Democracy Or Populism the Politics of Public Opinion in China

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Democracy Or Populism the Politics of Public Opinion in China chapter 21 Democracy or Populism The Politics of Public Opinion in China Yu Keping* Introduction One noticeable development of Chinese politics in recent years has been the increasing influences of public opinion on government decision-making. With the emergence of such internet-based “new media” as blogs, weibo and weixin, public opinion in China is deeply shaping China’s political process and chang- ing China’s political landscape. In the past couple of years, an increasing num- ber of political incidents were triggered by public opinion. Outstanding examples included the “Wen’an Incident in Guizhou,” “px Project Incident in Xiamen,” “Shifang Incident in Sichuan,” “Lei Zhengfu Incident in Chongqing,” “Qidong Incident in Jiangsu,” “Lon gnan Incident in Gansu,” “Haining Incident in Zhejiang” and “Wukan Incident in Guangdong” etc. Under the pressure of public opinion, a lot of corrupt officials were brought to justice. The most prominent example is Liu Tienan, the ex-deputy director of National Development and Reform Commission (ndrc). Some important government decisions were altered due to the pressure from public opinion. For instance, the collision of bullet trains in Wenzhou forced the central government to change its policies on high-speed train and some ongoing high-speed train programs were suspended as a result. The politics of public opinion is making its way in China. “Public opinion” has again become a popular term in Chinese politics and “respecting the pub- lic opinion” becomes a resounding political slogan. Some local governments even made a further step by incorporating public opinion into the decision- making on public policies and evaluation of government performance. Jiangyin city government of Jiangsu Province, for instance, initiated an “Happy Jiangyin” program with the intention to stimulate government reforms by bringing pub- lic opinion into the political process. In Huzhou city, Zhejiang Province, the local police authority attempted to evaluate and then direct police service by referring to public opinion. Mr. Xi Jinping, the newly inaugurated supreme * Yu Keping, University Chair Professor and Dean of School of Government, Peking University. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi �0.��63/9789004308770_0�� <UN> Democracy or Populism 303 leader of ccp, decided to launch “The Mass Line Campaign” in various organi- zations of ccp in the second half of this year,1 which is not only a continuation of ccp’s political tradition since Mao Zedong’s era, but also mirrors the central authorities’ recognition of the importance of public opinion against the back- ground of new historical circumstances. However, the politics of public opinion also gives rise to another outcome, i.e. the rise of populism. Under certain circumstances, the surging public opin- ion can also become a sort of “soft violence” and distort normal social and political life. Especially on the Internet, some parochial and irrational opinions are engendering “internet violence,” overwhelming the rational voices of soci- ety, interfering in the independent judicial process and the routine decision- making process as well as trampling citizens’ (officials included) legal rights. Some evil-minded businessmen and politicians even hired tremendous num- bers of people to fabricate “public opinion” on the Internet in order to achieve their personal interests. So what is the state of public opinion politics in contemporary China? As far as the politics of public opinion is concerned, what are the main mechanisms and key fields? What implications will the rise of public opinion bring to the political development in China? Does it represent progress towards democratic politics or an overflow of populism? This chapter will try to answer those questions. 1 The Politics of Public Opinion: Major Mechanisms Public opinion should be the basis for public policies. Under democratic sys- tems, public opinion is the major source of legitimacy for public policies. All decision-makers will spare no effort to claim their policies are consistent with the will and demands of the vast majority of people. Here, ccp is a good exam- ple that deserves more attention. As one of the “magic weapons” of ccp in its long march to win the ruling position, “Mass Line” to some extent represents a type of public opinion politics. Top ccp leaders always attached great impor- tance to the party’s relationship with the people: whenever the party has a close relationship with the people, then the party will usher in successes; whenever the party alienated itself from the people, then failures will follow suit. After the reform and opening up, Mr. Deng Xiaoping once again made 1 “Mass Line Education and Practice Conference of ccp held in Beijing,” People’s Daily, June 19, 2013. <UN>.
Recommended publications
  • China Data Supplement
    China Data Supplement October 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 29 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 36 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 54 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 61 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 66 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2008 The Main National Leadership of the
    [Show full text]
  • Hong Kong SAR
    China Data Supplement November 2006 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries 47 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations 50 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR 54 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR 61 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan 65 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 November 2006 The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU Jen-Kai Abbreviations and Explanatory Notes CCP CC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CCa Central Committee, alternate member CCm Central Committee, member CCSm Central Committee Secretariat, member PBa Politburo, alternate member PBm Politburo, member Cdr. Commander Chp. Chairperson CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CYL Communist Youth League Dep. P.C. Deputy Political Commissar Dir. Director exec. executive f female Gen.Man. General Manager Gen.Sec. General Secretary Hon.Chp. Honorary Chairperson H.V.-Chp. Honorary Vice-Chairperson MPC Municipal People’s Congress NPC National People’s Congress PCC Political Consultative Conference PLA People’s Liberation Army Pol.Com.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies
    Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies Volume 8, Issue 1, January 2018 ISSN 2048-0601 Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies This e-journal is a peer-reviewed publication produced by the British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS). It is intended as a service to the academic community designed to encourage the production and dissemination of high quality research to an international audience. It publishes research falling within BACS’ remit, which is broadly interpreted to include China, and the Chinese diaspora, from its earliest history to contemporary times, and spanning the disciplines of the arts, humanities and social sciences. Editors Sarah Dauncey (University of Nottingham) Gerda Wielander (University of Westminster) Sub-Editor Scott Pacey (University of Nottingham) Editorial Board Tim Barrett (School of Oriental and African Studies) Jane Duckett (University of Glasgow) Harriet Evans (University of Westminster) Stephanie Hemelryk Donald (University of New South Wales) Stephan Feuchtwang (London School of Economics) Natascha Gentz (University of Edinburgh) Rana Mitter (University of Oxford) Qian Suoqiao (University of Newcastle) Caroline Rose (University of Leeds) Naomi Standen (University of Birmingham) Yao Shujie (University of Nottingham) Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies Volume 8, Issue 1, January 2018 Contents Editors’ Introduction iv Articles Premarital Abortion—What is the Harm? The Responsibilisation of 1 Women’s Pregnancy Among China’s “Privileged” Daughters Kailing Xie Encompassing the Horse: Analogy, Category, and Scale in the Yijing 32 William Matthews The Favourable Partner: An Analysis of Lianhe Zaobao’s 62 Representation of China in Southeast Asia Daniel R. Hammond Free Trade, Yes; Ideology, Not So Much: The UK’s Shifting China Policy 92 2010-16 Scott A.W.
    [Show full text]
  • December 1998
    JANUARY - DECEMBER 1998 SOURCE OF REPORT DATE PLACE NAME ALLEGED DS EX 2y OTHER INFORMATION CRIME Hubei Daily (?) 16/02/98 04/01/98 Xiangfan C Si Liyong (34 yrs) E 1 Sentenced to death by the Xiangfan City Hubei P Intermediate People’s Court for the embezzlement of 1,700,00 Yuan (US$20,481,9). Yunnan Police news 06/01/98 Chongqing M Zhang Weijin M 1 1 Sentenced by Chongqing No. 1 Intermediate 31/03/98 People’s Court. It was reported that Zhang Sichuan Legal News Weijin murdered his wife’s lover and one of 08/05/98 the lover’s relatives. Shenzhen Legal Daily 07/01/98 Taizhou C Zhang Yu (25 yrs, teacher) M 1 Zhang Yu was convicted of the murder of his 01/01/99 Zhejiang P girlfriend by the Taizhou City Intermediate People’s Court. It was reported that he had planned to kill both himself and his girlfriend but that the police had intervened before he could kill himself. Law Periodical 19/03/98 07/01/98 Harbin C Jing Anyi (52 yrs, retired F 1 He was reported to have defrauded some 2600 Liaoshen Evening News or 08/01/98 Heilongjiang P teacher) people out of 39 million Yuan 16/03/98 (US$4,698,795), in that he loaned money at Police Weekend News high rates of interest (20%-60% per annum). 09/07/98 Southern Daily 09/01/98 08/01/98 Puning C Shen Guangyu D, G 1 1 Convicted of the murder of three children - Guangdong P Lin Leshan (f) M 1 1 reported to have put rat poison in sugar and 8 unnamed Us 8 8 oatmeal and fed it to the three children of a man with whom she had a property dispute.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinabrief in a Fortnight a Message from the Editor
    ChinaBrief Volume XIV s Issue 5 s March 7, 2014 Volume XIV s Issue 5 s march 7, 2014 In This Issue: A MeSSAge FroM The eDITor 1 IN A ForTNIghT Briefs by David Cohen and John C. K. Daly 2 NatioNAl SeCurITy TruMpS reForM at The NpC By Willy lam 6 A terrorist attack in Kunming, allegedly Terrorist Attack IN KuNMINg reVeAlS CoMpleX relatioNShIp WITh commited by members of the Uighur INTernatioNAl JIhAD minority, killed 29 people. Evidence By Jacob Zenn 8 suggests mixed global and local motives. In SyaMB FortnightolISM oVer Substance: SoChI ShowcaseS ChINA-ruSSIA prAgmatic China Brief is a bi-weekly jour- ParTNerShIp nal of information and analysis China By richard Weitz Brief 11 covering Greater China in Eur- asia. VolumeThe huMBlINg oF The ND14,rC Issue 5 March By 6, p eter2014 Martin 14 China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a private non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. and is edited by David Cohen. A Message from the Editor The opinions expressed in ThE JAMEsTown FoundATIon’s upCoMIng ChInA dEFEnsE China Brief are solely those And sECurITy ConFErEnCE of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Jamestown Foundation. n March 25, The Jamestown Foundation will hold its Fourth Annual China ODefense and Security Conference in Washington, D.C. The conference will be a unique opportunity to hear about cutting-edge research on Chinese thinking from Jamestown analysts, who will introduce fresh evidence and perspectives to challenge conventional wisdom about the strategic planning of the PRC. Experts, many of whom rarely visit the capital, will be flying in from England, Taiwan, Honolulu and Australia.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping's Administration— Proactive Policies
    Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping’s Administration— Proactive Policies at Home and Abroad or China, 2014 was a year when initiatives of the Xi Jinping administration Fcame to the forefront. In domestic politics, it was a year of important changes, as the anti-corruption campaign continued to make itself felt, resulting, for example, in Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Military Commission (CMC), being expelled from the party. Xi Jinping, who was already president as well as general secretary of the party, took the position of chairman of the new National Security Commission and created a number of small leading groups, part of his efforts to strengthen his structural authority. Meanwhile elements of instability grew as well, such as the number of bombings that took place in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and the CPC is cracking down vigorously. President Xi has assertively engaged in foreign policy, leading at times to strong unilateral positions such as China’s location of oil drilling equipment in the South China Sea. China is seeking to form “a new type of major-power relations” with the United States, but China’s actions in the South China Sea and the confrontation over cyber spying make it unclear whether China will be able to achieve the kind of US-China relations it desires. President Xi is also engaging in periphery diplomacy, seeking to ensure China’s peaceful development by reinforcing its economic relations with its neighbors and calling for an Asian New Security Concept, while strengthening its criticism of the system of alliances centered on the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The Prevention and Control of Economic Crime in China
    The Prevention and Control of Economic Crime in China: A Critical Analysis of the Law and its Administration Enze Liu Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Institute of Advanced Legal Studies School of Advanced Study, University of London September 2017 Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work. Where information has been used they have been duly acknowledged. Signature: …………………………. Date: ………………………………. 2 Abstract Economic crime and corruption has been an issue throughout Chinese history. While there may be scope for discussion as to the significance of public confidence in the integrity of a government, in practical terms the government of China has had to focus attention on maintaining confidence in its integrity as an issue for stability. Since the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its assumption of power and in particular after the ‘Opening’ of the Chinese economy, abusive conduct on the part of those in positions of privilege, primarily in governmental organisations, has arguably reached an unprecedented level. In turn, this is impeding development as far as it undermines public confidence, accelerates jealousy and forges an even wider gap between rich and poor, thereby threatening the stability and security of civil societies. More importantly, these abuses undermine the reputation of the CCP and the government. China naturally consider this as of key significance in attracting foreign investment and assuming its leading role in the world economy. While there have been many attempts to curb economic crime, the traditional capabilities of the law and particularly the criminal justice system have in general terms been found to be inadequate.
    [Show full text]
  • China COI Compilation-March 2014
    China COI Compilation March 2014 ACCORD is co-funded by the European Refugee Fund, UNHCR and the Ministry of the Interior, Austria. Commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of International Protection. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author. ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation China COI Compilation March 2014 This COI compilation does not cover the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, nor does it cover Taiwan. The decision to exclude Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan was made on the basis of practical considerations; no inferences should be drawn from this decision regarding the status of Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan. This report serves the specific purpose of collating legally relevant information on conditions in countries of origin pertinent to the assessment of claims for asylum. It is not intended to be a general report on human rights conditions. The report is prepared on the basis of publicly available information, studies and commentaries within a specified time frame. All sources are cited and fully referenced. This report is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Every effort has been made to compile information from reliable sources; users should refer to the full text of documents cited and assess the credibility, relevance and timeliness of source material with reference to the specific research concerns arising from individual applications.
    [Show full text]
  • A New Impetus for the Fight Against Corruption
    China Perspectives 2013/2 | 2013 Real Estate Speculation and its Social Consequences A New Impetus for the Fight Against Corruption Jérôme Doyon Translator: N. Jayaram Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6191 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6191 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 1 June 2013 Number of pages: 74-75 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference Jérôme Doyon, « A New Impetus for the Fight Against Corruption », China Perspectives [Online], 2013/2 | 2013, Online since 01 June 2013, connection on 15 September 2020. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6191 © All rights reserved China perspectives Current affairs This section, prepared by Asia Centre (www.centreasia.eu) is mainly based on the Chinese-language press and aims at explaining the debates ongoing in the PRC, at Hong Kong or in Taiwan on international questions and issues related to Greater China. A new impetus for the fight against corruption Analysis by Jérôme Doyon based on: – Ren Zhongyuan, (1) “以科学分权和异体监督反腐” (Systematic separation of powers and ensuring autonomous supervision of the anticor - ruption fight), Xin shiji , 31 December 2012. – Zhang Weiying, (2) “反腐败的两难选择” (Two choices for the fight against corruption), speech during the second session of the Jingjiguangcha Bao annual conference on reforms in China, held on 19 December in Beijing, reported by Xinlang Caijing , 19 December 2012. – Chen Baocheng, (3) “反腐新动力” (New anticorruption dynamics), Xin shiji , 31 December 2012. – Hu Shuli, (4) “反腐难与易” (Ease and difficulties in the anticorruption fight), Xin shiji , 17 December 2012. – Yang Minzhi, (5) “限权才能反腐败” (Liming powers and then resuming the anticorruption fight), Caijing , 10 December 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • China Media Bulletin
    CHINA MEDIA BULLETIN A biweekly update of press freedom and censorship news related to the People’s Republic of China Issue 87: May 17, 2013 Headlines New party directives call for more rigid ideological controls Official investigated for misdeeds after reporter’s online exposé Magazine production halted after labor camp revelations Protest over migrant worker’s death spurs online censorship Chinese netizens flood White House petition site PHOTO OF THE WEEK: THE EMPEROR IS FAR AWAY Credit: China Media Project BROADCAST / PRINT MEDIA NEWS New party directives call for more rigid ideological controls In recent weeks, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee directives ordering intensified ideological controls have reportedly circulated among universities and party committees throughout China. Given the party’s tendency toward secrecy, the directives have not been made public, and their full details remain unconfirmed. Beginning on May 10, online rumors indicated that a CCP directive had been handed down to some college campuses, barring seven topics from class discussions, including press freedom, judicial independence, civil rights, civil society, and the party’s historical mistakes. While the historical issues have been a long-standing taboo at Chinese academic institutions, the party has traditionally been less sensitive to instruction that touches on broader topics related to democratic governance. The alleged list of banned topics were quickly nicknamed the “Seven Don’t Mentions,” and the term was blocked on the search function of the Sina Weibo microblogging platform. Two scholars who wished to remain anonymous told Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post that they had been briefed on the taboo topics and were told they came from the Central Committee.
    [Show full text]
  • October 2013 Rs
    VOL. XXV No. 10 October 2013 Rs. 20.00 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (R) shakes hands with his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh during a welcome ceremony for Singh before their talks in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 23, 2013. Mr. Cai Mingzhao, Minister of the State Council Chinese Ambassador to India Mr. Wei Wei and the Union Information Office of China, was in the Ceremony of Minister for New and Renewable Energy of India Presenting Books by China to the University of Mumbai Dr. Farooq Abdullah were on the Ceremony of the on Sept. 17, 2013. sixty-fourth Chinese National Day held in New Delhi on Sept, 29, 2013. Chinese Ambassador to India Mr. Wei Wei was celebrating Indian friends were watching the “Beautiful China China’s National Day with some friends of India-China Exhibition” held in New Delhi by the Chinese Embassy in Friendship Association in New Delhi on Sept, 26, 2013. India and China National Tourism on Sept. 28, 2013. Artists were performing at the cultural evening named as China won the Best Destination Award on the 9th China-India Cultural Extravaganza 2013 which was Hospitality India and Explore the World Annual organised by Chinese Embassy and India China International Awards Ceremony which was held in New Economic and Cultural Council in New Delhi on Sept. 28, Delhi on Oct, 11, 2013. 2013. CONTENTS CHINA-INDIA RELATIONS 1. Chinese President Says World Needs China-India Common Development 4 2. Chinese Premier Holds Talks with Indian PM 6 3. Chinese Premier Hails Singh's Visit as "Landmark" Event 6 4.
    [Show full text]
  • Endemic Corruption in the People's Republic of China
    TRANI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016 1:13 PM Endemic Corruption in the People’s Republic of China EMILY TRAN* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 296 II. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK .................................................. 297 A. Bribery of Officials ........................................................................ 300 B. Compliance with the UNCAC ........................................................ 304 C. Commercial Bribery ...................................................................... 305 III. IMPACT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS IN CHINA ................................... 307 A. China’s Economy ........................................................................... 308 B. Foreign Companies........................................................................ 309 C. China’s Rule of Law ...................................................................... 310 D. Developing Cooperation with Foregin Countries .......................... 312 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND U.K. BRIBERY ACT .................................. 315 A. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the FCPA ..................................... 316 B. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the Bribery Act ............................. 317 C. Recommended Anti-Bribery Provisions in China .......................... 318 D. Accounting Provisions Under the FCPA ....................................... 319 E. Recommended Accounting
    [Show full text]