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FRUS 1961-1963, Vol IV: Vietnam August-December

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V. THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY, NOVEMBER 22-DECEMBER 31: LODGE-JOHNSON MEETING ON VIETNAM, NSAM 273, MCNAMARA VISIT, YEAR-END OBSERVATIONS 323. Editorial Note On November 22, at 12:30 p.m., Central Standard Time, Presi- dent Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas while traveling in an open car from Love Field to the Dallas Trade Mart where he was scheduled to give a speech on national security. The President was taken to Parkland Hospital in Dallas where doctors pronounced him dead at 1 p.m. The prepared text of the speech which President Kennedy planned to give, in which there is passing reference to Vietnam, is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John E Kennedy, 1963, pp. 890-894. Vice President Johnson arrived at Parkland Hospital approxi- mately 20 minutes before the President was pronounced dead. At 1:40 p.m., the Vice President left the hospital for Love Field. At 2:38 p.m., a Federal Judge administered the oath of office to President Johnson on Air Force One at Love Field. The President then departed on the presidential plane for Washington. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) 324. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President’ Washington, November 23,1963. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Ambassador Lodge I attach a longer draft memorandum’ of the results of the Hono- lulu conference. It was prepared by McGeorge Bundy and covers the highlights of the general discussion. Paragraphs 4 and 7 are the most ’ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vietnam Cables. Secret. 2 Not found. 627 628 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV important, and for your meeting with the Ambassador, 3 I recommend the following points: 1. Need for Teamwork. It is absolutely vital that the whole of the Country Team, but particularly Ambassador Lodge and General Har- kins, work in close harmony and with full consultation back and forth. There must be no back-biting or sniping at low levels such as may have contributed to recent news stories about General Harkins being out of favor with the new regime. A key element in this is the selection of a new deputy to the Ambassador, to replace William Trueheart. (Trueheart has been there more than two years, and the Ambassador agrees that he should now be replaced.) This is for the Secretary of State to work out, but what is needed is a good chief-of-staff type, able to work with the military, economic, and information people, knowing the area, and tough in pulling people together and ironing out any signs of dissension. Two names suggested have been William Sullivan (he is now Governor Harriman’s assistant and the Governor may not want to let him go) and Norbert Anschuetz of the Paris Embassy. In any case, the Ambassador should know that he has your authority to select the best possible man that he and Secretary Rusk can find, and this matter should be worked out before he leaves Washington. 2. Economic and Budget Problem. The Honolulu conference high- lighted that the new Vietnamese government faces a really serious 1964 budget problem requiring some combination of increased taxes, drawing on foreign exchange reserves, and other austerity measures, perhaps some greater US aid input (though this is tough for AID in view of Congressional cuts), and a really tight budget. The first step, agreed at Honolulu, is for Mr. Bell to get the strongest possible US team out to discuss these problems with the new government, which is clearly very inexperienced and unsure of its ground. The Ambassador must really get into this problem, as the essence of it is political- whether the new government can take steps that may make sense from an economic standpoint without unduly weakening its political position and stability-which is vital to the war. With the new govern- ment just getting on its feet, long-term factors are secondary to the short-term problem of insuring its position. We may well have to accept putting in more aid than we would theoretically like, to ensure the new government’s standing, and we should be prepared to direct the necessary funding at whatever cost to other programs in AID or in the Military Assistance Program. (Inciden- tally, the overall tigtness of funds highlights the importance of holding any further cuts in the total foreign aid bill to an absolute minimum.) Robert S. McNamara ‘See Document 330. The Johnson Presidency 629 325. Situation Report Prepared in the Department of State for the President 1 Washington, November 23,1963. SITUAHON IN VIET-NAM As background for your talk with Ambassador Lodge the current situation in Viet-Nam is as follows: Summary Assessment. The outlook is hopeful. There is better assur- ance than under Diem that the war can be won. We are pulling out 1,000 American troops by the end of 1963. The main concern is whether the generals can hold together until victory has been achieved. An immediate problem is an estimated budgetary deficit of roughly $100 million after aid for 1964. Political. The new “provisional” government consists of a Military Revolutionary Council, with an Executive Committee of 12 generals headed by General “Big” Minh as President; a Cabinet headed by former Vice President Tho as Premier; and a political advisory body called the “Council of Sages”. Minh and Tho, who are old friends, are working well together. Thus far no important signs of friction have developed among the generals. The uncertain element is the ambitious, emotional General Dinh, who is Minister of Public Security and retains command of the III Corps around Saigon. The new government has the enthusiastic support of the urban population. The peasants remain apathetic as under the Diem regime, but the government recognizes the importance of moving to win their support. Military. The Viet Cong incident rate shot up to a new high of about 1,000 per week immediately after the coup, but subsequently returned to its “normal” level (300-500 per week). The most critical area is the Mekong Delta south and west of Saigon, and it is there that the new government is expected to concentrate its efforts. The previously low troop ratio in the Delta is being improved. Officers and NCO’s are being chosen on merit rather than political loyalty. The dual chain of command which plagued efficiency under Diem has given way to a single chain which will improve coordination of civil and military operations. The government is expected to correct defects in the implementa- tion of the strategic hamlet program, first by establishing a proper system of priorities for hamlet development from more secure toward ’ Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country File, Memos and Misc. Confidential. Transmitted to the President under cover of an undated memo- randum from Rusk. 630 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV less secure areas. Some delay is expected because the government is just establishing a new central organization for the strategic hamlet program, and the new administration will have to shake down at the local level because of changes in province and district chiefs. Early action is needed to push forward with a fresh, realistic amnesty program to attract Viet Cong to surrender. The new govem- ment has not yet had a chance to focus on this problem. We are pulling out by the end of 1963 about 1,000 of the 16,500 American military forces in Viet-Nam. This was announced on the conclusion of the McNamara-Taylor visit in October. Economic. The major operational problem we face immediately is how to deal with an estimated 7 billion piaster (roughly $100 million) deficit in the GVN 1964 budget after a United States aid contribution at the 1963 level ($95 million in CIP and $30 million in PL 480). Unless handled properly, this could prevent the generals from consoli- dating the new government politically. Secretary McNamara was so concerned at Honolulu that he of- fered, if necessary, to switch some MAP funds to AID despite a shortage of $12 million in MAP availabilities to meet field require- ments It still remains necessary to conduct a difficult negotiation with the Vietnamese Government to get it to do all it can to meet this budgetary deficit problem. Relations with Foreign Countries. Our own relations with the new government are excellent at all levels. Ambassador Lodge would like to avoid putting heavy pressure on the new government over the next few months. Cambodian-Vietnamese relations remain poor. Sihanouk of Cam- bodia is upset about the activities of Cambodian dissidents in Viet- Nam and Thailand. Viet-Nam is concerned about Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory. The new Vietnamese Government will work well with Phoumi in Laos. We are pressing it to work with Souvanna, too. De Gaulle’s relations with the new government are strained be- cause he considers the coup a set-back to his hopes for neutralizing Viet-Nam. The Johnson Presidency 63 1 326. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the President 1 Washington, November 23, 1963. THE PRESIDENT’S MEETING WITH HENRY CABOT LODGE, AMBASSADOR TO VIET-NAM 1. Purpose of visit Ambassador Lodge is in Washington to discuss Viet-Nam with the President and other high U.S. officials who did not attend the Honolulu meeting on November 20. 2. You may wish fo: -Commend Ambassador Lodge on his superb handling of a diffi- cult situation. -Draw him out on the Vietnamese situation: 1. Political prospects of the new government. 2. Military outlook. 3. Changes in the strategic hamlet program.
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