Do Individual Factors Explain the Different Success of the Two
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Acta Politica, 2005, 40, (74–93) r 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 0001-6810/05 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/ap Do Individual Factors Explain the Different Success of the Two Belgian Extreme Right Parties Hilde Coffe´ Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen, Faculteit ESP (M210), Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel, Belgium. E-mail: [email protected] While the Vlaams Blok has become electorally one of the most successful extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe, the Francophone Front National does not seem to be able to establish a solid basis for support. This study provides an analysis of the possible reasons for the difference in the electoral results of the extreme right in Flanders and Wallonia in terms of individual sociological factors. The study takes individual-level social background characteristics and attitudes into account. Its findings show that the regional difference in electoral results cannot be explained by differences in voters’ social background or by voters’ attitudes. The hypothesis that after these individual elements have been controlled for the regional differences in extreme right-wing voting would be reduced, has to be rejected. Considering that in the Walloon provinces citizens are less involved in social and religious organizations and have, among other things, more negative attitudes towards immigrants, the regional difference in extreme right-wing voting becomes even greater after individual variables have been controlled for. The explanation for the difference therefore has to lie in other political, cultural and historical factors. Acta Politica (2005) 40, 74–93. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500078 Keywords: extreme right; Belgian politics; comparative research Introduction Since the 1980s, right-wing extremist parties have been successful in different Western European countries.1 Among others, the Freiheitliche Partei O¨ sterreichs (FPO¨ ) in Austria, the Front National in France, the Fremskritt- spartiet in Norway and the Alleanza Nazionale in Italy obtained electoral victorious. At the same time, the electoral results of extreme right parties remain marginal in other countries. For instance in Finland, Great Britain, Ireland and Portugal never elected a representative of an extreme right party in a nationwide election (Ignazi, 2003). In Belgium, there is a successful extreme right party in Flanders, while in Wallonia the extreme right enjoys only little support. This article seeks to Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 75 account for the variation across Belgium’s regions when it comes to voting for extremist right-wing parties. More specifically, we will analyse whether this difference in electoral success can be explained by the voters’ social background and attitudes. Many studies have used these individual elements to explain the success of extreme right-wing parties. In particular, research in Flanders, which often lacks a comparative perspective, has focused on these variables. In this article, we will analyse whether the regional difference in electoral success of the extreme right can be explained from individual sociological elements. In the first part of the article, we will describe the Belgian extreme right-wing parties. The next section addresses various theories on electoral support for extreme right-wing parties. In the third and major part of the article, we turn to empirical analysis. Comparative analyses will be conducted to inspect whether the socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes that characterize extreme right voters are more prominent among the Flemish electorate. This is to be expected, as the extreme right performs far better at the polls in Flanders than in Wallonia. We conclude the article with a summarizing logistic regression analysis. The analysis will focus on whether individual characteristics do explain the difference in electoral success of the extreme right parties. Extreme Right-wing Parties in Belgium Vlaams Blok The Vlaams Blok is an amalgamation of two nationalist parties and participated in elections for the first time in 1978. In its first few years, the Vlaams Blok remained a small splinter party that recruited its members from the ranks of activists in Flemish nationalist organizations with which it was in close contact. The Vlaams Blok set out to operate as a zweeppartij (literally ‘whip party’) of the Volksunie (VU). Its aim was to put other parties, in particular the Volksunie, under electoral pressure to adjust their policies to the people’s wishes (Mudde, 2000). At that time, the VU was the dominant Flemish nationalist party and, in the eyes of the Vlaams Blok, it was making too many concessions to French speaking community. The Vlaams Blok strove for the independence of Flanders. This chauvenist programme gave the party the stable but small support of between 1 and 2% of voters. In the mid-1980s the Vlaams Blok began to change. New members, leaders of nationalist youth and student organizations such as the present member of the Flemish Parliament Filip Dewinter, entered the party leadership and the Vlaams Blok organized its first conference devoted to the migration issue. The success of the French Front National in mobilizing people against immigrants provided a model that the Vlaams Blok was keen to imitate. In addition, the Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 76 link between nationalist Flemish separatism and a tough stance on migration is most obvious when the ethnic nationalism is considered. It should be noted that during the 1980s the Dutch ‘Centrumpartij’ — a right-wing party has been an influence on the Vlaams Blok. However, it disappeared in the 1990s. The party conducted a fierce anti-immigrant campaign in the 1987 parliamentary elections. The Vlaams Blok doubled its number of seats in Parliament — from one to two — and won for the first time in its history a seat in the Belgian Senate by using a new slogan, ‘Eigen volk eerst!’ (Own people first!). This slogan was based on the catchphrase of the French Front National, ‘Les Franc¸ais d’abord’. At the same time, tension began to grow over the choice between prioritizing the migration issue, which was electorally rewarding, and the original Flemish-nationalist ideology. Those who wanted to focus on Flemish nationalism accused Dewinter and others of being Lepenists (supporters of the Front National leader Le Pen in France) and of having sidelined the Flemish question in favour of the anti-immigrant issue (Mudde, 1995). In the end, the Vlaams Blok chose to follow the more electorally rewarding strategy and thus to focus on the anti-immigrant issue, but it combined it with the original nationalism. The party’s real breakthrough came in the parliamentary elections of 24 November 1991 — a day that was afterwards known as (Table 1) ‘Black Sunday’ — when the Vlaams Blok obtained 10.3% of Flemish votes. In Antwerp, every fourth voter supported the extreme right party, making it the strongest political force in the city. Antwerp, the city where it scored its Table 1 Results obtained by the Vlaams Blok since 1978 in the Flemish region and by the Front National since 1991 in the Walloon region in the federal Parliament elections (in percentages of valid votes)a Percentage Percentage Year Vlaams Blok Front National 1978 2.1 1981 1.8 1985 2.2 1987 3.0 1991 10.3 1.7 1995 12.2 5.5 1999 15.3 4.1 2003 17.9 5.6 Source: Ministry of Interior. aAs Belgium has a confederal party model, we give the electoral results within a region. After all, national parties no longer exist and, except in the complex situation in Brussels, a Flemish citizen cannot vote for a French-speaking politician, or vice versa. Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 77 first successes, is regarded as its main stronghold, but the party put up a vigorous showing in other areas of Flanders too (Mudde, 2000). The shock waves caused by the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok sent ripples as far as the so-called democratic camp. Numerous new organizations were founded, such as anti-racist pressure groups, and a cordon sanitaire agreement that had been signed for the first time in 1988 was reintroduced (Damen, 2001). In particular, the so-called seventy-point programme on migration policy put forward in 1992 by Filip Dewinter and Vlaams Blok president Karel Dillen sparked a good deal of reaction. In this pamphlet the Vlaams Blok advocated, among other things, ending immigration, applying the ‘Put Our Own People First’ principle and speeding up the repatriation of immigrants. The Vlaams Blok continued to grow throughout the following decade. In 2003, the party has gained more than 18% of the Flemish vote. However, despite being an important player in the Flemish political landscape, the party was never allowed to participate in policy-making, because of the cordon sanitaire. In the past, governing has never been an option for the Vlaams Blok, but today it is beginning to look as if it intends to present itself as a potential governing party, especially at the local level in Antwerp. In recent years, the Vlaams Blok has presented itself, using a populist way, on racism and anti-establishment issues, and this has obviously been a success. Strongly worded ideological texts have been filtered and rewritten under pressure from the government and out of pragmatism. The new texts are more moderate, but still show the same mindset. The party has an elaborate ideological programme built around a core of Flemish nationalism (Mudde, 2000). It considers the ethnic community to be the main organizational unit for groups of people, which means that it rejects a multicultural Belgian state and maintains that Flemish citizens should have their own state. The party’s other main topic is migration.