Do Individual Factors Explain the Different Success of the Two

Home , National Front (Belgium), National Front (Greece), Vlaams Blok

Acta Politica, 2005, 40, (74–93) r 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 0001-6810/05 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/ap

Do Individual Factors Explain the Different Success of the Two Belgian Extreme Right Parties Hilde Coffe´ Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen, Faculteit ESP (M210), Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel, Belgium. E-mail: [email protected]

While the Vlaams Blok has become electorally one of the most successful extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe, the Francophone Front National does not seem to be able to establish a solid basis for support. This study provides an analysis of the possible reasons for the difference in the electoral results of the extreme right in Flanders and Wallonia in terms of individual sociological factors. The study takes individual-level social background characteristics and attitudes into account. Its findings show that the regional difference in electoral results cannot be explained by differences in voters’ social background or by voters’ attitudes. The hypothesis that after these individual elements have been controlled for the regional differences in extreme right-wing voting would be reduced, has to be rejected. Considering that in the Walloon provinces citizens are less involved in social and religious organizations and have, among other things, more negative attitudes towards immigrants, the regional difference in extreme right-wing voting becomes even greater after individual variables have been controlled for. The explanation for the difference therefore has to lie in other political, cultural and historical factors. Acta Politica (2005) 40, 74–93. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500078

Keywords: extreme right; Belgian politics; comparative research

Introduction Since the 1980s, right-wing extremist parties have been successful in different Western European countries.1 Among others, the Freiheitliche Partei O¨ sterreichs (FPO¨ ) in Austria, the Front National in France, the Fremskritt- spartiet in Norway and the Alleanza Nazionale in Italy obtained electoral victorious. At the same time, the electoral results of extreme right parties remain marginal in other countries. For instance in Finland, Great Britain, Ireland and Portugal never elected a representative of an extreme right party in a nationwide election (Ignazi, 2003). In Belgium, there is a successful extreme right party in Flanders, while in Wallonia the extreme right enjoys only little support. This article seeks to Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 75 account for the variation across Belgium’s regions when it comes to voting for extremist right-wing parties. More specifically, we will analyse whether this difference in electoral success can be explained by the voters’ social background and attitudes. Many studies have used these individual elements to explain the success of extreme right-wing parties. In particular, research in Flanders, which often lacks a comparative perspective, has focused on these variables. In this article, we will analyse whether the regional difference in electoral success of the extreme right can be explained from individual sociological elements. In the first part of the article, we will describe the Belgian extreme right-wing parties. The next section addresses various theories on electoral support for extreme right-wing parties. In the third and major part of the article, we turn to empirical analysis. Comparative analyses will be conducted to inspect whether the socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes that characterize extreme right voters are more prominent among the Flemish electorate. This is to be expected, as the extreme right performs far better at the polls in Flanders than in Wallonia. We conclude the article with a summarizing logistic regression analysis. The analysis will focus on whether individual characteristics do explain the difference in electoral success of the extreme right parties.

Extreme Right-wing Parties in Belgium Vlaams Blok The Vlaams Blok is an amalgamation of two nationalist parties and participated in elections for the first time in 1978. In its first few years, the Vlaams Blok remained a small splinter party that recruited its members from the ranks of activists in Flemish nationalist organizations with which it was in close contact. The Vlaams Blok set out to operate as a zweeppartij (literally ‘whip party’) of the Volksunie (VU). Its aim was to put other parties, in particular the Volksunie, under electoral pressure to adjust their policies to the people’s wishes (Mudde, 2000). At that time, the VU was the dominant Flemish nationalist party and, in the eyes of the Vlaams Blok, it was making too many concessions to French speaking community. The Vlaams Blok strove for the independence of Flanders. This chauvenist programme gave the party the stable but small support of between 1 and 2% of voters. In the mid-1980s the Vlaams Blok began to change. New members, leaders of nationalist youth and student organizations such as the present member of the Flemish Parliament Filip Dewinter, entered the party leadership and the Vlaams Blok organized its first conference devoted to the migration issue. The success of the French Front National in mobilizing people against immigrants provided a model that the Vlaams Blok was keen to imitate. In addition, the

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 76 link between nationalist Flemish separatism and a tough stance on migration is most obvious when the ethnic nationalism is considered. It should be noted that during the 1980s the Dutch ‘Centrumpartij’ — a right-wing party has been an influence on the Vlaams Blok. However, it disappeared in the 1990s. The party conducted a fierce anti-immigrant campaign in the 1987 parliamentary elections. The Vlaams Blok doubled its number of seats in Parliament — from one to two — and won for the first time in its history a seat in the Belgian Senate by using a new slogan, ‘Eigen volk eerst!’ (Own people first!). This slogan was based on the catchphrase of the French Front National, ‘Les Franc¸ais d’abord’. At the same time, tension began to grow over the choice between prioritizing the migration issue, which was electorally rewarding, and the original Flemish-nationalist ideology. Those who wanted to focus on Flemish nationalism accused Dewinter and others of being Lepenists (supporters of the Front National leader Le Pen in France) and of having sidelined the Flemish question in favour of the anti-immigrant issue (Mudde, 1995). In the end, the Vlaams Blok chose to follow the more electorally rewarding strategy and thus to focus on the anti-immigrant issue, but it combined it with the original nationalism. The party’s real breakthrough came in the parliamentary elections of 24 November 1991 — a day that was afterwards known as (Table 1) ‘Black Sunday’ — when the Vlaams Blok obtained 10.3% of Flemish votes. In Antwerp, every fourth voter supported the extreme right party, making it the strongest political force in the city. Antwerp, the city where it scored its

Table 1 Results obtained by the Vlaams Blok since 1978 in the Flemish region and by the Front National since 1991 in the Walloon region in the federal Parliament elections (in percentages of valid votes)a

Percentage Percentage Year Vlaams Blok Front National

1978 2.1 1981 1.8 1985 2.2 1987 3.0 1991 10.3 1.7 1995 12.2 5.5 1999 15.3 4.1 2003 17.9 5.6

Source: Ministry of Interior. aAs Belgium has a confederal party model, we give the electoral results within a region. After all, national parties no longer exist and, except in the complex situation in Brussels, a Flemish citizen cannot vote for a French-speaking politician, or vice versa.

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 77 first successes, is regarded as its main stronghold, but the party put up a vigorous showing in other areas of Flanders too (Mudde, 2000). The shock waves caused by the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok sent ripples as far as the so-called democratic camp. Numerous new organizations were founded, such as anti-racist pressure groups, and a cordon sanitaire agreement that had been signed for the first time in 1988 was reintroduced (Damen, 2001). In particular, the so-called seventy-point programme on migration policy put forward in 1992 by Filip Dewinter and Vlaams Blok president Karel Dillen sparked a good deal of reaction. In this pamphlet the Vlaams Blok advocated, among other things, ending immigration, applying the ‘Put Our Own People First’ principle and speeding up the repatriation of immigrants. The Vlaams Blok continued to grow throughout the following decade. In 2003, the party has gained more than 18% of the Flemish vote. However, despite being an important player in the Flemish political landscape, the party was never allowed to participate in policy-making, because of the cordon sanitaire. In the past, governing has never been an option for the Vlaams Blok, but today it is beginning to look as if it intends to present itself as a potential governing party, especially at the local level in Antwerp. In recent years, the Vlaams Blok has presented itself, using a populist way, on racism and anti-establishment issues, and this has obviously been a success. Strongly worded ideological texts have been filtered and rewritten under pressure from the government and out of pragmatism. The new texts are more moderate, but still show the same mindset. The party has an elaborate ideological programme built around a core of Flemish nationalism (Mudde, 2000). It considers the ethnic community to be the main organizational unit for groups of people, which means that it rejects a multicultural Belgian state and maintains that Flemish citizens should have their own state. The party’s other main topic is migration. It has a xenophobic attitude to foreigners, who are regarded as a threat. Next to ethnic nationalism and migration, crime and lack of security are other key elements in the party’s programme. It makes connections between crime and migration: ‘Street crime, drug trafficking, car theft, prostitution, burglaries and homejackings can often be blamed on foreign youngsters and gangs. The number of second- and third-generation Eastern European and Islamic immigrants involved in crime is alarming’ (Vlaams Blok, 2003). In the party literature, ethical values are also given an important place. The Vlaams Blok supports family life, has a negative attitude towards homo- sexuality and rejects abortion and euthanasia. It likes to present itself as the sole defender of traditional values. Its economic programme is based on its nationalism, which means that the welfare state is presented as a system of social protection for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 78 have contributed to that community. Finally, the party’s discourse focuses on its opposition to the established parties, which are accused of patronage and scandals. In addition, these parties are heavily criticized for their anti-Flemish attitude and anti-Flanders policies. In short, Vlaams Blok can be located at the extreme right of the political spectrum in Belgium. It fosters an ethnic nationalism, laments moral decay and the loss of traditional values, and puts the political system itself under constant attack by delegitimizing the democratic institutions, especially the parties and the party system (Mudde, 2000; Pennings and Keman, 2003).

Front National The Walloon Front National was created by Daniel Fe´ ret in 1985 following the example of the Front National of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Fe´ ret immediately became president for life and his angle was clear: take advantage of the attention that the French Front National received in the media after the European elections of 1984. Le Pen was presented as the reference and Fe´ ret even copied the symbols, label and style of his strong example. In contrast to the Vlaams Blok, the FN started off as a completely new party. It had no resources, nor ideological coherence. From the few documents that are available from the 1985 elections, it is clear that migration was its outstanding issue (Delwit and De Waele, 1999). From the beginning, the party had no structure and was little more than an ad hoc collection of rather heterogeneous individuals (Swyngedouw, 1998). Even today — and in contrast to the Vlaams Blok — the party is not well organized and frequently has to deal with disputes between its officials. These conflicts have already driven officials to leave the FN and start splinter parties. Although its members are French-speaking, when it was founded the party had a bilingual name (Front National-Front voor de Natie). When it first took part in national elections (in 1985 and 1987), it presented lists only in Brussels. In 1991, the party — which had meanwhile changed its name to the monolingual ‘Front National’ — for the first time submitted lists of candidates in different Walloon provinces. With 5.5% of the overall Walloon vote, the party made definite progress in 1995 and appeared to achieve a moderate electoral breakthrough. In the following elections, in 1999, its vote decreased to 4.1%. It recovered, however, winning 5.6% of Walloon votes in 2003 when, for the first time in its history, the party could send delegates to the two federal chambers. This meant that it now receives federal funding. The programme of Fe´ ret’s Front National is poor compared with that of the Vlaams Blok. His answer to the question of what ideology the FN stands for is typical: ‘Absolutely none. The FN is a party that tries to give answers to today’s problems without looking for these answers in

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 79 ideologies’ (Abramowicz, 1995). The central element in the party’s programme is the migration issue, on which it is very similar to the Vlaams Blok. The FN would like to make naturalization requirements tougher and dual nationality impossible, and to introduce a more restrictive immigration policy. Law and order and political dissatisfaction are also key programme issues. The FN is negative about the other parties and accuses them of merely furthering their own interests. The Vlaams Blok and FN programmes are quite similar when it comes to ethical values. The family is considered to be the cornerstone of society, and both parties advocate a salary for housewives. Finally, there is the question of nationality. Like the Vlaams Blok, the FN supports the principle of national sovereignty based on a redefinition of national identity. Unlike the Vlaams Blok, however, it does not promote a Walloon society separated from Flanders, but supports a federal Belgium and opposes separatist actions. In other words, the two main extreme right-wing parties associate themselves with the nationalist references that are typical of their respective language communities: the Vlaams Blok is Flemish nationalist and strives for independence; while the French-speaking Front National is a royalist party and stands for a Belgian union (Delwit et al., 1998). But while Flemish nationalism is a central point in the discourse of the Vlaams Blok, the issue of Belgian nationalism is of minor importance in the Front National’s programme. This is one of the explanations for their different holds on the electorate (Ignazi, 2003).

Theories: Differences in Social Structure We now turn to theories regarding extreme right voting. Since we are concerned in this article with the influence of individual sociological factors on the success of extreme right parties, we limit ourselves to the theories that focus on the individual microlevel. In addition, theories that focus on the meso level and theories that focus on the social macrolevel can be distinguished (Coffe´ , 2004). The first category takes the characteristics of the parties as explanatory variables. They look for instance at the charisma of the party leaders, the organizational structure of the party and the party’s discourse. Theories that focus on the macrolevel consider social variables such as the existence of a national subculture, the presence of immigrants, the economical situation and the electoral system. With regard to the individual level, extreme right voting can be explained by individual socio-demographic variables as well as attitudes. Two types of composition effects are thus relevant to this study: one is related to the social structure of a region; the other to public opinion within it.

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 80

Social structure Previous research has revealed that the lower social classes in particular are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties. In his Theories of economic interests, Lipset (1960) suggests that social classes in economic or social positions comparable to those of immigrants are more likely to perceive immigrants as an economic threat, and will therefore be more likely to vote for an extreme right-wing party. In Kitschelt’s (1995) work, we find ideas about the theory of economic interests. In his Theory of social preference formation, Kitschelt elaborates the link between work experience and voting behaviour. He argues that as a result of the growing competition on the labour market, workers who traditionally voted for the social-democrats switched to extreme right parties. According to Kitschelt, workers tend to disagree with the policy of redistribution of the social-democrats but are rather attracted by the liberal market-discourse of the extreme right parties. Kitschelt indeed states that the rise of extreme right parties is based primarily on whether or not these parties adopt the winning formula of economically rightist as well as politically and culturally authoritarian positions. Mudde (1999), however, argues that the economic programme of extreme right parties primarily correlates with their nationalist platform. As for them the nation(-state) is the most important unit, the economy is meant to serve the nation. Therefore, national businesses and labour should be protected from foreign competitors. In breach of the neo- liberal adagium, the economic nationalism of extreme right parties includes state subsidies and protectionist measures. Moreover, extreme right parties are generally positive towards welfare state provisions, most notably pensions and social care, though they want to limit these to ‘their own’ only. Obviously, this contradicts Kitschelts winning formula thesis. In any case, the economic theme is not a central issue in the discourse of extreme right parties. Themes such as migration, security and nationalism occupy first place. Furthermore, less educated people are more likely to vote for extreme right parties. Cultural sociologists such as Gabennesch (1972) emphasize that higher education broadens a person’s social horizons. It increases knowledge and understanding of norms and values different from one’s own culture. In addition, non-religious people and those who are socially disintegrated seem to be over-represented among extreme right-wing electorates. Over-representation of these social categories among extreme right-wing electorates has been explained by theories of social disintegration (Kornhauser, 1960). These theories suggest that people who are badly integrated into society have a need to find intermediary structures. Extreme right-wing parties attempt to fulfil this need through their nationalist programmes. During the nineties, the importance of social participation with regard to the development of democratic attitudes has received a lot of attention. Putnam (1993) uses the term social capital and

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 81 defines this concept as the willingness to cooperate, the presence of trust in fellow citizens, the use of norms of reciprocity and the existence of networks within society. Two components may be distinguished: structural ones (networks, interaction) and cultural ones (reciprocity, trust). A structural component of social capital is amongst others the participation in social organizations. According to Putnam, this participation has important political consequences for the functioning of a democracy. People who participate more frequently and more intensely in organizations stick more to democratic values (Elchardus and Smits, 2002). The longing for a radical approach to problems and the fear for foreigners increases as citizens lead lonelier lives. As a consequence, they agree with the anti-immigrant discourse and the radical solutions which the extreme right parties stand for. As with participation in social organizations, religious involvement is thought to fulfill the function of social capital (Putnam, 2000). For individuals, religious involvement is a buffer against the atomization and social disintegration of mass society. A lack of religious influence increases the chance to show sympathy for extreme right. Lubbers (2001) concludes that atheists are over-represented in the extreme right electorate. According to Mayer (2002), this is particularly the case in countries such as Belgium and Austria where pillarization has been strong. Thus, the first hypothesis states that if a region contains relatively more people from the categories that are found to be most likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties, this could explain the cross-regional variation in support for these parties. This means for our comparison that we expect the Walloon voters to be more involved in social and religions life than the Flemings.

Public opinion Besides the background characteristics, socio-political attitudes seem to play a crucial role in votes for extreme right-wing parties. Four clusters of attitudinal positions can be found (Mudde, 1999): anti-immigrant attitudes, favourable in- group attitudes, authoritarian attitudes and political dissatisfaction. Anti- immigrant standpoints have been shown to be the most important (Depickere and Swyngedouw, 2002). People who — in line with theories of economic interests — perceive immigrants as a threat, are more likely to blame these out- groups. They are therefore more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties. Adorno et al. (1950) suggest in The authoritarian personality that an authoritarian attitude leads to the condemnation of minority groups. They show that anti-Semitism is not an isolated subject, but can be linked, together with ethnocentrism, stereotyping and authoritarianism, to one ideology: the authoritarian personality. The authoritarian personality is the result of a strict, traditional upbringing and is characterized by a strong attachment to conventional values, submission to authority and aggressive tendencies

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 82 towards offenders. Depickere and Swyngedouw (2002) find that the Vlaams Blok voter shows a more than average tendency to opt for authoritarian leadership. The link between political dissatisfaction and extreme right-wing voting is central to theoretical notions on protest voting — a concept that refers to the casting of an invalid vote to express a protest. Protest voters vote not for a particular party but rather against all those who they feel do not perform their task as they should. If, in the region where the extreme right-wing is most successful, people are on average more unfavourable towards out-groups, more politically dissatisfied or have a more authoritarian attitude, this may explain the regional difference in the electoral outcome of the far right. Given the success of extreme right in Flanders and the lack of it in Wallonia, we thus expect that Flemish citizens to be more negative towards immigrants, more politically dissatisfied and to have more authoritarian attitudes.

Analysis Most similar system strategy As we know from the theories that individual variables are characteristic of extreme right voting, and as we also know from previous studies that these variables are indeed over-represented within the Vlaams Blok and FN electorate (Coffe´ , 2003), we can analyse whether these characteristics explain the regional difference in the electoral results of the far right. In comparative political research a distinction is made between the most similar system strategy and the most different system strategy (Sartori, 1994). In the most similar system strategy, systems that are as similar as possible in as many features as possible are compared. A most similar system strategy assumes that factors common to relatively homogeneous countries or regions are irrelevant in explaining their differences (or can be assumed to be constant). As a result, it is recommended to choose entities that are similar, if possible in all variables with the exception of the phenomenon to be investigated. A most different system strategy, on the other hand, compares systems that are different as such and yet do not differ on the phenomenon under investigation. Flanders and Wallonia have been shown to be much alike. International comparative research has pointed out that something like a typical Belgian culture does exist (De Rynck, 1998). Voye´ et al. (1992) came to the same conclusion: the differences between Walloon and Flemish citizens are limited, while a lot of similarities between the two regions do exist. Consequently, a most similar system strategy is applicable. Both regions show many similarities in the social background characteristics of their population. The educational level, for example, is roughly the same in Flanders and Wallonia (Me´ renne et al., 1997).

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 83

Hereafter, Flemish and Walloon citizens will be compared in terms of their social backgrounds and attitudes. With regard to social background, we confine ourselves to social and religious involvement, because we know that other elements that correlate with extreme right-wing voting are similar in both regions.2 We assume that these common factors are irrelevant for our analysis, as we are applying a most similar system strategy and they cannot explain the regional difference in the electoral results obtained by the extreme right-wing parties in Belgium.

Religious and social involvement When describing theories on extreme right voting, we found that social involvement correlates significantly with an extreme right vote. Putnam (1993) discovered a negative relationship between social and religious involvement — two structural components of social capital — and a vote for extreme right- wing parties. As the Front National is relatively unsuccessful in Wallonia whereas the Vlaams Blok performs well in Flanders, we can take it that Walloon voters are more active in social and religious life.

Religious involvement There is a significant difference between the Flemish and Walloon regions when it comes to religious involvement (Table 2). In Flanders, more citizens define themselves as being Catholic or Christian compared to Wallonia. Wallonia has considerably more non-believers, freethinkers and people of other religions. This difference can be explained historically: Flanders was traditionally a rural society in which the Catholic church played a dominant role in political and private life, while Wallonia, on the other hand, was one of the first European regions to industrialize, and it experienced the process of secularization earlier (De Rynck, 1998). In addition, Flemish people observe the weekly Sunday obligation more than Walloons. It is noteworthy, however, that this difference in weekly church attendance between the regions is diminishing with time. In 1967, the difference between Flanders and Wallonia was 18 percentage points, whereas in 1998 it was only a little over 3 percentage points (Dobbelaere and Voye´ , 2000). Hence and in contrast to what was hypothesized, the Flemish citizens appear to be more active in religious life than the Walloons.

Social involvement According to the 1999 election survey, Walloon citizens seem to join social organizations less frequently than Flemings. Furthermore, Flanders has a more extensive network of associations and the phenomenon of pillarization is more

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 84

Table 2 Religious and social involvement by region (percentages)

Flanders NWallonia N

Religious involvement *** 2549 1144 Non-believer 15.3 21.2 Freethinker 9.3 12.2 Marginal Catholics 35.9 33.0 Irregular churchgoers 22.018.4 Regular churchgoers 16.4 12.0 Other ideology 1.1 3.2

Membership of association*** 2551 1347 Active member 41.9 29.1 Not an active member 58.1 70.9

Membership of health service organization*** 2538 1341 Christian 60.5 27.7 Socialist 20.1 40.6 Liberal 7.5 7.4 Other 11.9 24.3 Membership of trade union *** 25301340 Christian 20.1 11.1 Socialist 11.7 18.5 Liberal 2.8 1.3 Other 3.8 1.9 Not a member 61.5 67.2

Membership political party* 2555 1397 Member 9.7 8.1 Not a member 90.3 91.9

Source: ISPO/PIOP (1999). ***Pp0.01. **Pp0.05. *Pp0.10.

present in Flanders (De Rynck, 1998). It is also remarkable that Flemish corporate life is predominantly influenced by Catholic associations, while in the Walloon region the Socialist pillar dominates. In line with the ideological characteristics of Flanders and Wallonia, more Flemish people belong to the Christian health insurance organization, while the Socialist health insurance organization is the biggest in Wallonia. The same correlations occur to trade-union membership — also, and, overall more Flemish people than Walloons belong to a trade union. To sum up, the Flemish voters are more active in social life than the Walloon ones. This contradicts our hypothesis.

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Political participation and interest With respect to political participation as a specific characteristic of social involvement, Flemish citizens appear to be more active than Walloons (De Rynck, 1998). Flemings participate more in demonstrations (Smits, 1995), attach greater importance to politics (Gaus and Van der Voort, 1992) and have better political knowledge (Dewachter, 1993). On top of that, Walloon voters are more often absent from elections — which are compulsory in Belgium — and they spoil their votes more frequently. Walloons also belong less often to a political party, and the overall decline of party membership is sharper in Wallonia than in Flanders (Delwit, 2002). Hence, we cannot find an adequate explanation for the difference in the performance between the extreme right-wing in Flanders and Wallonia on the basis of religious and social involvement. In general, Walloons are less involved religiously and less active in social life, so we would expect the extreme right-wing in Wallonia to be more successful. Moreover, the high rate of blank and invalid votes presumes a significant proportion of potential far-right voters. Voters who do not vote are often protest voters, and it is known that the extreme right-wing parties receive a good deal of sympathy from them. With protest voters, it is dissatisfaction that determines voting behaviour, and this makes them attractive to populist parties as potential members. In general, we must conclude that we have to reject our first hypothesis. Contrary to what we stated, the Walloon citizens are less involved in social and religious life.

Attitudes After social background characteristics, we will now examine the attitudes that play an important role in explaining the electoral results of the extreme right, to see whether these attitudes show significant regional differences and may thus explain the regional difference in electoral outcome. Lubbers (2001) concludes that in countries where anti-immigrant attitudes are more widespread, the extreme right-wing is more successful. We know from the theories that extreme right voters do not only differ significantly from the general electorate with regard to negative attitudes towards immigrants. Extreme right voters are also characterized by feelings of political powerlessness and authoritarianism. The concept of a negative attitude towards immigrants refers to feelings of economic as well as cultural threat. It expresses negative feelings towards immigrants which may be guided by cultural differences and socio-economic disfavour. These negative feelings towards immigrants are in the literature referred to as soft, indirect or symbolical racism are also used (Mayer, 2002).

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 86

The items that measure political powerlessness fathom a feeling of political alienation and political meaninglessness. Respondents with high scores on this dimension are convinced that voting has no sense and that politicians do not take the opinions of the voters into account. Authoritarianism includes the demand for more respect, severe measures against what is perceived as deviation, and strong leaders. This will of subjection to an authority corresponds with Adorno et al.’s (1950) theory about the authoritarian personality and its correspondence with fascism. As the extreme right-wing is highly successful in Flanders while it is only marginal in the Walloon provinces, it may be assumed that the attitudes listed above are more prevalent in Flanders than in Wallonia. The 1999 election survey shows that an unfavourable attitude towards immigrants is significantly higher in Wallonia than in Flanders (Table 3). This is in sharp contrast with the popular image of the tolerant Walloon. Indeed, the qualitative research of Van Dam (1996) shows that Walloon and Flemish citizens in executive positions identify Walloons as being tolerant, not xenophobic or racist. Industrialization and the importance of trade unions are said to be the main cause of a social climate in which the class struggle predominates, rather than racial conflict. One Walloon interviewee puts it as follows: ‘One of our most important trump cards is our immigration tradition. Take the Italian community, for example, and see how well they have integrated!’ (p. 69). Another feature typical of Wallonia is said to be the diversity of nationalities. According to the people interviewed in the research by Van Dam and Nizet (2002), this jumble of nationalities is one of the reasons for an anti-racist mentality. Many deduce some kind of Walloon immunity against extreme right-wing from this image. Even politicians make this kind of remark. According to Van Ginderachter (2003), French-speaking politicians agree that the Flemish nation is ‘closed’, meaning that it is founded on ethnic and cultural principles. Walloon society, on the other hand, is seen as ‘civilian and voluntary’, and thus more ‘open’: by agreeing to democratic values,

Table 3 Mean values for attitudes (by region)a

Sign. Flanders NWallonia N

Negative attitude towards immigrants *** 50.3 2520 53,0 1289 Authoritarianism *** 56.9 2535 62,3 1337 Political powerlessness *** 56.5 2551 64,9 1333 aFor the operationalization of the attitudes, sum-scales are used. The sum-scales are standardized from 0(theoretical minimum) to 100(theoretical maximum). Source: ISPO/PIOP (1999). ***Pp0.01.

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 87 anyone who likes can become a Walloon citizen. Laurette Onkelinkx, now Minister for Justice in the federal government, said on French television in 1998 that there is a vital cultural difference between the north and the south: in her view, the south is a country of humanism and tolerance while the north is nationalistic, is not alarmed by the Vlaams Blok ideology and even accepts some of their propositions (Demelenne, 1998). Authoritarianism and political powerlessness score higher in Wallonia than in Flanders. Even after social background characteristics have been controlled for, these differences remain significant. In conclusion, Walloon citizens score significantly higher than their Flemish counterparts on the attitudes that characterize extreme right-wing voters. We have thus to reject our second hypothesis as well. In terms of attitudes, there is a higher potential for extreme right-wing voters in Wallonia than in Flanders. Hence we cannot explain the difference in the electoral results of the Vlaams Blok and the Front National by voter attitudes: regional comparisons would lead us to predict a higher score by the extreme right-wing in Wallonia than in Flanders.

The difference explained? From the regional comparisons of social and religious involvement and attitudes presented above, we conclude that individual elements cannot explain the difference in performance between the extreme right-wing in Flanders and in Wallonia. In this final section, we will apply a binary logistic regression to investigate this finding further. More particularly, we shall analyse whether, once the differences in religious and social involvement and in public opinion have been controlled for, the difference in extreme right-wing voting between the two regions is reduced. On the basis of the theories, this would be expected. However, given the results of the regional comparisons mentioned above, this is not expected. Voting for the extreme right-wing (Vlaams Blok or Front National) is the dependent variable in the binary logistic regression analysis performed.3 The region is the first explanatory factor that is added in the analysis. Afterwards, elements that refer to religious and social involvement and attitudes are added, step by step. To conduct the binary logistic regression analysis, the indicator method is used. This means that the effect of each category is compared with a specific reference category. For this reference category, which is put in italics, the exp(B) value is always equal to one. The results refer to correlations made after controlling for the other variables (Table 4). In the first model, the region is the sole independent categorical variable. The model is statistically significant, which means that our foreknowledge

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 88

Table 4 Binary logistic regression analysis extreme right voting

Independent variables Model 1 Sign Model 2 Sign Model 3 Sign

Region *** *** *** Flanders 3.32 *** 3.17 *** 6.07 *** Wallonia 1 1 1

Membership of association NS NS Active member 0.83 NS 1.07 NS Not an active member 1 1

Membership of health service organization *** ** Christian 1 1 Socialist 1.15 NS 0.84 NS Liberal 0.37 *** 0.36 *** Other 1.01 NS 1.03 NS

Membership of trade union *** *** Christian 1.82 *** 1.83 *** Socialist 1.12 NS 0.98 NS Liberal 1.55 NS 1.27 NS Other 0.84 NS 1.03 NS Not a member 11

Membership of political party *** *** Member 0.50 *** 0.42 *** Not a member 11

Religious involvement *** *** Non-believer 1 1 Freethinker 0.49 *** 0.62 * Marginal Catholics 0.57 *** 0.41 *** Irregular churchgoers 0.40 *** 0.28 *** Regular churchgoers 0.33 *** 0.20 *** Other ideology 0.00 NS 0.01 NS

Negative attitude towards immigrants 1.06 *** Political powerlessness 1.00 NS Authoritarianism 1.02 ***

Intercept 0.05 *** 0.10 *** 0.00 *** Model w2 77.12 *** 164.63 *** 580.03 N 3083 2815 2739

Source: ISPO/PIOP (1999). ***Pp0.01. **Pp0.05. *Pp0.10.

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 89 of the region allows us to make a more accurate prediction about the probability that people will vote for the extreme right-wing. Voting for an extreme right-wing party is significantly influenced by the region one lives in, that is among others things: the region’s political culture, party system and history. In Flanders, the odds on ‘voting for the extreme right-wing vs not voting for the extreme right-wing’ are significantly higher than one. Or rather, the likelihood that people will vote for the extreme right-wing is higher in Flanders than in the Walloon region. This conclusion is obvious, as the extreme right-wing has far greater electoral success in Flanders than in Wallonia. In the second model, it is examined whether the regional difference in the outcome of extreme-right voting remains significant after we have controlled for religious and social involvement. That is to say, we control for social background composition effects. Even after these variables have been controlled for, the variable region continues to play a significant role in explaining extreme right-wing voting behaviour. The ratio of voting for the extreme right-wing to not voting for the extreme right-wing is significantly higher in Flanders than in Wallonia and is roughly as high in the second model as in the first. This means that, as expected on the basis of the regional comparison of religious and social involvement, these elements cannot explain the regional difference in extreme right-wing voting. The hypothesis that regional differences in extreme right-wing voting would diminish after differences in social structure had been controlled for thus has to be rejected. Variables that refer to social and religious involvement cannot explain the regional difference in extreme right-wing voting. Finally, different attitudes are added to the model. This third model makes it possible to conclude whether or not the region in itself plays an important role in extreme right-wing voting, irrespective of religious or social involvement and attitudes. Our analysis shows that, even after these individual elements have been controlled for, the regional context remains a significant factor in explaining extreme right-voting. Like religious and social involvement, individual attitudes cannot explain the regional difference. There is no effect of attitudes, and the second hypothesis thus needs to be rejected. In contrast to what the hypothesis states, the regional difference in extreme right-wing voting actually increases after we have controlled for differences in public opinion. The regional difference is stronger when we assume that the citizens’ attitudes are the same. This means that if Flemish and Walloon citizens had the same unfavourable attitude towards immigrants, for instance, the difference in the electoral outcome of the extreme right in Flanders and Wallonia would be even greater. The explanation for this conclusion was found above: Walloon respondents score significantly higher on attitudes that correlate with extreme right-wing voting.

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 90 Conclusion Our study has demonstrated that although previous studies have shown that a voter’s attitudes and socio-demographic profile provide a good basis for predicting an extreme right-wing vote, this cannot explain the success of the far right in Flanders and its relative lack of success in Wallonia. In the French-speaking part of Belgium, a large body of potential extreme right voters does exist. Walloon citizens are less involved in social and religious life and show less political interest. Since a lack of social and religious involvement is characteristic of extreme right voters, a successful extreme right party would rather be expected in Wallonia. Besides, unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants, and attitudes such as political powerlessness and authoritarianism are more widespread in Wallonia than in Flanders. Given the fact that these attitudes are typical of the extreme right electorate, the difference in the electoral performance of the far right in Flanders and in Wallonia cannot be explained by individual attitudes either. This lack of explanatory value of individual level characteristics with regard to the regional difference in success of the extreme right parties, has been confirmed in a logistic analysis. After controlling for social background characteristics and public opinion, the regional difference in the electoral results of the extreme right parties is greater. If Flemish and Walloon citizens would have the same level of social and religious involvement and would have the same attitudes, the difference in electoral results between the Front National and the Vlaams Blok would even be greater. The absence of a strong, extreme right-wing party in the Walloon region therefore appears to result less from the lack of a demand for political alternatives than from a lack of supply. This conclusion underlines a shortcoming in most research about the far right: little attention has so far been paid to the social, cultural and political climate of a country or region. Especially in Flanders, research on the far right has rarely paid any attention to the social and political environment in which the success of the Vlaams Blok takes place. It has always concentrated primarily on describing the extreme right-wing electorate. However, as individual factors cannot explain the differences in performance, other elements than individual ones have to be taken into account. In an extensive analysis of the possible reasons for the difference in the electoral results of the extreme right in Flanders and Wallonia, we have included social and political elements as well as the extreme right parties themselves (Coffe´ , 2004). We therefore come to the conclusion that macroscopical factors are the main explanation for the difference in success. The main reason why the Front National has never been able to take full advantage of its opportunities is its poor organization and lack of leaders, members and organizational background. Moreover, it has always been

Acta Politica 2005 40 Hilde Coffe´ Individual Factors Explaining the Success of Belgian Extreme Right Parties 91 suffering from splits. As a result, it has never been able to present its product successfully to the electorate, and has always remained an outsider. In contrast to the FN, the Vlaams Blok is an efficiently structured, well- organized party with a charismatic leader able to convince voters. This is partly due to the existence of a traditionally well-organized nationalist subculture. The radical wing of the Flemish nationalist movement did indeed provide ideological and organizational coherence for Flemish extremists. Francophone extremists on the other hand have no distinctive nationalist tradition to appeal to and no notion of national betrayal to play on. Apart from the existence of a ‘nationalist’ subculture in Flanders and the lack of it in Wallonia, other elements explain the difference in electoral performance. For one thing, the radical right in Wallonia is handicapped because of the organizational, electoral and popular strength of socialism in the region. In fact, the influence of the French-speaking socialist party, the PS, is an inescapable reality in Wallonia. So far, the party succeeds in attracting right- authoritarian voters, partly due to its clientilistic way of conducting politics. Apparently these differences matter more than the individual features under investigation.

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Notes

1 Even though the term extreme right is still the most commonly used for the parties under study here, the term has been increasingly challenged in recent years (Mudde, 1996). In the 1990s, a wide variety of labels including the term populism has made its way into the field. Moreover, some terms that were used to describe (historical) fascism are still used today. Another term that surfaces in the literature is right-wing radicalism or the radical right. Still others replace the term right-wing extremism by the term racist.Asextreme-right is the most frequently used term, we prefer to use that term. Anyway, the position of the parties is clearly at the right extreme of the ethical left–right cleavage. Besides the discussion about the party family name, there is a lack of generally accepted definition of right-wing extremism. Mudde (1996) distinguishes five features: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state. 2 There are some regional differences in professional activity. Flanders has more working class employees than Wallonia (National Institute for Statistics, 2003). Wallonia, on the other hand, has more unemployed people. As the latter category is rather small in our survey, and the relationship between being unemployed and voting for the extreme right is significant only in Wallonia (Coffe´ , 2003), we do not take occupation into account as a variable. Moreover, the results of our analysis presented later, in Table 5, remain largely the same when this variable is included. 3 Note that the number of Front National voters is limited in the survey. However, given the correspondence of the FN electorate with other extreme right electorates (Coffe´ , 2003), we may assume that we get a correct picture of the electorate.

Acta Politica 2005 40