The Illegal Abalone Trade in the Western Cape Khalil Goga
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ISS PAPER 261 | AUGUST 2014 The illegal abalone trade in the Western Cape Khalil Goga Summary This case study provides the context in which the abalone trade in South Africa occurs, describes the various stages of the trade and analyses the impact of the illegal trade on governance. The community of Hout Bay was chosen as it appears to typify the trade across the Western Cape. The report concludes that criminal governance in the abalone trade takes various forms. These include the marginalised turning to the informal economy; both abalone wholesalers and gangsters developing a level of power over a region that renders them parallel sources of authority; the corruption and co-opting of state offi cials; and, arguably, the state’s reliance on the seizure of poached abalone. THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE resource management and consists of study can reduce certain conceptual provides an important case study of a numerous complexities that threaten barriers that exist in understanding the criminal network in Cape Town and how sustainable utilisation. First is the poaching trade. Von Lampe argues that it impacts on governance. The supply involvement of a broad spectrum of if one is to defi ne criminal networks as chain, or market processes of this role-players, ranging from those at ’sets of actors that are connected by trade reveal a number of connections the water’s edge to highly organised ties that in some way or other support that warrant further study. Of particular syndicates. Whether involved as the commission of illegal acts’, they importance are the production, divers, assistants, bag carriers, will constitute the ’least common transportation and distribution look-outs, transporters, or buyers, denominator of organised crime and processes, and the networks used. both employed and unemployed should therefore be taken as the key Particular attention must be paid to the people are involved in a hierarchy empirical referent of the concept of history of the abalone industry, and the of poaching activities. Therefore it is organised crime’.2 political and socio-economic context diffi cult to defi ne who is a poacher; This case study is based on research within which it operates. In the view of those involved represent a wide conducted into illegal abalone trading in Hauck and Sweijd:1 variety of socio-economic, racial, Hout Bay, Cape Town. This community and professional backgrounds.’ ’Illegal exploitation is intertwined was chosen as it is the location of major with issues that move beyond the By contextualising and identifying the organised criminal poaching activity and traditional methods associated with individuals within a network, a case appears to typify the trade across the PAPER Abalone shells near Hangberg, Cape Town, courtesy of Pieter van Dalen Western Cape. Alongside the picturesque describes the various stages of the trade A HISTORY OF THE ABALONE tourist attractions and residential areas in detail and analyses the impact of the POACHING INDUSTRY of Hout Bay lies a sizeable commercial illegal trade on governance. fi shing harbour and an industry that comprises a number of larger and smaller Background on the illegal commercial fi sheries, as well as the abalone trade activities of rights-based holders. The The illegal abalone trade has gained Declining abalone stocks, as a result of complex is a source of livelihood for a increasing attention because of the overfi shing and environmental reasons, number of communities and businesses lead to quotas and the criminalisation precariously low abalone stock levels of abalone fi shing. in the region, especially Hout Bay’s around the Cape.3 The criminalisation Hangberg township. A predominately of abalone trading is a relatively recent coloured area, Hangberg has over the development, starting in the 1970s years provided much of the labour for the and intensifying in the 1990s. Declining fi shing industry. The relationship between abalone stocks in the 1970s as a the residents of Hangberg and the state The weakening of border controls sees result of overfi shing, but also because the entry of foreign organised criminals, is a diffi cult and strained one. including many from Asia. of environmental reasons, forced the For the study, a review of the literature imposition of seasonal quotas. This preceded fi eld trips during which resulted in increased poaching levels and interviews were conducted with key the criminalisation of the abalone trade. informants. The interviews elicited views from offi cials acquainted with Weakening border controls from the Poaching becomes highly organised, late 1980s saw the entry into South with local gangs at the shoreline working monitoring and surveillance in the with international criminal networks. Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Africa of foreign organised criminals by Fisheries (DAFF), community leaders, foreign criminals from Asia and China fi sheries’ experts, journalists, Trade in particular, amongst others. Some of Records Analysis for Flora and Fauna these began to develop smuggling and in International Commerce (TRAFFIC), traffi cking routes into and out of the Various measures are introduced, and the shadow minister for agriculture, country. At the same time, South Africa including developing environmental forestry and fi sheries in parliament. experienced a rapid growth in legal courts and specialised units. Many of these are closed shortly after. This report briefl y provides the context transnational trade and inward foreign in which the abalone trade occurs, investment. The increase in trade with 2 THE ILLEGAL ABALONE TRADE IN THE WESTERN CAPE be purchased openly in Asian markets and consignments are diffi cult to trace once they leave South African shores. On top of this, South Africa’s neighbours do not have legal mechanisms against abalone poaching comparable to those of South Africa, which makes it possible for abalone to be smuggled to these countries for repacking and shipping as legal products. The poaching and traffi cking network The poachers At the centre of the fi rst level of ‘production’, the physical poaching A close-up of illegally poached abalone shells, courtesy of Pieter van Dalen of abalone in the Western Cape, lie a number of shoreline coloured Asia made it more diffi cult to track illegal consequent rise in demand for abalone communities that extract the abalone exports and imports as such goods changed the market substantially.5 This from the ocean. Whilst those involved in could be hidden within the larger volumes was refl ected by an increase in South the trade may not necessarily be divers of legal goods. African abalone export prices in real (various other roles exist, e.g. lookouts terms6 from R145,78 per kg in 1990 to and drivers), they all form part of the By the late 1990s, poaching had R610,52 per kg by 2007, an increase production or poaching stage. become highly organised and lucrative, that provided a huge incentive to with ‘street gangs’ and local criminals Abalone extraction of course also occurs poaching.7 According to DAFF offi cials, and poachers on the shoreline, and as a recreational, subsistence and abalone in 2013 traded at around R1 000 transnational criminals (often the commercial fi shing activity. These forms per kg), while processed (dried)8 abalone same Chinese/Asian gangs that had of extraction are regulated by permits traded at around R3 000 per kg. Dried established themselves during the fall of and quotas. The quota system has abalone can currently fetch anything apartheid) controlling the highly lucrative been a cause of resentment for many between R6 000 and R12 000 per kg communities in coastal regions and is trade routes to Asia. The weakening of 9 once it reaches Asia. 11 the rand against the US dollar buoyed open to abuse. ‘Abalone wholesalers’ this trade as the cost of illegal abalone South African abalone is regarded as can also abuse the quota system, either became cheaper.4 The continual decline superior to abalone from other parts of by buying quotas from fi shers or by the world. Although Chinese production of abalone stocks resulted in government encouraging legal fi shers to overfi sh of abalone has increased since late abalone. At the same time, individual launching counter initiatives such as 2000,10 the demand for South African fi shers may overfi sh and commit a less ‘Operation Neptune’ and ‘Operation abalone has remained unchanged organised form of poaching. Trident’, and the establishment of and the pressure on local stocks is Environmental Courts. Despite the Poaching wholesalers unabated. Meanwhile, efforts to combat relative success of the operations and and intermediaries abalone smuggling continue to be the courts, all were closed down in blunted by low levels of international The abalone trade has moved 2005. From 2007 to 2010 abalone was cooperation. Although Hong Kong and from largely being in the hands of a listed on the CITES index but this listing Chinese law enforcement agencies marginalised population to one that is was withdrawn because of problems have been particularly helpful in ’dominated by outside opportunists’. experienced with its implementation. curbing illicit drug traffi cking to South It has evolved from an informal activity During this period, other signifi cant Africa, they have reacted with less by fi shers into ’a highly organised developments occurred globally. The enthusiasm as regards abalone commercial fi shery run by organised rise in Asian purchasing power and the smuggling. Unlike drugs, abalone can criminal syndicates’.12 ISS PAPER 261 • AUGUST 2014 3 PAPER Organised individuals or groups of are spread throughout the country, traded for drugs is substantial but poachers make large profi ts from although they are concentrated on diffi cult to estimate. He asserts that the criminalisation and prohibition of Gauteng. Processing space has Chinese criminals have remained keen products by states, since such actions increased substantially since the earlier on supplying the Cape Town drugs drive up prices.