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The Political Economy of Migrant Detention in Libya: Understanding the Players and the Business Models Arezo Malakooti DISCLAIMER

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The Political Economy of Migrant Detention in Libya: Understanding the Players and the Business Models Arezo Malakooti DISCLAIMER APRIL 2019 The Political Economy of Migrant Detention in Libya: Understanding the players and the business models Arezo Malakooti DISCLAIMER This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was prepared, researched and written by Arezo Malakooti. Fieldwork was conducted by Arezo Malakooti, Naji Abou-Khalil, Jerome Veyret, Chiara Fall and Jessica Gerkin. Support was provided by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s local network in Libya. The report also draws on the in-house expertise of Global Initiative Director and Deputy Director, Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, and Senior Fellow Mark Micallef. The report was peer reviewed by experts from the Clingendael Institute: Fransje Molenaar, Floor el Kamouni-Janssen and Mariska van Beijnum. We are also indebted to the various migrants and key informants who graciously shared their stories and experiences with us. The research for this report was supported by funding under the North of Africa window of the EU Emer- gency Trust Fund for Africa. However, the contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the Global Initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union (EU). The photograph on the front cover was taken by the author in a migrant ghetto in Agadez, Niger. Please do not hesitate to contact the author: [email protected] ABOUT THE PROJECT ‘Monitoring the Political Economy of Human Smuggling in Libya and the Greater Sahara’ is a project funded under the North Africa window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Its goals are to create an expansive research facility that provides the EU and its partners with up-to-date monitoring and analysis of migration patterns and human smuggling dynamics in Libya and the Sahel (Niger, Chad and Mali). This takes the form of monthly briefs and regular in-depth, longform research studies such as this one. The project is implemented by a consortium consisting of the Global Initiative and the Clingendael Institute. The Political Economy of Migrant Detention in Libya | April 2019 iii Contents ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 2 FIGURES, MAPS AND TABLES .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 A. BACKGROUND AND METHODS ......................................................................................................................... 9 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 2. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 11 3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 16 B. CROSS-ANALYSIS OF MIGRANT DETENTION .................... 26 1. OFFICIAL v NON-OFFICIAL DETENTION CENTRES ....................................................................................... 26 2. THE ROLE OF ARMED GROUPS ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 29 3. CLASSIFICATION OF THE CENTRES ........................................................................................................................................................................ 29 4. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FROM THE CENTRES ................................................................................................ 34 5. PROFILES IN THE CENTRES ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 37 6. BUSINESS MODELS AND FINANCIAL FLOWS .................................................................................................................... 39 C. INDIVIDUAL CENTRES AND SMUGGLING DYNAMICS ACROSS LIBYA .......................................................................................................................................................... 45 1. DETENTION CENTRES AND SMUGGLING DYNAMICS IN SOUTHERN LIBYA ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 46 2. DETENTION CENTRES AND SMUGGLING DYNAMICS IN EASTERN LIBYA .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 59 3. DETENTION CENTRES AND SMUGGLING DYNAMICS ON THE EASTERN COAST .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 68 4. DETENTION CENTRES AND SMUGGLING DYNAMICS ON THE WESTERN COAST ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 70 5. DETENTION CENTRES AND SMUGGLING DYNAMICS IN NORTHERN LIBYA ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 83 D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................. 89 APPENDIX: DETENTION CENTRES IN LIBYA ............................................................................................................................................ 92 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 94 NOTES AND REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 103 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGO Attorney General’s Office AVR assisted voluntary return CFA Communauté Financière Africaine CIR Italian Refugee Council CSDP common security and defence policy DC detention centre DCIM Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration DGPC Direction Générale de la Protection Civile (Niger) DRC Danish Refugee Council ENFM EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia ETM emergency transit mechanism EU European Union EUTF European Union Trust Fund for Africa GDF gathering and departure facility GNA Government of National Accord HI Humanity and Inclusion NGO HOR House of Representatives IDI in-depth interview IDP internally displaced person IMC International Medical Corps ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant IOM International Organization for Migration IOM DTM IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix IRC International Rescue Committee KII key informant interview LCG Libyan Coast Guard LPA Libyan Political Agreement LNA Libyan National Army MoD Ministry of Defence MoI Ministry of the Interior MoJ Ministry of Justice MoL Ministry of Labour MOU memorandum of understanding MSF Médecins sans Frontières NGO non-governmental organization PUI Première Urgence Internationale NGO SAR search and rescue UN United Nations UAM unaccompanied minor UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSMIL United Nations Mission of Support in Libya VHR voluntary humanitarian return The Political Economy of Migrant Detention in Libya | April 2019 1 DEFINITIONS Official detention centres Migrant detention
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