Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography

Edging in From the Cold The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography Dr. David Ian Chambers Introduction agencies that once underpinned dic- tatorship, while a selective opening During the past three decades, great of intelligence archives in the for- progress has been made in mapping mer Soviet Union has led to the pro- and exploring the role of intelligence duction of official and semiofficial in international statecraft and war. studies of past KGB and GRU oper- The contribution of security services ations by Russian writers, as well as to the maintenance of state power has high-grade analyses by foreign his- also attracted a great deal of produc- torians of the use of intelligence and tive scholarly attention. There is a much counterintelligence in the USSR’s “ 3 neglected orphan in the As far as western intelligence and war against Nazi Germany. western scholarly security services are concerned, the Where once undergraduate and scale of the “missing dimension” backyard: the evolution postgraduate courses in intelligence identified by Christopher Andrew of China’s intelligence history were rare on the university and David Dilks in 1984 has shrunk and security services campus and their reading lists were significantly. 1 Benefiting from vari- and the role they played short, there is now no shortage of ous “open government” and free- courses or material on which to base in enabling the Chinese dom of information initiatives in the teaching and research. Communist Party (CCP) 1980s and 1990s, professional histo- to win and secure rians have produced a plethora of Despite these advances, there is a national power in the studies about individual agencies much neglected orphan in the west- 20th century. and their senior personnel, specific ern scholarly backyard: the evolu- operations, and the interface tion of China’s intelligence and between intelligence and states in security services and the role they times of war and peace. played in enabling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to win and ” Traditional official reticence or secure national power in the 20th silence about past operations has century. Though there is no short- been replaced by the production of age of publications focusing on the official and authorized histories; in current threat China’s intelligence several countries, former intelli- services present to western inter- gence officers are free to publish ests, non-Chinese studies of the his- memoirs provided they do not prej- tory of those services and its udice current intelligence sources reflection in current operational and methods.2 norms and practice are rare indeed. The collapse of communism in The very few that do exist were Eastern Europe has spawned an written mainly by journalists 20 to upsurge in studies of the security 30 years ago and have been criti- All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 31 Chinese Intelligence Historiography A largely unnoticed relaxation has provided a rich data stream for scholars seeking to develop insights into the CCP’s pre- plots by the CIA, SIS, and others, 1949 intelligence wars and intelligence operations it directed but there was no public discussion of the resource constraints under which against perceived internal and external enemies. the Chinese intelligence services labored when setting operational pri- cized for their defective methodolo- From “Liberation” to Destruction orities during and beyond the gies and uncritical reliance on a Korean War. Nor was there any handful of seemingly sensational but Within weeks of the establishment overt indication of a protracted and deeply flawed sources emanating of the PRC in October 1949, the divisive debate within the Chinese from both sides of the Taiwan CCP Politburo formally approved a intelligence community about opti- Strait.4 This is hardly surprising Central Committee Resolution on mum counterintelligence strategy given the enduring power of the near Intelligence Work, which stated that and tactics to be employed against total blackout on public discussion intelligence had played a major role the CCP’s old and new enemies. of intelligence issues that the CCP in the Party’s achievement of imposed after the establishment of national victory in its extended war In this, the behavior of Chinese poli- the People’s Republic of China with the Kuomintang. 5 However, cymakers was no different from that (PRC) in 1949; an adequate plat- just as the secrets of ULTRA and the of their western counterparts. The form for western scholarly studies of Double-Cross Operation in World judgment of the leaders of the intelli- Chinese intelligence history simply War II remained highly classified in gence services and their political mas- did not exist. the United Kingdom until the 1970s, ters was that secrecy was an absolute the successes of the CCP’s wartime value and that there should be no dis- However, just as more relaxed offi- intelligence operations were with- closures about past operations lest cial attitudes towards intelligence held from public view and the scru- they prejudice wartime sources and research and publication have fueled tiny of historians in China. methods—which were still valued the growth in historical studies of and in play—or the commitment of western services, and as China has Nowhere was there scholarly dis- those fighting on the “hidden front” to pursued a path of radical economic cussion of the role of intelligence in defend the new regime. Equally, open “reform and opening up” over the preserving the CCP from near extinc- discussion of security and intelli- past three decades, a parallel but tion in the late 1920s and early 1930s; gence dilemmas was considered likely largely unnoticed relaxation has pro- the major contribution intelligence only to provide comfort to China’s vided a rich data stream for scholars made to the Red Army’s successful perceived enemies. seeking to develop insights into the breakout from the Jiangxi Soviet that CCP’s pre-1949 intelligence wars began the Long March in 1934; the Thus although intelligence chief Li and the subsequent intelligence acquisition of predictive intelligence Kenong encouraged the gathering of operations it directed against per- in 1941 about Nazi Germany’s inva- archival material and preparation of ceived internal and external ene- sion of the USSR and Japan’s thrust intelligence case histories in the mies. Based on interviews with PRC into the Pacific; the paranoid counter- 1950s, such material was for in- intelligence historians and veterans, espionage campaign in communist house use only. 6 In society at large, as well as documentary research, base areas in 1943 for which CCP trained and politically correct histo- this article’s aim is to account for the Chairman Mao Zedong was later rians were in short supply, their pri- underdevelopment of public intelli- obliged to apologize before his peers; mary duty being to compile gence history in China during and or the comprehensive intelligence macrohistories of the Chinese revo- immediately beyond the Mao penetration of the Kuomintang’s lution for use in universities, Zedong era, to examine the reasons political and military establishment schools, work units, and CCP for the relaxation that began in the between 1945 and 1949. branches as part of a nationwide 1980s, and to introduce the types of political resocialization program. The Chinese press of the early intelligence history now being pro- 1950s did carry countless emotive duced, as well as the constraints that The aim of such history was less to reports about the neutralization of affect their use as a scholarly establish and explore facts than to dastardly espionage and subversion resource. inculcate and reinforce loyalty to the 32 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) Chinese Intelligence Historiography The aim of such history was less to establish and explore facts CCP by presenting an idealized past than to inculcate and reinforce loyalty to the CCP. dominated by the infallible wisdom of Mao, the heroic role of the Red Army and “the masses” in the Chi- ated as case officers or deep penetra- questions about the loyalty of indi- nese revolution, and the sagacious tions of Kuomintang and Japanese vidual intelligence cadres. As anec- leadership of the CCP throughout establishments were particularly dotally-based accusations and the civil and Sino-Japanese wars. 7 exposed: to support their operations, counteraccusations about past case- Provision of detailed public intelli- many had publicly adopted at best work flew back and forth at the gence history was not a priority. neutral and at worst stridently pro- height of the 1943 campaigns, hun- Kuomintang or pro-Japanese cover dreds of intelligence and security Concepts of necessary secrecy and identities. Operating separately from cadres were targeted for interroga- the need to concentrate scarce schol- local underground CCP branches, tion in Yan’an and other CCP base arly resources on “big picture” his- they had worked for a single supe- area headquarters about their possi- tory aside, a further reason for the rior cadre fully aware of their cir- bly dubious links with the Kuomint- nondevelopment of public intelli- cumstances and intelligence product, ang and Japanese. gence history was the willful distor-

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