Evolving Threat Narratives: The Case of China’s Transition from Foe to Friend during Rapprochement Carl John Ciovacco Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Planning, Governance and Globalization Chair: Joel Peters Timothy Luke Ariel Ahram Georgeta Pourchot March 1, 2018 Alexandria, Virginia Keywords: Political Science, International Relations, Economics, China 1 Evolving Threat Narratives Carl John Ciovacco ABSTRACT This research endeavor attempts to better understand the nature of American threat narratives, how narratives evolve, what drives the change, and finally, what it all means for perceptions of threat to the US. The raison d'être of this study is to understand the implications of bias on evolving threat narratives and threat calculus and ultimately determine its impact on perceptions of friend and foe. The case study of China during the years of rapprochement is enlightening as it helps inform many of these questions around American threat perception. Contrary to popular opinion, changing American perception of external threat may not be caused primarily by actions of the threat actors. Instead, American perceptions change as threat narratives evolve based on phenomenon located on the American domestic front. To a large extent, threat narrative creation is shaped by domestic sources of bias and transparency with the former introducing elements of subjectivity and the latter elements of objectivity. 2 Evolving Threat Narratives Carl John Ciovacco GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT This research attempts to better understand the nature of American threat. The purpose of this study is to understand the implications of bias on evolving threat narratives and threat calculus. The case study of China during the years of rapprochement is enlightening as it helps inform many of these questions around American threat perception. Contrary to popular opinion, changing American perception of external threat may not be caused primarily by actions of the threat actors. Instead, American perceptions change as threat narratives evolve based on factors on the American domestic front. To a large extent, threat narrative creation is shaped by domestic sources of bias and transparency with the former introducing elements of subjectivity and the latter elements of objectivity. 3 Table of Contents Part I Prologue 1 1. Introduction A. Research Question 8 B. Methodology 14 C. Why is China an Important Story? 28 D. Why Look at the Rapprochement of the 1970s? 40 Part II 2. Theory A. What is Threat? 43 B. What are Threat Narratives? 58 C. Theoretical Torches to Inform 68 Part III 3. How Did We Get There? The Shaping of American Views on China A. America’s Early Ventures into China 79 B. American Views on China in the Late 19th Century 85 C. The Appeal of Westernized, Christian Leaders in China 87 D. The China Lobby and WWII 93 4. Evolution of Enemy Narratives (1948-mid 1960s) 96 A. Military Narratives 100 B. Economic Narratives 112 C. Political Narratives 117 5. Evolution of Friend Narratives (late 1960s-mid 1970s) 126 A. Military Narratives 129 B. Economic Narratives 134 C. Political Narratives 137 6. Sources of Bias and Transparency at the Heart of Threat Evolution 147 7. Conclusion 182 Epilogue 8. Old Wine in New Bottles? Implications for American Threat Calculus on China 198 Bibliography 232 iv List of Tables Table 1. Framing Matrix 14 Table 2. Enemy Threat Narratives 99 Table 3. Friend Narratives 129 v List of Figures Figure 1. Research Design 18 Figure 2. Elaborated Research Design 24 Figure 3. Threat Inflation 66 Figure 4. Interaction Model 77 vi Not only we but all the people of the world will have to make our best effort if we are going to match the enormous ability, drive, and discipline of the Chinese people. Otherwise we will one day be confronted with the most formidable enemy that has ever existed in the history of the world (Griffin, 2014, 237). Richard Nixon— Diary entry from February 1972, the same month he made peace with China The most fundamental method of work… is to determine our working policies according to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made, we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation…and were subjective in determining our working policies (Cooper, 1972, 223). Mao Zedong— “The Thoughts of Mao Zedong” And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, 176). Biblical verse— John 8:32; adopted by Allen Dulles as the CIA’s motto Part I. Prologue When China transitioned from enemy to friend of the United States under the guiding hand of President Richard Nixon in 1972, American threat narratives around China were in a state of immense flux. After more than two decades of hostile narratives, China moved into the unprecedented position of ally. The shroud of secrecy surrounding this departure only added to the mystique of how and why the two countries drastically altered the terms of their relationship. Between Henry Kissinger’s secret advance party meeting, covert messaging vis-à-vis respective allies, the famous Ping Pong Diplomacy, and Nixon’s culminating visit, the United States and China normalized relations in the most unorthodox of manners. 1 After a rapprochement that shocked the world, no one could have envisioned how this change would impact the long-term relationship between the two countries. Within the larger geo-strategic picture, the Soviet Union may have provided the impetus for this transition; however, the eventual Soviet demise pushed the Sino-American relationship into uncharted territory. Highlighting the uncertainty around the very nature and longevity of American engagement with China, President Nixon shortly before his death told New York Times columnist William Safire, “we may have created a Frankenstein” (Browne, 2015, C2). This ambivalence at the end of Nixon’s life on China’s readiness to become an ally is indicative of a larger trend within American thought that encapsulates the many reservations and vacillations over time on views of China with respect to security. This incredibly complex and momentous occasion of rapprochement is worth exploring because of the lessons that we can learn regarding how the US views threat as well as its own insecurity. The rapprochement with China offers a unique glimpse into a dramatic shift in American security narratives from those of hostility and fear to those of partnership. Also, a whole host of sources of domestic bias and transparency influenced the journey as China moved from threat to partner. The details of rapprochement in the 1970s, its significance, as well as the meaningful events that contributed to its manifestation will be discussed later in the introductory chapter. Many questions exist around the precise reasons for China’s transition from American enemy to friend at this particular moment in time as well as others in the tempestuous Sino-American history. During the rapprochement of the 1970s, was it virtuous motives that drove Nixon to bring China to the table of nations? Was it 2 America’s concern over a rising China (Griffin, 2014, 237)? Was it a confluence of mutually friendly acts and hints at peace on the part of both countries at a fortuitous moment in time (Kissinger, 2011, 220-225)? Was it the reemergence of the China Lobby that had been so powerful in the 1930s and 1940s? Or, finally, was it solely a Realpolitik balancing act against the Soviets who had become estranged from China (Brzezinski, 2012, 19)? In all of these scenarios, a certain level of subjectivity may have crowded out the more objective security narratives and precipitated such change. Emotions may have trumped cold-hard facts or, on the contrary, the fog of emotions might very well have cleared to more plainly reveal the threat truth that had been present for years and merely masked by inherent biases. The role of evolving threat narratives around the American portrayal of China from the 1940s through the 1970s helps to inform how China transitioned from enemy to friend. Moreover, it sheds light on the larger picture of how the US has historically seen its security with respect to China. The series of events leading up to rapprochement is intriguing because of the implications that can be gleaned around how America perceives its own insecurity. Delving into the specific security narratives helps to paint a picture of threat inflation and deflation, changing perspectives, and policy transition. The storylines of insecurity encapsulate sentiments of the times and help outline the prevailing threat mindset. Understanding the threat narrative evolution and the role that actors and ideology play in furthering and detracting from these narratives could inform how the concept of threat, often believed to be objective in nature, is actually a highly subjective construction. 3 The manner in which the US adopted a quasi-friendship with China in the 1970s after so much hostility in the previous decades is significant because of how quickly the perceived threat of China dissipated. From the late-1940s until the mid-1960s, nearly all American threat narratives around China pointed to an extremely hostile, unpredictable country prepared for war and bent on testing American limits. Was this threat level artificially elevated due to subjective narratives in the 1950s and the departure from this mindset in the 1970s merely a return to a more objective view of threat? Setting aside the reasons for the departure for a moment, the threat narratives in the US during the late 1960s astoundingly morphed into friend narratives centered on balancing with China against the Soviets, China’s desire for high-level diplomatic dialogue, and even a slowing of Chinese nuclear weapon production.