sends a clear signal that commanders fall victim to this phenome- leviates the fear of failure and promotes broadening assignments are secondary non. Historically, mentors have counseled resiliency in the face of difficult situations, options and offers troubling insight into the most successful commanders to seek like those that resoundingly persist at the an institutional aversion to prioritizing more difficult positions in large opera- strategic level.29 Fixed mindsets encour- these mentally enriching assignments. tional commands and headquarters as aged through OER practices can cripple Even though human resource manag- optimal preparation for future promotion officers once they become strategic leaders stand alone as the primary executors and command, simply because that path ers because problems at that level are of officer assignments such as broadening worked for them.35 In addition, senior fluid and virtually unsolvable. Our leaders and joint opportunities, mentors have officers have a tendency to tether junior must mentally evolve throughout their a significant role in managing an of- officers to them at new assignments careers to focus on getting processes right ficer’s career. Officers will use mentors because these subordinates have proved versus seeking a clear win, but evaluations to seek guidance and wisdom for career loyal, competent, and trustworthy in the

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Ogden 49 Upperclass midshipman gives briefing to first-year midshipmen participating in annual Sea Trials at U.S. Naval Academy, May 2012 (U.S. Navy/Chad Runge) past. This technique potentially benefits shaping tacticians and well-rounded mil- students who are being primed for senior officers and the units they serve, itary officers, but delinquent in generat- strategic responsibility. Military organiza- but it can severely obstruct junior of- ing the deep thinkers [who] sustain the tions create an environment that inhibits ficers from new experiences and ways military profession in the long run.”37 divergence, which naturally extends of thinking that are beneficial to their His apt assertion seemingly contradicts into professional academic institutions. development portfolio.36 Senior officers the two-pronged purpose of PME: train Conformity and similarity engross all acting as mentors will insist on pulling for certainty in order to master one’s officers consistently throughout their their highest potential subordinates with skills, and educate for uncertainty in military career. Because of uniform stan- them to jobs and assignments that may order to attain critical thinking skills dards, everyone dresses alike. Officers not be the best fit for the career path of that assist in unanticipated and unpre- reside in nearly identical government the aspiring officer. In the end, mentors dictable situations.38 PME is paramount quarters. Most military communities, and, more broadly, officer management to an officer’s development, but its often geographically isolated, lack cultural practices have drastic effects on where an effectiveness rating over the past decade variety compared to civilian neighbor- officer gains experience and how well that has been dismal. Only 62 percent of hoods. With the implementation of experience associates them with strategic Army company and field-grade officers values systems, everyone adheres to a competencies. surveyed believe that the institutional shared set of beliefs. Assignments often domain has been effective in their reunite the same work colleagues because A Flawed PME System development or helpful in improving of redundant location options. Even Just as officers rely on the officer man- their leadership capabilities.39 Such low though leaders will move potentially agement system to provide them with confidence relates to significant flaws dozens of times in a career, the units they the best duty positions for develop- enmeshed within a PME system that serve resemble one another in almost ment, they also rely on PME programs adversely affects the intellectual progress every way due to intentional standardiza- to prepare them for future challenges. of our future strategic leaders. tion. With such resounding similarity in According to Eliot Cohen, “These edu- First, the PME environment lacks the the information, alternatives, and payoffs cational programs have been optimal for intellectual diversity needed to challenge presented in everyday life, officers begin

50 Essay Competitions / Deficiencies in Leader Development JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 synchronizing behavior in all aspects of them to move in accordance with normal more recognizably substandard academic lifestyle, to include patterns of thought.40 permanent change of station timespans.45 pipeline than their civilian counterparts Having such a homogenous lifestyle Acquiring unqualified instructors coupled destined for the same strategic field. As an and environment is not necessarily a with frequent losses of qualified instruc- extenuating effort, the Army created the bad thing for operational and family tors presents a major challenge with Army University to better integrate all readiness, but it drastically undermines faculty management and contributes PME schools under one governing body, intellectual diversity in a PME setting. to the lessening of intellectual diversity provide synchronization of progres- Like-minded students who come from among PME students. sive learning objectives throughout an the same professional background or In addition to lacking intellectual officer’s career, and establish regional ac- defense establishment predominantly diversity, PME courses lack depth and creditation standards for Army education comprise seminars at PME schools. The applicability in the curricula at each level. programs.50 Although a significant step current structure keeps officers intellectu- To be clear, the curricula at the PME forward, the Army University has yet to ally isolated and unable to escape military schools generally have pertinent top- earn the regional accreditation it desires paradigms or enhance their critical and ics and concepts that enhance leaders’ for many of its tenant programs, leaving creative thinking ability by interacting knowledge; however, a shortfall exists in them devoid of the comparable oversight with people who truly think differently.41 how quickly evolving concepts get imple- measures seen at other universities. Even though the schools attempt to mented into the program. For instance, The final evidence underscoring the diversify the seminars by integrating “other than some adjustments to accom- inefficiency of the officer PME system, government civilians and military officers modate counterinsurgency doctrine, the in relation to the Army, rests with un- from different Services, the composition PME provided by military institutions derwhelming general officer continuing lacks the necessary peer ratios that would in the past decade has largely remained education. By definition, all ranks of flag otherwise expose students to adequate constant in spite of rapid changes and officer fall under the category of strategic whole-of-government perspectives.42 evolving threats in the world.”46 To exac- leader, making them the end product for PME becomes a meeting place for gener- erbate this problem, most of the students the various leader development models. ally like-minded individuals to reinforce attending PME courses since 9/11 have However, officers encounter a steep comfortable biases and, therefore, serves wide-ranging deployment experience drop-off of PME once they pin on stars. as a mechanism for institutional group- and real-world application of the topics As a simple measure, Army officers com- think. Student intellectual diversity is covered. Course content is often inferior plete 32 combined months of mandated negligible in a purely military education to the level of a student’s practical experi- PME as tactical leaders in their first 20 program compared to a university that ence and does little to prepare them for years followed by roughly 8 combined consists of students from various back- immediate follow-on assignments and months as strategic leaders in the next grounds, values, political persuasions, future strategic assignments.47 Likewise, 10 to 20 years.51 There are even plans of and education and who have alternative the academic programs that officers dropping the 8-month requirement fur- experiences and viewpoints.43 experience in PME can be characterized ther to just 6 weeks in total due to course Educational expertise and tenures of as survey-level curriculum, which offers restructuring.52 Also, courses that general PME military instructors also have a hand limited exposure to professional topics officers attend only familiarize them with in perpetuating the gap of intellectual and prevents a level of mastery needed for practical strategic concepts rather than diversity among students. The selection proper development of lifetime practitio- immerse them into analysis of the kinds process for instructors lacks sufficient ners.48 Even if the depth of the courses of complex situations they could face. discernment and relies mostly on the and diversity of students met higher The Army simply stops educating its normal personnel management system standards, the efficacy of PME schools, officers effectively once they reach the rather than a process that identifies particularly for the Army, presents a dif- strategic rank of general, when those proper subject matter expertise for the ferent test. officers need it the most. According to position in mind.44 Without the consider- Like all academic institutions, military a previous Army War College report, ate and thorough selection of military PME programs must have legitimate “Other professions such as physicians, instructors, unmotivated personnel oversight, certification, and accountability lawyers, and professional engineers have viewing these positions as detrimental to in order to maintain competitive efficacy requirements for continuing education, promotion or even incapable personnel of student education. As an example, but the Army has very little beyond can make their way into the PME system, the Army historically fails to measure orientation courses” for its most senior virtually eliminating the impetus for chal- up to its civilian academic counterparts leaders like general officers.53 General lenging student thinking. Conversely, by having less than a quarter of its PME officers can count on their attendance at high-quality military instructors who programs accredited by authorized orga- one of the senior Service colleges being challenge their students to broaden their nizations under the U.S. Department of their last extensive experience within a mental capacity have limited time as PME Education.49 This inequity causes future PME program littered with flaws. instructors because their Service requires strategic leaders to migrate through a

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Ogden 51 A Way Ahead grades more vigorously into the process ment practices, and cultural barriers. Applying comprehensive modifications or conducting pre-promotion board Today’s senior leaders have to be more to the leader development systems of exams would serve as forcing functions dynamic than their predecessors from the Army and the other Services would for officers to break the operational the past century, but the leader devel- increase the effectiveness of military chains and seek out academic opportuni- opment system fails to prepare them officers throughout their careers and, ties instead. for a strategic environment that has more importantly, once they reach the PME requires major improvements increased in complexity, ambiguity, and highest levels of leadership. The most to enhance the institutional development speed in just a few decades. As a result, crucial recommendation is that current domain. For intermediate-level educa- the development system forces officers senior-ranking officials acknowledge tion and senior Service colleges, give the to focus on achieving the most senior that high-potential officers have been top quarter of students the option to rank versus the highest competency shortchanged by a flawed development participate in an apprenticeship program needed by the senior rank. Apply- system. Recognizing the problem would with civilian companies and government ing Stephen Covey’s message in the provide the right energy for integrated agencies outside of the military during epigraph, senior officers have as much solutions to flourish. Structurally for the electives period of school. A program desire to climb the ladder of success as the Army, Human Resources Command like this allows immediate practice and ever before; however, the Army and the and Senior Leader Division should exposure of lessons learned under strate- other Services have yet to reinforce the merge efforts with the Army University gically demanding settings. Next, increase ladder they climb and ensure it is, in in a leadership Center of Excellence the length of service and number of civil- fact, leaning against the wall of strategic framework. Officer management and ian and high-potential professors at the competence. The stakes are too high for leader development are inextricably intermediate and senior Service colleges the next generation of officers and the linked, and continuing to compartmen- so that student exposure to challenging national security institution as a whole talize them defeats the objective of pro- and diverse thinking becomes paramount to not overcome these blatant gaps. JFQ ducing the best leaders. The remaining throughout his or her academic experi- recommendations involve measures to ence. Finally, Army and the joint Services help balance and improve the systematic should consider better continuing educa- Notes portions of leader development over the tion for flag officers. The Army Strategic 1 course of an officer’s career. Education Program is a good first step in Stephen J. Gerras, ed., Strategic Leader- ship Primer, 3rd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Successful completion of a broaden- the Army’s case, but the piloted program Army War College, 2010), 28. ing assignment and earning a master’s greatly curtails general officers’ educa- 2 Raymond F. Chandler III et al., ALDS: degree should be required to compete for tion. Expand the program to at least Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 (Wash- battalion-level command. Additionally, 6 months for flag officer rank, forcing ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the the Army and applicable Services should them to inflate their knowledge of the Army, n.d.), 18. 3 Marybeth P. Ulrich, “A Primer on Civil- structure officer self-development to en- environment to come. This approach Military Relations for Senior Leaders,” in The sure not only that officers expend effort would supersede the current education U.S. Army War College Guide to National in this critical domain, but also that the model and allow for more in-depth study Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy focus is comprehensive and preparatory in preparation for the demands they will and Strategy, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. for gaining the right future skills. These soon face. Similarly, including mandatory (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Insti- tute, 2012), 314. adjustments would assist in the much- fellowships for all newly promoted one- 4 Emma Sky, “What Lessons Should We needed change in operational culture. star flag officers would jump-start their Take from the Iraq War,” Army Online 66, no. Officer management adjustments should mental transitions and could be the final 1 (December 2015), available at . 5 Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army skills such as how much prudent risk Training and Leader Development (Washing- the officer takes, interpersonal skills they U.S. Army generals and senior mili- ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the display, and examples of critical thinking tary leaders do not reach the highest Army, August 19, 2014), 3. and self-awareness improvement. At the potential possible over the course of 6 Heidi Keller-Glaze et al., 2009 Center same time, promotion boards should be their career. Do not misunderstand; flag for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings, Technical directed to equally consider these strate- officers today reflect some of the most Report 2010-1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center gic traits along with senior rater remarks adaptive, dedicated, and experienced for Army Leadership, April 2010), 38. about potential. The Army specifically tactical leaders that our nation has ever 7 David Barno et al., Building Better Gener- needs to incorporate academic compe- produced. However, their development als (Washington, DC: Center for a New Ameri- tency measures into the promotion and as strategic leaders is the product of a can Security, October 28, 2013), 11. 8 Mark Adamshick, 2013 Chief of Staff selection process. Integrating academic system wrought with flaws in military of the Army Leader Development Task Force evaluation reports and graduate-level education, inefficient officer manage-

52 Essay Competitions / Deficiencies in Leader Development JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Final Report (Washington, DC: Headquarters 22 Army Publishing Directorate Army Regu- Ways to Fix the Army’s Culture,” War on Department of the Army, June 14, 2013), 42; lation Page, available at . . TAL) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War Changing Minds in the Army: Why It Is So Diffi- 44 TRADOC PAM 525-8-2, 7. College, April 2007), 5. cult and What to Do About It (Carlisle Barracks, 45 George E. Reed, “The Pen and the 9 Scott Maucione, “Are Some of the Army’s PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2013), Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in Best Soldiers Being Forced Out?” Federal News 9. the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War Radio, October 31, 2016, available at . ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the 46 Barno, 7; U.S. House of Representa- 10 Richard H. Kohn, “Tarnished Brass: Is Army, February 25, 2005), 15. tives, Another Crossroads? Professional Military the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?” World 26 United States Army Human Resources Education, 72. Affairs Online 171, no. 4 (Spring 2009), avail- Command, “Reviewing Board Information,” 47 TRADOC PAM 525-8-2, 7. able at . hrc.army.mil/content/REVIEWING%20 “Rethinking Professional Military Education,” 11 AR 350-1, 4. BOARD%20INFORMATION>. Foreign Policy Research Institute: E-Notes, 12 John J. Fallesen and Katie M. Gunther, 27 Gerras, 29. October 25, 2013, available at . Leader Findings, Technical Report 2015-01 Digital, 2008), 10. 49 Robert B. Brown, “The Army Univer- (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lead- 29 Ibid., 21. sity: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex ership, June 2015), 98; Peter Schirmer, Leader 30 Barno, 16. World,” Military Review (July–August 2015), Development in Army Units: Views from the 31 Ibid., 7. 21. Field (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 50. 32 All Army Activities Message 293-2012, 50 David Perkins, Strategic Business Plan 13 Anne Helsdingen, “The Effects of Prac- “HQDA EXORD 10-13 ISO the HQDA for the Army University (Fort Eustis, VA: tice Schedule and Critical Thinking Prompts on FY13-15 Active Component Manning Guid- TRADOC, 2015), 18, available at files/docu- Task,” Journal of Educational Psychology 103, October 18, 2012, 2. ments/20150331_SIGNED_FINAL_Stra- no. 2 (May 2011), 383–398. 33 Fallesen and Gunther, 83. tegic_Business_Plan_for_the_%20Army_ 14 Mark A. Milley and Erik K. Fanning, 34 Anna B. Guest, “A Coach, A Mentor . . . University(Unrestricted).pdf>. 2016 Association of the United States Army A What?” Success Now, no. 13 (July–September 51 Department of the Army Pamphlet 600- Press Conference (Washington, DC: Defense 1999), 1. 3, Commissioned Officer Professional Develop- Video Imagery Distribution System, October 3, 35 Charles D. Allen, “Redress of Profession- ment and Career Management (Washington, 2016), video file, available at . Force Quarterly 59 (4th Quarter 2010), 97. December 3, 2014), 17. 15 U.S. House of Representatives, Commit- 36 Yingling. 52 Center for Strategic Leadership, “Army tee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Over- 37 Eliot A. Cohen, “Global Challenges, Senior Leader Development Courses: Programs sight and Investigations, Another Crossroads? U.S. National Security Strategy, and Defense Information Briefing,” briefing slides, U.S. Professional Military Education Two Decades Organization: Statement before the Senate Army War College, October 18, 2016. After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Committee on Armed Services,” 114th Cong., 53 U.S. Army War College, 5–6. Panel, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington, DC, 1st sess., October 22, 2015, 152. April 2010, xii. 38 Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American 16 U.S. Training and Doctrine Command Military Command from World War II to Today (TRADOC) Pamphlet (PAM) 525-8-2, The (New York: Penguin, 2012), 346. U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015 (Fort 39 Fallesen and Gunther, 73. Monroe, VA: TRADOC, January 20, 2011), 7. 40 Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, 17 Paul Yingling, “A Failure in General- and Ivo Welch, “Learning from the Behavior of ship,” Armed Forces Journal Online 27 (2007), Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational available at . 12, no. 3 (1998), 2. 18 Joe Kelly, Organizational Behavior 41 Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: U.S. (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., and Profession Military Education on the Chopping the Dorsey Press, 1969), 235. Block,” World Politics Review Online, April 17, 19 V. Mahalingam, “Role of Military Cul- 2013, available at . 20 Robert Rielly, “The Darker Side of the 42 James Stavridis and Harlan Ullman, Force: The Negative Influence of Cohesion,” “Needed: A Revolution in Military Educa- Military Review (March–April 2001), 59. tion,” Defense News Online, December 15, 21 Whitfield B. East,A Historical Review 2015, available at . 202–203. 43 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Six

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Ogden 53 “future of Syria must be determined by its people, but [Asad] is standing in their way. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for [Asad] to step aside.”2 However, nearly 6 years later, Obama has left office, while Asad rules a contiguous stretch of population centers and the majority of Syrians left in Syria. Mainstream analysis explains Asad’s resilience as a result of external factors, namely Russian and Iranian support, lack of alignment of foreign aid to opposition forces, and a subdued U.S. response to Asad and prioritization of fighting the so-called Islamic State. Likewise, analysis on the internal factors focuses the narrow but loyal support the regime enjoys from the ruling Alawite sect.3 The illegitimacy of the regime is assumed. Has the Syrian regime indeed lost its legitimacy? Scholarship on the concept of legitimacy has offered a variety of ty- pologies for measuring a state’s domestic legitimacy—external legitimacy being an entirely separate concept. A survey of this scholarship reveals two general themes. First, legitimacy, or the right to rule, is in the eyes of the ruled.4 Second, the concept of legitimacy is fluid, and the factors that constitute legitimacy depend on the unique context of the Bashar al-Asad, August 2011 (Fabio state being assessed.5 While in Western Rodrigues Pozzebom/Agência Brasil) democracies legitimacy is conferred at the ballot box and measured by a government’s ability to provide political goods like security or the rule of law, such legitimacy is a historic aberration.6 For most of history, a ruler’s heredity, Asadism and religious credentials, or military strength have conferred legitimacy. If legitimacy is the right to rule as Legitimacy in Syria perceived by those who are ruled, an assessment of Asad’s legitimacy must be informed by Syrian history and society. By Nathaniel Kahler But who is a Syrian? Historically, Syria has no national identity; it is, rather, a society of overlapping and competing n July 11, 2011, Secretary of identities—those of tribe, class, region, State Hillary Clinton asserted ethnicity, and creed—each vying for that Syrian President Bashar the loyalty of the people.7 In 1945, the Nathaniel Kahler wrote this essay while a student O in the College of International Security Affairs al-Asad had lost his “legitimacy,” pre- French Mandate ended, and the people at the National Defense University. It won the saging a U.S. policy favoring regime living in a group of Levantine cities and Strategy Article category of the 2017 Chairman 1 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay change in Syria. In August 2011, their hinterlands sharing no national Competition. President Barack Obama stated that the identity were proclaimed, by outside

54 Essay Competitions / Asadism and Legitimacy in Syria JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 powers, to be Syrians. The new country as antagonistic to them. This is not to U.S. intervention as a strategic interest lurched from coup to coup until Hafez blame the United States or Islamism for argue that the United States and the al-Asad, Bashar al-Asad’s father, con- the perpetuation of Arab autocracies such rebels’ various backers are, through their solidated his rule over Syria in 1970.8 as that of Asad. Rather, it is to recognize support for the opposition, changing Hafez al-Asad offered a new identity that the strong continuing appeal of the Asad camp’s calculus. Intervention, and bargain through a secular ideology Asadism is rooted in both a failure of po- it is argued, can encourage the regime of pan-Arab socialism called Ba’athism. litical Islam to offer a viable ideology to to negotiate, somewhat preserving the Today, the regime’s bargain remains. In a pluralistic society and a history of U.S. international norms against Asad’s brutal exchange for absolute loyalty, Asad pro- and broader Western imperialism, Central tactics, or weakening Iranian or Russian vides an ideological veneer of solidarity Intelligence Agency coups, support for positions in the Middle East.13 However, and unification that is the only hope for military dictatorships, or disregard for the U.S. stake in Asad’s departure will security and stability in Syria. Palestinians and “hypocrisy” that never never be commensurate with the regime’s This bargain could be termed matched U.S. rhetoric. interest in holding on; even if it were and Asadism, and it redefined the diverse The myth of a stalwart and strong the United States helped to force Asad people of Syria as part a broader shared Asad regime (both father and son) that from power, the installed government national identity. Indeed, it is the only led Syria to stand against the forces of would be deemed illegitimate by virtue of uniting identity that modern Syria has imperialism, Zionism, and Islamist fitna having U.S. support. ever known. The resilience of this iden- is, like so much of the regime narrative, Likewise, the United States may have tity seems at first strange; the Alawite a partial truth manufactured into an a responsibility to protect Syrian civilians, Asad rules over a state that is perhaps 60 ethos of resistance that grows stronger and Asad has forfeited Syrian sovereignty percent Sunni Arab.9 However, the as long as Asad faces down challenges. by failing to protect his people from regime’s bargain is predicated on It may be that Secretary Clinton de- gross human rights abuses.14 However, understanding that Syria is a majority- clared that Asad lost his legitimacy out a responsibility to protect divorced of minority country. That is, while Sunnis of wishful thinking. Either Asad still legitimacy is a short-term effort to allevi- are a religious ma-jority, this is not their has substantial legitimacy derived from ate suffering that does little to build the only identity.10 They also belong to a factors unique to the Syrian context, long-term stability and security of the minority: the urban elite, the military or or, alternatively, a new concept for the civilian population. Delaying regime vic- Ba’ath party bureaucracy, a favored tribe, basis of Asad’s resiliency is required. If tory can only further the suffering. If it is a regional identity—each identity adds legitimacy means that “the United States safe zones that the United States wants, complexity to the question of identity in does not deem your government to be there are plenty in Syria: in regime- Syria. In a land of minority identities, good, ethical, or in the U.S. interest,” or controlled territory. Asad’s legitimacy is rooted in his ability to some combination of these attributes, it Even if the United States saw fit offer a veneer of cohesion that binds them ceases to be a useful concept. If Syrians to invest the means to overpower the together. have grown to understand that this is regime and its backers, this suggests Moreover, Asad’s legitimacy is not what is meant when a Western leader no way to build governance in Asad’s created or sustained in a vacuum. The states “legitimacy,” the concept itself has absence—a U.S.-installed government inability of the opposition to offer a viable become illegitimate. would be tasked with ruling without le- and broadly appealing identity in Syria How, then, can the United States deal gitimacy in a splintered society. Modern confers legitimacy upon Asad. Asadism is with a regime that is demonstrably “bad” Syria has not known stability except the guarantee against the internal threat, but also maintains its legitimacy through under Asad. It is impossible to know the fitna, which is societal discord and a narrative that fits any U.S. move to extent to which the Syrian people view sedition. Political Islam and nonsecular counter it into a narrative of foreign con- Asad as legitimate; accurate opinion polls ideologies have disastrously failed to pres- spiracy against the Syrian people? There do not exist, and elections are dubious ent an alternative to Asadism. Likewise, is no clear path forward, but the United measures. However, Syrian history and alone in the Arab world, the Asad regime States must understand the Syrian conflict the continued resilience of the regime has maintained what can be termed a pop- is not a 6-year war but rather an ongoing indicate that the United States may have ulist foreign policy by publicly rebuffing half-century conflict in which the United prematurely discounted the sources of the machinations of Western imperial-ism States has been a sometimes active, and Asad’s legitimacy. and Zionism.11 When the regime is sometimes unwitting, belligerent. This is not to overlook or undervalue charged with the Islamist label of kefir, or Justifications for U.S. interven- the tragedy and suffering of Syria over the with the Western label of “illegitimate,” it tion pursue two tracks of logic that are last 6 years. Rather, it is to argue that the plays into the regime’s narrative.12 Both alternatively conflated and emphasized U.S. policy of oscillating between strate- confer legitimacy on Asad. when convenient: ridding Syria of Asad gic intervention to bring down a dictator, Asadism and the legitimacy of the regime is in U.S. strategic interest and/or a targeted actions against nonstate actors, are at least as much a symptom of U.S. humanitarian imperative. Proponents of and humanitarian intervention to prevent regional policy and of takfiri Islam

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Kahler 55 further atrocities ignores the sources of regime legitimacy and prolongs the conflict. In short, the last 6 years have demonstrated that the battle over legitimacy in Syria matters, but this is not a battle the United States can win. JFQ

Notes

1 Reid J. Epstein, “Clinton: Assad Has ‘Lost Legitimacy,’” Politico.com, July 12, 2011, available at . 2 Macon Phillips, “President Obama: ‘The Future of Syria Must Be Determined by Its People, but President Bashar Al-Assad Is Stand- ing in Their Way,’” White House blog, August 18, 2011, available at . 3 Omar M. Dajani, “The Middle East’s From NDU Press Majority Problems: Minoritarian Regimes and the Threat of Democracy,” Ethnic and Racial Women on the Frontlines of Peace and Security Studies 38, no. 14 (2015), 2516–2533. Foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Leon Panetta 4 Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). This book reflects President Barack Obama’s commitment to advancing 5 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the women’s participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. It is State of War (New York: Cambridge University inspired by the countless women and girls on the frontlines who make Press, 1996), 94–97. a difference every day in their communities and societies by creating 6 Ibid., 91. opportunities and building peace. 7 Philip K. Hitti, Syria: A Short History Around the globe, policymakers and activists are working to empower (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 31–250. 8 women as agents of peace and to help address the challenges they face as Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of survivors of conflict. When women are involved in peace negotiations, California Press, 1989), 14. they raise important issues that might be otherwise overlooked. When 9 Fabrice Balanche, “Ethnic Cleansing women are educated and enabled to participate in every aspect of their Threatens Syria’s Unity,” Washington Institute societies—from growing the economy to strengthening the security for Near East Policy, December 3, 2015, avail- sector—communities are more stable and less prone to conflict. able at . to military officials and from human rights activists to development 10 Chris Zambelis, “Syria’s Sunnis and the professionals. The goal of this book is to bring together these diverse Regime’s Resilience,” Combating Terrorism voices. As leaders in every region of the world recognize, no country can Center at West Point, May 28, 2015, available at . book seeks to add to the chorus of voices working to ensure that women 11 John Allen and Charles R. Lister, “Bring and girls take their rightful place in building a stronger, safer, more Syria’s Assad and His Backers to Account prosperous world. Now,” Washington Post, October 21, 2016. 12 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “Supporting Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/ Resistance, Not Regime,” Al Akhbar English, WomenontheFrontlinesofPeaceandSecurity.aspx July 5, 2012, available at . 13 Allen and Lister. 14 Michael Abramowitz, “Does the United States Have a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ the Syrian People?” Washington Post, September 6, 2013.

56 Essay Competitions / Asadism and Legitimacy in Syria JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Willie Fortes, right, and Briza Covarrubias, left, humiliate actress Cassandra Babcock who plays sexually assaulted victim during skit performed by Pure Praxis group aboard Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, November 4, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jonathan E. LopezCruet)

Toxic Culture Enabling Incivility in the U.S. Military and What to Do About It

By Kenneth Williams

ore values are the heart and soul practice of which creates organizational impact, cost, tolerance, enabling, of U.S. military Services and culture. Yet even with the emphasis on and reduction of toxicity. This article C their cultures. Military organi- core values such as respect and selfless applies private-sector research to assess zational, strategic, operational, and service, the Department of Defense DOD policies and practices and to rec- tactical strength lies in the degree to (DOD) continues to experience toxic ommend courses of action. Although which the Services’ systems, processes, and counterproductive behaviors that the implications and cost of toxicity are and behaviors of personnel align with sabotage culture and values, as well as beyond the scope of this article, a brief their stated core values, the collective performance, productivity, force protec- discussion is relevant for demonstrating tion, health, readiness, and actions of its significance. Private-sector research personnel.1 Although DOD has not has identified relationships between conducted comprehensive research toxic behaviors and adverse effects on Chaplain (Colonel) Kenneth Williams, USA, is a Senior Military Fellow in the Department of Ethics on toxic behavior, there is extensive mental and physical health (including at the National Defense University. private-sector research regarding the suicide, stress-related illness, and post-

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Williams 57 traumatic stress), increasing demands of others, either aggressively or passively, the environmental factors in its culture, on an already overburdened healthcare in the name of high performance on policies, and systems that are creating system; job satisfaction and commit- the surface, but with the goal of self- the conditions for the toxicity to flour- ment; individual and collective perfor- advancement, resulting in the sabotage ish.13 This is like a gardener failing to mance (cognition and collaboration); of interpersonal and organizational trust. prepare the soil in advance of planting employee turnover; and the creation of Toxic personnel are experts in manag- by removing all rocks and unwanted an organizational culture that tolerates ing upward, simultaneously giving the vegetation, only later to pull weeds one other inappropriate behaviors including appearance of high performance to their by one. Within DOD, what are the sexual harassment and discrimination.2 supervisors while abusing others to get rocks and weeds—the factors that create In addition to the impact on direct ahead.10 In other words, they kiss up and a toxic culture? targets of toxicity, research has identi- kick down. A common misconception Leaders often take a strong stance fied the transmission of adverse effects is defining a toxic person as explosive against incivility yet respond to allegations to bystanders and family members.3 and verbally abusive, when in fact most of workplace toxicity with surprise, denial, Private-sector research has also as- toxic behavior is passive and “under the excuses, and disbelief. Toxic personnel are sociated toxicity with the monetary costs radar.”11 Therefore, detection involves frequently highly competent, dedicated to of medical care, legal representation, observing the wake of wasted resources task accomplishment, possess skills or ex- personnel replacement and training, lost and demoralized workers left by toxic pertise needed by the organization, and at man-hours due to leaders addressing personnel. Signs of toxicity include a least appear to be productive in the short toxic behavior, complaint investigations, change in climate when the toxic person term. Leaders, assuming the organization absenteeism, decreased performance of is present and consistently unproductive is healthy, either disbelieve or are unaware targets and bystanders, avoidance of the meetings as the toxic person sabotages that someone could be so malevolent toxic person, time spent job searching, the process to remain the center of atten- toward others when he or she appears and wasted resources.4 The monetary cost tion and maintain his or her narcissistic so dedicated.14 Most toxic personnel are to DOD could be upward of $4.7 billion, self-validation. Robert Sutton suggests experts in presenting an image of high or 8 percent of the 2016 DOD budget,5 two tests for detecting toxic people: first, performance to their superiors. While calculated by a model assessing the rate of after interacting with the person, do you toxic personnel may be productive, they private-sector personnel who experience have a feeling of oppression or humilia- simultaneously create “a trust tax” that toxicity (10 to 16 percent6) and a cost tion? And second, does the alleged toxic debits from results.15 per case ($23,000 to $32,000, consider- person focus his or her toxicity on “tar- A leader may be aware of but willing ing inflation7), and full-time civilian and gets” who are less powerful?12 to tolerate toxic behaviors due to the military personnel strength (734,000 and Because toxic personnel excel in pre- personal or professional benefits resulting 1.3 million respectively8). The purposes of senting a positive appearance, effective from the toxic person’s short-term factual this article are to discuss how toxicity and detection requires leaders first to accept or perceived productivity. Toxic protectors incivility are tolerated and enabled within the reality of toxic personnel in their or- practice a subtle form of quid pro quo, DOD and to provide recommendations ganizations, not assuming all is well; and either having a personal relationship for addressing these effects. second, to collect data from a variety of with the toxic person, having a need for sources and levels of the organization— power and control that the toxic person’s Defining and Detecting Toxicity peers, direct reports, stakeholders, and actions feed, or benefiting from appar- Since the terms toxic personnel, toxic customers. ent high performance. Alternatively, the leadership, and toxic workplace are toxic person may exploit the relationship used loosely to describe a wide range How DOD Enables Toxicity with the protector to advance a personal of behaviors, it is important to define An organization experiences toxicity agenda. Sadly, “protectors do not protect the construct. For the purposes of this because its culture, policies, and systems an organization from the tragic human or article, toxicity refers to a pattern of create the conditions for tolerating bottom-line costs of toxicity. In fact, they combined, counterproductive behaviors and enabling uncivil behaviors. Like a prolong the situation by making it dif- encompassing not only harmful leader- garden, which requires nutrient-rich ficult for others who have the authority to ship but also abusive supervision, bully- soil free from weeds, as well as water, take action.”16 Toxic protectors sabotage ing, and workplace incivility, involving light, air, and a caretaker to thrive, a the organization by ignoring or enabling leaders, peers, and direct reports as high-performing organization requires behaviors that degrade productivity, mo- offenders, incorporating six specific such elements as trust, respect, effec- rale, trust, and cohesion. behaviors (see table): shaming, passive tive communication, efficient processes Many times, an organization does not hostility, team sabotage, indifference, and systems, and leaders who create the know how to deal with a toxic person negativity, and exploitation.9 These ele- conditions for productivity. Typically, and either reassigns or isolates and real- ments indicate a clear but often covert an organization identifies the problem locates the toxic person’s responsibilities pattern of abuse, disrespect, and control only as the toxic individual, overlooking to other, already overworked personnel,

58 Commentary / Toxic Culture JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Table. Criteria, Description, and Examples of Toxic Behavior Type of Behavior Description Observable Behaviors Shaming Humiliation, sarcasm, put-downs, jabs, blaming Persistently pointing out mistakes intending to reduce another’s self-worth Public embarrassment Passive hostility Passive-aggressive behavior redirecting one’s anger Resenting requests, deliberate procrastination, and intentional mistakes to inappropriately on a target person or persons avoid serving others Complaints of injustice and lack of appreciation Compliments that veil criticism Always getting in the last word (punch) Team sabotage Meddling to establish one’s personal power base, Inconsistency: unclear, constantly changing expectations and unpredictable resulting in decreased cohesion and performance policies, procedures, and behaviors Dysfunctional communication: in order to maintain power and control, withholding key information, sharing incomplete information, or sharing partial items of information resulting in each person having incomplete data Indifference An apparent lack of regard for the welfare of others, Lack of compassion and empathy especially subordinates Excluding certain people Disinterested in the successes and unsympathetic to the suffering of others Negativity A corrosive interpersonal style that has a negative Malice: cruelty and degradation are more prevalent than kindness impact on individual and collective morale and Narcissism: uncaring abuse of others for personal gain motivation Exploitation The perception of getting ahead at the expense of Inequality: tolerating toxic people, who are often highly skilled, but punishing others others Favoritism: special treatment for a select few Nepotism: hiring unqualified friends or family Taking credit for other’s results and accomplishments

Sources: Paul White, “5 Ways to Tell If Your Workplace Is Really Toxic,” December 23, 2014, available at ; Bruna Martinuzzi, “7 Signs You’re Working in a Toxic Office,” August 16, 2013, available at .

none of which actions address the behav- by increased requirements and decreased behavior, treatment of others, and ior.17 Or, as is often the case, the toxic resources and, being unable to express it how results are obtained. According to person is left in place and the targeted to their supervisors, redirect their frustra- information shared with the author by person is reassigned out of the toxic situ- tion toward direct reports.20 In DOD, over 25 GS-15 and O-6 supervisors, this ation. As a result, the toxic person is not values such as duty, loyalty, and honor absence of values-based feedback may be held accountable for counterproductive reinforce tolerating toxicity to fulfill due to supervisors being either unaware behavior, which is then passed around the mission accomplishment. Exhortations of how to include values in performance organization. Another response is proof “failure is not an option,” “do more counseling and evaluations, or fearful of moting the toxic person just to move him with less,” and “I don’t care how you grievances. or her out, which justifies and reinforces do it, just get it done” tend to fuel toxic Since evaluations provide primary the behavior. The failure to address toxic behaviors. In the era of DOD downsiz- information to board members, de- behavior creates resentment and frustra- ing, delayering, and budget cuts, the emphasizing values affects selections tion among other personnel. merging of roles and expansion of span for promotion and key assignments. In toxic organizations, the value of of control are common, with apparently The ends of getting results and being “getting results” becomes the priority, little or no consideration given to stream- promoted justify the toxic means. Also superseding core values. For example, lining processes and extending timelines. problematic is that in a zero-defects, performance metrics are useful in organi- The combination of factors such as the highly competitive promotion system, zations characterized by trust and respect. pressure to produce, uncertainty, submis- any marginally negative entry could However, in organizations characterized siveness, downsizing, abuse, and lack of influence selection, resulting in values by toxicity and incivility, metrics become peer support results in decreased motiva- becoming an affirmative, literal “check oppressive and prescriptive as person- tion for individual and collective effort.21 the block” on evaluations. This rein- nel often adjust statistics to present the In DOD, both military and civilian forces toxic behavior, as toxic personnel appearance of productivity and to avoid merit-based evaluation systems empha- are promoted and selected through the becoming targets of hostility.18 size performance-based achievement. system and mistreat others along the way. Organizational downsizing is associ- Although values are included in varying Military lore is replete with examples of ated with increased abusive supervision to degrees on each department’s military toxic senior leaders who were promoted maintain productivity, including manipu- and civilian evaluations, the achievement through a results-driven system and lation, coercion, and threats.19 Leaders, of results determines the individual’s rat- thereby enabled to abuse others.22 amid downsizing, tend to be frustrated ing, with little emphasis on values-based

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Williams 59 Chief selects run in formation during Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training 5k run on flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, August 17, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Alex Perlman)

A results-driven culture in a downsiz- Respectful engagement is “treating each the organization’s core values, which ing organization that overemphasizes individual with dignity and fairness, provide the principles and standards for productivity and tolerates toxic behavior with the operational premise that you norms and practices.25 Core values are the without accountability creates the condi- treat others in concert with the way you key nutrients for organizational culture tions for toxicity, diminished readiness, would like to be treated.”24 It involves and must permeate the organization’s and waste. Toxic people undermine pro- behavioral norms of authenticity, affir- daily activities—formal and informal dis- ductivity, organizations allow mediocrity, mation, attentive listening, transpar- cussions and meetings, decisionmaking, and targets of toxicity develop survival ency, open communication, trust, and systems, processes, and performance. techniques, all of which drain energy and mutual support. Also, successful change The culture should create the ex- resources. Current private-sector research requires focusing on the enabling con- pectation that all personnel practice has identified several actions that DOD ditions and not narrowly on the toxic the core values, not permitting anyone could implement or improve to address individual whose ingrained behavior is in authority to abuse the standards the problem of toxicity. reinforced by a results-rewarding system they are responsible for supporting. that tolerates toxicity. How do leaders It is insufficient merely to create a list How to Detox and Create prepare the soil, remove the rocks and of values assuming the desired culture a Culture of Respect weeds, and nourish the plants of orga- will automatically follow. Values must Since a cultural status quo produced nizational culture? The answer is to feed be communicated regularly and in a by the combination of multiple toxic and reinforce the culture, confront toxic variety of ways, since, as research shows, factors is difficult to change, effective personnel and those who protect them, “toxicity will be significantly reduced in detox requires a systems approach, and teach leaders to create a culture of organizations that clearly define values implementing and integrating multiple respectful engagement. in concrete ways, identify the kinds of actions at each organizational level Creating the conditions for produc- behaviors the organization will and to reinforce respectful engagement.23 tivity involves aligning and reinforcing will not tolerate, and have a clear set of

60 Commentary / Toxic Culture JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 consequences when an individual does suggestion is that evaluations consist of behavior; implementing a sequential not live up to the values. Of course, the 60 percent competence and 40 percent process to target a resolution by clarify- leader must model these behaviors as values.29 Since workplace relationships are ing the behavior as a problem; allowing well.”26 Enduring culture change requires a key factor in job satisfaction, retention, response and discussion; obtaining agree- leaders at each level to clarify acceptable and performance, initial and subsequent ment about the problem, if possible, and and unacceptable behaviors by translating performance counseling should establish brainstorming courses of action; and and operationalizing the department’s a clear relationship between values-based selecting a course of action with goals values for their specific organization, by behavior and its effect, either favorable or and a timeline for regular follow-up. enacting policies of universal account- adverse, on team performance. In other While most people respond positively ability, and by reinforcement. Former words, personnel must hear how their to feedback, toxic people are resistant, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter behavior is consistent or inconsistent with requiring a specific plan and persistent emphasized this clarification and his ex- organizational values and how they either accountability. pectation that empower or sabotage the organization. Toxic protectors, although often unaware of their actions, protect the leaders at every level of the Department Confront Toxic Personnel toxic person from being exposed and [should] engage personally with their and Their Protectors responsible.34 Leaders at all levels should subordinates in both formal and informal A gardener who observes weeds, pests, intervene with toxic protectors by first discussion about values-based decision- or disease must take immediate action realizing they exist and are identifiable making . . . as a part of their official so that the undesirable elements do not by the benefits gained from their rela- duties. These values include, among others, grow, multiply, and exploit the plants tionship to a toxic person; second, by honesty, integrity, loyalty, accountability for and their nutrients. In the same way, discussing with personnel their collective actions and decisions, fairness and impar- leaders must take immediate action performance, work relationships, and tiality, respect, and responsible citizenship. using a variety of individual, collective, climate assessments, carefully analyzing Importantly, this engagement must begin and organizational interventions. the information for toxic behaviors; third, with top leaders and cascade down to each A 360-degree assessment, whether by discussing with personnel toxic themes subordinate organization’s leader. Leaders mandatory or optional, is valuable for and patterns; and fourth, if a protector at all levels must foster a culture of ethics increasing self-awareness, developing is identified, by confronting him or her with their organizations by setting the ex- personnel, and identifying toxic behav- using targeted feedback. ample in their own conduct and by making ior.30 Its effectiveness for influencing values-based decision-making central to all change could be increased by three Provide Training in aspects of the Department’s activities.27 actions: the rater or senior rater could Respectful Engagement select respondents to provide unbiased The focus of professional military Effective clarification involves regular, feedback; the feedback should be used education and organization-sponsored continuing dialogue on the meaning in values-based performance counseling; professional development is primar- and practice of core values related to and the feedback should be utilized in ily on developing technical skills and such items as communication (includ- a coaching relationship for improved competencies. Leaders also need skills ing email), collaboration, addressing performance.31 Organizations can also in creating an organizational culture failure, correcting mistakes, giving praise, use a 360-degree assessment to identify that reinforces values, norms, and trust, acknowledging achievement, customer and address a toxic situation, not for the and in confronting toxic behavior.35 service, decisionmaking, ambiguity, purpose of obtaining evidence for firing Values-based experiential methods that goal setting, and respect for diversity. an individual, which can become a tool incorporate role-playing, active listen- Leaders must ask, “What does respect for retaliation, but for identifying coun- ing, conflict resolution, negotiation, (or honor, integrity, and so on) mean in terproductive behavior and creating a dealing with difficult people, stress how we communicate (or collaborate, healthy environment. management, and discussion of dilem- correct mistakes, and so on) with each Most toxic people are unaware of mas are effective methods of teaching other?” Then, to determine the extent of their uncivil behavior and its effects and, respectful engagement, as contrasted clarification, leaders should have informal when confronted, typically respond with with ineffective information-based conversations with personnel throughout denial or excuses.32 A change in behavior instruction.36 One-fourth of public- the organization and collect feedback requires a specific performance im- sector workers attributed their incivil- from customer and stakeholders. provement plan, also known as targeted ity to “not knowing any better” and Performance feedback that includes feedback, focusing on toxic behaviors and to a lack of organizational training in details on not only what personnel have effects on individual and collective per- respectful treatment.37 An excellent done but also how they get it done formance.33 Targeted feedback involves example of values-based training is the is extremely effective in reinforcing identifying the problem by respectfully U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division’s sexual the organization’s core values.28 One and nonjudgmentally describing the toxic assault prevention program, “Bystander

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Williams 61 Airman shares his experience being in toxic work environment at Storytellers event on Ramstein Air Base, Germany, February 23, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/ Savannah L. Waters)

Intervention,” in which Soldiers engage appear to be productive, and excel in Notes scenarios to translate the Army core managing upward, leaders should not values into norms, develop ownership, simply assume the culture is healthy. 1 Michelle Tan, “129 Army Battalion and wrestle with values-based action. Organizational toxicity is increasing in Brigade Commanders Fired since 2003,” The program’s premise is that individual the civilian sector, and it seems that the Army Times, February 2, 2015, available behavior to intervene is influenced by Department of Defense is not immune at ; Jeff Schogol, Additional effective methods merit Services do not act, there will be con- “‘Crush Their Nuts’: Marines Determine Work- mentioning, including a clear process for tinuing waste, declining productivity, ing for This Commander Was Pure Hell,” Ma- redress that balances confidentiality and an adverse effect on personnel, and rine Corps Times, November 29, 2016, available at . alleged offender; professional leadership military implements the strategies for 2 Bennett J. Tepper et al., “Abusive coaching; screening job applicants for respectful engagement, leaders could Supervision, Upward Maintenance Com- values-based behaviors38 and conducting expect increased readiness, productiv- munication, and Subordinates’ Psychological exit interviews with departing person- ity, performance, motivation, and a Distress,” Academy of Management Journal 50, 39 no. 5 (October 2007), 1169–1180; Christine nel ; and termination as a last resort after healthy environment. Future mission L. Porath and Amir Erez, “How Rudeness 40 adequate opportunity for change. The command will require high levels Takes Its Toll,” Psychologist 24, no. 7 (July main effort of detox should be creating of trust among personnel due to an 2011), 508–511; Christine L. Porath, Trevor a culture of respectful engagement that increased characterization of smaller Foulk, and Amir Erez, “How Incivility Hijacks prevents toxicity from flourishing. and lighter units and the prevalence Performance: It Robs Cognitive Resources, 42 Increases Dysfunctional Behavior, and Infects of cyber warfare. Since toxicity sabo- Team Dynamics and Functioning,” Organi- A culture characterized by core values tages cohesion, trust, and performance, zational Dynamics 44, no. 4 (October 2015), does not happen automatically and the success of future mission command 258–265; Lillemor R. M. Hallberg and Mar- without significant reinforcement and depends on addressing the toxic ele- garetha K. Strandmark, “Health Consequences vigilance. Since most toxic person- ments in our military organizations. JFQ of Workplace Bullying: Experiences from the Perspective of Employees in the Public Service nel are highly intelligent and skilled,

62 Commentary / Toxic Culture JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Sector,” International Journal of Qualita- ing the Work Go By or Aiding and Abetting?” 15 Franklin Covey, “The Business Case for tive Studies on Health and Well-Being 1, no. 2 Management 16, no. 5 (December 2013), Trust—Leadership Training and Organizational (January 23, 2010), 109–119; Heinz Leymann 680–696; Pamela Lutgen-Sandvik and Virginia Culture Change,” available at . Disorders,” European Journal of Work & Orga- Possibilities,” Southern Communication Journal 16 Ibid. nizational Psychology 5, no. 1 (1996), 251–275; 76, no. 4 (2011), 342–368; Pedro Neves, 17 Ibid. Heinz Leymann, “Mobbing and Psychologi- “Taking It Out on Survivors: Submissive 18 Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, cal Terror at Workplaces,” Violence & Victims Employees, Downsizing, and Abusive Supervi- Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Pro- 5, no. 2 (January 2, 1990), 119–126; Pamela sion,” Journal of Occupational & Organiza- fession (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Lutgen-Sandvik, Sarah J. Tracy, and Jess K. tional Psychology 87, no. 3 (September 2014), 2015). Alberts, “Burned by Bullying in the American 507–534; Stephen Kerzner, “The Crucial Role 19 Neves. Workplace: Prevalence, Perception, Degree of the ‘Third’ in Bully/Victim Dynamics,” Psy- 20 Bennett J. Tepper et al., “Procedural and Impact,” Journal of Management Studies choanalytic Inquiry 33, no. 2 (April 3, 2013), Injustice, Victim Precipitation, and Abusive 44, no. 6 (September 2007), 837–862; Nikola 116–123; and Black. Supervision,” Personnel Psychology 59, no. 1 Djurkovic, Darcy McCormack, and Gian 4 Christine L. Porath and Christine M. (Spring 2006), 101–123. Casimir, “Workplace Bullying and Intention Pearson, The Cost of Bad Behavior: How Incivil- 21 Neves. to Leave: The Moderating Effect of Perceived ity Is Damaging Your Business and What to Do 22 Reed; Stephen A. Elle, “Breaking the Organisational Support,” Human Resource About It (New York: Portfolio, Kindle Edition, Toxic Leadership Paradigm in the U.S. Army,” Management Journal 18, no. 4 (November 2009); Christine L. Porath and Christine M. U.S. Army War College, 2012; Tan; and 2008), 405–422; George E. Reed and R. Craig Pearson, “The Cost of Bad Behavior,” Organi- Schogol. Bullis, “The Impact of Destructive Leader- zational Dynamics 39, no. 1 (January 2010), 23 Kusy and Holloway, “Cultivating a Cul- ship on Senior Military Officers and Civilian 64–71; and Christine L. Porath and Christine ture of Respectful Engagement.” Employees,” Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 1 Pearson, “The Price of Incivility,” Harvard 24 Kusy and Holloway, Toxic Workplace. (October 2009), 5–18; Judith A. Black, “The Business Review 91, no. 1/2 (February 1, 25 Ibid. Lived Experiences of the Army Officer’s Wife 2013), 114–121. 26 Ibid. to an Army Commander’s Toxic Leadership: A 5 Department of Defense (DOD), “Depart- 27 Ashton Carter, “Leader-Led, Values- Phenomenological Study” (Ph.D. diss., Capella ment of Defense FY2016 Budget Fact Sheet,” Based Ethics Engagement,” February 12, University, 2015); Helge Hoel, Brian Faragher, available at . 28 Kusy and Holloway, Toxic Workplace; to Health, but All Bullying Behaviours Are Not 6 Aaron Schat, Michael Frone, and Kevin Porath and Pearson, The Cost of Bad Behavior. Necessarily Equally Damaging,” British Journal Kelloway, “Prevalence of Workplace Aggres- 29 Kusy and Holloway, “Cultivating a Cul- of Guidance & Counselling 32, no. 3 (August sion in the U.S. Workforce: Findings from a ture of Respectful Engagement.” 2004), 367–387; Bennett J. Tepper et al., National Study,” in Handbook of Workplace 30 Kusy and Holloway, Toxic Workplace. “Abusive Supervision and Subordinates’ Orga- Violence, ed. Kevin Kelloway, Julian Barling, 31 Glen Schmick, personal conversation, nization Deviance,” Journal of Applied Psychol- and Joseph Hurrell (Thousand Oaks, CA: 2016. ogy 93, no. 4 (July 2008), 721–732; Mitchell Sage, 2006), 47–89; and Gary Namie and 32 Kusy and Holloway, Toxic Workplace; Kusy and Elizabeth Holloway, “Cultivating a Ruth Namie, The Bully at Work (Naperville, IL: Porath and Pearson, The Cost of Bad Behavior. Culture of Respectful Engagement,” Leader to Sourcebooks, 2000). 33 Kusy and Holloway, “Cultivating a Leader, no. 58 (Fall 2010), 50–56; Bennett J. 7 Michael Sheehan, “A Model for Assessing Culture of Respectful Engagement”; Kusy and Tepper, Michelle K. Duffy, and Jason D. Shaw, the Impacts and Costs of Workplace Bullying,” Holloway, Toxic Workplace. “Personality Moderators of the Relationship paper presented at the Standing Conference 34 Kusy and Holloway, “Cultivating a Cul- between Abusive Supervision and Subordinates’ on Organisational Symbolism, Trinity College, ture of Respectful Engagement.” Resistance,” Journal of Applied Psychology 86, Dublin, 2001. 35 Christine M. Pearson, Lynn M. Anders- no. 5 (October 2001), 974–983; Bennett J. 8 DOD. son, and Christine L. Porath, “Assessing and Tepper et al., “Abusive Supervision, Intentions 9 Mitchell Kusy and Elizabeth Holloway, Attacking Workplace Incivility,” Organizational to Quit, and Employees’ Workplace Deviance: Toxic Workplace: Managing Toxic Personalities Dynamics 29, no. 2 (November 2000), 123. A Power/Dependence Analysis,” Organiza- and Their Systems of Power (San Francisco: John 36 Porath and Pearson, “The Price of tional Behavior & Human Decision Processes Wiley & Sons, Inc., Kindle Edition, 2009); Incivility”; Porath and Pearson, The Cost of Bad 109, no. 2 (July 2009), 156–167; Christine L. George Reed, Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the Behavior. Porath, Debbie Macinnis, and Valerie Folkes, U.S. Military (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 37 Porath and Pearson, The Cost of Bad “Witnessing Incivility among Employees: Ef- Press, 2015); Army Regulation 135-100, Army Behavior. fects on Consumer Anger and Negative Infer- Profession and Leadership Policy (Washington, 38 Ibid. ences about Companies,” Journal of Consumer DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 39 Ibid. Research 37, no. 2 (August 2010), 292–303; in draft); and Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, 40 Kusy and Holloway, Toxic Workplace. and Al-Karim Samnani and Parbudyal Singh, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: Headquar- 41 Porath and Pearson, “The Cost of Bad “20 Years of Workplace Bullying Research: A ters Department of the Army, 2012). Note that Behavior”; Porath and Pearson, The Cost of Bad Review of the Antecedents and Consequences the Army is the only military department to Behavior. of Bullying in the Workplace,” Aggression and have defined toxic leadership in doctrine. 42 Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command Violent Behavior 17, no. 6 (November 2012), 10 Porath and Pearson, The Cost of Bad White Paper,” April 3, 2012, available at . Understanding Target and Witness Reactions,” 12 Robert Sutton, The No Asshole Rule (New Journal of Managerial Psychology 28, no. 3 York: Grand Central Publishing, 2010). (2013), 290–305; Stephen Linstead, “Organi- 13 Kusy and Holloway, Toxic Workplace. zational Bystanding: Whistleblowing, Watch- 14 Ibid.

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Williams 63 Soldier assigned to USNS Mercy hands out basic hygiene kits to local Timorese children at Dona Ana Lemos Escuela elementary school in Gleno during Pacific Partnership 2016 health outreach event, June 15, 2016 (U.S. Navy/William Cousins)

Increasing Partner-Nation Capacity Through Global Health Engagement

By Bertram C. Providence, Derek Licina, and Andrew Leiendecker

If you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there.

— Paraphrase from Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland

hy the Department of Defense (DOD) and inter- W national military sector writ Brigadier General Bertram C. Providence, USA, is the Commanding General of Regional Health large engage in global health is well Command–Pacific. Lieutenant Colonel Derek Licina, USA, is the Chief of Global Health Engagements at 1 Regional Health Command–Pacific. Colonel Andrew Leiendecker, USA, is the Assistant Chief of Staff for documented. How DOD conducts Operations at Regional Health Command–Pacific. global health engagement (GHE) in a

64 Commentary / Increasing Partner-Nation Capacity JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 systematic way is not. While pundits leaves partner nations in the region con- objectively measure performance and ef- representing the Office of the Secretary fused. Both military and civilian partners fectiveness over time. of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant com- are left to assemble the training pieces Despite this single example of success, mands, Service components, and other that vary by doctrine and application, no standardized program, process, or organizations codify DOD policy for which may generate reputational risk for training packages exist for the other GHE GHE, individuals and units implement- DOD. Additionally, variation of the same OAAs conducted by DOD. These OAAs ing this broad guidance from 2013 to course among our own Services makes include the medical functional areas such today continue to do so in a patchwork it difficult to build interoperability with as evacuation, logistics, and force health manner.2 Using the Indo-Asia Pacific our partner nations. There may be a need protection, among others, that make up region as a case study, this article for some variation in course content to a majority of the engagements. DOD presents the background regarding the account for conditions that may differ be- policy now prescribes the requirement to current state of GHE in the region, tween regions. However, a standard from “foster accurate and transparent report- develops a standardized GHE approach which each of the Services, to include the ing to key stakeholders on the outcomes for engagement, and informs a partner- State Partnership Program, can adapt and and sustainability of security cooperation nation 5-year strategy. deliver predictable training to a partner and track, understand, and improve nation is essential. returns on DOD security cooperation Background Lacking a common approach also investments.” As SCP resources become GHE operations, activities, and actions makes it difficult for DOD and partner more constrained, the ability to measure (OAA) are used to implement the nations to track progress toward achiev- the impact of GHE using a standardized Secretary of Defense Policy Guid- ing learning objectives over time. As approach in support of partner-nation ance for DOD GHE and the U.S. such, DOD and partner nations become capacity-building is essential. Army Medicine 2017 Campaign Plan co-dependent to teach BFR year after in direct support of the U.S. Pacific year. Furthermore, thinking through the Developing a Standard Command (USPACOM) theater cam- next building blocks of partner-nation Approach for GHE paign plan (TCP) and U.S. Army Pacific medical capacity is often overlooked. This In an effort to standardize health (USARPAC) theater campaign support myopic approach of conducting BFR engagement execution and quantify plan.3 Analysis conducted by the Uni- annually using various programs of in- measures of performance and effective- formed Services University Center for struction consumes resources that could ness, the U.S. Army Regional Health Global Health Engagement found that be spent on developing the next higher Command–Pacific (RHC-P) built on of 2,518 Army engagements entered level of capability such as Advanced the USPACOM Health Engagement into the Overseas Humanitarian Assis- Trauma Life Support in support of a Appendix of the TCP. The appen- tance Shared Information System from United Nations–level one or two deploy- dix uses three health lines of effort fiscal years 2002–2012, 21.4 percent able hospital. (HLOEs) to guide Service component (approximately 540) were executed by To mitigate the problem, USPACOM GHE activities. The HLOEs are health USARPAC at a cost of $96.4 million. established a standardized BFR program system support, operational medicine, Out of the 540 engagements across of instruction. The resulting curriculum and public health/force health protec- 24 countries in the region, 28 percent and associated training packages are tion. Activities associated with the (approximately 153) were considered now used by validated trainers from all HLOEs include medical support to health related. Services to include Active, Reserve, and peacekeeping operations, basic first Despite significant investment, the Guard forces. This is an important step responder, humanitarian mine action, lack of standardization in how GHE in recognizing the variability in fund- unique health needs of the female Ser- OAAs are executed results in fragmented ing through the Security Cooperation vicemember, maternal/child health, and programs that may not develop the health Program (SCP) where the Army may emerging infectious diseases, among capability or increase the capacity of our secure funding to conduct an initial BFR others. The idea of binning health activ- partner nations (PNs) within the region. course this year only to be followed by ities into HLOEs is constructive, and For example, the basic first responder the Air Force to validate partner-nation RHC-P refined these based on existing (BFR) course has been conducted using trainers the next. Leveraging a standard- medical functional area doctrine. various programs of instruction by dif- ized program also increases overall DOD A review of Army medical doctrine ferent Services throughout the Indo-Asia efficiency. The lean approach of reducing led to the development of 3 Army Pacific region. The Air Force and Army waste where each Service developed inde- HLOEs based on 10 doctrinal medical National Guard also conducted BFR pendent BFR programs also incorporates functional areas (FA):4 courses through the State Partnership elements of Six Sigma, where variation in health system support Program using different programs of training products was eliminated. Using •• health service support instruction. As a result, the lack of stan- a standard approach allows individuals •• force health protection. dardization in delivering the same course and units conducting the BFR course to ••

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Providence, Licina, and Leiendecker 65 The 10 FAs are: population, bolstering confidence in gov- of State appropriations; a doctrine, ernance, and lowering the susceptibility organization, training, materiel, leader- combat and operational stress •• to destabilizing influences. Any engage- ship, personnel, and facilities scorecard control ment with PN civilian health systems is to assess capability and track progress combined information data •• coordinated with the ministries of health over time; an idealized engagement casualty care •• and U.S. Government agencies involved strategy to build the FA capability and dental services •• in health programs. These agencies in- increase capacity over a 5-year period; laboratory services •• clude the U.S. Agency for International and an example concepts of operation medical evacuation •• Development (USAID), Department to stimulate thought and discussion in medical intelligence •• of Health and Human Services (HHS) designing an appropriate health engage- medical logistics •• Office of Global Affairs, and Centers for ment strategy. The FA playbooks were mission command •• Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). constructed to socialize with Service preventive medicine and veterinary •• The health service support HLOE component and combatant command services. includes military-military and military- security cooperation country/regional Army Medicine is organized, civilian engagement across the following desk officers; Embassy personnel such trained, and equipped along these FAs. FAs: casualty care (medical treatment, as the Office of Defense Cooperation, Employing an engagement strategy using hospitalization, dental services, behavioral USAID, HHS (CDC Liaisons); and PN doctrinal FAs increases efficiencies in health, clinical laboratory services), medi- representatives from various ministries capitalizing on existing military capabili- cal evacuation, and medical logistics. In such as defense and health, among ties and standardizes the manner in which addition, seven USPACOM J07 health others. health engagements are conducted, as- engagement activities are binned into this During the annual combatant com- sessed, monitored, and evaluated. Each category: basic first responder, trauma mand security cooperation planning of these HLOEs and their associated FAs combat casualty care, mental health, cycle, these FA playbooks would inform are outlined below. medical logistics, humanitarian mine ac- discussions with the aforementioned First, the Army health system support tion, unique health needs of the female organizations and lead to the design of HLOE includes programs intended to Servicemember, and maternal/child health engagement project proposals. build capability and increase capacity of health. This approach informs a 5-year health PN military health systems to provide Third, the force health protection engagement strategy within the countries support across the range of military HLOE supports the health of U.S. of interest that supports combatant com- operations and types of mission support. military personnel, PN militaries, and mand country security cooperation plans Military operations include theater open- general public by mitigating disease risks. and Ambassadors’ integrated country ing, early entry, expeditionary, detainee, This HLOE includes the following FAs: strategy. The strategy is then translated humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, preventive medicine, veterinary services, into a single slide depicting engage- and peacekeeping operations. Mission combat and operational stress control, ments along the three HLOEs, by FA, support includes traditional assistance to dental services, and laboratory services to achieve a strategic Service component a deployed force, operations predomi- (area medical laboratory support). In and/or combatant command objective nantly characterized by stability tasks, addition, the USPACOM J07 health (see table). These strategies are used to and defense support of civil authorities. engagement activities of emerging infec- inform senior leader discussions such as This HLOE includes the following FAs: tious diseases and tropical medicine fall bilateral defense dialogues conducted mission command, medical intelligence, into this category for planning purposes. by the combatant command and Service and combined information data. In ad- components. Focusing senior leader dition, two USPACOM J07 (Command Building 5-Year Health talking points and discussions on these Surgeon) health engagement activities Engagement Strategies strategies leads to bilaterally agreed to ac- fall into this category: medical support Using doctrinal medical FAs to inform tions that sustain GHE programming to to peacekeeping operations and medi- how the Army in the Pacific executes support TCP objectives. cal support to humanitarian assistance/ health engagements, RHC-P designed The FA playbooks and associ- disaster relief. FA playbooks to socialize the concept ated 5-year strategies were socialized Second, the health service support with personnel instrumental in the SCP. with great success during the 2016 HLOE includes programs intended The FA playbooks include the follow- USPACOM Security Cooperation to increase capacity and capability of ing six elements: doctrinal definition of Capability Development Working Group military and civilian health systems, as the capability; list of units potentially (CDWG) held in Honolulu. The CDWG well as direct support to those systems. available to support health engagements is the single most important event in the This HLOE assists the partner nations in the FA; international military educa- Indo-Asia Pacific security cooperation in maintaining a level of health care con- tion and training courses available for planning process where engagement ducive to supporting the health of the PN attendance through Department OAAs are reviewed and coordinated in

66 Commentary / Increasing Partner-Nation Capacity JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Table. Country X Health Engagement Plan Strategic Enablers, Tools, and Resources Joint Chief of Staff Exercises, Pacific Angel, Pacific Pathways, Pacific Resilience Disaster Response Exercise Exchange, Global Health Security Agenda, National Guard SPP, Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, Regional Forum, Asia Pacific Military Health Exchange, Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences, U.S. Agency for International Development, and so forth. 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Line of Effort Engagement Engagement Engagement Engagement Engagement Objective Health System P1: Medical Support P2: Medical Support P3: Medical Support P4: Medical Support P5: Medical Support Primary Support (Shape) to Peacekeeping to Peacekeeping to Peacekeeping to Peacekeeping to Peacekeeping • Increase HA/ Operations Medical U.S. Medical Clinical/Functional Medical Operations U.S.–Partner DR and PKO Deployment Exercise SMEE Table Top Exercise Nation Medical Capability Planning Subject Observation SMEE Exercise Secondary Matter Expert • Enhance Defense Exchange (SMEE) Relationships Health Service P1: Clinical P2: Clinical P3: Clinical P4: Clinical P5: Clinical • Support Military Support Laboratory Laboratory Laboratory Laboratory Disposal Laboratory L2 Professionalism (Posture) Capability Handling Bio/Chem Infectious Borne of Hazardous Waste deployable hospital • Increase Development Sample SMEE Diseases SMEE SMEE lab operations Access and Interoperability Workshop P2: PT–Initial/ P3: PT–Physical P4: PT–Advance SMEE • Enhance U.S. P1: Physical Intermediate Fitness Clinical and P5: PT–Burn and Military Medical Therapy Capability Patient Evaluation Enhancement and Operational Wound Care, Readiness Development and Treatment Injury Prevention Practice SMEE Amputee Rehab Workshop SMEE SMEE SMEE Force Health P1: Preventive P2: Preventive Med P3: Preventive Med P4: Preventive Med P5: Preventive Med Protection Med Conducting Deployment OEHSA Occ/Env Sampling Food/Water/Soil TTX–Deployment (Ready) OEHSA/All Hazards Phase I SMEE and Health Risk Vector Assessment OEHSA Phase II Approach SMEE Assess SMEE SMEE SMEE Strategic • Land Forces Talks Leadership • Bilateral Defense Dialogues (Communicate) • Senior Leader Engagement • Asian Pacific Military Health Exchange • Attendance at Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response

*See Medical Functional Area Playbooks for DOTMLPF Assessment Scorecard, Engagement Strategy, and draft CONOPs advance of project nomination submis- The USARPAC Assistant Chief of executing GHE. Each combatant com- sions. The playbooks and 5-year strategy Staff for Medicine is using the respon- mand can select the most appropriate FA tools were received with enthusiasm sibility assigned through the Theater and engagement strategy to meet its TCP by myriad SCP officers. In numerous Campaign Order, FA playbooks, and objectives. Partners in the U.S. Central CDWG country synchronization sessions, 5-year strategies with great success in syn- Command area of responsibility may these officers requested a single point of chronizing health engagement proposals seek casualty care support while those in accountability by branch (for example, among all Services, Guard, and Reserve. the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. health) to synchronize the often redun- Furthermore, the playbooks and strategy Pacific Command areas of responsibility dant project nominations. The health tools were presented during the 2016 seek laboratory and preventive medicine community is positioned to support this Association of Military Surgeons United support. The laboratory and preventive request for two reasons: States Annual Meeting and as part of medicine FA playbooks and strategies the DOD Global Health Engagement could help DOD and U.S. interagency 1. The USPACOM Theater Campaign Capabilities Based Assessment conducted partners in supporting partner nations Order assigns a single Service com- from 2016–2017. Key leaders repre- through the Global Health Security ponent coordination responsibility senting multiple Services, combatant agenda. The opportunities are great. for health engagements in designated commands, and Service components However, the FA playbooks are countries. expressed interest in scaling up the use of not perfect. The U.S. Army Medical 2. The FA playbooks and associated these standardized tools immediately. Command recently tasked the U.S. Army 5-year strategies allow for all Services Although the playbooks and strate- Medical Department Center and School (to include Guard and Reserve) to gies are based on Army doctrine, all to develop training packages in line focus their nominations on building Services can incorporate their compara- with each FA playbook. The Uniformed capacity in support of a common tive advantage into the three HLOEs to Services University Center for Global TCP objective. ensure DOD does not duplicate efforts Health Engagement also expressed inter- and gains efficiency and effectiveness in est in potentially developing joint training

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Providence, Licina, and Leiendecker 67 ance for DOD GHE, Army Medicine 2017 Campaign Plan, USARPAC Theater Campaign Support Plan, and USPACOM TCP.5 Using this standardized approach to DOD GHE in a time of fiscal constraints is not only a wise investment of the limited resources available, but also increases the credibility of the DOD military healthcare system to leadership, elected officials, taxpayers, and the partners with whom we serve. JFQ

Notes

1 Josh Michaud, Kellie Moss, and Jen Kates, The U.S. Department of Defense and Global Health (Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation, September 2012), available at ; Derek Licina, “The Military Sector’s Role in Global Health: Historical Context and Future Direction,” Global Health Governance 6, no. 1 (Fall 2012), 1–30, available at . 2 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Department of Defense Instruc- tion TBD Global Health Engagement, 2016” (draft); Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5132.14, “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Coopera- tion Enterprise,” January 31, 2017, available at ; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/ LIC), “Policy Guidance for Department of Defense Global Health Engagement,” 2013. 3 ASD-SO/LIC; Army Medicine 2017 Campaign Plan (Washington, DC: Headquar- ters Department of the Army, 2017), available at ; June 13, 2015, during Pacific Partnership 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Peter Reft) U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), “Theater Campaign Plan 5000-20, Base Plan,” 2013; packages based on the FA playbooks trinal FAs, the Department of Defense U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), to further standardize how all DOD reassures allies and key regional partners “Theater Campaign Support Plan,” 2016 executes health engagement. Both initia- of American commitment, prepares (draft). 4 Field Manual 4-02, Army Health System tives will fill a gap and support quality regional partners to assume multina- (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department improvement of health engagement exe- tional leadership roles, opens lines of of the Army, 2013). cuted by individuals and units, assessment communication with new partners, and 5 ASD-SO/LIC; Army Medicine 2017 of their impact, and lead to an increase in sustains access to countries with limited Campaign Plan; USPACOM; USARPAC. PN capability and capacity. capacity to contribute toward regional and international security. Furthermore, Through global health engagements health engagements implement the based on standardized HLOEs and doc- Secretary of Defense Policy Guid-

68 Commentary / Increasing Partner-Nation Capacity JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Local boys observe activity within village of Sharmai, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, February 18, 2013, as Human Terrain Teams speak with locals (U.S. Army/Raymond Schaeffer)

Human Terrain at the Crossroads

By Brian R. Price

The task now falls to us to leverage [Human Terrain System’s] lessons learned and make evolutionary progress toward the systematic inclusion of sociocultural information in all- source analysis to support peacetime engagement as well as combat operations.

—Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA

he U.S. Army’s Human Terrain needs expressed by military leadership, Petraeus, the program rapidly expanded System (HTS) was created in HTS was offered as an experimental to place personnel with 31 teams in both T 2007 amid fears of defeat in Iraq effort to embed academic social scien- Iraq and Afghanistan, where groups and Afghanistan. Responding to clear tists with Army and Marine Corps units from five to nine were embedded at to dramatically increase local sociocul- the brigade, division, and theater levels. tural knowledge on the battlefield.1 These teams were devised to provide Following a test deployment in cross-functional capability built around Dr. Brian R. Price is an Associate Professor of History in the Department of History and Khost, Afghanistan, in February 2007, the expertise of one or two academic International Studies at Hawaii Pacific University. and actively supported by General David social scientists, a team leader (generally

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Price 69 Human Terrain Team consisting of U.S. Army Soldiers and civilians, along with Afghan interpreter, meet with local citizens of village near Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Stephen Schester) a military officer, Active duty or retired), to leverage blogs and newspaper reports the combat zone, where little oversight several field data gatherers (research that put the program on the defensive was practical in a program so quickly analysts), and one or two members to almost from the beginning, complicating expanded. As with similar but more manage data and classification (research the nontrivial managerial and leadership extreme cases by deployed members of managers). challenges facing the program as it de- the Department of Justice, some HTS The program left Iraq in 2012 with ployed without a test period into Iraq and members were accused of falsifying the drawdown and was gradually reduced Afghanistan. Sociologist Paul Joseph of timesheets.8 Some alleged sexual harass- in Afghanistan starting in 2013 with se- Tufts University concluded that the HTS ment, and Army investigations did find questration and as brigades left theater. In concept failed because it did not alter the some evidence for this. Team dynamics September 2014, the program appeared war’s strategy.6 were often problematic and team lead- to have met a quiet budgetary demise. The narrative advanced by HTS ership uneven.9 Mapping the Human It was hurried to its expiry on a wave of critics was that the program finally shut Terrain Toolkit, the technology package criticism from USA Today,2 independent down because of its expense and mani- intended to preserve HTS research and journalist John Stanton,3 and anthropolo- fold failures. Indeed, the program was enable sociocultural mapping at the gists opposed to the wars and to their expensive—costing as much as $800 unit level, cannot be said to have been a discipline’s participation in them.4 Some million over 7 years—and it suffered from success as it was cumbersome and failed military officers, like Ben Connable significant growing pains characterized to interface with major systems such as and Gian Gentile, believed HTS to be as “catastrophic success” in the words DCGS-A (Distributed Common Ground starving the Army and Marine’s ability of HTS founders Montgomery McFate System–Army) or the cleverly named to acculturate themselves.5 These crit- and Steve Fondacaro.7 Like other Federal package used by the Marines, Palantir. ics, reporters, and their congressional employees in Iraq and Afghanistan, In the early days especially, HTS allies coalesced into a vocal opposition some members abused the freedoms in ability to recruit quality personnel was

70 Commentary / Human Terrain at the Crossroads JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 hampered by dysfunctional contractor for Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) extensive baseline assessments, and control, making the assembly of func- deployed in Phase Zero, in advance local connections could potentially be tional teams designed to work smoothly of kinetic or stability operations, was established and social science could in the high-tempo world of a deployed clearly recognized. Even as HTTs were be used with a greater degree of reli- combat brigade extremely difficult. The removed from Iraq in 2012, a small team ability, so long as political and cultural controversial conversion of HTS person- was deployed in support of U.S. Africa sensitivities were observed. If operations nel from contractor to Department of Command (USAFRICOM). Small cells move to more kinetic phases, reliably Defense (DOD) civilian status in 2009 supported other combatant commands, trained and vetted social scientists could strained both the leadership and morale and a larger cell was proposed but never provide insight into the rapidly chang- of HTS personnel, who often spent con- funded for U.S. Pacific Command. Other ing dislocation that accompanies considerable time “outside the wire” to the efforts were made, as a National Defense flict. As designed, HTTs were to work breaking point. This created significant University (NDU) study recommended, as cross-functional teams at the brigade bad blood that fueled further criticisms to move the program to special opera- level, providing both intelligence-gath- and brought unwanted attention to tions forces (SOF), while advocates such ering and analysis. In practice, many HTS’s press-shy parent organization, as Lieutenant General Michael Flynn and teams dispersed to support battalion, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Kerry Patton believed HTS capability company, or even platoon operations as Command (TRADOC). Even as HTS should be consolidated with other intel- individual contributors, expanding the secured better control over hiring and re- ligence assets. Some critics within the capability in an unforeseen way in direct tention, many researchers fielded by HTS force, such as Ben Connable, believed support of combat units in the field. believed they were poorly treated, eroding HTS had competed with and retarded Therefore, the cross-functional team the managerial and leadership climate. necessary growth in cultural competence, structure was not necessarily required Despite these criticisms, the need especially in civil affairs. Clifton Greene to achieve remarkable results. Far less for and the assessments of the program suggested HTS-type expertise become expensive individual contributors, by those making use of HTS products part of a renewed Civilian Expeditionary surged as necessary, could provide much consistently returned positive results. In Force. Others suggested the Department of the capability with much less cost. four separate studies based on interviews, of State would be a better fit. Continuity. Between unit rotations, commanders asserted that through HTS Where should HTS-like capabil- HTTs often provided a valuable store of contributions kinetic activities were re- ity be housed? Within DOD, within local knowledge and experience. HTS’s duced and counterinsurgency initiatives the Intelligence Community, at the own rotation policy was somewhat prob- were more creatively designed and effec- Department of State, or with a con- lematic with teams in a constant state of tively run.10 Engagements with key leaders tractor? To answer this question, it is flux, but overall HTTs did provide a mea- and local constituents were reported to be necessary to identify the potential ben- sure of continuity between unit rotations. stronger. Notably, HTS’s unique ability to efits, resources necessary to provide the Alternative Perspectives and deliver creative perspectives on local issues capability, and potential costs. Rather Bridging. As noted in a 2008 West Point was a product of the embedding of civilian than jettisoning nearly $800 million in study, “Commanders and staff appreci- experts into a military environment. While hard-won experience, finding a rational ate the alternative perspective HTTs these contributions are difficult to quan- way forward to preserve what has worked bring.”11 It noted further that some HTT tify (as is progress in counterinsurgency is the purpose of this article. members earned trust “sufficient to take generally), the consistent support for the on the role of special advisor,” though program by brigade commanders, despite Benefits this was not universal. Within the diverse its cost, suggests that HTS filled several Sociocultural Analysis. HTS’s raison world of “enablers,” HTT social scien- important gaps. d’etre was the mapping of the human tists could bridge the academic/military This support goes a long way toward terrain. In the non- or semi-permissive divide, shaping input and contributions answering a question as to why the Army environments that characterized Iraq according to the unique command persisted in supporting the program into and Afghanistan, trained professionals environment and requirements for 2013 and 2014, despite negative press could uniquely and quickly offer quali- each unit, leveraging their own diverse reports and turbulence of the early years. tative exploratory research to combat backgrounds. HTTs were not tied to the Commanders and successive secretaries of units. Reliable quantitative data were institutional bias and agendas for other the Army and of Defense backed the pro- difficult to acquire (though it would contributors, nor were they completely gram because field commanders deemed be easier in a preconflict society). HTT bound by the reductive character of the it effective. analysis was built on a powerful research military decisionmaking process. Their Even before its shuttering, HTS reachback capability, today preserved stance enabled considerable creativity management, in partnership with its new as the Global Cultural Knowledge and adaptability, countering institutional contractor, CGI Federal, attempted to Network at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. inertia and conflict. HTTs worked not find a new home. Early on, the potential The Phase Zero environment, more only with brigade elements but also

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Price 71 with the State Department, Provincial depth to apply diverse methodologies to Along these lines, in Sociocultural Reconstruction Teams, and allied and the complex issues that were sharply dif- Intelligence: A New Discipline in host-nation officials, often helping to ferentiated at least at the provincial level, Intelligence Studies, Kerry Patton ad- bridge the gap between civilian, nongov- if not the district or village. vanced an argument for and description ernmental organizations (NGOs), and of “SOCINT” in an attempt to articulate military operations. Moreover, team con- Proposals Flynn’s vision. And indeed, such jobs tinuity supported longer term viewpoints Sociocultural Information as an Intel- have been advertised since at least 2012, than the relatively short-term perspective ligence Function. One stirring debate generally administered as contractor-proof deployed military units. surrounding HTS concerned whether vided intelligence support. The positions its function was intelligence or some- as advertised require a current TOP Profiling Success thing else. HTS founders McFate and SECRET/Sensitive Compartmented Commanders assessed their teams as Fondacaro maintained that in order to Information (TS/SCI) clearance and successful if they brought understanding be effective, HTS needed to forge ties a much lower educational require- of the local environment, proved them- within academia. They hoped that by ment, often just a bachelor’s degree. selves by strong working relationships focusing HTS products on unclassi- Such requirements exclude experienced within the staff and with other enablers, fied material and widely disseminating HTT personnel and reduce the pool of and supported the brigade’s efforts with them in an unclassified manner, such available expertise to a small number of their unique skills sets. ties could be forged. In 2012, I argued already experienced intelligence officers Despite considerable effort, HTS for the gathering and collating of local who bring the same DOD/Intelligence never established a comprehensive profile and oral histories into an archive avail- Community perspective to their work. for what a successful “social scientist” able to academics in a further effort to It specifically excludes academics owing looked like. Education and adaptability bridge the “academic/military divide,” to the current clearance requirement. were known attributes, but alongside as both McFate and I have termed it. These advertisements reflect the DOD social scientists, those with a background But HTS was also a kind of intelligence and Intelligence Community’s reflexive in the humanities also exceled, so mission function, reporting to TRADOC G2 allergy to openness. The self-referential success was not necessarily limited by (Intelligence). In 2010, its new direc- world of defense contractors, professional particular disciplines, such as anthropol- tor, Colonel Hamilton, had been military education, and defense/intel- ogy. This had been suggested in the deputy G2 at TRADOC and moved the ligence sector enforces limited left-right aforementioned 2008 West Point study, organization in a direction more in line limits on creative thinking. I argue that though it further complicated a troubled with G2 parameters. Almost all material in the creative world of contingency/ selection and assessment process. Clifton generated was caveated For Official Use stability/hybrid/counterinsurgency Green has argued recently that the HTS Only, with much of it being classified operations, intellectual curiosity, creativ- program turned itself around in 2012 SECRET. As such, it was not easily ity, and adaptability are prerequisites to and that it was a model program under available to constituent civilian coun- success. A SOCINT analyst is not likely the guidance and leadership of Colonel terparts, local or partner officials, and it to provide the alternative thinking that Sharon Hamilton. Until a more thorough fed the opposition’s favorite narrative of HTS provided to commanders and staff. organizational history is conducted, we HTS as a supporter of lethal targeting, Their educational breadth is likely to be may never know, but HTS did demon- spying, and general nefariousness. Plus, narrow, and their grasp on the relevant strate the utility of embedding academics it sharply reduced the availability of literature, social science, and humanities within combat units in theater and with HTS products outside the defense com- methodologies comparatively weak. And combatant commands (USAFRICOM, munity and virtually eliminated the pos- their products are likely to be classified, U.S. Special Operations Command), as sibility of collaboration with academia. unavailable to the breadth of civilian, well as on a limited basis within special Members of the Intelligence NGO, host-nation, and alliance partners operations. Community have argued that such in- who need the information. What is clear from the testimony of depth sociocultural intelligence should be These positions are analyst positions, those who served with HTS is that adapt- formalized as an intelligence function. In not collectors; HTT combined collection ability and flexibility were key attributes. 2010, Lieutenant General Flynn argued (“gathering”), analytical, and collation Also important was a comfort with mili- for stability operations information cen- functions, arguably yielding a more thor- tary culture, key to not only bridging the ters that would aggregate and disseminate ough approach that was more flexible to local and military culture but also work- much of the same kind of information the needs of local conditions. ing with many other enabling agencies. gathered by HTTs. Furthermore, in his Finally, such formal adoption by the As information gatherers, they needed foreword to the 2013 NDU study on Intelligence Community is likely to feed the ability to interface smoothly with HTS, he suggested the “systematic” in- continued negative press and hostility representatives of the host nation, and clusion of sociocultural information into within academia, reducing the quality of as analysts they needed the educational intelligence operations. recruits available to staff those functions,

72 Commentary / Human Terrain at the Crossroads JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 just as Project Camelot and HTS evoked open and sustained hostility, bringing unwanted negative press to DOD. Critics David Price and Roberto Gonzáles, among others, accused HTS of neocolonial spying, just as sociologists accused the Special Operations Research Office of spying and subversion during the mid-1960s. In both cases the result was the same, and I have written elsewhere about the cycle of retrenchment that has repeated itself in the wake of a turbulent effort to engage the assistance of academia in the study and understanding of foreign populations. If the Intelligence Community wants to develop an HTS-like capability, it will need to reduce the reliance on TS/SCI cleared personnel and instead find ways to integrate more highly educated and broadly oriented individuals who can contribute in a more fundamental way to the integration of sociocultural knowledge within the intelligence process. House It Within U.S. Special Operations Command. In Afghanistan, one HTT served with SOF, where members often accompanied teams on missions while accessing reachback capabilities and connections with other HTTs. Special Forces in particular have long held a similar interest in sociocultural knowledge in their missions relating to foreign internal defense. Housing HTS permanently with SOF was the recommendation of the carefully wrought 2013 NDU study, Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare. Soldier holds Afghan child and wears Kandahari hat to show solidarity during key leader meeting in The special operations community Koshab Village near Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Stephen Schester) also employed Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) comprised of female Army per- Moving HTS into the special opera- brigade or regimental commanders, their sonnel who were “attached” to the unit tions world make sense on several levels staffs, and teams in their efforts to un- and who could serve for a year before given the organization’s historical inter- derstand the sociocultural environment. returning to their units. CSTs went est in local cultures and their relatively Moreover, the pool of available academic through a 6-week preparatory course light footprint, less likely to trigger local experts would likely be small, given the before joining their special operations immune responses. Without knowing more rigorous physical and security unit. This was similar to the Female why these efforts failed, it is impossible requirements. Still, this would seem to Engagement Teams deployed alongside to comment on potential issues. But, remain a viable alternative. conventional Army and Marine units. as with the Intelligence Community, Contractors: Sociocultural From at least 2012, HTS leadership their products would likely be classified Consultants. Another approach is to explored the possibility of moving from and compartmentalized, unavailable to house the capability within the orbit- TRADOC to United States Army Forces broader DOD/State/Intelligence con- ing contractor community. A number Command or SOF, but without success. stituencies, and this does not help line of ex-HTS personnel have advocated

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Price 73 this approach. Companies such as governmental demand, noting that in eliminating overhead and fusing subject Civil Solutions International (CSI) “peacetime” HTTs contribute to team matter expertise with leadership. This are attempting to establish businesses training and advising. Striker maintains newly conceived team lead could coordi- providing sociocultural analysis services the structure as a team, concurring with nate efforts of the Female Engagement to defense and corporate markets. As the NDU study with respect to the Team. More extensive training could an exemplar, CSI provides assessment/ team’s strength as a cross-functional better prepare academics for service in reconnaissance in Phase Zero operations, entity. the field, and relationships within the unit humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, Permanently embedding teams at the could be built before deployment. and civil affairs, emphasizing “counterin- brigade level would build relationships On the downside, the potential as surgency by civil affairs,” seeking to drive therein and enable focused research on special advisor would be reduced, though change that it is hoped reduces the appeal likely zones of deployment. It would also most initiatives that have been proposed of radical ideologies. enable a slower and more considered have the same problem. The ability to Contract services have advantages selection of personnel and provide valu- provide continuity as units rotate through of being able to surge on demand and able preparatory training to the Brigade a deployment would also be lost, though not directly involving DOD personnel, Combat Team/Regimental Combat it could be argued that the entire civil they may move more fluidly within local Team, but it would also be likely to mili- affairs teams could be staggered with lon- environments, and they might leverage tarize the position. In this scenario, the ger deployments. knowledge gained in commercial con- HTT leader would likely become a staff State Department Function? tracts and establish credibility through position, integrating it into the reductive Arguably, the sociocultural function as positive civic and humanitarian action. Military Decision Making Process. The described may overlap with similar func- But there are disadvantages, too—po- expansive and “out of the box” role of tions within the Department of State. tential lack of accountability and control the better HTT members would be lost. This was the historical problem with (issues that plagued contractors in both Strengthening Civil Affairs: House similar research conducted during the Iraq and Afghanistan), lack of connectiv- HTTs Here? Here I propose a compro- Cold War, as chronicled by Seymour ity within the military units, and potential mise: consider housing sociocultural Dietchman’s 1976 The Best-Laid lack of a cohesive approach built over research expertise within civil affairs or Schemes: A Tale of Social Research and time by the military units they serve. attaching it to Foreign Area Officers Bureaucracy. It is generally agreed that Currently CGI Federal administers to working out of Embassies (much of the in counterinsurgency environments, the Global Cultural Knowledge Network. early work on the program originated close coordination or even fusion of This is the remnant of the formal HTS in the Foreign Military Studies Office at diplomatic/civic and military efforts program; CGI is charged with preserv- Fort Leavenworth). If established as a is necessary. In Iraq and Afghanistan, ing the HTS product library and has Reserve function, academics could serve HTTs often worked closely with additional training/educational capabili- as Reserve officers, much as other civic State Department personnel through ties. This solution has the advantage of expertise is leveraged within civil affairs. Provincial Reconstruction Teams or as maintaining some level of human terrain Social scientists/area experts/humanities brigade enablers. In theory, it could be expertise, especially the reachback re- professionals could form the core around possible to house an HTS-like capability search centers, with the probable intent which a surge capability could be built within State, reducing the academic angst to expand at the combatant command in wartime, with more junior analysts associated with DOD or the Intelligence level or surging in the event of greater being added as needed. The advantage Community. Working out of Embassies, demand. While it keeps the profile of would be that such officers could seek HTTs could establish themselves before the program low, it has not escaped the additional language and cultural train- conflict begins, perhaps with a represen- antipathy of its academic and congres- ing relevant to their potential areas of tative housed with potential deployed sional opponents. For this proposal to deployment, maintain and connect the brigades on a rotating basis to build mili- work, combatant commands would need program within academia, and conduct tary relationships. This could bring them to budget for HTT cores that could be summer research designed to create a sig- into closer working relationships with the surged as need required, as proposed (but nificantly greater Phase Zero awareness. Foreign Area Officers and the long-term not funded) by U.S. Pacific Command. Summers could be spent working out of strategy, but careful management would Establish Permanent Brigade-Level an Embassy (if agreed and approved by be necessary to preserve their credibility Presence of HTTs. Another possibility is the State Department). Such a solution with the brigade staff. developing a permanent capability within would enable significantly better con- Army brigades or Marine regiments. In nectivity into academia, better acclimatize Conclusion The Humanity of Warfare: Social Science academics to the military environment, The Intelligence Community is already Capabilities and the Evolution of Armed and enable surge capability in the case moving to capture some of the socio- Conflict, Sam J. Striker argues for such of deployment. In this arrangement, the cultural analysis space, but this solution a capability that serves corporate and social scientist could be the team leader, likely reduces sociocultural understand-

74 Commentary / Human Terrain at the Crossroads JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 ing to a subordinate position within a During the First Four Years,” PRISM 2, no. 4 port: A ‘Team of Teams,’” unpublished report (2011), 63–82. prepared by the U.S. Military Academy’s Inter- community where “red layer” concerns 2 Michael C. Davies, “Institutional Failure: disciplinary Team in Iraq for U.S. Army Train- are paramount. Housing an HTS-like USA Today and the Human Terrain System,” ing and Doctrine Command G2 (Intelligence), capability with SOF has some merit but Small Wars Journal, March 28, 2016. 2008; 2) Yvette Clinton et al., Congressionally has not been realized for undisclosed 3 John Stanton published a wide range of Directed Assessment of the Human Terrain Sys- reasons. HTS housed with the State critiques of the Human Terrain System (HTS) tem (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, on political Web sites such as Zero Anthropol- November 2010); 3) Contingency Capabilities: Department would likely run into bud- ogy, Cryptome, Intelligence Daily, and Pravda. Analysis of Human Terrain Teams in Afghani- getary constraints since State’s budget He continues to publish on the Global Cultural stan—Draft Final Report (Washington, DC: for research is so much smaller than that Knowledge Network. Institute for Defense Analyses, December afforded by DOD. The Army seems to 4 A number of anthropologists organized 2011); and 4) Lamb et al. have adopted a hibernation strategy, themselves into the Network of Concerned 11 Jebb, Hummel, and Chacho, 4. Anthropologists (NCA), publishing a myriad of preserving a core of HTS capability, sharp critiques of the wars as neocolonial, char- in theory in preparation to surge or acterizing HTS efforts as subversive intelligence support combatant command demands aimed at domination and spying. The NCA’s should they arise. This strategy does long drumbeat of opposition began almost im- not, however, provide significant pre- mediately as HTS was founded and continued even after the 2014 demise. They were fre- conflict analysis. quently featured prominently by USA Today re- But here is another possibility: hybrid- porter Tom Vanden Brooke in his steady stream ize the capability either by making it a of critical reports. Many NCA articles appeared part of the Army’s civil affairs organiza- on the political blogs CounterPunch and Zero tion or attaching small teams to work in Anthropology. See David H. Price, Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in Service of the Embassies, perhaps attached to Foreign Militarized State (Petrolia, CA: CounterPunch, Area Officers. 2011); and Catherine Besteman et al., The HTS did not, as sociologist Paul Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual: Or, Notes Joseph concluded—indeed, could not— on Demilitarizing American Society (Chicago: provide the silver bullet that would fix a Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009). 5 Ben Connable, “All Our Eggs in a Broken flawed counterinsurgency strategy. It is Basket: How the Human Terrain System is perhaps unfortunate that the program Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural was unable to develop into a strategic Competence,” Military Review (March–April asset, though it seems to have been 2009). productive at the tactical and, arguably, 6 Paul Joseph, “Soft” Counterinsurgency: Human Terrain Teams and U.S. Military operational level. The Human Terrain Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan (New York: System was never a “system,” but it did Palgrave MacMillian, 2014). succeed in increasing local understanding 7 McFate and Fondacaro. and provided much-needed perspective 8 Office of the Inspector General,An In- to commanders, staffs, and Soldiers/ vestigation into Overtime Payments to FBI and other Department of Justice Employees Deployed Marines as well as other enablers. to Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: While retrenchment into prepara- Department of Justice, December 2008). tion for “regular” operations has, as after 9 For an in-depth analysis of the dynam- Vietnam, gripped DOD, the challenge of ics of the teams, see Christopher J. Lamb, complex, hybrid, contingency, stability, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and Theodore F. Pikulsky, Human Terrain Teams: or operations other than war remains, An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural and HTS’s valuable experience should Knowledge in Irregular Warfare (Washington, be preserved and integrated. The fruitful DC: Institute of World Politics, 2013). This collaboration of academic, military, and is the most in-depth, complete analysis of the diplomatic personnel is absolutely neces- HTS program, though it is marred by its assumption that HTS research was best served sary as the United States continues to through the cross-functional team structure. In engage in operations around the globe. JFQ practice, many teams divided their resources, sending individuals out to serve with battalions, companies, and even platoons. Such individual Notes contributors often served the HTS mission more efficiently than the often-conflict-ridden 1 Montgomery McFate and Steve Fon- teams could. 10 dacaro, “Building a Rocket in the Garage: The four studies were conducted by 1) Reflections on the Human Terrain System Cindy R. Jebb, Laurel J. Hummel, and Tania M. Chacho, “Human Terrain Team Trip Re-

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Price 75 U.S. Coast Guard Academy officer candidate practices navigating using stars and sextant during evening training session aboard U.S. Coast Guard Barque Eagle, September 13, 2012 (U.S. Coast Guard/Lauren Jorgensen)

Are There Too Many General Officers for Today’s Military?

By Gregory C. McCarthy

here are approximately 900 enhance mission success but clutters the percent of GO/FOs in each Service Active-duty general/flag officers chain of command, adds bureaucratic to increase efficiency, streamline T (GO/FOs) today of 1.3 million layers to decisions, and costs taxpay- decisionmaking, achieve modest cost troops. This is a ratio of 1 GO/FO for ers additional money from funding savings, and enhance accountability of every 1,400 troops. During World War higher paygrades to fill positions. As decisionmaking. II, an admittedly different era, there end-strength fluctuates, force structure were more than 2,000 GO/FOs for and strength projections for the next Background a little more than 12 million Active decade show the uniformed Services Historical comparisons of GO/FOs as troops (1:6,000). This development maintaining substantial excess capac- a percentage of the total force from the represents “rank creep” that does not ity at senior ranks. Although historical establishment of the National Security numbers are inexact guides and future Act of 1947 to today show an all-time threats could radically change circum- high, a ratio that has steadily crept stances, the case for reduction is strong. upward for more than half a century. Colonel Gregory C. McCarthy, USMCR, is Officer in Charge, Marine Coordination Element, Camp The Department of Defense (DOD) GO/FOs grew so quickly during the Lemonnier, Djibouti. should reduce the numbers, billets, and Korean War that by mid-1952, the total

76 Features / Are There Too Many General Officers? JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 nearly doubled the World War II peak.1 for example, are not all officers. In a and a joint pool, but the overall picture The Services as a whole had more three- streamlined modern battlespace, the need is not presented. and four-star generals for Vietnam than for multiple levels of brass is less urgent. The Services have slight variations in for a vastly larger force during World Concerns about top-heavy ranks are GO/FO and officer/enlisted percent- War II.2 Although there were twice as hardly new. Even in the era of compara- ages. The Air Force has the highest many GO/FOs at the end of World tively austere command structure and percentage of officers and GO/FOs, and War II than today, there were nearly 10 within the least top-heavy Service, Marine are 2.5 times as top-heavy as the Marine times as many Active-duty troops, and legend Lieutenant General Chesty Puller Corps.15 The Air Force and Navy shrank more four-stars serve today than served stated of World War II, “The staffs are in the last decade but did not decrease during World War II.3 One study states twice as large as they should be. The regi- their percentage of GO/FOs. The Navy the obvious: the U.S. military is more mental staff is too large. I have five staff has nearly as many admirals as ships top-heavy than it has ever been.4 officers in the battalion and I could get when ships are now far more capable Comparisons across vastly different along with less.”11 Edward Luttwak states (seemingly arguing for fewer admirals). eras can be problematic, and it could be that in 1968 in Vietnam there were 110 Identified Service needs and tradition, unwise to mimic industrial age ratios. One GO/FOs and “hundreds and hundreds as well as an apparently informal truce study defends the dramatic growth in of colonels,” mostly in Saigon.12 Evidence between Services not to criticize each senior ranks as emerging from “the long- of excess brass adding to bureaucratic other’s funds or priorities, explain this term decline of labor-intensive functions complexity or poor decisionmaking is arrangement. An across-the-board assess- in the military relative to technologi- indirect and suggestive. Anecdotal comment is in order. cally skilled functions, and the increased plaints abound and historical comparisons The Marine Corps, which has the demand for managerial skill, given the mil- reflect skewed ratios, but a smoking gun lowest percentage of officers among itary’s greater organizational complexity is not apparent in the literature. Yet the the Services, is not exempt from these over time.”5 Another raises the possibility overwhelming skew of the numbers sug- concerns. There has been a 38 percent of why the GO/FO population has grown gests there is a great deal of excess brass increase in commissioned Marine officers while avoiding the downsizing that most that could be shed. as a percentage of end-strength from of the forces have endured in the last few 1968 to 2015 with no obvious justifica- years, including joint requirements, coali- Recent Growth tion.16 Overall, all Service officers as a tion operations, organizational structure, One difficulty of assessing whether the percentage of the total force have grown and technological change.6 Some generals GO/FO ratio is appropriate is that the an identical percentage over that period.17 anonymously speak to the complexity of Department of Defense (DOD) and Evaluating the farm team for the next the modern battlefield as justification for Services offer little guidance or doctrine crop of generals, one commentator has more senior officials than before.7 One that explains the optimal number of lamented the state of Marine colonels: observer speaks of the dollars and not GO/FOs. Defense authorization bill “The majority of these O-6s add little end-strength as the key growth in respon- reports are replete with requirements, value to the process and are seen by many sibility for today’s GO/FOs.8 Matching some requesting assessment of this as unimaginative paper pushers who international or coalition partners in rank topic, but rarely producing DOD-wide inhibit rather than assist Headquarters’ could also be a consideration. and vetted study. The Government ability to accomplish its mission of orga- But given official justification, or Accountability Office thought DOD nizing training and equipping the force. lack thereof, for the required number of should articulate that validated require- They have become an obstacle.”18 GO/FOs, it is doubtful that systemized ments be periodically reevaluated. It Events and time have not fundamen- planning or corresponding requirements found DOD wanting in both validating tally altered the steady upward growth of have informed the structure shaping and updating requirements.13 DOD GO/FOs. Although various defenders of present conditions. It is further unlikely concluded in its 2003 General and Flag the high level of GO/FOs cite the joint that today’s senior leaders are of such a Officer Requirements that it needed requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols higher caliber that a higher ratio is justi- more GO/FOs than authorized by law, Department of Defense Reorganization fied. One prominent observer argues that and it usually resists efforts at congres- Act of 1986, GO/FO numbers reflect a today’s Army generals, as a representative sional reduction. In 2011, then–Secre- steady upward trend from World War II example, have the same flaws as previous tary of Defense Robert Gates ordered a to present with no spike after 1986, just decades.9 Furthermore, the “strategic widespread reduction in 2011 as part of a continued trajectory. Neither has the corporal” concept advanced several years larger reforms. In 2014, DOD admitted introduction of nuclear weapons appeared ago plausibly posits that information tech- it had not updated GO/FO require- to have had an effect. Furthermore, nology will push strategic-level decisions ments since 2003 when it last sought an Goldwater-Nichols took effect in the final further and further down to junior troops increase.14 One difficulty in understand- years of the Cold War and subsequent doing tactical-level jobs, thus obviating ing the optimal number is that Services military downsizing, a theoretical oppor- the need for many bosses.10 Drone pilots, have their own GO/FO requirements tunity for brass reduction along with the

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 McCarthy 77 Airman welcomes new officer trainee to Officer Training School, November 2013, at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (U.S. Air Force/William Blankenship) significant force reduction that took place. grew from 871 to 943 (8 percent) and light-footprint war against the so-called The reverse has occurred. Senator John from 216,140 to 237,586 (10 percent), Islamic State.24 While not part of peace- McCain (R-AZ), chairman of the Senate respectively, while the enlisted population time DOD, even the Coast Guard has Armed Services Committee (SASC), decreased from 1,155,344 to 1,131,281 gotten in on the act, adding a second defended a proposal to reduce GO/FOs (2 percent).”22 Especially noteworthy is four-star to its permanent ranks.25 and recently summarized the Goldwater- growth at higher ranks. Nichols trends: “Over the past 30 years, An area of growth was combatant Right-Sizing the end strength of the joint force has command headquarters, which grew by A defense of the requirement for a decreased 38%, but the ratio of four-star about 50 percent from FY 2001 through large number of GO/FOs is found in officers to the overall force has increased 2012. Despite some congressional con- the ostensible need to provide “inher- by 65%.”19 Against the argument that cern about brass creep, DOD has grown ently governmental” functions, that budget authority responsibility drives to- (through congressional authorization and is, decisions involving high levels of day’s GO/FO numbers, the 1986 defense appropriations), adding new commands government assets or personnel. But topline is larger than today’s amount.20 and organizations, including the National this need does not explain the multiple A possible explanation for the Guard Bureau (2008), U.S. Africa levels of GO/FOs that are involved in continued increase in GO/FOs is the Command (2007), U.S. Cyber Command any substantive decision, or that many requirements associated with the war on (2010), Sexual Assault Prevention and GO/FOs command no forces whatso- terror. This period has shown a continua- Response Office (2006), and Defense ever. One GO/FO in a decision process tion of the trend line. From 2001 to 2011, Health Agency (2013), all headed by might be justified, but it is almost the number of three- and four-star officers GO/FOs or higher ranking GO/FOs always many more. Additionally, recent grew by nearly 25 percent, one- and two- over those already in place.23 Do any of growth has coincided with a boom in stars grew 10 percent, and enlisted ranks these reflect a strategic necessity? outsourcing, meaning GO/FO growth only 2.5 percent.21 Adding 2 more years to U.S. Space Command and U.S. Joint could not have occurred with inherently the sample shows an even steeper disparity. Forces Command were closed during governmental functions in mind. One study found, “From FY [fiscal year] this period, but were not enough to Clearly, historical comparisons or 2001 through FY 2013 . . . the GO/FO offset the growth trend. One reporter even lamenting the upward trend do not and non-GO/FO officer populations estimates 21 generals running the current end the issue. The deeper question is

78 Features / Are There Too Many General Officers? JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 what the right percentage of GO/FOs, Congress has traditionally questioned wars.”34 A retired Army three-star places Service-specific or DOD-wide, is. DOD DOD’s request for more GO/FOs. One losses in Iraq and Afghanistan on abysmal took a half-hearted stab at the matter in senior DOD official stated 20 years ago, generalship, stating “[it was] our war to 2003, successfully requesting more. Since “Congress has consistently taken the view lose and we did.”35 This damning indict- then, it has not updated or addressed its that we have needed fewer general and ment need not be wholly embraced to requirements, although Secretary Gates’s flag officers, and that we have taken the believe the system would be streamlined ordered reductions assumed excess. The opposite view, that we needed more than and improved with fewer GO/FOs. Services cannot be expected to lead, as the Congress would allow.”31 Congress Strategic-level thinking seems to be miss- voluntarily sacrificing personnel is a zero- has generally taken the opposite posi- ing, and a reordering of GO/FO-specific sum game and would be professional tion of DOD on Base Realignment and professional military education seems to suicide for a Service chief to unilaterally Closure (BRAC), weapons systems, com- be in order. disarm. Yet if there is no optimal percent- missary/TRICARE reforms, and other More troubling is the perception age, the current ratio is indefensible. spending items whose reduction would of increased corruption among senior Both DOD and the Services have yield far more savings. officers. Perhaps this is only increased been absent in defining their GO/FO The Senate has recently used its reporting, but high-visibility scandals have requirements, occasionally asking for confirmation power to block the pro- tainted the Navy, of note, as well as prom- additional ad hoc slots, rarely request- motions or higher grade retirements inent GO/FOs in other Services, often ing fewer. No DOD entity has offered of certain controversial officers. The with salacious details and tales of misuse much in the way of principles, let alone Senate could use confirmation to decline of government resources. These revela- numbers, other than marginal alterations promotions as a way of reducing GO/ tions seem to happen with a frequency of the previous year. The Army recently FOs, although this is virtually unprec- unheard of as recently as two decades got its Pacific billet upgraded to four edented. Senator John Stennis (D-MS) ago.36 This may be a “good news” story stars. The Marine Corps, for example, of the SASC personally imposed a cap of policing the ranks as never before, successfully requested 12 more generals on Air Force generals, announcing in the but the disclosures raise doubts about in the FY 1997 defense authorization bill mid-1950s that he would confirm no the crop of current leaders. Enhanced over the vociferous objections of only more than 300. During Vietnam, 560 accountability would be more achievable one Senator. The Marine Corps con- Army GOs were permitted by law, but with a smaller subset. Would national ceded that only 4 of the 12 had anything only 487 by Stennis.32 So a determined security be gravely damaged with a couple to do with joint requirements.26 Even Senator backed by a majority, without dozen fewer GO/FOs? The heightened in today’s era of constraints, Marines formal House or Presidential input, could reporting of scandals involving GO/FOs received one additional net GO above potentially block the filling of GO/FO exposes an inadequate status quo. The the two-star level in the FY 2017 defense vacancies if he or she desired. Similarly, population could be reduced. authorization.27 DOD could choose not to fill vacant bil- According to Ricks, the Army’s cur- The result of brass creep is “making lets through natural attrition. rent “template of generalship,” which he routine authorizations complex proce- As the senior uniformed leaders of argues is representative and influential dures,” in one view.28 This frustration led the military, the higher percentage of over all Services, is that of “organization Secretary Gates to order the elimination GO/FOs could perhaps be justified by men who were far less inclined to judge of more than 100 GO/FOs as part of unambiguous strategic success. Thomas the performance of their peers. They his 2010 efficiency initiative. He then Ricks views the GO/FO job description were acting less like stewards of their stated, “Almost a decade ago, Secretary as “being able to impose one’s will on a profession, answerable to the public, Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17 large organization engaged in one of the and more like keepers of a closed guild, levels of staff between him and a line offi- most stressful of human activities.”33 But answerable mainly to each other.”37 This cer. The Defense Business Board recently since World War II, American military situation cries out for reform and over- estimated that in some cases the gap successes mostly stop at the tactical or sight from without, as DOD has proved between me and an action officer may be operational level. Today is characterized unable to correct itself. as high as 30 layers.”29 Gates’s plans were by less than obvious success. Ricks finds The FY 2017 Defense Authorization partially implemented, but the highest the post–World War II class of generals, Act has admirably tackled this topic, ranks were spared. One former principal with few exceptions, strategically inept, ordering a reduction of 110 GO/FO offered that, “when Gates spoke there seen in middling conclusions to the many positions by the end of 2022. It also la- were 981 generals and admirals. Today, conflicts of the last several decades. He mented the following: there are 958. Yet, this difference results argues that Army leaders of the 1980s almost entirely from reducing one-stars; and early 1990s “produced a genera- despite two decades of Congressional there are now 10 more three-stars, and tion of tacticians who knew how to fight concern the Department of Defense and 14 more two-stars.”30 battles, but who apparently lacked the the military departments have not dem- strategic ability to fight and conclude onstrated the willingness to implement

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 McCarthy 79 Marine candidate participates in fire team assault course at Officer Candidate School, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, June 17, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Cristian L. Ricardo) even the reduction in the number of vacant as of this writing, should also be billion will barely keep pace with inflation general and flag officer positions directed targeted, but that topic is beyond the and not result in greater overall numbers by the Secretary of Defense’s Track Four scope of this article. immediately.40 The pressure is not off for Efficiencies Initiatives decision of March continued reform. The present setting 14, 2011.38 Conclusion calls for more efficiencies rather than One estimate places the total salary cost fewer. Continuing to reduce top-level This is a good start. to each general, including aides and officers is the kind of cost savings that Congress contemplated an additional staff, at nearly $1 million annually.39 must be sought. Personnel costs have to 10 percent reduction in GO/FOs in If all GO/FOs and their retinue were be addressed and should begin at the top. the report accompanying the FY 2017 eliminated, savings would be less than Ideally, this should trigger a DOD-wide law. Service- and DOD-wide sacrifice is $1 billion annually. Unlike BRAC or scrutiny of personnel needs vis-à-vis corre- in order and the effects of such a move cancellation of a weapons system, even sponding missions and long-term threats. should be monitored with hopes of a significant reduction in the number The sequester effort of the Budget something approaching the 25 percent of GO/FOs would amount to rela- Control Act of 2011 was criticized in reduction that the Senate originally tively small savings in an overall DOD numerous corners as an indiscriminate passed. Reduction should be imposed budget of approximately $580 billion instrument that blindly cut domestic and on headquarters, bureaus, offices, and in FY 2016. However, it would set the defense spending equally. But it had the commands. Service vice chiefs and other example and begin to address personnel virtue of partially controlling spending in high-level deputies could be reduced costs, one of the drivers of unsustainable an era of runaway deficits. Today’s times to three-stars as they were decades ago trends in DOD and broader budgeting. are no less challenging. Getting a grip on before Goldwater-Nichols. Theater com- Despite the Trump administration’s GO/FO numbers and, ultimately, senior manders below combatant commanders expressed desire to increase defense civilians and total force requirements could be three-star positions as they have spending and end-strength, this will likely would begin to align means and ends. been in recent memory. Excess senior prove difficult. Close observers point out Reducing each year by a percent and Pentagon civilians, positions largely that its recent proposed increase of $54 thus leading by example is how it should

80 Features / Are There Too Many General Officers? JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 begin. The Defense Department and na- report/2013/07/24/the-pentagon-has-too- . many-troops>. 21 “How Bad Is Our Bloat of Generals? tional security of the United States would 4 Ibid. How Does It Compare with Other Armies?” be enhanced by reducing the number 5 Priscilla Offenhauer, General and Flag Of- Fabiusmaximus.com, September 10, 2012. of GO/FOs currently on Active duty, ficer Authorizations for the Active and Reserve 22 GAO, cover letter. as part of a larger rationalizing of com- Components: A Comparative and Historical 23 Ibid., 14. mand structure and making forces leaner Analysis (Washington, DC: Library of Con- 24 Nancy A. Youssef, “Exclusive: 21 Gener- gress, December 2007), 1. als Lead ISIS War the U.S. Denies Fighting,” and flatter. This is not inherently risky in 6 Lawrence Kapp, General and Flag Officers Daily Beast, March 31, 2016. today’s world of technology and com- in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Con- 25 Meghann Myers, “The Coast Guard munication. Our GO/FOs could lead in siderations for Congress, R44389 (Washington, Just Got Its Second Four-Star Admiral,” Navy fewer numbers. DC: Congressional Research Service Report, Times, June 1, 2016. All personnel numbers, from end- February 18, 2016), 7–8. 26 Chuck Grassley, “Marine Corps Gener- 7 Mark Thompson, “Starry, Starry Fight: als,” Congressional Record, 104th Congress, July strength to GO/FO ratios, should be The Pentagon’s General Bloat,” Time, 30, 1996, S9150. regularly scrutinized to evaluate the May 15, 2016, available at . Fiscal Year 2017, 1014. upward growth of GO/FOs has no 8 Mark F. Cancian, Reducing the Number of 28 Saagar Enjeti, “Here’s Why Congress apparent justification. The case for reduc- Active Duty General/Flag Officers (Washington, Wants to Fire So Many Generals,” Daily Caller, DC: Center for Strategic and International June 26, 2016, available at . inherently governmental tasks or organi- generalflag-officers>. 29 Greg Jaffe, “Gates: Cuts in Penta- zations require GO/FO presence. The 9 Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American gon Bureaucracy Needed to Help Maintain Services’ less-than-full-throated defense Military Command from World War II to Today Military Force,” Washington Post, May 9, (New York: Penguin, 2012), 350. 2010, available at . and could be reduced. The fact that none Marines, January 1999, available at . nizations,” New York Times, May 28, 2014, 11 Quoted in Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., Marine available at . gaining in attempting to maintain their 12 Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and 31 Frederick Pang, Assistant Secretary of numbers, offering minor concessions at the Art of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, Defense for Force Management Policy, Testi- the lower ranks of GO/FOs. Today’s 1985), 28. mony before the Subcommittee on Personnel 13 Government Accountability Office of the House National Security Committee, technology allows for a much clearer (GAO), DOD Needs to Update General and April 8, 1997, quoted in Kapp, 1. battlespace picture than at any time Flag Officer Requirements and Improve Avail- 32 Mylander, 27. in history, allowing for a flatter chain ability of Associated Costs, GAO-14-745 (Wash- 33 Ricks, 350. of command, obviating the need for ington, DC: GAO, September 9, 2014), 2. 34 Ibid., 348. multiple GO/FO inputs. Staff and head- 14 Ibid. 35 Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A Gener- 15 Author’s review of “Authorized Strength: al’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan quarters elements are the least defensible General and Flag Officers on Active Duty,” in Wars (New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton places for layers of brass. The burden of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Mifflin, 2014), xiii. proof should be on the Services to justify Year 2017: Conference Report to Accompany 36 See Dan Lamothe, “The Air Force Is GO/FOs outside of senior leadership and S. 2943, U.S. House of Representatives, 144th Investigating Sexual-Assault Allegations Against commanders of large line organizations. Cong., 2nd sess., Report 114-840, Novem- a Retired Four-Star General,” Washington Post, ber 30, 2016, available at . 38 National Defense Authorization Act for which ones they want to keep. JFQ 16 Author’s review of end-strength numbers. Fiscal Year 2017, 1013. 17 Congressional Research Service Report 39 “How Much Does an Army General Cost compilation of data provided by Defense Man- Taxpayers?” Slate.com, August 2010, available Notes power Data Center. at . 1 Maureen Mylander, The Generals: Making 2005, 44. 40 Connor O’Brien and Gregory Hellman, It, Military Style (New York: Dial Press, 1974), 19 Thompson. “Trump’s Defense Budget Boost Falls Short 26. 20 Fiscal Year 1986 authorized $296 billion, of Buildup Plans,” Politico, March 16, 2017; 2 Ibid., 22. which would be $657 billion today. Fiscal Year Mackenzie Eaglen, “Why Trump’s Defense 3 Benjamin Freeman, “The Pentagon 2017 authorizes $590 billion. Defense spend- Budget Is Not Enough to Rebuild America’s Has Too Many Generals,” U.S. News & ing began a steep decline at the outset of this Military,” The Hill, March 16, 2017. World Report, July 24, 2013, available at period and a steep increase 15 years later before

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 McCarthy 81 Airman with 731st Airlift Squadron pilots C-130 Hercules as part of U.S. Army Africa Exercise Central Accord 2016, in Libreville, Gabon (DOD/ Brian Kimball)

Exploring a New System of Command and Control The Case for U.S. Africa Command

By Michael G. Kamas, David W. Pope, and Ryan N. Propst

he Senate Armed Services Com- primary warfighting mission supporting . . . replacing the Service component mittee (SASC) proposed several the National Defense Strategy, limiting commands with joint task forces [JTFs] T changes to improve the organi- CCMD participation in other impor- focused on operational military mis- zation of the combatant commands tant, but nonessential, mission sets. A sions. The Committee believes that this (CCMDs) in its markup of the National second proposal would “require the could provide lessons for improving the Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Secretary of Defense to conduct a pilot integration of operational efforts across for Fiscal Year 2017. The first provision program on an alternative organizational the command, streamlining unneces- seeks to focus the CCMDs on their structure at one combatant command sary layers of management, and reducing the number of staff.”1 Converting the command and control (C2) structure of a geographic CCMD from a group of Commander Michael G. Kamas, USN, is the prospective Executive Officer of the Maritime Patrol and Service component commands to a set Reconnaissance Weapons School. Major David W. Pope, USMC, is an Action Officer in the Multinational Cooperation Center at U.S. Africa Command. Major Ryan N. Propst, USA, is the Air and Missile Defense of JTFs is achievable, despite congressio- Chief for the Army’s 1st Infantry Division. nally mandated reductions in headquar-

82 Features / Exploring a New System of C2 JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 ters staff personnel and lack of a major Figure 1 US Africa Command Current C2 Organization combat operation in theater. While the final version of the NDAA removed this

requirement, U.S. Africa Command Combatant Command USAFRICOM (USAFRICOM) would have been the Operational Command (Stuttgart, DE) ideal CCMD to test and evaluate this new C2 structure.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department USAF USMC

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Commander, Commander, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force provided the impetus for several organiza- U.S. Air Forces Africa/3rd AF U.S. Marine Corps Forces Horn of Africa (Ramstein, DE) Africa (Stuttgart, DE) tional changes that are still evident today. (Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti) While many associate Goldwater-Nichols

with the mandate to end parochialism USA USN

within the individual Services through Commander, Commander, Commander, Special Operations new emphasis on “jointness,” the legisla- U.S. Army Forces Africa U.S. Naval Forces Africa Command Africa (Vicenza, IT) (Naples, IT) tion also provided greater command (Stuttgart, DE) authority for the unified and specified combatant commands. Geographic combatant commanders now report directly paper titled “Geographic Combatant CJTF option could prove advantageous. to the Secretary of Defense instead of Commander (GCC) Command and These reasons include a “single mission falling under the Chairman of the Joint Control Organizational Options,” which focus and resultant close integration/C2 Chiefs of Staff. The Service chiefs would analyzes several C2 alternatives available of forces and the freedom for the GCC provide training, manpower, and equip- to the unified combatant commanders to maintain a wide focus of the CCMD ment for the joint force, allocated and during steady-state or crisis operations. area of responsibility (AOR) through apportioned under the operational control Traditionally, a CCMD consists of subor- deliberate delegation of authority to the of a combatant commander. As Secretary dinate commands that could be grouped JTF commander.”5 Although JTFs were of Defense Chuck Hagel stated in a 2013 into three categories: Service components, designed to be limited in duration, that speech, “Goldwater-Nichols succeeded subunified commands, and functional paradigm has shifted in recent years as in its purpose by strengthening the Joint components. There is not a standard tem- demonstrated by enduring JTFs such as Staff and the Combatant Commands, but plate on how each CCMD must organize, CJTF-HOA and JTF-Guantanamo. it went about doing this by layering joint but the C2 structure broadly utilizes a set Since the proposed 2017 NDAA from organizations and processes atop service of Service component subordinate com- the SASC would require one of the geo- organizations and atop processes. The mands and an additional special operations graphic combatant commands to evaluate elevation of the former did not automati- component to execute the CCMD’s the alternative JTF option, the existence cally lead to the diminution of the latter.”2 mission. The J7 paper also analyzes three of CJTF-HOA and the broad mission Proponents of Goldwater-Nichols additional options for a CCMD’s C2 set of USAFRICOM make it the ideal reform argue that changes to warfare structure: a single Service force, JTFs, and place to test this C2 structure. Although in a complex world require a different specific operational forces.4 USAFRICOM covers a large continent approach to military command and The JTF option is not without and is engaged in over 15 named opera- control. Secretary of Defense Ashton precedent as it has been successfully tions, it is an economy of force command Carter stated, “Updates are needed in executed in the years following the pas- with limited assigned forces that relies on the Combatant Commands, adapting sage of Goldwater-Nichols legislation. force allocation and force sharing agree- them to new functions, including cyber, Operation Just Cause in 1989 was the ments with U.S. European Command and continuing to aggressively stream- first success story of a JTF operating (USEUCOM) to execute its mission. line headquarters.”3 In an era where under the authority of U.S. Southern USAFRICOM has six subordinate com- warfare has shifted from conventional Command in Panama. Today, the ponent commands, three of which are nation-against-nation conflict to a more Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of shared with USEUCOM (see figure 1). unpredictable set of interrelated conflicts Africa (CJTF-HOA) is an example of a U.S. Air Forces Africa (USAFAF) is a between state and nonstate actors, per- combined joint task force (CJTF) subor- •• Service component command dual- haps geographic boundaries are no longer dinate to USAFRICOM, which has been hatted as U.S. Air Forces Europe, the most effective way to organize the C2 charged with oversight and execution headquartered at Ramstein Air structure of military operations. of counterterrorism missions in Somalia Base, Germany. It provides forward- In August 2016, the Joint Staff J7 and the broader East Africa region. The based airpower and infrastructure Deployable Training Division pub- J7 paper provides significant guidance to execute operations in Europe lished the second edition of a focus on when the employment of a JTF or

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Kamas, Pope, and Propst 83 and Africa and also supports North of converting USAFRICOM to a series disrupts and neutralizes transnational Atlantic Treaty Organization air of JTFs, CJTF-HOA and SOCAFRICA threats, protects U.S. personnel and operations and planning. would remain largely intact. facilities, prevents and mitigates conflict, •• U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), It could be argued that U.S. Southern and builds African partner defense capa- formerly called the Southern Euro- Command (USSOUTHCOM), like bility and capacity in order to promote pean Task Force, provides mission USAFRICOM, maintains a diverse regional security, stability, and prosper- command and employs forces to set mission set, with no near-peer U.S. ity.”7 To meet mission requirements, the theater, conduct security force competitors within its AOR, and is just as the plan defines decisive, shaping, and assistance, and provide support to well suited to serve as the pilot CCMD sustaining efforts for campaign execu- USAFRICOM land operations in to evaluate the NDAA’s proposed C2 tion. Decisive efforts are those “focused Africa. USARAF is located at Vin- structure. USSOUTHCOM currently on building African partner capacity and cenza, Italy. has three JTFs within its organizational strengthening partnerships.”8 •• Combined Joint Task Force–Horn structure as well as the requisite Service The shaping effort is focused on of Africa is a multinational task force component commands, with a large disrupting and degrading VEOs to set designed to fight violent extremist emphasis on theater security coopera- the conditions for success of the decisive organizations in East Africa through tion activities.6 The USSOUTHCOM effort in time. Sustaining efforts sup- power projection and by building JTFs are Joint Task Force–Bravo, at port the other two efforts by ensuring the defense capability and capacity of Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras; JTF- the force and theater are set for the international partners. CJTF-HOA is Guantanamo; and Joint Interagency Task campaign. The campaign lists five lines based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Force–South, in Key West, Florida. But of effort (LOEs), each with supporting •• U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa unlike USAFRICOM, USSOUTHCOM intermediate objectives (IMOs), tied to (MARFORAF) also has the role of is not challenged by the fact that three the plan’s endstates. These LOEs are U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe of its four component commands are listed in priority order, and other than and is headquartered at Stuttgart, dual-hatted to support another CCMD. LOE 5, they can be attached to a specific Germany. MARFORAF maintains Each Service component command geographic area. a Special Purpose Marine Air- at USSOUTHCOM serves only one LOE 1. Neutralize al Shabaab/ Ground Task Force–Crisis Response combatant commander, and those •• transition African Union Mission in (SPMAGTF-CR) in the USAFRI- components have closer proximity Somalia COM AOR. and reach-back to forces based in the LOE 2. Degrade violent extremist U.S. Naval Forces Africa continental United States. Additionally, •• •• organizations in Sahel-Maghreb/ (USNAVAF), sharing the role USSOUTHCOM’s AOR is not as rife contain instability in Libya of U.S. Naval Forces Europe with violent extremist organizations LOE 3. Contain and degrade Boko (USNAVEUR), also serves as Naval (VEOs), which pose a direct threat to •• Haram Support Activity Naples, in Naples, U.S. interests, our allies, and regional LOE 4. Interdict illicit activity in Italy. USNAVAF/USNAVEUR stability. USAFRICOM’s one standing •• Gulf of Guinea/Central Africa maintains the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which joint task force—CJTF-HOA—is focused LOE 5. Build peacekeeping/human- consists of permanent and rotational on combating terrorism and providing •• itarian assistance and disaster relief naval forces to conduct ballistic stability in East Africa. For these reasons, capacity of African partners.9 missile defense and other missions it would be most logical to expand the within its AOR. JTF structure in USAFRICOM’s AOR, •• Special Operations Command Africa as opposed to USSOUTHCOM’s AOR. Structure Challenges in (SOCAFRICA) is a functional, sub- To assess the requirements for additional a Resource-Constrained unified command in Stuttgart, which JTFs across the African continent, a basic Environment serves as the Theater Special Opera- understanding of the USAFRICOM the- A key assumption of this proposal is tions Command (TSOC). While ater campaign plan (TCP) is required. the continued desire to minimize the USAFRICOM is granted operational U.S. military footprint in Africa. The control (OPCON) of the TSOC, USAFRICOM’s Theater vast size of the continent, African U.S. Special Operations Command Campaign Plan sensitivities to a colonial presence, and (USSOCOM) maintains combatant Published in August 2015, the USAFR- the lack of political will to establish a command authority. ICOM TCP is a 5-year plan intended to large overseas force structure all serve set conditions for achieving the 10-year as contributing factors toward the Of these six subordinate commands regional endstates described in the 2015 small U.S. presence. Accomplishment to USAFRICOM, only half are singularly USAFRICOM theater strategy. The of the USAFRICOM mission relies on focused on a specific mission inside the 5-year campaign mission statement is as Secretary of Defense–approved force USAFRICOM AOR. For the purposes follows: “USAFRICOM, with partners, allocation, which often involves agree-

84 Features / Exploring a New System of C2 JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules flies over Hopfenohe Drop Zone while conducting static line airborne operations with paratroopers assigned to Special Operations Command Africa at 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, September 25, 2013 (U.S. Army/ Markus Rauchenberger) ments to share operational forces and from a proportional downsizing of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF re- posture locations with USEUCOM and personnel from USAFAF, USNAVAF, quires execution of responsibilities involving U.S. Central Command. Proposed C2 and MARFORAF. As stated in Joint a joint force on a significant scale and close changes should not increase the military Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation integration of effort, or requires coordina- presence in Africa, unless it is required Planning, “When a CCDR [combatant tion within a subordinate area or local for tactical mission execution. commander] is directed to create a JTF defense of a subordinate area. The estab- U.S. special operations will continue headquarters, the CCDR creates a joint lishing authority dissolves a JTF when the to play an outsize role in military opera- manning document, sourced as much as purpose for which it was created has been tions over conventional forces; therefore, possible from CCMD resources, that is achieved or when it is no longer required.11 SOCAFRICA will maintain its current forwarded to JS [Joint Staff] J-1 for JIA role as a TSOC. [joint individual augmentation] sourc- LOEs 1 through 4 clearly meet the Lines of effort articulated in the 2015 ing approval.”10 The manpower shifts intent of what a JTF could be used for, as TCP are anticipated to remain consistent, should not be made in a vacuum. Service described above, and a JTF in support of although proposed C2 changes should component commands need to provide these LOEs could allow USAFRICOM have a measured amount of flexibility to vital input on what functions and tasks to maintain focus across the AOR while address emergent combatant commander previously performed by staff to support a JTF deals specifically with the problem priorities, improved capabilities of our Africa-centric operations should now shift sets inherent in the LOEs, a benefit de- regional partners, and unforeseen threats. to the new JTF headquarters. scribed in the J7’s August 2016 paper on However, a functional-based JTF struc- GCC C2 organizational options.12 ture should not result in any net increase JTF Structure Standup CJTF-HOA, as previously described, of headquarters personnel. To support the NDAA’s proposed pilot is already postured to meet objectives in Because USARAF is the only Service program, it is recommended that the support of LOE 1. Additionally, ongoing component command that is not shared new subordinate JTF structures be built programs within their area of operations with USEUCOM, it is ideally suited around existing USAFRICOM TCP are supporting LOE 5 objectives. Given for conversion to a JTF for North and LOEs. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, that this JTF is focused on the top priority West Africa. It is natural to assume that states: LOE, there is no need to make extreme USARAF will need additional head- adjustments to its structure or mission set. quarters personnel to expand its role A JTF may be established on a geographical LOEs 2 through 4, however, will require to a fully operational joint task force. area or functional basis when the mission a separate and new C2 organization. The expansion of administrative staff, has a specific limited objective and does It is recommended that a new CJTF– planners, and leadership should result not require overall centralized control of North and West Africa (CJTF-NWA) be

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Kamas, Pope, and Propst 85 Figure 2 US Africa Command Proposed C2 Organization their designated C2 organization, which maximizes their effectiveness. There are no outstanding issues with unit integrity in the proposed JTF construct; how- Combatant Command USAFRICOM Operational Command (Stuttgart, DE) ever, JTF commanders with OPCON authority to reorganize assigned units should only do so if there is a compelling case for it. To facilitate interoperability, USAFRICOM will need to ensure shared understanding across its staff and both Commander, Commander, Commander, JTFs regarding its systems, structure, Combinded Joint Task Force Combined Joint Task Force Special Operations North and West Africa Horn of Africa Command Africa liaison requirements, battle rhythm, and (Vicenza, IT) (Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti) (Stuttgart, DE) seams that affect the entire AOR. At the same time, each JTF must do the same with its assigned forces as they work to created in order to address the problem by planning and coordinating for the meet objectives. Additionally, interoper- sets that pertain to those regions and use of U.S. Army Regionally Aligned ability should be extended to CCMD LOEs 2 through 4. Like CJTF-HOA, Forces, the Army National Guard State and JTF coordination with Embassy CJTF-NWA would be responsible for Partnership Program, other military enti- country teams in the AOR to ensure a coordinating and executing activities in ties, and interagency assets (for example, whole-of-government approach to prob- its area of operations that contribute to the U.S. Coast Guard) to meet LOE 5’s lems sets and activities within the region. objectives that fall within LOE 5’s scope. associated endstate. Geographic boundar- SOCAFRICA would need to maintain Also, like CJTF-HOA, which serves as a ies for CJTF-NWA and CJTF-HOA are close coordination and interoperability combined JTF, with multinational ele- illustrated in figure 3. with both CJTFs since the special opera- ments contributing to its staffing and tions mission set would extend into the mission execution, the JTF for North and Proposed JTF C2 Structures geographic borders of both CJTF-NWA West Africa should be created as a CJTF. and Joint C2 Principles and CJTF-HOA. As it stands today, the United States and JP 1-0 states that a joint force com- JP 3-33, Joint Task Force its allies (for example, France, the United mander’s (JFC’s) C2 structure should Headquarters, establishes doctrine for Kingdom, Italy) share mutual interests for be centered on its mission, location, the “formation and employment of a JTF enduring stability, such as counterterror- and force capabilities, among other headquarters to command and control ism operations, containment of migrant things, and the following principles joint operations.”14 It not only provides flow, and defense institution building. should enable its structure: simplic- clarification on the organization of a new CJTF-NWA should leverage these shared ity, span of control, unit integrity, and joint headquarters but also discusses com- interests and synchronize partner-nation interoperability.13 mand and staff responsibilities and the actions to the benefit of the entire region. The proposed dual CJTF command management of subordinate commands Figure 2 shows the proposed C2 or- structure adheres to the principle of sim- within the JTF. Although beyond the ganization for the execution of this pilot plicity by establishing distinct objectives, scope of this article, JP 3-33 would be in- program at USAFRICOM. Although tied to LOEs for each JTF. This enables strumental to the formation or revision of each JTF could potentially become dis- unity of command and clearly defines a JTF within USAFRICOM’s structure. established when the JTF’s mission has roles, responsibilities, and authorities been accomplished, this model assumes across the AOR not only for each JTF Conclusion sustained relevance for the next 5 years, but also for USAFRICOM. As for span Because one of the geographic combat- which would encompass the length of the of control, CJTF-HOA certainly is com- ant commands will likely be selected to C2 evaluation period. pliant; however, CJTF-NWA’s varied evaluate a new system of JTF command Consistent with its theater campaign problem sets, objectives, and geography and control, USAFRICOM is the plan LOEs, USAFRICOM would accept will require its planners to consider the ideal theater to test this C2 structure the risk of not having a JTF focused on scope and size of activities in relation for many reasons. First, the existence the southern region of its AOR. This to its force capabilities in the AOR. of CJTF-HOA has demonstrated this is mitigated by the fact that this region Conversely, the addition of CJTF-NWA concept over the past 15 years in the is relatively stable, has no major VEO into USAFRICOM’s AOR will support eastern part of the USAFRICOM AOR, threat, and its militaries are mostly ca- the combatant command’s ability to posi- and it serves as a template for a com- pable of internal security. As part of its tively affect its span of control. bined, multi-Service headquarters with AOR-wide focus, USAFRICOM will Unit integrity is maintained when an enduring mission set. As an economy support LOE 5 objectives in this region forces assigned to the JTF align with of force command with limited assigned

86 Features / Exploring a New System of C2 JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 forces, USAFRICOM would benefit Figure 3 Proposed JTF Areas of Operation from restructuring its antiquated system of Service component commands to maximize efficiencies and reduce unnecessary headquarters staff. This slimmer, Morocco mission-oriented C2 structure would Algeria allow USAFRICOM to adapt rapidly to Egypt the many emergent crises and missions Liya that develop within its AOR. Finally, the estern CJTF- Sahara absence of any current or planned major Mauritania combat operation gives the combatant Mali NA Sudan Niger Chad Eritrea commander wide latitude to explore a Senegal new system of command and control, Guinea-Bissau Burkina CJTF- Faso Diouti Guinea without affecting the time, effort, and Benin Nigeria Togo resources dedicated to the develop- Sierra Leone Cte d’Ivoire Central Ghana OA Ethiopia African Lieria Repulic South Sudan ment of operational plans. Eliminating Cameroon

Somalia the Service component commands at a Euatorial Guinea Uganda CCMD assumes that Services are better Repulic Kenya Gaon of Congo Rwanda suited to serve as force providers based DR Congo Burundi not on geographic boundaries, but Tanzania rather on the capabilities required for a given JTF mission set. To convert the current Service com- Angola Malawi Mozamiue ponent–based subordinate command amia structure to the proposed dual-JTF struc- imawe ture, the Unified Command Plan should codify the changes to USAFRICOM’s Namiia Botswana C2 structure and specify a set time period for evaluation of the new pro- Swaziland cess. Additionally, fresh updates to the Lesotho various memorandums of agreement South Africa for apportionment of forces between USAFRICOM and USEUCOM would be necessary to enable the prompt 6 U.S. Southern Command, “SOUTH- exchange of military units to execute Notes COM Component Commands and Units,” combat operations, security coopera- November 5, 2016, available at . “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 7 “U.S. Africa Command Theater Cam- contingencies as they arise. While there Year 2017,” May 16, 2016, available at . 8 Ibid., 18. 2 efits and efficiencies from a JTF system Chuck Hagel, speech transcript, National 9 Ibid., 21. of C2 should greatly outweigh the chal- Defense University, Washington, DC, April 10 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Opera- 2013, available at . of Staff, August 11, 2011), H-2. The primary advantage of this new JTF 3 Lisa Ferdinando, “Carter Proposes Up- 11 JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support (Washing- structure is that it gives the combatant dates to Goldwater-Nichols Act,” DOD News, ton, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 31, 2016), commander an established subordinate April 5, 2016, available at . (GCC) Command and Control Organizational respond to emergent crises and maintain 4 Deployable Training Division (J7), “Geo- immediate focus on the threats oriented Options,” 9. graphic Combatant Commander (GCC) Com- 13 JP 1-0, V-18. along TCP lines of effort. Although mand and Control Organizational Options,” 14 JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters untested, this new construct could have Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2016, available at (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July potential benefits over the conventional . 30, 2012), i. 5 Ibid., 9. system of Service component commands, particularly in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility. JFQ

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Kamas, Pope, and Propst 87 Apollo 16 Hasselblad image of Earth from the moon (NASA)

ver the past decade, the United States has participated in a The Role of Space O variety of activities intended to shape international norms for outer space activities. The Oxford English Norms in Protection Dictionary defines a norm as “That which is a model or a pattern; a type, a standard.” In the outer space context, and Defense norms have come to mean both “top down” high-level principles intended to inform the development of new inter- By Audrey M. Schaffer national legal regimes and “bottom up” best practice guidelines intended to inform day-to-day operations.1 Both As an operator in the space and cyber domains, we must types of space norms have their value, but the latter have received the most partner to influence norms of behavior that preserve and improve the usefulness of the space and cyberspace domains.

—General John E. Hyten, USAF Audrey M. Schaffer is the Director for Space Commander, U.S. Strategic Command Strategy and Plans in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

88 Features / Role of Space Norms in Protection and Defense JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 attention in recent years because of contrary to operational norms, this is a operate with impunity. At first glance, their potential to enhance space safety clear flag to monitor its activities more military space operators may bristle at and sustainability as the number of closely. In times of peace, such activities the implication that norms may con- space actors grows and the nature are likely to be nothing more than an strain their freedom of action in space. of space activities changes. Much as anomaly, which may deserve increased Militaries, though, already accept legally roadway traffic rules prevent accidents monitoring to preserve spaceflight safety binding constraints in all domains. For and reduce congestion, safety-focused or to mitigate harmful electromagnetic example, fundamental to the conduct “space traffic management” norms, interference. In periods of heightened of modern warfare is international hu- such as limiting debris, avoiding col- tensions, norms can form the basis of manitarian law (also known as the Law lisions, and sharing space surveillance criteria for early indications and warning of War or the Law of Armed Conflict),2 information, can reduce the likelihood of potentially aggressive actions. which seeks to limit the effects of conflict, of accidents and protect valuable orbital To have maximum value in identify- especially on noncombatants. Militaries regimes from the deleterious effects of ing “abnormal” behavior, norms should around the world translate international long-lived space debris. All who operate be widely accepted, such as through humanitarian law into rules of engage- in space will benefit from a more safe, voluntary guidelines or international ment that guide servicemembers. predictable, and efficient operating standards. Short of explicit international A future space norms regime could environment. acceptance, national or allied declaratory be fashioned similarly to other regimes Militaries stand to gain additional policies can communicate those behav- that govern activities in shared spaces and unique advantages from widespread iors considered to be a demonstration allow for differences in the application adherence to operational space norms. of hostile intent, shaping tacit under- of rules to government or military actors Norms can serve to highlight abnormal standing of acceptable and unacceptable and private actors. For example, Article 3 behavior, enabling warning of and pro- behaviors. If these agreements and/or of the Convention on International Civil tection against space threats. Militaries, communications are clear, and norms Aviation provides that the Convention therefore, should support domestic and are generally observed in times of peace, does not apply to “state” aircraft, though international initiatives to shape opera- then we can assume in times of crisis that such aircraft are required to exercise due tional norms of behavior, and they should behavior contrary to norms is most likely regard for the safety of navigation of civil lend their expertise to norm development a deliberate choice. These assumptions aviation.3 Article 48 of the Constitution efforts. As international space norms will be a critical input to crisis decision- of the International Telecommunication take shape, militaries can then analyze making and, by extension, may have a Union likewise provides freedom for mili- abnormal behavior, characterizing those significant effect on crisis stability. Both tary radio installations, but requires them, specific behaviors they would consider an under-reaction and over-reaction to so far as possible, to observe provisions to hostile or aggressive and determining anomalous behaviors could have serious prevent harmful interference.4 As in these how to respond appropriately in different and unintended consequences for inter- other domains, safety and sustainability situations. Militaries may also need to national peace and security. focused space norms, while remaining consider whether to evolve operational To the extent that the international good and responsible practice no matter policies and practices to meet behavioral community can observe what is hap- the situation, need not be strictly adhered expectations. pening in space, norms will shape to by militaries at all times. world opinion about these behaviors, Even if militaries are not expressly re- Role of Space Norms in branding them as simply irresponsible quired to follow norms, they nonetheless Protection and Defense or something more egregious such as po- should be prepared to make more deliber- Norms are not a panacea for constrain- tentially unlawful. This will require, at a ate behavioral choices because of how ing aggressive, hostile, provocative, minimum, compelling evidence based on actions inconsistent with norms will be or otherwise deliberately irresponsible space situational awareness information interpreted. This not only requires a stra- behavior in outer space. Norms may be from a trusted source. Confirmation from tegic and holistic perspective on national enough to dissuade a rational actor from multiple, independent, international, security space behaviors, especially in peri- routinely engaging in irresponsible acts, and/or commercial sources of space ods of crisis, but also creates opportunities but they will not prevent a committed situational awareness will have a positive for deliberate signaling. Just as increasing aggressor from deliberately disrupting and reinforcing effect on detecting bad airborne reconnaissance or forward-de- or denying space services it deems detri- behavior in outer space. ploying aircraft carriers can demonstrate mental to its interests. Norms, however, Nations may condemn those who interest and stake, so too can maneuver- can play a critical role in detecting and choose to engage in behavior contrary ing satellites demonstrate readiness and responding to potential threats. to norms. Condemnation, however, is resolve. Ensuring that the desired signals Norms enable early detection of a double-edged sword; a nation cannot are received requires significant commu- potentially hostile actions or intentions take others to task for violating interna- nication and/or agreement on norms of in space. If a satellite exhibits behaviors tional norms and simultaneously seek to behavior well in advance of a crisis.

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Schaffer 89 procedures for launch safety and operator training, as well as implementing more advanced practices like conjunction assessment screening and collaborative collision avoidance. Most of these operational norms, however, are not codified. The present situation is beginning to change due to the efforts of the Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of UN COPUOS. Since 2009 the working group has been developing best-practice guidelines for the safe and sustainable use of outer space. The group agreed on a first set of 12 guidelines in June of 2016 and is expected to forward a final compendium of guidelines to the UN General Assembly for adoption in the fall of 2018.11 But this effort is largely codify- Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein testifies before Senate Armed Services Subcommittee ing behaviors already implemented by on Strategic Forces, May 17, 2017, as part of examination of military space organization, policy, and programs (U.S. Air Force/Scott M. Ash) spacefaring nations.

Norms also provide clarity to depending on the type of norm being Catalyzing Space Norm acquirers, operators, and decisionmak- described.5 The 1967 Treaty on Development ers. Similar to how the Department of Principles Governing the Activities of Operators who agree that shared norms Defense (DOD) reviews all new weapons States in the Exploration and Use of of behavior will benefit all can help systems to ensure they can be operated in Outer Space, including the Moon and catalyze their development. A more accordance with international law, acquir- Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer deliberate approach to sharing and har- ers and operators could look to space Space Treaty”) provides a broad legal monizing best practices may establish norms for guidance on what capabilities framework and principles for outer operational norms more quickly, yield- and actions would be permissible and space activities.6 Many Cold War arms ing benefits in the near term. under what circumstances. This ensures control treaties contain generic provi- Norms will emerge naturally over resources are not expended on systems sions on noninterference with “national time. Commercial operators, guided by that political leaders will not employ and technical means,” understood to include a desire for a predictable environment, provides guidance for operational plan- space-based reconnaissance and warning efficient operations, and regulatory stabil- ners on how to protect and defend space satellites.7 The 2002 Hague Code of ity, will self-organize and/or work with systems in a manner that will be deemed Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Prolif- governments to shape pragmatic opera- acceptable in different situations. eration requires prelaunch notification tional norms.12 These organic processes, Norms—or rather the violation of space vehicle launches.8 None of though, may not result in universally thereof—also enable the creation of these commitments, however, contain accepted norms in time to prevent a cata- thresholds, triggers, and rules of engage- pragmatic space traffic management strophic incident. ment that allow militaries to employ norms for day-to-day operations. Commercial actors should lead passive or active measures to protect Some operational space norms have activities to shape, in a proactive man- threatened space systems. Norms, been codified. For example, the 2007 ner, the development of international ironically, may enhance freedom of action Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of space norms. The policies and practices when it is needed most. Because norms the United Nations (UN) Committee of established operators, developed and support the development of criteria for on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space refined through decades of experience, judging hostile acts or hostile intent in (COPUOS) outline general practices for should be the baseline for a discussion space, they enable actions to be taken in limiting the creation of long-lived space of routine and responsible behavior. self-defense. debris.9 The various instruments of the Individual operators almost certainly have International Telecommunication Union documented their standards, procedures, Current State of Space Norms govern spectrum usage and deconfliction, and other rules for operating safely in Today one could argue that there including to and from space.10 Arguably different situations and orbital regimes. are either few norms or many norms, other norms exist, such as following basic Operators should share these practices

90 Features / Role of Space Norms in Protection and Defense JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 with one another to draw broad guide- shape and the balance of activity in space components of crisis decisionmaking. lines and best practices. As these practices becomes commercial, rather than gov- Military lawyers, like operators, must are refined over time and adopted by a ernment- or defense-oriented, military work through different scenarios to ex- larger proportion of those operating in behaviors will be more easily detected plore how to apply to space activities legal space, they will increasingly be recog- and highlighted (and potentially unsafe) principles such as prohibitions on the use nized as norms of behavior. if they do not conform to widespread of force and the inherent right of self- practices. Militaries, therefore, should defense. This legal analysis, as well as legal Role of Militaries participate in norm development pro- analysis of the application of international Military and other governmental opera- cesses, both to lend their expertise and humanitarian law to space activities, must tors should participate in norms devel- to ensure that they can follow emerg- be flowed back into operational rules of opment processes because they have ing norms in their routine operations. engagement. If conflict does extend to decades of space operational experience Military requirements, however, should space, militaries must understand how to to bring to bear. Like any operator, mil- not drive the conversation because mili- act in accordance with international law. itaries and other governmental agencies tary operators will always have unique Guidance on how international have policies, procedures, and standards requirements and a need for flexibility in law applies to space would be akin to for mitigating risks, whether they be crisis and conflict. guidance that exists for other domains mission, safety, political, or military, that of warfare. The San Remo Manual on can serve as a starting point for norms Identifying Operational and International Law Applicable to Armed development discussions. Legal Thresholds and Triggers Conflicts at Sea,16 Humanitarian Policy In some cases, militaries or gov- Once operators collectively establish and Conflict Research Manual on ernments will have relevant unique what normal behavior looks like, mili- International Law Applicable to Air and operational experience to lend to norm taries should begin to identify which Missile Warfare,17 and Tallinn Manual development efforts. Militaries can abnormal behaviors they might consider 2.0 on the International Law Applicable contribute by making policies publicly aggressive, hostile, or otherwise provoc- to Cyber Warfare18 each capture military available as an input to discussion. For ative. Behavior must always be consid- practice and academic theory in the ap- example, DOD Instruction 3100.11, ered within a geopolitical context, but plication of international law to conflict Management of Laser Illumination of identifying clear thresholds and triggers in their respective domains. The newly Objects in Space, describes those practices for indications and warning and pos- launched Manual on International Law that DOD follows, and recommends sible defensive responses will ultimately Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space others follow, to minimize the risks enable protection of critical military project aims to do the same for space.19 from inadvertent laser illumination.13 space systems. Operational and legal analysis must be Militaries can also directly leverage their Developing thresholds should take done in concert with allies and partners unique expertise to partner with industry into account warning and defensive and eventually be shared more broadly. in developing standards and norms for capabilities. For example, if on average Allies must have a common view of specific types of operations. For example, militaries around the world were hypo- behaviors they would consider crossing a new program of the Defense Advanced thetically only able to distinguish objects a particular threshold so as to remain Research Projects Agency intends to 50km apart in geosynchronous orbits, unified in crisis and conflict. This view foster the development of standards and then deliberately bringing a satellite should at least be communicated to non- norms for rendezvous and proximity closer than 50km could be considered allied countries, so as not to inadvertently operations through the creation of a non- provocative. Similarly, if space surveillance trigger a destabilizing response. governmental consortium.14 Militaries systems hypothetically require 24 hours can likewise be active participants in to register changes in the orbit of a given Evolving Military Policies international negotiation of standards object, then maneuvers that would result and Practices and guidelines relevant to national se- in dangerously close approaches in less As norms emerge, militaries should curity activities. For example, DOD has than 24 hours also could be considered take stock of their behaviors and deter- participated in the development of the provocative. mine whether to change policies and space surveillance data standards of the Legal analysis should be applied to practices in light of new international Consultative Committee on Space Data discussions of thresholds and triggers expectations. Conforming military Systems and the long-term sustainability because operational criteria for hostile behavior to international norms may guidelines of UN COPUOS.15 behavior should be considered in the require changes to operational tactics, Militaries will benefit by being in- context of international law. Factors that techniques, and procedures in the volved in the norm development process governments would take into account short term, but it is the only long-term because military activities will, over time, when determining whether a hostile act approach. Routinely operating outside largely follow established norms even or use of force was evidence of an actual of established norms will serve only to if not required to do so. As norms take or imminent armed attack will be critical highlight military activities rather than

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Schaffer 91 13 allow them to coexist with growing Department of Defense Instruction Notes 3100.11, Management of Laser Illumination of commercial and other nongovernmental Objects in Space, October 24, 2016, available activity in space. 1 Gregory L. Schulte and Audrey M. Schaf- at . will drive national security space activi- sponsible Behavior in Outer Space,” Strategic 14 Defense Advanced Research Projects ties to become increasingly transparent, Studies Quarterly 6, no. 1 (Spring 2012), 9–17. Agency, “Broad Agency Announcement, 2 For more information on the body of law Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and especially as growing congestion forces that constitutes international humanitarian law, Proximity Operations (CONFERS),” Decem- more collaborative spaceflight safety see International Committee of the Red Cross, ber 20, 2016, available at . become obsolete, requiring the national load/file/4541/what-is-ihl-factsheet.pdf>. 15 For more information on the Consulta- 3 “Convention on International Civil tive Committee on Space Data Systems, see security community to find new ways of Aviation,” December 7, 1944, United Nations . maintaining operational security. These Treaty Series 15 (New York: United Nations, 16 Louise Doswald-Beck, ed., San Remo changes will present challenges in the 1948), 298. Manual on International Law Applicable to short term, but the most capable and in- 4 “Constitution and Convention of the Armed Conflicts at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge novative actors will find ways to achieve International Telecommunication Union,” University Press, 1995). December 12, 1992, United Nations Treaty 17 Program on Humanitarian Policy and their military objectives in an evolving en- Series 1825 (New York: United Nations, 1998), Conflict Research (HPCR) at Harvard Univer- vironment. Those who are able to adapt 362–363. sity, HPCR Manual on International Law Ap- the most quickly will find that they have 5 Schulte and Schaffer. plicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Cambridge: the greatest freedom of action. 6 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Cambridge University Press, 2013). Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 18 Michael N. Schmidt, ed., Tallinn Manual of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Conclusion Celestial Bodies,” October 10, 1967, United Operations (Cambridge: Cambridge University The time to start developing norms for Nations Treaty Series 610 (New York: United Press, 2017). responsible behavior in outer space is Nations, 1970), 205–212. 19 For more information on the Manual on now. In addition to the safety and sus- 7 For example, in Article V of the Interim International Law Applicable to Military Uses tainability benefits that will be enjoyed Agreement Between the United States of of Outer Space, see . by all who operate in space, norms will Republics on Certain Measures with Respect enable the protection and defense of to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms capabilities critical for national security. (“SALT I”), the parties undertake not to Militaries, therefore, should strongly interfere with the national technical means of support activities to develop inter- verification of the other party. 8 “Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballis- national norms, even if they are not tic Missile Proliferation,” November 22, 2002, primary actors in those processes. As available at . in space, militaries should then develop 9 United Nations Office of Outer Space criteria, both operational and legal, to Affairs, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space determine which abnormal behaviors (Vienna: United Nations, 2010). represent potential threats. Militaries 10 In addition to the Constitution and may also need to consider whether their Convention of the International Telecommu- behavior should evolve to conform to nication Union, the ITU Radio Regulations, as widely accepted practices that enhance adopted by successive World Radiocommunica- tions Conferences, contain specific provisions safety and predictability for all who on the assignment, allocation, and use of operate in the domain. frequencies, as well as interference and interfer- The goal of the United States is to ence monitoring. prevent conflict from extending into 11 United Nations General Assembly, 71st space; however, we must also be prepared Session, Official Record, Supplement 20, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses to defend against aggressive acts by oth- of Outer Space, Fifty-ninth Session (8–17 June ers. The criticality of space systems for 2016), A/71/20 (New York: United Nations, national security demands that we not 2016), 22–25. only understand how space supports 12 For example, the Space Data Associa- terrestrial military activities, but also tion (www.space-data.org/sda/about/sda- overview/), a nonprofit association of satellite recognize when others are deliberately operators, requires information-sharing and seeking to take those advantages away. operational coordination among its members Space norms support defense and protec- to resolve situations related to spaceflight safety tion of critical space capabilities. JFQ and electromagnetic interference.

92 Features / Role of Space Norms in Protection and Defense JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Largest amphibious landing since end of World War II, September 15, 1950, at Inchon Harbor, Republic of Korea (U.S. Army/31st Infantry Regiment)

ime has always been considered Time in War a key element in war. Speed, by T definition, derives from time: “distance traveled divided by the time By Phillip S. Meilinger of travel” is the usual definition. Over two millennia ago, Sun Tzu remarked on its importance, noting that “speed is Go sir, gallop, and don’t forget that the world was made in the essence of war” and “divine swiftness” is to be “esteemed.”1 Carl von six days. You can ask me for anything you like, except time. Clausewitz believed similarly, comment- —Napoleon ing that time had a major psychological effect that would help provide secrecy as well as speed.2 Not just theorists, but also practitioners (such as Napoleon as quoted in this article’s epigraph) have Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.), served in the U.S. Air Force for 30 years. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Michigan. His latest book is Limiting Risk in America’s Wars: Airpower, recognized the importance of time and Asymmetrics and a New Strategic Paradigm (Naval Institute Press, forthcoming). timing in war. But what is time?

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Meilinger 93 There are several ways to describe the sold them into slavery; and then, as tradi- into position. What if Longstreet had at- concept, but most consider time to be a tion has it, sowed the ground with salt so tacked in coordination with his comrades straight line. Things begin, they develop, nothing would grow.6 as General Robert E. Lee had intended and they end. One can remember or read On August 6, 1945, a single B-29 instead of the piecemeal attacks that did about the past, but we cannot go back; bomber took off from the Mariana occur? One historian summed up the time marches inexorably forward, and the Islands, and at 0815 it arrived over day by stating, “Lee’s offensive, based future remains unknown. Hiroshima and dropped a single atomic upon attacks in progression until it de- Albert Einstein introduced a new bomb. The horrible blast and radiation veloped into a giant pincers squeezing concept: time was flexible and relative. effects of the bomb on the structures, both enemy flanks, required careful co- Physicists have adapted this bendable people, and land of the Japanese city were ordination and expert timing.”9 For the concept of time when discussing cos- not all that dissimilar from the effects of Confederates, that timing was off. mology. For theologians, God is both the Romans’ actions at Carthage two The Schlieffen Plan was devised in timeless and endless; He always was and millennia earlier.7 The difference between Germany in the last decade of the 19th always will be. Moreover, God’s time is the two events was that the destruction of century by the Chief of the Great General not an arrow but a circle: He sees all— Hiroshima was effected virtually instan- Staff, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen. past, present, and future—whichever way taneously by one weapon, and not over a The plan posited a worst-case scenario He chooses to look.3 period of years by several legions. It was of a two-front war. To be successful, Besides its physical and theological the conquest of time, not of matter, that Schlieffen believed that Germany had to aspects, time also has a psychological so stunned the world—both then and hold in the East against Russia and then component, which we all experience. since. strike quickly in the West against Belgium Although the clock ticks on rhythmically, and France, knocking them out of the we often feel it differently. On some days, Time and Land Warfare war to enable a turn back to the East the clock appears to move very slowly— There have been countless examples in time to meet the lumbering Russian when we are waiting in anticipation for of when time played a key role on the army as it moved toward Germany. It was something to occur. On other occasions, battlefield. At Borodino in September assumed that the Russians would take 2 time appears to accelerate—as when we 1812, Napoleon met the Russian army months to mobilize and thus would not are enjoying ourselves and want to pro- outside Moscow. He thought it could initially be a serious threat. Therefore, the long the moment. be the decisive battle of the war—a war in the West had to conclude within For the military, it is the notion of victory would destroy the enemy army, 2 months. Schlieffen retired in 1905, time as an arrow—the orderly sequenc- open the door to the capital city, and and over the next decade his successor, ing of events—that matters most. Yet the force the tsar to surrender. Yet the Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke psychological aspect of time, especially Emperor was reluctant to use all his (nephew of the great von Moltke who its apparent suddenness, is also of great troops in the battle, especially his Old was a hero of the German wars of unifica- importance, especially in military opera- Guard. One general who was on the tion) continued to tinker with the plan. tions. John Boyd, an Airman and theorist scene reported that Napoleon stated, “I Unfortunately, the necessity of maintain- of war, devised his famous OODA want to see more clearly. . . . My battle ing a rigid time schedule for the huge Loop—Observe, Orient, Decide, Act—to hasn’t begun yet. . . . The day will be military turning movement that would illustrate the cycle through which the long. You have to know how to wait. move through Belgium and northern human mind makes decisions. Boyd Time always has to be considered. . . . France remained a dominant feature.10 posited that the side whose OODA Loop Nothing is clear yet.” He then asked an When war broke out in July 1914, was quicker—who acted most appropri- aide what time it was, and when told, von Moltke feared the Russians would ately in the fastest time—would have an Napoleon remarked, “The time for my mobilize and attack more quickly than advantage.4 Military forces also use terms battle hasn’t come yet. It will begin had been anticipated, which they did. like tempo and synchronization to explain in two hours.”8 But the Emperor had As a result, he ordered six of his army the importance of conquering and best miscalculated. In 2 hours, the battle corps detached from the Western arm utilizing time in their operations.5 was already decided; his timing was off, to bolster the East. For this and other An example I have often used to il- and the Russian army survived to fight reasons, the rigidly timed attack in the lustrate this psychological effect concerns again. Napoleon would lose the war. West went awry. The German armies fell the fates of Carthage and Hiroshima. On the second day at Gettysburg, behind schedule and had to readjust their The Third Punic War ended with the Confederate Lieutenant General James timing. Gaps also developed between the defeat of Carthage at the hands of Rome. Longstreet was to attack the Union left armies as they maneuvered to readjust; When defeating the African power in 146 wing in conjunction with other unit at- the French and their British allies noticed BCE, the Romans wanted to ensure there tacks on the Union’s right and center the faulty German dispositions and hur- would be no Fourth Punic War, so they wings. But his corps took the wrong ried to act. Even so, it was a close-run razed Carthage; killed its inhabitants or road and was several hours late getting thing. As the German armies moved to

94 Recall / Time in War JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 the Marne River shielding Paris, a hast- craft backed out before the tides began to attack (300 to 500 feet) using B-24 ily cobbled-together French army was recede. It was a brilliant maneuver, per- heavy bombers to strike the complex in a rushed to the front just in time—partly fectly timed, against what many thought coordinated attack. Nearly 200 bombers by 2,000 Parisian taxicabs—and managed were hopeless odds.13 Concurrently, would be used and, given the unusual to deliver a decisive tactical check to the MacArthur directed an assault by his tactics as well as the extreme distance, the enemy.11 The carefully timed Schlieffen forces at Pusan timed to coincide with B-24s were fitted with extra fuel tanks Plan had fallen apart, and the Western Operation Chromite; the North Koreans and supplied with a low-level bomb- Front soon devolved into a stagnant were caught in an enormous vise. The sight. In addition, the crews practiced trench war of attrition that would last for aggressors fled north to escape that trap over the Libyan desert, flying low and much of the next 4 years. even faster than they initially had moved dropping practice bombs on a dummy In June 1950, North Korea attacked south.14 complex built to resemble that at Ploesti. across the 38th parallel demarcation line Complete rehearsals were flown on July into the south. Caught unprepared, Timing and Air Warfare 28 and 29, and on both days the mission Republic of Korea (ROK) forces pre- Between the wars, U.S. thinkers and went flawlessly, “completely destroying” cipitously retreated south. The United planners at the Air Corps Tactical the dummy site. Nations (UN) appointed General of School devised a doctrine for employ- On August 1, 1943, 177 planes in the Army Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. ing heavy bombers in a future war. five groups took off from Libya and commander in Japan, to lead a coalition They settled on an “industrial web” headed east. Beforehand, crewmen were against the aggression, and he began theory that likened an economy to a told to write letters home and leave them deploying U.S. troops and air assets spider’s web—all was interconnected, on their cots—if they did not return, the based in Japan into South Korea to help and damage anywhere in the web would letters would be mailed. It was not long stem the tide, and reinforcements were reverberate throughout the entire struc- after takeoff when things began to go hastily ordered from the United States. ture with dramatic effects. This theory awry. The weather was far different from Initially, this did not work; the UN and also hypothesized that certain resources the endlessly clear skies over the Libyan ROK troops were pushed into a perim- or facilities were more important to the desert, and thunderstorms en route broke eter at Pusan on the southern tip of the successful operation of an economy at up the formation. Radio calls would have peninsula, but MacArthur was planning war than others. Typical ideal target assisted planes to rejoin the formation, a counterstroke. Operation Chromite was sets included oil refineries and storage but the crews were told to maintain radio to be an amphibious assault at Inchon, facilities, the electric power grid, steel silence so as not to tip off the enemy. the port city near Seoul, which would plants, and armament factories, among Things worsened. take place in mid-September. As one others.15 In addition, it was believed As a result of the disruption in timing historian phrased it, “One of General that gaining air superiority was crucial caused by the formation breakup, two MacArthur’s outstanding attributes, to ultimate victory; therefore, destroy- bomber groups arrived over the target demonstrated quite often in World War ing aircraft and engine factories was just well before the rest of the force—thus II, was a keen sense of timing.”12 His as important as destroying the aircraft alerting the defenses for those coming forces would not be ready for the opera- themselves. behind. Two other groups misidenti- tion until mid-September, but waiting Germany had little internal oil fied a checkpoint and turned too early; until October would be too late for his resources, and during peacetime most they flew all the way to Bucharest before forces in Pusan. The window of opportu- had to be imported. When Adolf Hitler realizing their mistake. This too alerted nity was narrow. launched the war, one of his first objec- defenses and scrambled Luftwaffe fight- The obstacles at Inchon were formi- tives was to secure the oil fields and ers. Another group encountered heavy dable. The tides often exceeded 30 feet, refineries of Romania. These resources, antiaircraft fire approaching Ploesti, so it and when the tide was out, the mudflats centered around the town of Ploesti, made an unplanned deviation to the east left behind were so soft and deep as to would soon supply over 60 percent to avoid the threat. The result of these preclude movement. Twice a day, the of Germany’s crude oil supply.16 Air snafus was an uncoordinated attack as tides came in, but the time available for planners argued that knocking out this most of the bombers blew in piecemeal an assault to occur was only 3 hours. complex would have a disastrous effect from different directions and altitudes After that, the retreating tide would leave on Germany’s “web.” as opposed to the plan of arriving at the the attackers and their craft stranded on From the nearest Army Air Force target en masse in a single formation. the mud for the next 12 hours—sitting bases in Africa, the attack would be a Colonel Leon Johnson—awarded the ducks for the defenders. On September deep strike over hostile territory (1,200 Medal of Honor for his actions that 15, the UN forces landed at Inchon, miles each way). Moreover, the refineries day—later wrote, “We flew through totally astonishing the North Korean de- themselves were heavily defended by an- sheets of flame, and airplanes were fenders. The assault force landed at high tiaircraft guns and enemy fighter aircraft. everywhere, some of them on fire and tide, disgorged its troops, and the landing Planners therefore suggested a low-level others exploding.”17 Upon departing

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Meilinger 95 Through flak and over destruction created by preceding waves of bombers, 15th Air Force B-24 Liberators leave Ploesti, Rumania, after one of long series of attacks against primary oil target in Europe, August 1, 1943 (U.S. Air Force/Jerry J. Jostwick) the area, instead of reforming for the practically all mobile weapons relied on. forced to turn back when low on fuel. journey home, the groups pressed on by This was a “bottleneck” target whose The bombers would then be hit hard by themselves stretched out over 100 miles, destruction prewar air planners believed interceptors, but after striking the target making them easier prey for enemy fight- would have a disproportionate effect on they would turn south for North Africa ers. By the time it was over and the B-24s the German economy. Regensburg, a rather than reverse course and return to straggled back to Africa, 54 bombers nearby city, had a large Messerschmitt England. It was believed this would so were lost as well as 532 Airmen. Only 3 factory that produced 48 percent of the surprise and confuse the defenders that of the 177 bombers that had started the Luftwaffe’s fighter aircraft. In the sum- the second half of the bombers’ journey mission were still fit to fly the following mer of 1943, planners thought they knew would be fairly easy. day. To illustrate the harrowing nature of how to neutralize them.18 Due to the lack A second wave of bombers would the mission, five Medals of Honor were of long-range escort fighters to accom- depart England 10 minutes after the first awarded that day—the most ever for a pany the bombers deep into Germany—a and would head for Schweinfurt. The single air operation. major shortcoming of airpower thinking close arrival of the second wave was timed The keys to success at Ploesti were to between the wars—it was concluded the so it would arrive over the target while be “surprise and razor-sharp timing,” but bombers would suffer heavy losses at the Luftwaffe fighters were back on the both were lost and the result was carnage. the hands of the Luftwaffe fighter force. ground refueling and rearming. They It would not be until April 1944 that the Planners therefore decided to throw the would be airborne again within 30 min- Army Air Force attempted further at- enemy a curveball. There would be two utes, but the planners figured this would tacks on Ploesti—and those attacks were separate waves of bombers. The first allow the bombers to get to the target conducted at high altitude in standard air would depart bases in England and head relatively unscathed—although afterward group formation. directly for Regensburg. Spitfires and they would have to fight their way back Schweinfurt was Germany’s major P-47s would accompany them for the to England. production center of ball bearings, which first part of their journey, but would be

96 Recall / Time in War JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 In other words, the timing of the On the other hand, Williams’s an All-American football player at West two-wave assault would mean the first unescorted Schweinfurt crews were ham- Point, was an ace in World War II with wave (Regensburg) would only have to mered both to and from the target—over 13 victories, and had married movie defend itself on the way into the target, 300 Luftwaffe fighters pounced on them. actress Ella Raines. Olds devised a plan, whereas the second wave (Schweinfurt) Overall, the Eighth Air Force would lose Operation Bolo, to sucker the MiGs into would only have to fight on the way 60 bombers that day; another 100 bomb- air combat. home. It made sense. ers were so heavily damaged that they When bomb-laden F-105s were Crews were awakened at 0130 and would not fly again, and well over 550 sent north to strike various targets, served real eggs and bacon for break- aircrew were dead, missing, or captured. they were usually escorted by F-4s and fast—they knew something was up, and This toll amounted to over 20 percent “Iron Hand” assets—F-105s equipped many referred to the meal as “the Last of the attacking crew force and nearly with electronic jamming pods and Supper.”19 In the briefing room, the 60 percent of the airframes—losses that anti-radiation missiles to suppress the map showing their target for the day were completely unsustainable. It was not SAMs. If MiGs showed up, the F-105s was covered by a cloth, but the crew difficult for even the most mathemati- would continue to their targets while the members had learned that a string with cally challenged crewman to figure his Phantoms engaged the MiGs. The North a bob at the end would trace their route odds: such losses would mean the entire Vietnamese were aware of these tactics, of flight; more string left hanging at the bombing force would theoretically be so they avoided the Phantoms whenever bottom of the chart meant the target annihilated in 5 missions, yet they were possible.20 would be close to the coast and there- required to fly 25 combat missions. Operation Bolo proposed that F-4s fore include escort. Today, there was no In short, both missions had relied on would mimic the actions of an F-105 string showing. This would be a very superb timing to achieve success. But in strike package. The Phantoms would deep strike, unescorted. both cases that timing broke down and be loaded with air-to-air missiles (four Unfortunately, heavy fog rolled into resulted in disaster. radar-guided and four heat-seekers) but England the morning of August 16, A basic tenet for Airmen concerns the no bombs; they would use standard 1943. The first wave of 146 bombers importance of command of the air. For F-105 routing, altitudes, speeds, tactics, had no choice but to take off because its aircraft to operate effectively, the oppos- and call signs. It was hoped that North timetable required it to land at the unfa- ing air force and air defenses must first be Vietnamese radar operators would paint miliar North African bases before dark. neutralized. One method of achieving air the incoming aircraft and assume they Fortuitously, Colonel Curtis LeMay, who superiority is defeating enemy intercep- were unescorted F-105s. They would led the first contingent, had trained his tors in the air, but another is attacking the then scramble MiG interceptors from men rigorously on instrument takeoffs aircraft while they are still on the ground the five airfields ringing Hanoi and direct and climb-outs. The training paid off, and at their most vulnerable. them against the incoming bombers. Not and not a single bomber was lost during During Operation Rolling Thunder, until sighting the Phantoms would the the form-up. the air interdiction campaign against MiGs realize they had been duped. It But the takeoff of the second wave of North Vietnam between 1965 and was then expected that some of the MiGs 230 bombers, led by Brigadier General 1968, U.S. aircraft flying north were would peel off and head for home, know- Robert Williams, was then delayed for met by extremely heavy enemy air de- ing their landing fields were protected over 3 hours. The crewmembers knew fenses—antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air sanctuaries. But Olds was prepared for exactly what this meant: they would en- missiles (SAMs), and MiG fighters. These that: F-4s stationed at Da Nang Airbase in gage a freshly fueled, armed, and rested defenses were deadly, yet they could South Vietnam, also mimicking F-105s, fighter defense not only into their target, not be systematically attacked. Rules of would be heading toward Hanoi from the but on the return as well. Their escort engagement (ROE) stated that SAM sites east. Radar would assume these aircraft fighters could not offer much help and could not be hit while being built and still were also bombers intending to strike would have to turn back upon reaching harmless. Similarly, MiG airbases were targets near the capital. Instead, the Da the German border. There would be hell off limits—enemy aircraft could only be Nang fighters would head for the MiG to pay. attacked if actually airborne. Achieving bases and orbit overhead. Their intention? As expected, the first wave of bomb- air superiority under these rules appeared When the MiGs fled from the Thailand- ers led by LeMay endured heavy attacks impossible. based F-4s to recover at their airfields, the inbound to Regensburg—losing 14 air- In 1966, Airmen at bases in Thailand Da Nang F-4s would be waiting there. craft while they were still more than 100 devised a plan to destroy MiGs while The MiGs would be forced to fight.21 miles from the target. Ten more were lost still adhering to the ROE. Colonel Timing was crucial for the plan to over the city—but their turn south did Robin Olds, commander of the 8th succeed. Not only did the F-4s need indeed catch the defenders by surprise. As Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon, took to mimic the airspeed, altitude, and a result, the bombers’ 5-hour journey to the lead in this effort. Olds was a bit of tactics of the F-105s, but they also had North Africa was largely uneventful. a legend in the Air Force; he had been to arrive in separate flights and waves.

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Meilinger 97 Troops of the 31st Infantry Regiment land at Inchon Harbor, September 18, 1950 (National Archives and Records Administration/U.S. Army/Hunkins)

Studying the actions of the MiGs over had to continue their regular routines— and they did run into a buzz saw. Seven the previous months, Olds knew they combat missions were still flown against MiGs were quickly downed, one by Olds, remained airborne for only 50 minutes, normal targets. The F-4s also had to before they fled for home. Unfortunately, less if they used afterburners. The F-4s, mount the anti-SAM pods carried by the lack of the Da Nang force meant even though hitting tankers just prior Iron Hand—if they did not, North the remaining MiGs were able to re- to entering North Vietnamese airspace, Vietnamese radar operators would be cover safely. Even so, the Ubon crews still had only 5 minutes to engage over suspicious—but the switch could not be claimed seven enemy aircraft at no loss to the target. Accordingly, the MiGs would made too soon. The pods were therefore themselves. encounter several waves of U.S. Air removed from the F-105s at Korat and Force fighters—arriving at 5-minute Takhli and flown by C-130 to Ubon and What It Means intervals—allowing successive aircraft to Da Nang. There, maintenance crews Time has always been a crucial factor continue the fight while others departed worked all night installing them so they in war, and commanders and plan- for home.22 In addition, the Da Nang would be ready for Operation Bolo in the ners should give it great consideration aircraft also had to arrive over the MiG morning. when developing strategy and tactics. airfields in a series of waves so as to meet As is usually the case in war, the Although timing in war is a somewhat enemy aircraft attempting to flee. If mission did not go as planned. Bad theoretical concept, it is also essential. those F-4s arrived too soon, they would weather meant the Da Nang aircraft As one expert on the subject has stated, run low on fuel before the MiGs showed did not arrive over the MiG bases as “The purpose of theory is to change up; if they arrived too late, the MiGs intended. Nonetheless, Olds led his current doctrine through intellect rather would have already landed.23 Ubon-based aircraft as scheduled, the than through the bloody empiricism of Other activities had to be precisely North Vietnamese were tricked, 12 extinction.”24 The job of theory is to timed as well. To ensure secrecy, the MiG-21s scrambled to intercept what solve new problems for which current aircraft in Thailand and South Vietnam they supposed were unescorted F-105s, doctrine is inadequate.

98 Recall / Time in War JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Inchon was an example of excellent history—Alexander, Hannibal, Genghis can operate, psychological effect has al- timing carefully planned and artfully Khan, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, ways been touted by Airmen. Air Marshal executed. In some cases, however, com- Nelson, Wellington, Lee, and Patton, Hugh Trenchard, regarded as the Father manders have too quickly discounted or among others—were known for their of the Royal Air Force, stated that the ignored the importance of time, while rapidity of movement and ability to adjust psychological impact was 20 times greater on other occasions they have given it too quickly to events. With the arrival of the than the physical effect of bombing.26 much importance. The Schlieffen Plan airplane, this ability to move quickly and Although he was exaggerating, Trenchard was built upon a foundation of quick- conquer time was multiplied by an order was not alone in his belief regarding these sand: it imagined an ability to maintain of magnitude or more. Even in World psychological repercussions. an impossible time schedule given the na- War I, aircraft struck targets hundreds of It was one of the great irritants of ture of man, beast, and vehicles. Things miles behind enemy lines, with several the Vietnam War to Airmen that civilian usually go wrong in war, yet German tons of bombs, while traveling 20 times thinkers in Washington devised a strategy generals thought they could overcome faster than infantry on foot. It has been of “gradual escalation” against North such pesky details and proceed with rigid a facet of modern air warfare that this Vietnam. This policy was intended to precision. The result was calamity. The ability to strike deeply and quickly allows serve as a carrot and a stick: the United same belief in timing was also seen at parallel warfare—speed and precision- States would bomb some valuable targets Ploesti and Schweinfurt/Regensburg. guided munitions permit a multitude of in the North with the clear implication Timing was crucial to the successful enemy targets to be struck throughout that if enemy leaders would not modify outcome of these plans, but air planners a theater in a remarkably short period their behavior and cease fomenting failed to account for a situation in which of time. More targets were struck across war in the South, the bombing would the timing went awry. Too much weight Iraq from the air in the first 24 hours of increase in volume and include higher was placed on this one pillar of timing; it Operation Desert Storm in 1991 (152 value targets. If, however, the North could not support the pressure, and when separate targets) than the Eighth Air did ease off, then carrots—favorable it buckled, so did the entire edifice. Force had been able to hit in its first year political or economic terms—would Certain factors become clear when of operation over Europe in 1942 and be forthcoming. In the words of one studying the issue of time in war. The 1943.25 It is not unreasonable to suggest National Security Council document conquest of time can produce other that Iraq was defeated on the first day of from December 1964: qualities and situations that can turn the war; Saddam Hussein was cut off from tide. The first of these is speed. Theorists his forces and knocked off balance to Such a program would consist principally and commanders have realized since such an extent that he was never able to of progressively more serious air strikes, of antiquity that moving quickly is a major recover. The speed of the coalition attack a weight and tempo adjusted to the situa- goal to be achieved both approaching conquered time and made it virtually im- tion as it develops (possibly running from the battlefield and then during the battle possible for Saddam to avoid defeat. two to six months) and of appropriate itself. Speed often grants surprise, which Time can in some instances substitute U.S. deployments to handle any contin- contains both physical and psychological for mass. Although a principle of war, gency. Targets in the DRV [Democratic elements—most theorists would argue the tremendous speed and accuracy of Republic of Vietnam] would start with that the psychological impact is more modern air weapons can now assure infiltration targets south of the 19th powerful. The shock of arriving in force density—mass precision. As noted, such parallel and work up to targets north of when and where an enemy does not mass-precision attacks in a short period that point. This could eventually lead to expect it can often cause panic, as was the of time allow simultaneity—and those such measures as air strikes on all major case for the arrival of the Prussian army of attacks generally neutralize targets due to military-related targets; aerial mining of Frederick the Great at Leuthen in 1757, precision-guided munition accuracy. This DRV ports, and a U.S. naval blockade of the arrival of Admiral Horatio Nelson’s also means the lowering of risk—fewer the DRV. The whole sequence of military fleet at Aboukir Bay in 1798, or the drive aircraft, operating in a danger zone for actions would be designed to give the im- through the Ardennes by German blitz- a greatly reduced period of time, means pression of a steady, deliberate approach, krieg forces in 1940. In addition, time is lower casualties. Since Desert Storm in and to give the U.S. the option at any time crucial in the collection and dissemina- 1991, the United States has sustained just (subject to enemy reaction) to proceed or tion of accurate intelligence. Indeed, a handful of casualties in air operations not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the most commanders would argue that the despite hundreds of thousands of combat pace or not. Concurrently, the U.S. would value of intelligence is directly propor- sorties flown in various theaters around be alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, tional to the speed of that gathering and the world. and would be prepared to explore negoti- dissemination. As noted in the introduction to ated solutions that attain U.S. objectives The conquest of time also grants this article, the telescoping of time can in an acceptable manner.27 flexibility and mobility. It should not provide a great psychological impact. be surprising that the great captains of Because of the speed with which airpower

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Meilinger 99 This strategy of gradual escalation CT: Praeger, 1994), chapter 5. Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air 6 Brian Caven, The Punic Wars (London: War Against Nazi Germany (New York: Simon was deeply resented by the Airmen as- Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980), 273–291. & Schuster, 2006), 187–192. signed to implement it because it robbed 7 Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army 17 Miller, 191. airpower of one of its greatest weapons— and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, DC: U.S. 18 For the strategic context, see Craven and the psychological impact of dominating Army Center of Military History, 1985), Cate, II, 681–687; and for a more detailed ac- time. Worse, the strategy did not work. 534–550. count, see Miller, 192–205. 8 Count Philippe-Paul de Ségur, Napoleon’s 19 Miller, 193. The stick used in gradually escalating air Russian Campaign (Boston: Houghton Mif- 20 For the beginning of Operation Rolling attacks was never hard enough or swift flin, 1958), 70. For the battle itself, see David Thunder, see Jacob Van Staaveren, Gradual enough to prevent the North Vietnamese Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, from stealing the carrots. York: Macmillan, 1966), 790–810. 1965–1966 (Washington, DC: Air Force His- 9 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg tory and Museums Program, 2002). Campaign: A Study in Command (New York: 21 For an overview of Operation Bolo, see Time has been a key factor in war since Simon & Schuster, 1997), 384. Debates over Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back: The antiquity, and commanders and military who was at fault for the delays and lack of co- USAF and North Vietnam, 1966–1973 (Wash- thinkers have constantly tried to harness ordination on day 2 have raged for well over a ington, DC: Air Force History and Museums it for their advantage. To do so would century. Longstreet usually gets the blame, but Program, 2000), 52–55. grant them speed, secrecy, surprise, and others argue Lee gave confusing and contradic- 22 Olds had eight flights of four aircraft tory orders and failed to exercise the requisite each at Ubon. There would be three waves: shock. Great commanders were those control over his subordinates. Others blame the the flights would arrive on scene in 5-minute most adept at conquering time. This guides who failed to scout an appropriate route intervals with 10 minutes between waves. This quest took on new vigor with the inven- that would allow Longstreet’s corps to move would ensure there were U.S. fighters on scene tion of the airplane in the first decade of into place without being seen by the Union for the entire fuel duration of any MiGs that the 20th century. The conquest of time, spotters on the Round Tops. In any event, the came up. timing was seriously compromised and defeat 23 For an excellent and detailed account, as well as the medium in which aircraft was the result. See Noah Andre Trudeau, see Robin Olds, with Christina Olds and Ed operate, was recognized as revolution- Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage (New York: Rasimus, Fighter Pilot (New York: St. Martin’s, ary within the first decade of manned HarperCollins, 2002), 282–371. 2010), 271–282. flight. A century later, that revolution is 10 For the plan, see Gerhard Ritter, The 24 Leonhard, xxi. even more apparent as speed, accuracy, Schlieffen Plan (New York: Praeger, 1958). For 25 David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Opera- the first two decades after World War I, most tions: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Ar- range, and secrecy continue to increase. believed the plan was a brilliant concept that lington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, Joint commanders must recognize this was incompetently carried out by von Moltke 2001), 2. capability and factor it into their mili- and his generals. When the plan itself was finally 26 Hugh M. Trenchard, “Bombing Germa- tary plans. JFQ discovered and studied after World War II, that ny: General Trenchard’s Report of Operations opinion changed. Most historians have since of British Airmen against German Cities,” New decided there were not enough German troops York Times Current History 10, April 1919, to carry it out, it was politically foolish, and the 152. Notes plan was so dependent on precise timing of an 27 Department of State, Foreign Relations of extremely complex and difficult maneuver as to the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. I: Vietnam, 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel be impossible of execution. 1964 (Washington, DC: Government Printing B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 11 For an overview, see Martin Gilbert, The Office, 1992), 970. 1963), 106, 134. First World War: A Complete History (New 2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and York: Henry Holt, 1994), 29–30, 72. trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ- 12 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: eton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 198. The First Year (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 3 For excellent discussions of the physical, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), religious, and psychological dimensions of time, 144. see Paul Davis, About Time: Einstein’s Unfin- 13 Ibid., chapters 8 and 9. For an excel- ished Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, lent account of MacArthur and his role in 1995); and Colin Wilson, ed., The Book of Time Operation Chromite, see D. Clayton James, (North Pomfret, VT: Westbridge, 1980). The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 4 For the best examination of John Boyd’s 1945–1964, vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, theories—and my simple overview does not do 1985), 464–485. it justice—see Frans P.B. Osinga, “The Enemy 14 Schnabel, 173–177. as a Complex Adaptive System: John Boyd and 15 For an excellent discussion, see Stephen Airpower in the Postmodern Era,” in Airpower L. McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden Bombing, 1918–1945 (Washington, DC: Smith- and John Boyd, ed. John A. Olsen (Annapolis: sonian, 1995), chapter 5. Naval Institute Press, 2015). 16 For the strategic context of this mis- 5 One author, an infantryman, also uses sion, see Wesley F. Craven and James L. more scientific terms, such as frequency and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 7 amplitude, to describe the effects of time on the vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, battlefield. See Robert R. Leonhard,Fighting 1948–1958), II, 477–483. For a more detailed by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Westport, account, see Donald L. Miller, Masters of the

100 Recall / Time in War JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 rising Chinese strength causes great China and Eastern thinking. Richard concern for the United States and its E. Nisbett’s Geography of Thought (Free allies. Press, 2003) could help military strate- Destined for War begins with a gists with key cultural insights on the summary of the present operational differences between Western Aristotelian environment in which China has sur- and Eastern Confucian-based thought passed the United States economically, patterns. Allison does state that civiliza- as measured by several key indicators. tional differences “are growing more, not “Grand Master” Lee Kuan Yew, former less, significant as sources of conflict.” leader of Singapore, provides critical Allison lays out several strategic op- comments on China’s “true nature” and tions the United States should consider its potential as the “biggest player in the after its reflection. He cautions that history of the world.” The second part of accommodation is not the same as ap- the book provides a perspective of U.S.- peasement and should be rationally China relations using a 500-year survey considered. The withdrawal of U.S. of superpower relationships. Of the 16 troops from South Korea may be part of cases (16th-century Spain-Portugal to the an exchange for Chinese denuclearization current German rise), no less than 12 of of the North. With the 1963 U.S.–Soviet them ended in war. Allison ominously Union confrontation in mind, he realizes offers the case of the rivalry between any miscalculation producing an all-out pre–World War I Germany and Great nuclear war from Asia would be madness. Britain as the closest analogue to our cur- His next option would be to undermine Destined for War: Can rent global situation. Finally, he assesses the Chinese Communist leadership, America and China Escape that the United States must make radical which has a fragile hold on its 1.4 billion Thucydides's Trap? changes in its attitudes and actions if it is fellow citizens. The core Communist ide- not to follow the same path. His prescrip- ology is not compatible with increasing By Graham Allison tion involves a better understanding of demands for freedom, especially in areas Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017 the clash of civilizations that his colleague where non-Han Chinese populations 384 pp. $28.00 Samuel Huntington earlier outlined live. This confrontational U.S. option is ISBN: 978-0544935273 in his own seminal work. Importantly, problematic because many Chinese are Reviewed by James R. Cricks Allison calls for deeper reflection before sensitive to previous Western manipula- we “sleepwalk” into another 1914-like tion during a “century of humiliation.” catastrophe. Allison’s third option is to negotiate arvard sage Graham Allison has It is hard, but necessary, to critically a long peace similar to our arrangements chosen to focus his considerable evaluate Allison’s argument in spite of his with the former Soviet Union during H foreign policy expertise on the stellar reputation since John F. Kennedy’s the time of détente. The United States preeminent question of our age: how Cuban Missile Crisis. His impressive list- could link an end to its human rights can we avoid a future war between ing of colleagues can also create another litany to South China Sea concessions its two most powerful nations? This type of trap for readers easily awed by by the Chinese. Although there were book is a historically driven analysis Western academic credentials. Could advantages to this strategy when we faced of a topic he previously discussed in a this book be weakened by some intel- the Soviets, the Chinese have a patience prominent 2015 Atlantic article on the lectual arrogance as the author assembled that they can use to their advantage “Thucydides Trap.” In the classic work evidence from elite circles? He does not against the numerous U.S. administra- on the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides acknowledge any major knowledge gaps tions that Xi could face. His final option described the case of a disastrous con- that should be focused on during a U.S. is to redefine our relationship with China flict between a rising Athens and an “pause for reflection.” Xi Jinping and the and work together on such “mega- established Sparta that brought Greek current Chinese Communist Party lead- threats” such as climate change or global preeminence to a close. As a new U.S. ership are significant players, but so are terrorism. Presidents Xi and Barack administration grapples with a similar Jack Ma of corporate giant Alibaba and Obama began down this path with the relationship, Allison provides key other groups outside of Beijing. In the 2016 Paris Agreement but continued insights on the nature of the current last century, the United States focused cooperation does not appear likely as the problem while offering clues on how it on Chinese nationalist leader Chiang United States is now skeptical of many can be successfully managed. He asserts Kai-shek and missed other underlying global efforts. The recent “pivot” to the a U.S.-China war is not inevitable, but currents. Academic modesty may be in Asia-Pacific region was underwhelming conflict will continue to intensify as order as we struggle to better understand in execution, and few American strategy

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 101 documents are even read by senior mem- another work of military significance bers of the U.S. national security team. was published—The Prince by Niccolo Allison notes with hope that the Chinese Machiavelli. While this book did not leader is not irrationally nationalistic, al- deal with military deployment per se, lowing his daughter to attend Harvard its significance as one of the fundamen- and reap the benefits of international tal works on political-military relations cooperation among elites. Allison’s main has been widely acknowledged through caution is that our strategic dilemma re- the centuries. quires some major bilateral adjustment to On the one hand, both these works avoid an impending catastrophe. deserve our recognition as important key- This is an important book that stones in military history. On the other, strongly contributes to the body of their contributions to the phenomenon international relations work. Strategists of war were entirely different. While and military officers should read it the first had an instrumental and practi- carefully to better understand the high cal nature intended to solve problems stakes involved in this U.S.-China rivalry. in the context of 16th-century military George C. Marshall struggled with the technology and tactics, the second shaped Chinese relationship himself, especially as the philosophical understanding of why Secretary of Defense, even after person- states fight and how they should do it. ally knowing Mao Zedong and other Therefore, it is not surprising that while leaders in China. Marshall marveled at the military genius of the Counts of the complexity of the Chinese problem in Nassau is remembered only by a small 1950 and the challenge, including North G.S. Isserson and the War of circle of military historians, Machiavelli Korea, has not gotten any simpler today. the Future: Key Writings of maintains his position as one of the We no longer have Marshall or Lee Kuan a Soviet Military Theorist founders of modern political-military Yew to provide advice, so we are obli- thought. Translated and Edited by Richard W. gated to increase our own knowledge and Reading Dr. Richard Harrison’s Harrison empathy. Reading Destined for War is one translation G.S. Isserson and the War of McFarland, 2016 way to fulfill that obligation. JFQ the Future calls to mind the work of the 332 pp. $45.00 Counts of Nassau more than that of ISBN: 978-1476662367 Machiavelli. On the one hand, Isserson James R. Cricks is an Assistant Professor in Reviewed by Ofer Fridman truly deserves his place in the pantheon the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army of all great military thinkers, as one of the Command and General Staff College. most prominent developers and promot- n December 8, 1594, William ers of the concept of deep operations Louis of Nassau, one of the that proved itself so profoundly on the O commanders of the Dutch army, battlefields of World War II. Without sent a letter to his cousin, Maurice doubt, his concept of deep operations of Nassau, in which he suggested a was the European Countermarch of the new way to deploy musketeers on the 20th century that changed the way of war. battlefield that significantly increased On the other, Isserson is too practical and their rate of fire. He argued that six instrumental in solving the technological rotating ranks of musketeers could and tactical problems of his time, focus- produce a continuous hail of fire, ing on functional improvement of force keeping the enemy at bay. This “volley” deployment, rather than on the broader technique (known as the “European phenomenon of war or its evolution in Countermarch” today) soon became the 20th century. the standard way of force deployment Reading through Harrison’s selection in European armies. It was part of of six of Isserson’s works that comprises the emerging military revolution that the book, it is difficult to see their rel- changed not only the ways to conduct evance today or for the future of war. wars but also the geopolitical balance Thus, I do not share the enthusiasm in Europe and the general course of of retired Lieutenant General Paul K. history.1 In 1532, 62 years before this Van Riper’s foreword, which states that pivotal work of the Counts of Nassau, Isserson still has “much to offer for those

102 Book Reviews JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 involved in force development, that is, than contemporary relevance. Russian writing military concepts and doctrine military thought has its own Machiavellis, and designing future organizations” (p. Clausewitzs, and Jominis, who have 5). Indeed, it is easy to understand why been shaping the Russian way of war he finds Isserson’s claim—“the determi- for the last two centuries—Genrikh nation of the tasks of military operations Leer, Aleksandr Mikhnevich, Aleksandr corresponding to the political goals of Svechin, Evgeny Messner, and Makhmut war” (p. 4)—attractive, as at the time Gareev, just to name a few. Despite their when Isserson made this claim, the U.S. enormous potential to improve the Army’s textbook on strategy stated that American military understanding of the “politics and strategy are radically and Russian traditional approach to war, these fundamentally things apart.”2 However, works, unfortunately, have been generally Isserson’s work served as a practical solu- neglected by American military thinking. tion for the limitations created by the Van Riper is right about of the gaps that technology and tactics of the early 20th American military officers have in their century, without any attempt to reduce knowledge of the Russian military (p. 2), the significance of his work, but it seems but Isserson’s work is not the best one to that its relevance to military problems of start filling these gaps. JFQ the 21st century is similar to the relevance of Counts of Nassau and their volley technique to the battlefields of World Dr. Ofer Fridman is a Sessional Lecturer at the University of Reading and a Visiting Research War I. Fellow at King’s College London. He served for Moreover, the suggestion that 15 years in the Israel Defense Forces prior to embarking on an academic career. How Everything Became reading Isserson contributes to the un- War and the Military derstanding of the contemporary Russian Became Everything: Tales military approach is rather contestable. from the Pentagon Analyzing the works of contemporary Notes By Rosa Brooks Russian strategists on the phenomenon 1 Simon & Schuster, 2016 of war, such as Aleksandr Vladimirov, Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 448 pp. $29.95 Andrey Kokoshin, Vasilii Mikriukov, and 1500–1800, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge ISBN: 978-1476777863 others, is invaluable, but it is difficult to University Press, 2012), 18–24. find Isserson’s heritage in them. In other 2 Principles of Strategy for an Independent Reviewed by Tammy S. Schultz words, those American military scholars Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations (Fort who focus on Isserson’s work, which is Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1936), 19. steeped in the context of preparations for 3 T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On he reader of How Everything World War II, do it much more than their War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Became War and the Military Russian counterparts. Maybe Dr. T.X. Press, 2004). T Became Everything: Tales from Hammes was right after all, and the U.S. the Pentagon will cheer, groan, and military is still struggling to move away have core beliefs reinforced and chal- from its embrace of the third generation lenged—everything a good book of warfare with its massive force deploy- should do. Rosa Brooks argues that ments, armored maneuvers, and deep warfare is changing, the military is operations.3 Isserson’s manuals, so crucial taking on way too much, and U.S. for the effective deployment of massive national security is in peril as a result. forces in World War II, seem to shed little The book is especially timely given calls light on Russia’s military decisions in the for increased military spending while second decade of the 21st century. simultaneously drastically cutting State Overall skillfully translated and ed- Department and foreign aid funding. ited, this volume may deserve “a place Brooks, currently a professor at in any military professional’s library,” Georgetown Law School and a Senior as General Van Riper writes. However, Fellow at New America, served in the it should be placed on the same shelf Barack Obama administration. She with Jacob de Gheyn’s Arms Drill with also traversed the worlds of the State Arquebus, Musket and Pike, written in Department and nongovernmental 1607, for its historical significance rather organizations (NGOs). A well-respected

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 103 commentator on national security, or just some parts of international law? more appropriate ways and means for Brooks is uniquely positioned to trasn- Should new law be written, or does that many issues, from drones to cyber war- form what could be another tedious aggrandize these scourges upon the fare, we struggled to reconcile means and national security book into a page turner world? Should drone strikes continue ways with ends before. Nuclear weapons given her journalism background and to violate the sovereignty of states with are the most profound example. We just other experience. whom we supposedly are not at war, or have to have the moral courage to rec- Part memoir, part sounding an alarm take out U.S. citizens? What should be ognize the problem and work on better on the military’s ubiquitous role in the threshold of proof for a state to act answers. national security, Brooks deftly weaves preemptively? How can U.S. civilian and Clausewitz held that while warfare’s together research on warfare trends and military leaders learn to trust and respect grammar might be unique to policy, the Pentagon “there I was” policy fights. She each other enough to enter into these dif- logic is not. Brooks makes a compelling organizes the book into three sections: ficult conversations without immediately case for how war’s grammar is changing, the new American way of war, how we defaulting to entrenched, zero-sum posi- but in my opinion the policy logic still got here, and counting the cost. tions? These are all important questions holds. That said, civilian and military The first section covers her views that Washington needs to think much leaders who disregard her book’s argu- on the vast changes in the operational deeper about if we are to remain not only ments do so at their, and the nation’s, environment that have led to a new a global power, but also a unique one. peril. JFQ American way of war. Brooks covers a lot Brooks is a fantastic storyteller. Some of ground, but a few themes stand out. may believe that she jumps from topic When she discusses the “individualization to topic too quickly. For instance, she Dr. Tammy S. Schultz is Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of National Security and of war,” I recalled a conversation with a goes from Special Forces to contractors Joint Warfare at the U.S. Marine Corps War Marine Corps–level intelligence officer to overclassifying documents in a short College. more than 10 years ago. He commented span. But that critique entirely misses that other than historic bigwigs such as Brooks’s artistry. I believe she uses that Adolf Hitler and the like, he could not style to symbolize one of the book’s recall an entire Corps’ intelligence shop main points regarding our haphazard ap- focused on finding specific individuals, as proach. The military becomes the default was the case in Operation Iraqi Freedom. answer to any national security problem Brooks also discusses technology, such as absent other policies and civilian capabili- the ubiquity of drones, international law ties. The President, Congress, and the not keeping up with current challenges, American people would prefer to fund and ambiguity over traditional roles and the troops instead of civilian instruments missions. of power, even though a mindset change With the next section, Brooks jumps followed by true action could actually to history. Here the author employs save Servicemembers’ lives. more of her legal and NGO background I depart from Brooks on one of to show how the briar patch containing her main arguments—that war itself is national security thorns catching us today changing. First, Carl von Clausewitz’s was planted long ago. Brooks takes on most famous dictum states that “war is such subjects as warriors (and societies) policy by other means.” I once asked Dr. cleansing themselves before and after Eliot Cohen of the School of Advanced war; the laws of war (whatever “war” is), International Studies when Clausewitzian which are meant to put war “in a box”; principles would no longer apply to war- and state sovereignty issues, from wars in fare: War would have to cease to be about the state-making enterprise to interven- policy, he stated. I agree, and believe tion in failing states. we have not breached that fundamental Brooks finally tackles the costs for characteristic. these skewed lines in the third section. This leads to the second reason I am Even if all U.S. civilian and military not confident that war itself is changing. leaders are good people, which Brooks Brooks’s argument centers on warfare’s believes, she does not trust the rest of ways (policies, doctrine, concepts, the world, which makes the precedents and the like) and means (capabilities, we are setting troubling indeed. Should resources), not on the ends (goals) them- the United States follow international selves. So while she makes a compelling law in a fight against a nonstate actor, case that we have yet to truly develop

104 Book Reviews JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Amphibious assault ship USS America test-fires rolling airframe missile launcher to intercept remote- controlled drone during exercise to test ship’s defense capability (U.S. Navy/Demetrius Kennon)

Swarm drones could easily take on the appearance of the U.S Navy’s Low-Cost Robotic Swarms in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarming Technology (LOCUST),3 an inexpensive, fixed-wing platform that is individ- Offensive Maneuver ually tube-launched and autonomously joins a swarm once airborne. Alterna- By Jules Hurst tively, ground-based swarm combatants might resemble miniature tanks like the Estonian ADDER weaponized ground vehicle.4 For the purposes of this article, or many years, military scientists of horse archers of the Asian steppe though, assumptions need to be made. have contemplated the advent of against less flexible foes.2 Whatever the Future swarm combatants will likely be swarming tactics as an evolution source of inspiration, few authors move F severable into two broad categories: fire within maneuver warfare, and futurists beyond the abstract employment of support swarms and maneuver swarms. have contemplated the execution of the robotic swarms. To fully explore swarm Fire support swarm combatants will tactics by cooperative teams of semi- utility in fire and maneuver, swarms carry one-time-use warheads that are autonomous drones.1 These projections should be inserted into the tactical con- changed modularly to deal with a variety expound on strengths demonstrated cepts of today—chiefly, the five forms of targets (area, point, soft-skinned, by hive-minded organisms such as bees of offensive maneuver recognized under hardened, airborne, and others). These or ants, which work cooperatively to Army doctrine. kamikaze-styled drones could be airborne defeat larger invaders through non-hier- or ground-based. They might be capable archal communications. Other swarm Swarm Combatants of independently recognizing enemy theorists reference the deadly effective- Much of the reluctance to begin targets through image classification or ness of the ephemeral, loose formations theorizing about specific swarm tactics need assistance from human controllers. stems from the absence of a clear devel- They will likely be individually inexpen- opmental path in the technology. No sive compared to many modern weapons one knows what swarm combatants will Captain Jules “Jay” Hurst, USAR, previously of war, including the precision-guided served as the Operations Officer of the USSOCOM look like or what their capabilities will munitions they may replace. Fire support Analytic Innovation and Technology Unit and be, and many prototype pathways exist. Senior Intelligence Analyst of 1st Ranger Battalion. swarms probably will be initially deployed

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 105 Finally, robotic maneuver swarms may offer the best platform to execute reconnaissance pull tactics, a subset of Auftragstaktik or mission-type tactics.5 In recon pull, commanders order units to conduct reconnaissance along the length of the enemy front to determine where to mass forces for the battle’s decisive operation and attempt penetra- tions or envelopments. A swarm could be particularly effective at this because of its potential to collect big data in real time. Without pause, swarm combatants could relay situation reports faster than any squad leader on a radio. Every soldier may be a sensor, but each swarm combatant will be a sensor platform with an infallible memory.6 A shot fired by or at a swarm combatant provides a data point Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle designed to provide multiple surveillance, reconnaissance data, that, when aggregated, could help the and battlefield damage assessment missions launches from amphibious dock landing ship USS swarm (or human analysts and operators) Comstock, February 25, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Joseph M. Buliavac) determine the mass, density, and disposition of enemy forces along its front. With by conventional field artillery and air as- orbit the battlefield like flocks of angry proper processing, this swarm data could sets, but in the future, semi-autonomous birds. provide commanders with a visualization systems specifically designed for this Maneuver swarms will likely be of enemy activity on the battlefield in real purpose may take this mission from them. more durable than their fire support time and improve their cognitive ability Something akin to a mini–mobile mortar, counterparts and exercise greater coop- to perceive a battlefield filled with tens of self-propelled howitzer, high-flying drone eration with human combatants on the thousands of robots, human beings, and aircraft, or a “truck with rockets” could battlefield. Unlike fire support swarms, vehicles. autonomously move forward with ma- maneuver swarms will be persistent and Imagine the power of thousands of neuvering elements to deploy responsive capable of multiple uses. A maneuver drones gathering combat data in real time fire support swarms. swarm might resemble a microcosm of and the rapidity with which weak points Theoretically, fire support swarm the combined arms forces that have made in the enemy line could be calculated combatants will be less expensive than up militaries since the mid-20th century. and exploited with a robotic coup d’oeil. precision-guided munitions, capable of They will reflect the synergistic mix of ca- Then imagine how quickly these same targeting without human intervention pabilities found there, but they may field drones could concentrate in an attack on through object recognition and able to air and ground assets in drastically dif- these points. The potential for a trained loiter overhead until needed by maneuver ferent ratios than are common in today’s swarm to observe, orient, decide, and act forces. Their largest advantage will be nu- Brigade Combat Teams. faster than human combatants in this sce- merical. Modern air defense systems are Robotic maneuver swarms lack the nario is frightening.7 When swarms face not designed to intercept large quantities biggest inhibitor of human combatants— one another, the speed of the swarm’s of small projectiles, and current missile fear. This apathy to casualties would coup d’oeil—determined by algorithmic systems would be overwhelmed if tasked prevent them from having their maneuver efficiency and processing power—may with intercepting a fire support swarm restricted by enemy fires, and their ability decide the outcome of battles, and if consisting of dozens of munitions. to field large numbers of swarm combat- robots ever become the military’s primary Maneuver swarm drones will resemble ants offers them a resilience against losing maneuver arm, a force’s mobile comput- modern air forces and armies on a mi- combat effectiveness unknown to human ing capabilities may be a key component croscale. Miniature quadcopters armed combatants. Maneuver swarms consisting in evaluating its overall combat power. with light machine guns might act as at- largely of aerial robots would also pos- tack aviation platforms, and scaled-down sess the ability to compress into a space The Role of the Air Force infantry fighting vehicles will imitate unimaginable by ground-based maneuver and Naval Aviation modern armor and mechanized infantry. units because of their ability to stack ve- Air Force and Navy assets will play criti- Flights of fixed-wing swarms will provide hicles in the air at different altitudes. cal roles in the delivery, sustainment, persistent autonomous air support as they and cyber protection of drone swarms

106 Joint Doctrine / Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 on the land and in the sea and air, but article, maneuver swarms function under incapable of massing at a decisive point they will also have significant roles multi-Service control. with swiftness. Fire support swarms with in fielding and controlling maneuver Capability Assumptions. Autonomous straightforward attack missions may be swarms in land armies. Fixed-wing swarm technology only exists in nascent less reliant on intra-swarm communica- systems offer numerous advantages over stages, but to explore the use of swarms tions and should be less vulnerable to their rotary-wing counterparts in endur- in offensive forms of maneuver, we need electronic warfare. For this article, we as- ance, speed, and payload capacity due to make projections regarding their future sume that most future swarm combatants to efficiencies inherent in their aero- capabilities. will possess the means to communicate nautical design. Accordingly, fixed-wing Future swarm combatants will possess mid-battle, at least to the point where drones should make up a large portion sufficient artificial intelligence to oper- they will be able to intermittently com- of future maneuver and fire support ate semi-autonomously after receiving municate through burst communications swarms. Unless ceded to the Army, initial guidance from human operators. or while in close proximity to each other. these armed, robotic fixed-wing plat- Maneuver or fire support swarms should Both maneuver and fire support forms will be controlled by Air Force or be able to process tasks of the following swarms will be vulnerable to cyber attacks naval aviation, necessitating that both complexity without human control: by state and nonstate actors. The cyber Services further integrate their mission components of every Service will need command of these swarms directly with Attack all adult males within a 500-meter to make considerable effort to minimize land forces. radius of given center point until depleted vulnerabilities of friendly swarms and Currently, the Air Force sees maneu- of ammunition. Return to rally point X exploit those of the enemy. To decrease vering airpower as a way of adding flanks at that time OR travel to this geographic the likelihood of a single software or outside of horizontal battle, but the field- coordinate, count all individuals possibly hardware vulnerability, the Armed Forces ing of large swarms of fixed-wing drones identified as adult males for the next four will need to avoid overstandardization will expand the Air Force definition to hours, relay that data in real time, then of software within swarms, which will include features of Army and Marine return to coordinate X OR conduct a complicate system interoperability. The Corps concepts of maneuver.8 Unlike reconnaissance in force along a pre-deter- cyber battles that enable the kinetic use of historical aircraft, fixed-wing maneuver mined route, deviations are authorized if swarm combatants will consist of system swarms will have the persistence to take the route becomes impassable. Self-defense administrators and information assurance and hold terrain, allowing air forces to authorized if engaged. officers updating software patches before execute maneuvers in combat analo- enemy forces can identify exploitation gous to their land force brethren. Large Because of their ability to com- pathways in older versions, while friendly swarms of unmanned aircraft will be able municate with other members of the forces attempt to do the same to adver- to orbit for hours, if not days, at a time, swarm while performing other tasks (for saries. Encryption and the rapid updating raining munitions down on their foes like example, fighting or moving) without of cryptography will be another struggle. Mongol horse archers circling in front of distraction, maneuver and fire support Communications officers across the joint (or above) enemy battle lines.9 Aircraft swarms should be able to change forma- force may need to update cryptographic losses from ground fire may be high but tions or dispositions faster than human keys multiple times a day to preserve in- acceptable because swarm combatants combatants and exploit this advantage formation assurance. will maintain low per-unit production on the battlefield. Their ability to ignore Swarm combatants will be deploy- costs and not endanger pilots—one of the psychological effects of incoming fire able into combat from diverse platforms, the most expensive combat occupations makes this advantage even greater. including but not limited to airdrops, to train. Swarm endurance will grow with artillery projectiles, cruise missiles, Like modern Air Force combat time, but for now let us assume that conventional aircraft, and other ground- controllers, the Air Force and Navy swarm combatants possess satisfactory based motherships. personnel who control these fixed-wing power to sustain operations independent Deploying armed swarms on the bat- maneuver swarms will need to integrate of human support for 12 to 24 hours tlefield could easily pose risks to human into maneuver formations, and Air Force depending on the intensity of tasks. combatants on both sides. Fratricide is a and naval doctrine will change to accom- Charging stations, situation dependent, real risk, especially considering the early modate their new role in land warfare. may be deployable to extend their endur- state of robotic object recognition. To Additionally, the required interoper- ance mid-combat. combat this, both maneuver and fire ability of automated systems between the Among the hurdles to the success support swarms will likely have a number automated and unmanned components of swarm technology are secure com- of fire support control measures built into of different Services will necessitate stan- munications. Without intra-swarm their programming prior to employment. dardization and joint testing beyond that communications, maneuver swarms These control measures may be geo- of most 20th-century weapons systems. would become the equivalent of a graphic (only target enemy personnel in In the scenarios in the later part of this human-wave attack—deadly in scale but this geographic bounding box), temporal

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 107 Figure 1. Swarm Infiltration via Cruise Missile the Viet Cong famously led thousands A mixture of Fire Support Swarms and Aerial/Ground Maneuver Swarms are deployed through of North Vietnamese army units into the air-launched cruise missiles to seize bridges and block enemy forces from threatening a future South in small groups before launching amphibious assault on this coastline. the Tet Offensive.13 In another example, American and British forces boldly airdropped behind German defensive works in Normandy to seize key bridges and intersections prior to the main assault on the morning of June 6, 1944.14 While airborne forces still offer attractive infiltration options, maneuver swarms will likely be deployable more quickly due to the speed of potential transportation options available. Today, Tomahawk land attack missiles can precisely deploy 166 submunitions from a range of over 1,000 kilometers, traveling at a speed of 550 miles per hour.15 Envision a flotilla of U.S. destroyers launching salvos of these same missiles carrying dozens of maneuver or fire support swarm combatants to seize key terrain prior to an amphibi- (do not engage targets after 1200 zulu), swarm vehicles will be built specifically for ous, airborne, or air assault. These same or beacon-based (do not attack individu- identified missions, and others will pos- capabilities could be used to quickly als or vehicles broadcasting or carrying sess weapon and sensor modularity that surprise an enemy force mid-battle by X; a similar concept is displayed in the allow them to adapt to multifunctional suddenly creating a hostile force in the movie Screamers, where soldiers wear a roles across different combat theaters. enemy rear. And unlike airborne infiltra- beacon to avoid being targeted by blade- Most important, as semi-autonomous tion or forcible entry operations, a swarm wielding robots who roam the planet10). technology proliferates, commanders will transported via sub- or supersonic missile A redundant approach is likely and need swarm vehicles capable of engag- would lack the observable indicators of recommended. ing traditional maneuver units and other a large airborne operation—creation of Though deadly, swarm combatants swarms. an air corridor, massing of transporta- will be just another tool in the joint force tion aircraft—and would reduce the risk commander’s toolbox. Conventional Forms of Offensive Maneuver to brigades, regiments, or divisions of forces will still largely consist of human According to U.S. Army Field Manual human combatants. combatants and manned vehicles for 3-90, Tactics, there are five kinds of That being said, swarm infiltrations at least the next two decades, but the maneuver used in offensive operations: would likely need human support to role of robotic combatants will grow in infiltration, penetration, frontal attacks, achieve any kind of endurance on the parallel with their capabilities. One day, envelopments, and turning move- ground. Small numbers of human para- semi-autonomous systems may compose ments.11 Each offers an opportunity troopers might accompany swarms into the majority of combatants on the battle- to gain utility from robotic swarms in combat as controllers, maintainers, and field. Still, swarms will not be omnipotent. its own way. In the next section, we installers of charging stations. To hold Weapons carried by infantrymen, manned explain each of these forms of maneu- terrain for any length of time, maneuver fighter aircraft, and ships will adapt to the ver, provide historic examples of the and fire support swarms would need a arrival of swarm combatants just like they movement, and describe a hypothetical means of refueling behind enemy lines, did to tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and use for a robotic swarm inside that type potentially through air-dropped solar submarines. of maneuver. power stations, petroleum generators, or Commanders will need variety in their Infiltration. A favorite of light forces precharged batteries. Swarms would also swarm vehicles to effectively accomplish and insurgents, in an infiltration, ele- be unable to handle more complex tasks, their missions. Swarm combatants may ments of the offensive force slip behind such as the neutralization of explosively vary in cost from a few hundred dollars or through enemy lines to seize advanta- rigged bridges or the clearing of obstacles; (for disposable fire support munitions) geous terrain in the enemy’s rear or to sow after seizing objectives in Normandy, U.S. to hundreds of thousands (for persistent confusion before the main assault.12 They and British paratroopers often had to strip combatants), all depending on their can also be used to interfere with the ene- charges from infrastructure designed to purpose and desired durability. Some my’s ability to conduct resupply. In 1968, deny invading Allied forces its use.

108 Joint Doctrine / Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Penetration. Penetration attacks are Figure 2. Swarm Penetration offensive maneuvers that utilize attacks along a narrow front to pierce enemy lines and defensive systems. Once penetration is achieved, forces can either Enemy Line Enemy Line Enemy Line Enemy Line drive forward to an objective behind Enemy Line enemy lines or attack the undefended flanks created by the division of enemy Enemy Line defenses. Penetration movements are often used when flanks are unassailable or well defended or when commanders lack A dispersed Maneuver Swarm conducts Once the gap is identified, the Maneuver After destroying the enemy force in 16 reconnaissance in force across the enemy Swarm masses against it and begins front of them, drones fan out to screen the time to attempt other maneuvers. front and identifies a gap in the enemy penetration. A fire Support Swarm begins the mechanized infantry element defenses by continuously gathering data conducting bombardment in extremely close exploiting their breakthrough. Penetration attacks may also be launched and analyzing strength across different proximity to friendly forces. Human elements enemy sectors. fix the enemy in place and prepare to exploit to take advantage of a prominent weak- the breach. ness in enemy defenses. Armies have used penetration tactics since the dawn of Source: U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics (Washington, DC Headuarters Department of warfare. Germanic warriors employed the the Army, July 2001). boar’s head formation to pierce enemy shield walls during the Dark Ages, and medieval knights brought the maneu- the enemy line was identified, maneuver faster than human combatants in similar ver into the Middle Ages.17 In a more swarms would silently consolidate and situations, allowing it to surreptitiously modern example, British Field Marshal mass against it. As they began their as- overwhelm opponents by massing at an Bernard Montgomery successfully used sault, a fire support swarm could further unexpected point. Frontal assaults, de- an armored penetrating attack to win degrade defenses in the area, taking the pending on the complexity of terrain and an Allied victory at the Second Battle of place of an artillery bombardment, and the swarm deployment technology used, Alamein in World War II.18 permit a rolling barrage of precision can make poor use of these attributes. But, Successful penetration attacks often indirect fire support with previously as described, the ability of swarm combat- use extensive indirect fire to weaken inconceivable speed and proximity to ants to gather and simultaneously transmit enemy defenses or to pin enemy elements advancing forces—robots do not fear information to the joint force commander in place to prevent them from assisting the fratricide. Once an initial penetration will make them highly useful as scouts and section of the enemy line targeted for pen- is achieved, human mechanized forces as fixing forces. Because commanders will etration. Prior to the Old Guard’s failed could exploit the breakthrough and drive not be as concerned with swarm casualties, penetrating attack at Waterloo, Napoleon the attack onward toward objectives in they will eagerly commit them to these massed his artillery to weaken the British the enemy’s rear or exploit the newly cre- tasks. And because swarms lack fear and defenses, but the use of a reverse-slope de- ated disruption in enemy defenses. cannot be psychologically pinned down, fense and the arrival of the Prussian army Frontal Attack. Likely used since they will execute them with unrivaled prevented the maneuver’s success.19 combat took on a modicum of organiza- quickness and commitment. In a penetration attack using swarms, tion, frontal attacks are among the oldest Consider this scenario: Two light maneuver and fire support swarms could forms of maneuver. Commanders use infantry forces of equal size stumble upon work in unison to identify and exploit frontal attacks when they possess over- one another in a meeting engagement. a weakened section of enemy defenses. whelming combat power relative to the One side deploys several dozen maneuver Using the robotic coup d’oeil described, enemy to fix hostile forces in place, to swarm combatants from a mothership maneuver swarms could deploy along the destroy a breaking enemy, or to conduct vehicle and pushes them forward in a length of the enemy front as skirmishers a reconnaissance in force.20 At the Battle frontal assault to contain the enemy force and gather data on the composition and of Bunker Hill, for instance, British forces and permit human elements to maneuver. disposition of enemy forces they encoun- sustained over 1,000 casualties conduct- These swarm combatants may all be deter. Far behind the frontline, a cluster ing a series of frontal attacks against stroyed, but if they give the light infantry computer, a series of them, or the com- fortified colonial militiamen defending force the opportunity to maneuver on puting power of the swarm itself could the hill outside of Boston.21 Many a a similar-sized force with less risk, they aggregate the swarm’s observations and commander has planned extravagant ma- have served their role. Maneuver and fire identify enemy weakness by examining neuvers prior to battle, only for a souring support swarms will provide command- how many swarm skirmishers were lost in situation to force him into a frontal battle ers with the option to trade robot lives each sector, how fast swarm combatants of attrition with his foes. for space and time and will encourage were expending ammunition, and other The strength of a robotic swarm lies aggressive tactics that might give com- observables. Once the weakest sector of in its ability to communicate and move manders ordering human soldiers pause.

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 109 Figure 3. Frontal Attac to Fix in Place could again make use of their ability to gather large amounts of data to conduct reconnaissance and send back data that aid human analysts in determining where the enemy flank begins and what, if any, forces are protecting it. Even more frightening, maneuver swarms could be easily deployed by projectile to effect a vertical envelopment of a retreating enemy force and disrupt it sufficiently to allow the pursuing army to destroy it. Turning Movement. In a turning A meeting engagement occurs between two A swarm mothership occupies the center of the friendly element similarly sized infantry elements. and releases a portion of its swarm. The Maneuver Swarm movement, the offensive force avoids moves forward while the rearmost infantry element begins a Both sides close to fix each other in place. flanking maneuver against the enemy position. the enemy’s principal defenses and seizes objectives behind the enemy lines with Source: FM 3-90, Tactics. the goal of forcing the enemy to respond by displacing from its current position Figure 4. Maneuver Swarm Conducts Envelopment in whole or in part. Turning movements are often used to force enemy units off advantageous terrain through the seizure of populated areas or supply lines critical to the enemy army.25 James Longstreet famously advocated for Robert E. Lee to execute a turning movement prior to becoming decisively engaged at Gettysburg in July 1863.26 Longstreet hoped to place the Confederate army between George Meade and Washington, DC, forcing the Union Army into a costly attack. Infantry, with artillery support, closes in on an enemy formation. As the elements close on one another, the artillery deploys a Maneuver Swarm of air and ground combatants on the right Another well-known example is Douglas flank of an enemy infantry unit. MacArthur’s amphibious landing at Source: FM 3-90, Tactics. Inchon, which severed North Korean lines of communication and sent the Communist forces back north.27 Envelopment. Envelopments send At their core, successful envelopments Swarm combatants would likely best the attacking force around prominent require three things: a mobility advantage serve a ground commander as a screening enemy defenses to seize objectives in over an adversary, an informational ad- force, not as the element conducting the the enemy rear or to attack an assailable vantage (the location of an assailable flank turning movement itself. The swarm’s flank. They come in several forms: single must be identified), and strong com- inability to conduct self-sustainment envelopments, double envelopments, munications between the enveloping and would make it a poor choice. Without encirclements, and vertical envelop- fixing force. Robotic swarms may provide human support, maneuver swarms would ments. All forms avoid the enemy’s front, joint force commanders an edge in all not be able to sustain a hostile presence where he possesses the greatest ability three. As described in the infiltration sec- in the enemy’s rear long enough to truly to place fires.22 The classic example of tion, maneuver and fire support swarms threaten enemy lines of communication. a successful double envelopment and will be deployable at near-supersonic Instead, maneuver and fire support ultimately, an encirclement, is Hannibal’s speeds from hundreds of miles away. If swarms could be placed between the victory over Roman legions at the Battle tactical intelligence, surveillance, and enemy body and the friendly element of Cannae in 216 BCE.23 The ultimate reconnaissance assets could effectively conducting the turning movement. American example is General Robert E. identify the end of an enemy’s flank, a The mechanized and aerial mobility of Lee’s sweeping envelopment of General commander could request the expedited individual swarm combatants would not Joseph Hooker’s flank at the Battle of deployment of swarm combatants on only allow them to cover wide swathes Chancellorsville, a daring tactical maneu- that flank within minutes from cruise of terrain but also quickly consolidate to ver that secured the legend of Stonewall missiles or airdrops, granting tremendous counter any enemy attempt to concentrate Jackson and Lee in the American military tactical surprise. In addition to their de- against the turning force as it exposes its consciousness.24 ployment advantage, swarm combatants vulnerable flank to the main enemy force.

110 Joint Doctrine / Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Technology Drives Tactics Figure 5. Maneuver Swarm Screens During Turning Movement Ultimately, the technological limitations and advantages of maneuver swarms and Turning Force Turning Force fire support swarms will determine their OBJ OBJ uses in offensive maneuver and, more broadly, the tactics of employing them as a whole. Like all groundbreaking Enemy Line Enemy Line technologies—the tank, aircraft carrier, and submarine, among others—the Swarm Screen masses to thwart effectiveness of swarm combatants will enemy attack Swarm Screen Main Body Main Body increase in accordance with matura- tion in the technology and warfighter A body of mechanized infantry executes a In the event the enemy notices the turning turning movement using a dispersed forces attempt to slip past its lines, the comfort with its use. U.S. officers and Maneuver Swarm as a screening force to Maneuver Swarm senses the enemy obscure the movement and provide security consolidation and masses to perform a noncommissioned officers can accelerate to their vulnerable flanks as they move delaying action to shield the column. that comfort by beginning to postulate toward the rear-ward objective. about the use of swarms well before Source: FM 3-90, Tactics. they hit the battlefield. In the vein of aviation visionaries Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet, members of the Depart- successfully-tested-the-first-weaponized-fully- battle-tactics-boar-formation/>. 18 ment of Defense must look forward 10, modular-unmanned-ground-vehicle.html>. Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three 5 Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Battles of El Alamein (New York: Overlook, 20, or even 30 years to when artificial Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle 2006). intelligence allows the deployment of (New York: Presidio Press, 1991), 114. 19 David Howarth, Waterloo: A Near Run swarm combatants on a regular basis. 6 Stew Magnuson, “Army Wants to Make Thing (New York: Phoenix, 2003). It will take years of field maneuvers Every Soldier a Sensor,” National Defense 20 FM 3-90, 3-30. 21 to perfect the employment of swarms Magazine, May 2007, available at . 2014). during these exercises may be shattered 7 John R. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” De- 22 FM 3-90, 3-12. during the first few hours of war. Even cember 1986, available at . thage-Rome,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 8 must adopt a venture capital mindset Jeff Becker and Todd Zwolensky, “Making December 23, 2014, available at . and accept many failures for the few Views on Maneuver,” War on the Rocks, July 24 Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville (New novel ideas that may produce game- 3, 2014, available at . 26 “America’s Civil War: Robert E. Lee 9 soon, but the type of units and their Kacey Deamer, “Two Days Aloft: ‘Vanilla’ and James Longstreet at Odds at Gettysburg,” Drone Breaks Endurance Record,” Live Sci- HistoryNet, June 12, 2006, available at . htm>. 10 Screamers, directed by Christian Duguay 27 David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: Notes (Culver City, CA: Sony Pictures, 1996). America and the Korean War (New York: 11 Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics (Wash- Hyperion, 2008). ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the 1 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Army, July 1, 2001), 2-2. Swarming and the Future of Combat (Santa 12 Ibid., 3-19. Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). 13 James H. Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A 2 Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Concise History (New York: Columbia, 2008). Future of Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 14 Stephen E. Ambrose, Band of Brothers: E 2005). Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from 3 Eric Limer, “Watch the Navy’s LOCUST Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest (New York: Launcher Fire Off a Swarm of Autonomous Simon & Schuster, 2001). Drones,” Popular Mechanics, May 24, 2016, 15 “Tomahawk Cruise Missile: United States available at . asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2>. 4 “Estonian Defence Forces Successfully 16 FM 3-90, 3-25. Tested the First Weaponized Fully Modular 17 Njord Kane, “Viking Battle Tactics: The Unmanned Ground Vehicle,” Defense Blog, Boar Formation,” Spangenhelm, June 23, 2016, December 3, 2016, available at

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Hurst 111 After continuous rains caused serious flooding in Haiti’s north, government agencies supported by UN mission in Haiti and World Food Program responded with evacuations, temporary shelters, and food and supplies distributions, November 11, 2014 (Courtesy UN/Logan Abassi)

The U.S. Government’s Approach to Food Security Focus on Campaign Activities

By George E. Katsos

hairman of the Joint Chiefs of critical information and resources. Per seven dimensions, one of which is food Staff General Joseph F. Dunford, his direction, the joint force continues security. 2 Complementing an initial C Jr., stresses the importance of to inquire about and examine the installment on health security also effective cooperation with nonmilitary nuances between organizational work- published in Joint Force Quarterly, this organizations to promote a common force cultures and methodologies. One article addresses the U.S. Government’s operational framework and allocate area where military and nonmilitary approach to food security with a focus workforce approaches differ is security. on combatant command campaign This article focuses on an aspect of activities.3 security known in international circles Food security is inextricably linked Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR, is the and endorsed by the United Nations to national, regional, and international Department of Defense Terminologist on the 1 4 Joint Staff and a Deputy Director of Civil-Military (UN) as human security. Threats to stability. It involves food availability and Training for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. human security can be categorized in access based on purchase, agricultural

112 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government and Food Security JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 practices, and systems of distribution.5 on food availability, access, utilization, agricultural trade development that also Nations and international organizations and stability.9 For our discussion, food supports organizations such as the UN such as the United States and the UN security refers to all of the above includ- World Food Program. continue to develop policies and deploy ing plant, animal, and processed food In 1961, Congress passed the Foreign workforces to prepare for, respond to, safety and defense from contamination by Assistance Act to better assist partner na- and even prevent threats to food security. human intention (for example, agroter- tions with security challenges. This law As domestic approaches mature and rorism) and nonhuman progression (such created the U.S. Agency for International international demands for food secu- as invasive species).10 This analysis, based Development (USAID), which carries rity expand, U.S. military involvement on research and informal discussions, is out U.S. global food policy implementa- in support of increased national food categorized into four sections: the his- tion and coordination.15 Subsequently, security objectives should be expected. tory of U.S. policy in conjunction with U.S. Government international policy Although food security is not an inher- international initiatives, executive branch began to shift from donating surplus food ent Department of Defense (DOD) strategy and activities, military campaign to emergency response and long-term function for civilian populations, it is an activities, and recommendations for agricultural development. Since then, objective of U.S. Government strategic strengthening food security efforts. food security–related legislation steadily competition.6 Without food security, increased domestic food security and political, economic, or social stability can Legislative Actions and food resilience capability development in deteriorate, leading to increased requests International Engagement foreign nations. Certain initiatives include for U.S. military assistance. Additionally, U.S. legislative history and interna- the Food for Progress Act (the latest U.S. Government workforce deploy- tional agreements capture methods that Farm Bill),16 the Feed the Future (FTF) ments that counter nontraditional threats address modern food security concerns. Initiative,17 the Food for Peace Act,18 the (such as those to any dimension of U.S. Government international food Global Food Security Act,19 and relevant human security) can easily increase costs aid can be traced back to an 1812 public health and agricultural bioterror- beyond those of conventional war. While earthquake in South America when ism acts.20 To better understand U.S. trends of conflict and instability (for Washington donated shipments of flour Government organizations that imple- example, human displacement, disease, to Venezuela just weeks before declaring ment food security efforts, the following hunger, and famine) may impact food war with England.11 Twenty-five years section examines components of the security, neglect of food security efforts later, a food and agricultural office was executive branch. can result in limited food access, reduced lodged within the Department of State safety, less defense, and reduced agricul- that eventually moved to the Depart- The Executive Branch tural development, thus impacting overall ment of the Interior.12 During the One document that links executive political stability, human security, and the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln policy to governmental activities is global economy. In other words, food se- established the U.S. Department of a national strategy. The President’s curity is crucial to U.S. national security. Agriculture (USDA) to assist those who National Security Strategy articulates To understand the nuances of food produced food and owned land that policy goals that are connected to security, definitions and descriptions are developed food.13 objectives that expressly describe or presented from both governmental and In the 20th century between the world imply food security approaches.21 In nongovernmental organizational docu- wars, legislation focused on domestic food support, the U.S. Government Global mentation. One U.S. Government report and agriculture that is now couched in a Food Security Strategy links food describes food security as both food present-day quadrennial law known as the security departmental objectives to aid (in-kind food donations) and food U.S. Farm Bill. At the end of World War National Security Strategy objectives.22 assistance (in-kind donations and cash II, food security became a necessity for As a result, food security roles within transfers for purchasing food from local the international community to maintain the executive branch become further economies) that also includes support- postwar regional stability. In support of defined. The President also articulates ing economic development projects and this goal, the UN Food and Agriculture policy through executive orders on nutrition programs.7 U.S. Code defines Organization was born out of a decade- national security matters via Presidential food security as access by all people at all old International Institute of Agriculture directives. Over the last 15 years, the times to sufficient food and nutrition for to defeat hunger. In 1949, the United following directives set conditions for a healthy and productive life.8 The UN States became a signatory to a set of in- impacting food security and strategy defines food security as a condition that ternational treaties known as the Geneva development. In 2004, President exists when all people, at all times, have Conventions and Protocols, the fourth George W. Bush issued the directives physical, social, and economic access to of which addressed occupying power re- Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food, sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to sponsibilities to provide population food focusing on food security preparedness, meet their dietary needs and food prefer- aid.14 A few years later, Congress enacted and Biodefense for the 21st Century, to ences for an active and healthy life based legislation on surplus food donation and address food contamination threats.23

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Katsos 113 Table. U.S. Agency for International Development and United Nations Sectors USAID coordinates and integrates long- term economic development expertise USAID Humanitarian Sectors UN Cluster Sector System and resources. Additionally, the USAID Agriculture and Food Security Food Security administrator serves as the govern- Economic Recovery and Market Systems Early Recovery ment’s de facto Global Food Security Health Health Coordinator for the purposes of align- Humanitarian Coordination and Information Camp Coordination and Camp Management ing and coordinating FTF with other Management U.S. Government food security–related Humanitarian Studies, Analysis, or Applications Education programs and policies. Under the FTF Logistics and Relief Commodities Logistics program, USAID leads security and sustainment of food and agriculture Nutrition Nutrition development activities as well as ad- Protection Protection ministration of certain Food for Peace Natural and Technological Risks Emergency Telecommunication assistance programs.34 Moreover, USAID Shelter and Settlements Emergency Shelter implements Global Food Security Act Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sanitation, Water, Hygiene efforts via the Global Food Security Strategy to ensure that government resources are aligned to achieve national In 2010, President Barack Obama Diplomacy and Development Review and objectives.35 For international disasters issued the U.S. Global Development the Department of State and USAID and crisis situations, State arranges U.S. Policy, which emphasized food security Joint Strategic Plan.28 For purposes emergency and early recovery assistance through FTF.24 The following year, the of this discussion, USAID, which that is managed by USAID across 11 or- President issued National Preparedness, coordinates and integrates economic ganizational sectors that closely resemble replacing a previous directive to better development and disaster assistance the UN Cluster system (see table).36 synchronize whole-of-government expertise and resources abroad, is cat- The Agriculture and Food Security responses to threats that include food egorized as an entity under State, as humanitarian sector that closely mirrors security. He also approved Implementa- they both report to the same Cabinet UN Food and Agriculture Organization tion of the National Strategy for Coun- Secretary.29 efforts within the UN Food Security tering Biological Threats in support of State conducts diplomacy that results Cluster is administered by the USAID President Bush’s biodefense directives.25 in foreign aid or assistance (for example, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Relief Moreover, Critical Infrastructure Resil- security, humanitarian, development) Assistance through coordination and ience revoked a previous directive that to other nations. As the lead for U.S. integration of disaster assistance expertise replaced another and identified sectors Government security sector assistance, and resources. Other efforts, such as the such as food and agriculture.26 The State leads policies, programs, and ac- Famine Early Warning Systems Network, directive U.S. Security Sector Assistance tivities to engage with, help build and track and forecast potential famines world- was issued to build capabilities of part- sustain the capacity of, and enable foreign wide and aid in prepositioning food in ners and allies in addressing common partners to contribute to efforts that ad- preparation for the deluge of refugees.37 security issues.27 Focusing on depart- dress their common security challenges, USDA supports U.S. Government ments with Presidentially appointed including food security.30 Under security food security objectives through Secretaries that implement U.S. Gov- assistance programs, State’s Economic governance of issues relating to food, ernment policy, the following overviews Support Fund grants that focus on the agriculture, natural resources, rural de- capture individual department global poor provide programs for primary ag- velopment, and nutrition.38 With offices and domestic food security efforts in ricultural needs.31 In conjunction with at over 90 U.S. Embassies, USDA has a three cascading categories: significant, DOD security teams, State leads joint long institutional history of cooperating additional, and remaining. mission Provincial Reconstruction Teams with other countries to achieve their food Significant Efforts. The State and in Afghanistan to advance local agricul- security goals. In support of the Global Agriculture departments play significant tural capacity development.32 The State’s Food Security Strategy and other efforts, roles in achieving global food security Office of Global Food Security also leads USDA uses cooperative approaches to objectives. State manages foreign affairs diplomatic engagement on U.S. food animal health, crop diseases, food safety, for the President and recently prioritized security and nutrition policy in bilateral nutrition, and natural resource manage- food security as an issue of national and multilateral assistance forums.33 For ment that can reinforce and strengthen security. Two strategic documents that domestic response, State manages international capabilities. Countries in turn provide organizational guidance on food national contributions of support. can participate in international markets, assistance, nutrition, and agricultural and While State leads engagement for thus expanding the demand for U.S. rural development are the Quadrennial U.S. Government food-related initiatives, agricultural products and enhancing

114 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government and Food Security JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Sailors aboard aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan provide humanitarian assistance to Japan as directed in support of Operation Tomodachi, March 15, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Michael Feddersen)

global food security.39 Under Food for agriculture, forestry, and food guid- countermeasure employment against the Peace, USDA implements international ance.42 With its largest focus on food and intentional introduction of diseases and nutrition, development, and research col- nutrition service programs, USDA-led biological threats to food supplies.45 laboration programs through its Foreign activities assist farmers and food produc- The Department of Commerce’s Agriculture Service.40 ers with the sale of crops and food and strategic food objectives focus on fos- With other organizations, USDA help the United States supply high- tering healthy and sustainable marine assists in food security efforts through quality food to the world.43 In support resources such as fish stocks, habitats, and agricultural advisor deployments of crisis response, USDA is delegated to ecosystems.46 Its National Oceanic and to DOD- or State-led Provincial be the lead coordinator for Emergency Atmospheric Administration provides Reconstruction Teams, research pro- Support Function 11, Agriculture and access to comprehensive oceanic, atmo- grams, information-sharing, policy and Natural Resources, by the Department spheric, and geophysical data and offers regulation promotions that expand of Homeland Security (DHS) in the capacity-building assistance through im- agricultural markets and trade, and National Response Framework.44 proved weather forecasting, drought early leadership to multilateral food security Additional Efforts. Other depart- warning systems, and climate change initiatives (for example, the Global Open ments make substantial contributions to resilience and adaptation.47 Furthermore, Data for Agriculture and Nutrition U.S. Government global food security its International Trade Administration initiative, Global Alliance for Climate efforts. For example, DHS provides do- ensures fair trade of agricultural Smart Agriculture, Committee on World mestic security and coordinates Federal commodities. Food Security, and G20 Meeting of crisis response and recovery through its DOD supports food security efforts Agricultural Chief Scientists).41 Federal Emergency Management Agency. primarily through its military workforce. Both at home and abroad, the USDA DHS also supports food security efforts For international and domestic requests, Animal and Plant Health Inspection through activities such as cross-border the sheer size, budget, and ready capa- Service protects animal and plant protection at U.S. airports and seaports, bilities of DOD make it an attractive health from invasive pests and diseases. agricultural and food sector awareness candidate for food security requests Domestically, USDA develops and ex- and warning, vulnerability assessment, in support of government efforts.48 ecutes Federal laws related to farming, mitigation of screening procedures, and In support of U.S. capacity-building

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Katsos 115 More than 3,000 internally displaced persons sheltered inside UN Mission in Darfur base in Khor Abeche, South Darfur, following attack by armed group on March 22, 2014 (Courtesy UN/Albert Gonzalez Farran) activities abroad, DOD contributes to safety and security of national food sup- Protection Agency enacts laws to protect engagement and prevention programs plies, and detect foodborne illnesses to the food supply from waste and chemicals. and surveillance and response systems, as protect the U.S. food supply from bioter- As U.S. Government departments well as raising awareness and developing rorism or agroterrorism.51 continue to develop their own strate- missions that incorporate risks posed by The Treasury Department funds gies in support of national food security current and projected climate variations food security programs (for example, objectives, the future is uncertain on how into planning, resource requirements, the World Bank and Global Agriculture they will plan for a robust international and operations considerations.49 DOD and Food Security Program), relieves or workforce response, especially to food also provides defense support to civil enforces sanctions, and supports ecosystems disruption or complete collapse. authorities through research, preparation, nomic growth and poverty reduction by Currently, USAID-led foreign disaster surveillance, and response efforts. overseeing U.S. Government efforts with relief is effective for routine disasters, but The Department of Health and international financial institutions.52 coordinated U.S. food-related assistance Human Services emphasizes infor- Remaining Efforts. Other depart- is still needed in environments impacted mation-sharing, disease surveillance, ments maintain capabilities that address by catastrophic events with cascading and laboratory research to diagnose, domestic food security concerns but effects on critical public infrastructure.54 prevent, and control the spread of have minimal equity in support of global Climate and demographic changes will disease that impacts food safety.50 Via food security efforts. The Department also place a larger burden and expecta- certain components (Centers for Disease of the Interior develops surveillance and tions on U.S. Government departments, Control and Prevention, Food and Drug monitoring systems and tracks commodi- more specifically DOD, regarding Administration, and U.S. Public Health ties related to food security, while the transport and security capabilities. For Service), Health and Human Services Department of Justice enforces Federal interoperability and educational reasons, supports responses to investigate, improve consumer protection laws.53 It is also non-DOD organizations should keep a surveillance, mitigate consequences, assure worth noting that the Environmental watchful eye on how they are portrayed

116 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government and Food Security JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 by the U.S. military in joint doctrine— and, most importantly, the local human agreements, military investments are in the core foundation of military workforce and agricultural environment. For ex- the form of engagement, cooperation, best practices.55 ample, in the last 15 years, U.S. Central and deterrence activities that promote Command (USCENTCOM) and coali- long-term regional stability through civil- Military Campaign Activities tion forces that deployed to rural areas ian and military capacity-building efforts. Food security can be debilitated by in Afghanistan found themselves either These campaign activities are meant to political, economic, and social elements directly or indirectly in contact with food manage internal threats and eventually of conflict such as weak governance, and agricultural issues. While roughly 80 encourage security-recipient nations food price volatility, and poor food dis- percent of Afghans rely on agriculture to to become security providers. Limited tribution systems. These elements can provide income and food for their fami- deployments such as crisis response and lead to long-term disruption of national lies, decades of conflict have continuously contingencies meet defined requirements food systems (growing, harvesting, interrupted the traditional interfamilial rather than promote broad, open-ended, packing, processing, transforming, knowledge transfer of farming. Initially long-term stability, compared to large- marketing, consuming, and disposing of unaware of negative impacts and attitudes scale, standalone missions that are larger, food).56 While food security may not be generated toward foreign intervention, more complex, and longer.61 As the an inherent DOD function for civilian many stabilization efforts were under- impact of food insecurity on the broader population protection, the joint force mined or lost by a failure to recognize security environment, along with the conducts food security tasks that are social protocols pertaining to food and connection that conflict has to food ac- either directed by senior military and agriculture. Some military command- cess, becomes clearer to understand, the political leadership or identified as com- ers planned activities that inadvertently following levels of crisis describe joint batant commander objectives during disrupted crop production cycles and force activities: capacity-building, slow planning. Food security discussions in endangered family food security. Certain onset, rapid onset, and complex.62 joint doctrine can be inferred in several tactical practices that were not mindful Capacity-Building. Combatant joint documents: under stabilizing activ- of herd behavior angered herders who commands identify and participate in ities of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint might have otherwise provided valu- campaign activities that build partner and Operations; security and humanitarian able intelligence across the vast swaths host-nation capacity in support of food assistance stability functions within JP of insurgent-impacted landscapes the security. These campaign activities im- 3-07, Stability; interagency and other herders occupied. Moreover, interpreters prove the collective ability of the United organizational dimensions within JP were typically from urban backgrounds States and its partner nations in respond- 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation; and seldom understood food and agri- ing effectively and expeditiously to food security sector assistance within JP cultural issues, which further strained security challenges. Geographic and 3-20, Security Cooperation; emergency cooperation.59 In U.S. Africa Command functional combatant commands, such support responsibilities within JP 3-28, (USAFRICOM), a former commander as U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Defense Support of Civil Authorities; described food security challenges as and U.S. Special Operations Command disaster relief roles within JP 3-29, contributing to regional instability but (USSOCOM), identify food security– Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and relevant in all areas where the U.S. mili- related objectives in campaign plans. civil-military interaction within JP 3-57, tary has forward presence For more efficient first-responder, risk- Civil-Military Operations.57 reduction activities, USSOCOM and civil The joint force traditionally provides There are undeniable linkages . . . between affairs personnel conduct on-the-ground support to U.S. Government food se- our responses to food emergencies, food observations that can feed back real-time curity efforts as an occupying force with security, and our broader security and information on food security threats. In legal responsibilities to the population, stability objectives. . . . environmental chal- support of their missions are training as as part of a peacekeeping operation to lenges are likely to increase the severity and well as education through formal courses protect humanitarian workers for food frequency of food emergencies . . . unless the such as the Agricultural Development for distribution, or as a provider of assistance international community works together to Armed Forces Pre-Deployment Training to vulnerable populations to ensure food increase the sustainability of regional and and Active Army battalion and brigade access and availability.58 These deploy- global food supplies.60 pilot programs such as Farm Assessment ments, activities, and investments can and Evaluation Training. Graduates from come with more advantages if military While many terms can be used to these courses return to their units and personnel and their commanders have describe DOD food security contribu- many deploy to better advise command- basic knowledge of strategic, regional, tions, this discussion refers to those ers on tactical-level food security issues.63 and local food and agricultural issues. DOD-specific contributions as cam- Additionally, the Chairman of the Unfortunately, the lack of food secu- paign activities (for example, military Joint Chiefs of Staff recently endorsed a rity knowledge can impact operations, investments, limited deployments, and special area of emphasis on nontraditional long-term U.S. Government efforts, large-scale missions). Based on mutual security threats including food security

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Katsos 117 for military institution consideration.64 peace operations, foreign humanitarian providing contributions in the form of se- Other DOD capacity-building efforts assistance, and defense support to civil curity and transportation of food during include the National Guard Bureau’s authorities. In USAFRICOM, General the onset of crisis, DOD contributions Agribusiness Development Team concept Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC, stated are most often intertwined with long- and State Partnership Program. Both that stabilization efforts that focus against term diplomatic and development efforts. efforts support combatant commander the al Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia Complex Crises. Complex crises can objectives through training and advice to could become complicated by famine result in numerous deaths and consider- universities, ministries, and farmers as well and drought and that USAFRICOM has able suffering from war, disease, hunger, as through formal state partnerships with to coordinate closely with relief agencies and displacement owing to natural and foreign countries. In USCENTCOM, to avoid impacting civilians on the move manmade actions or events.75 A tactic National Guard personnel from Texas in search of food.71 Slow onset crisis to encourage capitulation by adversaries developed a relationship with a university missions are usually in response to inter- is withholding food from populations in Afghanistan to support the country’s national calls to action, and if requested, or the prevention of food access as a agriculture future and student prepara- DOD activities would support U.S. weapon of war (for example, burning tion for postgraduate work in that field.65 Government requirements to support in- crops).76 In 2015, the Syrian govern- In another example, in U.S. European dividual nation or international requests. ment used a “starve into submission” Command, National Guard personnel Rapid Onset Crisis. Rapid onset policy that led to brokered ceasefires from Iowa conducted campaign activities crises are often localized to one particular with rebels where they surrendered with Kosovo ministry counterparts on area, generally small, and periodic in weapons in return for easing sieges and agricultural exchanges and cooperation occurrence. They are usually the result allowing the entry of food into their with public and private collaboration on of sudden, natural events such as wind- controlled areas.77 A potential complex agriculture.66 At home, U.S. Northern storms, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, crisis related to counterterrorism efforts Command (USNORTHCOM) and floods, tsunamis, wildfires, landslides, in the USCENTCOM area of respon- USPACOM campaign activities support avalanches, earthquakes, and volcanic sibility is the Saudi Arabian blockade U.S. Government agricultural plant and eruptions. Upon request, DOD con- of Yemen, a country with high food animal biological defense and safety.67 A ducts campaign activities such as limited insecurity that imports 90 percent of legitimate threat to domestic food secu- deployments and large-scale missions to its food.78 Other considerations are the rity is embodied by an al Qaeda training support government efforts.72 Abroad impacts of globalization, increased food manual that is devoted to agroterrorism— in 2008, U.S. Southern Command prices, a changing demand for food at that is, the destruction of crops, livestock, (USSOUTHCOM) rapidly responded to the local level, the unintended secondary and food processing operations.68 In con- a U.S. Government request to transport consequences of economic policies, and junction with capacity-building efforts, and deliver food to Haiti after flooding.73 increased urbanization challenges (for lethal and nonlethal military operations In 2011, USPACOM personnel trans- example, resources and megacities) that in support of regional organization, ported and delivered tens of thousands lead to population grievances and some- partner, and host-nation requests may be of meals in Japan via rotary-wing aircraft times radicalization.79 necessary but, importantly, can mitigate after an earthquake and typhoon. A few In 2007–2010, countries located instability that impacts the evolution of years later, USCENTCOM personnel in both the USCENTCOM and slow, rapid, and complex food crises. airdropped hundreds of bundles of food USAFRICOM areas of operation Slow Onset Crisis. Most slow onset and thousands of meals to refugees in experienced food price increases and crises emerge based on a confluence northern Iraq fleeing persecution by the subsequent rioting across North Africa of events.69 These crises can result in so-called Islamic State.74 and the Middle East as droughts coin- famine or hunger due to either crop For domestic limited deployments cided with dramatic changes to food failure from drought, climate change, and large-scale response missions, availability and cost.80 People across the spread of agricultural pests or disease, DOD (under USNORTHCOM and region no longer found work in the fields or gradual deterioration of a situation USPACOM) supports USDA under and moved to cities, where most did leading to conflict (for example, chronic Emergency Support Function 11 to not find work and showed their frustra- poverty, destitution, and govern- contain and eradicate outbreaks of plant tion in the streets in protest.81 In many ment policies that result in widespread or animal diseases as well as to provide cases, protests turned to violence and malnutrition, an increase in mortality disaster relief. During Hurricane Sandy, regimes were toppled, leading the United rates, and the destruction of stable liveli- USNORTHCOM assisted in setting up States into more substantial diplomatic hoods).70 Upon request, DOD acts as food distribution points around New involvement and potential deployment a first responder to conduct campaign York City and provided over 144,000 or workforces including the joint force activities such as limited deployments of meals to citizens in need, including food in support of stabilization efforts. In crisis response or other contingencies to delivery to high-rise buildings through- 2010, USSOUTHCOM responded to a support U.S. Government–sanctioned out the city. Besides building capacity and government request in support of Haiti

118 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government and Food Security JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Norman Borlaug Institute for International Agriculture country director and project coordinator shows land being cleared for future farming as part of partnership with U.S. Africa Command to produce large-scale agriculture project on Camp Base, March 17, 2011, Democratic Republic of the Congo (U.S. Africa Command/Amanda McCarty)

earthquake disaster relief by transport- environments, and regardless of the protection of a country’s food system ing tens of thousands of humanitarian fact that the joint force employs certain and its restoration when disrupted will daily rations for distribution.82 The issue capabilities to assist responders, the inter- be challenges that the U.S. Government here was not weak governance but the national community should expect the should plan and prepare for, including complete decapitation of governance quantity of U.S. Government response to making arrangements to support interna- itself from the people that increased be limited or even diminished. Therefore, tional workforces as needed. complexities regarding disaster relief, participation in complex crises will most Although a budget increase is food access, and availability. However, in likely need to be planned for beyond a proposed, the amounts are not quite USCENTCOM, the al Qaeda–affiliated whole-of-government response and re- a substitute for the loss of soft power militant group al Shabaab is presently quire a whole-of-society approach through capabilities in other departments, and delivering food to locations in Somalia interorganizational (public, private, and so the extra funds may not even keep the suffering from severe drought. This ap- forth) cooperation to future challenges.84 department at an acceptable level of proach counters previous insurgency equipment and systems readiness. As practices that severely damaged their Successfully managing food security such, further analysis of joint force roles group’s image with and influence over can mitigate or prevent conflicts and in campaign activities such as capacity- the local population in 2011, when al civilian deaths. When it comes to food builders, first responders, and protectors Shabaab blocked food aid delivery and security, all levels of command should of critical infrastructure, and the inter- killed humanitarian workers.83 be aware of the criticality of knowledge organizational cooperation sought with Given that U.S. Government support transfer and the impact that food security others, should be conducted to create to an international response is expen- have on the broader security environ- and practice more efficiencies in support sive, especially in lethal and uncertain ment. Even though threats persist, the of food security efforts.85 JFQ

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Katsos 119 15 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public 28 The first combined State and USAID Notes Law 87-195, 87th Cong., 1st sess., September strategic plan was published in 2003. FY 4, 1961. 2014–2017 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Devel- 1 United Nations (UN) Development Pro- 16 The Food for Progress Act of 1985, Pub- opment Review (Washington, DC: Department gramme Human Development Report Office, lic Law 99-198, 99th Cong., 1st sess., December of State, 2015); FY 2014–2017 Department of Human Security, UN General Assembly, 66th 23, 1985; 7 U.S.C. 17360. State and USAID Strategic Plan (Washington, Session, “Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Hu- 17 The Global Food Security Act of 2016 DC: Department of State, 2014). man Security of the 2005 World Summit Out- represents a codification of the administration’s 29 22 U.S.C. § 6592, U.S. Code, Unanno- come” (A/RES/66/290), October 25, 2012; Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, tated Title 22, Foreign Relations and Inter- UN General Assembly, 66th Session, “Follow- Feed the Future program, into the Foreign As- course § 6592, Administrator of AID reporting up to General Assembly Resolution 64/291 on sistance Act of 1961; Schnepf, 42. to Secretary of State. Human Security” (A/66/763), April 5, 2012; 18 The Food for Peace Act, Public Law 30 The White House, Office of the Press and UN General Assembly, 64th Session, “Hu- 110-246, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., June 18, 2008, Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector man Security, Report of the Secretary-General” replaced the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Policy,” April 5, 2013, available at (A/64/701), March 8, 2010. and Assistance Act, Public Law 83-480, 83rd . sonal, community, and political. See James Gus- Law 114-195, 144th Cong., 2nd sess., July 14, 31 Defense Security Cooperation, “Intro- tave Speth, Human Development Report 1994, 2016; Schnepf, 42. duction to Security Cooperation,” I-5, available New Dimensions of Human Security (New York: 20 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act at . 3 George E. Katsos, “U.S. Government 12, 2002); Public Health Security and Bioter- 32 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Approach to Health Security: Focus on Medical rorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002; Afghanistan and Iraq, GAO 09-86R (Washing- Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 85 and Biennial Review and Republication of the ton, DC: Government Accountability Office, (2nd Quarter 2017), 66–75. Select Agent and Toxin List (42 U.S.C. 262a) October 1, 2008), 6–7, 12; Afghanistan PRT 4 U.S. Africa Command, “General Ham (Bioterrorism Act). Handbook (Washington, DC: Government Ac- Speaks at NDU Food Security Conference,” 21 National Security Strategy. countability Office, October 1, 2008), 50. March 8, 2012, available at . U.S. Agency for International Development AID, September 2016), 72. 5 Speth, 27. [USAID], September 2016), 110. 34 Global Food Security, USAID Is Improving 6 National Security Strategy (Washington, 23 Homeland Security Presidential Direc- Coordination but Needs to Require Systematic DC: The White House, May 2010), 12, 14, 18. tive 9, Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food Assessments of Country-Level Risks, GAO-13- 7 Randy Schnepf, U.S. International Food (Washington, DC: The White House, January 809 (Washington, DC: Government Account- Aid Programs: Background and Issues, R41072 30, 2004); Homeland Security Presidential ability Office, September 17, 2013), 6. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Directive 10/National Security Presidential 35 USAID, 60. Service, September 2016). Directive 33, Biodefense for the 21st Century 36 Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interorga- 8 7 U.S.C. §1732, U.S. Code, Unannotated (Washington, DC: The White House, April 28, nizational Cooperation (Washington, DC: The Title 7, Agriculture §1732, Definitions. 2004). President Barack Obama followed up Joint Staff, 2016), A-Q-2, B-B-13. 9 Government Accountability Office,Global these directives with one on specific strategy 37 Famine Early Warning Systems Network Security Progress, 10-494T (Washington, DC: implementation; see Presidential Policy Direc- Web site, available at . Government Accountability Office, March tive 2, Implementation of the National Strategy 38 JP 3-08, A-B-1. 2010). for Countering Biological Threats (Washington, 39 Strategic Plan for FY 2014–2018 (Wash- 10 United States Department of Agricul- DC: The White House, November 23, 2009). ington, DC: Department of Agriculture, 2014). ture, “Food Defense Overview,” available at < 24 Presidential Policy Directive 6, U.S. 40 U.S. Government Global Food Security https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/ Global Development Policy (Washington, DC: Strategy FY 2017–2021, 63. topics/food-defense-defense-and-emergency- The White House, September 23, 2010). 41 Ibid. See also “About Food and Nutri- response/food-defense-overview>; Agribusiness 25 Presidential Policy Directive 8, National tion Service,” USDA Web site, available at Industry Final Report, Spring 2014 Industry Preparedness (Washington, DC: The White . Study (Washington, DC: National Defense House, March 8, 2011); Homeland Security 42 Agricultural Act of 2014 (Farm Bill), University, 2014), 14. Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness Public Law 113-79, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 National Archives, “Letter to James (Washington, DC: The White House, Decem- February 7, 2014. Madison from Henry Lee, 24 April 1812,” ber 17, 2003). 43 U.S. Government Global Food Security available at . Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Wash- Department of Agriculture Web site, available 12 Food and Drug Administration, “FDA ington, DC: The White House, February 12, at . Organizational Histories,” available at . Prioritization, and Protection (Washington, January 2008). 13 Public Acts of the Thirty-Seventh Con- DC: The White House, December 17, 2003); 45 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review gress, Chapter LXXII, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., and Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland May 15, 1862. Infrastructure Protection (Washington, DC: Security, June 18, 2014); Homeland Security 14 United Nations Humanitarian Civil- The White House, May 22, 1998). Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296 § 707, 107th Military Coordination Field Handbook (Geneva, 27 Presidential Policy Directive 23, U.S. Se- Cong., 2nd sess., November 25, 2002, 154; and Switzerland: Palais des Nations, n.d.), 21, 82. curity Sector Assistance (Washington, DC: The 2012 Annual Report: Duplication, Overlap, and White House, April 5, 2013). Fragmentation, GAO 12-342SP (Washington,

120 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government and Food Security JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 DC: Government Accountability Office, Febru- 61 JP 3-0, VIII-1. 75 JP 3-29, III-4. ary 2012), 15–16. 62 Perry and Borchard, 17, 41; JP 3-29, 76 Perry and Borchard, 17, 41; Forman. 46 FY 2014–FY 2018 Strategic Plan (Wash- III-3/4. 77 “Food Insecurity in War-Torn Syria: ington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2014), 63 Jesse Belford, “92nd Civil Affairs From Decades of Self-Sufficiency to Food 26. Battalion (Airborne) Tests New Agricul- Dependence,” Carnegie Endowment for 47 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- tural Program,” available at . ion__Airborne__Tests_New_Agricultural_Pro- org/2015/06/04/food-insecurity-in-war- 48 Paul N. Stockton, All-Hazards Foreign gram>; Agricultural Development for Armed torn-syria-from-decades-of-self-sufficiency-to- Response: Lessons Learned from Haiti, Fuku- Forces Pre-Deployment Training, “Stability food-dependence-pub-60320>. shima, and Other Catastrophes (Falls Church, Through Food Security,” available at . ton as Saudi Coalition Attack on Yemen Port 49 National Security Implications of 64 Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Educat- Appears Imminent,” Washington Post, May Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate ing the Next Generation of Military Leaders 2, 2017, available at ; coalition-attack-on-yemen-port-appears- Implementation Plan (NHSS/IP) 2015–2018 Paul J. Selva, Academic Year 2017–2018 Joint imminent/?utm_term=.9b45027c5102>; (Washington, DC: Department of Health and Professional Military Education Special Areas of Reliefweb, “Yemen—Recent Cholera Cases, Human Services, 2014). Emphasis, CM-0238-16, December 23, 2016. Food Insecurity and Population Displace- 51 Strategic Plan FY 2014–2018 (Washing- 65 Alexander K. Stewart, “U.S. Army ment,” available at . 2014–2017 (Washington, DC: Department of available at . “Food Security: How Drought and Rising (Washington, DC: Department of Interior, 66 Jim Greenhill, “Iowa, Kosovo: A model Prices Led to Conflict in Syria,” Carnegie En- 2011); Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan National Guard State Partnership Program dowment, June 4, 2015, available at . pub-60320>. 56 United Nations Food and Agriculture 67 JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiologi- 81 Dalia Mortada, “Did Food Prices Spur Organization, “The Future Food System: The cal, and Nuclear Response (Washington, DC: the Arab Spring?” PBS.org, available at . en/c/448182/>. ist Attack: DOD Roles and Responsibilities 82 William Landay, “Humanitarian As- 57 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: United States sistance for Haiti,” available at . Staff, August 3, 2016); JP 3-08; JP 3-20, Secu- org/?abstract&did=747577>. 83 Larisa Epatko, “Al-Shabab Militants Try rity Cooperation (Washington, DC: The Joint 69 UN Office for the Coordination of Hu- Food to Win Hearts and Minds in Somalia,” Staff, May 23, 2017); JP 3-28, Defense Support manitarian Affairs (OCHA), OCHA and Slow- PBS.org, available at . Humanitarian Assistance (Washington DC: available at . Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (4th The Joint Staff, September 11, 2013). 70 JP 3-29, III-3. Quarter 2015), 106–112; James C. McArthur 58 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative 71 Richard Sisk, “Somalia Famine Com- et al., “Interorganizational Cooperation, II of to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time plicates U.S. Counter-Terror Campaign,” III: The Humanitarian Perspective,” Joint Force of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Art. Military.com, March 27, 2017, available at Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter 2016), 145–152; 55 (Geneva, Switzerland: UN, August 12, ; Selva. spective,” Joint Force Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter Dimensions of the Challenge in Africa (Fort 72 JP 3-0, xix–xvii. 2016), 129–139. Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 73 Reliefweb, “Haiti Storms,” available at 85 Ibid. April 2010), 41–42. . Operations for Afghanistan and Beyond,” Small 74 Claudette Roulo, “Humanitarian As- Wars Journal, August 22, 2013. sistance Continues in Iraq,” available at .

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Katsos 121 U.S. Army and British paratroopers perform static line jump at Holland Drop Zone in preparation for Combined Joint Operational Access Exercise 15-01, demonstrating interoperability between U.S. Army and British army soldiers, U.S. Air Force, Air National Guard and Royal Air Force airmen, and U.S. Marines, April 11, 2015, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (U.S. Air Force/Sean Martin)

During the recent doctrinal review, commenters noted that joint doctrine Joint Publication 5-0, adequately addressed operational art, operational design, and the planning process, but fell short on discussing Joint Planning planning for daily operations in a global campaign. These campaigns direct the theater and functional campaigns the By Steve Townsend combatant commands (CCMDs) execute on a day-to-day basis, forming the basis of Department of Defense (DOD) opera- he Joint Staff Director, Strategic operations. In 2002, an additional tions that set conditions to deter conflict Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), manual, JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for or prepare for a contingency response. approved a new Joint Publication Campaign Planning, was added to the T Additionally, joint doctrine focused on (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning. The publica- 5-series to address campaign planning. In planning at the operational level, leav- tion, signed by the Director, Joint 2006, the first update to the original JP ing a gap in providing the best military Force Development (J7), will be the 5-0 was conducted, titled Joint Operation advice, and options, to national-level fifth iteration of joint doctrine on plan- Planning. This JP included lessons leadership. ning since 1995. learned from the joint force’s response The new version of JP 5-0 takes JP 5-0 was developed to support to the terror attacks of September 11 these considerations into account and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, to identify the and guidance from Secretary of Defense recognizes that joint planning, especially planning requirements essential to suc- Donald Rumsfeld. It was updated in at the CCMDs, has two key purposes. cessfully executing contingency combat 2011 to provide clarity to joint doctrine. First, it must provide options for the These previous versions focused on plan- President and Secretary of Defense in the ning for combat operations and, more event of a crisis or contingency. Second, specifically, planning for contingency Steve Townsend is a Strategic Planner in the it must provide a means to identify the Joint Chiefs of Staff J5. combat operations.

122 Joint Doctrine / Joint Publication 5-0 JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 best military advice on the effective and •• Contingency plans serve as branches operational, and tactical issues. For exam- efficient use of the joint force on a daily to the campaign plans. As such, ple, the introduction of theater campaign basis, including short of armed conflict, contingency plans should have mul- planning in JP 5-0 resulted in related to protect national interests and achieve tiple options at the strategic level changes in JP 3-0 to ensure continuity the national objectives in a complex, to provide opportunities to escalate and consistency in language. Plans devel- uncertain, and changing environment, or de-escalate and return to the oped in accordance with JP 5-0 will be from cooperation through competition campaign. Similarly, the campaign executed consisted with the JP 3-0 series and, if necessary, armed conflict. While should address the assumptions in a of publications. For example, JP 5-0 in- the nature of war has not changed, the contingency plan in order to reduce troduces phasing for the operational and character of warfare has evolved. Military uncertainty. tactical levels, but does not provide any operations will increasingly operate •• Since strategic plans must provide examples; JP 3-0 has examples to show in a transregional, multidomain, and options for senior leaders, most how phasing might be implemented in multifunctional (TMM) environment. notably the President and Secretary execution. Conversely, joint operations, TMM approaches will cut across multiple of Defense, phasing is not used conducted on a daily basis outside of con- CCMDs the land, maritime, air, space, in those plans. At the strategic tingencies, are now addressed as part of and cyberspace domains. Effective plan- level, plans must be flexible and the campaign plan rather than as a phase ning provides leadership with options adaptable to allow decisions on of a potential contingency. This requires that offer the highest probability for escalation and de-escalation rather updates to other doctrinal publications to success at acceptable risk and enables the than planning the expectation that identify how operations support global efficient use of limited resources, includ- plans, once implemented, continue campaigns outside of contingencies and ing time, to achieve objectives in this through fixed, phased progression. the relationship between campaign opera- global environment. Global campaigns The description of phasing remains tions and contingency planning. also identify the best use of the military to unchanged, and phasing remains compete short of armed conflict to pro- critical at the operational and tacti- Planning will continue to evolve as tect U.S. national interests and achieve cal levels; however, for strategic DOD implements integrated planning objectives. plans, the six-phase model can be both in the global campaign plans and The core elements of the planning an obstacle in discussing options, integrated contingency planning. As the process remain unchanged. Whether requirements, and risks. planning community develops updated planning for the long-term campaign •• The terms deliberate and crisis action processes in the new planning environ- that directs daily activities, developing a were removed from planning. All ment, the Joint Doctrine Development contingency plan, or planning in a time- planning uses the same conceptual Community will capture those best constrained environment in response to framework, from problem identifica- practices and integrate them into JP 5-0 a crisis, the planning process continues to tion through completion. The differ- through the adaptive doctrine process. follow the time-tested steps from initia- ences arise in the use of assumptions, The updated JP 5-0 is a big step tion and problem identification through decision points, and output. in aligning planning doctrine with the mission analysis and course-of-action •• Contingency plans must be inte- processes used by planners in the com- development to approval and then plan grated across CCMDs. In the TMM batant commands and the guidance in or order development. Similarly, planners environment, operations and their the National Military Strategy and Joint still use operational art and elements of effects are rarely confined to a single Strategic Campaign Plan. This version operational design in plan development. combatant commander’s geographic provides joint force commanders and their Due to the planners’ feedback dur- or functional area. Plans must component commanders with processes ing the joint doctrine review process, address how they interact across that allow for that flexibility and the ability and the introduction of global campaign commands and domains and the to plan and develop plans for an uncertain plans and integrated planning, JP 5-0 was dependencies between commands. and challenging environment. JFQ significantly rewritten. These changes •• Appendices were added to address include: assessments, red teams, posture plans, and theater distribution plans. •• CCMD campaign plans were added as the base for all operations the joint Because of the interrelationship force conducts. These campaigns between planning and execution, JP 5-0 seek to achieve U.S. objectives and was developed in close collaboration protect U.S. interests short of armed with JP 3-0, which was published earlier conflict. They also set conditions to this year. JP 3-0 and 5-0 authors col- support a contingency, should one laborated to ensure continuity between occur. these keystone JPs to address strategic,

JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 Townsend 123 New from Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision NDU Press (to be signed within 6 months) for the Center for Complex JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces Operations Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the JP 3-11, Operations in CBRN Environments World of Social Media by Heidi A. Urben JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations Past research JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations contends JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense that with the exception JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency of voting in JP 3-27, Homeland Defense Presidential JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities elections, military offi- JP 3-32, C2 for Joint Maritime Operations cers’ politi- JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters cal participation is fairly muted. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations Through a survey of more than 500 military elites attending the JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations United States Military Academy JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations and National Defense University, JP 4-02, Joint Health Services this case study seeks to establish the nature and extent of politi- JP 4-04, Joint Contingency Basing cal expression throughout social JP 4-09, Distribution Operations media and whether such expression is in keeping with the norm of JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) nonpartisanship. Findings suggest that while most JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations military elites continue to identify as JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations conservative and Republican, fewer JP 3-0, Joint Operations appear to do so today than at any other time over the past 30 years. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats Military elites who identify as liber- JP 3-13.4, Military Deception als and Democrats are more likely to JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations have more politically diverse military friends on social media, but are also JP 3-20, Security Cooperation more likely to report feeling uncom- JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore fortable by their friends’ politics. JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations This study concludes by considering the implications these findings carry JP 5-0, Joint Planning for the norms of an apolitical, nonpartisan military.

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124 Joint Doctrine / Joint Publication 5-0 JFQ 87, 4th Quarter 2017 From NDU Press Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration 2016 • 396 pp.

The Trump administration takes office in a time of great complexity. The President faces a national security environment shaped by strong currents: globalization; the proliferation of new, poor, and weak states, as well as nonstate actors; a persistent landscape of violent extremist organizations; slow economic growth; the rise of China and a revanchist Russia; a collapsing Middle East; and domestic policies wracked by division and mistrust. While in absolute terms the Nation and the world are safer than in the last century, today the United States finds itself almost on a permanent war footing, engaged in military operations around the world.

This book, written by experts at the Defense Department’s National Defense University, offers valuable policy advice and grand strategy recommendations to those senior leaders who will staff and lead this administration in national security affairs. The President and his staff, Members of Congress, and the many leaders throughout government concerned with the Nation’s security interests should find this book valuable. Their task is not an easy one, and this volume’s insights and reflections are offered with an ample dose of humility. There are no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems confronting America and its leaders. This volume provides context and understanding about the current national security environment to those in the Administration as they prepare to lead the Nation during challenging times. To those senior leaders who bear the heavi- est responsibilities, these policy insights may chart a course forward.

The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.

Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/charting-a-course/ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-SEVEN, 4TH QUARTER 2017

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National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ New from NDU Press New from Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. ChairmanStaff: of the Joint Chiefs of Dunford, Jr., From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked