DOCSLIB.ORG

UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ct538mg Author Twist, Kimberly Publication Date 2015 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair Professor Jason Wittenberg Professor Jacob Citrin Professor Katerina Linos Spring 2015 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe Copyright 2015 by Kimberly Ann Twist Abstract The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair As long as far-right parties { known chiefly for their vehement opposition to immigration { have competed in contemporary Western Europe, scholars and observers have been concerned about these parties' implications for liberal democracy. Many originally believed that far- right parties would fade away due to a lack of voter support and their isolation by mainstream parties. Since 1994, however, far-right parties have been included in 17 governing coalitions across Western Europe. What explains the switch from exclusion to inclusion in Europe, and what drives mainstream-right parties' decisions to include or exclude the far right from coalitions today? My argument is centered on the cost of far-right exclusion, in terms of both office and policy goals for the mainstream right. I argue, first, that the major mainstream parties of Western Europe initially maintained the exclusion of the far right because it was relatively costless: They could govern and achieve policy goals without the far right. During this period of exclusion, however, major parties of both the left and right attempted to win back voters lost to the far right by enacting more restrictive immigration policies; they would borrow from the far right as long as it was beneficial. Second, I argue that the mainstream right has increasingly treated the far right as it would any other party during coalition decisions. Major mainstream parties prioritize being in government, and will select the coalition that offers both stability and the ability to achieve policy goals in areas of greatest importance to them at the time. As the far right continued to attract voters throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the mainstream right realized that working with the far right { which was now a more useful partner, as it had more legislative seats { might result in more advantageous policy compromises. Once far-right parties could be useful to the mainstream right, exclusion became a more costly strategy. Third, far-right parties can be attractive coalition partners to the mainstream right be- cause they are flexible on most issues { immigration excepted { and thus more willing to give the mainstream right its preferred policies in exchange for gains in immigration. Addi- tionally, far-right parties are nearly always smaller than the major mainstream-right parties, 1 so the mainstream parties are able to carry more weight in coalition decisions and obtain important ministerial positions. I demonstrate my argument through in-depth case studies of Austria and the Netherlands, from the 1980s through the present. Both countries have had far-right parties in and out of government, providing important variation on the dependent variable. Finally, I show the wider applicability of my argument in two ways by extending my arguments about inclusion and exclusion to coalition-like agreements in the United Kingdom and France, as well as to mainstream left responses to far-left parties in Europe. 2 To Stephen. i Contents Contents ii List of Figures iv List of Tables v 1 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in West- ern Europe 1 1.1 Mainstream-right and far-right parties . 2 1.2 The far right in government: A record of growing collaboration . 4 1.3 Existing literature . 9 1.4 My argument . 16 1.5 Data and methods . 25 1.6 Chapter overview . 28 1.7 Appendix: Party names . 30 1.8 Appendix 2: Mainstream-right and far-right seat shares . 32 2 Changing Electoral Realities and the Mainstream Right 34 2.1 Mainstream voters up for grabs . 34 2.2 Opportunities for new parties . 39 2.3 The importance of immigration . 45 2.4 The far right beyond immigration . 51 2.5 Conclusion . 55 3 Dutch and Austrian Parties 56 3.1 Mainstream parties in the Netherlands . 56 3.2 Mainstream parties in Austria . 64 3.3 The politics of the past . 70 3.4 The far right in the Netherlands . 72 3.5 The far right in Austria . 79 3.6 Voter support for the far right . 84 3.7 Conclusion . 86 ii 4 Borrowing from the Far Right: The Mainstream Right and Immigration 87 4.1 The (end of the) Dutch consensus about multiculturalism . 88 4.2 The politicization of immigration in Austria . 97 4.3 Conclusion . 104 5 Coalition Formation in Austria 105 5.1 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far right (Scenario 3) . 108 5.2 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition with the far right, but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . 111 5.3 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right (Scenario 1) . 118 5.4 Far right not mathematically part of coalition options (Scenario 4) . 133 5.5 Conclusion . 136 6 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands 138 6.1 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands . 139 6.2 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right (Scenario 1) . 145 6.3 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition with the far right, but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . 152 6.4 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far right (Scenario 3) . 155 6.5 Conclusion . 160 7 The Mainstream Right and Far Right in Majoritarian Systems: France and the United Kingdom 163 7.1 The mainstream right and far right in France . 163 7.2 The mainstream right and far right in the United Kingdom . 174 8 Conclusion: Mainstream and Extreme Parties in Western Europe 185 8.1 The mainstream left and extreme parties . 185 8.2 The future of mainstream right and far right cooperation . 193 Bibliography 196 iii List of Figures 2.1 Alford Index, 1947-1986 . 36 7.1 Immigration tagline in the Conservative Party manifesto, 2005 . 179 7.2 \Go home" vans (Conservative-Lib Dem coalition, 2013) . 183 iv List of Tables 1.1 Formal and informal governmental inclusion of the far right . 6 1.2 Elections: Would a mainstream-far right coalition have a majority of seats? . 7 1.3 Elections: If the mainstream right and far right had enough seats to govern, did a coalition form? . 7 1.4 Elections: Could a right-wing coalition be formed without the far right? . 8 1.5 Replication of de Lange's (2008) results: Variables affecting far-right inclusion . 12 1.6 Test of party distance as a predictor of far-right inclusion . 13 1.7 Austrian coalitions and CMP distance measures . 15 1.8 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 1990 (CMP scores in parentheses) 15 1.9 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 2008 (CMP scores in parentheses) 16 1.10 Predictions of coalition formation, Austria 2008, using traditional theories . 17 1.11 Three measures of party placements, Dutch parliamentary parties . 19 1.12 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2001 . 20 1.13 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2010 . 21 1.14 Far right party positioning and issue importance . 23 1.15 Expectations: Mainstream right inclusion of the far right . 24 1.16 Coalition cases, by country and scenario . 27 1.17 Far-right parties in Western Europe, 1980s-present . 30 1.18 Current major mainstream-right parties in Western Europe . 31 2.1 Working-class as percent of active work force, 1950s-1980s . 36 2.2 Change in religious affiliation of Europeans, 1970-97 . 37 2.3 Percent of population attending religious services at least once per week, 1970-98 37 2.4 Percent change in number of party members, 1980-2000 . 38 2.5 Real GDP growth, 1960-1989 . 39 2.6 Left-right distance between the major parties of left and right, 1983 to 1993 . 42 2.7 Vote shares for \old" parties, 1960 and 1990 . 43 2.8 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after 1980 . 44 2.9 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after the far right's first successful national election (> 5%) . 44 2.10 Percent of British respondents feeling there are too many immigrants in the UK 45 2.11 Percent wanting immigration partially or totally restricted . 46 v 2.12 Foreigners/immigration as an important problem in the Netherlands, 1971-2012 47 2.13 Foreign residents as percentage of the total population, 1950-1990 . 47 2.14 Percentage of new immigrants from outside the EU . 48 2.15 Asylum applications, 1985-99 (in thousands) . 49 2.16 Far right party positioning and issue importance . 50 2.17 Percent agreeing they \would not want an immigrant" as a neighbor . 50 2.18 Percent saying that there are too many immigrants in their country .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Democracies Are Often Classified According to the Form of Government That They Have
    Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Democracies are often classified according to the form of government that they have: • Parliamentary • Presidential • Semi-Presidential Legislative responsibility refers to a situation in which a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government from office without cause. A vote of confidence is initiated by the government { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A vote of no confidence is initiated by the legislature { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the incumbent loses a vote of no confidence. A vote of no confidence is initiated by the legislature { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the incumbent loses a vote of no confidence. A vote of confidence is initiated by the government { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. The defining feature of presidential democracies is that they do not have legislative responsibility. • US Government Shutdown, click here In contrast, parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies both have legislative responsibility. • PM Question Time (UK), click here In addition to legislative responsibility, semi-presidential democracies also have a head of state who is popularly elected for a fixed term. A head of state is popularly elected if she is elected through a process where voters either (i) cast a ballot directly for a candidate or (ii) they cast ballots to elect an electoral college, whose sole purpose is to elect the head of state.
    [Show full text]
  • Forming a Government in the Event of a Hung Parliament: the UK's Recognition Rules in Comparative
    Forming a government in the event of a hung parliament The UK’s recognition rules in comparative context Petra Schleiter Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford Valerie Belu Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford (Graduate Student) Robert Hazell The Constitution Unit University College London May 2016 ISBN: 978-1-903903-73-5 Published by: The Constitution Unit School of Public Policy University College London 29-31 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU United Kingdom Tel: 020 7679 4977 Fax: 020 7679 4978 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ Department of Politics and International Relations Manor Road Building Manor Road Oxford OX1 3UQ United Kingdom Tel: 01865 278700 Email: [email protected] Web: www.politics.ox.ac.uk © The Constitution Unit, UCL & DPIR, University of Oxford 2016 This report is sold subject to the condition that is shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. First Published May 2016 Front cover image copyright Crown Copyright/ Number 10 Flickr 2009 Contents Executive summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 The need for clearer rules on government formation ....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded from Manchesterhive.Com at 09/23/2021 12:29:26PM Via Free Access Austria Belgium
    Section 5 Data relating to political systems THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE referendum. The constitutional court (Verfassungsgerichtshof ) determines the constitutionality of legislation and Austria executive acts. Population 8.1 million (2000) Current government The 1999 Capital Vienna election brought to an end the Territory 83,857 sq. km 13-year government coalition GDP per capita US$25,788 (2000) between the Social Democratic Party Unemployment 3.7 per cent of of Austria (SPÖ) and Austrian workforce (2000) People’s Party (ÖVP), which had State form Republic. The Austrian been under considerable strain. When constitution of 1920, as amended in the two parties failed to reach a 1929, was restored on 1 May 1945. On coalition agreement, Austria found 15 May 1955, the four Allied Powers itself short of viable alternatives. The signed the State Treaty with Austria, record gains of the radical right ending the occupation and Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) had recognising Austrian independence. changed the balance of power within Current head of state President the party system. The other two Thomas Klestil (took office 8 July numerically viable coalitions – 1992, re-elected 1998). SPÖ/FPÖ or ÖVP/FPÖ – had been State structure A federation with nine ruled out in advance by the two provinces (Länder), each with its own mainstream parties. An attempt by the constitution, legislature and SPÖ to form a minority government government. failed. Finally, a coalition was formed Government The president appoints the between the ÖVP and FPÖ under prime minister (chancellor), and, on Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) and the chancellor’s recommendation, a reluctantly sworn in by President cabinet (Council of Ministers) of Klestil on 5 February 2000.
    [Show full text]
  • Do Coalition Partners Drift Apart Or Stick Together? an Analysis of Party Platform Changes in 8 Western European Countries
    Do Coalition Partners Drift Apart or Stick Together? An analysis of party platform changes in 8 Western European countries Abstract Coalition governments are the norm in West European democracies. Yet, we do not know whether governing together affects parties’ calculations about setting their pol- icy position in their next election manifesto. Therefore we ask: do coalition parties drift apart or stick together after a spell in office? We hypothesize that government parties stick together in anticipation of government continuation. Coalition parties are more likely to expect continuation if they are popular, have no inter-party conflict and have experience in co-governing. If this is not the case, coalition parties drift apart as they seek new coalition formation opportunities. We empirically substanti- ate our hypotheses with an innovative measure of party platform change analyzing 1,193 platform changes in 8 European democracies between 1968 and 2013 using new opinion poll data and several existing data sets. We demonstrate that parties plant the seeds of future coalition participation in their platforms: the more experienced and the more popular coalition parties are, the more they converge. Encountering conflict, on the contrary, leads them to diverge. Key words: Political Parties’ Strategies, Coalition Government, Coordination of Party Platforms, Political Decision Making In 1982, the mutual dislike between Joop den Uyl, the leader of the Dutch Social Democrats (PvdA), and Dries van Agt, the leader of the Christian Democrats (CDA), had reached its zenith. The coalition government consisting of these two parties and D66 collapsed. A few months later, new elections followed, where the CDA had shifted their position to the right, closer to its alternative coalition partner the Liberal Conserva- tives (VVD).
    [Show full text]
  • The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist a Dissertation Submitted In
    The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair Professor Jason Wittenberg Professor Jacob Citrin Professor Katerina Linos Spring 2015 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe Copyright 2015 by Kimberly Ann Twist Abstract The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair As long as far-right parties { known chiefly for their vehement opposition to immigration { have competed in contemporary Western Europe, scholars and observers have been concerned about these parties' implications for liberal democracy. Many originally believed that far- right parties would fade away due to a lack of voter support and their isolation by mainstream parties. Since 1994, however, far-right parties have been included in 17 governing coalitions across Western Europe. What explains the switch from exclusion to inclusion in Europe, and what drives mainstream-right parties' decisions to include or exclude the far right from coalitions today? My argument is centered on the cost of far-right exclusion, in terms of both office and policy goals for the mainstream right. I argue, first, that the major mainstream parties of Western Europe initially maintained the exclusion of the far right because it was relatively costless: They could govern and achieve policy goals without the far right.
    [Show full text]
  • Do Dutch Ministerial Appointments Respond to Individualization And
    Master Thesis Master COMPASS (Comparative Politics, Administration and Society) 2017-2018 Radboud University Nijmegen The government we deserve: do Dutch ministerial appointments respond to individualization and party-decline? A study into ministerial selection in Dutch government cabinets in 1977-2017 Floris van Bodegraven s4632370 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Monique Leyenaar 29-7-2019 Picture: Houses of Parliament, Hofvijver, The Hague Michiel Verbeek, BY-SA 4.0 https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bestand:Den_Haag,_het_Binnenhof_diverse_RM_met_de_Hofvijver_op_de_voorgrond_foto8_2015-08- 05_18.56.jpg 1 s4632370 Floris van Bodegraven Abstract This thesis performs a descriptive analysis of all ministerial appointments in Dutch cabinets between 1977-2017 in order to understand find out whether societal macro-developments such as individualization, party decline and party system fragmentation influence the preference of political parties and prime ministers for the type of experience of their ministers during government formation. Although it finds no support for this theorem, this thesis does contribute to the literature by expanding previous work into the type of ministers that take seat in Dutch government. As such, it finds that while political experience dominated up to 2002, it seems to be on its retour. This thesis attempted to find causal relationships between ministerial expertise and individualization and party decline. This analysis did not provide any usable results due to multicollinearity between the predictor-variables, but may provide some avenues for further research. Keywords: Ministerial selection, multiparty government, cabinet government, government formation, principal- agent approach, party decline, party system fragmentation. Wordcount: 20.818 2 s4632370 Floris van Bodegraven Acknowledgement & Foreword This thesis started as result of pure curiosity after the Dutch general parliamentary elections of 2017.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Essays on Coalition Formation and Ideological Information Processing By
    Perceptions of Partnership: Three Essays on Coalition Formation and Ideological Information Processing by Ida Bæk Hjermitslev Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved: Herbert Kitschelt, Advisor Christopher Johnston Rune Slothuus Georg Vanberg Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2020 ABSTRACT Perceptions of Partnership: Three Essays on Coalition Formation and Ideological Information Processing by Ida Bæk Hjermitslev Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved: Herbert Kitschelt, Advisor Christopher Johnston Rune Slothuus Georg Vanberg An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2020 Copyright c 2020 by Ida Bæk Hjermitslev All rights reserved Abstract How are voters’ perceptions of party positions a↵ected by the formation of coalition governments? Voters perceive parties that form coalitions together as more ideo- logically similar than they would have had otherwise. This framework endogenizes perceptions of parties to the coalition formation process. Instead of relying exclu- sively on the policies that parties are advocating in election campaigns, voters assess partners relationally based on their mutual interactions. This dissertation extends the existing literature by examining various aspects of how coalition formation impacts voters’ perceptions. Chapter 2 explores whether voters’ perceptions of opposition parties are altered by coalition formation. Using survey data from the European Election Study 1989-2019, Ifindthattheimpactofcoalitionformationonvoters’perceptionsofoppositionpar- ties is comparable in size to that of coalition members.
    [Show full text]
  • Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments 1
    VOTING WEIGHTS AND FORMATEUR ADVANTAGES IN THE FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS 1 Stephen Ansolabehere Department of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology James M. Snyder, Jr. Department of Political Science and Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology Aaron B. Strauss Department of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology Michael M. Ting Department of Political Science and SIPA Columbia University July, 2003 1James Snyder and Michael Ting gratefully acknowledge the ¯nancial support of National Sci- ence Foundation Grant SES-0079035. Michael Ting also acknowledges the ¯nancial and intellectual support of the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Stephen Ansolabehere gratefully acknowledges the support of the Carnegie Corporation under the Carnegie Scholars program. Abstract We examine the relationship between parliamentary seats and cabinet posts in European governments between 1946 and 2001. Our speci¯cation improves on past studies in two respects. First, it derives and uses the voting weights of the underlying coalition formation games. This reduces the measurement error introduced when seat shares are used to proxy for voting weights. Second, the statistical model allows us to nest the predictions of di®er- ent formal theories of the distribution of posts. We ¯nd that for non-formateur parties in the government, there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts. Additionally, the formateur party receives a substantial \bonus" relative to its voting weight. The latter ¯nding is more consistent with proposal-based bargaining models of coalition formation, and less so with demand-bargaining models.
    [Show full text]
  • American Political Science Review, Forthcoming
    WHAT YOU SEE IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT YOU GET: BARGAINING BEFORE AN AUDIENCE UNDER MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENT LANNY W. MARTIN ∗ GEORG VANBERG ∗∗ Abstract. Party elites in coalition governments are acutely aware that the deals they strike will be critically evaluated by their supporters, and that they risk losing support if they are perceived as ineffective negotiators. This has a powerful influence on the bargains parties strike. Because most supporters are unaware of the complex aspects of bargains, and instead rely on simple heuristics to evaluate their most visible features, parties have incentives to meet supporter expectations primarily on easily observable outcomes. To do so, they make tradeoffs on less observable outcomes. This implies that the more visible features of a bargain typically do not accurately reflect the relative success of parties in coalition negotiations. We evaluate our argument using original data on the office rewards and policy risks of portfolio allocation in 16 parliamentary democracies. Our findings support our argument, and they have important implications for the nature of representation under multiparty government. American Political Science Review, Forthcoming * Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University. [email protected]. ** Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University. [email protected]. We wish to thank Christoph Vanberg, as well as seminar participants at Aarhus University, Emory Univer- sity, Humboldt University, King’s College London, the University of Bologna, the University of Essex, the University of Kentucky, the University of Mannheim, the University of Milan, and the University of Zurich for helpful comments on previous versions of this article.
    [Show full text]
  • The Queen, the Populists and the Others
    VU Research Portal The Queen, the Populists and the Others. New Dutch Politics explained to foreigners. Sap, J.W. 2010 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Sap, J. W. (2010). The Queen, the Populists and the Others. New Dutch Politics explained to foreigners. VU University Press. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 26. Sep. 2021 jan willem sap sap willem jan Outsiders look with surprise at the climate The Queen, change in the Netherlands. As well as the Dutch themselves. Their country seemed to be a multi-cultural paradise. But today popu- lists are dominating politics and media. Much to the chagrin of the old political elite, includ- ing the progressive Head of State, Queen Beatrix.
    [Show full text]
  • Biography of His Royal Highness the Grand Duke
    Biography of His Royal Highness the Grand Duke His Royal Highness Grand Duke Henri was born on 16 April 1955 at Betzdorf Castle in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Grand Duke Henri, Prince of Nassau, Prince of Bourbon-Parma, is the eldest son of the five children of Grand Duke Jean and Grand Duchess Joséphine-Charlotte. On 14 February 1981, the Hereditary Grand Duke married Maria Teresa Mestre at the Cathédrale de Notre-Dame de Luxembourg. They have five children: • Prince Guillaume (born in 1981), the Hereditary Grand Duke, • Prince Félix (born in 1984), • Prince Louis (born in 1986), • Princess Alexandra (born in 1991) • Prince Sébastien (born in 1992). He became Head of State of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on 7 October 2000. Preparing his role as future Head of State Prince Henri completed his secondary education in Luxembourg and France, where he passed his baccalaureate in 1974. He trained at the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in Great Britain and obtained the rank of officer in 1975. Prince Henri then enrolled at the Institut des hautes études internationales (Graduate Institute of International Studies) in Geneva, Switzerland, where he graduated with a Licence ès Sciences Politiques in 1980. Prince Henri met his future wife Maria Teresa Mestre during their university studies. Service Presse et Communication 1/7 In 1989, he was appointed Honorary Major of the Parachute Regiment in the United Kingdom. He also travelled extensively overseas to further his knowledge and education, particularly to the United States and Japan. As Hereditary Grand Duke, Prince Henri was an ex officio member of the Council of State from 1980 until 1998, which gave him insight into the legislative and institutional procedures and workings of the country.
    [Show full text]
  • LES GOUVERNEMENTS ET LES ASSEMBLÉES PARLEMENTAIRES SOUS LA Ve RÉPUBLIQUE
    LES GOUVERNEMENTS ET LES ASSEMBLÉES PARLEMENTAIRES SOUS LA Ve RÉPUBLIQUE - 2 - AVERTISSEMENT La liste des ministères établie par la présente brochure fait suite à celles figurant : 1° dans le tome I du Dictionnaire des parlementaires français de 1871 à 1940 ; 2° dans la publication séparée, intitulée « Ministères de la France de 1944 à 1958 ». Elle couvre la période du 8 janvier 1959 au 31 juillet 2004. Outre la liste nominative des membres des Gouvernements, on trouvera les renseignements relatifs : - à l’élection des Présidents de la République ; - aux dates des élections aux Assemblées parlementaires et à la composition politique de celles-ci, ainsi qu’aux dates des sessions du Parlement ; - aux lois d’habilitation législative prises en application de l’article 38 de la Constitution ; - à la mise en jeu de la responsabilité gouvernementale ; - aux réunions du Congrès ; Dans les notes en bas de page de la liste nominative des membres des Gouvernements, les formules utilisées correspondent aux cas suivants : * Devient : changement des fonctions gouvernementales * Nommé : légère modification des fonctions gouvernementales et changement de titre * Prend le titre de : changement de titre sans changement des fonctions gouvernementales. Le texte de la présente brochure a été établi par le Secrétariat général de la Présidence et le service de la Communication. - 3 - CONNAISSANCE DE L’ASSEMBLÉE 2 LES GOUVERNEMENTS ET LES ASSEMBLÉES PARLEMENTAIRES SOUS LA Ve RÉPUBLIQUE 1958-2004 (Données au 31 juillet) ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE - 4 - TOUS DROITS RÉSERVÉS. La présente publication ne peut être fixée, par numérisation, mise en mémoire optique ou photocopie, ni reproduite ou transmise, par moyen électronique ou mécanique ou autres, sans l’autorisation préalable de l’Assemblée nationale.
    [Show full text]