Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese
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Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart: Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese _____________________________________________________________________ A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the University of Canterbury by James Jiann Hua TO ___________________________________________________________ University of Canterbury 2009 Table of Contents Acknowledgements iv Abstract v Notes on Romanization of Chinese vi List of Acronyms and Abbreviations vii Figure 1: Relationships Between the Qiaowu Apparatus and the viii Extended State Bureaucracy 1.00 Introduction 1 1.01 A Comparison: Incorporating the Turkish Diaspora in Europe 3 1.02 Introduction to the Extant Literature 7 1.03 Aims of this Research 10 1.04 Importance of Qiaowu Research to International Relations 11 1.05 Political/Social Control 13 1.06 Qiaowu for the 21st Century 15 1.07 Problems with Assessing Qiaowu 16 1.08 Methodology 17 1.09 Thesis Outline 21 st 2.00 Mobilizing the OC in the 21 Century 23 2.01 Capitalizing on the Olympic Spirit 23 2.02 The 1989 Tiananmen Incident 26 2.03 The CCP’s Ideological Work and Influence on PRC Students 28 2.04 The 2008 Olympic Torch Rallies 30 2.05 Another Evolution in Qiaowu 34 2.05 Conclusion 35 3.00 Unveiling Qiaowu 36 3.01 The Role of the OC for the CCP-led Party-State 36 3.02 Political Mobilization 38 3.03 Espionage 41 3.04 Unveiling Qiaowu 44 3.05 Service for the OC: Qiaowu Cadres and Their Duties 46 3.06 The CCP’s Guiding Hand 50 3.07 A Brief History of Qiaowu Organizational Structure 51 3.08 Origins of the PRC OC Qiaowu Bureaucracy 54 3.09 The OC “Problem” 56 3.10 Domestic Returned OC Work and Internal Chaos 59 3.11 The OC and Their Role in UF Work Abroad 62 3.12 Post-Revolution Qiaowu Policy 65 3.13 Political Structure of the Qiaowu Administration in the 69 Contemporary Period 3.14 CCP Influence over Qiaowu Affairs 73 3.15 Qiaowu and the Xitong Bureaucracy 77 3.16 Decentralization of Power to Provincial Level Qiaowu Operations 81 3.17 Conclusion 84 ii 4.00 Targets and Subjects of Qiaowu 85 4.01 ROC Definition of the OC 85 4.02 Taiwanization of ROC Qiaowu 87 4.03 The ROC’s Redefinition of Huaqiao 90 4.04 Damage Control 93 4.05 Name Changes 95 4.06 ROC OC Organs in the Contemporary Period 97 4.07 Rebuilding Links 99 4.08 PRC Definition of the OC 101 4.09 Distinguishing Huaqiao from Huaren 102 4.10 Xinqiao – Leading the Change in OC Demographics 107 4.11 Elite OC 109 4.12 Dual Nationality and the OC 115 4.13 Conclusion 117 5.00 Cultural Work: Reconstructing ‘Chineseness’ 119 5.01 Theories of Ethnic Belonging – Chineseness 120 5.02 Promoting Cultural Unity 126 5.03 Taiwanization of ROC Cultural Work 128 5.04 PRC Education Work 130 5.05 PRC External OC Education 134 5.06 Confucius Institutes 135 5.07 Problems Regarding PRC OC Education 136 5.08 Challenging Alternative Forms of Chineseness 139 5.09 Promoting ‘Love’ for China: OC Church Work 142 5.10 Encouraging ‘Love’ for China: Earthquake Diplomacy 144 5.11 Evaluation of Nationalism and the OC 146 5.12 Conclusion 150 6.00 Cultural Work: Reconnection 151 6.01 Active Reconnection: Tours and Root Seeking 151 6.02 Xungen – Falling Leaves Return to Their Roots 154 6.03 Building Links 156 6.04 OC Youth Work 158 6.05 PRC OC Youth Work 161 6.06 Comparison of Youth Work 162 6.07 Development of Youth Work 164 6.08 Soft Power and the OC Media 166 6.09 Borrowing Ships to Go to Sea 168 6.10 Managing OC Reporters 172 6.11 New Technology: Television and Radio 175 6.12 Qiaowu and the Internet 177 6.13 Conclusion 180 iii 7.00 External Work: Threats & Challenges 182 7.01 Co-optation 184 7.02 Coercion of the OC 189 7.03 The OC Pro-Democracy Movement 190 7.04 Grand Unification Nationalism 192 7.05 Challenging Taiwanese Independence 193 7.06 Winning Over the Middle Elements 195 7.07 Transformation Work 198 7.08 A Conditional Relationship 201 7.09 Falun Gong (FLG) 203 7.10 The CCP’s Iron Fist 204 7.11 Independence Movements 206 7.12 Chinese Unity and the Minority OC 208 7.13 Cracking Down on ‘Terrorists’ 209 7.14 Conclusion 210 8.00 External Work: Diplomatic Assistance 212 8.01 The PRC and Its Protection of the OC 212 8.02 1998 Indonesian Riots: A Turning Point in OC Affairs 217 8.03 ROC Protection for OC 220 8.04 Modern PRC Diplomatic Protection 224 8.05 The Limits of PRC Consular Assistance 230 8.06 OC Protection and China’s International Relations 233 8.07 Conclusion 236 9.00 The Future of Qiaowu 238 9.01 Export of Labour 239 9.02 Qiaowu in the Pacific 241 9.03 Illegal Migration in the Pacific 244 9.04 Passing On Responsibility for Migrant Behaviour and Illegal Migration 246 9.05 PRC Views on Illegal Migration 249 9.06 ‘Unqualified’ Chinese 250 9.07 Raising China’s Image: Getting Along Together 253 9.08 Consolidation of the OC 256 9.09 Capacity Building 261 9.10 Conclusion 265 10.00 Conclusion 267 10.01 From Strength to Strength: The Evolution of Qiaowu 268 10.02 Consolidating Power and Eliminating Rivals 269 10.03 The Rise of China and the OC 270 10.04 Implications for the World 271 10.05 Conclusion 273 11.00 Bibliography 275 iv Acknowledgements This thesis is the product of five years of intensive research into a subject that is very close to my heart. It first began as a study of finding my own identity as an ethnic Chinese person living in New Zealand. My research then gradually took on a regional focus by examining case studies throughout the Pacific. In the end, it evolved into an overall examination of the ramifications and implications of the connections between the overseas Chinese, China and Taiwan in an international context. Several of the examples cited come from my own firsthand experience in the OC community and my participation in international OC organizations, but I attribute many of my findings to my vast network of family, friends, and colleagues throughout New Zealand and around the world. Firstly, I would like to acknowledge and thank my primary supervisor Assoc. Prof. Anne-Marie Brady. She has provided me with plenty of encouragement and constructive comments and criticism over the years. She was instrumental in patiently guiding me through my research methodology – particularly in finding my focus, highlighting the crucial aspects of my topic, offering advice for accessing essential data, and giving me the opportunities to present my research to a wider audience. I also wish to thank my secondary supervisors: Assoc. Prof. John Henderson, who introduced me to the topic of China in the Pacific, and has since provided useful advice concerning my thesis presentation; and Assoc. Prof. Alex Tan, who offered inspiration and ideas in the early days of my research – particularly with connecting me with his contacts in Taiwan. It was a great privilege to study under the guidance of such a knowledgeable supervisory team. I am also grateful to those who kindly assisted my research through interviews and correspondence. Without their input, this work would have been impossible to complete. Of particular mention, I wish to thank the academics and qiaowu cadres who provided me with vital primary and secondary source information during fieldwork in Beijing and Guangzhou. I would also like to thank the many diplomats, experts and representatives of various organizations who placed their confidence in me by offering important information and interesting practical examples in a professional and responsible manner. My thanks also go to the secretary of the School of Political Science, Mrs Jill Dolby. She has always been kind and helpful with sorting out any problems I may have had, and making many useful suggestions. Finally, I would like to make a special acknowledgement to the Poll Tax Heritage Trust, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Asia New Zealand Foundation and the New Zealand Asia Studies Society for granting funding towards travel and accommodation expenses associated with the research. v Abstract Following the violent crackdown on students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, tens of thousands of sympathetic ethnic Chinese and nationals of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from across the globe (hereafter described as the Overseas Chinese or OC1) unified in protest against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While some were too afraid to speak out, others were much more critical and antagonistic by calling for democratic reform on the mainland.2 Fearing an escalation of anti-CCP sentiment amongst a diaspora crucial to its national interests, Beijing promptly intensified qiaowu gongzuo (hereafter described as qiaowu or OC work) to deal with the precarious situation. It employed a foreign legion of diplomats, attaches from various government ministries and specialist qiaowu cadres to aggressively manage and control strategic OC communities under a comprehensive set of influential tools and persuasive techniques.3 Over the next two decades, the CCP continually developed and improved qiaowu to the extent that it had become more successful with these methods in the current period than any other era – particularly so with new migrants and PRC students. Such prowess became apparent in 2008, when large numbers of the OC again took to the streets in heated protest.