UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ct538mg Author Twist, Kimberly Publication Date 2015 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair Professor Jason Wittenberg Professor Jacob Citrin Professor Katerina Linos Spring 2015 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe Copyright 2015 by Kimberly Ann Twist Abstract The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair As long as far-right parties { known chiefly for their vehement opposition to immigration { have competed in contemporary Western Europe, scholars and observers have been concerned about these parties' implications for liberal democracy. Many originally believed that far- right parties would fade away due to a lack of voter support and their isolation by mainstream parties. Since 1994, however, far-right parties have been included in 17 governing coalitions across Western Europe. What explains the switch from exclusion to inclusion in Europe, and what drives mainstream-right parties' decisions to include or exclude the far right from coalitions today? My argument is centered on the cost of far-right exclusion, in terms of both office and policy goals for the mainstream right. I argue, first, that the major mainstream parties of Western Europe initially maintained the exclusion of the far right because it was relatively costless: They could govern and achieve policy goals without the far right. During this period of exclusion, however, major parties of both the left and right attempted to win back voters lost to the far right by enacting more restrictive immigration policies; they would borrow from the far right as long as it was beneficial. Second, I argue that the mainstream right has increasingly treated the far right as it would any other party during coalition decisions. Major mainstream parties prioritize being in government, and will select the coalition that offers both stability and the ability to achieve policy goals in areas of greatest importance to them at the time. As the far right continued to attract voters throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the mainstream right realized that working with the far right { which was now a more useful partner, as it had more legislative seats { might result in more advantageous policy compromises. Once far-right parties could be useful to the mainstream right, exclusion became a more costly strategy. Third, far-right parties can be attractive coalition partners to the mainstream right be- cause they are flexible on most issues { immigration excepted { and thus more willing to give the mainstream right its preferred policies in exchange for gains in immigration. Addi- tionally, far-right parties are nearly always smaller than the major mainstream-right parties, 1 so the mainstream parties are able to carry more weight in coalition decisions and obtain important ministerial positions. I demonstrate my argument through in-depth case studies of Austria and the Netherlands, from the 1980s through the present. Both countries have had far-right parties in and out of government, providing important variation on the dependent variable. Finally, I show the wider applicability of my argument in two ways by extending my arguments about inclusion and exclusion to coalition-like agreements in the United Kingdom and France, as well as to mainstream left responses to far-left parties in Europe. 2 To Stephen. i Contents Contents ii List of Figures iv List of Tables v 1 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in West- ern Europe 1 1.1 Mainstream-right and far-right parties . 2 1.2 The far right in government: A record of growing collaboration . 4 1.3 Existing literature . 9 1.4 My argument . 16 1.5 Data and methods . 25 1.6 Chapter overview . 28 1.7 Appendix: Party names . 30 1.8 Appendix 2: Mainstream-right and far-right seat shares . 32 2 Changing Electoral Realities and the Mainstream Right 34 2.1 Mainstream voters up for grabs . 34 2.2 Opportunities for new parties . 39 2.3 The importance of immigration . 45 2.4 The far right beyond immigration . 51 2.5 Conclusion . 55 3 Dutch and Austrian Parties 56 3.1 Mainstream parties in the Netherlands . 56 3.2 Mainstream parties in Austria . 64 3.3 The politics of the past . 70 3.4 The far right in the Netherlands . 72 3.5 The far right in Austria . 79 3.6 Voter support for the far right . 84 3.7 Conclusion . 86 ii 4 Borrowing from the Far Right: The Mainstream Right and Immigration 87 4.1 The (end of the) Dutch consensus about multiculturalism . 88 4.2 The politicization of immigration in Austria . 97 4.3 Conclusion . 104 5 Coalition Formation in Austria 105 5.1 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far right (Scenario 3) . 108 5.2 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition with the far right, but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . 111 5.3 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right (Scenario 1) . 118 5.4 Far right not mathematically part of coalition options (Scenario 4) . 133 5.5 Conclusion . 136 6 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands 138 6.1 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands . 139 6.2 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right (Scenario 1) . 145 6.3 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition with the far right, but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . 152 6.4 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far right (Scenario 3) . 155 6.5 Conclusion . 160 7 The Mainstream Right and Far Right in Majoritarian Systems: France and the United Kingdom 163 7.1 The mainstream right and far right in France . 163 7.2 The mainstream right and far right in the United Kingdom . 174 8 Conclusion: Mainstream and Extreme Parties in Western Europe 185 8.1 The mainstream left and extreme parties . 185 8.2 The future of mainstream right and far right cooperation . 193 Bibliography 196 iii List of Figures 2.1 Alford Index, 1947-1986 . 36 7.1 Immigration tagline in the Conservative Party manifesto, 2005 . 179 7.2 \Go home" vans (Conservative-Lib Dem coalition, 2013) . 183 iv List of Tables 1.1 Formal and informal governmental inclusion of the far right . 6 1.2 Elections: Would a mainstream-far right coalition have a majority of seats? . 7 1.3 Elections: If the mainstream right and far right had enough seats to govern, did a coalition form? . 7 1.4 Elections: Could a right-wing coalition be formed without the far right? . 8 1.5 Replication of de Lange's (2008) results: Variables affecting far-right inclusion . 12 1.6 Test of party distance as a predictor of far-right inclusion . 13 1.7 Austrian coalitions and CMP distance measures . 15 1.8 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 1990 (CMP scores in parentheses) 15 1.9 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 2008 (CMP scores in parentheses) 16 1.10 Predictions of coalition formation, Austria 2008, using traditional theories . 17 1.11 Three measures of party placements, Dutch parliamentary parties . 19 1.12 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2001 . 20 1.13 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2010 . 21 1.14 Far right party positioning and issue importance . 23 1.15 Expectations: Mainstream right inclusion of the far right . 24 1.16 Coalition cases, by country and scenario . 27 1.17 Far-right parties in Western Europe, 1980s-present . 30 1.18 Current major mainstream-right parties in Western Europe . 31 2.1 Working-class as percent of active work force, 1950s-1980s . 36 2.2 Change in religious affiliation of Europeans, 1970-97 . 37 2.3 Percent of population attending religious services at least once per week, 1970-98 37 2.4 Percent change in number of party members, 1980-2000 . 38 2.5 Real GDP growth, 1960-1989 . 39 2.6 Left-right distance between the major parties of left and right, 1983 to 1993 . 42 2.7 Vote shares for \old" parties, 1960 and 1990 . 43 2.8 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after 1980 . 44 2.9 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after the far right's first successful national election (> 5%) . 44 2.10 Percent of British respondents feeling there are too many immigrants in the UK 45 2.11 Percent wanting immigration partially or totally restricted . 46 v 2.12 Foreigners/immigration as an important problem in the Netherlands, 1971-2012 47 2.13 Foreign residents as percentage of the total population, 1950-1990 . 47 2.14 Percentage of new immigrants from outside the EU . 48 2.15 Asylum applications, 1985-99 (in thousands) . 49 2.16 Far right party positioning and issue importance . 50 2.17 Percent agreeing they \would not want an immigrant" as a neighbor . 50 2.18 Percent saying that there are too many immigrants in their country .