The Illegal Abalone Trade in the Western Cape Khalil Goga

ISS PAPER 261 | AUGUST 2014

The illegal abalone trade in the Western Cape Khalil Goga

Summary This case study provides the context in which the abalone trade in South Africa occurs, describes the various stages of the trade and analyses the impact of the illegal trade on governance. The community of Hout Bay was chosen as it appears to typify the trade across the Western Cape. The report concludes that criminal governance in the abalone trade takes various forms. These include the marginalised turning to the informal economy; both abalone wholesalers and gangsters developing a level of power over a region that renders them parallel sources of authority; the corruption and co-opting of state ofﬁ cials; and, arguably, the state’s reliance on the seizure of poached abalone.

THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE resource management and consists of study can reduce certain conceptual provides an important case study of a numerous complexities that threaten barriers that exist in understanding the criminal network in Cape Town and how sustainable utilisation. First is the poaching trade. Von Lampe argues that it impacts on governance. The supply involvement of a broad spectrum of if one is to defi ne criminal networks as chain, or market processes of this role-players, ranging from those at ’sets of actors that are connected by trade reveal a number of connections the water’s edge to highly organised ties that in some way or other support that warrant further study. Of particular syndicates. Whether involved as the commission of illegal acts’, they importance are the production, divers, assistants, bag carriers, will constitute the ’least common transportation and distribution look-outs, transporters, or buyers, denominator of organised crime and processes, and the networks used. both employed and unemployed should therefore be taken as the key Particular attention must be paid to the people are involved in a hierarchy empirical referent of the concept of history of the abalone industry, and the of poaching activities. Therefore it is organised crime’.2 political and socio-economic context diffi cult to defi ne who is a poacher; This case study is based on research within which it operates. In the view of those involved represent a wide conducted into illegal abalone trading in Hauck and Sweijd:1 variety of socio-economic, racial, Hout Bay, Cape Town. This community and professional backgrounds.’ ’Illegal exploitation is intertwined was chosen as it is the location of major with issues that move beyond the By contextualising and identifying the organised criminal poaching activity and traditional methods associated with individuals within a network, a case appears to typify the trade across the PAPER

Abalone shells near Hangberg, Cape Town, courtesy of Pieter van Dalen

Western Cape. Alongside the picturesque describes the various stages of the trade A HISTORY OF THE ABALONE tourist attractions and residential areas in detail and analyses the impact of the POACHING INDUSTRY of Hout Bay lies a sizeable commercial illegal trade on governance. fi shing harbour and an industry that comprises a number of larger and smaller Background on the illegal commercial fi sheries, as well as the abalone trade activities of rights-based holders. The The illegal abalone trade has gained Declining abalone stocks, as a result of complex is a source of livelihood for a increasing attention because of the overfi shing and environmental reasons, number of communities and businesses lead to quotas and the criminalisation precariously low abalone stock levels of abalone fi shing. in the region, especially Hout Bay’s around the Cape.3 The criminalisation Hangberg township. A predominately of abalone trading is a relatively recent coloured area, Hangberg has over the development, starting in the 1970s years provided much of the labour for the and intensifying in the 1990s. Declining fi shing industry. The relationship between abalone stocks in the 1970s as a the residents of Hangberg and the state The weakening of border controls sees result of overfi shing, but also because the entry of foreign organised criminals, is a diffi cult and strained one. including many from Asia. of environmental reasons, forced the For the study, a review of the literature imposition of seasonal quotas. This preceded fi eld trips during which resulted in increased poaching levels and interviews were conducted with key the criminalisation of the abalone trade. informants. The interviews elicited views from offi cials acquainted with Weakening border controls from the Poaching becomes highly organised, late 1980s saw the entry into South with local gangs at the shoreline working monitoring and surveillance in the with international criminal networks. Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Africa of foreign organised criminals by Fisheries (DAFF), community leaders, foreign criminals from Asia and China fi sheries’ experts, journalists, Trade in particular, amongst others. Some of Records Analysis for Flora and Fauna these began to develop smuggling and in International Commerce (TRAFFIC), traffi cking routes into and out of the

Various measures are introduced, and the shadow minister for agriculture, country. At the same time, South Africa including developing environmental forestry and ﬁ sheries in parliament. experienced a rapid growth in legal courts and specialised units. Many of these are closed shortly after. This report brieﬂ y provides the context transnational trade and inward foreign in which the abalone trade occurs, investment. The increase in trade with

2 THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE IN THE WESTERN CAPE be purchased openly in Asian markets and consignments are difﬁ cult to trace once they leave South African shores. On top of this, South Africa’s neighbours do not have legal mechanisms against abalone poaching comparable to those of South Africa, which makes it possible for abalone to be smuggled to these countries for repacking and shipping as legal products.

The poaching and trafﬁ cking network The poachers

At the centre of the fi rst level of ‘production’, the physical poaching A close-up of illegally poached abalone shells, courtesy of Pieter van Dalen of abalone in the Western Cape, lie a number of shoreline coloured Asia made it more diffi cult to track illegal consequent rise in demand for abalone communities that extract the abalone exports and imports as such goods changed the market substantially.5 This from the ocean. Whilst those involved in could be hidden within the larger volumes was refl ected by an increase in South the trade may not necessarily be divers of legal goods. African abalone export prices in real (various other roles exist, e.g. lookouts terms6 from R145,78 per kg in 1990 to and drivers), they all form part of the By the late 1990s, poaching had R610,52 per kg by 2007, an increase production or poaching stage. become highly organised and lucrative, that provided a huge incentive to with ‘street gangs’ and local criminals Abalone extraction of course also occurs poaching.7 According to DAFF offi cials, and poachers on the shoreline, and as a recreational, subsistence and abalone in 2013 traded at around R1 000 transnational criminals (often the commercial fi shing activity. These forms per kg), while processed (dried)8 abalone same Chinese/Asian gangs that had of extraction are regulated by permits traded at around R3 000 per kg. Dried established themselves during the fall of and quotas. The quota system has abalone can currently fetch anything apartheid) controlling the highly lucrative been a cause of resentment for many between R6 000 and R12 000 per kg communities in coastal regions and is trade routes to Asia. The weakening of 9 once it reaches Asia. 11 the rand against the US dollar buoyed open to abuse. ‘Abalone wholesalers’ this trade as the cost of illegal abalone South African abalone is regarded as can also abuse the quota system, either became cheaper.4 The continual decline superior to abalone from other parts of by buying quotas from fi shers or by the world. Although Chinese production of abalone stocks resulted in government encouraging legal fi shers to overfi sh of abalone has increased since late abalone. At the same time, individual launching counter initiatives such as 2000,10 the demand for South African fi shers may overfi sh and commit a less ‘Operation Neptune’ and ‘Operation abalone has remained unchanged organised form of poaching. Trident’, and the establishment of and the pressure on local stocks is Environmental Courts. Despite the Poaching wholesalers unabated. Meanwhile, efforts to combat relative success of the operations and and intermediaries abalone smuggling continue to be the courts, all were closed down in blunted by low levels of international The abalone trade has moved 2005. From 2007 to 2010 abalone was cooperation. Although Hong Kong and from largely being in the hands of a listed on the CITES index but this listing Chinese law enforcement agencies marginalised population to one that is was withdrawn because of problems have been particularly helpful in ’dominated by outside opportunists’. experienced with its implementation. curbing illicit drug traffi cking to South It has evolved from an informal activity During this period, other signifi cant Africa, they have reacted with less by fi shers into ’a highly organised developments occurred globally. The enthusiasm as regards abalone commercial fi shery run by organised rise in Asian purchasing power and the smuggling. Unlike drugs, abalone can criminal syndicates’.12

ISS PAPER 261 • AUGUST 2014 3 PAPER

Organised individuals or groups of are spread throughout the country, traded for drugs is substantial but poachers make large profi ts from although they are concentrated on diffi cult to estimate. He asserts that the criminalisation and prohibition of Gauteng. Processing space has Chinese criminals have remained keen products by states, since such actions increased substantially since the earlier on supplying the Cape Town drugs drive up prices. The undeniable allure of 1990s and the quantities of abalone market and that those drug lords who big money remains a prime motivator for being handled today require whole are able to gain cheap abalone can both poorer and the wealthier poachers. houses or factories, while multi-ton barter it for drugs. Criminal networks often comprise a core of organisers at the centre directing Organised individuals or groups of poachers make illegal activity for substantial economic gain. The organisation of poaching large profi ts from the criminalisation and prohibition of networks may vary from syndicate products by states, since such actions drive up prices to syndicate, while the infl uence of poaching syndicates will also change abalone poaching syndicates need The majority of transnational traffi ckers from region to region. industrial spaces. Since the price fetched in abalone have been Asians. Whilst Often poaching wholesalers will work by dried abalone is dependent not only researchers have often referred to Asian with a group of illegal abalone fi shers, or on abalone quality but also on how well it criminal groups as ‘triads’ or ‘Chinese they will employ a number of legal divers is dried, the more sophisticated criminals mafi a’, these terms should be used with to abuse the quota system, or they will employ high-quality equipment and caution. Rather than being hierarchal act as buyers of poached abalone from drying specialists.14 Drying is, however, bodies, the groups often have the form independent divers in a community. The not the only way in which abalone can of ‘fraternal’, horizontally structured wholesalers will have contacts with other be processed; it can, for example, organisations in which individuals have a groups and networks and be aligned to be canned. large degree of autonomy. Signifi cantly, Asian criminal syndicates. For example, there is no single international abalone Asian fugitive traffi cker Ran Wei, who is Abalone traffi ckers cartel or triad, not even an oligopolistic implicated in some of the largest abalone Within the Cape Town region there network, and, according to Gastrow, poaching activity in the country, was is an established link between drug organised Asian criminals within South connected to two wholesale networks.13 dealers and Asian abalone smugglers. Africa rarely cooperate with ‘triads’ in other countries.17 Processing The focus of this relationship has been on the trade of abalone for Mandrax or Whilst traditional groups such as triads, Tied into the wholesaling process, is methamphetamines, or the ingredients jaotou and the tongs may have a turf, the processing of abalone. Abalone has for methamphetamine production. Both restricted membership and a hierarchal to be processed quickly, i.e. de-shelled drugs are particularly popular in the structure, there are many transnational and preserved, as it can easily become region, although methamphetamine, networks that have no such attributes stale or rot once extracted from its known locally as tik, has been replacing and consist solely of opportunistic habitat. Drying or shucking the product Mandrax as the drug of choice by both businessmen.18 The modus operandi of is preferable as abalone in this form is users and sellers. In 2007, Igshaan varied Chinese transnational smugglers, not only more diffi cult to trace but has Davids, the reported leader at the time including those who smuggle drugs only a tenth of its original mass. At the of the Americans gang on the Cape and humans is similar, with a network same time the value of abalone in this Flats, stated that he could trade $43 000 consisting of a core group of organisers form increases greatly. Many criminals worth of abalone for methamphetamine who resemble a ‘group of entrepreneurs’ thus prefer to process and export worth $64 000. ‘For two days more rather than a criminal organisation and shucked abalone. work, I make an extra R150 000,’ he those on the periphery who are used Sun drying is the ideal method but, is quoted as saying.15 The relationship for specifi c tasks. It is argued that most as it requires a fair amount of skill between drug dealers and abalone traffi ckers are ‘simply bold risk-takers and expertise, and is risky, industrial traffi ckers is not just anecdotal. It is who work with family members, or form processing is often employed. Police confi rmed by Steinberg, as well as Brick, alliances with friends or other social have been aware of such processing Muchpowda and Visser.16 Steinberg contacts whom they come to trust’ and is plants in South Africa since 1993. They states that the proportion of abalone ‘dominated by groups of entrepreneurs.’19

4 THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE IN THE WESTERN CAPE This is not to suggest that there are not weighing 1 to 1,5 t. Checking the bags point as the country does not have a signifi cant number of powerful criminal required the use of forklifts. Eight bags legislation against abalone exports. Using groups or networks in South Africa – were found to contain abalone. Checking import data from Hong Kong, TRAFFIC there is suffi cient evidence to validate refrigerated containers is particularly has compiled the accompanying chart to their existence – but rather it is to be diffi cult as the procedure raises the illustrate the quantity of abalone that is critical with regard to ‘alien conspiracies’. risk of causing irreversible damage to traffi cked in this manner.22 Chinese criminals engage with other lawful cargo, which could become a criminal groups to conduct business. costly exercise should no contraband Criminal governance 21 A study by Gastrow illustrated that from be found. Successful interception has On account of its magnitude, abalone initial poaching to exportation to China, tended to be informed by intelligence trading affects governance. Two ways in three different Chinese groups were and information. Both small and larger which this occurs were examined in the 20 involved within South Africa alone. ports are used. While small ports have case study, namely how it sustains an less security than larger ports, large ports Methods of transport ‘informal’ and ‘criminal’ economy, and have large traffi c volumes that are diffi cult the tendency for the trade to ‘criminalise’ Poached abalone is transported to control. key components of the state. to processing locations within the The smuggling of illegal abalone into Marginalisation and a turn to Western Cape or nationally. From there a neighbouring country that does not a ‘criminal’ economy the abalone is goes to neighbouring have abalone trading legislation is made countries or direct to Asia. Transporters easier by the porosity of South Africa’s The poaching history of certain range from those working directly for a borders. Transport can occur by land, communities is rooted in the poaching syndicate to those who move sea or light aircraft. The abalone is marginalisation and relocation of the product nationally, regionally or hidden in sealed containers and the communities during the social internationally. Those involved in the fi rst odours are masked. The abalone is engineering initiatives under apartheid. stage of transport often move abalone subsequently exported directly from the Forced away from their traditional from the sea to a transport facility close transit country or through South Africa, livelihoods, affected communities took to by. Nationally, abalone traffi ckers have since South African authorities do not poaching and fi shing as a way to subsist. transport facilities across the country. ordinarily check shipments that are in According to Steinberg, ’the transition Transporters may pay bribes to facilitate transit. Mozambique is a major transit to democracy carried with it a universal safe passage.

Transporters operating in the fi nal stage Figure 1: How trade data analysis can assist in determining volumes of IUU poached product: abalone imports into Asian have to pass customs and move their countries from South Africa (kg) wares to Asian countries. This can be done in three ways. The fi rst is to 4 500 000 smuggle the product from South Africa to its destination direct by air or sea, using 4 000 000 IUU Abalone forged permits. Illicit abalone may also 3 500 000 be concealed in or among other export 3 000 000 products, or customs offi cials may be bribed to let smuggled items pass. 2 500 000

The monitoring of trafﬁ c exiting through 2 000 000 ports is a major challenge. Poachers 1 500 000 may sign false consignment declarations. DAFF investigations have shown that 1 000 000 poached abalone is sometimes hidden 500 000 in duvets or comforters, or mingled 0 with pilchards. A difﬁ cult case was one 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 in which abalone was smuggled with Legal exports from SA Imports from SA Imports from all countries propylene pellets in a 20 t container. The consignment consisted of 18 bags, each Source: Markus Bürgener, TRAFFIC East Southern Africa

ISS PAPER 261 • AUGUST 2014 5 PAPER

expectation that access to the sea ought The criminalisation of abalone extraction to open up quickly and dramatically. has increased the number of people To make the politics of the moment turning to crime other than for purely more complicated, many members of predatory gains. For example, in 2007, coastal coloured communities were when the Cabinet suspended all abalone deeply suspicious of the recently fi shing in the hope that this would protect unbanned ANC.’23 It is apparent that the the species, there was a noticeable criminalisation of much of the abalone outcry from legitimate permit holders trade has marginalised some shoreline who were now left destitute despite communities. These communities being legal fi shers and law-abiding believe that, having been excluded by citizens. The social plan accompanying the apartheid government that favoured the suspension was unclear to them, white commercial fi sheries, they now and many of them thus turned to illegal

Many people in these communities do not see poaching as a crime, and in Hangberg poaching is sometimes referred to as ‘informal ﬁ shing’

suffer a similar fate at the hands of the fi shing to survive.27 This sentiment was ANC government. Hauck echoes this echoed in interviews conducted in Hout sentiment by referring to communities Bay, where communities were unhappy such as Hawston, where abalone about the manner in which quotas were poachers argue that they were forced distributed and by the fact that infl uential into illegal poaching by government community members had gained access policies that affected them negatively. to signifi cant quotas by corrupt means According to them, there needs to be without ever ’getting wet’. A community a concerted effort to revisit rights and leader in Hangberg has referred to redistribution.24 these rights holders as ’white collar gangsters.’28 The legacy of apartheid, however, is not the only factor in the turn toward Marginalisation of local communities criminality. This is evident when the fosters community resistance to profi les of poachers in the Western Cape regulatory law enforcement and turns are compared to those in the Eastern people toward non-state sources of social Cape. Research in the Eastern Cape that order. Aggressive policing has pushed profi led fi shers in urban centres showed people further away and increased their that the poachers in this region were social exclusion. Many people in these multi-ethnic but predominately white communities do not see poaching as Afrikaner males with a small component a crime, and in Hangberg poaching of local and Western Cape coloured is sometimes referred to as ‘informal 29 males who serve mainly as shore-based fi shing’. The likelihood of poachers divers or middlemen.25 Like the coloured being reported to the authorities is far less than with other crimes. poachers of the Western Cape ’white Afrikaans-speaking fi shers interviewed Furthermore, within a marginalised CABINET SUSPENDED ALL questioned the legitimacy of the society such as Hangberg, the ABALONE FISHING IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD post-apartheid government and were community will more easily accept those PROTECT THE SPECIES unwilling to accept the values of the new who are involved in poaching, which democratic dispensation.’26 increases the poachers’ infl uence.

6 THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE IN THE WESTERN CAPE There is evidence to suggest that large- scale poachers, who employ a number of divers and collect and wholesale abalone, have turned to ‘criminal philanthropy’ to gain community support in certain areas. Such philanthropy involves donations to people and religious bodies, and fi nancial support of local sporting projects.30 This is a strategy similar to that employed by drug dealers in the Cape Flats, who provide certain services and money to residents to gain community support. However, criminal philanthropy often goes in conjunction with threats of violence to the community and offi cials.31 Many smaller coastal communities with limited law-enforcement capacities have been fl ooded by gangsters from Cape Town who used a mixture of violence and There is virtually no security or compliance checking at Hout Bay harbour. (Image: Khalil Goga) corruption to develop a stranglehold on the illegal abalone industry.32 school during the day. Hangberg High under the infl uence of criminals and School now has a disproportionately that this reduces the functions of state. It should be noted, however, that the low number of coloured male students Standing has illustrated that much of the relationship between communities and in its ranks. The large amounts that can power of these criminals comes from the state is not a simple antagonistic be earned from poaching also make the the wealth they have accumulated. This binary of marginalised communities incentive to turn away from poaching wealth gives them the ability to buy off versus the state. Steinberg has stated less enticing and entrenches the position parts of the community by providing that despite the perceived sense of of poaching in the economy.36 Failure to protection.37 An offshoot of the abalone- injustice by communities about the gain suffi cient skills means that poaching for-drugs bartering system is that there limitation of fi shing in certain areas, is the only viable job opportunity for is a substantial increase in income and studies have proven that many communities overwhelmingly disapprove such persons. Whilst a vast number of therefore power in a crowded market. 33 people are unemployed and seek to of illegal poaching. Failure of the state and the make a living from poaching, there are a criminalisation of the state At the same time, it can also be argued noticeable number of persons who either that greed plays an important role moonlight as poachers or have left the Lack of state capacity and regulation in the lure of poaching. Many young formal economy or given up schooling, to boys (as young as 10) are recruited by There is a perception that state pursue the profi ts of the abalone industry. poaching syndicates as lookouts and institutional capacity is mismanaged soon learn the poaching trade, earning The oversupply of methamphetamines, and that this increases the ability of large sums of money in the process.34 the bartering of these drugs for abalone poachers to conduct their activities. What This development means that many and the profi ts this entails for Cape was noticeable during research trips to youngsters will choose poaching as Flats gangsters is probably one the Hout Bay was the severe deterioration a career and are often proud of their largest potential concerns in terms of and lack of control at the state-run chosen profession. In Hangberg, many criminal governance in the region. Unlike harbour. There is virtually no security youngsters have rejected a lifestyle of the other actors involved, gangsters or compliance checking at any point. gangsterism in favour of poaching as in the region have been central to the Fishing boats being docked were not the risks are lower and the rewards governance of the region for decades checked as required by the Marine Living greater.35 This in turn has led to many and are fi rmly solidifying their positions. Resources Act, and much of the port youths leaving school at a young age as It is an undeniable fact that parts of was in disrepair compared to privately they poach at night and are too tired for the Cape Flats and coastal towns are run harbours in the area.

ISS PAPER 261 • AUGUST 2014 7 PAPER

Fishing boats docked at Hout Bay harbour were not checked, as required by the Marine Living Resources Act (Image: Khalil Goga)

Boats that required repair had sunk along enough abalone to stay in business, the jetties and those who anchored their but not so much that poaching stops boats in the state harbour complained and revenue dries up’. The DAFF has of massive vandalism and theft because dismissed these accusations, stating of a lack of security. Access to ‘secure’ that confi scation of abalone does not areas was uncontrolled. Furthermore, it add much to the department’s budget. was evident that the contents of fi shing The DAFF states further that the bidding boats were being unloaded straight onto process for confi scated abalone is trucks and in full view of port offi cials and above board.40 Reliance on a poaching transported from the harbour without industry to maintain a state department being inspected and weighed. The failure is one of the more interesting examples of the state to regulate these spaces of the ‘fuzzy’ dividing line between allows criminality to thrive. organised crime and the state. The assets confi scated as a result of abalone Despite all diffi culties, smuggled abalone poaching range from a single car to is regularly traced and confi scated assets worth R16 million as in the case by Marine and Costal Management of Elizabeth Marx of Gansbaai.41 (MCM). But this has added a new dimension to government involvement. Herein lies the paradox for the DAFF. Its It has been reported that because of institutional status creates a ‘legitimate’ the poor fi nancial state of the MCM, racketeer that ‘competes’ with organised which is now part of the DAFF, up criminality. Experts have hinted that to 30 per cent of the organisation’s the DAFF has a vested interest in budget derives from this activity.38 confi scation over prevention. Experts THE PRICE THAT THE MARINE Noseweek has reported that the MCM have also expressed a concern that the AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT sold confi scated abalone for R18/kg relocation of Fisheries from Environmental COULD HAVE OBTAINED FOR when the price it could have obtained Affairs to the Department of Agriculture, 39 CONFISCATED ABALONE was R350/kg. The magazine cynically Forestry and Fisheries has not assisted in argues that ’the aim is to seize and sell limiting poaching.

8 THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE IN THE WESTERN CAPE Corruption and criminalisation of A different type of role-player was new networks can easily spring up at the state evident in the case of Philip du Toit, any time. Although a law enforcement who played a curious role in a Cape agent in Steinberg’s study is quoted as As stated earlier, a range of offi cials, Flats–Chinese crime connection. Du Toit saying that there could be only 11 major from the DAFF, the police and customs, facilitated exchanges between Chinese multi-ton abalone smuggling syndicates, and investigators, are involved in the criminals, such as the mysterious there are hundreds of individuals who control of the abalone supply chain. Mr Lau who supplied ephedrine used work in these networks and can pick Importantly, there have been a number in the manufacture of tik to criminals up the pieces and continue the trade. of cases where police involvement on the Cape Flats. At the same time, Therefore, according to Steinberg, moved beyond a ‘mere’ looking away Du Toit was employed by the National ’while organised crime investigations or the sale of information to criminal Intelligence Agency, who used him for could certainly destroy the businesses elements to more active involvement information on Chinese criminals, and of individual abalone smugglers, it is in the criminal network, not only in the Scorpions. He was also used by unlikely that they could seriously impair the Western Cape, but nationally. the abalone smuggling market as a whole. The best that organised crime Immigration offi cials have been bribed as much investigation can do in a fl at, capital-light as R5 000 for a work permit and R20 000 for a market is to signifi cantly increase the risk of smuggling abalone, and thus the cost permanent residence permit of smuggled abalone.’46

Criminal governance in the abalone trade But corruption need not be limited to George Fivaz and company to conduct thus takes various intersecting forms. law enforcement. Asian criminals are surveillance work. Du Toit thus had These include the marginalised turning known to corrupt immigration and high-level connections with important to the informal economy in the wake customs agents, with Minnaar’s research members of a criminal network whilst of lack of opportunity; both abalone having shown that immigration offi cials engaging with licit actors. He eventually wholesalers and gangsters developing a have been bribed as much as R5 000 became the centre of a surveillance level of power over a region that renders for a work permit and R20 000 for a controversy in the Western Cape and them parallel sources of authority; the permanent residence permit.42 was arrested for being in possession corruption and co-opting of state offi cials; of substantial amounts of abalone. Whilst Asian criminals have often and, arguably, the state’s reliance on the On receiving notice of his arrest, Cape focused on the corrupting lower seizure of poached abalone. Premier Helen Zille personally made calls offi cials, corruption at higher levels to investigate the matter.44 Leveraging also occurs through other criminal his position on both fronts, Du Toit is facilitators and actors. There are also an example for the merging of ‘upper’ connections between higher offi cials worlds and underworlds.45 and abalone traffi ckers. For example, drug traders have relationships with law Steinberg logically argues that the idea enforcement offi cers as well as abalone of a ‘big man’, or a controlled monopoly traffi ckers. The trial against Glenn or oligopoly over the illegal abalone trade Agliotti not only illustrated a high level in South Africa, is a creation of South of corruption, but also collusion in terms African law enforcement offi cials. For of drug and abalone traffi cking, and Steinberg, the relative ease of entering an intricate web of dealings with the into the market combined with the state. What was demonstrated by the low capital requirement for conducting trial is that Chinese and South African an abalone-poaching and smuggling criminals interact both as far as drugs operation makes a network of smaller and abalone is concerned. Facilitators players far more likely. Hopes by law like Agliotti frequently provide the enforcement offi cials to destroy or arrest necessary protection, and high-level a few ’Mr Bigs’ are therefore not realistic. corruption can thus include a facilitator If this analysis is correct, it will be very or ‘proxy’.43 diffi cult to disrupt the abalone trade as

ISS PAPER 261 • AUGUST 2014 9 PAPER

Notes 16 Johnny Steinberg, op. cit., as well as Kerri 32 Jean Redpath, Poached close to extinction, Brick, Edwin Muchapondwa and Martine 2002, available at http://www.hsf.org.za/ 1 Hauck, and Sweijd, N.A, A case study of Visser, Abalone poaching, methamphetamine resource-centre/focus/issues-21-30/issue- abalone poaching in South Africa and its use, criminal activity in South Africa and 25-fi rst-quarter-2002/poached-close-to- impact on fi sheries management, ICES the associated implications for resource extinction (accessed 15 July 2013). Journal of Marine Science 56(6), 1999: 1028. management (draft paper), available at http:// 33 Steinberg, op. cit. 2 Klaus von Lampe, Criminal networks and www.commerce.uct.ac.za/economics/ 34 Interview with Gregg Louw trust, Global Crime 6(2), 2004: 159–184. seminars/2009/Brick%20et%20al%20(2009). 3 Levels of abalone were at 8 per cent of pdf (accessed 14 April 2013). 35 Ibid. pristine (which is the level needed to sustain 17 Peter Gastrow, Triad societies and Chinese 36 Interview with Gregg Louw. fi shingin 2011. Fiona Macloed, Fishing organised crime in South Africa, Institute for 37 Andre Standing, Organised Crime: A Study experts put red alert on lobsters, Mail & Security Studies, Occasional Paper No 48, from the Cape Flats, ISS, 2006 Guardian, 18 February 2011, available at 2001. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-18-fi shing- 38 Shaheen Moolla, Contextualising illegal, 18 James O Finckenauer and Ko-lin Chin, experts-put-red-alert-on-lobsters/ (accessed unregulated and unreported fi shing of marine Asian transnational organized crime and its 14 April 2013). resources in South African waters, ISS, impact on the United States: developing a available at http://www.feike.co.za/web/ 4 Johnny Steinberg, The illicit abalone trade in transnational crime research agenda, Trends news/AbaloneISS%20Paper.pdf (accessed South Africa, ISS Paper 105, 2005. in Organized Crime 10(2), 2006. 14 April 2013). 5 Ibid. 19 Ko-lin Chin and Sheldon X. Zhang, The 39 Noseweek Issue number 147, 1st January 6 This fi gure was calculated using an online Chinese Connection: Cross-border Drug 2012 Traffi cking between Myanmar and China, Final infl ation calculator which bases its fi gures 40 Interview with DAFF offi cials on StatsSA data. It is accessible at http:// Report made to United States Department of infl ationcalc.co.za/ (Accessed 20 May 2014) Justice, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 41 John Yeld, Court orders poaching suspects’ pdffi les1/nij/grants/218254.pdf (accessed assets seized, 19 February 2003, available at 7 Raemakers et al, Review of the causes of the 20 May 2014) http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/court- rise of the illegal South African abalone fishery orders-poaching-suspects-assets-seized- 20 Gastrow, op. cit. and consequent closure of the rights-based 1.101615?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrintPageLayout. fishery, Ocean & Coastal Management 54, 21 South Africa’s scanners (there are 5 in total) ot (accessed 13 April 2013). 2011, 433-445 to check containers are of limited use, with 42 Anthony Minnaar, A symbiotic relationship: one in Durban harbour and a mobile unit 8 Abalone can be dried using a variety of organized crime and corruption in South for presidential security (the other three are techniques, including sun-drying or by the use Africa, available at http://9iacc.org/papers/ unaccounted for). DAFF interview of machinery. Since dried abalone is lighter day4/ws5/d4ws5_aminnar.html (accessed and more compressed, it is more valuable 22 Presentation made by TRAFFIC. 13 April 2013) and easier to smuggle. 23 Suspicion of the ANC was evident from 43 In this case, however, Agilotti informed on 9 Statements made a DAFF offi cial, February the voting patterns in the 1994 elections. a Madam Chen. Her drugs and abalone 2013 Communities voted predominately for the processing equipment was confi scated by 10 Peter Cook and Roy Gordan, World abalone apartheid National Party rather than the ANC. authorities and a number of arrests were supply markets and pricing, Journal of See Steinberg op. cit. made. See the State versus Agliotti and the Shellfi sh Research 29(3), 2010: 569–571, 24 Hauck, M and Sweijd, N.A, op. cit. State versus Selebi. available at http://www.fi shtech.com/ 25 Serge Raemaekers, Rethinking South Africa’s 44 Pearlie Joubert, Council spy ‘caught in the ThailandSymposium1.pdf (accessed at 10 small-scale fi sheries management paradigm crossfi re, Mail & Guardian, 26 October 2007, March 2014). and governance approach: evidence from the available at http://mg.co.za/article/2007- 11 DAFF offi cials liken this anger toward the Eastern Cape, Phd thesis, Rhodes University, 10-26-council-spy-caught-in-the-crossfi re quota system to that communities have as 2009. (accessed 13 April 2013). regards land redistribution: there will always 26 Ibid. 45 Robert Cox in The political economy of a be someone who feels aggrieved. Interview plural world, uses the term ‘covert world’ 27 Karen Breytenbach and Boyd Webb, Industry with DAFF offi cials in February 2013. to describe the realm in which Mr Du Toit players enraged by perlemoen plan, 26 12 Hauck, M, Rethinking small-scale fi sheries existed. The plural world exists outside the October 2007, available at http://www.iol. compliance: from criminal justice to social three powers of empire, state and civil society. co.za/news/south-africa/industry-players- justice, 2009, PhD thesis, Department of 46 Steinberg, op. cit. Environmental and Geographical Science, enraged-by-perlemoen-plan-1.376526#. University of Cape Town. UE8wMmCc-Hx (accessed 14 April 2013). 13 DAFF interview, February 2013 28 Interview with Gregg Louw a social activist from Hangberg in January 2013 14 Others can facilitate this. For example, during a large Mandrax bust linked to Glenn Agliotti, 29 Ibid. industrial equipment for abalone processing 30 Interview with Markus Burgerner, Senior was also confi scated. Programme Offi cer for East and Southern 15 Mark Schoofs, As meth trade goes global, Africa at TRAFFIC, January 2013 Cape Town gangs barter rare shellfi sh for 31 Interview with Shaheen Moolla (Fisheries drugs, Wall Street Journal, 21 May 2007, consultant at Feike Consulting and Faatimah available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ Hendricks (Journalist who has extensive SB117969636007508872.html (accessed experience reporting from Hangberg), 14 April 2013). January 2013

10 THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE IN THE WESTERN CAPE SUBSCRIPTIONS TO ISS PUBLICATIONS

If you would like to subscribe to ISS publications, complete the form below and return it to the ISS with a cheque, or a postal/money order for the correct amount, made payable to the Institute for Security Studies (marked not transferable). You may also deposit your payment into the following bank account, quoting the reference: PUBSPAY + your surname. If you would like to subscribe to the SA Crime Quarterly only, please quote the reference SACQ + your surname.

ISS bank details: FNB, Brooklyn, Branch Code: 251345 Account number: 62447764201 Swift code: FIRNZAJJXXX

Kindly fax, email or mail the subscription form and proof of payment to: ISS Publication Subscriptions, PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, 0075, Pretoria, South Africa ISS contact details: (Tel) +27 12 346 9500, (Fax) +27 12 460 0998, Email: [email protected]

Website: www.issafrica.org

PERSONAL DETAILS

Title Surname Initials Organisation Position Postal Address Postal Code Country Tel Fax Email

Please note that the African Security Review (ASR) is now published by Taylor & Francis. Kindly refer to the Taylor & Francis website www.informaworld.com/rasr, subscription inquiries can be forwarded to Helen White ([email protected]). For orders in sub-Saharan Africa, contact Unisa Press, PO Box 392, Unisa, 0003, South Africa. (Tel) +27 12 429 3449; Email: [email protected]

SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLICATIONS AFRICA COUNTRIES* INTERNATIONAL

ISS Monographs (Approx. 4 per year) R130 US$ 40 US$ 50

ISS Papers (Approx. 10 per year) R150 US$ 45 US$ 55

SA Crime Quarterly (4 issues per year) R115 US$ 30 US$ 40

Comprehensive subscription R550 US$ 130 US$ 150 (Monographs, Papers and SA Crime Quarterly)

SUBSCRIPTIONS INDICATE COST The ISS is an African organisation that aims to ISS Monographs only enhance human security ISS Papers only by providing independent SA Crime Quarterly only and authoritative research, Comprehensive subscription expert policy analysis, training

TOTAL and technical assistance.

* Angola; Botswana; Burundi; Congo-Brazzaville; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar; Malawi, Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Reunion; Rwanda; Seychelles; Swaziland; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe (formerly African Postal Union countries). PAPER

About the author ISS Pretoria Khalil Goga is a researcher at the ISS Transnational Threats and Block C, Brooklyn Court, 361 Veale Street International Crime Division. He has been researching organised crime New Muckleneuk, in Africa since 2009 and has been afﬁ liated with the ISS since 2012. He Pretoria, South Africa previously lectured at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and received both his Tel: +27 12 346 9500 undergraduate and master’s degrees from this university. Fax: +27 12 460 0998 [email protected]

ISS Addis Ababa About the ISS 5th Floor, Get House The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation that aims Building, Africa Avenue, to enhance human security on the continent. It does independent and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and Tel: +251 11 515 6320 delivers practical training and technical assistance. Fax: +251 11 515 6449 [email protected]

ISS Dakar Acknowledgements 4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum Route de Ouakam, Dakar, Senegal Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42 Fax: +221 33 860 3343 [email protected] This paper was made possible with support from the International ISS Nairobi Development Research Centre. The ISS is grateful for support from Braeside Gardens, the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the governments off Muthangari Road of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya Sweden and the USA. Tel: +254 20 266 7208 Fax: +254 20 266 7198 [email protected]

www.issafrica.org

© 2014, Institute for Security Studies ISS Paper No 261 Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reﬂ ect those of the ISS, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.