social compassco

50(4), 2003, 481±491

Seong Hwan CHA Modern Chinese Confucianism: The Contemporary Neo-Confucian Movement and Its Cultural Signi®cance

The article examines the way of thinking of Neo-Confucian scholars in modern China. These contemporary intellectuals have inherited the ways of reasoning of the scholars of the Song-Ming dynasty who faced the challenges of Buddhism in the 12th century. Likewise, modern Chinese scholars who have been alienated from the outside Western world, face the challenges of the West. Chinese scholars' ways of encountering the West deserve special attention as a possible means of overcoming the negative e€ects of globalizationÐembodying the possibility of keeping one's cultural identity while engaging in dialogue with other cultures and learning from them.

L'article analyse le mode de penseÂe des intellectuels neÂo-confucianistes de la Chine moderne. Ces intellectuels ont heÂrite de la structure de raisonnement des eÂrudits de la dynastie Song-Ming, qui avaient releve les de®s du bouddhisme au 12eÁme sieÁcle. De facË on analogue, les intellectuels chinois actuels, qui ont eÂte rejeteÂs par le monde occidental, releÁvent les de®s de l'Occident. La manieÁre dont les intellectuels chinois geÁrent leur rencontre avec l'Occident meÂrite une atten- tion particulieÁre car elle permet d'entrevoir la possibilite de surmonter les e€ets neÂgatifs de la mondialisation: la possibilite de conserver son identite culturelle tout en engageant un dialogue mutuellement enrichissant avec d'autres cultures.

The Current Situation

In this article, I will question the modern Confucian1 revival movement, which is generally called the new Confucian or the neo Confucian movement. My aimis to explain the ``cultural signi®cance'' 2 of the modern neo- Confucian movement led by a group of cultural intellectuals with extra- ordinary ways of thinking, as well as its in¯uence on the modern civilization of China and the nation's future. Thus, I think it is necessary to point out the similarity and di€erences between the modern neo-Confucian movement and the reformof Confucianismled by outstanding scholars such as Zhou Xi (1130±1200) during the 12th-century crisis, as Buddhismchallenged Confu- cianism. First, the two movements are similar in that they are prophetic3 in character, recomposing their own and imported ways of thinking, rather

0037±7686[200312]50:4;481±491;038739 www.sagepublications.com & 2003 Social Compass 482 Social Compass 50(4) than being content with existing ones. They prefer co-existence through acceptance and conversation to exclusion. Second, both groups of intellec- tuals are interested in the human mind, not the objective physical world existing outside the human person. It seems to me that the neo-Confucian movement of the 20th century is continuous with that of the 12th century. That is why the modern Confucian movement is still called the neo- Confucian movement, despite many di€erences from the former. There are also important di€erences between the two movements. The external reason for the crisis in Chinese culture was fundamentally di€erent. In the 12th century it was Buddhism, a completely di€erent religion from India. On the other hand, in the 20th century, the modern civilization of the West, representing democracy and science, is the reason for the crisis. Since the Cultural Revolution and, particularly, since the 1980s, China seems to be gradually moving away from an isolated socialist system towards a Westernized capitalist system. Here it is assumed that Chinese society will pro®t fromits long cultural heritage. This is because a reformedand open economy is considered an element of Westernization. But, in some aspects, just the opposite phenomenon has appeared in China. In other words, a neo-Confucian movement emphasizing tradition has begun to gain followers. We need to clarify the basis and social connotation of this phenomenon. The modern neo-Confucian movement was started by a small number of prophetic intellectuals in the 1920s, shortly after the fury of the May 4th movement in 1919, led by a majority of intellectuals and young people advo- cating rejection of traditionalismand adopting overall Westernization. During China's Communist era, from 1949 until the 1980s, the force of anti-traditionalismwas so strong that the activities of representatives of the neo-Confucian movement were limited to outside mainland China. But despite such a social atmosphere, the modern Confucian movement, known as ``cultural conservatism'' has slowly taken root in China since the 1980s (Bresciani, 2001: iii±iv; Lee Ming Huei, 1998: 236). As Fang Keli explains in his book, this is an exceptional phenomenon given the reality of Chinese society (Fang Keli 1997: 453; quote fromBreschiani, 2001: iii±iv). The modern neo-Confucian movement has grown into a powerful social force involving approximately 10% of the intellectuals of mainland China.4 A large number of these activists are known to be members of the Chinese Communist Party. Now the leaders of this movement are no longer con- sidered second-, or third-class thinkers. On the contrary, they are considered pioneers, leading modernization and the open economy in China (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 390). Furthermore, this intellectual movement is presently receiving direct and indirect support from the Chinese Communist Party and the government. The movement came to be endowed with a social sub- structure once the ``Confucius Foundation, partially supported by the government'' was founded.5 This foundation publishes the academic journal, Confucius Research and holds numerous domestic and international sym- posia, playing an enormous role in expanding the social foundation of the neo-Confucian movement. Many ``unocial'' private organizations studying Confucianismor Chinese tradition have also appeared 6 (Lee Ming Huei, 1998: 238). In addition, the ``Confucius Culture University'', a modern Cha: Modern Chinese Confucianism 483 university for the succession and development of modern neo-Confucianism, will be established in Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius.7 It should be noted that those most enthusiastic about the neo-Confucian movement belong to the intellectual class.8 Furthermore, the interest in Chinese culture and Con- fucianismamongcollege students has grown continuously since the 1990s. 9 In December 2001, a bronze statue of Confucius was erected on the campus of the Renmin (People's) University in Beijing with the support of the Chinese Communist Party. The event was not considered to con¯ict with the open market policy and received favorable response from students.10

Characteristics of the Way of Thinking of Modern Neo-Confucian Activists

Despite the diverse aspects of the neo-Confucian movement, I will limit myself to explaining the cultural signi®cance of the modern neo-Confucian movement in modern China.

Neo-Confucian Perspectives on Traditional Culture One aspect of the neo-Confucians' particular way of thinking can be seen clearly in their attitude toward traditional Chinese culture and the Western culture that has entered China. The core of traditional culture over the years is typi®ed by a moral-ethical value system taught by traditional Con- fucianism, which has dominated China for 2000 years. Their attitude can clearly be distinguished fromthat of the Zhongti Xiyong (who suggest making Chinese studies the main framework while utilizing Western studies), Quanban Xihua (total Westernization) and Xiti Zhongyong (socialist modernization) groups.11 The concept of ``culture'' mentioned by neo-Confucian intellectuals needs to be clari®edÐnot an easy task. These neo-Confucian scholars' distinction between politics and culture reveals characteristics of their views. Accord- ingly, they claimthat issues of culture and ethics should be studied distinct fromsocial and political order (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 56). According to these intellectuals, culture is related to issues of fundamental importance to humanity and the world, i.e., ultimate values such as ethics, morals and philosophy, and held not to be closely related to the political arena. In fact, they believe the modern crisis in China is caused by a cultural rather than a political problem. They further argue that culture provides a meta- physical foundation for political theory.12 Thus, it seems normal that these Confucian intellectuals are interested in cultural reformprior to political reform(Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 35).

Characteristics of the Neo-Confucian Intellectuals' Concept of Culture and Cultural Relativism Modern neo-Confucian intellectuals have tried to restore and develop tradi- tional Confucianism, which has been in crisis caused by the clash of Chinese 484 Social Compass 50(4) and Western culture, seen fromthe perspective of ``cultural relativism''. Meanwhile, an absolute majority of intellectuals, especially those belonging to the Quanban Xihua and Xiti Zhongyong groups, have maintained a sort of ``cultural universalism'' from the early 20th century until now. They have claimed that in order to modernize China, what is backward in Chinese culture must be discarded, and Western culture must be adopted In this case, modernization meant Westernization. However, in contradiction to them, modern neo-Confucian intellectuals agree that Chinese society must be modernized, but they emphasize that modernization does not necessarily mean Westernization. This fact must be clearly understood. According to cultural universalism, the cultures of all nations are advan- cing unilaterally towards a single goal. Thus, an objective judgment of culture through comparison of diverse cultures may be possible. Hu Shi, who is a leader of the ``Westernization'' group, says ``culture is a lifestyle of a people, and people's lifestyles are basically the same'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 42). Thus, di€erences of nations and cultures in reality are not because of di€erent contents or tracks of development, but because of conditions that promote or hinder development. Therefore, replacing a traditional culture with a developed one is only saving the time that would be needed to reach that stage of development, and hence does not mean changing the quality of the culture. A traditional culture is a lower level in a developed nation's culture, not a fundamentally inferior one. That is why a culture is considered as something that can be developed and expanded through the method of simply transferring it from one society to another (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 43). Intellectuals of the Quanban Xihua group, including Hu Shi, have gradually fallen into following Western centralism. This becomes clear from their statement, ``the culture of Europe and America should be considered as the standard for world culture, and should be used to explain and anticipate the culture of humankind'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 45). Such an attitude towards culture shows the logical foundations of the Quanban Xihua and Xiti Zhongyong groups' ideal of modernization through the complete destruction of traditional Chinese culture and its replacement by Western culture. However, as I mentioned above, modern neo-Confucian intellectuals have been a minority, but they have a quite di€erent view on culture. First of all, they do not unconditionally favor traditional Chinese Confucianism. They clearly understand that traditional Confucianismhas becomestale and is useless in a completely new social environment. They compare the condition of modern Chinese culture to ``a sick person''. In other words, they try to stress the fact that being sick is di€erent frombeing dead. As the sick still maintain life, so Chinese culture still sustains its stale and sick medieval feudalistic ideologies. There exists a continuous ``cultural vitality'' in Chinese culture (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 39±40; Zhang Jia Sen et al., 1958: 547±548). Thus, it is evident that it is not the stagnant culture that they have been trying to revive, but the ``spirit'' of the Chinese people, also known as ``cultural vitality''. I think the signi®cance of this cultural vitality needs to be clari®ed. In order to do this, examining the basic positions of modern neo-Confucian intellec- Cha: Modern Chinese Confucianism 485 tuals is crucial. Their position was made public in ``the Declaration for the Re-evaluation of China Studies and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture'' signed and circulated by Zhang Jia Sen and others in 1958. Modern neo- Confucian intellectuals think that culture is an objective expression of the human mind, and that this culture as an objecti®ed spirit inevitably loses the vitality once held by the subjective spirit as time passes. This can be con®rmed from the following statement by Zhang Jia Sen et al.:

We must not forget that culture is an objective expression of the spiritual life of human beings Culture is an expression of each nation's mental life, and the vitality of the culture will be drained naturally as time goes, by the rules of nature. (1958: 547, 571)

It is important to understand the modern neo-Confucian intellectuals' view of culture, and what it means to revive cultural vitality. I think the German sociologist Georg Simmel's ``culture tragedy concept'' will be help- ful in understanding their unpolished concept of culture and their vague task of the era. According to Simmel, culture is an objecti®cation of the human mind. Culture, as an objecti®ed mind, is reproduced through human perception. Culture is an historical expression of truth, which is acknowledged as valid, or else it is an accumulation of that truth. But, in this objecti®cation process, the mind can no longer exist in its original form. It only exists in a latent, hard-to-de®ne form(Simmel,1993: 565). Characteristics of the mind, such as over¯owing vitality, inner self-responsibility, creative tension of the subjective ``soul'',13 inevitably confront the forms of culture in a pro- found dimension (Simmel, 1968: 116). The mind can only realize itself in history through a hardened form, a distilled and dried form that sustains its existence. In other words, ``the objecti®cation of the mind provides a form that makes preservation and accumulation of mental labor possible, and this form is the most important and e€ective category among all the historical categories of humankind'' (Simmel, 1993: 566). It is easily under- stood that such forms re¯ect history and the era. As I explained above, there is an unavoidable structural contradiction between the contents and spirit of culture. Simmel de®nes this relationship of structural contradiction as the tragedy of culture (1968: 116±147; 1993: 557±583). Now it is clear that modern neo-Confucian intellectuals are trying to recover the ``spirit'' of Chinese culture, the true, original spirit of Confucian- ism. According to them, the true original spirit of Confucianism as historical, cultural vitality is not sti€ened, institutionalized Confucianism. The theo- retical work of these modern neo-Confucian intellectuals is related to distin- guishing ``values or contents of Confucian theory fromthe previous society or political structures'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 48). Unlike advocates of total Westernization (Quanban Xihua), who emphasize the time stage of objective culture, modern neo-Confucians stress that the spirit of each nation has its own individuality and special characteristics fromits people. Zheng Jia Dong quotes Liang Shu Ming:

``The Chinese people have their own direction and attitude, and it is di€erent fromthe Westerners'' (Liang Shu Ming, 1922: 65). This indicates that the di€erence between 486 Social Compass 50(4)

East and West is not just ``a di€erence of level in time and space,'' but a di€erence of quality, ``fundamental mentality,'' and ``cultural track''. (1993: 43)

Such a perspective leads to the conclusion that one culture cannot simply be replaced with a di€erent one. It is also linked to the following statement of a cultural relativistic trend: ``Liang Shu Ming showed a tendency of cultural relativism. He thought the good or bad of the three [Chinese, Western and Indian] cultures could not be generalized, and the key point was which culture was `appropriate for the times''' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 44). Zheng Jia Dong considered that Yu Ying Shi (1930±) formulated the cultural relativist perspective of modern neo-Confucian intellectuals most clearly, and presents the following summary. ``The so-called cultural pluralism is that all nations have their unique culture, which originated fromdi€erent sources. Thus, European culture cannot be a universal standard to measure other cultures'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 46). This is also the theoretical back- ground of the neo-Confucian intellectuals' rejection of the claims of the Quanban Xihua and Xiti Zhongyong groups calling for modernization through the simple replacement of Chinese tradition with Western culture (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 43±44). In addition, it also became grounds for asserting the value of Chinese and Eastern culture against the gigantic tide of Western culture. Thus, neo-Confucian intellectuals were able to argue that there could be various means of modernization other than unconditional Westernization, which is a threat to Chinese cultural identity. Opposing the Quanban Xihua and Xiti Zhongyong groups, they argue for modernization, but incorporating Chinese national tradition.

How Modern Neo-Confucian Intellectuals Came to Re-interpret Confucian Tradition and Accept Western Culture I will limit my argument here to explaining the peculiar ways of thinking used by these modern neo-Confucian intellectuals in accepting the cultural heri- tage of the West to presenting a few examples. Yan Fu, who urged total Westernization (Quanban Xihua) in the 1920s, says ``if we are to evaluate our academic studies through Western standards, there is nothing worthy of calling `studies' in China'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 78). This is a clear example of an assessment of Western science at that time. The Western science that was introduced into China at that time clearly shows a trend of optimism grounded in early positivism, with a mixture of unspecialized social evolutionismand philosophy. It carries a sort of ``religious color'' based on scientism. In other words, ``all problems of society and life [can] be solved through the increase of scienti®c knowledge and the advancement of the scienti®c level'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 78, 79). If this were so, it would be a reason for traditional culture and traditional Confucianismto dis- appear. In such circumstances, modern neo-Confucian intellectuals attempt to demonstrate the relativity of Western science and prove that their Con- fucian traditions are still useful in certain aspects through a new method of distinguishing between the objects and methodology of science. In other words, they distinguish between ``the world of facts and the world of mean- Cha: Modern Chinese Confucianism 487 ings, or the world of nature and the world of what should be'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 80). They also argue that Western scienti®c methodology can only be applied to the world of facts and nature, whereas the philosophical methods of neo-Confucianism, seeking ethical virtue rather than science, should be applied to the world of meaning and what should be. This is intended to demonstrate the relative domains of competence of both Western science and traditional Confucianism, and then acknowledge their value, but only in certain areas. Previous traditional Confucianismhad believed that it could be applied to everything, regardless of the world of fact or meaning (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 87). The way of thinking of modern neo-Confucian intellectuals in this process may be compared to that of the scholars who were on the side of German Geisteswissenschaften and history, during the debate on methodology in 19th-century Europe. Positivism, which began in France, claimed that history or Geisteswissenschaft that is unable to discover strict rules for its objects cannot be called science. In response, German scientists concerned with culture and history demonstrated the relativity of positivism, asserting that it was only a speci®c science, which studies the aspects related to rules of reality. They also stressed the need for a di€erent kind of science that deals with exceptional and particular aspects of reality, studying the value dimen- sion. Similarly, these scholars established a foundation for their mental and cultural science by emphasizing the fact that it is possible theoretically and methodologically (Cha Seong Hwan, 1992: 159±196; Also, see Droysen, 1977: 451±488). Modern neo-Confucian intellectuals observe positivism, which seeks knowledge of the world of simple facts and nature, and other Western philo- sophies, such as metaphysics. For their part, they intend to develop the study of mentality in Confucianism into a philosophyÐmetaphysics with the core concepts of Xin (heart), Xing (nature), and Tian (heaven)Ðbased on the premises and methodology of Western metaphysics (Xie Zhong Ming, 1998: 28). Through such studies, they think they can ``shape human souls and improve the state of life'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 83). As mentioned above, these intellectuals do not simply accept the meta- physics of the West, but investigate properties that can confront foreign culture and re-interpret it to create their own unique metaphysicsÐ``life philosophy''14 (Mou Zong San, 1984: 4; quoted in Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 56). This re¯ects the way of thinking of the typical modern neo-Confucian intellectual (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 94). Such moral metaphysics provides people with ``a general perception regarding the truth of the cosmos'', together with ``a sort of metaphysical state of `human±heaven unity' and an emotional experience'' (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 95). According to modern neo-Confucian intellectuals, Western philosophy holds opposite positions, believing that the cosmos and nature exist regardless of human beings, that they are objective entities that just follow natural laws of causality, focusing on researching basic elements that formthe cosmosand nature. That is why Western philosophy is unable to urge people to seek the ``metaphysical state of `wuwo-yiru' (objects and myself are one) and `tienren-heyi' (unity of heaven and man)'' (Zheng Jia 488 Social Compass 50(4)

Dong, 1993: 98). Modern neo-Confucian intellectuals say that such moral metaphysics is not their creation, but only a recomposition of the essence of the Xinxing (heart and nature) 15 theory of traditional Confucianism (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 100). Reconstructing the essence of this theory not only has the religious signi®cance of ``proving the existence of all creation in the cosmos,'' but also examines ``the source of ethical creation,'' which can be used for integration in modern Chinese society (Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 99).

Conclusion

The modern neo-Confucian movement has continued its expansion and reproduction in China as well as overseas. This re¯ects the fact that it embodies aspects meeting the Chinese people's demand for sustaining and developing cultural identity. Such a modern neo-Confucian movement has great signi®cance with regard to Chinese society and the cultures of many nations in the world, continuously thwarted by the globalization process. As mentioned above, this is because the way of thinking of modern neo- Confucian intellectuals demonstrates the practical possibility of di€erent cultures entering into dialogue, learning fromeach other, and co-existing, as they each maintain their own identities. If this modern neo-Confucian movement continues to succeed and revive the Chinese people's ``soul''Ð giving unity to the Chinese nationÐrestoring its vitality, I expect that it will play an important role in modern Chinese society, which is aiming at a ``socialist market economy'', at developing into a new, alternative civiliza- tion that can enter into dialogue and co-exist with the world's other advanced civilizations.

NOTES

This work was supported by Korea Research Foundation Grant (KRF-2001±002- B00076).

1: A point that must be made clear when discussing Confucianism is whether it should be considered a religion, a Western concept. I do not intent to get involved in this issue; however, I want to point out that Confucianismis not included in the ocial statistics on religion in China. Whether Confucianismis a religion or not, it is a fact that it was an intellectual tradition that has played a major role in the form- ing and maintenance of Chinese culture and civilization. This is where my interest lies. Though there is a Department of Religion in the Chinese government, Con- fucianismis not included there. For res pectable research work with regard to the debate on the religious aspect of Confucianism, see Chen His Yuan (1999). 2: A termadopted fromMax Weber. See myarticle for a speci®c explanation of the cultural signi®cance (Cha Seong Hwan, 2002: 107±111). 3: Religious intellectual prophets are in positions of total confrontation vis-aÁ -vis ociating priests of religious communities. See Max Weber (1980: 268±269) for a detailed discussion. Cha: Modern Chinese Confucianism 489

4: There are no ocial statistics for this. The number is based on the contents of an interview I had with Professor Guo Qi Yong of Wuhan University on January 15, 2002. Professor Guo, who is one of the modern neo-Confucian movement activists, is of the personal opinion that among all intellectuals in China, 70% are totally against Confucianism, 5% consider Confucianism as important, 10% follow the idea of modern neo-Confucianism, and 15% have various other views. 5: visited the Confucius Foundation in Beijing on January 9, 2002, and met with ocial Wu Xing Zhong. He said that the Foundation was not a purely civilian orga- nization. Some of the ocials working in the Foundation are on the legal payroll of the government. Presently, approximately 100 people are working at the Founda- tion. Dozens of these are government employees. The number of board members consisting of professors and other social leaders is estimated to be between 60 and 70. One-third of the expenses of the Confucius Foundation is met by the government. The rest is raised by individuals, organizations and companies throughout the country. There is greater response in coastal areas deeply in¯uenced by the reformand open economicpolicy. Thus, research on Confucius and Confu- cianismis ocially approved and syste matically supported. The Foundation was established in 1984. The headquarters are in Jinan, and it has branch oces in Beijing, Qufu, Lianhai and Qingdao. 6: Based on my interview with Professor Yang Guo Rong of the Huadong Edu- cational University on January 18, 2002, an individual cannot forman academic school or participate in it. An individual is, however, allowed to conduct any kind of research freely on a personal level. Academic schools are not ocially authorized in China. Considering the fact that most new academic research is undertaken by academic schools, this has great signi®cance. Modern neo-Confucianism is in¯uen- cing the only ocial ideology of the state, Marxism. There remains the possibility of a clash between the two. 7: This is based on an interview with a Confucius Foundation ocial on January 9, 2002. There is also a plan to establish a college for Confucius research in Hong Kong. 8: This was con®rmed in an interview with Professor Fan Fu En of Fudan University in Shanghai. 9: Based on a meeting with Philosophy Professor Zhang Li Wen of Renmin University on January 8, 2002, and a meeting with Professor Shu Yi Lie of Beijing University on January 8, 2002. 10: This is based on my interviews with Professor Zhang Li Wen of Renmin University, January 8, 2002, and with Professor Shu Yi Lie of Beijing University on January 9, 2002. 11: The way of thinking of Zhongti Xiyong is the ®rst and most typical style of response by Chinese cultural intellectuals in a situation where the clash between civilizations of China and the West threatens the very existence of Chinese culture. The Quanban Xihua group sought to oppose socialismand promoteWestern capi- talism. The Xiti Zhongyong group worked through Marxism to modify society and Chinese culture (Fang Keli, 1994: 337±340, 346, 350; Li Zhe Hou, 1992: 14, 18, 291, 459±460; Zheng Jia Dong, 1993: 17). 12: This attitude towards politics and culture by modern Neo-Confucian Scholars continues to this day. I con®rmed this when I visited China and met some of them in January 2002. For example, Zhang Li Wen, Jiang Ri Tian, and Peng Yong Jie of the Philosophy Department of Renmin University, Shu Yu Lie of Beijing University, Fan Fu En of Fudan University, and Yang Guo Rong of Huadong Educational University. 490 Social Compass 50(4)

13: In Simmel, the relation between the soul and spirit is clearly de®ned in the following passage: ``To make a comparison, Spiritual contents exist scattered, and forma uni®ed entity only through the so ul.Thisislikenon-organicmaterial being absorbed into an organismto forma uni®cation of life'' (1993: 582). And the soul ``cannot be named, but is an idea anchored somewhere in the world of spirit'' (1968: 117). 14: Here, there is no theory of knowledge or logic. On the contrary, the main interest is ``life and moral nature.'' Therefore, by content, it can be categorized as moral philosophy, action philosophy and life philosophy. 15: See the following: ``This theory is a research of the basics of ethics, forms the core of Chinese thought, and is the origin of all theories regarding the unity of man and heaven in virtue'' (Zhang Jia Sen et al., 1958: 548).

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Seong Hwan CHA has taught sociology at Hanil University in Korea since 1993. He received his PhD in Social Science (Sociology) from TuÈ bingen University in Germany (1989). His publications include Max Weber's Methodology of Social Science (ed. and trans., 1990); Socio- logical Understanding of Korean Religious Thought (1995); Max Weber and the Meaning of the World of Modernity (1997); Korean Civil Religion in Globalization (2000); Possibility and Limitation of Jeong Yakyong's World View in the Age of Globalization: Focusing on Critique of Chu His Cosmology (2002); ``Korean Civil Religion and Modernity'', Social Compass 47(4), 2000; ``Myth and Reality in the Discourse of Confucian Capitalismin Korea'', Asian Survey 43(3) (May/June 2003). ADDRESS: Hanil University/Shinri 694±1, Sangkwanmyn, Wanjukun, Chonbuk, 565±831, South Korea. [email: [email protected]]