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ASC Dissertation Scientific Practice and Analogical Reasoning: The Problem of Ingrained Analogy Andrea Gayle Sullivan-Clarke A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2015 Reading Committee: Alison Wylie, Chair Lynn Hankinson-Nelson Andrea Woody Carole Lee Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Philosophy ©Copyright 2015 Andrea Gayle Sullivan-Clarke University of Washington Abstract Scientific Practice and Analogical Reasoning: The Problem of Ingrained Analogy Andrea Gayle Sullivan-Clarke Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Dr. Alison Wylie Philosophy From metaphors that direct scientific inquiry to analogical inferences that justify particular hypotheses or models, analogical reasoning plays numerous roles in scientific practice. While in some cases the analogy is explicit and carefully controlled, scientific communities are often not aware of the analogies that inform their research. More importantly, when scientific communities take the analogical correspondences presupposed by a metaphor for granted, a practice I refer to as the problem of ingrained analogy, the uncritical use of analogy becomes dangerous. For example, the race as species metaphor that guided 19th century race science endorsed a research program that promoted a hierarchy of race, and ultimately resulted in social policies that marginalized large segments of American society. A similar worry is linked with the metaphor, prenatal hormone as an organizer of the human brain, which motivates brain organization research. In both cases, reasoning from analogy has the potential to misdirect research programs. Not only does it hinder or sometimes prevent the acquisition of knowledge, it can result in social policies that have profound, and ii long-lasting, negative effects. In philosophy of science, the ambivalence toward analogical reasoning has taken the form of an unhelpful denial, which fails to recognize the constructive, and often invaluable, role that analogy plays. Thus, the challenge for any account of analogical reasoning is to recognize its contributions while also articulating normative guidelines that bring ingrained analogies to the surface and subject them to systematic, critical appraisal. In my dissertation, I argue that communities must adopt strategies that encourage an awareness of the assumptions associated with their use of analogy and propose strategies for critical assessment, drawing from feminist theory and social epistemology. By employing such strategies, scientific communities can not only avoid being misled by analogical reasoning, but by instituting practices that limit harm, scientific communities also become more socially responsible. iii iv For my family Tempunvyakvn ke tat vpeyet tos v Acknowledgements This dissertation is my last step toward becoming an academic. Interestingly, it is also my first step on a new path: the development of a research program. Looking back, I am struck by how many special people supported my travel. As a recipient of the Minority Dissertation Fellowship at the University of Washington, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance given to me by the Bank of America and the University of Washington Graduate Opportunities and Minority Advancement Program (GO-MAP). The Bank of America provided a teaching fellowship for my first and last academic years, which allowed me the opportunity to focus on my research and the writing of this dissertation. I wish to personally thank Cynthia Morales and Anthony Salazar at GO-MAP for their support and guidance throughout my graduate career. In addition, I am grateful for the opportunity to work with my GO-MAP faculty mentors, Dr. Ralina Joseph and Dr. Joy Williamson-Lott. As leaders of the GO-MAP Graduate Dissertation Writing Group, their insight and advice proved invaluable while writing this dissertation. This project would never have gotten off the ground without the amazing faculty who agreed to serve on my dissertation committee. Words cannot adequately acknowledge the guidance, support, and encouragement of my doctoral advisor, Dr. Alison Wylie, and the members of my committee at the University of Washington (Dr. Lynn Hankinson-Nelson, Dr. Andrea Woody, Dr. Carole Lee, and Dr. Bruce Hevly). Each member played a unique role in helping me to grow and develop as an academic, and I only hope to approximate her or his professionalism as I begin my career. A special thank you goes to my external committee member, Dr. Paul Bartha (University of British Columbia) for his extensive comments and support from a distance! My work greatly benefitted from his expertise. I would also like to 1 thank the staff, graduate students, and faculty of the University of Washington Philosophy Department for their support. I would especially like to thank my fellow graduate students, Jenna Kreyche, Elizabeth Scarbrough, and Tim Brown, for reading drafts, texting support, and conducting endless conversations about my project. I would like to thank undergraduate, James Harbinger, for the opportunity to present my work to the undergraduate philosophy club. It was a wonderful experience. Finally, I thank my family. My parents, Jack and Sharon Sullivan, who offered a constant source of support and encouragement even when I am sure they did not know exactly what I was doing (and I am not sure I always knew either!). I could not have finished this project without their love and understanding. Words cannot express my appreciation for the support of my immediate family, and so I will say thank you to my husband Alan and my children—Nicholas, Harrison, Christian, and Evelyn Clarke. Our family moved from Denver to Seattle so that I could go to graduate school. Admittedly, it was not easy, but every time the kids pitched in around the house or ate yet another dinner of pasta, I was able to make progress on this project. Thank you. 2 Contents Introduction Chapter One, Analogical Reasoning and Scientific Practice 1.1 What is Analogical Reasoning? What is Analogy? 20 1.2 Why Scientific Practice? 31 1.3 The Different Roles of Analogical Reasoning in Scientific Practice 35 Chapter Two, Darwin, the Origin, and Analogical Reasoning 2.1 The Standard Interpretation of Darwin’s Analogy in the Origin 56 2.2 Richards and the Inefficacy of Darwin’s Analogy 62 2.3 Causal Efficacy and the Analogy in the Origin 70 2.4 Metaphor, Analogy, and their roles in the Origin: A Response to Gildenhuys 82 2.5 Differing Accounts of Induction, Differing Accounts of Analogy 91 Chapter Three, A Renewed Interest in Analogical Reasoning 3.1 The Contributions of Mary Hesse 100 3.2 Paul Bartha and the Limitations of Hesse’s Account 107 3.3 Bartha’s Articulation Model 111 3.4 The Broad and Narrow Roles for Analogy 119 Chapter Four, The Problem of Ingrained Analogy 4.1 The Problem of Ingrained Analogy and Its Effects 123 4.2 The Basic Structure of a Powerful Problem 131 4.3 19th Century Race Science: The Research of Samuel George Morton 136 4.4 Brain Organization Research: Science and the “Male” or “Female” Brain 148 3 Chapter Five, Transformative Criticism and Scientific Practice 5.1 Communities, Social Epistemology, and Cognitive Science 172 5.2 Prior Accounts for Critiquing Scientific Metaphors 175 5.3 Endorsing Strategies for Effective Scientific Practice 182 5.4 A Return to the Darwin and the Origin 214 Conclusion 215 References 221 4 5 Introduction In Darwin and His Critics, David Hull describes Charles Darwin as having “both the good fortune and the misfortune to begin his scientific career at that moment in history when philosophy of science came into its own in England” (Hull 1973, 3). Imagine, a young scientist conducting research and developing a major treatise like the Origin amidst the discussions and debates on the methods of science and the nature of induction. Such was the case for Darwin; he developed his theory while witnessing the debate on induction between John Stuart Mill and William Whewell, as well as having John Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy serve as a methodological exemplar. Darwinian scholars—namely Michael Ruse, C. Kenneth Waters, and Jonathan Hodge—note that Darwin wrote the Origin under the influence of Whewell and/or Herschel, as well as other works such as Humboldt’s Personal Narrative and George Lyell’s Principles of Geology.1 So influential was the philosophical environment in which Darwin wrote the Origin that Gregory Radick concludes, “Darwin’s theory of natural selection was no gift of sheer, sublime, solitary genius, but in several key respects a product of Victorian culture” (Radick 2005, 147). Interestingly, this auspicious state of affairs was also Darwin’s misfortune. As Hull notes, “Darwin braced himself for the potential hostility with which the content of his theory was received, especially given its implications for human evolution, but he was not prepared for the criticism against his methodology, which came from the most respected philosophers and scientists of his day” (Hull 1973, 6-7). 2 1 See Ruse (1973, 1975), Waters (2003), and Hodge (1992). Hodge no longer maintains that Whewell influenced Darwin to the extent that Ruse and Waters do (Hodge, forthcoming manuscript). 2 Emphasis in the original. 6 Of those responding negatively to Darwin’s work, Hull states Some of the reviewers were obviously biased. Some were merely mouthing undigested platitudes. But many of the reviewers were competent scientists honestly trying to evaluate a novel theory against the commonly accepted standards of scientific excellence and evolutionary theory consistently came up wanting. (Hull 1973, 14) Although Herschel, Mill, and Whewell did not formally review the Origin, their negative responses to Darwin’s methods, particularly those provided by Mill and Herschel, surprised and even disappointed Darwin and his supporters (Hull 2003, 181 & 186). While Darwin found the critiques discouraging, I disagree with Hull that it was a “misfortune”. True, Darwin believed his theory of evolution was “grossly misrepresented, bitterly opposed and ridiculed;” yet, he also acknowledged that those same critiques were often tendered “in good faith” (Darwin 1896, 89).
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