The Party Organization of the Vlaams Belang

Home , Filip Dewinter, Karel Dillen, Vlaams Belang, Vlaams Blok

The party organization of the Vlaams Belang

Teun PAUWELS, Cevipol, Université libre de Bruxelles ([email protected])

Emilie VAN HAUTE, Cevipol, Université libre de Bruxelles ([email protected])

Prepared for the 2013 CES Conference, Amsterdam, 25-27 June 2013

Abstract

This paper examines how ‘unique’ the party organization of a populist radical right party is compared to the other party organizations in the same party system, taking Belgium and the Vlaams Belang as a case study. The paper outlines the organizational development of the party as well as its main formal organizational features and informal internal dynamics. It then compares the party organization of the populist radical right party with the other parties in the system on four main indicators: the level of cartelization, the characteristics of the party membership, the party leadership, and the structure of the party finances. The paper shows that if the shell of the party resembles other parties, its core is of a different nature.

Key Words

Political parties, populist radical right, party organization, Belgium

I. Introduction

The Vlaams Belang is often singled out from the rest of the Belgian parties. It is portrayed as a threat to democracy in the media, ostracized by the rest of the party system via a cordon sanitaire, and often studied as a unique or pathological deviant case in the scientific literature (Mudde 2010). This separation of the VB from the rest of the political landscape rests often on an analysis of the ideological foundations of the party. However, not much has been written on the party organization, especially in comparative terms. Therefore, this paper aims at investigating how unique the VB party organization is. More specifically, the paper tries to answer the following questions: How does the party organize at different institutional levels? Which intra-party dynamics and tensions exist within the party organization both at and between different levels? What is the role of the party leader within the party organization? Exploring these elements will enable us to answer the overarching question of this paper: in terms of its organization, is the VB a ‘normal’ party?

To answer this broad question, this paper is divided into five sections. The first section of the study provides a summary of the main steps in the development of the party. In a second section we will explore the formal party organization. The third section looks at the informal intra-party dynamics and tensions. The fourth section of the paper focuses more specifically on the role of the party leader. Finally, the uniqueness of the VB party organization will be addressed by introducing a comparative perspective.

II. Brief overview of the party development

The VB emerged in 1978 out of dissatisfaction with the Flemish nationalist Volksunie (VU). In the second half of the 1970s, part of the Flemish movement started criticizing the VU for its positioning considered as too moderate and left leaning. This frustration peaked when the VU signed the so-called Egmont Pact, which envisioned a reform of the Belgian state that was seen as too favourable to the French speaking population, especially in the periphery of Brussels. One of the VU members, Lode Claes, decided to quit the party; he established the Vlaamse Vokspartij (VVP). At the same time, Karel Dillen founded the Vlaams-Nationale Partij (VNP). The two parties decided to participate in the federal elections of 1978 under the name Vlaams Blok (VB). Against all expectations, Dillen is the one who got elected, not Claes. The latter decided to leave politics and Dillen absorbed the nationalist wing of the VVP. On 28 May 1979 the VNP is dissolved and the VB is officially established (De Witte and Scheepers 1997; Mudde 2000).

In its early years, the VB remained a small party dominated by Dillen. Its programmatic focus was almost entirely directed against the Egmont Pact while striving for Flemish independence. The party recruited particularly among Flemish nationalist movements such as Voorpost and Were Di. Despite the support from these auxiliary organizations, the VB did not grow in electoral terms. In 1981, Dillen was re-elected but the vote share of the party declined from 2.1 to 1.8 per cent. In the second half of the 1980s, the VB started to broaden its ideological programme and evolved from an anti-Egmont party towards a modern populist radical right party adhering increasingly to anti-immigrant rhetoric. Together with this ideological shift, the party also started to change internally. With operation ‘Rejuvenation’, Dillen integrated various young VB members in the party council. The 29-year-old Gerolf Annemans replaced Karel Dillen in the Lower House in 1987. In the same year, a youth organization called Vlaams Blok Jongeren (VBJ) was established by among others Filip Dewinter and Frank Vanhecke. These internal changes provoked some tensions as a group of committed VB members accused the VBJ group of side- lining the Flemish cause in favour of the anti-immigrant issue in 1988. Dillen supported the VBJ, however, leading to the exit of the dissatisfied VB members while strengthening the position of Dewinter (Mudde 2000).

The ideological and organizational changes started to pay off electorally at the end of the 1980s. In the federal elections of 1987 the VB obtained 3 per cent of the votes with its slogan ‘Own people first!’. The local elections one year later showed the party’s potential as the VB secured 17.7 per cent of the votes in the city of Antwerp (Swyngedouw 2000). In the 1989 European elections, the VB doubled its 1987 score, and obtained 241,117 votes. The real breakthrough came when the party polled 10.3 per cent in the 1991 national elections (see Figure 1). This ‘Black Sunday’ alarmed all other Belgian parties, which agreed upon a cordon sanitaire or agreement not to cooperate with the VB under any circumstances and on any political level (Damen 2001). Some social movements were also established to protest against what was considered a ‘revival of fascism’.

Figure 1. Polling results and vote share of the VB in Flanders, over time (%)

20 R² = 0.99172

0 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Naonal elecons Regional elecons Opinon polls Trend (Naonal elecon)

Note: Opinion poll results are average scores of the polls held in a specific year (Source: TNS Dimarso)

However, as the party could rely on a solid organization, the VB did not suffer from ostracism in electoral terms, on the contrary. In 1996, the leadership switched from Dillen to Vanhecke who was considered a figure of consensus between the Flemish nationalist wing (symbolised by Annemans) and the anti-immigrant wing (symbolized by Dewinter). Under the lead of Vanhecke the VB obtained one electoral victory after the other. The party was particularly successful in Antwerp and other urbanized areas (De Decker, Kesteloot, De Maesschalck, and Vranken 2005; Pauwels 2006). At the national elections of 2003, the party obtained 18 per cent of the votes.

One year later, however, the Court of Appeal of Ghent condemned several VB organizations for violating the anti-racism law (in first instance in April, confirmed after appeal in November). The conviction by the Court gave the party high visibility in the media and enabled the VB to play the role of a victim of the established parties. The party polled its best result ever at the 2004 regional and European elections in June with 24 per cent of the votes, and became the second largest party of Flanders (technically the first, since CD&V and N-VA arrived first but formed an electoral cartel of 2 distinct parties). After the appeal and the confirmation of the sanction in November 2004, the name Vlaams Blok was changed into Vlaams Belang. The party also moderated its external discourse to some extent, as indicated by Dewinter admitting that his 70-points plan (which envisioned the forced repatriation of immigrants) was no longer realistic. At the same time, Vanhecke conveyed a different discourse internally, as he confirmed at the party conference in November 2004 that the VB changed its name but not its identity (Coffé 2005a).

Table 1. VB representatives at the various institutional levels, 1999-present

European House of Regional (Flanders) Regional (Brussels) representatives 2 (1999-2004) 15 (1999-2003) 20 (1999-2004) 4 (1999-2004) 3 (2004-2009) 18 (2003-2007) 29 (2004-2009) 6 (2004-2009) 2 (2009-2014) 17 (2007-2010) 21 (2009-2014)b 1 (2009-2014) 12 (2010-2014)a Note: (a) reduced to 11 after Jurgen Ceder left the party and decided to sit as an independent MP; (b) reduced to 18 after Karim Van Overmeire, Erik Arckens, and Gerda Van Steenberge left the party

Despite the party’s electoral performances and good parliamentary representation (Table 1), it could not pass the governmental threshold because of the cordon sanitaire. In an attempt to further broaden the party’s appeal, some young members such as Marie-Rose Morel and Jurgen Verstrepen were recruited. In 2008, Bruno Valkeniers replaced Vanhecke as party leader. Nevertheless, it seems that the growth of the VB had come to an end. In the 2006 local elections, the party faced its first symbolic defeats. In Antwerp, the party seemed to have reached a ceiling and even arrived second in Antwerp behind the Socialists (Delwit 2012). In Ghent, the party lost 2 seats. At the national elections in 2007, the VB faced competition from the neoliberal populist LDD. For the first time since the early 1990s, its results were not

5 impressive (19%, a loss of 6 percentage points and one seat). The first real electoral defeat took place in 2009 as the party lost one third of its votes compared to 2004 (loss of 8.9 percentage points, 11 seats). A post electoral survey showed that 15 per cent of the previous VB voters switched to the Flemish nationalist N-VA (the successor of the VU) while 8 per cent defected to LDD. Interestingly, a considerable part of switchers referred to the cordon sanitaire to motivate their switch to another party (Pauwels 2011). While the effectiveness of the cordon sanitaire has often been questioned, it seems that a consistent strategy of containment combined with democratic alternatives might have a negative impact on national populist parties in the long run (Rummens and Abts 2010). The electoral decline continued at the national elections in 2010, where the party only obtained 12.6% of the votes in Flanders (12 seats).

The electoral decline of the VB had consequences at the internal level (see Section IV). The party was divided as to how to react to an (unprecedented) electoral defeat. Whether a strategy of moderation or radicalization should be adopted produced a fierce debate inside the party. The radical approach of Dewinter and the growth of the moderated alternative N-VA has inspired important VB representatives such as Verstrepen, Van Hecke, or Karim Van Overmeire, to leave the party. After the disappointing local elections of 2012, Valkeniers decided to step down as the head of the VB and Annemans was elected as the new party president.

III. Formal party organization: a well-oiled multi-level party structure

In this section we look back at how the VB has developed in terms of organization, and we examine how the party is structured at different institutional levels today, based on the party statutes.

1. Phases of organizational development

In terms of organizational development, two phases can be identified, with a potential third phase linked to the first electoral defeats of the party since 2010.

The first phase (from the emergence of the party until the mid-1990s) corresponds to the early days of the party organization. During these first fifteen years, the party emerged and grew as

6 an organization and went through two major stages (Greiner 1972): creation (the start-up of the party) and direction (the necessity to have a clear focus). This development was facilitated by the fact that the party was established out of the ashes of the VU: the founding fathers of the VB had a model to refer to. They used that model to build the new party structures (creation phase). Therefore, from the very start, the party adopted clear and well-established structures – including a study centre (1983) and a youth organization (1987). The content and informal functioning of the initial party structures have evolved over time – they have professionalized – but the formal structures themselves have not changed much. During the creation phase, the founding fathers also benefitted from the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the new party was embedded in Flemish nationalist organizations such as Were Di and Voorpost. It brought important advantages to the party in terms of personnel, finances, and roots at the local level – crucial elements for a party during the creation phase. Art (2008, 430) claims that the motivated members of Flemish nationalist organizations were the political soldiers who “did “the dirty work” of campaigning, stuffing tens of thousands of mailboxes with campaign material and postering the city of Antwerp”.

If the structures were there, at the same time, the party was still very small and heavily dominated by its leader Karel Dillen (see section V), who imposed his views and direction for the party: a clear focus on the Egmont Pact, and Flemish independence. The party displayed only a marginal electoral appeal (see Figure 1), and stagnated in terms of membership recruitment (around 5,000 members throughout the period – see Figure 2). During these years, the VB was still an organization of volunteers and amateurs. The party president, Karel Dillen, combined his work in parliament, for instance, with a job at a taxi company (Coffé 2005c).

The first phase of creation and direction ended by a crisis of leadership and autonomy, opposing the party leader and his support for the Rejuvenation operation. The new generation prevailed, however, resulting in a shift of focus towards the immigration issue and the exit of the dissatisfied VB members (Figure 2: 1987-1988), thereby resolving the tensions.

From the solution of the crisis emerged the second phase (from the mid-1990s until the end of the 2000s). This phase corresponds to organizational maturity and professionalization. During these next fifteen years, the party grew both electorally (see Figure 1) and organizationally in

7 terms of membership (Figure 2). In three years, from 1992 to 1995, the party doubled its membership base (4,682 to 9,322 registered members). By 2000, the party almost doubled that amount again, claiming 17,167 members. Party membership reached its peak in 2006 with 25,090 members.

Figure 2. Number of VB members

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0 1979 1981 1985 1987 1988 1989 1991 1995 1997 1998 1999 2001 2005 2007 2008 2009 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1990 1992 1993 1994 1996 2000 2002 2003 2004 2006

Number of VB members

Source: Delwit 2011; van Haute et al 2012; www.projectmapp.eu

With such a rapid growth, the VB had to adapt and professionalize its organization, and learn how to delegate and coordinate (Greiner 1972). Adaptation and professionalization were facilitated by the electoral breakthrough of 1991, after which the VB started to receive considerable amount of public funding, as Belgian parties rely for the major part of their finances on state funding based on their vote share. In terms of propaganda, the VB is the Flemish party that spends more than any other party on leaflets, posters, etc. (Buelens and Deschouwer 2003, 21). The party provides a range of different services to its office holders and members such as judicial support, media training, support for designing campaign material, summer universities, etc. It has also launched its own publication, the Vlaams Belang Magazine, published monthly.

By the end of the 2000s, however, this second phase ended by a crisis triggered by the first electoral defeats of the party. According to Greiner, this crisis would be typical of organizational

8 development and would take the form of a crisis of control, as leaders sense that they are losing control over their large organization (Greiner 1972, 43). Greiner (1972) also expect a ‘red-tape’ crisis to oppose the leadership and the lower levels of the party organization, the lower levels and grassroots accusing the leadership to lose connection with what is happening on the ground due to a too large and complex organization. Exploring the informal dynamics in section IV will reveal that many of these expectations indeed materialized.

These phases of organizational development show that, if the party has grown and professionalized over the years, the basic party structures were implemented from the very start and have remained rather similar across time.

2. Party organizational structures

Vertically, the party is organized at 4 different levels (national, provincial1, regio, and local), although the most important levels are the local and the national levels. Each level is organized around a council and an executive body2.

At the national level there is the congress in which all members can participate. The congress is responsible for the actualisation of the manifestos by means of resolutions and can select a new party leader. In practice, they can only endorse a new party leader who has been proposed by the party council. The party statutes do not specify the periodicity at which the congress has to meet: it is organized at the initiative of the party council.

The party council (partijraad – approx. 110 members) consists of the members of the party executive (partijbestuur), the party leader, the MPs from all parliamentary groups (European, federal and regional), representatives at the provincial level, delegates from provincial branches, delegates from regional branches: 1 delegate (preferably the president of the regio party council) + 1 delegate / 1,000 members, delegates from the youth organization, and former MPs after application and authorization by the party council. Party members can be entitled if their application is approved by 2/3 of the members. Officially, the party council is responsible for making the fundamental political and strategic decisions. They furthermore control the party

1 This organizational layer was added after the electoral reform of 2002, when it was decided that electoral districts 2 The examination of the party structures is based on the most recent version of the party statutes (version 2011/03/19). 9 executive, make directives for lower levels and approve the party finances. Other powers include the exclusion of members or cadre, determination of content of congresses, control on party publications, revisions of party statutes or internal party rules (2/3 majority of delegates attending), supervision of disciplinary procedures, final say on all electoral lists, and revoke the party leader if 2/3 majority of delegates attending.

The party president composes and leads the party executive. He or she is responsible for the day-to-day management of the party and is the main speaker of the party.

The party executive (partijbestuur) is composed of minimum 12 and maximum 15 members. The party president makes the selection, but leaders of the PPG of the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Flemish Parliament, and the president of the party council are automatically included. A vice-president, national secretary and treasurer are nominated. The party executive is responsible for the daily management of the party (political and strategic positions) and reports to the party council.

At the provincial level there exists a provincial executive (provinciaal bestuur). It is composed of the leader of the provincial executive who is designated by the party council under proposition of the party executive. Top of the list candidates at the previous election for the House and Flemish parliament and the PPG leader at the provincial council are also members of the provincial executive. Finally, the latter categories can designate extra members. The provincial executive is responsible for the information flow between national and lower levels, coordinates regio branches, supervises the work of the provincial party representatives, and deals with conflicts at the regional level. Furthermore, the provincial executive advises the national level for the composition of electoral lists for the House of Representatives and the Flemish parliament, is responsible for the composition of the lists at the provincial and local levels together with regios, and coordinates campaigns for the House and the Flemish parliament at the provincial level.

At the regional level there is a regional council (regio raad), which is composed of at least one member of the executive of each local branch. The regional council is in charge of information and coordination. Furthermore there exists a regional executive (regio bestuur) for which

10 directly and indirectly elected Representatives and cadres of the party at the local, regio, provincial and national levels can apply. The previous regional executive, in agreement with provincial and national levels, makes the decision. The regional executive coordinates and informs between levels, supervises work of local representatives in the region, and proposes lists for provincial elections together with the provincial level. Furthermore, it is responsible for the composition of the lists at the regional and local levels and deals with local conflicts.

At the local level there are at the moment3 210 local branches (for 308 municipalities in Flanders). The minimum requirement to be considered as a local branch is to count at least 4 people: a president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer. Furthermore, there is a delegate from the VB youth organization and all members since 1 year can apply. The previous executive decides of the final composition. Local branches are in charge with the functioning of the party at the local level. They collaborate with representatives at the local level and together with the region they propose electoral lists at the local level. An overview of the VB’s organization can be found in Table 2.

Table 2. Overview of the VB organization

Level Body Powers National Party president Daily functioning, speaker of party National Party council Strategy, control, finances, lists, … National Party executive Daily functioning National Congress (all party members) Manifesto changes, endorse party leader Provincial Provincial executive (n=5) Information flow national-regional level, coordination, supervision, lists, conflicts, … Regional Regional council (n=20) Coordination, supervision, lists, conflicts, … Regional Regional executive (n=20) Coordination, supervision, lists, conflicts, … Local level Local branch (n=210) Functioning local level, lists …

Horizontally, the party has only one auxiliary organization, its youth organization (Vlaams Belang Jongeren). VBJ can send 1 delegate / 500 VBJ members to the party congress, but the statutes do not refer to a guaranteed representation in the party executive. Although its missions are not described in the party statutes, they are rather typical functions for youth organizations: recruitment and socialization (Hooghe, Stolle, and Stouthuysen 2004).

3 Figure based on data provided by the national party in June 2012. 11

Party membership is regulated by uniform national rules described in the party statutes. Only individual affiliations are allowed (no collective or group affiliation possible), via the party website or the local party branch. The statutes do not mention forms of affiliation other than formal membership (no friend, supporter, or sympathizer of the party). In terms of conditions to become a member, the rules are not strict: there is no probationary period, no requirement of sponsor by another member or of affiliation to another related organization, no incompatibility with affiliation to another party and no minimal age. The only two conditions mentioned in the statutes are the payment of a membership fee (12.5 euros / year, determined by the national level) and the active affirmation of agreement with the party principles as described in the statutes. Once affiliated, members are granted a right of information (VB Magazine) and the right of free affiliation to the party’s auxiliary organization (VBJ) if in the age conditions. The statutes do not mention time restrictions or a probationary period for members to complete before they can run for internal party positions or stand for elections. Membership status can be revoked if the membership requirements are not met. In that case, the party council is in charge of all disciplinary procedures.

In terms of profile, the VB reports a ratio of 73.2% men for 26.8% of women in 2006 (75.3%- 24.7% in 2005). The reported distribution in age in 2005-2006 was rather balanced between age groups (Table 3).

Table 3. Age distribution of party members, 2005-2006

Age group 2005 Age group 2006 0-35 21.0 0-30 13.0 36-50 26.2 31-50 37.5 51-64 22.4 51-64 28.9 +65 30.4 +65 20.6 Source: Noppe 2005, 2007.

IV. Informal party organization: Intra-party dynamics and tensions

As can be seen from de description of the VB’s organization in the previous section, it appears that the party is tightly organized. While the formal structure resembles the one adopted by most Belgian parties, the distribution of power is truncated.

Vertically, the party executive is one of the most important bodies of the VB and probably where most power resides. The lower levels do not have much of an influence. The party executive is responsible for selecting the party leader (see section V). Although it is not explicit in the party statutes, the party executive is also the driving force in the formulation of policy positions and party manifestos. The statutes mention that the executive proposes ‘all political materials and decisions regarding the strategies of the party’, whereas the council can ‘discuss’ the proposals and the congress can only approve the proposals. The party executive also controls the composition of the lists for the European, national, and regional levels, as it is granted with the right of proposal. The provincial levels can only advise the party executive, and the council approves. Only for local elections can the local branches and regios propose the composition of the lists. Dewinter claimed in 1993 that the concentration of power in the executive is partly related to the professionalization of the party but also because to a lack of input of the party council itself (Buelens and Deschouwer, 2003). Another reason might be that all members of the party executive are also members of the party council, and can therefore control it. Given the composition of the party executive, most of the power resides in the hands of the party leader and the leaders of the parliamentary party groups.

Despite the fact that the statutes limit the number of members of the party executive to a maximum of 15, the current party executive consists of 24 members4: the party leader, the Treasurer, 1 MEP, 3 Senators, 5 MPs from the House of representatives, 6 MPs from the Flemish Parliament, 1 MP from the Brussels Parliament, and 5 extra members including 3 members of the executive board of the VBJ.

Horizontally, the party is characterized by an unequal geographical distribution. From its origins, the VB has always been an ‘Antwerp’ phenomenon, both in terms of organization as in terms of

4 http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/partijbestuur/ (13/06/2013). 13 electoral success. This can be explained to some extent by the fact that many former Flemish nationalists and collaborators sought the anonymity of Flanders’ largest city after WWII. Furthermore, immigration, unemployment and a lack of urban-friendly policies provided a breeding ground for the mobilization of VB voters in Antwerp as well as other urban areas. Nowadays, Antwerp still dominates to party. It can be seen in the composition of the party executive (Table 4), where 37.5% of the members reside in the province. It can also be seen in the geographical distribution of party members (Table 8). About a quarter of the members (25.3%) are affiliated to the Antwerp provincial branch of the party.

Table 4. Number of party executive members per province (2013)

Province Members of the party executive Inhabitants West Vlaanderen 2 1,159,366 Oost Vlaanderen 3 1,432,326 Antwerpen 9 1,744,862 Limburg 2 838,505 Vlaams Brabant 6 1,076,924 Brussel 2 1,089,538 Total 24 7,341,521 Source: http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/partijbestuur/ (13/06/2013).

As pointed out in the previous section, the organizational development of the party gave rise to internal tensions. These tensions were more acute at the end of each phase of organizational development: the end of the 1980s, and the end of the 2000s.

The end of the 1980s was characterized by tensions around the leadership and the autonomy of the organization towards the leadership. Karel Dillen was pushing the party in a direction (Rejuvenation, switch in terms of core issues) that alienated part of the party. It resulted in a large membership drop, as the party lost 41% of its members between 1987 and 1988 (Figure 2).

Since the end of the 2000s, the party entered a new phase of crisis triggered by the first electoral defeats. The tensions emerged around the geographical dominance of the Antwerp, as well as the level of control of the party executive over the rest of the organization.

Indeed, the number of Antwerp VB candidates inside the vital organs of the party has remained important despite the diminishing weight of the provincial branch in terms of membership

(Table 8 in Appendix). Between 1995 and 2006, the Antwerp branch has lost 5.6 percentage points in its weight in the party’s total membership. Symbolically, whereas it started off representing almost one third of the party’s total membership, it represented ‘only’ a quarter ten years later. Yet, it still dominates the party executive, which has led to tensions and resentment from other branches.

The level of control of the party executive over the rest of the organization also generated tensions. A ‘red-tape’ crisis opposed the leadership and the lower levels of the party organization, the lower levels and grassroots accusing the leadership to have lost connection with what is happening on the ground. More specifically, the first electoral setbacks have instigated much discussion about the strategy to be followed (radicalisation versus moderation) and has also meant that fewer mandates have been distributed. Particularly, the dominant position of Filip Dewinter – one of the more radical VB members – has led to severe tensions. The radical strategy of Dewinter that remained intact after the electoral losses has clearly alienated part of the VB members and main figureheads. Several well-known figures of the party, including Vanhecke, Jurgen Verstrepen, Koen Dillen and Karim Van Overmeiren, have consequently left the VB. Politicians such as Vanhecke and Van Overmeiren have stated clearly that they can no longer identify with the radical strategy that is maintained by the head of the VB. Party membership also started dropping. Between 2007 and 2009, the party lost 2,500 members (10%). The drop is expected to have continued and aggravated, although the party has not disclosed its membership figures for the subsequent years. One indicator points in that direction: in the official statements of party accounts to the House of Representatives, the VB reports 121,408 euros of membership fees in 2011, and only 20,583 euros for 2012 (Doc 53 – 2786/002). It represents a loss of about 100,000 euros of revenues from membership fees, and probably a dramatic drop in membership numbers5.

The party is also facing a crisis of control, with the leadership not wanting to lose control over the lower levels of the organization, and the (growing) lower levels requesting more say in the decision-making. The recent conflict where the regional party executive of Ghent (second

5 If we consider a standard membership fee of 10 euros, it only represents about 12,140 members for 2011, opposed to 22,500 claimed in 2009. The loss of 100,000 euros would represent a loss of roughly 10,000 members, leaving the party with only about 2,000 members! 15 largest Flemish city) opposed to the national party executive illustrates these tensions. In 2011, a regional executive was appointed with the support of the head of the party, but the local office holders disagreed and even established the dissident ‘Belfort group’. The leader of this group argued that the appointment of the regional executive was a problem, but that there is also a deeper underlying reason of dissatisfaction: “We are dissatisfied because the party leadership clings on it style and methods of 20, 25 years ago. We think that the party’s message should be translated into the 21st century with less provocation. But the style of Filip Dewinter still dominates, you might say the style of the Antwerp municipal council” (VRT 2011).

This last example illustrates that two sources of dissatisfaction overlap. Another example of this overlap can be found in a statement by Vanhecke, who explicitly denounced on his Internet blog the complete domination of the VB by the Antwerp section led by Dewinter. He stated that “[t]he fragile equilibrium that existed until mid-2009, with FDW [Filip Dewinter] playing an important and prominent role but at least taking the role of the party bureau . . . into account, has been systematically broken down by Bruno Valkeniers. On every crucial occasion Valkeniers has taken the side of FDW . . . The VB has become the party of one man and this cannot possibly end well” (Van Hecke 2011).

V. The role of party leadership

During its first years, the party was dominated by the figure of its founder, Karel Dillen. Although he managed to lead the party in a very clear manner and for a very long time (17 years), he cannot be considered as a charismatic leader. He conducted his political career and a career as accountant in a taxi company in parallel.

The main shift occurred with the emergence of the new generation – Annemans, Vanhecke, and Dewinter – at the end of the 1980s. Dillen remained the party leader until 1997, but the party was not a one-figure party anymore. The distribution of power and roles was very clear. Annemans played the card of Flemish nationalism, whereas Dewinter focused on immigration and anti-establishment; Vanhecke would occupy a middle position. It positioned him perfectly to occupy the role of party leader. He succeeded Dillen and led the party during 12 years, from

1996 until 2007. Valkeniers, who can be seen as leaning towards the Flemish nationalist side, replaced him until 2012 (5 years). The lifespan of the party leader has been dramatically reduced since the Dillen era.

Formally, the leader is appointed for 4 years in a two-step process emphasizing the dominant role of the party executive. The first step of the process corresponds to the designation of the candidate. All members of the party executive can apply, and the selection of the candidate is made by a secret vote of the party executive. The candidate who wins a majority of the votes after the first round is proposed to the congress as candidate-leader. If no candidate reaches a majority of the votes, a second round is organized, with only the top-two candidates of the first round. In the second step of the process, the candidate-leader is presented to the party congress, where all members with voting rights6 are invited to vote. If the candidate does not reach a majority of the votes, the party executive has to propose an alternative candidate, under the exact same procedure.

The formal procedure gives all the power to the party executive in the selection of the party leader. The congress is never faced with a real choice, since the executive only proposes one candidate-leader to the congress. Therefore, the vote of the congress can be regarded as a plebiscite more than a real competitive race. As an illustration, Frank Vanhecke was re-elected as party leader in December 2004 with 94.2% of the votes7.

Because of the centralized character of the party organization, the party leader and the members of the party executive are the public figures of the party. The leader is not the only face of the party organization. (S)he is rather the internal face of the organization, whereas prominent figures of the executive are more present in the media. It is the case of Dewinter, who appears in opinion polls as the public figure of the VB.

6 Members are granted the right to vote after one year of party affiliation. 7 Out of the 469 votes recorded, 2.6% voted blank/null, and 3.2% voted against the candidate. 17

VI. Discussion: the VB, a ‘normal’ party organization?

The elements developed in the previous section give a good picture of the development of the party organization and its current state. However, in order to fully grasp whether the VB has a ‘normal’ or unique party organization, these aspects have to be put in a comparative perspective. This section compares the VB to the other Belgian parties on 4 indicators: level of cartelization of the organization, party leadership, party membership, and party finances.

In terms of party structure, we have seen that the VB has, from the very beginning, adopted a structure that resembles the typical structure of Belgian parties. What is more interesting from a comparative perspective is to look at the distribution of roles within the party structure. Some of the elements discussed previously can be combined to look at the level of cartelization of the party organization. Sandri and Pauwels (2010) investigated the internal dimension of cartelization (Bolleyer 2009) in all Belgian political parties. Looking more specifically at the blurred character of party membership - via the recruitment procedure and the rights and obligations of party members (van Haute 2013)-, and the level of stratarchy of the organization, they built an index of cartelization for all Belgian parties (Table 5). The VB is clearly located at one end of the index with the lowest level of cartelization among all Belgian parties. While it is the party with the most open procedure for membership recruitment it has the lowest level of stratarchy in the organization, and the lowest level of rights and obligations for its members.

This finding is, however, based on the VB party statutes, which are much shorter (12 pages) than the average length of the statutes for the other Belgian parties (average of 33.8 pages)8. The shorter statutes do not develop as many rules and regulations as the other parties tend to do. Nevertheless, it shows that, if the overall structure of the VB looks like the structure of other party organizations in Belgium, the formal distribution of roles as described in the party statutes is quite different.

8 Average length calculated based on the most recent version of the statutes – see http://www.politicalpartydb.com. The length of the statutes for the other Belgian parties is: Groen: 14; Ecolo: 51; SP.a: 28; PS: 55; NVA: 37; CD&V: 55; CDH: 44; OpenVLD: 10; MR: 11. 18

Table 5. Level of cartelization in a comparative perspective

Membership Rights over Stratar Cartelizat Weighted cartelization Party openness obligations chy ion index (%)

SP.a 11.0 5.0 5.7 21.7 74.6 Groen 7.0 7.0 4.3 18.3 65.4 Open VLD 6.0 9.0 3.3 18.3 65.0 CDH 6.7 7.0 3.3 17.0 59.2 CD&V 8.0 6.0 3.3 17.3 58.3 Ecolo 7.0 8.0 2.3 17.3 58.0 N-VA 6.7 4.0 3.3 14.0 48.0 PS 6.7 5.0 2.3 14.0 46.2 VB 12.0 3.0 1.3 16.3 45.0 Source: Sandri & Pauwels 2011

In terms of party leadership, the VB also distances itself from the rest of the Belgian parties on two levels: the leadership selection method, and the length of party leadership. In terms of leadership selection method, the VB is the only party that does not grant its members the right to directly elect the party leader. All the other parties have now transferred that right to the members (Cross and Pilet, forthcoming)9. As regard the average length of party leadership, the VB is again at odds with the general trend in other Belgian parties. With only 3 former party leaders and an average of 11.7 years in office, the length in office of the VB is much higher than the common pattern in the other parties.

Figure 3. Average length of party leadership (in years), 1979-present

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Source: author’s own data

9 CDH in 1970, Ecolo 1981, MR 1989, OpenVLD and CD&V 1993, Groen and SP.a 1995, PS 1997, VU/NVA 1999. 19

In terms of party membership, the VB distances itself from most of the other Belgian parties – with the exception of the Greens (Ecolo and Groen) on three levels. First, the party attracts slightly more young members than the other Belgian parties (van Haute et al 2012). More fundamentally, it is one of the rare parties that is characterized by a long-term membership growth. Yet, despite the membership growth, the party hardly reaches an overall ratio of members to voters (M/V) similar to the other Belgian parties, again with the exception of the Greens (Table 5).

Table 6. Party membership (ratio members/voters) in a comparative perspective

Average all Groen Ecolo SP.a PS VU / NVA CD&V CDH VLD MR VB but VB 1981 0.6 0.6 15.3 21.1 8.1 10.7 12.5 7.8 9.1 10.7 2.4 1985 0.4 0.6 12.3 16.9 10.6 9.0 8.6 11.3 11.4 10.1 4.3 1987 0.5 0.4 11.3 15.1 9.9 11.6 8.7 10.6 13.2 10.1 3.6 1991 0.7 0.4 13.3 15.5 10.0 12.7 6.6 9.0 6.7 9.3 1.0 1995 1.5 1.0 10.6 16.3 5.5 10.4 6.5 10.0 5.6 8.2 2.0 1999 1.0 0.6 12.1 16.4 4.5 12.3 7.0 8.6 6.0 8.5 2.4 2003 3.7 1.9 6.3 9.6 5.7 10.0 5.5 7.3 4.3 6.3 2.2 2007 1.7 1.4 7.9 10.8 0.8 6.4 7.0 8.5 3.8 5.8 3.1 2010 1.8 1.9 8.7 9.1 1.4 10.0 7.2 11.8 4.2 6.8 4.1 Source: author’s compilation

The structure of party financing can be used as a last indicator to compare party organizations. On average, the VB did not differ much from the other Belgian parties in the period 1999-2007 (Table 6). It relied for almost ¾ of its funding on state subsidies (75.1%). The rest of the funding came from contributions from MPs (8.4%) and members (5.8%).

Table 7. Party financing in a comparative perspective (%)

VB Average 1999-2007 VB 2011 VB2012 All other parties 2012 State subsidy 75.1 87.3 89.0 75.8 MPs contribution 8.4 8.4 8.0 9.9 Membership fees 5.8 1.9 0.3 3.3 Donations 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.8 Other 10.5 2.3 2.6 10.2 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: VB average 1999-2007: Weekers & Maddens 2009; 2011-2012: author’s compilation for the Political Party Database project: http://www.politicalpartydb.com

These numbers are almost identical to the average structure of funding in the other Belgian parties. However, since the end of the 2000s, the pattern has changed, and the VB has distanced itself from the ‘typical’ distribution. It tends to rely more and more on state (decreasing) subsidies, and the membership fees have almost disappeared in 2012. This change has to be interpreted as a sign of struggle rather than as a chance of strategy on the behalf of the party.

VII. Conclusion

This paper has sought to develop a better understanding of the party organization of the VB. It started off by looking at the formal and informal features of the party organization.

From the very start, the VB adopted a rather classic organizational structure that hasn’t evolved much over time. The internal dynamics are characterized by the vertical dominance of the party executive and the horizontal supremacy of Antwerp over the rest of the branches. These dynamics haven’t changed much over time either. Nevertheless, the content and functioning of the organization has changed, as the party evolved from an amateur to a professional party. The organizational development was not smooth, and the party has experienced two major organizational crises: a leadership and autonomy crisis at the end of the 1980s, and a crisis of control and a red-tape crisis that the party currently struggles to overcome.

Drawing on an analysis of the organizational features of the party this study also tried to address a more fundamental question: in terms of its organization, is the VB a ‘normal’ party? The evidence is mixed. If the shell of the party resembles other parties, its core is of a different nature. On some aspects, the VB does not distinguish itself from the rest of the Belgian parties. The organizational structure of the VB does not differ much on paper from the structures of the other parties. In terms of funding too, the distribution of the party budget resembles the average typical distribution that can be found in other Belgian parties, at least until the end of the 2000s.

In other ways, however, the VB strongly differs from the other Belgian parties. It is characterized by a lower level of intra-party cartelization than the other Belgian parties. Members have relatively few rights and local branches have little impact on the construction of candidate lists.

However, this might be partly explained by the short party statutes that do not leave space for long developments on rules and regulations regarding party membership. The VB also distinguishes itself by the characteristics of its tightly controlled party leadership selection procedures, and the exceptional length of leadership mandates. In line with these observations, Jagers (2002) concludes that in terms of organization, the VB is the least internally democratic of all Flemish parties. Finally, the party differs from most of the Belgian parties by displaying increasing membership numbers, and by the recruitment of younger age categories.

These specificities, however, have drastically changed since the start of the red-tape crisis. It is almost as if the indicators have reversed. The party no longer follows the same pattern than other parties in terms of funding, and rely more and more on shrinking public subsidies. The dominance of the party executive and the Antwerp branch has generated heavy criticism and tensions. In contrast, the VB gets closer to the other parties by experiencing similar membership decline (with heavy financial consequences), and shorter mandates for the party leader.

In comparative terms, it is expected that populist radical right parties that have developed effective organizations and roots among activists will ‘prove more resilient’ than others (Norris 2005, 218), and be able to sustain through victories and losses. It the case of the VB, the party organizational strength has always been put forward as one explanatory factor for the success and longevity of the VB (Art 2008; Coffé 2005b). However, the current crisis is a sign of an increasing distance between the party elite and the grassroots of the party (voters, members, and activists). The question is therefore whether the party organization is indeed strong enough to survive these difficulties, or if the dominance of the party executive and the ‘Antwerp faction’ will alienate the grassroots further and put the party at risk to be sucked out its marrow and substance and left only with the party elite. With the recent selection of Annemans as party leader – who is considered more of a moderate VB member – over Dewinter – who is much more controversial – it seems that the VB executive is aware of these dangers and is trying to limit the internal problems to a minimum. Yet many challenges lie ahead and it remains to be seen whether the VB will be able to overcome the current crisis in the long run.

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