China Studies Review Is a Editorial Board Paul H

vol 2 2016 CHINA

STUDIES

featuring articles by REVIEW

Benjamin Pollok Patrick Lozada Cheng Zhang David Rubin Adrienne Dalton Peter C.Y. Kim Jakob Bund Shuxian Luo Winston Kung vol 2 2016 CHINA

© 2016 The China Studies program of The Johns Hopkins University The China Studies Review is a editorial board Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies publication of the China Studies All rights reserved. program of The Johns Hopkins Editor-in-Chief University School of Advanced STUDIES REVIEW Design: www.SchumannStudioCreative.com Printed on Rolland Hitech - with a minimum of 30% post-consumer fiber, International Studies (SAIS). The Natalie Lynch made using renewable biogas energy. Review publishes interdisciplinary work by SAIS graduate students The China Studies program does not take institutional positions conducting research on China, Staff Editors on public policy issues; the views represented herein are the author’s including topics in history, politics, and do not necessarily reflect the views of its staff, or trustees of economics, political economy, Johns Hopkins University. Brittany Coley policy, energy and the environment. For electronic copies of this report, visit: Adam Lee https://www.sais-jhu.edu/content/china-studies-review#about Kaj Malden China Studies Program The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School Pola Shim of Advanced International Studies Rome Building, Suite 606-612 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Matt Sindelar Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: +1 202 663 5816 http://www.sais-jhu.edu/content/china-studies#overview Benjamin Tsui [email protected] Faculty Advisor Carla Freeman CHINA STUDIES REVIEW vol 2 | 2016

to Yellow Dust to Yellow table of table contents Shuxian Luo … 61 … Shuxian Luo David Rubin … 26 … David Rubin China and India’s China and India’s Peter C.Y. Kim … 46 Kim … C.Y. Peter Winston Kung … 79 … Winston Kung Policymaking Model Policymaking Model Naval Modernization Making the Transition: Making the Transition: in a Cross-Strait Crisis: in a Cross-Strait After the Rise of Xi Jinping After the Rise of Covered with Dust: China’s Dust: China’s with Covered A Analysis Scenario-Driven A in Comparative Perspective Assessing the Decision Process Assessing the Decision Process Position in Regional Approaches Approaches Position in Regional Behind U.S. Military Intervention Behind U.S. Military Intervention Examining China’s Environmental Environmental Examining China’s Same Goal, Different Trajectories: Trajectories: Same Goal, Different

Jakob Bund … 8 Bund … Jakob Natalie Lynch … 1 … Lynch Natalie Cheng Zhang … 4 Cheng Zhang … Why So Negative? Patrick Lozada … 17 … Lozada Patrick Benjamin Pollok … 2 … Benjamin Pollok Adrienne Dalton …6 in Japan and China Letter from the Editor Letter from Cybersecurity Coalition Shifting Attitudes Public Bilateral Investment Treaty Bilateral Investment for an Effective U.S.-China of the Triad’s Political Past of the Triad’s in the Twenty-First Century: in the Twenty-First Creative Stagnation: Stagnation: Creative China’s Trust: Assessing the Prospect Assessing the Prospect Trust: Protesters Remind Hong Kong Protesters Limited Agreement, Maximized Limited Agreement, Knife Attacks on Pro-Democracy Attacks on Pro-Democracy Knife The Failure of Zone-Based Reform The Failure Potential Gains from a U.S.-China a from Potential Gains THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS STUDIES THE CHINA CHINA STUDIES REVIEW vol 2 | 2016 1

------. Review Natalie Lynch Washington, D.C. Washington, that U.S. diplomatic and military leverage leverage and military diplomatic U.S. that to Taiwan and China would eventually lead tensions in the region. de-escalate excited are program Studies China the in We student showcase to opportunity this have to and developments domestic China’s on work to take I would like policy. foreign evolving to thank our staff editors this opportunity and writers for their enthusiasm and hard and reality a publication this making in work to our faculty for Carla Freeman, advisor, ofher ongoing support the cooperate cooperate in the absence of trust. Patrick indus Lozada discusses “creative China’s tries”, and the shortcomings of China’s in foster economic zones special creative ing an innovation David economy. Rubin builds upon Bruce Gilley’s spectrum of authoritarian environ and democratic mentalism and finds that in the context of environmental policymaking, China is inclusivity and more towards transitioning Kim also Peter engagement. grassroots and policy environmental China’s examines uses dust and sandstorms, also known as to “yellow examine dust”, the challenges coop for environmental and opportunities Shuxian Luo Asia. in Northeast eration analysis ofconducts a comparative China and India’s naval modernization efforts, noting that while rapid economic China’s its naval modern development has spurred other are there pace, rapid more a at ization threat elements such as differing important help that options alliance and perceptions mod naval in lag relative India’s explain to presents Winston Kung Finally, ernization. crisis scenario analysis that Straits Taiwan a examines the legal, diplomatic, strategic, would and domestic opinion factors that likely affect a U.S. response, concluding - - - - the editor letter from from letter In our first section, we introduce three important examine pieces that short issues in investment U.S.-China relations, public opinion in China and Japan, and move pro-democracy the Hong Kong the examines Pollock Benjamin ment. progression of negotiations between the a and China in adopting United States high-quality bilateral investment treaty. to Genron from Cheng Zhang uses data dis mutual behind reasons the understand Adrienne Japan. and China between trust triads of the role Hong Kong at Dalton looks ofsuppression in the Hong Kong the 2014 demonstrations. pro-democracy six research Our second section features of covering a wide range articles topics. Jakob Bund relations explores U.S.-China alternative an provides and cyberspace in can countries two the which by framework This is an exciting time for China scholars time for China is an exciting This major undergo to continues country the as and interna in its domestic transformations tional Within spheres. the China last year, financial international major a founded has rate its economic growth institution even as has fallen to just above 6 At percent. the same time, we have witnessed an escala Sea China South the in hostilities in tion as well as neighbors its and China between the and China between tensions increased no While cybersecurity. over States United all ofone journal can hope to capture these pleased are we developments, fascinating of edition second the China the present to as a showcase of Review Studies student of School Hopkins Johns the at scholarship hope and Studies Advanced International ofChina’s understanding the further will it and challenges. opportunities SAIS | THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM STUDIES THE CHINA CHINA STUDIES REVIEW vol 2 | 2016 3 - -

, About the Author Toward a US-China Investment Treaty a US-China Investment Toward Economics, for International Institute Peterson 3. February 2015, PIEE Briefing 151, Secretary. Press ofWhite House Office the The China Economic Relations.” Sheet: U.S.- “Fact 2015. September 15, Benjamin Pollok is a second year SAIS stu year is a second Pollok Benjamin After Studies. China in concentrating dent 2011, in University Colgate from graduating in interna years several for Ben worked University Peking for first education, tional In Programs. Academic CET for then and the summer of 2016, Ben interned at the Policy Global for Center Carnegie-Tsinghua in Beijing. 1 2

------2

SAIS | industries industries all THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM STUDIES THE CHINA administration’s administration’s designation of the U.S.- China relationship as “a top priority”, should the take U.S. advantage of China’s to expedite as an opportunity stagnation negotiations. BIT ambitious investment The treaty yet. U.S.- in expanding would go further China BIT investors U.S. that meaning access, market would enjoy the broadest array of invest investors of opportunities ment foreign any in China. also may economic integration Further relations, diplomatic U.S.-China strengthen regula investment in clarity greater and may reduce tions and dispute settlements from has resulted the political friction that BIT The a mutual lack of transparency. for point launching a even provide could an eventual bilateral trade or agreement, China’s integration into the Trans-Pacific (TPP). Partnership China’s slowing economic performance for expe an opportunity may provide over the coming year. dited negotiations In light of increasingly China’s ambitious for a and its desire years in recent BITs an stimulus, economic an as BIT U.S.-China BIT quality U.S.-China for a high opportunity has With never the been Obama greater. foreign firms can invest. This is the first Chi first the is This invest. can firms foreign a of basis the on function will that BIT nese firms will meaning U.S. that list”, “negative be able to invest directly in as exempt listed explicitly those except investment. international from Chi some critics have questioned Though ability na’s to agree and adhere to a high over quality the BIT, past few years there have been positive indications of China’s willingness to create more robust invest their trilateral Preceding ment agreements. Free Trade Agreement, in 2012 China, investment an signed Korea and Japan This treaty. agreement was China’s most - - - Benjamin Pollok from a U.S.- from China Bilateral Bilateral China Potential Gains Gains Potential

A high quality BIT would address would address high quality BIT A 1

Investment Treaty Investment

delineates delineates the specific industries in which next next logical step in broader trade China’s existing 107 China’s process. liberalization all operate BITs on a which “positive list”, While the proposed U.S.-China BIT is a major departure from China’s existing bilateral and regional it BITs, marks the ease ease China’s controversial law requiring U.S. firms to partner with domestic firms in “joint ventures”. Namely, Namely, the BIT would open previously inaccessible industries for foreign direct potentially in China and (FDI) investment China. U.S. prevent many of concerns that the key entering the Chinese market. investors from the the manufacturing, service and financial sectors. In 2015, the U.S. held a meager of in investments percent 1.2 foreign total ment treaty. Countries with their own BITs with their own BITs Countries ment treaty. for opportunities with China have greater investment, including greater access to legal protections and transparency. and transparency. legal protections most the has U.S. the countries, two the Of invest quality high binding, a from gain to investors. If negotiations are successful, the successful, are negotiations If investors. invest of streams two-way broaden will BIT greater investors with ment and equip U.S. could be mutually beneficial and would represent a substantial step in China’s liberalization of market access for foreign Investment Treaty (BIT) have made incre made have (BIT) Treaty Investment based BIT, quality high A progress. mental principally on the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, Since Since 2013, negotiations between the Bilateral a on China and States United 2 CHINA STUDIES REVIEW vol 2 | 2016 5 - - - , March 27, 2015. 27, March , About the Author ”, 32. ”, Japan-China Public Opinion Poll,” Opinion Poll,” Public Japan-China Poll,” Opinion Public Japan-China (May 2013), 167. (May 2013), The Times Japan The th th th Springer Science and Business Media: Ibid. Ibid. “The 10 Ibid. Love Tourists “Why Chinese Adam Minter, “The 10 Nation Popular Japanese “Anti Kang, Su-Jeong “The 10 Ibid. Japan,” Japan,” 2014, 3. 2014, Japan Towards Approach alism and China’s 2001- Tension, Political amid Sino-Japanese 2006,” East Asia 26. 2014,

6 7 8 9 Stud Japan is a second year Cheng Zhang Her academic SAIS. at ies concentrator relations Japan-China include interests collaboration, regional Asian Northeast and including diplomatic his communication, exchange. cultural and reconciliation torical working on a research She is currently and historical revisionism paper regarding as 1980s, the since Japan in reconciliation contentions with well as major historical East Asian countries. 1 2 3 4 5 ------7

Crit SAIS | 3

Corre 5

In 2013 this figure rose In 2013 this figure 4

Cultural exchanges on litera on exchanges Cultural 9

THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM STUDIES THE CHINA increase increase in tourism in both directions, par ticularly Chinese tourists visiting hasJapan, Chinese between understanding promoted touristsChinese with people, Japanese and of afterJapan positive impression expressing travels. their ture, movies and popular culture can also better to audiences younger and older assist cultures. Japanese understand Chinese and China’s criticism China’s of past Japan’s acts and China’s curriculum were too subjective and nationalistic. ofto 58.6 percent respondents. in spondingly, 2013 almost 61 percent of Japan that declared Chinese respondents and apologize for its past must recognize China. towards aggressions associ to pressures related Other reasons also concerns security regional with ated contributed to the negative feelings in both the countries. For Japanese respon military a as China of perception the dents, 61.8 from increased the region to threat in 2014. in 2013 to 64.3 percent percent Chinese For more respondents, than half cooperation military Japan’s that believed to con is an attempt with the United States tain China. per negative Despite the predominantly twenty-first the of part early the in ceptions Jap between interaction increased century, anese and Chinese citizens has the potential recent The mutual perceptions. to improve Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are unacceptable. unacceptable. are islands Senkaku/Diaoyu of Genron Japanese percent 48.4 Almost the they expected that stated respondents two countries to approach the issues by military through than rather negotiating means (2014; 2013, 49.1 percent). mainly respondents Chinese icism from of actions focused on the unilateral the in claiming admin government Japanese disputed islands. over the control istrative Disagreement on how history should be treated is another major reason behind the negative public attitudes in Japan ofJap 56 percent Around and China. anese respondents believed that both

- - - - found found Cheng Zhang China Daily This piece examines piece examines This 1

Attitudes in Attitudes First Century in the Twenty- showed that although public Unfavorable attitudes in Japan Japan in attitudes Unfavorable and areas for increased mutual for increased and areas 2

Shifting Public Public Shifting

Japan and China and China Japan

agree agree that one another’s actions over the Reasons for negative impressions are sim are impressions for negative Reasons ilar in the two countries. First, both the respondents Chinese the and Japanese responded with a wave of anti-Japanese with a wave ofresponded anti-Japanese sentiment in China. demonstrations in China in the early 2000s, 2000s, early the in China in demonstrations steadily growing impressions with negative 2006. after cor which 2014, and 2013 in again spiked spiked in 2009 and again in 2013 and 2014. in 2009 and again in 2013 and 2014. spiked China were towards attitudes Japanese noticeably influenced by anti-Japanese China Daily favorable more was sides both on opinion from 2006 to 2008, negative impressions from 2000 to 2014 demonstrated predom 2000 to 2014 demonstrated from Japan. towards attitudes inantly negative and NPO Genron from data opinion Public understanding between the two countries. countries. two the between understanding In China, public opinion polls conducted been predominantly negative during the twenty-first century. and NPO Genron from data opinion public China Daily tute Corporation (Genron NPO) and the the NPO) and (Genron tute Corporation Chinese newspaper have countries both in attitudes public that close cooperation and high tension. Joint and high tension. close cooperation public opinion polls conducted by the Japanese Public Opinion Research Insti Since the normalization of relations in the in the ofSince the normalization relations 1970’s, the relationship between Japan periods of and China has experienced 4 CHINA STUDIES REVIEW vol 2 | 2016 7 - - - - (Hong , October , The Wash The The New York The New York About the Author The Telegraph The Hong Kong Triad Societies Triad Hong Kong , October 4, 2014. October 4, , , October 4, 2014. October 4, , Liu, 40-43. Liu, Orga Triad “Beyond Social Capital: Wing Lo, T. Benjamin T. Liu, Liu, T. Benjamin on Protesters Attacks to Links “Triad Dan Levin, Hong Kong Attack Men “Masked Phillips, Tom Mob Triad When a “Watch: Tharoor, Ishaan ington Post British and China,” nized Crime in Hong Kong 5 (September no. Journal of Criminology 50, 858-860. 2010), Before and After the 1997 Changeover After and Before 30-35. 2001), Net e-Publishing, Kong: Some Old Questions,” Raise Times Protesters,” Democracy 2014. 13, Protesters,” Hong Kong’s Attacked

5 6 Adrienne Dalton is a is a graduate ofJohns Dalton is a is a graduate Adrienne Hopkins SAIS, where she concentrated in pro and research Her Studies. Strategic civil include Chinese interests fessional Chinese society, social issues and the law taught she studies, her to addition In war. of English language literature at a public high school in China, and has traveled She holds a Asia. throughout extensively lan Bachelor ofAccountancy and French College. Wofford guage from 1 2 3 4

- - - 5

SAIS | 6

THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM STUDIES THE CHINA hundred pro-democracy protesters out of protesters pro-democracy hundred crackdown. Tiananmen Beijing during the changeover During the 1997 administrative that believed people many Kong, Hong in to help the triads recruited Beijing directly that and to ensure maintain social order would occur seamlessly. the transition When Beijing announced its intentions to 2017 Kong’s Hong for candidates the select executive elections, and pro-democracy protesters subsequently filled thestreets, the mirrored atmosphere the charged administra the 1997 preceded scene that front” “united IfBeijing’s changeover. tive to suppress tactic with the triads worked not is it then 1997, in support pro-Western again once would Beijing that implausible vigilante call upon the triads to provide the that to ensure in order patrols street to the Communist election goes according plan. Party’s Beijing in order to silence the pro-democ to order Beijing in movement. racy triads committed IfKong Hong it is true that the Chi with in cooperation these attacks this nese would Communist not Party, be the first time that the triads have involved are triads The themselves in politics. whose primary organizations opportunistic financial and gain economic are objectives associations political times, at but stability, have proved to be lucrative investments. For example, in 1949, triads assisted Chiang Kai-shek in fighting againstthe the 1989, in and Army, Liberation People’s than one more triads assisted in smuggling

- - - - - 1

Follow 4

Adrienne Dalton Hong Kong Hong Kong of the Triad’s of the Triad’s Political Past Political The scale and coordinated scale and coordinated The 3

Pro-Democracy Pro-Democracy Knife Attacks Attacks Knife on

Protesters Remind Remind Protesters government had been cooperating with ing the incident, student protesters called protesters student incident, the ing officials Kong Hong with meet to plans off the Hong Kong under the suspicion that to escape arrest, and allowing anti-democ allowing and arrest, escape to as protesters beat and harass to mobs racy they attempted to flee tosafety. nature of the attacks suggested that that suggested of attacks the nature organized crime groups were behind the were units in Hong Kong Police violence. assailants masked the permitting observed ers were attacked by dozens of masked assailants armed with knives and other weapons. triads in the territory. In 2014, pro-democracy student protest business opportunities. However, recent has revived in Hong Kong political unrest discussion of the political influence of the in triad activity throughout the city, with many believing that the moved groups to of lucrative mainland China in search more Kong Kong Chinese was affiliated witha triad. The years following Hong admin Kong’s to Britain Great from changeover istrative China in 1997 saw a significant decrease the triads established their first Hong and by 1988 headquarters, the Kong Brit one in twenty Hong that ish estimated known as triads, have a colorful history of the with and interdependency interaction government of mainland China. In 1819, Hong Kong’s organized crime groups, 6 CHINA STUDIES REVIEW vol 2 | 2016 9 - - - Anatomy of Alliances with such cooperative alliances. The next next The alliances. with such cooperative these differences to address section seeks and a offers brief of recapitulation the cir country has cumstances under which each into alliances in the past. entered foreign U.S. policy is alliance-based in its conception. U.S. coalitions, whether with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan or South Korea, have grown out and therefore experiences ofwar-time military component have a prominent built into them. The salience of military has also been the source however, affairs, of repeated conflict within the coalitions, automatic about concerns around revolving out of grow treaty that military responses has particular, in Germany, responsibilities. The stance on the issue. a reserved taken has only recently Japan in political climate States’ States’ own With peril. strategic vision, Lo better foster can States United the argues, extending by countries both with relations more for Russia and China to opportunities engagement. cooperative the understanding in critical is analysis Lo’s coop of promoting in role States United the eration on cybersecurity issues. First, the initiative needs to seize the United States for engagement opportunities and extend to China to unhinge the axis. Second, the of potential aware be to has States United of could effects its policy that alienating cause others to join camp. While China’s China, and Russia on focuses research Lo’s Iran and other members of the Shanghai might (SCO) Organization Cooperation choose to bandwagon with China for the led to the partnership that same reasons may China leverage providing – with Russia orientation the about negotiations its in use of States. a coalition with the United approach coalition-driven a Although towards addressing cybersecurity issues would provide many benefits, the United and China have fundamentally dif States understandings and experiences ferent ------Axes of Confidence Axes of Convenience and 2

Bobo Lo characterizes relations 3

itics”, between China and Russia as operating along an “axis of in which convenience”, distrust mutual a behind unite nations both analysis Lo’s decisions. policy foreign U.S. of although China and Russia contends that seek and relations strong have to appear to counter influence, thisU.S. axis of con policy foreign sustainable a not is venience restoring with rests priority China’s vehicle. its international position of influence and domestic political authority. consolidating While Russia follows objectives similar to with ofinfluence spheres claims it China’s, open risking willingly assertiveness, greater approach confrontational Russia’s conflict. has the potential to cause serious harm to ofbecause per precisely agenda, China’s countries’ two the between parallels ceived the partner Overemphasizing aspirations. ship component ofrelations with Russia’s China comes at Russia’s and the United formalized in official alliances. Cooperation Cooperation alliances. official in formalized issue-spe around to occur likely more is nonetheless can that cific agreements as their spillover effects powerful produce on a life of dynamics take their procedural own and constrain the parties’ immediate It is this over their implementation. control United the encourage should that prospect approach to pursue a cooperative States with China, even if the initial benefit may seem small. To corroborate this recommendation, (1) an two scenarios: this study contrasts unyielding hard-bargaining strategy that China to form a counter-coali prompts tion, and (2) an integrative approach that emphasizes mutual benefits. This anal ysis borrows from Bobo Lo’s concept of the axis of convenience to gain a better understanding of why actors change their freedom to regain coalitions in an attempt of maneuver. In his 2008 book “Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopol ------The SAIS 1 |

THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM STUDIES THE CHINA ior by imposing a prohibitive cost. and the United States China security threats environ strategic in the current confront ment increasingly emanate from global governance challenges. mobilize to emerge may coalitions Organic cooperative behavior for shared bene fits and do not necessarily need to be global global community is an unlikely scenario, ofgiven the wide divergence competing current the fill to proposals normative international regulatory vacuum. Instead, coalitions between countries will take the to support to win enough role leading shape cyberspace security arrangements. depends be will process this smooth How the positions the United on part in large States and China adopt, as representa tives of opposite sides of the normative the issue and vis-à-vis spectrum regarding of underlying challenges The other. each not are conceptions managing competing the inherent But United States. new to the presets cyberspace of interconnectedness a mode of engagement and precludes During the Cold ofpatterns containment. relations between War, the United States and the Soviet Union were governed by a rudimentary form of trust, expressed in the logic of destruction. mutually assured of if oppo the credibility the in only Trust, nent’s threat facilitated posture, negative between the two adversaries cooperation specific behav proscribed effectively that United States and China incur for non-co and China United States depends impact their mitigating operation, on direct engagement between the two countries, outside of the frameworks of of coalitions convenience. country’s each and paper assesses the prospects This cooperation challenges of U.S.-China on global cybersecurity. Cyberspace, unlike any other sphere of interaction, is defined by its globalreach and ability to In this across reach borders. transnational no environment, single country is able to for the architecture determine the security unanimous Likewise, domain. digital entire consensus on cybersecurity issues in the ------Jakob Bund

Maximized Maximized

U.S.-China for Effective for Effective the Prospect the Prospect Cooperation Cybersecurity Cybersecurity

Trust: Assessing Assessing Trust:

Limited Agreement, Agreement, Limited tional balance of power. Given the costs the costs the Given power. of balance tional States, the continuous economic loss from from loss economic continuous the States, cyber-enabled espionage has reached a to upend the interna threatens scale that regime stability, regime tarnishes stability, its ambition to rela country major of type new a establish the United For tions with the United States. Non-cooperation entails rising costs ofNon-cooperation its own. China’s parochial practice of cyber authori an of reflective is which diplomacy, about concerned is that government tarian cooperation cooperation that can produce tangible results in the absence of trust, with the potential of trust as an output. generating approach to cooperation – independent – independent to cooperation approach explores paper This of input. an as trust issue-specific for opportunities alternative United States. Differing interests between interests Differing United States. do not preclude both however, countries, the of rethinking a require but cooperation disputes. These These disputes. conditions increase both esca of consequences and probability the lating tensions between China and the tional controversy over the laws and norms tional controversy of permissible peacetime behavior appli and China leave domain cyber the in cable to manage with few tools the United States Relations Relations between the United States and depicted routinely are cyberspace in China interna Ongoing terms. antagonistic in 8 CHINA

changed to facilitate support missions China’s recent history of strategic part- CoalitiOFF: The Rise of channel through which overseas media

for allies. Additionally, while France has nerships, on the other hand, is shaped Authoritarian Ideological organizations penetrate China to dissemi- STUDIES REVIEW expanded its air campaign against ISIL by tectonic shifts in the geopolitical land- Security Communities nate “mistaken views and ideas.” The paper targets in response to the terrorist attacks scape. Being a non-aligned latecomer to a takes alleged links between civil society in Paris on November 13, 2015, the rallying “coalitionalized” international community Even with the backing of the SCO, China groups in China and “Western anti-China around the fundamental values of “liberté, explains China’s preference for opportunis- remains an international outlier when it forces” as a clear indication “that the con- egalité, fraternité” 4 in the aftermath of the tic behavior in forging an axis of temporary comes to Internet governance. 8 The gov- test between infiltration and anti-infiltration incident render it questionable whether a convenience. Following the collapse of ernment-created information filter, dubbed efforts in the ideological sphere is as severe move towards militarization of the global the USSR, China seized the opportunity to the Great Firewall, severely limits open as ever, and so long as we persist in CCP common cyberspace would find popular settle its border disputes with the former web access and reinforces China’s claim to leadership and socialism with Chinese

backing. In this sense, the hard bargaining Soviet republics Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Internet sovereignty by applying the prin- characteristics, the position of Western anti- vol 2 position the United States has adopted with Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia continues to form ciples of territorial integrity to cyberspace. China forces to pressure for urgent reform

12 |

regard to South China Sea has the potential the center of gravity for China’s system of In this matter, hard bargaining on the part won’t change […].” 2016 to splinter a coalition of its traditional allies strategic partnerships. Together with these of the United States will accomplish little when carried over to cyberspace. Assur- countries and Russia, China formed the to change China’s position where internal Ideological security opens an avenue for ances about the intention to protect the Shanghai Five in 1996, an institutional stability is concerned. At the same time, engagement with a number of actors. Iran openness of cyberspace notwithstanding, framework for political, economic and if the United States seeks further integra- features prominently in this list, given the militarization of the cyber domain would military collaboration that grew into the tion through coalitions that exclude China, shared concern about regime change raise enormous domestic challenges for SCO in 2001. China leveraged the institu- that is likely to only exacerbate concerns in and the common interest in surveillance U.S. allies. tion in the past to push its cybersecurity China about the government’s ideological of popular communication. Sino-Iranian agenda and Internet sovereignty as orga- security and invigorate official support for cooperation has already moved beyond Yet, the current situation in the South nizational principle. The July 2015 report the idea that cooperation with the United rhetorical alignment. 13 As Iran becomes a China Sea offers a case in point for how “Developments in the Field of Information States on cybersecurity issues will open it to rehabilitated member of the international permeable the different areas of con- and Telecommunications in the Context of regime change, thereby prompting China community, with sanctions related to its flict are and how fluent the passage is International Security” issued by the UN to counter these coalitions with alliances of nuclear program gradually lifted, this part- between the traditional domain of the sea Group of Governmental Experts explicitly its own. In 2013 President Xi Jinping made nership is expected to only deepen further. and the unconventional environment of acknowledges the SCO’s proposal for an comments in this vein: cyberspace. In July 2015, while holding a international code of conduct for informa- On the technological front, China has long hearing at the request of the Philippines to tion security centered around the concept Western anti-China forces continue to vainly been assisting Iran in the build-up of its assess the validity of the nine-dash line that of Internet sovereignty. 7 attempt to use the Internet to “topple China.” “halal” national network SHOMA. 14 The encompasses China’s maritime claims in the Many years ago, there were Western govern- Chinese corporation ZTE, indirectly gov- South China Sea, the Permanent Court of Present Chinese endeavors in the region ments that stated that “with the internet, there ernment-controlled through a 51 percent Arbitration in The Hague became the target focus on opportunities for mutual eco- is a way to tackle China”, “Socialist countries share held by a consortium of state-owned of a cyber attack. The court’s website was nomic gains that stand in contrast to the are infused with Western ambitions, which enterprises, has been discovered to have shut down. 5 Circumstantial evidence gath- United States’ military orientation of foreign starts from the Internet”. […] On this battle- provided deep packet inspection technol- ered from the larger geopolitical situation policy. China’s efforts to build closer eco- field of the Internet, whether we can stand up, ogy to the Telecommunication Company suggests the attack originated from China. 6 nomic connections with Western Europe and gain victory, directly relates to our coun- of Iran (TCI) that allows authorities to read This incident speaks to the increasing risk through Central Asia with its “One Belt, One try’s ideological security and regime security. 9 online traffic. 15 The parties to the deal are that adversaries in the region resort to out- Road” initiative and the development of the revealing, considering that TCI controls of-area provocation or retaliation, using Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank demon- Leaked shortly after Xi’s speech, in April almost all of Iran’s fixed line communica- cyber means to exert influence in sover- strate an integrative approach that could 2013, the Communiqué on the Current tions, telephone and Internet. 16 Moreover, eignty disputes in the South and East China help China in the medium-term to raise State of the Ideological Sphere, issued ZTE-TCI documents have revealed that Iran Sea. Benign network disruptions gener- the political capital to forge coalitions on by the Central Committee of the Chinese had been able to circumvent U.S. sanctions ally assumed to be below the escalation issues that diverge from the current route Communist Party’s (CCP) General Office, and gain access to U.S. technology through threshold could become a frequent tool. and extend into cyberspace. detailed the extent of China’s concern a Chinese firm acting as an intermediary. 17 The lack of codified response mechanisms, about foreign challenges to its ideological however, adds to the uncertainty of how security. 10 Also known as Document 9, the The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export these events should be managed, poten- General Office’s notice explicitly refers to Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual- tially giving rise to unintended escalation. efforts to “conscientiously strengthen man- Use Goods and Technologies features as agement of the ideological battlefield”. 11 one possible issue in which the coopera- The document identifies the Internet as the tion on ideological security could play out.

10 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Limited Agreement, Maximized Trust 11 CHINA

Neither China nor Iran are signatories of the cost of unresolved cybersecurity problems 2015 to resume bilateral cybersecurity talks Adopting an approach of many limited

agreement. In December 2013, the agree- to its digitalizing economy. A 2014 study by under the new framework of the U.S.-China agreements between the United States and STUDIES REVIEW ment was amended to prevent the export McAffee and the Center for Strategic and High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime China would almost inevitably create con- of cyber intrusion and surveillance software International Studies estimated the annual and Related Issues, concerted efforts have cerns among traditional U.S. allies about a and technology to authoritarian regimes loss to the global economy from cyber- been undertaken by both countries to bilateral bias towards China in the design suspected of deploying these tools against crime to amount to $400 billion. 20 When establish a productive working relation- of U.S. foreign policy. Some countries might their own populations. 18 The amendment measured in terms of GDP, the figures for ship. On December 1, 2015, U.S. Attorney sense the need to position themselves to has sparked controversy among technol- the United States (0.64 percent) and China General Loretta E. Lynch, Department of pre-empt the emergence of a G2 arrange- ogy companies in the United States that (0.63 percent) are remarkably close to each Homeland Security Secretary Jeh John- ment between the United States and China cite the inherent dual-use nature of most other. 21 National Security Agency Director son and Chinese State Councilor Guo that would significantly restrict their interna-

software and technology products as a Admiral Mike Rogers, in his remarks at the Shengkun met for the first round of the tional influence. The United States needs to vol 2 major obstacle to enforceability. 19 Even if Halifax Security Forum in November 2015, U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on be aware of and address these concerns as

25 |

implemented in its current form, the effi- put these findings into words: Cybercrime and Related Issues. The it progresses on this track. U.S. allies should 2016 cacy of the amendment to deny access to meeting concluded with a set of mutu- draw assurance from the rationale President communication monitoring tools to author- To my Chinese counterparts, I would remind ally agreed guidelines for combating Obama offered in his remarks announcing itarian governments remains contested. them, increasingly you are as vulnerable as cybercrime and related issues, covering the nuclear agreement with Iran: “you don’t As European and U.S. companies exit the any other major industrialized nation state. requests for investigative assistance and make deals like this with your friends.” 27 market in countries of concern, China could The idea that you can somehow exist outside the responses to these requests. become a major source of surveillance the broader global cyber challenges I don’t Conclusion technology. These commercial relation- think is workable. 22 This initiative illustrates the prospect of ships could prove a point of departure for issue-specific agreements, presumably The behavior the United States adopts vis-à- further cooperation between China and To what extent this statement was intended contained in the functional area of cyber- vis China shapes the strategic options in the these countries on a normative level. as a veiled threat or merely a descriptive crime and related malicious cyber activities. U.S.’ portfolio. The areas of limited cooper- remark about China’s economic rise and As the outcomes of the first joint dialogue ation explored in this paper can produce In the meantime, the Chinese ICT compa- increasing reliance on networked technol- meeting suggest, the implications of these tangible benefits for both parties. At the nies ZTE and Huawei have set up their North ogy is subject to individual interpretation. talks are unlikely to remain compartmen- same time, non-cooperative behavior does American headquarters in Richardson and The following passage, taken from the 2015 talized within the confines of assistance on not offer a neutral alternative but comes at Plano, Texas, taking the two-level game to Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Eco- cybercrime and have already expanded to costs of its own. If the United States contin- foreign soil. Choosing Texas as the loca- nomic and Security Review Commission, table top exercises intended to improve ues to be confrontational, the opportunity tion for their headquarters appears to be however, places Rogers’ statement in an the respective understanding of national for integrating China will wane. In the strategically motivated, with the purpose of interesting context: authorities, processes and procedures for worst case scenario, China may engage in enlisting local representatives and senators managing malicious cyber activity. 26 Prag- building coalitions with like-minded states to lobby against the Obama administration U.S. law does not allow retaliatory cyber matic, limited agreements have a higher in an act of counter-balancing. Such a con- in Washington, D.C. The fact that major Chi- attacks by private citizens and corporations, chance of fulfilling their purpose because solidated block favoring Internet sovereignty nese technology companies with strong nor does it appear to allow counter-intru- of their restricted scope and specific objec- and state-managed information flows will be ties to the government in Beijing vie for sions (or “hack backs”) for the purpose of tives. The targeted approach China and considerably harder to break up later on than influence in U.S. domestic politics, however, recovering, erasing, or altering stolen data in the United States pursue in collaborating bringing China in as an individual actor now. also suggests that China has a fundamen- offending computer networks. International in their fight against cybercrime has the tal interest in engagement with the United law has not kept up with developments in potential to develop a gravitational pull An integration-oriented approach via func- States and is willing to pursue other chan- cyber warfare, and no international consensus that spirals into increasingly comprehen- tional areas that gives the United States nels if the diplomatic track proves to be exists on how to attribute or appropriately sive agreements. Such a trajectory would some mechanisms to point to Chinese politically obstructed. respond to cyber attacks. However, a policy confirm that the lack of agreement does non-compliance within a mutually agreed discussion on the issue of offensive and retal- not reflect a lack of interest but a lack of framework will make it difficult for China CoalitiON: The Spillover iatory cyber operations has begun. 23 trust. Small agreements may remedy this to continuously violate its commitments Potential of Engaging China deficiency one step at a time. Notably the without incurring a tremendous cost to Rogers’ remarks could also be construed as announcement of the cybercrime guide- its reputation. China’s economic trajectory provides emphasis on the need to work together to lines made explicit mention of the intention further incentives to the United States to address these common cyber challenges. to “establish common understanding and Non-cooperation has forced China to extend opportunities for cooperation to expectations regarding the information to self-impose a tremendous diplomatic cost China. China cannot sustain an uncooper- Since the announcement by President be included in such requests and the time- on its endeavor to strengthen its position of ative position indefinitely, given the rising Obama and President Xi 24 in September liness of responses.” international influence. In response to the

12 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Limited Agreement, Maximized Trust 13 CHINA

U.S. indictment of five People’s Liberation About the Author 7 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts 16 TCI used to be a government agency but has

Army (PLA) officers on charges of cyber on Developments in the Field of Information been privatized with the Iranian government STUDIES REVIEW economic espionage in May 2014, the Chi- Jakob Bund is a recent Johns Hopkins Uni- and Telecommunications in the Context of now owning a 20 percent share. Report by TCI nese leadership decided to suspend the versity School of Advanced International International Security, Report 2015, A/70/174, Board of Directors at the Sixth General Assem- U.S.-China working group on cybersecurity. Studies (SAIS) M.A. graduate, specializ- July 22, 2015, 7, http:// www.un.org/ga/search/ bly Meeting, Telecommunications Company The need to save face internationally forced ing in International Economics, Strategic view_doc. asp?symbol=A/70/174. of Iran, May, 2014, http://tci.ir/userfiles/amar/ China to pull out of a diplomatic initiative Studies, and China Studies. He currently The%20Report%20by%20TCI%20Board%20 that had put it on par with the United States supports the European Union Institute for 8 China, Russia, Iran, and India were the only of%20directors%20at%20the%20Sixth%20 in addressing one the most pressing global Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris as ana- countries that decided not to sign the final res- General%20Assembly%20meeting%20Format- security challenges. The reach of China’s lyst in training. Before joining the EUISS, olution of the NetMundial conference in 2014, ted.pdf.

soft power, in no small part, is defined as he worked for several think tanks in Ger- the last global forum that brought together vol 2 a function of its ability to provide an alter- many and the United States, focusing on representatives from governments, industry, 17 Stecklow.

civil society, and academia to discuss the chal- | native while demonstrating a pragmatic strategic engagement of China and Iran, 2016 approach to problem solving by keep- and the evolution of norms in cyberspace. lenges of Internet governance. The dissenting 18 Rep. John Ratcliffe, Statement of Subco ing its relationship with the United States Most recently, he led efforts for the Strate- countries justified their position referencing mmittee Chairman, Hearing on “Wassenaar: free of major tensions. Realizing these gic Technologies Program at the Center for their opposition to the proposed inclusive Cybersecurity & Export Control,” Cybersecurity, constraints, China’s reaction pattern has Strategic and International studies (CSIS) to multi-stakeholder approach, advocating Infrastructure Protection, and Security Tech- changed significantly since its withdrawal assess the maturity of cybersecurity capa- instead for a state-centered multilateral mech- nologies Subcommittee, House Homeland from the working group mechanism led to bilities in highly digitized countries. The anism. “The Future of the Internet,” Business Security Committee, January 12, 2016, https:// the breakdown of official channels on the author welcomes comments and sugges- Standard, May 3, 2014. www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/ subject. Following the announcement that tions at [email protected]. doc_download/1395-congressional-hear- United States is mulling sanctions, China 9 Xi Jinping, Speech at the National Propaganda ing-on-bis-cybersecurity-proposed-rule-janu- this time became active itself and arrested and Ideology Work Conference, August 19, ary-12-2016. a number of hackers from a list the United 1 Alex Gillespie, “Dialogical Dynamics of Trust 2013. States had shared in a deliberate attempt and Distrust in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in 19 Joe Uchill, “The Security Industry Files Formal to test Chinese resolve. 28 Ivana Marková and Alex Gillespie, “Trust and 10 Central Committee of the Communist Party Objections to Wassenaar Proposal,” Christian Conflict: Representation, Culture and Dialogue,” of China’s General Office, “Communiqué on Science Monitor, July 21, 2015. The United States as an actor managing an Routledge, 2012. the Current State of the Ideological Sphere,” intricate system of alliances needs to pay translation furnished by ChinaFile, Asia Society, 20 Center for Strategic and International Stud- close attention to how its partners react to 2 Bobo Lo, “Axis of Convenience: Moscow, November 8, 2013. ies and McAffee, “Net Losses: Estimating the its China policy. A U.S.-Chinese rapproche- Beijing, and the New Geopolitics,” Brookings Global Cost of Cybercrime,” June 2014, 2, ment on cybersecurity that is viewed by Institution Press and Chatham House, 2008. 11 Ibid. http://www.mcafee.com/jp/resources/reports/ core U.S. allies as coming at their expense rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf. would offset any gains of a bilateral pact. 3 Lo. 12 Ibid. If the United States succeeds in containing 21 Ibid. the potential for such negative externalities, 4 “Liberty, equality, fraternity,” the national motto 13 Jakob Bund, “Flipping a Bit: Testing the Nor- the slow but steady trust dividends from of France. The slogan was reportedly first used mative Credibility of China’s Cyber Strategy 22 National Security Agency Director Adm. Mike limited agreements with China stand to by French revolutionary Maximilien Robes- against Iran’s Response to Stuxnet,” empiric Rogers at Halifax Security Forum, on November equally benefit its allies. pierre in a speech in 1790. “Liberty, Equality, inquiry conducted for China Studies Research 21, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/ Fraternity” Embassy of France in the Seminar at Johns Hopkins University School of defense/2015/11/21/china-vulnerable-cyber- United States, November 30, 2007, http://www. Advanced International Studies, May 2015. space-us-cyber-chief-warns/76175458/. ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article620. 14 Small Media, Iranian Internet Infrastructure and 23 U.S.China Economic and Security Review Com- 5 David Tweed, “China’s Cyber Spies Take to Policy Report March 2014, 7. mission, 2015 Report to Congress, 9, http:// High Seas as Hack Attacks Spike,” Bloomberg origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_ Business, October 16, 2015. 15 Steve Stecklow, “Special Report: Chi- reports/2015%20Executive%20Summary%20 nese Firm Helps Iran Spy on Citi- and%20Recommendations.pdf. 6 Jason Healey and Anni Piiparinen, “Did China zens,” Reuters, March 22, 2012, http:// Just Hack the International Court Adjudicating www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/ 24 Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit Its South China Sea Territorial Claims?,” The us-iran-telecoms-idUSBRE82L0B820120322. to the United States, The White House, Office Diplomat, October 27, 2015, of the Press Secretary, September 25, 2015,

14 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Limited Agreement, Maximized Trust 15 CHINA

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of- around the country, it has not produced the

fice/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jin- China’s Creative innovation that policymakers had hoped STUDIES REVIEW pings-state-visit-united-states. for. This paper argues that although the cre- Stagnation: ative cluster approach has been successful 25 “First U.S.China U.S. HighLevel Joint Dialogue in other countries as a means for fostering on Cybercrime and Related Issues Summary The Failure of innovation and sustaining robust economic of Outcomes,” Department of Justice, Office growth, it is unsuited to addressing China’s of Public Affairs, December 2, 2015, http:// Zone-Based economic challenges. Although China’s www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-us-china-high-lev- cluster approach can lead to positive out- el-joint-dialogue-cybercrime-and-related-is- Reform comes, such as economies of scale in the

sues-summary-outcomes-0. manufacturing sector, a top-down, state-led vol 2 approach is fundamentally incompatible

26 Ibid. | Patrick Lozada with the creative mode of production. 2016

27 U.S. President Barack Obama, Statement by the First, this paper will summarize the literature President on Iran, The White House, Office of This paper examines how China’s approach regarding creative clusters and develop- the Press Secretary, July 14, 2015, https://www. to creative special economic zones for man- ment zones. Second, it will explain why the whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/ ufacturing has affected their approach to idea of creative development zones has statement-president-iran. develop “creative industries.” In their search gained popularity in China. Third, it will to build an innovation economy, China describe how China has attempted to adapt 28 Ellen Nakashima and Adam Goldman, “In has turned to the “creative class” vision the idea of creative clusters to fit into a Chi- a first, Chinese Hackers are Arrested at the of urban planners like Richard Florida. nese context and how the transformation of Behest of the U.S. Government,” Washington This vision, which links culture and space this Western concept ties into unique fea- Post, October 9, 2015, https://www.washing- with economic production, fits in with the tures of China’s political economy. Lastly, it tonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-first- government’s concept of cultural power, will speculate on how China might be able chinese-hackers-are-arrested-at-the-behest- the promise that such initiatives might to create and sustain a creative economy of-the-us-government/2015/10/09/0a7b0e46- help deliver value by moving Chinese in order to avoid the middle income trap, 6778-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html. companies high up the value chain and whereby gross domestic product (GDP) China’s previous experience with special stagnates due to an over-reliance on low economic zones. In the long run, these value-added forms of industrial production. projects have failed to meet their intended goals. In “planning” for innovation, the Chi- Literature Review nese government has treated innovation like a manufactured and interchangeable While creativity is a timeless feature of the commodity instead of as an independent human experience, the literature on “cre- ecosystem that needs space to thrive. This atives” as a distinct group of people who paper argues that creative enterprise is play a dominant role in driving the economy incompatible with the inflexible organiza- is much newer. The American economist tional scheme of state planning and control. and social scientist Richard Florida is often credited with pioneering the study of this During the reform and opening period group in his book, The Rise of the Creative in the late 1970’s, China created “special Class: And How It’s Transforming Work, economic zones” (SEZs) in which it con- Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life. ducted small-scale policy experiments Florida argues that “Creativity— ‘the ability with economic liberalization. Today, as to create meaningful new forms,’ as Web- China seeks to escape the “middle income ster’s dictionary puts it—has become the trap” by shifting production to higher val- decisive source of competitive advantage” ue-added goods, it has sought to apply in the economy. 1 He argues that people the same small-scale zoning approach to engaged in creative enterprises are a class creative industries. While this approach has unto themselves and share similarities with led to the creation of new creative clusters

16 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS 17 CHINA

each other even though their work can critiques the implementation of Florida’s free market “C-School” and gradualist on foreign direct investment to a particular 6 be different: ideas in modern cities. Critics of creative “E-School” effectively summarizes the dif- city or region, government officials were STUDIES REVIEW class theory such as Michele Hoyman, ferent perspectives in the literature around able to experiment with a new model in a I define the core of the Creative Class to Chris Faricy and Mel Gray contend that development zones. “E-school” thinkers controlled fashion. These zones, as Barry include people in science and engineering, Florida’s argument is guilty of conflating such as Barry Naughton or Peter Nolan are Naughton writes, “permitted incremental architecture and design, education, arts, correlation with causation, and fails to more likely to support the approach to extol progress within a rigid system,” and the music, and entertainment whose economic incorporate stringent causality testing. the benefits of corralling free enterprise fundamental logic of zone-based reform function is to create new ideas, new tech- These critics also argue that the statistical and industry into a confined space. This has continued to appeal to policymakers nology, and new creative content. Around arguments for growth it presents are more approach fits into their idea that China’s to the extent that, “China has marked every this core, the Creative Class also includes a adequately accounted for by Human Capi- economic success has come from a unique major wave of liberalization with the estab-

12 broader group of creative professionals in tal theory, which emphasizes education and model of controlled reform. By contrast, lishment of a new batch of zones.” vol 2 business and finance, law, health care, and job training. 7 “C-school” thinkers such as Huang Yasheng

related fields. 2 | or Wing Thy Woo himself see the inherent SEZs are also compatible with the politi- 2016 Of most direct relevance to the argument limits and forestalled economic progress cal economy of China’s state apparatus. Florida argues that the nebulous force of presented in this paper are those schol- of these productive forces. 11 Because local officials are incentivized to creativity underlies this diverse group of ars who examine how the creative cities promote GDP growth, successful reform professions and that the creative mode of model has been adapted to fit the Chi- The argument presented in this paper does in one province leads to the pressure production is inseparable from the lives of nese context. Justin O’Connor and Gu Xin not rely heavily on the urban planning and to expand that growth in other areas. the people involved in it. Thus, the urban of Queensland University approach the cultural studies criticism present by O’Con- Susan Shirk calls this logic “playing to environment and the culture within it are model from a cultural studies perspective, nor, Gu, Ren and Sun but rather seeks to the provinces.” 13 Although she used this key to promoting economic growth; “Place,” situating it within wider historical conflicts combine Michael Keane’s dissection of the argument to describe the process of fiscal Florida argues, “has become the central around modernity in China and arguing political economy of creative clusters and decentralization, the logic of it – provincial organizing unit of our time.” 3 Florida has that Chinese notions of creativity differ situate it within the more established litera- representatives to the Central Committee in mind places like “trendy” Manhattan with from Florida’s characterization of creativ- ture around value chain and development becoming invested in reform because of its fashion designers and stockbrokers and ity as disruptive. 8 Meanwhile, sociologists zones. With regard to this literature, the the direct benefits to local government “quirky” Austin with its music and software Ren Xuefeng and Sun Meng from Michigan early achievements of SEZs are acknowl- budgets – also applies to development development. The diverse and progres- State University attempt to identify creative edged and seen as valuable, but their zones. The place of SEZs in China’s politi- sive nature of these places is supposed spaces from the perspective of government long-term viability is questioned. Ultimately, cal logic has led to a veritable ‘zone fever’. to encourage would-be “disruptors” and control. Designating spaces as “creative” creative enterprise in China cannot be cor- According to the World Bank, there are 716 innovators in all industries. For example, allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ralled into zones and carefully controlled. In SEZs in China as of 2014 with labels rang- Florida famously uses a “gay index” to show to plan for and confine the impact of unsta- some ways, whether or not one agrees with ing from “open coastal cities” and “financial that urban areas that have more gay people ble creative forces while also allowing the Florida’s model of creativity is irrelevant. reform pilot areas” to “national high-tech- and gay-friendly culture have higher rates government to profit from the subsequent This analysis instead asks how and why this nology parks” and “national ecological of growth and income. This is not because development. 9 Michael Keane, a fellow at discourse, true or not, has been accepted civilization demonstration areas.” 14 gay people are more productive, but rather the ARC Center for Creative Innovation at and modified in China to fit into the govern- because creative people are inherently Queensland University of Technology in ment’s broader development objectives. Although SEZs have accompanied every attracted by and bring growth to cities that Australia, takes a different approach, tracing wave of reform so far, the benefits of these are progressive and accept people from the political economy of artistic develop- The Political Economy of Zone zones are limited. As local officials around diverse backgrounds. 4 ment and examining why officials chose to Development in China the country have used economic zones as a adopt the rhetoric of this fundamentally for- means to enhance their own prestige, they Other scholars, especially those in the fields eign urban planning approach. 10 Keane is Deng Xiaoping famously characterized have over-saturated the economic envi- of urban planning, economics, and sociol- the most prolific writer on the subject, and China’s approach to “Reform and Open- ronment and wasted government funds ogy, have built on and modified Florida’s although he has a positive outlook on the ing” as a process of “crossing the river by on far-fetched projects. In the case of the framework of analysis. Ed Glaeser, an econ- prospects for creativity in China, he is less feeling the stones.” In other words, reform Guangzhou Development District, sizable omist at Harvard University who studies optimistic about the success of the cultural is a process of small steps that relies on amounts of land and capital were commit- cities, modified Florida’s theory by fitting cluster concept. lessons learned to chart the way forward. ted to a project that struggled because of it into his own model, which emphasizes The four initial SEZs in Shantou, Shenzhen, the sheer number of other zones that had urban labor pool impacts not tied to pro- In examining the development of creative Xiamen and Zhuhai are examples of the preferential treatment toward industrial gressive culture. 5 Gregory Peck situates clusters, it is important to trace the dis- creation of geographically defined spaces investors. 15 Additionally, China’s applica- Florida’s argument within the Schumpeter/ course surrounding development zones. focused on liberalization as a means to spur tion of the development zone model to Kondratiev models of economic growth that Wing Thy Woo’s characterization of the economic growth. By limiting new policies sectors outside of manufacturing has had emphasize circular flows of innovation and 18 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Creative Stagnation: The Failure of Zone-Based Reform 19 CHINA

limited success due to the characteristics It is then perhaps no surprise that China has Another factor that contributed to the pop- manufacturing. 24 This has been true even

of these other sectors. For example, the taken Joseph Nye’s writings on soft power ularity of creative clusters as a development in the case of the production of “high-tech” STUDIES REVIEW Shanghai Free Trade Zone – at one point a and incorporated it into their own concept tool was the ability to more effectively goods, such as smart-phones and laptop strong central government priority under of “Comprehensive National Power (zonghe monitor and control artistic and innovative computers. As Edward Steinfeld writes, “In the personal direction of Chinese Premier guojia quanli)” that incorporates not only spaces through geographic limitation. For the Chinese case, we have seen produc- Li Keqiang – has been called “disappoint- military and economic metrics, but also instance, the Beijing municipal government ers rush into newly opened industries but ing” because of its failure to implement the measures of cohesion such as a strong has extended its creative control over artist largely in the low-value end of the activity kind of incentives that would attract valu- sense of culture. 18 As Hu Jintao said in villages on the periphery through “dis- spectrum. What appears as upgrading from able foreign business. 16 In a recent survey, his keynote speech made on behalf of the trictification.” The new modes of control soft industries to high-tech ones, then, often three-quarters of American firms in Shang- 16th CCP Central Committee to the 17th are achieved by the use of interlocking involves very little upgrading at all.” 25 The

hai said that the zone did not offer them National Congress of the CCP: directorates, whereby the state appoints challenge for the government thus is to vol 2 any benefits. 17 the same government officials across the focus on high-value production activities

Culture has become a more and more import- | executive boards of multiple key governing like marketing and product development 2016 The Case for Creativity ant source of national cohesion and creativity bodies in art districts. 22 that have historically been dominated by and a factor of growing significance in the developed nations. Michael Keane terms Despite the decreasing returns on invest- competition in overall national strength… [We The geographic limitation of creative this shift being from a model of “Made in ment for development zones in China, the must] enhance culture as part of the soft power clusters allows authorities to effectively China” to “Created in China.” The key to idea of “creative cities” has gained traction of our country to better guarantee the people’s contain disturbances and even shut down unlocking this model and moving up to among Chinese policymakers in recent basic cultural rights and interests. 19 these zones if necessary. The 798 Art Dis- these high-value production activities was years. There are three main reasons why trict in Beijing, as well as the Tianzifang seen to be creativity, and the way to achieve Chinese policymakers have adopted the Michael Keane argues that the discourse and Moganshan Lu districts in Shanghai, this was through zone-based development. creative cluster model in national planning: around creativity and creative clusters are all physically contained within a gated incorporates both modern and tradition- space with entries and exits that can be shut Implementation of the Cultural Power alist proponents of China’s growing cultural down if need be. This adds to the inher- Creative Cluster Concept power. Discourses on cultural power rely ent peripheral nature of art districts, which China has long had conflicting views on especially on ideas such as “soft power,” generally form due to low rents and thus As argued above, China’s desire to imple- culture, sometimes promoting tradition and which refers to a culture’s ability to influence are not centrally located. When planned ment the creative clusters model is based at other times advancing modernity. On the the behavior of others without coercion. A for actively, this isolation from the general on a desire to establish itself as a cultural one hand, China’s five thousand years of common refrain in China was: “When will public can be consciously fostered. There power, exercise control over creative enter- history and its philosophers like Confucius China have its Gangnam Style?” referring is precedent for this in the development prise and avoid the middle-income trap by and Laozi are regarded reverently and held to a popular Korean pop song that had of SEZs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. shifting production to higher value added up as superior. On the other, traditional captured global attention in 2012. 20 Tra- During this time, the Chinese government goods. While the reasons why China is CCP narratives portray a slowly modern- ditionalists are more inwardly focused and tried to locate development zones in rural pursuing this model are interesting, the izing China that is falling behind due to attempt to reinterpret ‘creative industries’ areas in order to keep distance between its implementation of this concept sheds its culture, necessitating an increased as ‘cultural industries’ promoting Chinese people and foreign investors. 23 additional light on certain idiosyncrasies acceptance of Western ideologies such Confucian values. Thus, when Beijing was in China’s political economy. This section as Marxism. For example, in the modern creating an office to promote creative Moving Up the Value Chain will first establish a baseline for comparing Chinese classic Diary of a Madman (kuang cluster development, they attempted to China’s pursuit of this model by describ- ren ri ji), Lu Xun carries on an extended mobilize factions, calling their initiative China’s national policymakers are increasing how the creative cities framework is metaphor that portrays Confucianism as a “Cultural and Creative Industries” and ingly aware of the importance of generating implemented and understood in the West literally cannibalistic ideology that teaches establishing an annual event called the higher-value industries so as to avoid the and then will discuss how that framework Chinese people to eat each other. Indeed, International Cultural and Creative Indus- “middle income trap” that results from the changed when exported to China. traditional Chinese culture was a point of tries Expo (ICCIE) in 2006. 21 The ICCIE was predominance of low value-added eco- struggle during the Cultural Revolution as soon joined by the International Creative nomic activities such as manufacturing. As mentioned previously, Richard Florida’s people were told to “smash the four olds.” Industries Alliance (ICIA), the International Much of the economic growth that China ideas around the creative economy have Through China’s history, whether it is pro- Creative Industries Conference (ICIC), the has experienced so far has been the result gained significant traction in the West, moting the simulacrum of Chinese history International Cultural Creative Industries of the modularization of global production, particularly in the United States. Florida’s presented by traditionalists or embracing Conference (ICCIC) and several other sim- as developed economies have shifted writings on the subject address certain the unforgiving cultural critiques of the ilarly named organizations. to economic activities such as branding peculiarities of the U.S. economy with its modernizers, culture has been closely and research and development (R&D), focus on inter-state competition through linked to conceptions of power. Creative Control developing economies have engaged in incentives, a wide range of voices and

20 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Creative Stagnation: The Failure of Zone-Based Reform 21 CHINA

organizations incorporated into planning product that informs official approaches to these science and technology parks often Based on the development of this area and

decisions and its reliance on activities the development of creative clusters. give the appearance of creativity without subsequent flocking of companies engag- STUDIES REVIEW higher up on the value chain. This should giving it actual substance. ing in unrelated creative enterprises, the not imply that the creative economy archi- This mentality is not only limited to the art problem is not that Chinese people are not tecture is particular to the U.S. The creative industry. It is also evident in the techno- There is, however, another prominent creative, but rather that the Chinese state cluster concept was transmitted to China logical industrial park model, especially model for creative clusters in China. This cannot artificially grow creative enterprises. through consultants from the United King- prevalent in animation, digital content and model of creative clusters has arisen inde- As the examples of Dafen and 798 Art dis- dom, and creative economy discourse has software. A proliferation of these zones on pendently of any government intervention. trict show, when the government tries to get become popular in Singapore, Hong Kong the outskirts of major cities has been hap- There are many examples of this, but one involved, it parses creative enterprise as an and other non-Western countries around pening as the push for creative content has of the best examples is the Dashanzi Arts interchangeable unit and separates it into

26 the world. increased. For example, between 2005 and District in Beijing, better known as 798 Art products to be created en masse. When vol 2 2009, China has set up seventeen accred- District (798 yi shu qu). Originally, the area it encounters spaces where the creative

28 |

How this model of urban development was ited animation bases. Establishing an was a successful factory owned by a State- economy forms naturally, its instinct is to 2016 processed as it made its way around the official zone is a concrete achievement an Owned Enterprise called the Seven Stars regulate and control them. Even when the world from academia, to policy consultants official can point to as he looks to move Group. As the company began to lay off product is not an artistic one, the inflexible and finally to Chinese government officials up the Communist Party system. A similar workers in the late 1990s, the Seven Stars organizational scheme of the state quashes illuminates unique elements of political case can be made with regards to the cen- Group rented out factory space in order the incentives for genuine innovation. In economy. Instead of incorporating Florida’s tral government’s pressure on officials to to pay pensions. At this time, students and sum, China’s adoption of the creative clus- core beliefs in the three T’s of “technology, increase the number of patents, irrespec- professors from Beijing’s art schools set up ter ideology has been a failure. Successes talent and tolerance,” the core message tive of the quality or usefulness of these workshops in 798, drawn in by low rents that do come will likely come in spite of and received seemed to be that increasing new “innovations.” and the accidentally-minimalist Bauhaus not because of the government’s promo- cultural products – envisioned by some style of the old factory. 30 tion of creative industry. provincial officials as interchangeable units Since they are located far outside Central – would attract economic growth through Business Districts in fringe industrial zones, The relative independence of the art Conclusion increased levels of creativity. This creation of these centers are unable to tap into the community in 798 lasted for eight years, cultural products as indistinguishable and dynamism of the city. Florida sees this as an during which time it became internationally The failure of China’s interpretation of the interchangeable parts allowed the Chinese important element of creative enterprise, known as the center of Beijing’s art scene. creative cluster ideology showcases the government to take the lessons it learned because while a bunch of people working However, in 2006 a joint committee com- idiosyncrasies of China’s political economy. from creating cellphones and textiles and with computers sounds like Silicon Valley, posed of the management of the Seven First, it shows the reliance (and over-reli- import them directly to “innovation.” Take it ignores the element of Silicon Valley as a Stars Company and the Chaoyang District ance) of governments on incremental for example of the early creative factory of diverse ecosystem. As Florida writes, Government was formed to oversee 798’s progress driven by the creation of special Dafen outside of Shenzhen. The process of transition into a Creative Industries Area. test zones. Second, it offers insight into developing this area followed the classic Silicon Valley can’t be understood without This is another element to create cultural a dimension of the center-local dynamic development zone playbook. First, local reference to the counterculture of nearby San and creative zones – it puts incentives to in China by showing how local officials bureaucrats identified the cultural/creative Francisco. Had it not been receptive to offbeat establish zones in innovative spaces that respond to discourses from the national product – paintings and sculptures. Then, people like the young Steve Jobs years ago, it have developed naturally, and forces them level, in this case by actively pursuing the there was an obvious business model: could not have become what it is today. 29 into the matrix of state management. Citing creative-cultural industries concept. Third, set up a factory, call it a cluster and pro- “safety concerns,” the new government it demonstrates how national-level polit- duce contracted products. Today in Dafen, These clusters of people all in the same committee decreed that events and exhi- ical priorities unrelated to economics, in this “artist village” employs around 8,000 industry located far from city centers are bitions need to be officially reported and this case the desire for soft-power growth, people working on replicating oil paintings effectively just warehouses for tech work- approved, including contents and loca- can be linked to economic policy. Fourth, for local and international customers. The ers, and they similarly apply the logic of the tions. In addition, a new permission system it demonstrates China’s desire to move artisans here have no art college training factory to non-factory work. They are not was enacted to control the admission of up the value chain. And fifth, it shows the or painting experience. Production takes creative spaces. Indeed, especially in ani- new entrants. As a result of these new mea- limits of top-down management over cer- place under factory conditions, with labor- mation and gaming, these industrial parks sures, the contemporary art scene in China tain kinds of industries, in this case creative, ers working long hours replicating classic often host companies who are doing rou- has largely left 798 in favor of Songzhuang, cultural, and innovative ones. paintings to be hung in dentists’ offices tine fee-for-service work for Western design an area where rents are cheaper and gov- and in the homes of the nouveau riche. 27 companies, or in the video game business ernment control is less entrenched. 31 What Divorcing creativity from the inclination to This type of creative cluster is anything but doing the tedious work of “porting” – recod- is left is the consumerist edifice of art, polit- think differently is impossible. What is pos- creative. However, it elucidates Chinese ing a video game to work on several types ically acceptable units of culture that are sible is that China can begin to develop notions of creativity as an undifferentiated of systems. Like the art studios of Dafen, sold on the global marketplace. the ability to accommodate and even

22 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Creative Stagnation: The Failure of Zone-Based Reform 23 CHINA

encourage differences in thinking under About the Author 10 Michael Keane, “Great Adaptations: China’s 22 Ren and Sun, 505.

the broad umbrella of Communist party Creative Clusters and the New Social Contract,” STUDIES REVIEW rule. Singapore appears to present a test Eriberto P. Lozada III, e.patrick.lozada@ Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Stud- 23 Wong Siu Wai and Tang Bosin, “Challenges to case. Like China, Singapore has a one-party gmail.com, is a graduate of the Johns Hop- ies, Vol.23 No. 2 (April 2009), 221-230. the sustainability of ‘development zones’: A system and is also ethnically majority Chi- kins SAIS program in Washington D.C. He case study of Guangzhou Development Dis- nese. However, Singapore has a higher is a graduate of Haverford College and 11 Wing Thy Woo, “The Real Reasons for China’s trict, China,” Cities, Vol. 22.4 (2005), 308-309. percentage of workers involved in creative holds a certificate in Chinese Studies from Growth,” The China Journal, Vol. 41 (1999), class jobs (47.3 percent) than any other the Hopkins Nanjing Center at Nanjing 115-137. 24 Edward Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why nation on the planet, while China ranks University. He has previously worked as China’s Economic Rise Doesn’t Threaten the a dismal 75th, with just 7.5 percent of its a research consultant on Chinese human 12 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy (Cam- West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),

32 workers involved in creative enterprise. rights issues; as a contributor and editor bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 406. 701-720. vol 2 The Singapore example suggests that at Shanghaiist and Beijing Cream; and in

13 Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic 25 Steinfeld, 92. | a creative China is not impossible. What communications at the Friends Committee 2016 is needed is not an overthrow of China’s on National Legislation, a peace lobbying Reform in China (Berkeley: University of Cali- system of government, but rather a greater group in DC. fornia Press, 1993), 150. 26 Keane (April 2009), 223. tolerance of diversity in expression. 14 “China’s Special Economic Zones: Experi- 27 Keane (April 2009), 225. A key lesson from China’s misadventures 1 Richard Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, ence Gained,” The World Bank, http://www. in the creative industry is this – China does Revisited (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 6. worldbank.org/ content/dam/Worldbank/ 28 Keane (April 2009), 228. not want creativity in the same way the West Event/Africa/Investing%20in%20Africa%20 understands it. While “disruption” may be 2 Florida, 8. Forum/2015/investing-in-africa-forum-chi- 29 Florida, 282. a buzzword in the Western entrepreneurial nas-special-economic-zone.pdf. context, the byword in China is “harmony.” 3 Ibid. 30 Jennifer Currier, “Art and Power in the New The Chinese Communist Party has little 15 Wong Siu Wai and Tang Bosin, “Challenges China: An Exploration of Beijing’s 798 District use for a gay index, nor does it want cel- 4 Florida, 58. to the sustainability of ‘development zones’: and Its Implications for Contemporary Urban- ebrations of difference: it wants unity. The A case study of Guangzhou Development ism,” The Town Planning Review, Vol. 79, No. 2 Chinese education system too is deeply 5 Edward Glaser, “Book Review: Rise of the District, China,” Cities, Vol. 22.4 (2005), 304. (2008), 242-245. standardized, and at every level instructors Creative Class,” http://scholar.harvard. edu/ reward compliance. What Beijing’s bureau- les/ glaeser/ les/book_review_of_rich- ard_ 16 “Reform Paralysis, Slow Progress Cloud Shang- 31 Currier, 247. crats want is the value of creativity, completely oridas_the_rise_of_the_creative_class. pdf. hai Free Trade Zone Project.” Reuters, Septem- divorced from the substance of it. ber 14, 2014. 32 Florida, 69. 6 Jamie Peck, “Struggling with the Creative Class,” International Journal of Urban and 17 “Political priority, economic gamble,” The Econ- Regional Research 29.4, (December 2005), omist, April 14, 2014. 740-770. 18 J.S. Bajwa, “Defining Elements of Compre- 7 Michele Hoyman, Chris Faricy, and Mel Gray as hensive National Power,” Center for Law and cited in Frank Bures, “The Fall of the Creative Warfare Studies Journal (Summer 2008), 153. Class,” Thirty-two Magazine, (June, 2012). 19 Hu Jintao as quoted in Keane (April 2009), 221. 8 Justin O’Connor and Gu Xin, “A New Moder- nity? The Arrival of ‘Creative Industries’ in 20 Osnos, Evan. “Why China Lacks Gangnam China,” International Journal of Cultural Studies, Style.” The New Yorker, October 3, 2012. Volume 9.3 (2006), 271-283. 21 Michael Keane, “Creative Industries in China: 9 Ren Xuefei and Sun Meng, “Artistic Urbaniza- Four Perspectives on Social Transformation,” tion: Creative Industries and Creative Control International Journal of Cultural Policy Vol. 15, in Beijing,” International Journal of Urban and No. 4 (November 2009), 436. Regional Research, Volume 26.3 (May 2012), 504-521.

24 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Creative Stagnation: The Failure of Zone-Based Reform 25 CHINA

builds on Gilley’s scholarship, examining challenges, but with several important executive agencies manned by capable

Making the these developments through the lens of caveats and nuances reflecting President and uncorrupt elites seeking to improve STUDIES REVIEW his environmental framework, while also Xi’s emphasis on strong enforcement. environmental outcomes. Public participa- Transition: undertaking an exploratory content anal- tion is limited to a narrow cadre of scientific ysis of the MEP’s phraseology in speeches In this context, this assessment provides: and technocratic elites while others are Examining China’s during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping expected to participate only in state-led eras to further elucidate a shift towards 1. An overview of Gilley’s framework that mobilization for the purposes of implemen- Environmental democratic environmentalism. This paper discusses how these data points will be tation. The policy outputs that result include examines a five-year period from March operationalized; a rapid and comprehensive response to the Policymaking 2010 to May 2015, eclipsing two and a issue and usually some limits on individ- 2 half years before and after the power 2. An overview of China’s historical model ual freedoms.” In China, there is a strong vol 2 Model after the transition to Xi Jinping. This paper comes for environmental policymaking, includ- prevalence of “ecoelites”, particularly within |

to the conclusion that, even in the post-Xi ing an assessment of current players and the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2016 Rise of Xi Jinping era, Chinese environmental policymaking institutions in China’s environmental policy the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, does appear to be shifting towards a more processes; Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, “democratic model”, though there remain the National Leading Group to Address Cli- David Rubin several caveats towards the nature, goal 3. A descriptive analysis of recent devel- mate Change (NLGACC – within the NDRC), and structure of this “democratization”. opments since Xi Jinping’s rise as either National Environment Advisory Commis- “democratic” or “authoritarian”; sion and various ministry-level advisory In 2012, Bruce Gilley of Portland State Uni- China faces some of the most perplexing bodies staffed with technocrats. 3These versity’s Hatfield School of Government environmental challenges in the world 4. A preliminary content analysis of MEP science and technology organizations published a paper entitled, “Authoritarian today. Historically, it has used a top-down, speeches to determine its shift towards form the backbone of authoritarian envi- environmentalism and China’s response to authoritarian framework to address these more “democratic” or “authoritarian” poli- ronmentalism’s justification for its policies, climate change”. This paper was an explor- equally staggering issues. However, cymaking; and rather than relying on grassroots or com- atory analysis of China’s environmental despite increasingly punitive regulations, munity input on environmental issues. policymaking structure and its position China still faces significant breakdowns of 5. A final analysis of these developments These structures are often characterized on the democratic environmentalism and enforcement and community buy-in for its to determine whether China’s policymak- by highly-effective policy generation, but authoritarian environmentalism spectrum. policies at the local-level. Bruce Gilley’s ing is shifting towards a more “democratic often experience breakdowns in enforce- Since Gilley published his work, there have “Authoritarian environmentalism and Chi- environmentalism” model, including areas ment capacity or community buy-in at the been several important political develop- na’s response to climate change” examines for further research on these important local level. ments that have taken place in mainland the basis for China’s environmental policy- developments. China. A new regime under President Xi making through a well-defined framework Democratic Environmentalism Jinping has come to power, overseeing to contextualize particular policies as either Examining the Framework of the greatest leadership purges since the democratic or authoritarian in nature. Democratic vs. Authoritarian Conversely, Gilley defines democratic Cultural Revolution. New leadership has This analysis was less prescriptive, but Environmentalism environmentalism, “as a public policy taken over at China’s Ministry of Environ- instead more descriptive, examining the model that spreads authority across sev- mental Protection (MEP), while a landmark natures and characteristics of authoritarian When evaluating policy processes, political eral levels and agencies of government, Environmental Protection Law (EPL) came environmentalism and democratic environ- frameworks can be useful tools to delin- including representative legislatures, and into force as of January 1, 2015. Many mentalism. Gilley also assessed that China eate and classify specific data points. This that encourages direct public participa- leading academics, including U.S. scholar is transitioning towards a more democratic is particularly important when examining tion from a wide cross-section of society David Shambaugh, see Xi’s rise as a tec- model, versus its current authoritarian shifts from one political model to another, (drawing from Holden 2002 and Humphrey tonic shift towards greater authoritarianism, model. Since Gilley’s research, there have as in the case of democratic to authoritar- 2007). Policy outputs may be piecemeal which may even cause the downfall of the been several additional developments ian environmentalism. Gilley cites several and subject to time lags, and do not gen- Chinese Communist Party and the Peo- catalyzed by President Xi Jinping’s rise scholars in creating a working definition for erally include restrictions on basic social, ple’s Republic. In this context, this paper to power to contextualize this shift. Using each of these models. 1 civil, or political liberties.” 4 Policy processes refutes this position and instead posits Bruce Gilley’s framework, this paper ana- are usually much more involved and can be that at least in environmental policymak- lyzes these new data points and concludes Authoritarian Environmentalism piecemeal, but often are more successful in ing, Xi Jinping’s China is still transitioning that since Gilley’s initial analysis, China is the implementation phase given a higher towards more inclusivity and grassroots continuing to shift towards a more demo- Gilley provisionally defines authoritar- degree of socialization with the public and engagement on pollution enforcement cratic model under President Xi Jinping’s ian environmentalism as “a public policy community buy-in for enforcement. and policy generation. This assessment rule to address its growing environmental model that concentrates authority in a few

26 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 27 CHINA

Gilley underscores that these two models China as Authoritarian State Precedent of a Shifting Politburo Standing Committee [serving as a

form a spectrum of policymaking. Many Chinese Political Model Chinese Communist Party (CCP) structural STUDIES REVIEW states often employ elements of both dem- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) complement to the two PRC agencies]. ocratic and authoritarian environmentalism inarguably remains an authoritarian state, However, as in most analyses of East Asian to achieve their desired policy goals and though with several definitional diver- political theory, the Chinese model of The Ministry of Environmental Protection outcomes. This paper provides a visual gences from formal authoritarianism. Juan authoritarianism is once again the excep- (MEP): The MEP is the de facto agency in depiction of this spectrum below. Using this Linz lays out the foundations for examining tion rather than the rule. Kenneth Lieberthal charge of enforcing environmental policy. framework, this paper will analyze specific authoritarianism as a form of governance describes China’s political model as one The MEP’s role is to manage air, water, instances of Chinese environmental poli- with four qualities: “[Authoritarian regimes of fragmented authoritarianism, where soil, noise and chemical pollution as well cymaking and MEP speeches to determine can be characterized as] political systems “authority below the very peak of the Chi- as solid waste management, and also to

their characteristics as either falling into the with limited, not responsible, political nese political model system is fragmented conduct State Council-mandated environ- vol 2 “authoritarian” or “democratic” model. pluralism, without elaborate and guiding and disjointed… [Where] the fragmenta- mental impact assessments, among other

10 |

ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, tion is structurally based and enhanced by tasks. Noticeably absent from its man- 2016 China’s Historical Model for without extensive nor intensive political reform policies regarding procedures.” 7 date, however, is the ability to set national Environmental Policymaking mobilization, except at some points in This structure can also be illustrated effec- climate change goals and targets. These their development, and in which a leader tively through the principal-agent problem are instead set by the NDRC, whose role is Before examining the trend lines of Chi- or occasionally a small group exercised – local cadre, city, township, prefectural and examined below. The MEP has historically na’s environmental tradition towards a power within ill-defined limits but actually central authorities will often act in their own been incredibly weak within the Chinese more democratic and inclusive model, it quite predictable ones.” 6 China’s political self-interests, tacitly engaging with other political system, criticized by its own former is important to examine the country’s histor- system fits into many elements of this defi- officials while operating under informa- Minister Zhou Shengxian as being one of ical model for environmental policymaking. nition. Instances of political mobilization tional asymmetry. 8 Numerous other authors the four most embarrassing government In the case of China, its environmental pol- have largely abated since the mass move- have written about the shift in Chinese departments in the world, which some icymaking structure evolved in part out of ments of the Mao Zedong era. Small groups political decision making from a strictly netizens quipped as being as effectual the nation’s political regime identity. 5 of political elites exercise control without authoritarian to a more hybrid model in as landlocked Mongolia’s navy 11. Faced specified checks or balances, though often response to a need to reestablish regime with a tradeoff between environmental follow precedent on their political roles. legitimacy and avoid widespread public sustainability and economic growth, PRC discontent. 9 Driven by a self-interest to officials often prioritized development at maintain power, there are many examples the expense of the MEP’s mission. The Min- Democratic vs Authoritarian Environmentalism of China’s Party elites redefining policy pro- istry’s former bureaucratic position reflects Gilley (2012): “Authoritarian environmentalism and China’s response to climate change” cesses or political structures to neutralize this. Until 1984, the MEP’s predecessor perceived threats. In so doing, Party elites was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 12 AUTHORITARIAN DEMOCRATIC entertain various experimental policies that of Urban Construction (MUC). While the environmentalism environmentalism can either fall within a more democratic or National Environmental Protection Agency authoritarian framework. China’s environ- was established in 1984 as an independent mental policymaking in this regard is no body, it did not receive a full voting seat at Characteristics Characteristics different. Its structure is still rooted funda- the State Council until it became a ministry mentally in authoritarian rule. Yet political in 2008. 13 The MEP’s operational capacity 1 Limit freedoms to encourage 1 Direct participation from a elites have shown a degree of flexibility in has also been historically weak; the Ministry sustainable behavior cross-section of public their environmental policymaking (at times (working with local Environmental Protec- co-opting more unorthodox and vaguely tion Bureaus EPBs) has historically failed 2 Policy generated by autonomous 2 Authority spread across several agen- participatory policies) in order to maintain in the most basic elements of pollution central state, little role for social cies of government, including order, control, and legitimacy. enforcement and compliance in the coun- actors or representatives representative legislatures tryside, while EPBs remain subordinate Principal Institutional Actors in to local governments through funding. 14 3 Efficient, top-down policy generation, 3 Drawn-out and often piecemeal policy Environmental Policymaking MEP itself, however, has gained additional but plagued by lack of stakeholder generation fraught with political credibility and political capital with the new buy-in and ineffective enforcement horse-trading, but with strong In essence, the Chinese environmental Environmental Protection Law (EPL) and a enforcement and community support policymaking structure is driven by three new minister, Chen Jining. The transforma- main bodies – the Ministry of Environmen- tive nature of the new minister and of the IS CHINA MAKING THIS TRANSITION? tal Protection, the National Development EPL are examined in section five below. and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the

28 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 29 CHINA

National Development and Reform Commis- generated within the NPC and MEP. The Examining Case Studies to Determine developing policies, lack of enforcement

sion (NDRC): The NDRC is also an important PSC most often steps in on issues associ- a Democratic Transition mechanisms and a lack of community rights STUDIES REVIEW policymaking body on environmental ated with national infrastructure projects. or public input, among other elements. 22 issues within the Chinese government. Chaired by President Xi Jinping and There are several case studies that offer Since that time, Minister Chen has also As mentioned above, its primary mission Premier Li Keqiang, the seventh-ranked insight into China adopting a more dem- taken bold steps to shut down investment is to set national climate change tar- member Zhang Gaoli is rumored to hold ocratic and inclusive policy process for projects harmful to local communities and gets through its Department of Climate the environmental portfolio of the PSC. 20 environmental issues, while there are environmental sustainability, including the Change and National Leading Group to also examples pointing towards a con- Yangzi’s Xiaonanhai dam (a considerable Address Climate Change, as well as liaise “Counter Agencies”: Along with policy tinuation of its traditionally closed-off, USD 5.1 billion project) that the PSC had with the Ministry of Environmental Pro- generation, there are also several agencies authoritarian model. complicity greenlighted and that local

tection through the NDRC Department of that provide checks against environmen- officials had pushed for at the expense of vol 2 Resource Conservation and Environmental tal legislation. These agencies include Evidence of a Democratic Model after community interests. 23,24 The MEP also

15,16 |

Protection. For many years, the NDRC’s the Ministries of Agriculture, Land and President Xi’s Rise announced the expansion of greater local 2016 chief negotiator on climate change was Xie Resources and Water Resources, who have pollution enforcement teams to combat Zhenhua. Xie dual-hatted as the Vice Chair- claimed that certain environmental policies Empowerment of the MEP and Minister air pollution in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei man of the NDRC. This technocrat had led encroach on their operational jurisdiction Chen Jining: One of the most telling exam- corridor in the Fall of 2014, and according negotiations for China at the UN Climate given their overlap with the MEP’s mission. ples of a shift towards a more inclusive, to MEP Vice Minister Wu Xiaoqing is also Change Conferences since at least 2007 at democratically-focused environmen- ratcheting up efforts to crackdown on data the Conference of the Parties (COP) 13 Bali All of these agencies work to generate tal policymaking process in China is the falsification by local governments. 25,26 Negotiations. 17 There were open reports environmental policies within the Chinese emergence of Chen Jining and the rising that Xie had been called upon to retire from system. Noticeably absent from this list, assertiveness of the MEP in cultivating a The 2014 Environmental Protection Law: his position in early 2015, though stories however, are social actors, NGOs, local stronger role for environmental enforce- Along with the MEP, the new 2014 EPL circulated in mid-April 2015 indicate that governments and community members ment and community support. Chen Jining also takes important steps to cultivate a he has now reemerged out of retirement – all central to a classical democratic envi- is viewed by some to be a transformative more inclusive environmental policymaking to carry the negotiations at least through ronmentalism model. figure in Chinese environmental policy. His structure. Within the law, there are guaran- COP 21 in Paris. 18 The NDRC’s Department appointment as the new MEP will also have tees for both whistleblower protection and of Resource Conservation and Environmen- Evidence of a Shifting implications for environmental protection public interest lawsuits, critical pillars for tal Protection has historically worked with Chinese Structure? and enforcement. Chen, a rising political cultivating stronger local-level support for the National People’s Congress in drafting star, was hand-picked by Xi’s inner circle environmental reforms. The whistleblower national environmental frameworks. As described above, China’s environmental to take on the MEP’s difficult portfolio. 21 protection statutes of the EPL takes policymaking structure is remarkably com- He previously served as president of the important strides to, “encourage public National People’s Congress (NPC): The plex. There are several official channels and prestigious Tsinghua University – Xi’s alma involvement in monitoring corporations NPC’s Environmental Protection and agencies, as well as closed technocratic mater – and is an environmental sciences and regulatory officials to make sure they Resources Conservation Committee is the groups, which are involved in the policy expert. Given his connections to Xi and carry out their duties lawfully and appro- main body for generating draft legislation generation process. Bruce Gilley’s frame- China’s leadership circles, he is expected priately.” 27 Citizens will now be protected on the environment. The NPC is strongly work takes a comprehensive snapshot to be uniquely empowered to carry out the when they report environmental pollution motivated by economic growth; with the of many of these players in his analysis MEP’s mission. or ecological damage caused by institu- NDRC, it had responsibility for drafting the of China’s authoritarian environmental tions, or if they report failures by authorities first version of the new EPL until this privi- framework. However, since Gilley’s paper Since Xi Jinping came to power, there have to address such damages. Furthermore, lege was revoked following a circulation of was published, there have been several also been several instances of the MEP following an extensive lobbying process, its very weak public draft in August 2012. 19 important developments in how the Chi- trying to elicit greater local-level buy-in NGOs were able to secure their role as Responsibilities were turned over to the nese government appears to be generating for environmental enforcement. During champions for public interest lawsuits. In Law Committee of the NPC, which oversaw policies. This section examines several of the drafting of the EPL (expanded further an earlier EPL draft, this right was given a much more environmentally-amenable revi- these case studies, and also undertakes a below), the MEP controversially circulated as an exclusive monopoly to the All-China sion process. The NPC often rubber-stamps more in-depth content analysis of shifting a public list of 34 arguments against the Environmental Federation, an organization policies that are generated within the upper phraseology choices by the Ministry of original weak draft pushed by the NDRC with close ties to the central government. 28 echelons of the Chinese central government. Environmental Protection, to determine and the NPC’s Environmental Protection This is an important step in enabling NGOs whether the PRC is indeed shifting towards and Resources Conservation Committee. to serve as interlocutors for local commu- Politburo Standing Committee (PSC): The a more democratic model. The list was published on the MEP’s web- nities and begin a process of grassroots PSC also plays an important role as a CCP site in late October, 2012, railing against enforcement on environmental law. complement and check on the policies the role of exclusive scientific bodies in

30 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 31 CHINA

Grassroots Push for Data Transparency: made “in order to realize the principles of who destroy ecology or environment, with Foreign NGO Enforcement Law: Another 31 36 Another indication of a democratic shift democratic and open policy-making.” In no exceptions.” In a speech in 2013 on troubling development in the Xi Jinping era STUDIES REVIEW has been the central government’s acqui- a similar move that October, the NLGACC the Silk Road Economic Belt, he again toed has been the drafting of an extremely strict escence towards greater data transparency held a meeting with the China Civil Climate a more authoritarian environmentalism and limiting law that would render opera- on air and water pollution. Throughout Change Action Network to solicit the opin- line, stating that an ecological civilization tions for foreign NGOs nearly impossible. 2013, environmental NGOs began push- ions of several NGOs on that same climate is “[sic] about not only the well-being of This draft law stipulated that NGOs that ing the central government to release change bill. 32 In November 2013, the NDRC the people, but also the future develop- violated “Chinese society’s moral customs” data on emissions and water discharge also co-hosted a panel discussion at COP ment of the nation.” 37 Furthermore, at a could not operate in China, and further following several high-level stories about 19 in Warsaw with the China Civil Climate May 2013 study session with the Political prevented foreign NGOs from opening Beijing’s “airpocalypse”. To the surprise Change Action Network, several NGOs, and Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party any branches in China domestically. While

of many NGO leaders, central authorities the All China Environmental Foundation to Central Committee (CCPCC), Xi stressed state monitoring of NGO activities has long vol 2 agreed. On January 1, 2014, the central discuss how China could take a more asser- that “only the strictest system and most been accepted as simply the price of oper- |

government mandated that over 15,000 tive role in soliciting inputs from the NGO tight-knit law enforcement” could guar- ating in China, this new law was decried 2016 factories (including those operated by community. 33, 34 This is a very significant antee China’s ecological progress, saying by rights activists as effectively outlawing SOEs) must publish their pollution data development for the NDRC. This organiza- that “on issues of ecological and environ- the operations of foreign NGOs. The NPC in real time. 29 This was a coup for China’s tion, which has historically aligned against mental protection, people should not cross did amend the law after some push-back environmental NGOs – while not a direct greater inclusionary measures (including the line or they will get punished”, and also from internal departments on claims that channel for public input into environmental working with the NPC to direct the drafting called on people to shift their lifestyles and this law would prevent Chinese organiza- lawmaking, greater data transparency does process for the EPL at the exclusion of the curb consumption to encourage greater tions from tapping into the wealth of data allow communities to identify and apply MEP), appears to be testing the waters for resource conservation. 38 This choice of that science and technology-related NGOs pressure to the greatest polluters in their at least slightly greater stakeholder input phrasing aligns very closely with the author- currently provide. 42 The revised draft spec- towns and cities. This may indirectly culti- into the environmental policymaking pro- itarian environmentalism model, particularly ified instead that foreign NGOs could vate greater public support for the central cess – a critical element of a shift towards around limiting personal freedoms, enforcing operate only with the permission of the government’s policies. Furthermore, this a more democratic model. Indeed, public a strict top-down approach, and underscor- State Council. This further indicates a reas- central government signal may also cata- input in the national law-making process ing the autonomous and omnipotent role sertion of an authoritarian structure, given lyze more local-level transparency, a central is becoming more common, and this may of central authorities. both the prioritization of access to tech- element of democratic transition (spread- soon be better reflected in the NDRC’s nocratic bodies and the consolidation of ing authority on tracking and enforcement own functioning. The Environmental Protection Law’s Stip- NGO approval to the central government’s to additional stakeholders). For example, ulations on NGOs: Other indicators that State Council. NGOs are an important ele- the Shandong provincial government has Evidence of a Strong Authoritarian the Chinese government is continuing ment of civil society within the democratic started publishing its own monthly vio- Model after President Xi’s Rise on its current authoritarian environmental environmentalism framework. Without their lators list after the central government model include the limits on NGOs actually role to amplify issues from the public to started taking steps towards disclosing Xi Jinping’s Ecological Civilization: There participating in public interest lawsuits, as the government, it remains very difficult more data. 30 are, however, several case studies pointing stipulated in the EPL. In order to file claims to make a transition to a more inclusive towards a continuation of a strong author- on behalf of the people in the People’s policymaking structure. Even a Shifting Stance for the NDRC?: itarian model for environmental policy in Court, NGOs must, “(1) be registered with Along with the EPL and MEP, there are even China in the wake of President Xi’s rise. the civil affairs department at or above Prominence of Citizen Activist Censorship: indications that the historically removed Chief amongst them has been the Pres- the municipal level and (2) [have]… been Finally, censorship still features as a central and technocratic NDRC may be taking ident’s choice of words. Since coming focused on environment-related public tool of the government in limiting commu- steps to encourage greater community to office, the President has “stressed the interest activities for five consecutive years nity input into the policymaking process. involvement in developing environmental concept of ecological civilization and or more.” 39 Of the over 3,500 registered On February 28, 2015, Chai Jing released policies. Albeit before Xi Jinping’s rise to conservation culture at political events in environmental NGOs in China (as of 2012, the widely circulated Chinese film Under power, the NDRC’s National Leading Group China and abroad more than 60 times since discounting unregistered), it is estimated the Dome, a critique of China’s top-down on Addressing Climate Change took an November 2012.” 35 Environmental protec- that only roughly 300 will be able to meet policymaking structure and its failure to unheard of step in cultivating grassroots tion is clearly an area of importance to the these two requirements. 40,41 This limits enforce pollution regulations. The film input. In March 2011, the NLGACC issued new President. However, when examining the depth and breadth of NGO players circulated for a week and generated 300 an unusual call for written submissions from his remarks specifically, it becomes clear that can participate, disenfranchising any million views before it was taken down the public for ‘advice and suggestions’ that his approach is ostensibly very authori- young, issue-specific or locally registered from Chinese sites, while central authorities about a draft climate change law intended tarian. For example, during the 12th NPC in NGOs from the process and eliminating a also ordered news sites to stop circulating to bring coherence to the existing suite early March, Xi declared that, “we are going potential valuable channel to encourage stories about the documentary. 43 The cen- of laws and regulations. The appeal was to punish, with an iron hand, any violators more public involvement and discourse. sorship of the film underscored that the

32 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 33 CHINA

central government would not tolerate such and China’s response to climate change” Distribution of MEP Ministerial Publications

bold criticisms of its own policies. However, to identify shifting phraseology in MEP STUDIES REVIEW it is important to note that the government speeches. This paper draws on the wealth 3 did let the film circulate for much longer of remarks and speeches available on the Xi Jinping than it could have, increasing the film’s MEP’s website, translated into English by assumes power exposure. Chen Jining actually praised the the MEP itself. 45 To further visualize the film as worthy of comparison with Rachel spectrum of authoritarian and democratic 2 Carson’s seminal “Silent Spring”. 44 environmentalism models, another chart is presented below. Content Analysis of MEP Speeches

1 This assessment identified phrases that vol 2 Along with the anecdotal evidence pre- best characterize both democratic and |

sented in the case studies above, this authoritarian environmentalism, as defined 2016 assessment also attempts to quantify by Gilley and referenced throughout this 0 shifting language choices in the speeches piece. The analysis cross referenced thirty made by senior MEP officials over the last unique speeches, remarks, press releases, 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 15 15 five years to determine a shift towards or and articles written by former Minister Zhou 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 away from democratic environmentalism. Shengxian and Minister Chen Jining from Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 This is an important step in operationalizing May 2010 through May 2015. 46 Due to Gilley’s theoretical framework by providing data limitations, only one speech is avail- an initial content analysis of an increasingly able from Minister Chen; the remaining are influential environmental decision maker in from Minister Zhou. A graphical depiction the Chinese political system. of the distribution of these sources across during late 2012 and throughout 2013, fol- Independent Democratic Authoritarian the five-year period is displayed above. lowed by high activity across early 2014. Variables Focused Variables Focused Variables Operationalizing Variables: This paper Minister Zhou was quit prolific throughout uses the framework presented in Bruce 2011 and early 2012, and had a relatively This study used twenty-four words and scien-ce/ Development Public tific/-ically-/ness Gilley’s “Authoritarian environmentalism average number of speaking engagements phrases as variables to capture a tran- Tech- sition from authoritarian to democratic Environment Communi-ty/ties environmentalism. There are three vari- nology/-nical able categories – independent variables, democratic-focused variables and author- Environmental Democra-tic/-acy Enforce/-ment Visualizing the Environmentalism Spectrum itarian-focused variables. In order to Protection NGO Limit AUTHORITARIAN DEMOCRATIC account for the wide spectrum of phrases environmentalism environmentalism that could indicate a policy shift towards Economic Stakeholder Punish more democratic environmentalism, this analysis used both “soft democratic” Local Fine Characteristics Characteristics phrases (such a “public”, “people”, “society”) as well as more “hard democratic” People 1 Limit on individual freedom and 1 Few limits on social, civil or phrases (such as “media”, “NGO”, “stake- public input to policymaking political liberties holder”, or “democracy”) to capture the Partici-pate/ nuances of any potential shift. The table -pation/-pants 2 Policy formation by autonomous 2 Policy formation driven by inclusive, of variables is shown on the right. “ecoelites” supported by technocrats multidimensional public discourse Accountability

3 3 Exclusion of NGOs and business Various stakeholders - businesses, Then, using each written source’s tran- Society actors in policy formation NGO’s, media, issue experts, politicians script from the speeches section of the MEP website, a word frequency counter 4 Centralized formulation and 4 Decentralized formulation and Social decentralized implementation decentralized implementation was used to determine phrase prevalence for each of the variables above. 47 This Promo-te/ 5 Importance of political leadership 5 Importance of stakeholder consensus paper then graphically compared word -tion/-ting

prevalence in speeches across the 2010 to Media 2015 timeframe. However, written sources

34 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 35 CHINA

varied between 537 and 12,201 words. To Instances of Democratic Democratic Phrase Prevalence account for the potential skewing of word Phrase Prevalence STUDIES REVIEW prevalence, instances of phrase appear- hard Democratic variables ance were divided by total words in a Looking at the overall structure of the 0.35% source, providing a phrase occurrence phrases, several important trends emerge. 48 percentage metric. The independent The most prevalent democratic variables 0.30% variables were used as controls to ensure used in official minister-level MEP speeches that the speeches themselves concen- and publications since Xi Jinping’s rise are 0.25% trated on environmental content and (in ranked order): “people”, “promote”, Xi Jinping assumes power could therefore be included in the anal- “public”, “social” and “society”. Society has 0.20%

49 yses. However, they did not yield any dropped in usage, but is still fifth most prev- vol 2 democra-tic/-cy statistically relevant trends. alent. “Promote” has seen the most year 0.15% media |

over year growth. This may reflect the use of 2016 stakeholder

Once the phrase occurrence percentage mobilizing campaigns such as the Ecological in Text Prevalence 0.10% was calculated, assessments of phrase Civilization campaign. A more in-depth anal- prevalence over time were run for multi- ysis of “hard democratic” variables is featured 0.05% ple variables to determine any potentially on the right. statistically significant trends. There were 0% both expected and surprising results for When examining the “hard democratic”

both the democratic and authoritarian phrases, some interesting wrinkles in the 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 14 14 14

phrases. The findings of the study are data emerge. Some of the more contro- 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 as follows: versial phrases, such as democracy and stakeholder, drop off completely from Year of Speech/Publication

Democratic Phrase Prevalence Democratic Phrase Prevalence soft Democratic variables

1.40% 2.50% 1.20%

democra-tic/-cy 2.00% media 1.00% Xi Jinping participa-te/-tion/-nts Xi Jinping assumes power assumes power 1.50% social 0.80% public NGO promo-te/-tion/-ting stakeholder 0.60% 1.00% people public

Prevalence in Text Prevalence communi-ty/-es

in Text Prevalence 0.40% promo-te/-tion/-ting 0.50% society 0.20% accountability 0% 0% 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 14 14 14 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 14 14 14 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Year of Speech/Publication Year of Speech/Publication

36 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 37 CHINA

Authoritarian Phrase Prevalence official MEP discussions at Xi Jinping’s rise Instances of Authoritarian “punish” & “enforce” variables to power. Starting in 2014, a greater rele- Phrase Prevalence: STUDIES REVIEW vance of the term “community” and “media” 0.60% are used. It is notable that “NGO” does not An analysis of the authoritarian phrases appear in any official Minister-level speech also offers interesting insights into the 0.50% between May 2010 and May 2015. priorities of the MEP. Looking at the chart below, there has been a decrease in the However, when looking at the “soft demo- prevalence of “technology” and “science” 0.40% Xi Jinping assumes power cratic variables” as above, there are a few mentioned, while there has been a signifi- interesting trends that emerge. “People” cant rise in the use of “enforcement” and in 0.30%

punish has seen a significant rise in use, while particular, “punish”. A more narrow analysis vol 2 enforce/-ment “promote” does seem to be growing in of these phrases is on the right. 0.20% | Prevalence in Text Prevalence

prevalence but seems to oscillate fre- 2016 quently. “Public” did experience increased The chart shows the prevalence of the use in 2013, but has tapered significantly use of both “punish” and “enforce” by the 0.10% through the end of 2014. Not shown in MEP Minister. Note the shifts that have this graph, “society” and “social” have taken place since Xi’s rise to power. There 0% both experienced a noticeable drop since are greater instances of enforcement and 14 15 Xi Jinping’s rise. At a more-macro level, punishment mentioned. 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 20 20 these graphs indicate that there has been 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 a fall in the use of phrases such as “stake- This indicates a potential emphasis on Year of Speech/Publication holder” and “democracy” in MEP Ministerial coercive policy measures to ensure environ- speeches, with an increase in “community”, mental compliance, such as the pollution “people”, and “promote”. regulations in the new EPL.

Authoritarian Phrase Prevalence Authoritarian Phrase Prevalence “technology” & “science” variables

0.60% 1.00%

0.90% 0.50% 0.80% 0.70% Xi Jinping 0.40% Xi Jinping assumes power fine assumes power 0.60% punish 0.30% 0.50% limit tech-nology/-nical enforce/-ment 0.40% scien-ce/-tific/-ically-/ness tech-nology/-nical 0.20% Prevalence in Text Prevalence 0.30% Prevalence in Text Prevalence scien-ce/-tific/-ically-/ness 0.20% 0.10% 0.10%

0% 0% 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 14 14 14 14 15 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Year of Speech/Publication Year of Speech/Publication

38 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 39 CHINA

However, another interesting (and contrast- towards adopting both democratic and shift towards a more democratic model. On references to democratic tools and empha-

ing) element of this data is the decreasing authoritarian elements in the formulation top of this, the data from the context analy- sizes stricter social controls. Therefore, in STUDIES REVIEW emphasis on “technology” and “science”, at of its environmental frameworks, as shown sis shows that in MEP ministerial speeches, the context of the democratic evidence least from the official MEP Ministerial line. in the qualitative assessment in section five certain democratic catch phrases like above, this analysis finally posits that a This may indicate less emphasis on the role and the MEP content analysis above. How- “people”, “community”, “public”, and “pro- new model for environmental policymaking of technocrats and ecoelites within the Chi- ever, when assessing these developments mote” are growing in use, while phrases outside of Gilley’s framework is emerging nese system. Note above how science is of holistically through Gilley’s framework, the like “technology” and “science” are falling. in China – “Democratic Environmentalism much lower magnitude, while technology question remains whether China’s environ- This indicates a model potentially shifting with Chinese Characteristics”. This model in only mentioned in early 2013 and again mental policymaking is still shifting more towards Gilley’s democratic environmental- is characterized by metered liberalization in mid-2014. towards a democratic structure under the ist structure, with less reliance on “ecoelites” of democratic policymaking emphasizing

new Xi Jinping administration. and technocrats in place of the emphasis of public discourse, grassroots monitoringand vol 2 Takeaways from the Content Analysis society and the public to develop new envi- data transparency, while still choreograph- |

Conclusions of the Study and ronmental policies. ing the role of civil society and carefully 2016 The results of the content analysis offer Potential Next Steps for Analysis de-emphasizing “hard democratic” phrases interesting anecdotes to the nature and Evaluating evidence for a democratic vs. in official messaging. direction of Chinese policymaking, spe- This study makes several important infer- authoritarian shift, this paper concludes that cifically through the lens of MEP senior ences regarding the nature of Chinese the democratic evidence should be given Recommendations for Potential leadership speeches. Some elements of environmental policymaking after the rise more weight. While the authoritarian evi- Next Steps for Analysis the analysis were as predicted, such as a of President Xi Jinping in November 2012. dence presented above could constitute a slightly softening attitude to and increasing Within the qualitative case studies, there is compelling argument, these policies and Based on the results presented, this analysis prevalence of “democratic characteristics” evidence of both more inclusive, grassroots narratives represent the status quo for both recommends two areas for further research: within MEP publications. As laid out above, policymaking and also more exclusive, top- President Xi Jinping and the traditional Chi- however, there are varying degrees on the down policymaking. However, juxtaposed nese model. The democratic trends in both Further Operationalization of the Data democratic spectrum of Gilley’s framework. against the results of the contextual anal- the content analysis and case studies rep- Set in Content Analysis: This paper only As such, within the confines of the speeches ysis, a more nuanced narrative appears. A resent a significant departure from China’s used a basic search function to establish and variables chosen in this study, the more democratic model is emerging, albeit established model of environmental poli- word prevalence. Given the magnitude of MEP’s public narrative is incorporating the with growing emphasis on elements of the cymaking. At the very least, these results material available from MEP, this research increasing use of soft democratic phrases authoritarian model. In this context, the key point to greater inclusionary rhetoric from barely scratched the surface of potential like “public”, “promoting” and “people”, conclusions of this analysis are provided in central authorities with a growing emphasis relationships inherent in the data. This along with a growing (but still muted) use the section below, followed by recommen- on data transparency and grassroots envi- paper recommends that further research of hard democratic phrases like “commu- dations for next steps in research. ronmental monitoring. for specific phrases be examined (beyond nity” and “media” Simultaneously, the focus single words), and also recommends that on more authoritarian concepts like the Major Conclusions – A Shift with Caveats? the data be referenced against dates in the role of technology and science in policy China Transitions to a more Democratic Environmentalism Chinese political calendar (the NPC, Five Year generation has fallen. However, there are Democratic Model, with Caveats with Chinese Characteristics Plans, etc.) to examine how certain phrases also indications of continued authoritar- became more prevalent at specific times. ian environmentalism at play under the Xi This paper attempts to definitively answer However, the more authoritarian shifts administration. Since November 2012, the the question, “Using Gilley’s framework of should not be discredited completely. Prescriptive Analysis of China’s Transition MEP has abandoned any mention of truly democratic vs. authoritarian environmental- The authoritarian trends in both the case to Democratic Environmentalism: This inclusive phrases like “democratic” and ism, is China making the transition towards study and content analysis indicate a much paper examines “how” China has begun “stakeholder” in minister-level speeches. a more inclusive, democratic policymaking more complex structural shift in China’s to shift towards a more democratic model The terms “punish” and “enforce” have model?” In short, based on the evidence environmental policymaking. While the for environmental policymaking, based reached five year highs in MEP speeches. available, this paper asserts that this shift to Chinese government is showing signs of on Bruce Gilley’s framework. However, it Viewed in isolation, this could be the a more democratic model is in fact taking greater inclusionary measures, there has does not examine “why”. There is a scholarly result of the Ministry taking a cue from place, though it is premature to conclude a been a fall in the use of “democracy” and consensus that authoritarian environmen- the President’s unprecedented crack- fundamental shift in China’s approach over a rise in use of “punish” and “enforce” in talism leads to effective policy generation down on corruption to dial up its own the long-term. official MEP speeches. Simultaneously, but ineffective policy enforcement. Fur- Ministerial rhetoric. the government has advanced policies ther analysis is recommended to examine Recent policy measures, including increased to carefully orchestrate the role of NGOs whether the steps taken to liberalize and In this context, the data ostensibly points data transparency and greater public involve- and activists. These are both indicators of subtly democratize the environmental pol- towards Chinese policymaking trending ment in the EPL, are strong indicators of a a more authoritarian approach that stifles icymaking structure will in fact encourage

40 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 41 CHINA

9 These authors include Cheng Li (“The End greater efficacy for China’s environmental Link: About the Author Month laws. This analysis requires an expanded http://english.mep.gov.cn/Ministers/ of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism? A STUDIES REVIEW Year Speeches/… dataset and time horizon to establish any David Rubin is a recent graduate of the Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in relationships between these new policies Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of China”), Ming Xia (“China Rises Companion – and their effects on pollution enforcement November | 2011 … 201201/t20120110_222367.htm Advanced International Studies, where he Political Governance”), and Perry Link (“China’s and policy generation. However, such anal- concentrated in both the China Studies Modern Authoritarianism”). ysis would help not just in understanding November | 2011 … 201111/t20111125_220550.htm and Energy, Resources, and the Environ- why China is adapting to its environmen- ment programs. David is an Associate at 10 Ministry of Environmental Protection,

tal policymaking limitations, but also in December | 2011 … 01111/t20111124_220485.htm The Asia Group, a strategic and capital “About SEPA”, March 2008, http://english. illuminating how other authoritarian envi- advisory consultancy in Washington, DC. mep.gov.cn/About_SEPA/Mission/200803/

ronmentalist entities may address their David’s diverse research interests span agri- t20080318_119444.htm. vol 2 January | 2012 … 201201/t20120129_222892.htm policy shortfalls. cultural and environmental policy, regional

11 Tom Phillips, “China’s environment ministry | security and defense dynamics and the 2016 Appendix – Sources for MEP Speeches: February | 2012 … 201201/t20120113_222534.htm politics of U.S. alliance management in the ‘one of four worst departments in world’, The Full text available at: http://english.mep. Asia-Pacific region. Telegraph, June 9, 2013, http://www.telegraph. gov.cn/Ministers/Speeches/ July | 2012 … 201202/t20120223_223827.htm co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10168806/ Chinas-environment-ministry-one-of-four- 1 Full data analysis available in excel format August | 2012 … 201208/t20120807_234449.htm Heilbroner (1974), Holden (2002), Humphrey worst-departments-in-world.html. upon request. (2007), Wells (2007), Shearman and Smith (2007), and Beeson (2010). 12 The State Council, “Ministry of Housing and February | 2012 … 201208/t20120807_234449.htm Urban Rural Devel opment of the People’s Link: 2 Month http://english.mep.gov.cn/Ministers/ Bruce Gilley, “Authoritarian environmentalism Republic of China”, September 9, 2014, http:// Year July | 2012 … 201211/t20121121_242374.htm Speeches/… and China’s response to climate change”, Envi- english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/ ronmental Politics, 2012, 287-307; 288. content_281474986284089.htm. The Ministry May | 2010 … 201007/t20100707_191806.htm August | 2012 … 201208/t20120807_234449.htm of Construction was renamed to the Ministry of 3 Gilley, 288 Housing and UrbanRural Development in 2008.

June | 2010 … 201007/t20100707_191840.htm November | 2012 … 201210/t20121030_240700.htm 4 Gilley, 289. 13 Environmental Law Institute, “China’s Environ- mental Super Ministry Reform: Background, November | 2010 … 201011/t20101125_197971.htm February | 2013 … 201211/t20121121_242374.htm 5 This paper classifies “political regime identity” Challenges, and the Future”, U.S. Environmental as totalitarian, authoritarian, democratic, etc. Protection Agency, 2009, http://www.epa.gov/ January | 2011 … 201101/t20110113_199824.htm February | 2013 … 201302/t20130216_248088.htm ogc/china/xin.pdf. 6 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian 14 January | 2011 … 201102/t20110222_201041.htm June | 2013 … 201303/t20130320_249648.htm Regimes, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Jost Wubbeke, “The three year battle for Chi- Publishers, 2000, 159. na’s new environmental law”, China Dialogue,

April | 2011 … 01102/t20110216_200867.htm January | 2014 … 201306/t20130613_253739.ht April 25, 2014, https://www.chinadialogue.net/ 7 Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, article/show/single/en/6938-The-three-year- Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in battle-for-China-s-new-environmental-law. April | 2011 … 201104/t20110412_209078.htm February | 2014 … 201401/t20140122_266773.htm Post-Mao China, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1992, 6. 15 National Development and Reform Com- April | 2011 … 201104/t20110415_209261.htm March | 2014 … 201402/t20140217_267823.htm mission, “Department of Resource Con- 8 Scholars such as Kate Zhou and Joseph servation and Environmental Protection”, June | 2011 … 201105/t20110516_210672.htm May | 2014 … 201404/t20140408_270218.htm Fewsmith attribute this principal agent prob- 2008, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfod/200812/ lem to the process by which the first reforms t20081218_252198.html.

July | 2011 … 201107/t20110707_214518.htm June | 2014 … 201405/t20140529_276212.htm to land ownership and the household responsibility system were implemented across the 16 National Development and Reform Com- Chinese countryside in the late 1970s and mission, “Department of Climate Change”, August | 2011 … 201107/t20110712_214872.htm March | 2015 … 201406/t20140612_276867.htm early 1980s. 2008, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfod/200812/ t20081218_252201.html. September | 2011 … 01108/t20110815_216048.htm March | 2015 … 201503/t20150319_297563.htm

42 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 43 CHINA

17 Xie Zhenhua, “Statement at Joint Highlevel drones-and-inspection-teams-used-to-monitor- 35 Kong Defang, “Xi’s ecoprotection footprint”, 2015, http://english.mep.gov.cn/Ministers/

Segment of 13th Session of the Conference of pollution-ahead-of-apec-summit-in-beijing/. Xinhua (via English.people.cn), March 10, Speeches/. STUDIES REVIEW the Parties to the Convention”, 13 th Confer- 2015, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0310/ ence of the Parties at the UN Climate Change 26 Ibid. c90785-8860929.html. 46 A full list of the speeches used in available in Conference, Bali, Indonesia: December 12, the appendix. 2007, http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/ 27 Robert L. Falk and Jasmine Wee, “China’s 36 Ibid. CCChina/UpFile/File223.pdf. New Environmental Protection Law”, Morrison 47 This study used http://www.writewords.org.uk/ Foerster, September 30, 2014, https://media2. 37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s word_count.asp. 18 Fu Jing, “Veteran official back as climate nego- mofo.com/documents/140930chinasnewenvi- Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Deliv- tiator”, China Daily USA, April 14, 2015, http:// ronmentalprotectionlaw.pdf ers Important Speech and Proposes to Build 48 For example, a 12,000 word speech may

usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-04/14/con- a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian reference “punish” 30 times (1 in 400 words), vol 2 tent_20426344.htm. 28 Liu Jianqian, “New environmental pro- Countries”, September 7, 2013, http://www. while a 2,000 word speech references punish

tection law would exacerbate pollution fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfw- 20 times (1 in 100 words). This is deceiving, as | 2016 19 Wubbeke. in China”, China Dialogue, February 7, zysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml. the longer speech has a higher absolute value. 2013, https://www.chinadialogue.net/ However, when looking at share of words, the 20 BBC News China, “Profiles: China’s new blog/6171-New-environmental-protec- 38 China Council for International Cooperation shorter 2,000 word speech has “punish” appear leaders”, BBC News China, November tion-law-would-exacerbate-pollution-in-China/ on Environment and Development, “President 400% more frequently. 15, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/ en. Xi Jinping pledges not to sacrifice environ- world-asia-china-20321603. ment”, May 28, 2013, http://www.cciced.net/ 49 For example, a speech may have been given by 29 Simon Denyer, “In China’s war on bad air, encciced/newscenter/latestnews/201305/ the Minister of Environmental Protection, but 21 Bo Zhiyue, “China’s New Environmental government decision to release data gives t20130528_252803.html. for a niche area such as radioactive waste man- Minister: A Rising Star”, The Diplomat, March fresh hope”, The Washington Post, February agement. This is not a representative sample of 4, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/chi- 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 39 Falk and Wee. typical words used, and could skew results. nas-new-environmental-minister-a-rising-star/. world/in-chinas-war-on-bad-air-government-decision-to-release-data-gives-fresh- 40 Sha Liu, “Environmental NGOs grow across 22 环境保护部, “关于报送对《环境保护法修正案（ hope/2014/02/02/5e50c872-8745-11e3-a5bd- China but still struggle for support”, Global 草案）》意见和建议的函 ”, October 29, 2012, 844629433ba3_story.html. Times, June 12, 2012, http://www.globaltimes. http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bh/201210/ cn/content/714330.shtml. t20121031_240778.htm. 30 Christopher Beam, “China Tries a New Tactic to Combat Pollution: Transparen cy”, The 41 Falk and Wee. 23 The Economist, “Saving fish and baring teeth”, New Yorker, February 6, 2015, a ccessed May The Economist, April 18, 2015, http://www. 3, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/news/ 42 John Ruwitch and Paul Tait, “China draft law economist.com/news/china/21648687-new-en- news-desk/china-tries-new-tactic-combat-pollu- lets foreign NGOs open offices with govern- vironment-minister-displays-his-appe- tion-transparency. ment OK”, Reuters, April 23, 2015, http://www. tite-taking-polluters-saving-fish-and-baring. reuters.com/article/2015/04/24/us-china-par- 31 Gilley, 300. liament-ngos-idUSKBN0NF08L20150424. 24 There are some rumors that this may have been more of a politically motivated rather than 32 Ibid. 43 Tania Branigan, “Beijing authorities sanguine environmentally motivated issue, given that as pollution documentary takes China by the Xiaonanhai dam was revived most recently 33 Hao Jing, “What NGOs Can Contribute to storm”, The Guardian, March 5, 2015, http:// by now purged former CCP official Bo Xilai. Responding to Climate Change”, China www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/ However, Chen’s capacity to shut down this Meteorological Administration, November beijing-sanguine-pollution-documentary-china. multi-billion project indicates his determination 18, 2013, http://www.cma.gov.cn/en/Climat- in ensuring that infrastructure projects aren’t eChange/ClimateChangeNews/201311/ 44 Alexandra Harney, “New film on China’s pollu- advanced without proper vetting. t20131118_231900.html. tion sparks debate, seen as milestone”, Reuters, March 2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/arti- 25 Times of News, “Drones and inspection teams 34 Additional NGOs and academic institutions cle/2015/03/02/us-china-environment-idUSKB- used to monitor pollution ahead of APEC included Green Zhejiang, Global En vironmen- N0LY11P20150302. summit in Beijing”, Times of News, October tal Institute, Greenovation Hub, Brand Chin a 28, 2015, http://china.timesofnews.com/ Union, Capital Normal University. 45 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China, “Speeches”,

44 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model 45 CHINA

Province and Gangwon Province with up near future unlikely. This research serves to observed DSS events among the three

Covered with Dust: to 1,044 micro-grams of fine dust per enhance the understanding of the role of countries are largely due to the differ- STUDIES REVIEW cubic meter and more than 800 micro- environmental security in Northeast Asia by ent paths traveled by the dust storms. 9 China’s Position grams throughout the peninsula. 2 In fact, focusing on a key local issue that is increas- Indeed, storms originating in Inner Mon- the Korea Meteorological Administration ingly placing strains on regional affairs. golia usually travel east, but depending on in Regional (KMA) deemed atmospheric concentration wind patterns, they can also travel south levels of particulate matter so threatening Yellow Dust: first and move east afterwards, thereby Approaches to that people, especially children and the More Than Meets the Eye impacting regions within China rather elderly, were advised to stay indoors and than its neighbors. Storms that originate Yellow Dust limit outdoor activity. These yellow dust Yellow dust is the colloquial term for what in the arid northwest regions of China

phenomena are not limited to continen- is collectively and officially known as dust also tend to travel southeast and often vol 2 tal Asia. Within a day after the KMA issued and sandstorms (DSS). 4 DSS is the name hit inner provinces in China towards the |

Peter C.Y. Kim a yellow dust warning, Japan witnessed given to the massive dust storms that occur direction of Taipei rather than Beijing or 2016 rising cumulative PM2.5 levels, with Kyushu, when large quantities of dust and fine Seoul. Similarly, storms brewing from the Shikoku, Tokai and Tokyo experiencing sand particles from arid regions in China northeast can miss Beijing but pose serious How do environmental problems shape moderately high levels of yellow dust and and Mongolia are picked up and carried threats in the Korean Peninsula and Japan. regional cooperation in Northeast Asia? particulate matter. 3 towards the Pacific by strong westerly winds These patterns show the extent to which Using yellow dust, more formally known during the winter and spring. nature plays a definitive role in the yellow as dust and sandstorms (DSS), as a case Dust and sandstorms originating from arid dust phenomena. study, this article describes the prospects regions of continental Asia, such as the Although DSS has occurred naturally for and challenges of domestic, bilateral and Gobi Desert in Mongolia and the Loess thousands of years in the region, 5 its fre- Large-scale DSS events have significant multilateral approaches to environmental Plateau in China, are becoming a signifi- quency, geographic coverage and damage socioeconomic ramifications. 10 Accord- cooperation in Northeast Asia. This article cant source of concern for the people of intensity have all escalated within the past ing to the 2005 ADB report on DSS, direct argues that while there has been defi- Northeast Asia. While accepted as a natural fifty years. Exceptionally disruptive storms damage caused by DSS can include loss of nite progress in addressing the issue, the phenomenon and a traditional harbin- in 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2008 and now crops and livestock; loss of topsoil; damage upstream-downstream dynamics of DSS ger of spring in the region, the increase 2015 have raised significant awareness to property, industries and businesses, criti- have empowered China’s position in envi- in frequency and intensity of yellow dust in the region of the recurrent problem. cal facilities and infrastructure; disruption of ronmental negotiations relative to those of storms in recent years sits at an intricate Based on a 2005 report compiled by the transportation systems; road accidents; and Japan and South Korea. Domestic political nexus between environmental security, Asian Development Bank (ADB), the aver- closures of schools and services. Likewise, priorities as well as an understanding of DSS domestic security and foreign policy. This age recorded occurrence of DSS in China indirect damages caused by DSS include as a strictly natural phenomenon in China will paper will explore this phenomenon by has increased more than six-fold since increased medical expenses as well as continue to hinder the possibility of a more focusing on the multilateral and domestic the 1950s, with DSS averaging only five increased financial costs for cleaning and robust regional cooperation mechanism. approaches taken by China, Japan and days per year in the 1950s compared to repairing residential and commercial build- South Korea to address this issue. First, thirty-two days in 2001. 6 Corresponding ings. 11 Dust and sandstorms can inflict real On April 15, 2015, Beijing suffered its most the paper will construct a paradigm that statistics show that annual cases of DSS in horror. One such DSS incident occurred severe sandstorm in a decade. 1 Thick blan- establishes dust and sandstorms as not just South Korea have also increased rapidly on May 5, 1993, and caused the destruc- kets of yellow-red dust layered the capital a natural occurrence but rather a security within the same period from less than four tion of 4,412 houses, 120,000 livestock as its 21 million residents were forced to imperative that cuts across multiple sectors. days a year in the 1980s to an average of and 373,000 hectares of cropland in the don face-masks and goggles to protect Second, it will survey the development of eighteen days since 2000. 7 Japan has seen Hexi Corridor of Gansu Province and also themselves from injury and respiratory environmental cooperation in Northeast its average of twenty days per year in the resulted in eighty-five deaths and 246 inju- problems. Authorities at the China Mete- Asia especially with regard to addressing 1970s increase to about forty days since ries. 12 This one case alone cost the Chinese orological Administration (CMA) issued a dust and sandstorms. Last, the paper will the early 2000s. 8 Although the exact rate of economy 550 million Chinese renminbi yellow alert, the third-most serious warning examine how cooperation mechanisms are increase differs in each country, especially (RMB), or about $72 million. status, and many areas in the metropoli- being implemented in China, the source of since each country uses different criteria tan region recorded hazardous levels of air yellow dust, and assess its response to the and thresholds for documenting dust activ- As a whole, the ADB estimates that dam- pollution, some up to nearly 1,000 micro- overall problem at hand. This paper argues ity as DSS, all have experienced a dramatic ages directly associated with DSS in China grams per cubic meter. The problem had that even though recent developments in rise in the number of DSS incidents per year alone range from $70 million to $239 mil- regional implications: just two months cooperation on mitigating DSS have been over the past decades. lion per year, with indirect costs comprising earlier, the worst seasonal yellow dust in cautiously optimistic, China’s failure to at least 4.5 times that of the direct costs. 13 five years hit the entire Korean Peninsula, establish DSS as a multidimensional priority W. Chad Futrell of Cornell University claims Understandably, the impacts of DSS differ covering places such as Seoul, Gyeonggi makes tangible reductions in DSS in the that the discrepancies in the number of based on the distance from source regions.

46 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Covered with Dust: China’s Position in Regional Approaches to Yellow Dust 47 CHINA

In South Korea, the Korea Environment The economic costs associated with dust While there have been varying views on to project, headed by the Naiman Semi-Arid

Institute (KEI) states that the dust storms and sandstorms are minimal compared to what extent anthropogenic activities have Research Center, planted poplar trees and STUDIES REVIEW kill up to 165 people annually, mostly the the confirmed public health risks. While contributed to the intensification of DSS aspen pines in enclosed fields to encour- elderly or those with respiratory illnesses, the most common health issues associated events in recent decades, there is a general age the growth of native grasslands. Due and sicken 1.8 million more. Schools often with DSS are increased cases of eye, nose consensus in the scientific community that to the research center’s efforts from 1985 close, airports are affected due to concerns and throat irritation, scientists are increas- decades of deforestation, overgrazing and to 2005, degraded land claimed by desert- with visibility and a range of industries from ingly discovering more severe health rapid industrialization in northern China and ification in the Naiman Banner of Inner agriculture to semiconductor manufactur- implications from greater exposure to fine Mongolia have directly contributed to land Mongolia decreased from 1,898 square ing document losses that the KEI estimated dust particles. Kazuma Higashisaka et al., degradation, which in turn has accelerated kilometers to 1,199 square kilometers. 22 in 2008 to be up to 5.5 trillion South Korean researchers at Osaka University, explain that desertification. The rate of desertification However, environmental trends associ-

14 won (KRW), or close to $5.82 billion. In bacteria can adhere to the outer surface in China has been significant. From the ated with climate change suggest that vol 2 Japan, damages are limited to mostly air of dust particles and therefore exposure 1950s until 1975, China saw an expansion DSS will increase in the future. That climate |

pollution from particulate matter, poor vis- to yellow dust can lead to increased rates of desert areas by 1,560 square kilometers change has led to drier, hotter seasons to 2016 ibility that interferes with air and ground of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, per year, which then accelerated to 2,100 the region is readily documented, but this transportation, and yellow dust piling on childhood asthma, bronchitis and even square kilometers per year from 1975 to trend further underscores the additional cars and clothing. Yoshika Yamamoto, pneumonia. 17 More pressing, however, 1987 and finally to 3,600 square kilome- pressures of depleting water tables and a researcher from the Environment and is the concern that dust storms pick up ters per year from 1987 to 2000. 19 In fact, increased water scarcity in Northern China, Energy Research Unit at the Tokyo-based pollutants, heavy metals and carcinogens the advancing desert areas have uprooted both of which complicate the re-vegetation Science and Technology Foresight Center, such as dioxin as they pass over industrial villages and forced locals to migrate east- processes that current anti-desertification summarizes the burden of cost among the regions in China before hitting the Korean ward, affecting a total of 400 million people mechanisms so highly rely upon. affected Northeast Asian countries in the Peninsula and Japan. Some statistics show in recent decades. 20 Because the strength chart below. 15 concentrations of heavy metals such as and intensity of DSS depend largely on two Sweeping Yellow Dust Out of China: lead, cadmium and chromium that are up criteria—a dry and loose surface and strong Regional and Domestic Approaches to fifteen times that of normal air. 18 and persistent winds—a greater availability of dust and sand from desertification has Multilateral Efforts Against DSS: led to increased amounts of particulates Building a Monitoring Network that are blown away by the wind. Yufu Chen and Haiping Tang, researchers from the DSS is clearly a serious transboundary Chinese Academy of Sciences, specifically environmental issue in Northeast Asia with Types of Damage Caused by DSS link recent increases in dust and sand- serious economic and health costs. Despite 16 storm occurrences to “the consequences the political rivalry and sensitivity that have Across different countries by distance of human activities such as over-cultivation hindered many modes of cooperation in Source: Yamamoto (2007) and overgrazing” in Northern China and the region, DSS has led to relatively effec- “land desertification due to water diversion tive bilateral and trilateral mechanisms to farmland and reservoirs.” 21 among China, Japan and South Korea. Mongolia China Korea Japan The causal link between DSS and desert- Even though all three countries are parties deaths & damage to crops ification is a point of concern for many to the World Meteorological Organization missing people environmentalists and policymakers in the (WMO), meteorological data and services buried schools railway & facilities close region. Programs launched by the Chinese from WMO mandates are far from adequate government have targeted desertification to analyze and predict DSS. 23 Therefore, trees uprooting defective products from factories through afforestation since the 1950s with most bilateral or trilateral agreements respiratory & opthalmological diseases mixed results. For example, China has been have focused primarily on improving fore- experimenting with afforestation since 1978 cast accuracy, while also restoring desert flight cancellations & traffic congestion due to poor visibility by launching the Three-North Shelter Forest areas in China. Both Japan and South Korea dirt on cars & Program in a broad area covering its North- started individual bilateral monitoring net- washed clothes east, Northern and Northwest regions. works with China in 1996. For Japan, the Multiple centrally-led and non-govern- Japanese Environmental Agency estab- distance from Kosa (Yellow Sand) originating source area mental organization (NGO)-led initiatives in lished a monitoring station on the roof of Inner Mongolia have also focused on large- the Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Envi- scale ecological restoration projects. One ronmental Protection in Beijing in 1996. 24 It

48 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Covered with Dust: China’s Position in Regional Approaches to Yellow Dust 49 CHINA

has since initiated joint monitoring projects in tandem with an independent Regional a considerable increase from its current As a result, the State Forest Administration 32 in Ningxia in 1998, conducted sampling in Master Plan for Prevention and Control of access to four CMA stations. (SFA), the central government body in STUDIES REVIEW the Dunhuang region and the Taklimakan Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia, charge of forestry affairs and thus the main Desert in 2000 and built several monitoring brought together the TEMM countries, Bilateral and trilateral cooperation on DSS actor for reforestation, stated in 2014 that stations in Japan in 2003. Japan signed a Mongolia and four partner institutions 27 has been especially effective in two ways. “China is on track to meet its 2020 target research agreement with China in 2000 to with a strategy on establishing a regional First, DSS, at least on a regional level, has for expanding the nation’s forest to cover further investigate the formation, spread DSS monitoring and early warning net- been acknowledged as a trans-bound- 23 percent of its landmass.” 35 Since 2008, and effects of sandstorms. 25 South Korea work. Through DSS-RETA and the Regional ary environmental problem with its point afforestation efforts have gained momen- similarly pursued a bilateral approach to Master Plan, a total of nineteen DSS mon- sources located in China and Mongolia. tum. China has planted 13 million hectares DSS, opting to support a tree-planting pro- itoring sites were built and have been Second, financial assistance, technology of new forests per year, which has increased

gram in China from 2001 to 2005 through operational since 2006, with fifteen sites transfer and capacity building have been total forest coverage to 208 million hect- vol 2 the Korea International Cooperation located in China and four in Mongolia. effectively implemented, with China ares, or 21 percent of its entire landmass. In |

Agency (KOICA), its primary official devel- All three TEMM countries currently main- receiving the largest share of assistance fact, the Green Wall of China has received 2016 opment assistance (ODA) agency. tain an early DSS warning service for the in establishing monitoring networks. so much positive publicity in the press that public, but forecasting accuracy for Japan Although tensions still remain regarding even Luc Gnacadja, the executive secre- The formation of the Tripartite Environmen- and South Korea still depends heavily on China’s deliberately withholding DSS data tary of the United Nations Convention to tal Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in 1999, a raw data collected at source sites in China from its neighbors, cooperation within the Combat Desertification (UNCCD), lauded South Korean initiative to bring together and Mongolia. past two decades has been moderately Chinese efforts to combat desertification: the environmental ministries of China, successful in monitoring the problem, its “It is fair to say that China has the right Japan and South Korea for greater envi- While regional cooperation has led to the trajectory and its severity. vision, the political will and is moving in ronmental cooperation, proved to be a construction of monitoring sites through- the right direction.” 36 turning point for each country’s DSS strat- out China, effective data sharing has Solving DSS Through Desertification: egy. Although DSS was not included in the still been an obstacle. In February 2008, Domestic and NGO Approaches China’s massive, state-led afforestation ini- agenda in the first TEMM, it was eventu- China suddenly withdrew from the DSS- tiatives are working in tandem with other ally incorporated into the agenda by the RETA monitoring program and unilaterally Domestic approaches from the Chinese afforestation projects that are coordinated third TEMM in 2001 at the insistence of refused to let equipment located within its government at addressing DSS have tar- by both international institutions and NGO South Korea on addressing yellow dust as borders be used for gathering meteorolog- geted desertification. According to Qi movements. While ADB’s involvement a regional problem. According to Reinhard ical data, claiming that such information was Lu and Sen Wang, researchers from the in establishing monitoring networks has Drifte, a Visiting Research Fellow at the Asia critical to national security and could not be Chinese Academy of Forestry, China’s been crucial in the regional fight against Research Center of the London School of released to its neighbors or the public. 28 anti-desertification strategies mainly fall DSS, other multilateral bodies such as the Economics and Political Science, the fact This resulted in furious criticism outside of under six following categories: 1) building World Bank have extensively supported that DSS was included by TEMM at its third China; then Environment Minister of Japan, windbreaks on the peripheries of deserts, rural poverty programs like the Loess Pla- iteration reveals Chinese attitudes regard- Ichiro Kamoshita, disapprovingly stated, 2) protecting oases, 3) managing agro-pas- teau Watershed Rehabilitation Project that ing yellow dust. Drifte asserts that although “About yellow sand, I am not sure how toral transition zones, 4) safeguarding the have included grassland and soil stabiliza- yellow dust had garnered public attention and why it can be regarded as a national outskirts of cities and towns, 5) protecting tion initiatives. These programs, although in all three countries by the founding of secret. Air is connected beyond national head waters of rivers and 6) harnessing not specifically targeted towards DSS, are TEMM, China “[did] not like to be implic- borders, and yellow sand travels beyond desertified grassland. 33 Most projects have notable in that they have established strong itly or explicitly exposed to the accusation borders. I think it is important we share attempted to address deforestation either linkages between rural poverty and desert- of being the main causer of yellow [dust]” information.” 29 Interestingly, later that year through afforestation and re-vegetation or ification. The prevention of DSS is also a and believed that the inclusion of DSS in in September 2008, China started relaxing overgrazing and over-cultivation through significant part of the North-East Asian the TEMM agenda would naturally place its national security dialogue and agreed restrictions on herding and farming. Subregional Programme for Environmental blame onto itself. 26 Nonetheless, success- to share raw numerical data on PM10 Cooperation (NEASPEC), an intergovern- ful diplomacy led to a tripartite agreement concentrations in DSS source areas with Since the 1980s, with the aforementioned mental framework coordinated by ESCAP, in 2001 for joint monitoring mechanisms Japan and South Korea. 30 As recently as Three-North Shelter Forest Project, China UNDP, UNEP, and ADB. Unlike TEMM or through remote sensing equipment, train- April 2015, China again agreed to provide has been planting billions of trees to con- DSS-RETA, NEASPEC includes North Korea ing, and research. In 2003, TEMM, along yellow dust data from a greater number struct a “green wall” in thirteen northern and Russia, two other important stake- with the ADB, the United Nations Environ- of sites, although this time only to South provinces around the Gobi Desert to holders in Northeast Asia. NEASPEC has ment Programme (UNEP), and the Global Korea as part of a bilateral agreement. 31 block its expansion. In 2002, the central organized multiple training workshops for Environment Facility (GEF), launched the These agreements are expected to give government reaffirmed its commitment to policymakers on ways to combat desert- Regional Technical Assistance on Dust South Korea access to raw data from over the so-called Green Wall by increasing its ification through capacity building and and Sandstorm (DSS-RETA). DSS-RETA, seventy-four observation stations in China, budget to 60 billion RMB, or $7.22 billion. 34 information sharing. Moreover, it has

50 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Covered with Dust: China’s Position in Regional Approaches to Yellow Dust 51 CHINA

worked to expand the Regional Master Understanding China’s attempt to consciously minimize its contri- hand, South Korea, which suffers more from

Plan in Mongolia. In addition to multi- Role in DSS Mitigation bution to DSS as a trans-boundary issue. DSS, has shown leadership in regional envi- STUDIES REVIEW lateral cooperation, Japan has invested This viewpoint is also confirmed by Liu Tuo, ronmental diplomacy, but cooperation with around $375 million in 2003 and 2004 The relative success of TEMM in estab- the head of the desertification control office China on this issue is still limited to receiv- alone through ODA to bolster China’s affor- lishing monitoring networks and the in the SFA, who commented, “The sand- ing raw observation data from China. estation efforts, while South Korea has also engagement of local, regional and storms are a natural disaster like typhoons spent over $10 million since 2001 through international non-government actors or earthquakes,” 39 and by Chinese meteo- Second, because the upwind-down- KOICA for the same purpose. 37 in addressing desertification and DSS rologist Lu Juntian, who wrote, “There have wind dynamic strengthens China’s role in paint a rosy picture on the outlook of mit- been five periods with high frequencies of regional DSS policymaking, for any mode Japanese and South Korean NGOs have igating DSS in the region. However, while sand storms in China over the past 1700 of cooperation to be successful, Chinese

played a significant role in working with policies have generally been portrayed years, with each period lasting about 90 input and willingness to comply with Japan vol 2 local groups in China since the 1990s to as yielding positive results, there are sev- years.” 40 Some experts have gone even and South Korea must be present. However, |

mitigate desertification while also alleviat- eral characteristics in China’s approach to further by applauding yellow dust for its the Chinese refusal to provide monitoring 2016 ing rural poverty. Groups such as Japan’s DSS that raise significant doubts upon the potential environmental benefits such as data to Japan and South Korea in 2008, Green Earth Network (GEN), the Korean likelihood of actual reductions in DSS in neutralizing acid rain, depositing minerals which curiously coincided with the Beijing Federation for Environmental Movement the near future. into the ocean or reflecting sunshine to Olympics and the central government’s (KFEM) and EcoPeace Asia are examples help reduce global warming. While these green Olympics media campaign, shows of the numerous NGOs working in China on Problems with Future Multilateral effects may be present, the benefits are that China’s willingness to comply varies a wide variety of target-specific solutions to Approaches to DSS highly insignificant compared to the costs significantly based on its domestic priori- address desertification. While each NGO’s and damage DSS inflict in China, Mongolia, ties. Additionally, because Japan and South area of focus and expertise may be differ- The key critical difference in China’s Japan, and South Korea. Korea are situated at the receiving end of ent, they are all similar in that they have approach to DSS compared to that of yellow dust data, the future of multilateral developed region-specific strategies and Japan or South Korea is the characterization Avoiding direct responsibility for DSS has cooperation sits precariously on domestic projects rather than simply plant trees. For of DSS as a natural phenomenon. While all also factored into China’s broader view of developments within China. Moreover, instance, GEN has been exploring growing three countries acknowledge that dust and treating DSS as a trans-boundary issue. As in current DSS research is now shifting from trees that could also address the needs of sandstorms have been occurring naturally most upstream-downstream politics, China, analyzing dust storm sources and move- local residents and is currently focusing on for thousands of years, the anthropogenic as the upwind country, feels less obliged ments to focusing more on the changes apricot trees, which are drought-resistant causes of recent increases in frequency, to harness efforts to address DSS and the in the composition of dust as it travels and can also yield produce. KFEM, on the intensity, and toxicity have been strikingly many pollution-related environmental over Chinese territory. This means that other hand, has prioritized the develop- downplayed by the Chinese government. problems arising from yellow dust collect- raw yellow dust data can now be used to ment of hybrid grass test sites with local In a 2007 interview with China Daily, Qin ing industrial pollutants, which happen to track the amount and type of pollutants herders instead of focusing on afforesta- Dahe, director of the CMA and also a dele- be the main source of concern for Japan that dust particles capture while moving tion. Likewise, EcoPeace Asia has chosen to gate representing the scientific community and South Korea. This is even more so across China. Essentially, pollutants can be invest in growing grasses rather than trees at the Chinese People’s Political Consul- because of China’s understanding of DSS used as a proxy for the level of industrial with the belief that grasses are more suited tative Conference (CPPCC), stated, “It is as a natural occurrence and not one with development, which in turn can be used to the environment in Inner Mongolia. Part- impossible for human beings to get rid of anthropogenic ties. This is worrisome for to assess China’s national economic devel- nership is now moving to the private sector sandstorms, which have existed for millions two reasons. First, as established thus far, opment policies especially in politically as well. With the introduction of corporate of years.” China Daily adds an additional much of the bilateral and multilateral coop- sensitive regions of Inner Mongolia and social responsibility (CSR) reports in the dimension to Qin’s statement by summa- eration among the three states has focused Xinjiang. This exposes the central govern- Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, rizing: “Spring sandstorms are inevitable, on establishing monitoring networks in ment to domestic and foreign pressure, and many companies in China have launched so people should accept the law of nature China, which was essentially a transfer of therefore, as DSS monitoring technology tree-planting initiatives as part of their CSR and not worry so much… So said China’s technology and know-how through Jap- develops over time, China may be even efforts. In order to raise awareness about top meteorologist in order to correct what anese and South Korean ODA. Now that less willing to share raw data with Japan sustainable land management, South he considers public misunderstanding of China has a robust system of observation and South Korea. Korea’s Hanwha Group with UNCCD and the annual phenomenon.” 38 That Qin, stations installed, there may be less room the SFA helped install an 80 kilowatt-hour as a member of CPPCC, emphasizes the for continued cooperation. Japan lacks the Domestic Initiatives: Good Intentions solar photovoltaic generation facility in natural inevitability of DSS rather than the initiative required for developing a real but Questionable Results Lingwu, Ningxia, in 2012 and provided anthropogenic pressures that the scientific framework for regional cooperation that technical training for managing and oper- community in Japan, South Korea and even does not involve ODA, especially since it While the future of regional cooperation on ating the facility. within China highlights captures an alarm- suffers noticeably less from DSS than either DSS will likely face challenges in the coming ing picture of the Chinese government’s of the two other countries. On the other years due to the crowding out of available

52 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Covered with Dust: China’s Position in Regional Approaches to Yellow Dust 53 CHINA

means of cooperation and an increasing may ultimately fail in the medium to long- system, often seen as the fundamental and the number of grazing animals limited. 41 dependence on Chinese domestic pol- term. Many of the newly planted saplings weakness in local implementation of central The central government aims to resettle the STUDIES REVIEW itics, there is hope for efforts to mitigate have a lifespan of only four decades, are environmental policies, is shifting towards remaining 1.1 million nomad population DSS within Chinese borders. Because the mono-cultures prone to disease and ulti- green evaluations, with criteria such as air who are mostly ethnic Mongolians. Yang official Chinese stance on DSS is that it is a mately are unsuited to the soil. Chen and quality becoming one of the metrics used Youlin, the Asia regional coordinator for natural phenomenon, domestic efforts to Tang also suggest that the project is gen- to evaluate cadres and gauge their likeli- UNCCD, agrees with the need for increased address the problem have instead focused erally unsuccessful because the types of hood of promotion. 45 local input: “We definitely need to better on combating desertification, which is at trees that are planted do not survive the understand the traditional nomadic culture the core of dust and sandstorms. How- arid and semiarid steppe landscape. 42 Gao These political developments offer unprec- on the steppes here. Nomadic herdsmen ever, it is important to realize that there is Jixi, a researcher at the China Environmen- edented opportunity for addressing are not comfortable with static agriculture…

47 a gap between desertification and DSS. tal Science Institute, wants policymakers environmental issues such as desertification [and] want to own more animals.” vol 2 The central government has focused on to consider the “environment in northern and DSS. To redirect anti-desertification |

desertification because it is a significant and [north]western China as a whole” and efforts from simply planting trees to a more In terms of addressing dust and sandstorms, 2016 problem on its own, not because it believes states, “Planting more trees does not mean sustainable policy, the following concepts it is in China’s interest to first recognize that the best way to solve DSS is through the improvement of the environment.” 43 must be considered. First, policymakers the anthropogenic input factors that have desertification. While many Japanese and Likewise, Xu Jianchu, a professor at the Kun- must further coordinate with researchers, increased the frequency, intensity and South Korean NGOs have worked on affor- ming Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy ecologists and environmental experts. The toxicity of recent storms. While the central estation in China with the primary objective of Sciences, argues, “The SFA only looks largest setback to the Green Wall of China government’s main environmental priori- of reducing dust and sandstorms, the Chi- at forested land, but they forget the big is the incompatibility of trees with the local ties appear to be air quality, water quality, nese government is undoubtedly more picture.” 44 The big picture, he claims, sug- ecosystem. In fact, in Chinese deserts and water management and land degradation concerned with the encroaching desert; gests worsened soil erosion and water grasslands in Inner Mongolia, grass is by (including desertification), dust and sand- any reductions in DSS can thus be seen as scarcity as major casualties of China’s far the most common form of vegetation storms sit at an intricate nexus between a positive externality. afforestation program. rather than trees. The massive planting of all of these issues. Mitigating yellow dust trees not only conflicts with the ecology improves air quality, especially with respect China has a number of strengths in com- Towards a Cleaner Future of the region, but is also more expensive to trapped pollutants, heavy metals and bating desertification. First, the Chinese and uses large quantities of groundwater other forms of PM2.5 and PM10. Targeting government, through the 2001 Law on For China to help solve the increasingly that are becoming increasingly scarce. DSS also addresses issues of water scarcity Preventing and Combating Desertification, pressing issue of dust and sandstorms, In western Inner Mongolia, groundwater and land degradation. Therefore, estab- has a well-established legal framework there must be distinct developments in has now receded to 100 meters below lishing direct linkages between DSS and for desertification control. Second, as the battle against desertification and the the surface from what used to be just each of China’s environmental initiatives evidenced by its multi-billion RMB invest- national concept of DSS as more than a 0.5 meters. 46Grass, on the other hand, is can provide a more robust framework to ment in the Green Wall of China, there is natural phenomenon. denser, is primarily dependent on rainwater tackle both problems simultaneously. strong political commitment and a sound rather than groundwater, and keeps the soil acknowledgment of desertification at the Recent developments in environmentalism from blowing away. Second, afforestation Furthermore, by underscoring such link- top leadership level. Third, national affor- in China show good promise. President Xi efforts must continue into areas further ages, China can open new venues for estation policies have had high levels of Jinping and Premier Le Keqiang have both away from cities. The lack of infrastructure ODA from Japan and South Korea. The participation by local farmers and have declared war on pollution on the basis of such as roads in key areas has meant that environmental communities in China’s attracted the help of many local orga- a Chinese-style ecological civilization. A afforestation efforts both from the central neighboring countries have prioritized nizations, allowing for a transition from greater emphasis on market mechanisms government and NGOs have avoided the DSS mitigation efforts for years, especially top-down to bottom-up approaches in and pollution taxes are pressuring dirty very remote areas that are perhaps more because unlike other domestic environ- re-vegetating lands lost to deserts. state-owned industrial facilities, such as stricken by land degradation. Third, anti-de- mental problems, the upwind-downwind coal plants and petrochemical plants, to sertification programs must emphasize nature of DSS has meant that Japan and However, these efforts have been met with comply with environmental targets set forth poverty alleviation and a greater consid- South Korea are powerless to reduce costs criticism from the scientific community. Jon by central authorities, while civil society has eration for local customs in rural Inner inflicted by DSS unless they actively engage R. Luoma, a contributing editor at Audu- taken a greater role in raising awareness of Mongolia. Overgrazing is a key contributing with China. China has a host of environ- bon, writes that researchers question the air and water pollution issues. The success- factor to desertification, but central gov- mental problems that require attention, long-term sustainability of China’s affor- ful passing of the Environmental Protection ernment programs that target overgrazing and as argued above, these problems estation push. More specifically, Luoma Law (EPL) now allows public interest law- have little regard for the lives of the local offer potential linkages to DSS. An official argues that based on an analysis by sci- suits through registered NGOs, guarantees people, who are some of the poorest in the push in expanding DSS prevention within entists at Beijing Forestry University, up whistle-blower protection and calls for nation. In some villages in Inner Mongolia, China will be viewed favorably by the other to 85 percent of the newly-planted trees greater data transparency. Even the cadre open grazing has been banned outright two countries and can lead to increased

54 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Covered with Dust: China’s Position in Regional Approaches to Yellow Dust 55 CHINA

financial or technological assistance with Conclusion establishment of linkages between DSS About the Author

other related environmental problems, and its core environmental drivers and STUDIES REVIEW thereby resulting in positive gains. More- Dust and sandstorms are a significant the opening of new venues for coopera- Peter Chang Yup Kim received his master’s over, Japan and South Korea, as downwind environmental issue. While they do occur tion from Japan and South Korea through degree in International Relations and Inter- countries, will feel a greater level of inclu- naturally, it is without a doubt that man- ODA in other environmental issues. Recent national Economics at the Johns Hopkins sion and involvement in solving DSS, which made changes in China’s environment, political developments within China show University School of Advanced Interna- can assuage regional tensions over this especially desertification, have led to that central authorities are now more tional Studies, where he concentrated in environmental issue. more frequent and intense storms in recent than ever inclined to tackle environmen- international political economy and global decades. Because dust particles pick up tal issues. But with so many problems to environmental policy. His research interests To do so, there must be a greater empha- industrial pollutants and bacteria while trav- choose from, it remains to be seen whether include the political economy of environ-

sis on cooperation between domestic eling across China before inflicting damage DSS as a separate policy issue will be able mental policy, sustainable development, vol 2 researchers and policymakers. TEMM and on South Korea and to a lesser extent to catch the attention of Chinese leaders regional cooperation in East Asia and inter- |

NEASPEC have allowed for joint research Japan, the regional community is increas- as they engage in their recently declared national climate change negotiations. Peter 2016 between Chinese scientists and their Jap- ingly alarmed by the socioeconomic and war on pollution. holds a B.A. in Economics Mathematics and anese and South Korean counterparts who public health costs of yellow dust. Within Sustainable Development from Columbia understand DSS as more than a natural the past two decades, China, Japan and University. He would like to thank Dr. Carla occurrence. Even within China, there is a South Korea have made unprecedented Freeman and the various editors of this strong scientific community that recognizes strides in environmental cooperation on publication for their assistance and support. the multidimensional linkages. A general DSS despite lingering political sensitivities. agreement on the anthropogenic factors Collaborations such as TEMM and DSS- contributing to DSS among the ecoelites RETA with assistance from international 1 Mark Hanrahan, “China Sandstorm: Beijing and technocrats could shape policy more organizations such as ADB, UNESCAP and Blanketed in Red Dust as Biggest Storm in over favorably towards resolving the DSS prob- UNCCD have established a strong network a Decade Hits,” International Business Times, lem. Included in the broad overhaul on the of monitoring systems throughout China April 16, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/china- characterization of yellow dust is a greater and Mongolia, while continued bilateral sandstorm-beijing-blanketed-red-dust-biggest- need for civil society and the media to mechanisms have led to ODA and technol- storm-over-decade-hits-photos-1884317. become involved in reporting dust and ogy transfers from Japan and South Korea sandstorm events. While media reports to the point source sites. However, China’s 2 “S. Korea hit by worst winter yellow dust have detailed the extent of damage caused unilateral handling of raw observation in 5 years,” Yonhap News Agency, Febru- by each DSS incident, they have shown a data based on its domestic priorities has ary 23, 2015, http://english.yonhapnews. general pattern of qualifying the economic placed strains and distrust on an otherwise co.kr/national/2015/02/22/81/0302000000 and social costs with the emphasis that DSS effective cooperation. AEN20150222003753315F.html. are inevitable occurrences of nature. This gap in available evidence and reporting is At home, China does not have a specific 3 Eric Johnston, “High levels of yellow sand, significant enough for civil society actors, policy mechanism for DSS and instead PM2.5 heading in from China,” The Japan including NGOs and independent filmmak- treats DSS as nothing more than a natural Times, February 24, 2015, http://www. ers, to pressure the Chinese government to phenomenon. At the same time, however, japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/24/national/ take a stronger stance on addressing DSS. its aggressive afforestation tactics through high-levels-of-yellow-sand-pm-2-5-heading-in- the Green Wall of China and other projects, from-china/#.VU0FctNViko. Finally, there may be room for Chinese such as those that have targeted overgraz- officials to link DSS (or more generally ing, have contributed greatly to mitigating 4 Yellow dust is also known as shachenbao in desertification) to climate change, espe- desertification, which in turn address prob- Chinese, hwangsa in Korean, and kosa in Japa- cially as experts are now worried that lems central to DSS. With opportunities nese. Shachenbao, 沙尘暴, literally translates to increasing temperatures and drier seasons for increased multilateral cooperation on “sand and dust explosions,” while hwangsa and may thwart years of land recovery. Climate DSS likely to decrease, China’s domestic kosa, both derived from the Chinese characters change has national security implications. efforts against DSS are critical to the future 黃砂, translate to “yellow sand.” However, the Chinese government has of dust and sandstorms as a policy agenda shown reluctance to associate climate in Northeast Asia. There is room for devel- 5 For more information on historical evaluations, change with national security, 48 so it is opment: a change in Chinese official and refer to Youngsin Chun and HiKu Cho, “Histor- highly unlikely that desertification (and public stances on yellow dust by recogniz- ical Records of Asian Dust Events (Hwangsa) in DSS) will serve a role greater than its current ing the anthropogenic input factors, the one as an environmental problem. 56 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Covered with Dust: China’s Position in Regional Approaches to Yellow Dust 57 CHINA

Korea,” American Meteorological Society, July 14 Jon Herskovitz, “China’s killer yellow dust hits 25 Reinhard Drifte, “Transboundary pollution as an http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/25/

2008, 15. Korea and Japan,” Reuters, March 3, 2008. issue in Northeast Asian regional politics” (ARC china-forests-idUKL3N0LU1KB20140225 STUDIES REVIEW Working Paper 12, London, UK, 2005). 6 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Regional 15 The author fully acknowledges that the statis- 36 Rita Alvarez Tudela, “Fighting desertification in Master Plan for the Prevention and Control of tics cited in this paragraph require an update. 26 Ibid. China,” Al Jazeera, December 8, 2012, http:// Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia (Manila, There is a dearth of research on the direct and www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/12 2005), 1.1.3. This report was conducted in coor- indirect economic costs of DSS. Given that the 27 The four partner institutions are ADB, UNEP, /2012126123056457256.html; Yufu Chen and dination with the United Nations Convention to problem of DSS continues to intensify each United Nations Economic and Social Com- Haiping Tang, “Dust Storm as an Environmental Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the United year, the argumentative reasoning provided mission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and Problem in North China,” Environmental Nations Economic and Social Commission here is still relevant and salient to the issue. United Nations Convention to Combat Deserti- Management, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2003).

for the Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and fication (UNCCD). vol 2 the United Nations Environment Programme 16 Yamamoto, 49. 37 Futrell, 59.

(UNEP). 28 Brandon Keim, “China’s Yellow Dust | 2016 17 Kazuma Higashisaka et al., “Asian Dust Particles Storms Begin, Data Called a ‘State Secret,’” 38 Sun Xiaohua, “Sandstorms a fact of nature,” 7 Shin Wha Lee, “Environmental Regime Building Induce Macrophage Inflammatory Responses Wired, March 3, 2008, http://www.wired. China Daily, March 15, 2007, http://www. in Northeast Asia,” in Korea at the Center: via Mitogen-Activated Protein Kinase Activation com/2008/03/from-china-with/ chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/15/con- Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia, ed. and Reactive Oxygen Species Production,” tent_828050.htm. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Journal of Immunology Research, Vol. 2014 29 AFP, “Chinese yellow sand hits Japan, SKorea: 2006), 231. (2014), 19. officials,” AFP (republished on Sino Daily ), 39 Jonathan Watts, “China makes gain in battle March 3, 2008, http://www.sinodaily.com/ against desertification but has long fight 8 Yoshika Yamamoto, “Recent Moves to Address 18 Jung Yoon Lee, “Yellow dust storms bedevil reports/Chinese_yellow_sand_hits_Japan_ ahead,” The Guardian, January 4, 2011, http:// the KOSA Phenomenon,” Quarterly Review, No. local industry,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 17, SKorea_officials_999.html. www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/04/ 22 (2007), 48-49. 2012, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/ china-desertification. news/article/article.aspx?aid=2951577&cloc= 30 DSS, Korean Ministry of the Environment, Sep- 9 W. Chad Futrell, “Choking on Sand: Regional joongangdaily%7Chome%7Conlinedaily%- tember 16, 2001. 40 People’s Daily, “China Faces High Frequency Cooperation to Mitigate Desertification in 7Chome%7Conline. of Sand Storms,” People’s Daily, July 18, 2000, China,” Woodrow Wilson International Center 31 Hyun-jeong Lee, “Korea, China, Japan step http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ for Scholars China Environment Series, No. 9 19 Futrell, 58. up pollution fight,” The Korea Herald, April jan/04/china-desertification. (2007), 58. 30, 2015, http://www.koreaherald.com/view. 20 Rita Alvarez Tudela, “Fighting desertification in php?ud=20150430001315. 41 Jon R. Luoma, “China’s Reforestation Programs: 10 Yellow dust also reinforces many other global China,” Al Jazeera, December 8, 2012. Big Success or Just an Illusion?” Yale Environ- environmental problems, such as radiative 32 Hyun-jeong Lee, “Seoul, Beijing to share air ment 360, January 17, 2012, http://e360.yale. transfers that can exacerbate global warming 21 Yufu Chen and Haiping Tang, “Dust Storm as quality data in real time,” The Korea Herald, edu/feature/chinas_reforestation_programs_ and climate change. For more information, an Environmental Problem in North China,” November 1, 2015, http://www.koreaherald. big_success_or_just_an_illusion/2484/. refer to Yamamoto, 45-61. Environmental Management, Vol. 32, No. 4 com/view.php?ud=20151101000404. (2003), 415. 42 Chen and Tang, 415. 11 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Regional 33 Qi Lu and Sen Wang, “Dust Sand Storms in Master Plan for the Prevention and Control of 22 Benjamin Carlson, “Waterless World: China’s China: Disastrous Effects and Mitigation Strat- 43 China Daily, “Sandstorm Blows 30,000 Tons of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia (Manila, ever-expanding desert wasteland,” Global Post, egies.” FAO, 2003, http://www.fao.org/docrep/ Dust into Beijing,” China Daily (republished on 2005), 4.1. December 16, 2013, http://www.globalpost. ARTICLE/WFC/XII/0859-B5.HTM China.org), March 23, 2002, http://www.china. com/dispatch/news/science/131211/water- org.cn/english/29323.htm. 12 Ibid. less-world-inner-mongolia-desert-wasteland. 34 CNN, “China steps up sandstorm prevention,” CNN World, April 25, 2002, http://edition.cnn. 44 Reklev and Chen. 13 Ibid. The ADB, in the same report, also esti- 23 ADB, 3.1. com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/25/china. mates that land degradation and desertification sstorm/index.html. 45 Henry Sanderson, “Chinese Cadres Told Going cost the Chinese economy approximately $6.7 24 The Japanese Environmental Agency has since Green Rivals GDP to Rise in Party,” Bloomberg billion each year. The linkages between DSS then been elevated to the Ministry of the Envi- 35 Stian Reklev and Kathy Chen, “China on Business, March 13, 2014. and land degradation and desertification will ronment in 2001. track to meet 2020 forest targets, but con- be discussed in the following paragraphs. cerns linger,” Reuters, February 25, 2014, 46 Carlson.

58 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Covered with Dust: China’s Position in Regional Approaches to Yellow Dust 59 CHINA

47 Manipadma Jena, “China Battles Desert- build up ground forces as they perceived

ification,”Inter Press Service, July 5, Same Goal, major security threats emanating from the STUDIES REVIEW 2012, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/07/ land. 2 Since the 1990s, as China and India china-battles-desertification/ Different have become rapidly integrated into the global economy, the need for a modern 48 Duncan Freeman, “The Missing Link: China, Trajectories: China navy has loomed large due to a variety of Climate Change and National Security,” Asia common driving forces. The major driv- Paper, Brussels Institute of Contemporary China and India’s Naval ers entail: their increasing reliance on Studies (2010), 326. sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for Modernization trade and energy supplies, the growing

desire to establish dominance in areas vol 2 in Comparative regarded as their “maritime backyards” |

(the South China Sea and the northern 2016 Perspective Indian Ocean, respectively) and the need to protect their growing global interests. 3 Additionally, both countries have wrestled Shuxian Luo with similar constraints, including the longstanding dominance of their armies and competing choices between defense and Since the 1990s, as China and India have civilian goods. become rapidly integrated into the global economy, the need for a modern blue-water Notwithstanding so many similarities, China navy has loomed large. Despite similarities and India’s naval modernization has fol- both in driving forces and constraints, the lowed very different trajectories. China has two countries’ naval modernization have prioritized “near-sea” defense capabilities demonstrated very different trajectories. and modernized the People’s Liberation China has prioritized “near-sea” defense Army Navy (PLAN) at a stunning pace. India capabilities and modernized its navy at emphasizes power projection capabilities, a stunning pace, whereas India empha- but has carried out its naval modernization sizes power projection capabilities but at a relatively modest speed. 4 has carried out its naval modernization at a relatively modest speed. The two coun- At first glance, the development gap tries’ economic development gap, while between China and India seems to offer a critical factor contributing to their mili- a plausible explanation for the different tary capabilities gap, leaves unanswered paths in their naval modernization. Eco- some key questions observed in this dis- nomic power, while a key enabler of military crepancy. Besides economic factors, there modernization, fails to address some key are other factors that have decisively influ- questions in this discrepancy, however: enced their naval development patterns. why did China and India choose to prior- These factors include threat perceptions itize different types of naval capabilities? between the two countries as well as alli- Beyond economic factors, are there other ance options and threat perceptions with factors that can better explain their different third-party countries. paces and scopes as well as their sources of arms acquisition? Have the two countries’ The imperative of developing a modern priorities changed over time and will they navy has been harbored by the People’s change in the future? Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India since their independence in the This paper will answer these questions by 1940s. 1 However, in the four decades fol- examining two factors. The first is the threat lowing their foundation, both countries perception of each country, which offers a had to allocate their limited resources to clear explanation for why China and India

60 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS 61 CHINA

chose to prioritize different capabilities. Having settled most of its land border dis-

China & India’s GDP The second is the availability of potential putes in the 1990s, China sees its major STUDIES REVIEW Source: World Bank Databank (accessed September 18, 2015) allies, which helps to explain why China and security threats lying on its maritime periph- India’s naval modernization has proceeded ery, specifically, Taiwan, and maritime at different speeds and scales, and through territorial disputes in the East and South different arms acquisition sources. 5 The China Seas. Beijing views the “near-sea” as 12K conclusion will also discuss how the trends the “main strategic direction” of its military of naval modernization are likely to play out planning and modernization, in which the 10K ) in both bilateral and multilateral contexts, United States (primarily the U.S. Navy) is and how the Sino-Indian interactions in the viewed as China’s most likely adversary. 6 8K

maritime domain will shape their broader vol 2 China strategic discourse. Taiwan comes as the first and most press- 6K India | ing maritime issue that instills a sense of 2016 What Capabilities to Build: urgency and vulnerability in Beijing. Spe-

current US $ billion current 4K Measuring Threat Perception cifically, the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crises exposed the weakness of the PLAN vis- GDP ( 2K Comparison of naval modernization à-vis the U.S. Navy, and underscored “the between China and India dwells, for the potential challenge of U.S. military inter- 0% most part, on their distinct evaluations of vention.” 7 Arguing that U.S. “hegemonism” their own maritime security environments. and “military interventionism” were on the 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Differing threat perceptions appear to be a rise, Chinese security analysts pushed for 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 major factor that accounts for the different prioritizing and accelerating military mod- naval capabilities that the two countries pri- ernization. 8 In its 1998 Defense White oritize in their paths to naval modernization. Paper, China declared the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a

China & India’s Military Expenditure China & India’s Military Expenditure Growth Rates

Source: SIPRI database (accessed September 18, 2015) Source: SIPRI database (accessed September 18, 2015)

250 25

225 20 200

175 15

150 10 125 China China 5 100 India India

percent

75 0

current US $ billion current 50 -5 25

0% -10 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

62 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 63 CHINA

major component of its defense strategy, By contrast, India enjoys a far more benign Whether India perceives China as its major to deter hostile maritime powers does little

with an emphasis on “reducing quantity maritime environment, which has enabled threat is also debatable. Over the past to explain India’s recent naval moderniza- STUDIES REVIEW and improving quality” while transition- New Delhi to invest more in building its decade, New Delhi appears to have per- tion.” 26 Conceptualized as “constabulary,” ing the PLA from “manpower-intensive” power projection capabilities to safeguard ceived the expanding presence of China “diplomatic” and “benign” missions as to “technology-intensive.” 9 The growing its seaborne trade and energy imports, and in the Indian Ocean as a major challenge opposed to “military” missions in the IN pro-independence mentality in Taiwan undertake low-intensity and noncomba- to India’s dominance in this region. 19 The doctrinal documents, these missions cover throughout the 1990s—which culminated tant functions in the far-flung waters of the “string of pearls,” a term coined by Booz low-intensity and noncombatant operations in the victory of the pro-independence can- Indian Ocean. Allen Hamilton in 2005 with reference to such as anti-piracy, maritime patrol, human- didate, Chen Shui-bian, in Taiwan’s 2000 China’s network of maritime facilities in the itarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/ presidential election—underscored the With its longstanding territorial dispute littoral of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and DR) and evacuations.

imperative for Beijing to accelerate naval with Pakistan over Kashmir and Jammu, the PLAN’s routinized anti-piracy operations vol 2 modernization in preparation for a Taiwan India confronts “no counterpart to the in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 have both Pace, Scope, and Acquisitions:

10 20 |

conflict scenario. In the 2004 Defense Taiwan impasse [on its maritime frontier] caused consternation in India. Examining Ally Options 2016 White Paper, China clearly stated that the that compels [the Indian leadership to take] PLAN, along with the PLA Air Force and the quick action on their part.” 15 Although That said, New Delhi seems to have yet to Although both China and India have few, if Second Artillery, would receive priority in maritime border disputes once existed reach a broader consensus on the imme- any, formal alliances on paper, India does terms of resource allocation. 11 between India and its neighbors, most were diacy and severity of the threat China have several potential allies while China minor and have been settled through bilat- would impose on India’s security interests, does not. This distinct difference appears The Taiwan issue aside, China has not eral and multilateral negotiations as well as mostly because of the uncertainty about to have critically affected the differing stra- resolved its territorial disputes with any of international arbitration. 16 China’s long-term intentions. 21 Some India tegic time horizons envisioned by decision its eight maritime neighbors, leaving an experts believe that the mainstream per- makers in Beijing and New Delhi, which oceanic periphery embedded with flash- Although Pakistan remains India’s major spective in New Delhi “has been that the in turn have translated into the different points. 12 The East China Sea presents a threat on the subcontinent, whether the threat from China is not direct, but lies in paces and scopes of China and India’s major arena where China and Japan have Pakistani naval capability—especially its Beijing’s special relationship with Islam- military modernizations. In addition, the clashed since the mid-2000s. Each side submarine fleet—poses a threat to India is abad. There is no consensus in India that discrepancy in ally options also affects each presses its claims by deploying naval and questionable. If New Delhi sees Pakistan New Delhi should seek military advantage country’s sources of arms acquisition. coast guard vessels to disputed waters or littoral defense as its primary maritime over Beijing… India has been unwilling to around the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. In concern, then it should have invested heav- match Chinese investment in defense mod- China has limited ally options. 27 Despite the South China Sea, China’s relations ily to build “a localized fleet of short-range ernization.” 22 This also is reflected in the Beijing’s peaceful development rhetoric, with Southeast Asian countries, particularly surface combatants supplemented by land- steadily moderate growth trend in India’s good neighbor policy and charm offen- Vietnam and the Philippines, have soured based naval aviation assets,” which New military expenditure. No spike is observed sive diplomacy, it is nowhere near forging rapidly as clashes at sea have become Delhi has not done. 17 Indeed, the Pakistani for the years following either 2005 or 2008 a global network of allies and security more frequent. Beijing has always been navy is only half the size of the Indian Navy (as marked by the red lines in Figures 2 partners compared to what the United aware that should China attempt to use (IN) in terms of manpower, and one-fifth the and Figure 3). China was mentioned in the States has fostered. Chinese analysts are force in either case, the U.S. military is a size in terms of combat vessels. 18 IN’s 2007 and 2009 Maritime Doctrine only well aware that this disadvantage will be major factor that could stand in the way “in passing, with fleeting — albeit forebod- extremely difficult to overcome since a of China’s success. 13 ing — reference to ‘some nations’ attempting global alliance network requires not just to ‘gain a strategic toehold in the Indian hard power but soft power and historic These disputes are also increasingly related Ocean Rim.’” 23 A recent Pew survey shows opportunities. 28 Therefore, seeing itself to another issue of equally strategic con- that most Indian respondents still view Paki- as “a superpower fundamentally differ- cern to Beijing: the “Malacca Dilemma.” stan as India’s archenemy. 24 ent from the United States,” China has This dilemma refers to the prospect that the embraced a defense strategy stressing U.S. Navy, by using its air and naval deploy- Beyond its home waters, the rapid inte- self-reliance over alliances. 29 ment in the Indo-Pacific region, can block gration of India into the global economy China’s energy lifelines. Acknowledging the has forcefully dictated its navy to enhance Meanwhile, surrounded by U.S. allies and vulnerability of its critical sea lines, Beijing capabilities to ensure the country’s “security potential allies, China seems to believe that typically envisions such a blockade against of access and trade.” 25 Indeed, “the pri- the time horizon for its military buildup is the backdrop of a China-U.S. military con- mary mission driving naval modernization is short. There is a deep anxiety in Beijing flict in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea sea-lane security, with the development of that the United States has been seeking to or the South China Sea. 14 Source: Wikipedia commons ‘softer’ aspects of power projection capabil- contain China by orchestrating an “Asian ities receiving some support, while the need NATO” with Japan, South Korea, Australia

64 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 65 CHINA

and India, and constructing a “C-shaped Narendra Modi’s “Act East Policy,” which This is not to say that India is likely to enter surface combatants, weapon systems, 43 encirclement” on China’s maritime periph- he announced at the 2014 ASEAN-In- a binding alliance with any of these afore- submarines and technology. Since the STUDIES REVIEW ery. 30 Beijing appears to believe that “the dia Summit, has given a new thrust to mentioned countries. On the contrary, 2000s, China has invested heavily in boost- faster China’s socioeconomic develop- this relationship. lacking certainty about China’s intentions ing its indigenous defense industry. By the ments are, the more likely it will face hostile in the long-run, New Delhi appears to have second decade of the 2000s, the PLAN’s forces’ containment and encirclement… In the West Pacific, India has been rapidly not reached a broader and clearer consen- acquisition had shifted mostly to indige- the PLA must have a full understanding of expanding its defense cooperation with sus on the future direction of India-China nously designed and produced weapons the complexity and gravity of the national Japan as both countries increasingly see relations and thus is unlikely to make such and platforms. 44 security situation, and the significance and a shared interest in balancing an assertive a move. Indeed, pursuing a hedging strat- urgency of accelerating national defense China. 38 Building on the “strategic and egy through omni-directional diplomacy On the other hand, India enjoys largely

31 and military modernization.” global partnership” announced in 2006, the and having ally options appears to have unrestricted access to the international vol 2 two countries launched their 2+2 Dialogue provided effective leverage that New Delhi weapons market and has been the world’s

45 |

Viewed in this context, Beijing sees the in 2010, with senior officials from both can employ to hedge against a potentially largest weapons importer since 2009. 2016 imperative to build a full-size, modern countries’ foreign and defense ministries, assertive China without outright antagoniz- The IN has so far obtained its major plat- military. This includes what the 2015 and the Defense Policy Dialogue in 2011, ing Beijing. In a similar vein, maintaining forms from abroad. While this has enabled Defense White Paper calls “a combined, involving meetings between their defense close alignment with India without forming India to acquire state-of-the-art naval multi-functional and efficient… modern ministers. 39 In 2015, the two countries a formal alliance appears to be a hedging equipment from foreign suppliers, the flip maritime military force… commensurate reached a defense deal that would enhance strategy adopted by both the United States side of this balance is that a high degree of with national security and development mutual defense equipment, technology and Japan in response to the rise of China. dependence usually means a high degree interests.” The sense of urgency also drives and information sharing. 40 India has also of vulnerability. Arms embargoes, restric- China to expedite this process as allowed been boosting its maritime security coop- The differing ally options for China and tions on the use of imported equipment by the country’s economic and technolog- eration with Australia since 2006. 41 India contribute to their distinct sources of or delivery delays all may curtail the navy’s ical capacities. 32 arms acquisitions. Since 1989, China has modernization efforts. In fact, delays have Having potential allies appears to be vital been subject to US arms sale sanctions, and remained an acute problem with India’s India, however, has several ally options. leverage that enables India to cope with thus, Chinese arms acquisition and tech- arms imports. 46 Operating and maintaining New Delhi’s relations with Washington China’s expanding maritime power through nology transfer from the United States and a mix of equipment systems from different have seen a steady upswing since 2001. 33 a concerted effort by a group of nations, other Western countries remain at a modest countries may also pose additional technical The two capitals have been cooperating rather than by India matching the pace level. The PLAN has relied on Russia as the barriers and financial costs. broadly in defense technology, weapon or scope of China’s naval modernization. single most important supplier for modern production and arms sales. 34 Under the Despite some Indian strategists’ ambitious

Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, goals for India’s naval development, it is Arms Exports to China bilateral relations continue to strengthen. a commonly acknowledged fact in New Source: SIPRI database (accessed October 16, 2015) Particularly, navy-to-navy collaboration Delhi that “[r]esource limitation will not in “has grown dramatically in size, scope and the foreseeable future allow their force to 3500

sophistication,” and has grown to be “the ‘go one-on-one’ against the Chinese navy, ) most robust” component in overall mili- either in terms of numbers or strategic 3000 tary-to-military relations. 35 India has been assets.” 42 Moreover, the likelihood of a Chi- 2500 increasingly hailed by the United States as na-India confrontation at sea—even only as United Kingdom

a “natural ally” in the Asia-Pacific, largely part of a multi-country conflict with China in Ukraine 2000 due to their shared value of democracy, which the IN would operate in conjunction Switzerland Russia growing economic ties and common inter- with the United States and other navies— 1500 ests in counter-terrorism and balancing a looks remote. Therefore, with India’s still Israel 36 rising China. daunting domestic socioeconomic chal- 1000 France lenges and the United States’ continuing Since the 1990s, India has maintained maritime dominance in Asia, New Delhi 500

close ties with the Association of South- may see a more pragmatic strategy in play- constant 1990 prices US $ million (at east Asian Nations (ASEAN) under the ing the role of a moderate partner rather 0 “Look East Policy,” and has engaged in than an overbearing leader in the Indo-Pa-

active naval diplomacy with Singapore, cific security architecture. 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 and the Philippines. 37 Indian Prime Minister

66 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 67 CHINA

Arms Exports to India and other regional actors promptly sent That India has been almost single-mindedly Source: SIPRI database (accessed October 16, 2015) humanitarian assistance and personnel to focused on power projection capability STUDIES REVIEW the region, China was embarrassed by its building seems to reasonably explain why inability to “provide immediate disaster the country’s progress in modernizing its 6K

) relief in its own backyard” due to its lack subsurface and surface fleets lags behind

United States of necessary power projection and logistics that of the aircraft carrier program. Cur- 5K 53 Uzbekistan capabilities. This need for better power rently, India’s submarine fleet consists of

Ukraine projection capabilities in the region, the fourteen submarines, which are largely 4K United Kingdom improvements in the cross-Taiwan Strait obsolete and diesel-powered with an

Russia relationship since 2008, combined with operational readiness rate of lower than

3K Israel China’s expanding global interests, have 40 percent. Acquisition of new submarines vol 2 60 Italy convinced the PLAN to devote more suffers from serious delays in delivery.

2K | Germany (FRG) resources to building power projection India’s surface fleet is in a better situation. 2016

Poland capabilities to cope with non-traditional Until recently, seven of India’s ten in-ser- 1K France security threats from the “far sea.” China’s vice destroyers had been commissioned for

Netherlands 2008 Defense White Paper articulated for over fifteen years with an average service of US $ million (at constant 1990 prices US $ million (at 0 the first time a requirement for military twenty-five years. 61 To ameliorate this situ- operations other than war (MOOTW). 54 ation, India has successfully commissioned

95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 The PLAN has been conducting anti-piracy two Kolkata-class—its most modern indig- 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 operations in the Gulf of Aden since late enously produced combatants to replace 2008, and commissioned its first aircraft the aging destroyers. In addition, India carrier Liaoning in 2012. The 2015 White commissioned six Russian-built Talwar-class Paper requires the PLAN to transform its frigates between 2003 and 2013. 62 focus from a single point on “offshore waters Translating Threat Perceptions the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, since defense” to a combination of “offshore waters Both China and India have endeavored and Ally Options into 1995 China has acquired a total of fifty-six defense” and “open seas protection.” 55 to build up naval nuclear forces as a Capability Building submarines at a rate of about 2.7 subma- central piece of developing a credible rines per year. The PLAN is also upgrading On the other hand, India, driven by the goal second-strike capability. Similar to other China and India, driven by their very differ- anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) on these of securing its SLOCs and the desire to have naval capabilities, the main focus of China’s ent threat perceptions and alliance options, submarines. 49 China’s naval combatant its great-power status recognized, sees the sea-based nuclear deterrent capability is to have taken divergent paths to modernize vessels have been rapidly modernized as aircraft carrier program as the backbone meet the challenge from the more powerful their navies. Drawing heavily on a rapidly well. 50 Some types of vessels are consid- of its naval modernization. As it stated in U.S. nuclear arsenals. This buildup simulta- growing indigenous defense industry, the ered “comparable in many respects to the the 2009 Maritime Doctrine, “sea control neously guarantees Beijing a second-strike PLAN has devoted considerable resources most modern Western warships.” 51 is the central concept around which the capability vis-a-vis India. The PLAN currently to building “near-sea” defense capabilities [IN] is structured, and aircraft carriers are has four Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-pow- with “key elements… specifically tailored to In addition, China has made rapid develop- decidedly the most substantial contributors ered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in counter U.S. capabilities.” 47 On the other ments in anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). to it.” 56 The power projection capabili- service, all equipped with twelve JL-2 sub- hand, the IN has focused on building its Since 2008, China has been fielding the ties proved to be an extremely effective, marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) power projection capabilities based on DF-21D. This ASBM, equipped with a vital asset for India’s cultivation of its soft that have an estimated range of 7,400 imported equipment and increasingly maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), power in the region when the IN promptly km. 63 India possesses land-based delivery indigenously-developed platforms. can hit moving ships at sea, posing an responded to the 2004 tsunami with the platforms capable of hitting targets deep unprecedented threat to U.S. Navy vessels participation of the Indian Naval Ship (INS) within China, including Beijing and Shang- China has made major strides in modern- operating in the Western Pacific. 52 Viraat. 57 Currently having two carriers in hai, but has yet to develop a credible at-sea izing its submarine forces, which are key to active service, the IN already has experi- deterrent capability with regard to China. 64 conducting sea control operations. This is While “near-sea” defense has been and ence operating the vessels. 58 India’s first The IN did not begin the sea trial of its first regarded by Beijing as “a critical element of will continue to be the primary focus of the homegrown carrier was undocked in 2015 SSBN until late 2014. Currently the SSBN regional deterrence, particularly when con- PLAN’s modernization, the development and is expected to be in service in 2017. is in the stage of completing final trials. 65 ducting ‘counter-intervention’ (anti-access/ of China’s power projection capabilities is The second, currently under design, may Despite India’s nuclear asymmetry with area denial or A2/AD in US military termi- more recent and still nascent. In the after- be granted U.S. permission to use General China and the slow pace of India’s nuclear nology) against modern adversaries.” 48 math of the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Dynamics’ advanced Electromagnetic Air- buildup, the nuclear capabilities that both According to the latest report released by Asia, as the United States, India, Japan craft Launch System. 59

68 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 69 CHINA

countries possess remains a key source of has already been signaled by Modi’s March mixed implications for Sino-Indian inter- be tempted to constrain India’s power on 66 stability at the strategic level. 2015 visit to Seychelles and Mauritius. In action in the naval dimension. The United the subcontinent through Pakistan and STUDIES REVIEW the South China Sea, China’s assertive ter- States and Japan’s outreach to India is redouble the PLAN modernization as a Looking Ahead ritorial claims have galvanized a strong call largely a function of the United States and counter-balance in the maritime domain. among the Southeast Asian countries for a Japan’s responses to the rise of China, and China and India clearly have different balancing strategy. Viewed by ASEAN as “a each one of the four players has adopted As neither India nor China appears pre- threat perceptions and alliance options, useful balance to China’s heft,” India has a strategy of hedging in dealing with each pared to change its tactics on any of these which in combination have translated been welcomed as a partner. 67 As tensions other. On the one hand, each country has issues, these hurdles will likely persist and into very different trajectories of their in the South China Sea continue, New Del- been carefully calculating its moves so as impede trust-building at the strategic level. naval modernization. This simultaneous hi’s strengthening security and economic to avoid threatening core interests of any However, there is still room for maritime

modernization, in and of itself, did not ties with ASEAN countries, in particular Viet- of the other three parties. Both China and cooperation and confidence-building mea- vol 2 begin as an arms race, and is still prema- nam, will likely gain more weight, which China India have exercised great caution to avoid sures at the operational level. Beyond their |

ture to be depicted as a toe-to-toe maritime will likely reciprocate with continued suspi- making moves that would impinge on each peripheral waters, China and India’s inter- 2016 rivalry. However, their naval modernization cion and further naval buildup. 68 other’s core interests—such as the maritime ests converge significantly, which should alludes to a regional security competition territorial issues for China and nuclear issue serve as a foundation for future coopera- due to strategic mistrust between China The China-India border issue, albeit not for India—while cooperating on issues of tion, especially in MOOTW. This will likely and India. Over recent years, New Delhi directly related to the maritime competition, common interests such as trade and climate serve both countries’ interests and pave the has developed a perception that China’s will continue to be another major source of change. On the other hand, as the power road to addressing strategic mistrust. bolstered ties with India’s neighboring mistrust between the two countries, which distribution between China and the United countries and naval modernization aim in turn will intensify the competition at sea States continues to shift, New Delhi seeks to encircle India. Beijing, on the other through mis-perception and miscalculation. to maintain the equilibrium of power in the hand, views India’s outreach to the Pacific The border issue shapes India’s perception Asia-Pacific by developing a balance with region and naval buildup as an attempt to of China through the prism of the 1962 the United States and Japan toward China restrain China’s influence in South Asia and Sino-Indian War. Due to this perception, and continued naval buildup. China, suspi- power projection into the Indian Ocean. there is a tendency in New Delhi towards cious of India along with the United States This mutual perception is compounded exaggerating the significance and threaten- and Japan ganging up against China, may by suspicions deeply rooted in the long- ing nature of China’s actions and strategic standing security issues including the intentions, including the PLAN’s modern- Sino-Indian border dispute and Sino-Paki- ization, while ignoring stabilizing factors stani relations. In the years to come, as both in crucial dimensions, including nuclear countries strive to expand their presence deterrence and growing economic inter- 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 in each other’s “maritime backyards,” this dependence. This perception will continue China India China India China India China India China India shared perception of maritime compe- to feed into China’s perception of a hostile tition will likely continue, and be further India and China-India security relations in SSBN 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 4 0 compounded in the broader geopolitical zero-sum terms. context of the China-India-Pakistan trilat- SSN 5 0 5 0 5 0 6 1 5 1 eral relations and the China-India-US-Japan Sources of mistrust and rivalry also lie quadrilateral interactions. beyond the bilateral framework. Beijing’s SSK 44 15 57 16 61 19 54 16 60 13 “all-weather” relationship with Islamabad Aircraft Overlapping competition for influence in remain a serious concern for New Delhi Carrier 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 each other’s “maritime backyard” is also a and will likely continue to influence the major factor contributing to China-India China-India security discourse, despite Destroyer 18 5 20 8 21 8 28 8 17 12 maritime competition. The Indian Ocean modifications in China’s policy toward 69 has traditionally been an area of primary Pakistan since the 1990s. New Delhi will Frigate 32 18 40 12 42 17 52 12 54 13 interest for New Delhi. As China continues likely continue to view major infrastructure Amphibious to build a blue-water navy and expand its projects, including the Gwadar Port and the Ship (LPD) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1 naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it is Karakorum Corridor, as potential Chinese bound to challenge India’s dominance in military assets in the Indian Ocean region. LST 19 1 18 2 19 2 27 5 26 5 this region. New Delhi will likely respond by continuing to revitalize and augment its The relations between China, India, the LSM 35 8 41 7 31 5 56 5 59 4 security ties with the littoral countries, as United States and Japan may produce

70 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 71 CHINA

About the Author energy security front, China became an oil al., Distracted Antagonists, Wary Partners: China Defense White Paper,” December 2004.

net importer in 1993 and a natural gas net and India Assess Their Security Relations (Alex- STUDIES REVIEW Shuxian Luo is a graduate from Johns Hop- importer in 2007. As of 2013, China imports andria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis China 12 Andrew Erickson, “China’s Near-Sea Chal- kins SAIS, where she concentrated in China nearly 60 percent of its crude oil, among which Studies, 2011), 6. On the land borders disputes, lenge,” National Interest, January/February, and Japan Studies. Her study and research over 80 percent travels through the Indian China began border settlement negotiations 2014, 60-66. focuses on US-China-Japan relations, Chi- Ocean, see The Central People’s Government in 1992 with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan nese foreign policy, Asia-Pacific maritime of PRC, “Imported Oil and Gas Count for 58.1 and Russia. In 1998, a settlement treaty was 13 There are strong convictions in Beijing that a security and China’s military modernization. Percent and 31.6 Percent, Respectively, of signed between China and Kazakhstan. Border US intervention is more likely in the ECS than in Prior to SAIS, Shuxian worked as a news Our Country’s Energy Consumption in 2013” negotiations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan con- SCS, largely due to different treaty obligations reporter in Los Angeles. She earned her [2013 年我国石油天然气对外依存度达到 58.1% cluded with separate settlement in 1999. China and strategic calculus that the United States

B.A. in English Linguistics and Literature 和 31.6%], January. 20, 2014, http://www. settled border disputes with Russia in multiple has with respect to the two regions. See, for vol 2 from Peking University. She is currently a gov.cn/gzdt/2014-01/20/content_2570732. agreements signed in the 1990s and 2000s. example, Ju Hailong [鞠海龙], “Researching the

htm; US-China Economic and Security Review Shen Wenwen, “China and its Neighbors: Trou- Obama Administration’s policies on the South | doctoral student at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 2016 Commission, China Navy Extends its Combat bled Relations,” EU-Asia Centre, March 1, 2012, China Sea” [美国奥巴马政府南海政策研究], Reach to the Indian Ocean, March 14, 2014. http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details. Journal of Contemporary Asia Pacific Studies [ 1 See for instance Li Dingwen, “On Mao India depends on the sea for over 90 percent php?pub_id=4. The only unsettled land border 当代亚太], Issue 3 (2011): 97-112; Sun Haiyong[ Zedong’s Naval Development Strategy Theo- of its international trade. See Bernard D. Cole, dispute is the one with India and Bhutan. 孙海泳], “Analyzing US strategy of intervening ries” [论毛泽东海军发展战略思想 ], Xinhuanet, Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled in East Asian maritime issues” [美国对东亚海洋 December 8, 2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ Waters (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 7 US Department of Defense, Annual Report to 问题的介入战略评析], New Vision [新视野], Issue mil/2003-12/08/content_1219632.htm; C. Raja 2013), 131. On the energy front, as of 2013, Congress Military and Security Developments 2 (2014). On the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, while Mohn, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry India imported roughly 73 percent of its total Involving the People’s Republic of China, the United States maintains neutrality on the in the Indo-Pacific (Washington DC: Carnegie oil consumption, see US Energy Information 2011; Michael S. Chase, “Explaining Taiwan’s competing sovereignty claims, it agreed in the Endowment for International Peace, 2012), Agency (EIA), International Energy Data and Response to Chinese Military Modernization: 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty with Japan to 3639; James R. Holmes, et al, Indian Naval Analysis, last updated June 26, 2014, https:// Alliance Dynamics, Threat Perceptions, and apply the US-Japan Security Treaty to Ryukyu Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (New York, www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_ Domestic Politics” (PhD dissertation, Johns Islands and the Daito Islands, which included NY: Routledge, 2009), 28. includes/countries_long/India/india.pdf. Hopkins University, 2007), 113. the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Mark E. Manyin, “Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: 2 As for China, while there was a maritime 4 “Near-seas” is defined as covering: 1) the first 8 Michael Chase, “Explaining Taiwan’s Response US Treaty Obligations,” Congressional Research threat from the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan island chain which stretches from Kurile Islands to Chinese Military Modernization,” 113-114. Service, January 22, 2013. that compelled Beijing to develop some through the Islands of Japan, Ryukyu Archipel- coastal defense capabilities, the majority of its ago, Taiwan, the Philippines to Borneo Island; 9 Ministry of Defense of PRC, China’s National 14 See, for example, Xinhuanet, “US military to sta- resources were devoted to tackling security 2) the three near seas, namely, Yellow Sea, East Defense, July, 1998. tion in Malacca and choke China’s throat, how challenges coming from land: the Korean China Sea and South China Sea, within the can China break the predicament” [美军进驻马 War (1950-1953), the Sino-Soviet tension and inner rims of the island chain; 3) sea areas adja- 10 In the 2000 Taiwan Policy White Paper, Beijing 六甲掐住中国咽喉，中国如何破解困局], April 16, border conflicts with India (1962) and with cent to the other rims of this island chain, and stated, “a serious crisis still exists in the situation 2004; People’ Daily, “Keeping control on Chi- the Soviet Union (1969). India was in a similar those of the north Pacific. This concept does of the Taiwan Strait… if a grave turn of events na’s oil valve” [把着中国油路阀门], December 1, situation. It fought a series of wars with Pakistan not cover the south Pacific or the Indian Ocean. occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from 2007; Global Times, “US experts proposed to (1948, 1949, 1965 and 1971) and one with China in any name… the Chinese government block Malacca to subdue China in the event of China (1962). 5 My primary focus is restricted to external will only be forced to adopt all drastic mea- a US-China conflict” 美专家支招中美冲突，可封[ factors, as for both countries naval moderniza- sures possible, including the use of force.” The 锁马六甲让中国低头], September 30, 2014. 3 China estimates that trade accounted for 67 tion is a response to their perceived external State Council of the PRC, The One-China Princi- percent of China’s economy in 2006. Notwith- environments, although domestic factors also ple and the Taiwan Issue, February 21, 2000. 15 James R. Holmes, et al, Indian Naval Strategy in standing a slight decline in recent years, the undeniably have an impact. the Twenty-first Century (New York, NY: Rout- ratio so far remains more than 50 percent. 11 The White Paper stated, “the PLA gives ledge, 2009), 89. See State Oceanic Administration of PRC, 6 M. Taylor Fravel, “China Views India’s Rise: priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force “Constructing a Great Maritime Power is an Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differ- and Second Artillery force to seek balanced 16 For a complete list of the settled maritime Inevitable Requirement of China’s Economic ences” in Ashley J. Tellis, et al., ed., Strategic development of the combat force structure, in border disputes, see, Integrated Headquarters Development” [建设海洋强国是中国经济发展 Asia 2011-2012: Asia Responds to Its Rising order to strengthen the capabilities for winning Ministry of Defense (Navy), “Freedom to use 的必然要求], November 21, 2012, http://www. Powers China and India (Seattle and Wash- both command of the sea and command of the the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy,” soa.gov.cn/xw/ztbd/2012/kxfzcjhh_xyddsbd/ ington DC: The National Bureau of Asian air and conducting strategic counter strikes.” 2007, 57-58. The maritime territorial dispute hygz/201211/t20121127_11596.htm. On the Research, 2011), 8991; Murray Scot Tanner, et Ministry of Defense of PRC, “China’s National between India and Bangladesh in the Bay

72 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 73 CHINA

of Bengal was brought by Bangladesh to a Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies), and political values similar to China’s as the 35 The United States and Indian Navies conduct

UN tribunal in 2009 for arbitration. In 2014, October 2015, http://www.defence.gov.au/ United States has successfully done.” Sun four joint exercises on an annual basis: MAL- STUDIES REVIEW the tribunal awarded 19,467 square kilo- ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Sokinda_IPS_ Peisong [孙培松],“China’s Military Capability is ABAR (the premier annual bilateral maritime meters of a total disputed area of 25,602 Paper.pdf. Far from Establishing Global Presence” [中国 exercise conducted to reinforce maritime km to Bangladesh, which was upheld by 军力远未确立全球地位], Global Times, May 17, tactics, techniques, and procedures), HABU- both Bangladesh and India. Ruma Paul, “UN 21 Steven A. Hoffman, “Perception and China 2011. NAG (naval aspects of amphibious opera- tribunal rules for Bangladesh in sea border Policy in India,” in Francine R. Frankel and Harry tions), SPITTING COBRA (explosive ordnance dispute with India,” Reuters, July 8, 2014, Harding, ed., The Indian China Relationship: 29 Xinhuanet, “China: A ‘Super Power’ Fundamen- destruction focus), and SALVEX (diving and http://in.reuters.com/article/bangladesh-in- What the United States Needs to Know (New tally Different From The United States [中国：与 salvage). US Department of Defense, “Report dia-seaborder-idINKBN0FD14R201407; York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), 美国截然不同的超级大国], November 27, 2012. to Congress on US-India Security Coopera-

Zachary Keck, “How South Asia Resolves 3374; Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, tion,” November 2011, 3; K. Alan Kronstadt vol 2 Maritime Disputes,” The Diplomat, July 10, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modern- 30 Michael S. Chase, “Fear and Loathing in and Sonia Pinto, “India-US Security Relations:

2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/ ization (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Beijing? Chinese Suspicion of US Intentions,” Current Engagement,” Congressional Research | 2016 how-south-asia-resolves-maritime-dispute. Press, 2010), 13-14. China Brief 11, no. 18 (September 30, 2011); Service, November 13, 2012, 8. John W. Garver and Feiling Wang, “China’s 17 Walter C. Ladwig III, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: 22 Cohen and Dasgupta, 13-14. Anti-encirclement Struggle,” Asian Security 6, 36 See, for example, Kevin Whitelaw, “Obama: Naval Power, ‘Look East,’ and India’s Emerging no. 3 (2010), 238-261. US, India ‘Natural Allies’ in 21st Century,” NPR, Influence in the Asia-Pacific,”Asian Security 5, 23 Iskander Rehman, cited by Jeff M. Smith, Cold November 24, 2009, http://www.npr.org/tem- no. 2 (2009), 91. Peace; China-India Rivalry in the Twenty-First 31 “Strengthening the sense of vulnerability, the plates/story/story.php?storyId=12071279. Century (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), sense of crisis, and the sense of responsibili- 18 “China’s submarine noose around India,” India 164. ties” [增强忧患意识危机意识使命意], PLA Daily 37 The annual India-ASEAN multilateral maritime Today, December 4, 2014. As of 2015, the [解放军报], December11, 2013; Michael S. exercise MILAN began in 1995. The Indian Indian Navy has a force size of 58,350 people, 24 In this survey, near half (45 percent) of the Chase, “Fear and Loathing in Beijing?.” Navy’s participation in the 2004 post tsunami 14 tactical submarines, 27 principal surface Indian respondents named Pakistan as their HA/DF has been seen as a successful showcase combatants, and 96 patrol and coastal combat- country’s greatest threat. Pew Research Center, 32 Ministry of Defense of PRC, “China’s Military of India’s naval diplomacy in Southeast Asia. ants. Pakistan’s corresponding figures for the “How Americans and Chinese View Each Strategy,” May 2015. Mohan, Samudra Manthan, 101104. Ladwig same year are: 23,800, 10 and 18. International Other,” November 1, 2012. (2009), 95. Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Bal- 33 India’s relations with the United States went ance 2015, 249-250, 277-278. 25 Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming through a brief chilling period after India’s 38 Rajan Menon, “An India-Japan Alliance without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization 1998 nuclear test. In 2001, the Bush adminis- Brewing?” The National Interest, January 22, 19 The China threat rhetoric was particularly (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, tration announced that it would waive prolifer- 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ played up by a 2005 Booz Allen report which 2010), 92-95. ation-related sanctions for India, following with india-japan-alliance-brewing-974; Ladwig described China’s port development along the bilateral agreements to cooperate in civilian (2009), 100. Japan joined the US India annual Indian Ocean littoral as the “string of pearls” 26 Walter C. Ladwig III, “Drivers of Indian Naval nuclear and other high-technology industries. maritime exercise MALABAR since 2007, and strategy, and furthermore after China deployed Expansion,” in Harsh V. Pant, ed., The Rise of the C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of began to conduct bilateral naval exercise with its antipiracy forces to the Gulf of Aden in 2008. Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, 27; India, known as JIMEX, in Northern Indian Murray Scot Tanner, et al., “Distracted Antag- Challenges (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publish- Ladwig (2009), 102. Ocean West Pacific areas in 2012. DoD, “Report onists, Wary Partners: China and India Assess ing Limited, 2012), 19-20. to Congress on US India Security Coopera- Their Security Relations” (Alexandria, VA: 34 India signed its first ten year defense agree- tion,” 3; IDR News Network, “JIMEX 12, first Center for Naval Analysis China Studies, 2011), 27 China traditionally only has North Korea as ment with the United States in 2005, which exercise between India and Japan,” Indian 37-41. its official ally, and Pakistan and Myanmar as enabled military technology transfers, arms Defense Review, June 8, 2012, http://www. semi-allies. sales, joint weapons development and produc- indiandefencereview.com/news/first-bilater- 20 See, for example, Andrew S. Erickson and tion. In 2015, a new defense pact was signed, al-maritime-exercise-between-india-and-ja- Austin Strange, “China’s Global Maritime 28 For example, Sun Peisong, Director of Lianyun- opening door for cooperation in development pan-n-jimex-12/. Presence: Hard and Soft Dimensions of PLAN gang Development Research Institute, argues, and construction of weapons including aircraft Anti-piracy Operations,” China Brief 15, no. “the United States deployed its troops around carriers and jet engines. Sridhar Krishnaswami, 39 Menon. New Delhi has also been discussing 9, May 1, 2015, http://www.jamestown.org/ the world through colonial wars, two World “India, US sign framework for defense cooper- with Tokyo over importing Japanese defense uploads/media/China_Brief_Vol_15_Issue_9_2. Wars and subsequent intervention wars. ation,” The Hindu, June 30, 2005; NDTV, “India, equipment and technologies, the first poten- pdf.Strategy for Countering China’s Increased However, future history will not create such an US sign new 10 year defense framework pact,” tial sale being the Maritime Self Defense Influence in the Indian Ocean,” Indo-Pacific opportunity for China… It is very difficult for June 4, 2015; Council on Foreign Relations, “US Force’s US2 amphibian aircraft to the Indian Strategic Papers (Australian Defence College, China to attract followers with security needs India Defense Framework,” June 3, 2015. Navy (IN). Japan Times, “Japan, India agree

74 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 75 CHINA

to continue talks on potential US2 exports,” 45 Russia remains India’s largest arms supplier by modern), fifty-two frigates (thirty-five modern), June 1, 2010, Institute for Defence Studies and

March 31, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ a share of 70 percent. The United States jumps twenty new corvettes, eighty-five modern Analyses, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ STUDIES REVIEW news/2015/03/31/national/politics-diplomacy/ to the second largest supplier as American missile-armed patrol craft, fifty-six amphibi- IndiasFutureAircraftCarrierForceandtheNeed- japan-india-agree-continue-talks-potential- arms sales to India have seen a rapid upswing ous ships, forty-two mine warfare ships (thirty forStrategicFlexibility_irehman_010610. us-2-exports/; James Hardy, “Aero India 2015: since 2005 when the first U.S.-India defense modern), more than fifty major auxiliary ships Shin Maywa confident of progress on US2 sale agreement was signed. Israel and the UK also and more than 400 minor auxiliary ships and 58 Indian Navy, “Indian Navy Ships;” Zachary Keck, to India,” HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly, February maintain substantial weapon sales to New service/support craft. O’Rourke, 15. “India to Test First Homegrown Aircraft Carrier.” 17, 2015. Delhi. Sushant Singh, “SIPRI data shows India world’s biggest arms importer at three times of 51 The Jiangkai-class frigates series, Luyang-class 59 Ankit Panda, “India’s INS Vikrant Aircraft Carrier 40 Nidhi Verma, “India to get Japan’s bullet train, China,” The Indian Express, March 16, 2015. destroyer series, and the upcoming new Success fully Undocks,” The Diplomat, June

deepens defence and nuclear ties,” Reuters, cruiser class. ONI, “The PLA Navy,” 13. 11, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/ vol 2 December 12, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/ 46 For instance, India’s Russian-made aircraft car- indias-ins-vikrant-aircraft-carrier-successful-

article/india-japan-idINKBN0TV07D20151212. rier, Vikramaditya, and more recently, its order 52 O’Rourke, 9-10. ly-undock. General Electronics describes | 2016 of six Scorpene submarines from France, have the advantages of EMALS over conventional 41 Australia, after joining MALABAR exercise in undergone long periods of delay. 53 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: launch methods as: reduced manning work- 2007 and MILAN IN 2012, began its first bilat- Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New load; reduced thermal signature; increased eral maritime exercise with India, AUSINDEX, in 47 James Steinberg and Michael E. O’Hanlon, York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 35. launch availability; reduced topside weight; 2015. Prashanth Parameswaran, “Australia, India Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China reduced installed volume; launch capability for to Hold First Ever Naval Exercise Amid China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, 54 The document stated, “With the focus of atten- unmanned aerial vehicle. In operational terms, Concerns,” The Diplomat, September 1, 2015. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 104. tion on performing the historical missions of Indian carriers equipped with EMALS would the armed forces for the new stage in the new enjoy greater flexibility in carrier operations 42 The Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta, 48 Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Moderniza- century and with raising the capability to win over their competitors in the region. Ankit when delivering a talk on the Future Vision tion,” 7. local wars in conditions of informationization Panda, “This US Technology Could Give Indian of the Indian Navy in 2008, outlined the goal, at the core, it works to increase the country’s Aircraft Carriers an Important Edge,” The “By 2022 the Indian navy will have a fleet of 49 China has acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo-class capabilities to maintain maritime, space and Diplomat, April 6, 2015, http://thediplomat. 160plus ships, three aircraft carriers and 400 non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs) electromagnetic space security and to carry com/2015/04/this-us-technology-could-give-in- aircraft of different types. Extensive satellite and commissioned at least four new classes out the tasks of counter-terrorism, stability dian-aircraft-carriers-an-important-edge/. surveillance and networking will be there.” of indigenously built modern submarines. The maintenance, emergency rescue and interna- Cited in James R. Holmes, et al, Indian Naval four indigenously produced new classes of tional peacekeeping. It takes military opera- 60 The IN submarine includes nine Russian Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, 83; Cole, submarines are: Jin-class (Type 094), a nucle- tions other than war (MOOTW) as an important Kilo-class (Sindhugosh) and four locally-built Asian Maritime Strategies, 150. ar-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN); form of applying national military forces, and Shishumar-class, and one nuclear-pow- Shang-class (Type 093), a nuclear-powered scientifically makes and executes plans for the ered Chakra-class submarine which India 43 As China’s military modernization proceeds, attack submarine (SSNs), Yuan- (Type 039A) and development of MOOTW capabilities.” Ministry leased from Russia in 2012. India ordered however, Russia becomes increasingly reluctant Song- (Type 039/039G) class non-nuclear-pow- of Defense of PRC, China’s National Defense six Scorpene-class diesel attack submarines of selling more advanced systems. Eric Hagt, ered attack submarines. Ronald O’Rourke, White Paper, January 2009. from France in 2005. In October 2015, India “Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Industry “China Naval Modernization: Implications for announced the induction of the first submarine Reform,” in Roy Kamphausen, et al., The PLA at US Navy Capabilities Background and Issues 55 Indian Navy, “Indian Navy Ships;” Zachary would be scheduled to be commissioned in Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Keck, “India to Test First Homegrown Aircraft September 2016, and delivery of the remain- Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: September 21, 2015, 12, 17; US Office of Naval Carrier,” The National Interest, June 10, 2015, ing five boats would be completed by 2020. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War Col- Intelligence, “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ India and Russia have also been reportedly lege, 2010), 487-488. and Missions for the 21st Century” (2015 PLA india-test-first-homegrown-aircraft-carrier-1308. discussing a ten year lease of a second Navy report), 19. nuclear-power submarine since October 44 Despite the great leap forward in China’s indig- 56 Iskander Rehman, “The Indian Navy has a 2015. Rahul Bedi, IHS Janes Defense Weekly, enous defense industry, currently some engi- 50 China since the 1990s has procured four Big Problem: The Subsurface Dilemma,” The October 06, 2015; Indian Navy, “Indian Navy neering components and subsystems remain Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers, National Interest, November 4, 2014, http:// Submarines;” Franz Stefan Gady, “India to imported or licensed-produced in-country. and commissioned six new classes of indige- nationalinterest.org/feature/the-indian- Lease Another Nuclear Submarine from Russia,” Jesse L. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval nously built destroyers all armed with ASCMs, navy-has-big-problem-the-subsurface-di- The Diplomat, October, 30, 2015, http:// Modernization,” testimony before the US-China and four new classes of indigenously built lemma-1159. thediplomat.com/2015/10/india-to-lease-an- Economic and Security Review Commission, frigates. According to the ONI report, the PLAN other-nuclear-submarine-from-russia; Indian January 30, 2014, 3. surface fleet currently consists of twenty-six 57 Iskander Rehman, “India’s Future Aircraft Carrier Navy, “Indian Navy Submarines;” Franz destroyers (twenty-one of which are considered Force and the Need for Strategic Flexibility,” Stefan Gady, “India’s Submarine Fleet Faces

76 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Same Goal, Different Trajectories: China and India’s Naval Modernization 77 CHINA

Further Delays,” The Diplomat, February, Ho Chi Minh City, which will likely share with the most sensitive geopolitical fault line

27, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/ Vietnam tracking and imaging information Assessing the between the United States and the People’s STUDIES REVIEW indias-submarine-fleet-faces-further-delays/. of Chinese naval base and movement in the Republic of China (PRC). Even the subse- South China Sea areas. China responded by Decision quent abrogation of the United States’ 61 Indian Navy. warning that “if the cooperation is aimed at alliance treaty with Taiwan has not removed China and violates China’s interests, it is wrong Process Behind the sensitivity of this flashpoint; indeed, 62 Chahryar Pasandideh, “India’s Ongoing Surface and unwise.” Xu Huan, “China should stay alert its replacement, the purposefully vague Naval Combatant Modernization,” NATO Asso- to “India-Vietnam cooperation,” CNTV, January U.S. Military Taiwan Relations Act, has only rendered ciation of Canada, May 22, 2015. 28, 2016, http://english.cntv.cn/2016/01/28/ the interactions between the United States ARTI7WpG4x92tXEN23JaHoSK160128.shtml. Intervention in a and the PRC murkier. Up to this day, many 63 O’Rourke, 17-18. observers would agree Taiwan remains the vol 2 69 Jingdong Yuan, “Beijing’s Balancing Act: Cross-Strait Crisis: issue most likely to spark a potential war 64 Manjeet S. Pardesi, “China’s Nuclear Forces and Courting New Delhi, Reassuring Islamabad,” | between the United States and China. 2016 Their Significance to India,”The Nonprolifera- Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (Spring/ A Scenario-Driven tion Review 21, no. 34 (2014): 344. Summer 2011): 37-54. Any such conflict between the world’s two Analysis strongest powers would massively impact 65 Rehman, Indian Navy. Gady, Nc Bipindra, the global geopolitical order, and deserves “India Nears Completion of Nuclear Triad with correspondingly careful study. Indeed, Armed Submarine, Bloomberg, February 25, Winston Kung there have been volumes of military 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti- assessments on the prospects of conflict cles/2016-02-25/india-said-to-near-inducting- over Taiwan, many of which are based its-first-nuclear-armed-submarine. In any potential military crisis between upon scenario-driven analyses. However, China and Taiwan, the first-order ques- these assessments usually assume a fully 66 C. Raja Mohan, “Modi and the Indian Ocean: tion which arises would not be, “Could US engaged state of war between the U.S. and Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,” Asia naval forces defeat Chinese naval forces in China as their starting point. Compared to Maritime Transparency Initiative, June, 18, a cross-straits scenario?” but rather, “Would these analyses, there is a relative lack of 2015. the U.S. commit to militarily intervene at scenario-driven analyses of the political all?” This paper undertakes a scenario anal- decision behind whether the U.S. would 67 Lee Kuan Yew, cited by Ladwig (2009), 94-98. In ysis of the U.S. geopolitical calculus behind choose to intervene militarily at all – yet October 2014, India and Vietnam announced military intervention, assuming a fixed 2017 assessing the outcome of this decision a major arms sale contract that enables Hanoi crisis scenario of Taiwanese President Tsai would likely be the most important factor to acquire four naval patrol vessels from India. Ing-Wen escalating pro-independence informing the planning of all sides affected Reuters, “India to supply Vietnam with naval rhetoric, and China responding through by the crisis, from China and Taiwan to vessels amid China disputes,” October, 28, mobilization of naval forces in the Taiwan regional neighbors including South Korea 2014. Strait. After an analysis of the legal, dip- and Japan. lomatic, strategic and domestic opinion 68 During Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s factors likely to affect a U.S. president’s deci- This paper examines the U.S. likelihood visit to Vietnam in October 2014, India pledged sion on intervention, we conclude that the of militarily defending Taiwan in a cross- to supply naval vessels to Vietnam and pro- United States would conduct non-kinetic strait crisis. It does so through assuming vide $100 million line of credit for Hanoi to military operations to signal a strong threat a fixed scenario through which the crisis make the acquisition. Both sides also signed of American intervention, while simultane- first unfolds, and comprehensively exam- agreement to enhance joint oil exploration and ously applying heavy diplomatic pressure ines each of the dimensions the President development in the South China Sea. China to both China and Taiwan to de-escalate the of the United States is likely to weigh in responded with a warning against potential situation; we further conclude that China formulating his or her response to such a impingement on China’s sovereignty claims. and Taiwan will likely de-escalate accord- crisis. The purpose of this analysis is not to Sanjeev Miglani, “India to supply Vietnam ingly to U.S. pressure, in light of U.S. military provide a policy recommendation, or even with naval vessels amid China disputes,” and diplomatic leverage. to predict the outcomes of the scenario Reuters, October 28, 2014, http://www. with any degree of certainty, but rather reuters.com/article/us-india-vietnam-idUSKB- Ever since the United States first signed a to illuminate the complex, often clashing N0IH0LE20141028. In January 2016, India Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic mixture of factors affecting the decision unveiled its plan to build a satellite station in of China (ROC) in 1954, Taiwan has been for intervention. Fixing a scenario to one

78 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS 79 CHINA

specific situation is essential to conducting dimensions are not implied to be strictly to the security or the social or economic to its allies’ military aid under the condi-

an analysis which yields insight on factors separate; indeed, the President would system of the people on Taiwan and any tion that “the attack on that country poses STUDIES REVIEW which might affect a president’s judgment; have to assess them simultaneously, and danger to the interests of the United States a clear danger to Japan’s survival or could without a fixed prism, any analysis would concerns from one dimension will bleed arising therefrom. The President and the fundamentally overturn Japanese citizens’ otherwise devolve into the dreaded axiom: into another. However, as an organizational Congress shall determine, in accordance constitutional rights to life, liberty and “It depends on the situation.” paradigm, the analysis will be broken down with constitutional processes, appropriate the pursuit of happiness.” 8 An attack on by section into these dimensions, and point action by the United States in response to Taiwan, which is only seventy miles away This analysis assumes a scenario unfolding out linkages to other dimensions as neces- any such danger.” In other words, the Pres- from Okinawa, can conceivably be argued in 2017, one year into ROC President Tsai sary. This analysis will not explore who will ident is obligated only to brief Congress as a “danger to Japan’s survival.” Ying-Wen’s first term. Throughout 2016, the be the President or personalities of specific and consult with it; “appropriate action”

PRC has undergone frustrating attempts candidates likely to be the 2017 President. is not defined, and conceivably includes Ultimately, the legal dimension confers vol 2 to induce Tsai to re-confirm the 1992 Con- This is to avoid delving into a murky realm non-action or simply verbal protests. 4 no obligation one way or the other on the |

sensus, or otherwise offer a replacement of psychoanalysis and political horse-race President’s options. He or she will have to 2016 “One China” formula, yet has received little calling; instead, the focus is to examine the So the United States is under no legal com- make his or her decision based off of the response from Tsai. 1 To begin the scenario, landscape of trends that would condition pulsion to enter a war. But if it does decide other dimensions. Of course, this legalistic as a means of exerting leverage, the PRC any President’s decision. to do so, what legal implications does this argument alone will not help the United withdraws some of the Three Linkages have for U.S. allies? These legal implications States much if the rest of the world under- with Taiwan, including direct flights. 2 This Legal Dimension will inform how U.S. allies urge the United stands the Taiwan Relations Act as a true sets off a nationalistic reaction in Taiwan, States to react, given their level of legal lia- U.S. defense commitment–by implication, especially among student leaders and Any decision for intervention would have bility and entanglement if the United States if not strict legal mandate. Tsai’s pro-independence base, and Tsai to first examine legal obligations, either in does intervene. accordingly escalates her rhetoric, from domestic law or through treaties, which Diplomatic Dimension non-recognition of the 1992 Consensus, might bind the United States to any course In the event that the United States does to explicit denial of both the 1992 Consen- of action. If there were a legal obligation enter a war with China, this does not Perhaps the most crucial dimension for the sus and the One China concept. The PRC for the United States to defend Taiwan, the impose any legal obligation on U.S. treaty President to weigh is how the U.S. course interprets this as a move towards Taiwan United States would have no choice but allies South Korea or Japan to join the war, of action affects its relationships in the East independence, which crosses one of their to follow the law: all other factors would although it may impose an obligation on the Asia region, as well as U.S. global reputa- “red lines,” and mobilizes their navy across become irrelevant. Philippines. The South Korea-U.S. Mutual tion and credibility. The President would the Taiwan Strait in what looks like clear Defense Treaty only covers armed attacks have to further consider what diplomatic, preparation for military action, although it The United States does not currently main- on “territories now under [the United States non-military options the United States can is not yet clear whether they will attempt an tain a treaty alliance with Taiwan nor do any or South Korea’s] respective administrative pursue in response to a crisis. amphibious invasion, a blockade or merely of its domestic laws bind the United States control,” where Taiwan obviously does not a coercive posture. 3 Meanwhile, the PRC to declare war over an invasion against qualify. 5 The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Historically, the United States has adopted has suffered an economic slowdown over Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) Cooperation and Security only covers “an a policy of “strategic ambiguity” towards the last two years, and PRC rhetoric esca- states that Congress will “consider any effort armed attack against either Party in the terri- Taiwan, warning China that the United lates aggressively in nationalist invective to determine the future of Taiwan by other tories under the administration of Japan.” 6 States may intervene against any cross- against Taiwanese renegades, as the Chi- than peaceful means, including by boycotts However, the U.S.-Philippines mutual treaty strait aggression, while simultaneously nese Communist Party (CCP) leaders seek or embargoes, a threat to the peace and has language that may entangle the Phil- warning Taiwan that the United States may to exploit nationalism to restore their dam- security of the Western Pacific area,” and ippines in a war if combat indeed occurs not defend Taiwan if it acts provocatively. 9 aged legitimacy. This all happens within a that it will “maintain the capacity of the between the United States and China, as This stance is intended to deter destabi- matter of days, taking the United States policy United States to resist any resort to force or the treaty’s coverage includes attack on lizing moves from both sides of the strait, apparatus rather by surprise. All other global other forms of coercion that would jeopar- either party’s “armed forces, public vessels and perhaps also give the United States an issues–the South China Sea, the Middle dize the security, or the social or economic or aircraft in the Pacific.” 7 “exit option” to refrain from military inter- East, Russia and Ukraine–remain roughly system, of the people on Taiwan”; but convention in a crisis. If U.S. allies perceived unchanged from their status in 2015. sidering an attack against Taiwan a threat Although Japan is under no obligation the United States as truly being indifferent and maintaining the capacity for resisting to join the United States in a war against to the interests of either side, the United In light of this situation, this analysis will coercion do not equate to an obligation China, it may have the legal capacity to do States could perhaps walk away from a evaluate the President’s reaction from the to use that capacity. The TRA specifically so if it wishes, despite its pacifist Constitu- conflict without any loss of credibility in four dimensions most likely to affect the lays out what actions should be taken if any tion. The Japanese Diet recently passed a its other defense commitments. decision: legal, diplomatic, strategic/mili- crisis arises: “The President is directed to reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese tary and domestic opinion/politics. These inform the Congress promptly of any threat Constitution, stating that Japan could come

80 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis 81 CHINA

But this is not the case. The pattern of suffer some loss of credibility if it does not occurs. Japan itself, through former Prime the Asia-Pacific region seriously, and will

rhetoric and behavior used by the U.S. follow through on the implied commitment Minister Mori, took diplomatic steps to not back down from confrontations with STUDIES REVIEW government, consistent over the past few to Taiwan, though not to the same extent warn President Chen Shui-Bian against China. However, their deeper concerns decades, has created an understanding of as if it failed to defend an official treaty ally. provocation in 2003. 21 with China are balanced by deeper risks strategic alignment between the United of entanglement in backing U.S. interven- States and Taiwan as well as the expectation Despite this pattern of exceptionally close However, if a diplomatic solution fails to tion in Taiwan–the Philippines through of some form of military aid in a crisis–to the relations, the United States has made clear be reached and further military escalation, their defense treaty language, and Japan point where Lingnan University professors that its implied commitment does not or even kinetic combat, occurs, U.S. allies through its operational proximity to Taiwan, Brian Bridges and Che-Po Chan have called translate into giving Taiwan carte blanche would probably be in favor of the United and the almost certain need for U.S. forces the relationship “sufficiently strong… for the to provoke China, and has continually States showing military commitment rather to operate out of Japanese bases in any

10 24 U.S. to qualify as an ‘ally’ in all but name.” reiterated its support for the One China than standing by. South Korea, in recent defense of Taiwan. vol 2 policy, as made clear in the 1982 U.S.-China years, has grown increasingly concerned |

It is easy to see where this characteriza- communique: “The United States Govern- over what they perceive as waning U.S. Despite these direct risks of war with China, 2016 tion springs from. As a starting point, the ment… reiterates that it has no intention global engagement. This concern has Japan would still likely support U.S. inter- United States and the ROC were treaty of… pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or grown to the point where South Korea has vention if China moves past intimidation allies from 1955-1979. When that was ‘one China, one Taiwan.’” 17 Moreover, it has pushed for an indefinite delay in OPCON towards a kinetic attack on Taiwan. Like abrogated, the Taiwan Relations Act was directly taken diplomatic steps to rein in 2015, the plan to transfer South Korean South Korea, a guiding principle for Japa- passed almost immediately afterwards; pro-independence behavior from Taiwan, soldiers from U.S. operational command nese foreign policy has been to encourage while not imposing a strict legal obliga- most notably when President George W. to South Korean command, on the notion deepened U.S. engagement in East Asia. 25 tion, it couches the United States’ reaction Bush directly criticized ROC President Chen that U.S. command operationally binds the Additionally, Japan has deep strategic to any use of force against Taiwan in strong Shui-Bian for proposing controversial ref- United States to South Korea’s defense. 22 reasons for keeping Taiwan out of China’s language, considering it a “threat to the erenda on the ROC constitution in 2003. 18 Larry Niksch, a Congressional Research Ser- military sphere of influence. Daniel Twin- peace and security of the Western Pacific vice Asian specialist, has noted that South ing, a former member of the Secretary area and of grave concern to the United Given this impression of strategic alignment Korean officials have even raised questions, of State’s Policy Planning Staff, notes, “a States.” 11 Continued arms sales to Taiwan between the United States and Taiwan, “in response to Russia’s actions against friendly Taiwan helps secure southeast- over the past four decades, including a while also understanding the strong U.S. Ukraine, as to whether the perceived weak ern approaches to the Japanese home $1.83 billion arms package approved in support for the status quo, how would response of Obama would be repeated in a islands — the most likely route of any air- December 2015, further reinforces this U.S. allies encourage the United States to full-scale military crisis with North Korea.” 23 borne or naval assault on America’s closest impression of strategic alignment. 12 Rhet- respond to this scenario’s crisis? It is diffi- If the South Korean establishment views the Asian ally.” 26 According to Twining, these oric from both U.S. diplomats and military cult to gauge their stances on this issue, U.S. defense of Ukraine – which the United concerns have led Japan to “more clearly officials has also created the impression as the governments of Japan, Korea and States has never had any military commit- define the defense of Taiwan as a core area of a U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense. the Philippines have viewed public com- ment to, formal or implied – as insufficient, of alliance cooperation” with the United Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ment on any cross-strait security issues as they will almost certainly view U.S. inaction, States; 27 in 2005, Japan even sent mili- proclaimed Taiwan an important “security a diplomatic taboo. However, this analysis in the face of Chinese aggression against tary technicians to observe a hypothetical partner.” 13 In 2003, Admiral Dennis Blair attempts to infer their preferences from Taiwan, as a serious indication of U.S. dis- U.S.-Taiwan-Japan joint operation, with informed Chinese leaders that U.S. forces their economic and security concerns. engagement from global affairs. Of course, both Japanese and Taiwanese personnel were prepared to fight on behalf of Taiwan, their preference for U.S. engagement linking up computers in the simulation and that defending Taiwan was worth risk- Certainly, U.S. allies have a vested interest in would be coupled with the fact that they through U.S. middleman computers. 28 This ing American lives. 14 The relationship this situation being resolved without kinetic would have no obligation to be entangled indicates a level of commitment from Japan between the Taiwan and U.S. militaries has use of force, and especially without them in the conflict, or otherwise disrupt their towards Taiwan’s defense, and certainly a been exceedingly close: Taiwanese officers being drawn into war with China. China is relationship with China. wish to see resolve from the United States. were invited to the Asia Pacific Center for South Korea’s largest trading partner by Security Studies, funded by the Defense far, 19 and ranks as Japan’s second-largest The Philippines and Japan have even With U.S. credibility and engagement Department, despite a lack of official trading partner. 20 Any escalation of con- deeper reasons to urge U.S. resolve against in Asia already under question from its diplomatic recognition. 15 Perhaps most flict in the region would severely disrupt Chinese aggression – Chinese aggression Asian allies, a perceived failure to mili- revealingly, an operational plan, Oplan these trade flows; more dangerously, a has directly threatened their own territo- tarily hold off Chinese aggression could 5077-044, was leaked, showing plans for hostile resolution to the crisis would per- rial interests in the Spratly and Senkaku seriously erode the credibility of U.S. a fully engaged U.S. war against China over manently render China a more aggrieved (Diaoyu) Islands. For them, a robust U.S. security guarantees. In the absence of a the defense of Taiwan. 16 Given the cumu- and unpredictable power. Therefore, there response to Chinese military activity against regional Asian security architecture – the lative impression that these actions have would likely be a strong preference towards Taiwan would send a reassuring signal that U.S. alliance system in Asia has long been given, the United States would most likely a diplomatic solution before any combat the U.S. takes its military commitment to described as a “hub-and-spoke” system – if

82 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis 83 CHINA

U.S. allies began to doubt the value of the global warming accords without angering There is precedent for the United States Simultaneously, the United States would

U.S. defense system, they would have no its increasingly environmentally-sensitive using diplomatic pressure to rein in pressure China with both rhetoric and mili- STUDIES REVIEW alternative sources of security to turn to but population, nor allow Iranian nuclear pro- Taiwan. In 2003, President Bush took the tary signaling – to be further covered in the themselves. U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander liferation without jeopardizing the stability unprecedented step of directly criticiz- strategic dimension – that the United States Scott H. Swift gave a speech in response of its energy supplies. Any disruption to ing “the leader of Taiwan[’s]” willingness will intervene against aggression. However, to aggressive Chinese tactics in the South the relationship would negatively affect to “make decisions unilaterally to change the United States would simultaneously pri- China Sea, asserting that, “alarmed by these both countries; it would perhaps be even the status quo.” 33 The State Department vately communicate to China their efforts trends, claimants and non-claimants alike more economically painful to China, whose and National Security Council also issued to rein in Taiwan, and offer a face-saving are transferring larger shares of national economy is extremely export-oriented and statements publicly to the same effect. 34 exit option. wealth to develop more capable naval whose largest export market, by far, is the In the assumed scenario, the United States

31 forces beyond what is needed merely for United States. would find it more difficult to issue such Would China accept such an “off-ramp” vol 2 self-defense, raising the risk of a sustained overtly critical public statements; it could for de-escalation? Unless Chinese nation- |

arc of increased regional tension” – in other If direct combat between the United States be interpreted as weak support for a qua- alist sentiment has spiraled out of control, 2016 words, a destabilizing arms race. 29 Use of and China were to actually occur over si-ally under duress. However, the United the answer is likely yes. After all, Chinese Chinese force against Taiwan, unopposed Taiwan, the impact on the U.S.-China rela- States could still exert strong pressure on military actions, dating back to the 1962 by the United States, would be orders of tionship would not simply be a temporary Taiwan privately, not least through privately war against India, have often been used as magnitude more disruptive, and trigger a disruption; it would be a long-lasting rup- asserting strategic ambiguity to Taiwanese coercive diplomacy to “prove a point,” and proportionally more destabilizing “arc of ture. The RAND Corporation’s U.S.-China leaders–as this analysis will demonstrate foregone further escalation into protracted increased regional tension,” as well as seri- Military Scorecard predicts that “a war for in later dimensions, there are many cred- war. The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis was ously diminish U.S. influence in East Asia. Taiwan would be a… sharp, and probably ible reasons for the United States to not declared a victory in Beijing, even though it The President could not fail to ignore this desperate affair with significant losses on to get involved. Even if the United States ended with de-escalation in the face of U.S. possible outcome in judging a response both sides.” 32 The optics arising from a fully has already shown signals of military sup- carrier dispatches, because it forced the to this crisis. escalated war – ships sinking, thousands port, the United States could still threaten United States to warn Taiwan against future of lives lost, possible strikes against Chi- to cut off future post-crisis support for provocation. 36 Historically, Chinese leaders While military confrontation of China might na’s coast – would lead to bitter memories Taiwan in various economic and social have coupled threats against Taiwan with reassure allies and maintain U.S. regional and poison the relationship for decades issues, including revoking potential sup- an option for de-escalation: three days credibility, it comes with a very serious risk: to come. The United States would fear port for Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty before President Chen’s inauguration, Chi- the rupture of diplomatic relations with pushing China from strategic competi- (TPP) entry, or canceling the Visa Waiver na’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated, “Taiwan China. The U.S.-China bilateral relationship tor to aggrieved permanent enemy. But Program, unless Tsai immediately issued leaders have before them two roads:” affects not only East Asia, but also global China would equally fear the United States a statement to the effect that Taiwanese one road led to force, and the other road affairs. U.S.-China cooperation has been becoming a fully determined, hostile force society is still in favor of the ’92 Consensus. was the option to “pull back immediately crucial to resolving a wide range of global for containment. The enormous damage This would threaten Taiwan with the serious from their dangerous lurch towards inde- issues important to the United States, from this would entail for both sides’ long-term consequences of economic isolation with- pendence… and dedicating their efforts the sanctions regime against Iran, to climate goals implies that escalation is in neither out jeopardizing U.S. military credibility by to closer cross-Straits relations.” 37 China change, to – most importantly – sustaining side’s interest. cutting off Taiwanese security. is also very familiar with the use of the both sides’ economic growth through huge United States as a diplomatic intermedi- levels of trade. The United States would be The United States does not want to lose Would Taiwan listen to this pressure? Prece- ary to resolve crises with Taiwan. During loath to stake the stable management of its already suspect credibility among allies. dent indicates that Taiwan has backed down a period of particularly high tensions with such important global issues, as well as its Nor does it want escalation to cause a rup- before under Chen, and Chen is a seem- President Chen, China gave Dick Cheney economic prosperity, on Taiwan – a non- ture in the world’s most important bilateral ingly more risk-tolerant personality than – no great sympathizer to China – the “full ally acting, in this scenario, in blatantly relationship. This suggests that the United Tsai. Presumably, Tsai would be escalating red-carpet treatment,” in hopes that he provocative ways. States will prioritize a diplomatic solution, her rhetoric in a context of a more inde- would return to Washington to encourage as a way of demonstrating engagement pendence-radicalized social climate, driven greater pressure against Chen 38 The final However, many of these issues – especially and leadership over the issue to its allies especially by youth protesters. However, reason for China to accept a face-saving sustained economic growth – are equally without risking unpredictable military forces in Taiwan in favor of stable relations off-ramp is simple and stark: the alternative, important to China. As Professor Robert escalation. The United States could exert with China still remain strong. The business escalation, leads to an unknown situation, Sutter, an expert on East Asian affairs, stated heavy pressure on Tsai to back off from her elite, and the KMT, represent two formida- which is unfavorable to it in military trends in an interview, “the Chinese basically coop- pro-independence statements, while offer- ble forces in Taiwan society that would be and carries enormous risks. erate on these things on a calculation that’s ing China an off-ramp to save face through exerting pressure for Tsai to back down. 35 based on what serves their interest.” 31 Taiwanese rhetorical concessions, and pro- Of course, the President must not dismiss China could not cut off its support for ceed with military de-escalation. the possibility that despite the United

84 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis 85 CHINA

States’ best diplomatic efforts, China may status. Short of a situation of unrestrainable alliance system in Asia, and the reassur- Beijing more favorably disposed to a dip-

continue its military escalation. If Taiwan Taiwanese provocation, it seems clear that ance American forward-deployed forces lomatic off-ramp. STUDIES REVIEW bows to diplomatic pressure and offers a U.S. diplomatic interests – to preserve its have offered Asian partners for decades, conciliatory statement while China keeps credibility but not rupture its relationship could be overturned if Taiwan flipped from Of course, acquiescing to a blockade, in escalating, the decision seems clear-cut: with China – would chart a path towards a friendly to unfriendly hands.” 43 This threat hopes that Taiwan will be able to bear the United States, and the world, would diplomatic resolution, while still maintain- to Okinawa would be further compounded the costs without capitulating, would still then begin to view Chinese aggression ing non-combat military signaling to show by the exponential increase in China’s damage U.S. credibility. Here, the Presi- as unprovoked, and intervene to militarily U.S. resolve. anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2/ dent must consider: if U.S. forces are fully support Taiwan. AD) when distances shorten – while China committed to all-out combat against China, Military/Strategic Dimension can currently exert effective A2/AD near its could the United States actually achieve

The trickier situation emerges if neither side coast, controlling Taiwan would give it A2/ victory? If U.S. forces are likely to lose, that vol 2 backs down rhetorically. Some academics Before the decision to intervene in Taiwan AD capability up to the borders of Japan. 44 changes the calculation behind committing |

believe that any perception that Taiwanese is evaluated on its military and strategic In short, the United States has a strong forces considerably. 2016 intransigence has unilaterally provoked the merits, this analysis must make it clear that strategic interest in keeping the Chinese crisis may lead the United States to feel let there is no clear phase in which diplomacy military out of Taiwan. The broad spectrum of military assess- off the hook from its defense commitments stops and military efforts begin. Unless ments indicates that the United States to Taiwan – a line of thinking which Sutter the United States chooses to declare war But what if Taiwan could hold off the Chi- would probably still defeat China – but to summarizes as “Taiwan getting its just des- against China, diplomacy would almost cer- nese military by itself? In such a case, the do so would require a protracted, risky and serts… [as an] “irresponsible partner.” 39 If a tainly be taking place simultaneously with President’s dilemma would be solved, as bloody war. By no means would it be a one- diplomatic solution to the situation cannot U.S. military positioning. In fact, military the United States could simply rely on sided conflict. For the first seven days, the be found, the President enters a wider geo- signaling would be necessary to reinforce Taiwan to defend itself without risking United States would probably not even find strategic debate: whether Taiwan is worth U.S. diplomacy. The military dimension direct combat with China. This was cer- sufficient basing to conduct a successful defending no matter what. Experts can be is evaluated in a separate section for tainly possible as recently as the early campaign for air superiority, according to found on both sides of the debate. Charles organizational clarity. 2000’s. 45 However, in the assumed year of the RAND Corporation’s US-China Military Glaser, director of the Elliot School’s Insti- the scenario, 2017, China will have a mas- Scorecard. 49 Neither side could assume vic- tute for Security and Conflict Studies, has The first-order strategic question is how sive array of modern military assets which tory with a great degree of confidence, and argued for abandoning the defense com- much strategic value the island of Taiwan Taiwan lacks, including attack submarines both sides would incur significant casual- mitment to Taiwan, as “the risks of reduced holds, independent of its political-symbolic and fourth generation naval aircraft. 46 Ana- ties. 50 However, over time the United States U.S. credibility for protecting allies… should importance. The answer is quite a lot. Chi- lysts almost unanimously agree that Taiwan would have a greater margin for error than be small, especially if any change in policy nese military planners have long asserted alone would not be able to secure naval or China: RAND assesses that due to U.S. mil- on Taiwan is accompanied by countervail- the importance of gaining military superi- aerial superiority against China, especially itary advantages across a wide variety of ing measures.” 40 (It is worth noting that in ority within the “First Island Chain,” a line if China were committed to fully kinetic operational factors, the U.S. could afford a his context, this would be a gradual shift which stretches from Japan through Taiwan strikes against Taiwanese assets. 47 A Chi- number of military setbacks and still prevail in policy; in our scenario’s context, the down to the Philippines and Indonesia; nese blockade would very likely succeed in in a conflict, while “Chinese leaders face a United States has not done any signaling securing military dominance over Taiwan the absence of U.S. intervention. However, situation in which failure in even one area beforehand that it is changing its strategic would be China’s first opportunity to hold even in 2017, China would face enormous could spell catastrophe.” 51 position on Taiwan.) Other academics, most an island in the chain. According to Chinese – perhaps prohibitive – risks in any amphib- notably Davidson political science profes- policy experts, holding Taiwan would have ious invasion. The Department of Defense All-out protracted war is not a situation sor Shelley Rigger, have argued that U.S. significant geostrategic implications, from notes that China does not even have “the arrived at overnight. Given the political support for Taiwan is crucial for the Asian denying rival powers’ access to seas adja- conventional amphibious lift required to sensitivities of the situation, and the degree security architecture. 41 At this point, it is cent to China’s coast, to allowing Chinese support such a campaign.” 48 The impli- to which military movements would be unclear what the President would do. submarines to operate in the open ocean cation of these force assessments is that important not just for operational value, but The assessment would likely boil down east of Taiwan. 42 China’s military operations would likely stop also political signaling, officials would likely to the President’s personality, advisors at a blockade and fall short of occupation. develop a ladder of escalation options. and judgment call. Meanwhile, for the United States, Twining However, a blockade cannot guarantee observes, “Hostile control of Taiwan would capitulation, and may even harden attitudes The first half of the ladder would involve Fortunately, the precondition for this sit- geographically sever the primary base [in through a Taiwanese nationalistic backlash non-kinetic options short of combat. On uation – Taiwan refusing to back down in Okinawa] of U.S. expeditionary forces in – especially if the United States makes a China’s side, this would involve mobilizing the face of pressure – is unlikely. It would Asia from strategic regions such as the point to supply Taiwan through the block- its navy – the scenario already assumes this have to assume a radical polarization of South China Sea and the Indo-Malaysian ade. This lack of Chinese military capacity has occurred – and perhaps taking some Taiwanese society far beyond its current archipelago… The operation of the U.S. to unilaterally force capitulation could make minor offshore Taiwanese islands. The

86 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis 87 CHINA

United States has a range of non-kinetic as covered in the diplomatic dimension, Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.” 57 knows China would be hesitant to take.

options to respond with. It could raise inflicting violence against Taiwan could Such threats are probably infeasible from In the meanwhile, this graduated ladder STUDIES REVIEW its level of military alerts, conduct mili- represent clear Chinese aggression to U.S. the Chinese side. China has publicly of non-kinetic escalation could provide tary exercises, or summon carrier groups allies, and tip their scales towards encour- declared a “No First Use” nuclear doctrine the time necessary to negotiate a diplo- to formations not immediately within the aging a robust military response, increasing for decades. 58 Moreover, given the lim- matic solution between all sides, while still cross-strait theater, but in position to proceed the likelihood of U.S. intervention. ited number of Chinese intercontinental demonstrating the seriousness of a U.S. towards it (Clinton’s action in the 1996 crisis). ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can actually defense commitment. Base strikes between China and United reach the United States, and U.S. missile More coercively, the United States could States would represent a further level of defense capabilities, it is dubious whether Domestic Opinion / Politics Dimension impose a distant blockade. This would escalation. A RAND Corporation study China has confidence in successfully strik-

59 involve blockading China’s oil imports in points out that the nature of Chinese doc- ing even one U.S. city. The United States Public opinion in the United States is vol 2 maritime choke points distant from it, most trine – which stresses surprise, pre-emption possesses full escalation dominance in strongly against any war over Taiwan. Since |

notably the Strait of Malacca. China’s status and “key-point strikes” against a superior every conceivable nuclear capability; any 1982, surveys conducted by the Chicago 2016 as the world’s largest net importer of oil adversary – makes a Chinese pre-emptive resort to nuclear escalation by China would Council on Global Affairs have found that renders it economically vulnerable to such strike on US bases in Okinawa likely, even be highly unlikely. no more than one third of Americans have a blockade; one estimate predicts a dis- going so far as to call a Chinese strike on ever advocated defending Taiwan from a tant blockade could reduce China’s GDP the U.S. Kadena Air Base as “something How far would both sides be willing to Chinese invasion; only 26 percent of Ameri- by 6.6 percent. 52 There are flaws with the of a ‘no-brainer’ from an operational climb up this escalation ladder? The United cans support it today. Of course, the polling blockade strategy: military specialists have perspective.” 56 Here, China is caught in States, given its superior military capabili- numbers alone should not determine pointed out a lethal “inner-ring” blockade a dilemma. China knows if it strikes U.S. ties at every rung of escalation, can afford a U.S. response; after all, the same poll would need to complement blockades at bases, this is an automatic casus belli and to wait for China to escalate before going shows that only 47 percent of Americans distant choke points to fully cut off China’s draws the U.S. military into an all-out war tit-for-tat; for example, it can strike Chinese support defending a clear-cut treaty ally, supplies. 53 Nevertheless, an outer-ring – a war that the United States probably shores only after the Chinese strike U.S. South Korea, against North Korean aggres- blockade which does not contact China’s holds an overall advantage in, even after bases. China will realize that the United sion. However, even in this context, support forces, even if not fully operationally effec- initial base strikes. Yet its best chance of States has full escalation dominance, and for defending Taiwan is strikingly low. Out tive, is a useful intermediate escalation step operational victory relies on pre-emptively that it can probably win even after pre-emp- of all scenarios polled, defending Taiwan for the United States – a way to signal mil- launching these strikes. The resulting catch- tive strikes on U.S. assets – pre-emptive against China received the least support on itary resolve without entering combat or 22 implies China will likely seek to avoid strikes would only serve to bring about the list – even defending Ukraine, a country declaring war. Finally, in the event of a Chi- this dilemma altogether by preventing the a more protracted war and harden oth- which has never had any type of defense nese blockade of Taiwan, the United States military tension from escalating too far – erwise ambiguous U.S. attitudes with a relationship with the U.S., against further could send convoys through the blockade especially if the United States is dangling full-on casus belli. In this scenario, losing a Russian invasion was more popular. The to test Chinese reactions. All these options a diplomatic solution. war would be absolutely disastrous for the American population, as a whole, is grow- would force China to fire the first shot. CCP, undermining its nationalistic claims of ing more isolationist; the desire to “stay Conversely, the United States could launch overseeing China’s rise on the world stage, out of global affairs” is at its highest point Beyond non-kinetic options is a similarly strikes on Chinese missile assets in Fujian at the same time its legitimacy is already since 1947. 60 Even if one assumes that a multi-pronged ladder of kinetic escala- and other coastal provinces. However, as being undermined by an economic slow- crisis could trigger war fever, one cannot tion. The first and most likely step would the side superior in overall firepower, the down; running the risk of a fully escalated expect too strong a wave of support: in the be China striking Taiwan – not just mobi- United States does not have the asymmet- war would be unacceptable. 2003 Iraq invasion, the war fever case par lizing or blockading. Such a strike is very ric pressure for surprise and pre-emption, excellence, support for the invasion only possible if the PLA pursues a blockade. PLA especially one that carries such serious The President would be fully aware that grew by 12 percent, from 54 percent before doctrine envisions blockade operations as political risks. It is therefore likely that the neither side wants the spiraling risks that the September 11th attacks, to 64 percent a “Joint Blockade,” which would involve not U.S. would refrain from striking the Chinese kinetic escalation could bring. Therefore, he on the eve of the war. 61 A corresponding only an embargo, but also kinetic missile mainland unless the Chinese struck U.S. or she would most likely first order non-ki- 12 percent boost in support for a war with strikes against Taiwanese ports, airfields forces first. netic options to signal military resolve China would bring support levels from 26 and air-defense assets. 54 Inflicting actual – for example, positioning carrier forma- percent to only 38 percent. force against Taiwan might not trigger a The final phase of the escalation ladder tions. If China escalated to a blockade, a kinetic retaliation from the United States; would involve nuclear options. Some loose convoy could be sent through, or a distant Economic interdependence provides Sutter believes if such a case occurred, the talk of nuclear risks over a Taiwan scenario blockade imposed. The operation chosen additional motive against domestic sup- United States should send a strong warning has occurred before: a Chinese senior offi- would force China to be responsible for the port for a war. China is the United States’ to China not to repeat further strikes, but cial was said to have told American officials first strike, a risk which the United States largest source of imports, and its third not yet strike Chinese assets. 55 However, in 1995, “in the end, you care more about

88 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis 89 CHINA

largest export market. 62 Commercial The Congressional House of Representa- pro-Taiwan lobby in Congress to support opinion and politics provides enough social

interests would likely be highly against tives has long shown a bipartisan streak intervention, or the low opinion poll num- impetus, both for and against intervention, STUDIES REVIEW a war that ruptures relations with China. of sympathy and support for Taiwan. In bers and overall isolationist mood to justify that the President could craft a solid public But in any crisis context, the markets will 2000, the House passed a Taiwan Security non-intervention. messaging strategy to support the policy have already plunged, having immedi- Enhancement Act, which would have for- he or she chooses for diplomatic and ately priced in the increased political risks; malized links between the United States Should the President decide that he or strategic reasons. therefore, businesses would be in favor of and Taiwanese militaries, though it failed she indeed is willing to risk war with U.S. engagement to bring about a quick to pass the Senate. 66 As recently as 2013, China, there would be significant hur- Taking the cumulative implications of all resolution of the issue and also enable nor- Congressman J. Randy Forbes wrote a dles in engaging in pre-emptive military these dimensions, I conclude that the Pres- malized ties and trade relations afterwards. bipartisan letter to the Secretary of Defense action against China–the President would ident will most likely push the Taiwanese

calling Taiwan “our democratic ally,” and need to obtain a Congressional authori- and Chinese hard for a diplomatic solution vol 2 One should not assume, though, that the pressing for Taiwan to be invited to the zation for war against China, in the face to the crisis, while ordering non-kinetic mil- |

dim public support for war over Taiwan Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 multi- of low polling support for war. However, itary operations short of combat to signal 2016 and the concerns over economic stability national naval exercise. 67 In the event of non-kinetic military operations short of the threat of American intervention. This would mean that American society would the scenario’s outlined crisis, we can safely war, where assets are positioned to dare would probably be enough to de-escalate not support intervention. There is still a vast expect these same congressmen and con- China to shoot the first shot, could offer the the situation, given the United States’ dip- array of interests in the United States which gresswomen to call for the United States President a path around this dilemma; any lomatic leverage over Taiwan, and China’s are predisposed to view China negatively. to stand up against a bullying China and Chinese first strike against American forces reluctance to run risks in an unfavorable As political science professors Andrew defend its democratic Taiwanese brethren. would almost certainly swing public opin- military situation. Nathan and Andrew Scobell have pointed Any attempt to justify non-intervention, ion strongly behind a war against China. out, “China’s political system elicits oppo- through pointing out Taiwan’s unilaterally However, in the unlikely, but still possible, sition from human rights organizations; provocative steps towards independence, Ultimately, domestic opinion and politics scenario that push truly comes to shove – its population-control policies anger the would not convince these congressmen do not give us strong predictive value on that China continues to militarily escalate antiabortion movement; its repression of and congresswomen. As recently as the the President’s decision because of the the situation – would the U.S. President churches offends American Christians; 1990s, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich cleavages on both sides and the diffi- really be willing to commit the country to its inexpensive exports trigger demands was asking, “Why don’t we just recognize cult-to-forecast nature of national moods war against the world’s second most pow- for protection from organized labor; its Taiwan?” 68 Granted, the political situa- and media frenzies. Perhaps the most that erful country, or even commit to non-kinetic reliance on coal and massive dams for tion has changed since the 1990s, when can be said is that the President could actions that risk combat? The risks could energy upsets environmental groups; and memories of the 1989 Tiananmen massa- attempt to placate both pro-Taiwan hawks be enormously high: economic crisis, and its rampant piracy and counterfeiting infu- cres were still fresh – but it is not clear that and isolationists through a policy of strong even a non-negligible possibility of mili- riate the film, software, and pharmaceutical Congressional attitudes towards China diplomatic pressure against China while tary defeat. There is no way to answer this industries. These specific complaints add have improved since then, especially in the maintaining non-kinetic or other military with any certainty; it will depend on the strength to the broader fear of a ‘China recent context of rising trade and South operations that are below the threshold President’s personal beliefs and tempera- threat,’ which permeates American polit- China Sea tensions. Of course, a strong of war. ment. However, this paper’s assessment is ical discourse.” 63 isolationist contingent in Congress could that diplomatic and strategic factors would cancel the anti-China and pro-Taiwan voices Final Assessment and Conclusion incline the President towards at least risking Meanwhile, sympathy for Taiwan runs out; but it is important to recognize that combat, if not firing the first shot, due to the strong in the United States. Americans legislators in support of Taiwan still retain a The analysis has shown that the legal salience of the Taiwan issue to the overall clearly see more of their values reflected strong voice, perhaps stronger in Congress dimension confers no obligation on the U.S. alliance system in Asia, and the feeling that in Taiwan, a freewheeling democracy, than than among the general public. to act towards intervention or non-interven- the Chinese would probably back down in authoritarian China. Taiwan has also tion. The diplomatic dimension suggests due to the risks involved. committed significant resources to actively Ultimately, it is difficult to arrive at a defin- that our allies want engagement, though shaping American attitudes: it has funded itive net assessment of public opinion not necessarily combat, and that neither This raises the question: what happens if academic institutions and lobbyists to the and domestic politics; there are impe- the United States nor China would want strategic factors shift so that U.S. military tune of millions of dollars a year. 64 China, tuses towards both a policy of strong escalation. The military/strategic dimension capabilities no longer possess so-called while also exerting its own resources on intervention, and total non-intervention. If indicates there are good strategic reasons escalation dominance over the Chinese – in lobbying, has failed to achieve results any- the President wanted to sell either policy for defending Taiwan and that the United other words, if U.S. shows of resolve, daring where nearly as successful. 65 to Congress and to the American public, States would hold the overall upper hand China to shoot the first shot, become more he or she could find plenty of means to in a conflict. War would be highly risky, likely to trigger a Chinese acceptance of These results for Taiwan are perhaps appeal to both audiences – democratic and the United States has military options combat? In such a situation, the President’s reflected most prominently in Congress. values, anti-China sentiment and the vocal below the level of combat. Finally, domestic willingness to take any form of military

90 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis 91 CHINA

action which could provoke a Chinese About the Author 11 Taiwan Relations Act. Security Dynamics in East Asia: A Post-US

attack would become much more uncer- Regional Order in the Making?, ed. Elena Ata- STUDIES REVIEW tain. In the end, military realities still provide Winston Kung is an M.A. candidate at the 12 Patricia Zengerle and David Brunnstrom, nassova-Cornelis and Frans-Paul Van Der Putten the most fundamental underpinning to Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Interna- “Obama administration authorizes $1.83 billion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 102. both sides’ political decisions. tional Studies of Johns Hopkins University, arms sale to Taiwan,” Reuters, December 16, concentrating in Strategic Studies and 2015. 24 Daniel Twining, “The Future of Japan Taiwan Fortunately, it is unlikely that the United China Studies. Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit States and China will face such a scenario, 13 Alex Gray, “Forbes Leads Bipartisan Letter of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” (paper at least not in the scenario’s postulated date Asking Secretary Hagel to Include Taiwan in presented at the Taiwan’s Future in the Asian of 2017. If other countries were to conduct 1 The 1992 Consensus is an understanding, RIMPAC 2014 Exercise,” Press Release, US Century: Toward a Strong, Prosperous and

their own analysis on a likely U.S. response, reached between semiofficial representatives House of Representatives, 2013. Enduring Democracy Conference, Washington, vol 2 China – with its sometimes fundamental of the PRC and ROC, in which both sides DC, November 10, 2011), 7.

agreed on the principle of “One China,” but 14 Richard Halloran, “Taiwan,” U.S. Army War Col- | assumption of the United States’ hostile 2016 intentions and commitment to containment differed on its interpretations. It is not a written lege: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, http:// 25 Kuniko Ashizawa, “”Keeping the United States of China – will likely read the split picture document, and DPP politicians have previously strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/param- In,” in Changing Security Dynamics in East Asia: to mean that the United States would inter- denied its existence. eters/Articles/03spring/halloran.pdf, 31. A Post-US Regional Order in the Making?, ed. vene militarily. Taiwan would conclude that Elena Atanassova-Cornelis and Frans-Paul Van the United States would probably inter- 2 The Three Linkages between the PRC and ROC 15 Ibid. Der Putten (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 69. vene–but recognize there are enough refer to postal links, transportation links (includ- factors pulling the United States away from ing direct air flights), and trade links. 16 Charles Snyder, “US plan for defending Taiwan 26 Twining, 7. war in this picture, including economic con- disclosed,” Taipei Times, June 05, 2006. cerns and low public support, and that it 3 “Anti-Secession Law,” Xinhua News, http:// 27 Ibid. would be completely imprudent to run any news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-03/14/con- 17 United States of America and People’s Republic level of risk which invites a Chinese attack. tent_2694180.htm. of China, “U.S.PRC Communique on Arms Sales 28 Bridges and Chan, 590. If this scenario analysis cannot provide a to Taiwan,” August 17, 1982. definitive prediction on the U.S. response 4 The Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 968 29 Prashanth Parameswaran, “China’s Unilateral to a crisis, it can certainly confirm one truth: (1979). 18 The White House, “President Bush and Assertiveness ‘Unacceptable’ in Asia: US Navy America’s strategic ambiguity is not simply Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press,” Commander,” The Diplomat, December 17, a bargaining tactic. The ambiguity of the 5 “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United December 9, 2003, http://georgew- 2015. U.S. response is deeply embedded in its States and the Republic of Korea,” Yale Law bush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ legal, diplomatic, strategic and domes- School: The Avalon Project, October 1, 1953, releases/2003/12/20031209-2.html. 30 Robert Sutter, interview by Winston Kung, tic dilemmas, and no amount of analysis http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ November 17, 2015. will provide enough certainty for either kor001.asp. 19 “South Korea,” The Observatory of Economic Beijing or Taipei to exploit an anticipated Complexity 2013, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/ 31 United States Census Bureau, “Top Trading U.S. response, or non-response, for their 6 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Japan en/profile/country/kor/#Destinations. Partners December 2014,” https://www.census. own ends. and the United States of America,” Ministry gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/ of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa. 20 “Japan,” The Observatory of Economic Com- top1412yr.html. go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. plexity 2013, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/ profile/country/jpn/#Destinations. 32 Eric Heginbotham, The U.S.China Military 7 “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving States and the Republic of the Philippines.” 21 Jamie Miyazaki, “Japan: Don’t rock the Balance of Power: 1996-2017 (Santa Monica, crossStrait boat,” Online Asia Times, February California: RAND Corporation, 2015), 332. 8 Ayako Mie, “Abe wins battle to broaden 20, 2004. defense policy,” The Japan Times, July 1, 2014. 33 White House, “President Bush and Premier Wen 22 Joshua Bryce Bruns, “Report: US, South Korea Jiabao Remarks to the Press.” 9 Brian Bridges and Chan, “Looking North: to scrap 2015 transfer plan,” Stars and Stripes, Taiwan’s Relations with Japan under Chen October 21, 2014. 34 Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Management of ShuiBian,” 578. Relations with the United States during the 23 Larry Niksch, “The US Security Role in South First Chen Shui-bian Administration” (paper 10 Bridges and Chen, 579. Korea: Issues that Test South Korean Confi- presented at the Harvard SOAS Conference On dence in the US Commitment,” in Changing

92 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis 93 CHINA

The First Chen Shui-bian Administration, May 48 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 59. 61 “Iraq,” Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/

58, 2005), 26 and 16. poll/1633/iraq.aspx. STUDIES REVIEW 49 Heginbotham, xxiv. 35 Robert Ross, “The Stability of Deterrence in the 62 The U.S.-China Business Council, US State Taiwan Strait,” National Interest, Fall 2001, 74. 50 Heginbotham, 372. Exports to China (2005-2014), https://www. uschina.org/reports/us-exports/national. 36 Suisheng Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait: Main- 51 Heginbotham, 332. land China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis, 63 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 120. 52 Xunchao Zhang, “A U.S.China War in Asia: “How China Sees America: The Sum of Could America Win by Blockade?,” The Beijing’s Fears,” Foreign Affairs (September/

37 Robert L. Suettinger, “Leadership Policy toward National Interest, November 25, 2014. October 2012). vol 2 Taiwan and the United States in the Wake of

Chen Shui-bian’s Reelection,” China Leadership 53 T. X Hammes, “Strategy for an Unthinkable Con- 64 Zhao, 117. | 2016 Monitor 11 (Summer 2004): 7. flict,”The Diplomat, July 27, 2012. 65 Tim Ferguson, “Where the China Lobby Meets 38 Suettinger, “Leadership Policy toward Taiwan 54 Michael S. Chase, “Second Artillery in the Closed Doors: Congress,” Forbes, February 20, 2014. and the United States in the Wake of Chen Hu Jintao Era: Doctrine and Capabilities,” in Shui-bian’s Reelection,” 5. Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the 66 Michael O’Hanlon, “Can China Conquer Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Taiwan ?,” Brookings Institution, 2000, http:// 39 Sutter, interview. and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: US Army War www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/ College Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 318. articles/2000/9/fall%20china%20taiwan%20 40 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?,” ohanlon/2000fall_is.pdf. Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011). 55 Sutter, interview. 67 Gray. 41 Shelley Rigger, “Why Giving Up Taiwan Will 56 David A. Shlapak et al., A Question of Balance: Not Help Us With China,” American Enterprise Political Context and Military Aspects of the Chi- 68 Zhao, 121. Institute for Public Policy Research, November na-Taiwan Dispute (RAND Corporation, 2009), 29, 2011, http://www.aei.org/publication/why- 86. giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china/ print/. 57 Brad Roberts, China-U.S. Nuclear Relations: What Relationship Best Serves U.S. Interests? 42 Alan Wachman, “Why Taiwan?: Geostrategic (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2001), 6. Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity” (Stan- ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 149. 58 Elbridge A. Colby and Abraham M Denmark, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: 43 Twining, 7. A Way Forward (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013). 44 Heginbotham. 59 David C Gompert and Phillip C Saunders. The 45 David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Eroding Military Advantage,” The Washington Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington Quarterly 23:2 (2000), 119. DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 80. 46 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 60 Dina Smeltz and Ivo Daalder with Craig Kafura, Republic of China 2015,” 60. Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment: Results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of 47 J. Michael Cole, “Taiwanese Military Reform American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy and PLA Political Warfare,” April 16, 2015, (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global 10, 2015, http://thinking-taiwan.com/ Affairs, 2014). taiwanese-military-reform-pla-political-warfare.

94 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS

The China Studies Program at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) offers unparalleled opportunities for graduate-level study of China and international relations. Students may elect to concentrate in China Studies, with 15 courses taught by leading China scholars and practitioners, or take advantage of a range of expertise and courses related to China and Asia across programs such as International Development; Energy, Resources, and Environment; International Political Economy; and other functional and area studies programs. SAIS China encompasses SAIS-wide formal activities across greater China, including China Studies in Washington DC, the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in Nanjing, and a dual-degree program with Tsinghua University in Beijing.

Aside from China itself, Washington, DC is ground zero for the study of contemporary China and China policy. China Studies is in the center of Washington —amidst embassies, think tanks, NGOs, and government agencies — all with considerable China involvement and expertise. Given their unmatched opportunity to study China from both the inside and outside, SAIS graduates are employed in government, business, multilateral organizations, and NGOs around the world.

China Studies Program The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Rome Building, Suite 606-612 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: +1 202 663 5816 http://www.sais-jhu.edu/content/china-studies#overview [email protected]