Congress During the War of 1812

This dissertation has been 62—2121 microfilmed exactly as received BARLOW, William Ray, 1930- CONGRESS DURING THE WAR OF 1812. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1961 History, modern University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan CONGRESS DURING THE WAR OF l8l2 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By William Ray Barlow, B, A,, A. M. ***** The Ohio State University 1961 Approved by Adviser Department of History PREFACE . Most investigations into the War of I8l2 have emphasized causes to the exclusion of other phases. With the exception of various chap ters in Henry Adams' history of the Madison administration and brief passages in seme biographies, the role which Congress played has been largely ignored. This study attempts to tell the story of the United States first wartime Congress. Throughout the war, many events from a crucial financial situa tion to the burning of a Canadian village captured the attention of Congress. Response to these events varied from heated debate to the passage of laws. Since there existed no precedents or accepted pat terns which might have provided methods of conduct during the crisis. Congress was forced constantly to develop new means of resolving the complicated problems arising from the war. In some cases, no alter natives were possible, as probably was true of the over-all strategy of the war which was executive in origin. In others, however, choices existed, as in the type of government bank thought necessary to meet the financial crisis. Practically every controversy caused by the war reached the halls of Congress; all, with few exceptions, became politically involved; and all, in large measure, were decided along partisan lines. This study emphasizes that Congress' actions were conditioned by legislative-executive relationships, legislative procedures and organization, and partisanship. ii iii During the war debates of late I8 II and early I8l2, Congress gave considerable attention to tfee role expected of it once hostilities be gan. In raring degrees, some members claimed that Congress must bear the brunt of the responsibility, while others declared that its po sition would be far inferior to that of the executive. Shortly after peace returned. Representative John Forsyth (Rep., Ga.) pointed out: "Time had been . when the recommendations of the Executive of the United States, and persons to whom the Executive offices were commit ted, had some weight in this House; when the opinions of persons who had examined, in all their details, subjects on which they must be best informed, were considered of some force and authority." In re taliation, Representative Daniel Sheffey (Fed,, Va.) "wished to God" that era had passed and that "the time had arrived when such recom mendations had no more influence that they merited."! The two statements are significant in light of the preceding three years. The executive branch of the government recommended the most important legislation of the war period, but Congress was not as passive as many members thought that it might be. Basic laws as well as funds still had to be provided, authorizations granted, and many issues could be resolved only in Congress through political means. The job of Congress was criticizing, objecting, amending, and at times initiating. Although the President enjoyed more power than in peace time, he was careful that his actions had a legislative base. These discretionary powers were given the President over the iv objections of some members who feared an increase in executive authority. In some policy spheres, the influence of the President prevailed. The diplomacy of the war, for example, was almost entirely executive in origin and direction. Congress often criticized but did not ser iously attempt to alter executive plans. The military strategy of the war, upon which depended the executive's diplomatic aims, however, was subjected to legislation. In many other areas, the desires of the President and Congress clashed, and each attempted to imprint on the other its ideas. Again the problem of a national bank is rele vant. Over the objections of the President, who insisted on a particular type of a bank. Congress debated various alternatives and eventually passed a bill. The measure was vetoed on the grounds that it would not aid the war effort, and Congress was on the verge of en acting the executive plan when peace arrived. When it came to ap propriations, however, congressional influence was strong. While ad ministrative departments prepared the estimates of money required. Congress scrutinized all expenditures and rarely gave what was asked. On many issues the President failed to enlist sufficient support, as for example, in regard to an embargo and conscription; at other times his leadership was decisive. Congress often tended to procrastinate and perhaps to hold an exaggerated opinion of itself, but on occasion it acted quickly and vigorously. Neither was consistent. Politics as usual marked the war years. While the Republican presidential candidate in 1812 received fewer votes than in 1808, the V party won all national elections during the war, even increasing con siderably its strength in the Fourteenth Congress. Both parties hoped to gain politically from the war, and probably the greater opportunity to do so rested with the Federalists, for mismanagement or defeat would have tended to discredit the Repbulicans, But, as is well known, the minority's obstructionistic approach as well as its segment of dis union sentiment, destroyed the party's future. For the Republicans, peace-even without victory— proved a boon. The War of l8l2, then, was fought with a nation bitterly divid ed politically, and nowhere was this disunity more apparent than in Congress, Although some Federalists voted in favor of preparation for war, all opposed its declaration, and only on one occasion did a member of the minority advocate that the party lend its support and then on terms unacceptable to the administration. The decision on war, in fact, intensified the partisan feeling already existing and aggravated the charges of British and French influence. The debate on the latter issue proved one of the most interesting of the war, I wish to acknowledge the kind assistance of Professor Harry L, Coles, who suggested the topic for this study and who directed the research, I am also indebted to the staff of The Ohio State University Library and to others who have assisted in making this thesis possible. NOTES TO PREFACE ^Annals. 13 Cong., 3 Sess, (House), February 27, 1815» pp. 1215-1216. VI CONTENTS Page PREFACE................................................... ii Chapter I. CONGRESS GOES TO W A R ............................... 1 II, CONGRESS DURING THE W A R ........' 20 III. CONGRESSIONAL CONVERSION AND CONTROL................ 52 IV. MANPOWER.......................................... 95 V. IN SEARCH OF MONEY................................. 135 VI, MILITARY STRATEGY................................. 186 VII. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS...................... 244 VIII. CONCLUSIONS...................................... 294 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................... 308 AUTOBIOGRAPHY.............................................. 325 Vll CHAPTER I CONGRESS GOES TO WJt The President and Congress Declare War A "black Cloud of War, with England hangs over us," observed ex- President Adams in early spring of 1812, At the same time, another ex-president at Monticello awaited a declaration of war with "perfect calmness." Whether men viewed the national scene with apprehension or composure, all would agree with Representative Abijah Bigelow (Fed,, Mass,), who told his wife Hannah that it was a "critical period for the nation"; in fact, Joseph Story thought that "at no period since the independence of our country will there have been a more interesting crisis." "Some hesitate, some are decidedly for peace," Story observed, and he predicted a "great and resolute struggle when the time ap proaches," From "all quarters" he heard that the "President is un hesitatingly for war,"l President James Madison was not as eager for war as Story implied, but his actions over the previous months had been directed less toward the olive branch than toward the sword. He had called the nationalistic Twelfth Congress into session a month earlier than usual because of "great and weighty matters" in regard to the "further developments of the policy of the belligerent powers toward this country which might the more unite the national councils in the measures to be pursued," In his third annual message he had spoken bellicose words against 1 2 England as well as France and recommended to Congress a program of war preparation* On May 13, undoubtedly with Madison's knowledge, the House passed with no "more than five dissenting votes" a resolution introduced by Representative David R. Williams (Rep., ^* ) directing absentee mem- 2 bers to return "forthwith," On the same day that Congress was summoned, the President and House leaders met to outline administration strategy. Madison desired the conference and the war-minded congressmen were even more willing to meet with the President, for it seemed that Madison was unnecessarily hesi tant in asking for war. This reluctance arose not frcm "backwardness" on Madison's part but from the fear that the House might refuse to sustain his recommendation for war. As described by editor Joseph Gales of

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