68- 13,598

AGUILAR, Luis Enrique, 1926- CUBA 1933: THE FRUSTRATED REVOLUTION.

The American University, Ph.D., 1968 History, modem

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

(c) Luis Enrique Aguilar 1968

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED CUBA 1933; THE FRUSTRATED REVOLUTION

By

Luis Enrique Aguilar

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Signature of Committee

Date:

Dean of the

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Date: A*? LIBRARY M A Y 1 4 1968 WASHINGTON. 0. C 37s i TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION......

PART I. ANTECEDENTS

CHAPTER I. THE CREATION OF THE REPUBLIC, 1895-1902......

a) The Efforts for Independence b) American Intervention and the Platt Amendment c) The First Steps of the Republic, 1902-1906

CHAPTER II. THE FAILURE OF THE REPUBLIC, 1906-1925......

a) The Second American Intervention and Its Consequences b) Political Developments, 1909-1925 c) Economic and Social Developments, 1909-1925

PART II. WINDS OF CHANGE

CHAPTER III. THE ELECTIONS OF 1924......

CHAPTER IV. MACHADO THE PRESIDENT, 1925-1927......

CHAPTER V. PROROGUE OF POWERS AND RE-ELECTION, 1927-1928......

CHAPTER VI. WINDS OF CHANGE......

PART III. THE FIGHT AGAINST MACHADO, 1929-1933

CHAPTER VII. THE SITUATION IN 1929......

CHAPTER VIII. DEPRESSION AND GENERAL OPPOSITION, 1930-1933...... CHAPTER IX. CONSPIRACY AND REBELLION 98

a) The Army as a Political Factor b) The Last Effort of the Old Guard

PART IV. THE REVOLUTION, 1932-1933

CHAPTER X. NEW TACTICS AND NEW PROGRAMS...... 110

CHAPTER XI. THE MEDIATION OF SUMNER WELLES, MAY-AUGUST, 1933 ...... 121

CHAPTER XII. THE DOWNFALL OF MACHADO...... 141

CHAPTER XIII. THE FAILURE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AUGUST 12- SEPTEMBER 4, 1933 ...... 148

CHAPTER XIV. THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER, 1933-JANUARY, 1934 ...... 160

a) The Significance of the Moment b) The Rise of Grau San Martin c) The Enemies of theRevolutionary Government 1) The Left 2) The Right d) The Ambassador, the Army, and the Downfall of the Revolutionary Government

EPILOGUE: THE AFTERMATH ...... 202

CONCLUSIONS...... 205a

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 206

iii INTRODUCTION

"...In Cuba our own proconsul, Leonard Wood, was putting the finishing touches on American colonialism and the Cuban

Constitution, which was to last until the coming of Fidel

Castro."* The above quotation, taken from a serious study, expresses both a great historical mistake and a common tendency today. The mistake is evident: the Cuban Constitution of 1901, did not last until Castro but was abolished in 19^0, when a new and very modern constitution, without any trace of coloni­ alism, was adopted in Cuba. The tendency is less evident, but far more important. It consists of a continuous dismissal of what happened in Cuba before Castro, of a trend ignoring all the previous struggles, triumphs, and defeats of the Cuban people. It reaches at times the dimension of ignorance, oc­

*Richard W. Weatherhead, "Traditions of Conflict in Latin America," Politics of Change in Latin America, ed. Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965)* p. 29*

1 2

casionally it is the result of a political partiality, usually it is born of over-simplification.

I could multiply that type of quotation to show how many serious studies try to present a parallel between the Mexico of 1910, the Bolivia of 1952, and the Cuba of 1959* The ex­ istence of a common factor-a victorious revolution-seems to obliterate the enormous differences in the historical past of these three nations, not to mention the important racial, eco­ nomic, and cultural differences.

This dissertation is a humble attempt to correct that perspective, to point out that Cuba was not in 1959 the som­ nolent Mexico of Profirio Diaz or the remote Bolivia of the tin barons. Already in the middle twenties, Cuba was entering into a revolutionary period from which she emerged with deep and radical transformations, of which two of the most important results were: a popular revolutionary party and a Constitution with great emphasis on social legislation. Some of the pro­ grams or ideas, that for those who don't know Cuban history appear as radical and new in 1958, were to a great extent a continuation of the frustrated revolution of 1933* PART I

ANTECEDENTS CHAPTER I

THE CREATION OF THE REPUBLIC, 1895-1902 a) The Efforts for Independence

Certain traits or characteristics of Cuban history in the nineteenth century must be briefly mentioned to understand the developments that took place in that island in the twentieth century.

The Cubans remained passive during the great governmental and revolutionary crisis of 1808-1812 that shook the whole

Spanish colonial system in Latin America. The apparent loy­ alty of the Cubans was due to two principal factors: a) the fear of the creole minority that a rebellion against Spain could end in a general uprising of the slaves in the island, 1 with the same tragic results as the Haitian rebellion; and

-*-For a good delineation of this continual fear of the creoles, which lasted until approximately the first half of the twentieth century, see Vidal Morales y Morales, Inlciadores y Prlmeros M£rtlres de 1a. Revolucibn Cubana (3 vols.; Habana: Consejo Nacional de Cultura, 1963)•

4 5

b) the creoles feeling that any disturbance could endanger the economic boom that the island had been experiencing since

1790, when sugar production expanded becoming the main indus- Q try of Cuba. Until approximately 1820, the Spanish govern­ ment aided this economic expansion by allowing the introduction of slaves and other measures.

This leap forward, this quick transformation of a rather somnolent and forgotten part of the Spanish colonial empire into a progressive and active colony, also gradually gave birth to a new attitude-a "national conscience".

After 1810, an affluent society, with the economic means to buy books and the leisure to study, produced a brilliant group of Cuban"writers who "discovered" the island and pro­ moted education and political reforms. It is this generation- the generation of philosophers as F£lix Varela (1787-1853)> of. poets as Jos£ Marla Heredia (1803-1839)» and of essayists as

Josd Antonio Saco (1797-1879), and many others-who changed the attitude of the Cuban people toward Spain. These are the writers who no longer speak of the "siempre fidelisima Isla de

^From 1790-1795, tobacco was the main product of Cuba. During that period' the revolution in Haiti produced a jump in the sugar prices from 4 reales per pound to 28 and 30 reales per pound. From then on, Cuba became the most important sugar producer of America. See, H. F. Friedlander, Historia Eco­ nomica de Cuba (Habana: Jesds Montero, 19^0, P« 112. 6

Cuba" (forever faithful island of Cuba) but discuss fostering

the idea of a fatherland. Such was the rallying cry that Jos£

de la Luz y Caballero (1800-1862) expressly proposed to the

Cubans in 18^8 when he wrote: "He aqul nuestra divisa: Re-

undtmonos, instruyamonos, mejoremdnos, tengamos Patria, ten-

gamos PatriaI"3

While these writers and intellectuals were awakening the

.national conscience of the Cubans, the economic policy of Spain

was becoming more and more of a burden for the creole minority

who controlled the land and the sugar industry. Spain failed

to grant any political or economic reforms, so that, by 1865-

1867, this neglect drove the most active segment of the creole

minority on the warpath. Among the many who testify to the

economic basis of the first Cuban insurrection,^ is this ex­

pressive statement by C. H. Bithern, American Consul in Santi­

ago de Cuba in 1868:

The rumor of the contemplated rising of the natives of the Island /sic7, headed by some eight or ten estate owners

3"I have here our standard: Let us reunite, let us in­ struct, let us improve, let's have a Fatherland, let's have a Fatherland!" Josd de la Luz y Caballero, De la Vida Intima (Habana: Editorial Universidad, 19^), p. 19^-. ~_

^Herminio Portell Vile, Historia de Cuba en sus relaclones con los Estados Unidos y Espana (Habana: Jesus Montero, 1938), II, 12. 7

who X'jere known to be highly dissatisfied with the late taxation imposed on landed property and their production was confirmed at the ninth instant.->

From 1868-1878, the Cubans fought for their independence in a war initiated by enlightened representatives of the wealthy class of creoles. The war ended in defeat.

Among the many consequences of this long struggle, one must be noted because of its unique contribution to the Cuban experience. This was the very moment when the landed aristoc­ racy was establishing firm political and economic control over most parts of Latin America; when the Argentine "gauchow was wiped out by the cattle owners; when the Parliamentary Repub­ lic was established in Chile; and when the "rurales'1 of

Porfirio Diaz were securing Mexico for the latifundistas. At this moment the nucleus of the landed aristocracy was defeated in Cuba. It had lost its economic and political power. Almost an entire social class lay dead, in exile, or in prison. And this traditional elite, at least in the typical Latin American form, will never rise again in Cuba. The seeds of a powerful oligarchy who controlled wealth, position, and political power were not allowed to grow in the island.

After the Ten Years War, the politically active sector of

^Friedlander, Hist. Econo., p. 422. 8

Cuban society was divided into two groups: those who had faith in the Spanish promises for reforms, and those who still nur­ tured the hope of insurrection and independence. The former group, by far the most important in the first decade after the war, organized a party popularly called "Autonomista"; the sec­ ond group, without direction or a definite program, either dis­ banded and went into exile or waited in silence in the island.

But Spain did not change. In spite of promises and pro­ grams, in spite of minor concessions, as the decade of the

1890's began, it became more and more evident to many Cubans that Spain was incapable of making any real effort to change the conditions in Cuba. The Autonomistas had stired new hopes and had spread the desire for reform with their meetings and their publications, but had failed to obtain them. Already in that year, the newspaper, El Pais, voiced the bitterness and disillusion of the Party: "Estard. ya prdxima la hors de la disolucidn de nuestro partido, por obra del desaliento y de la pdrdida de toda fd?"^

So, the cause of separatism, nutured by disillusion and desperation, and guided now by the political astuteness of

6"Is the hour near for the dissolution of our party be­ cause of discouragement and lack of faith?" La Lucha Autono- mista (Madrid: Imp. Sagarra, I896), p. 3 9. 9

Josd Marti (1853-1895)> began to gain the upper hand. As a symptom of change, in 1893> Rafael Merchan and a select group 7 of Autonomists openly backed the road of revolution.

It was the task, and the enormous contribution of Marti, to build the fighting instrument, the channel through which all these diverse attitudes and convictions would be organ­ ized into a. common effort for the independence of Cuba. In

January, 1892, after infinitely patient work, El Partido Revo- lucionario Cubano (The Cuban Revolutionary Party) was born.

The reasons, justifications, and political ideas of the new movement were published in a document written by Martl.

For the purpose of this dissertation it is not necessary, tempting as it may be, to discuss in detail the political ideas and the social objectives of Marti, which today are a 8 sort of battlefield between Marxists and anti-Marxists. To understand certain Cuban reactions after independence, it is enough to say that wartl wanted: 1 ) a brief war which would

?The measure of Merchan's change of attitude can be seen in his book, Cuba, justificacidn de sus guerras de independenoia (Habana: Direccidn de Cultura, 1961).

®The communists usually stress the anti-imperialism of Marti, for example, Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, Marti anti- imperialista (Habana: Direccidn de Cultura, 19617; their opponents, his rejection of Marx, for example, Ernesto Ardura, Marti anti-comunista (Caracas: Edit Antorcha, 1962). 10

avoid vast destruction in the island, the rise of militarism, and the intervention of the United States, a. possibility that

Marti feared the most; 2) a republic jffith justice for everyone and capable of solving social and racial inequalities; and 3) a republic with agricultural diversification and free of economic dependence. Incessantly, Marti warned against depending on one crop and one buyer as a situation which will "inevitably

Q end in political domination. 7

Grasping every cent, calming the impatient, encouraging the doubtful, by the end of 1894, Marti had gathered a well- equipped expedition that was to strike the initial and the decisive-blow on the unsuspecting Spanish forces. But three days before the departure, the government of the United States, under pressure from Spain, detained the three ships at

Fernandina, Florida, and confiscated the war materiel. In spite of this disaster, the leaders of the revolution continued with their plans and on February 24, 1895> the fight for inde­ pendence started once more in Cuba. Three months later, Marti was killed in a skirmish with the Spanish forces.

And so, for reasons beyond his control, the dreams and

9The "Resolutions of the Cuban Revolutionary Party" and the so-called, "Manifesto de Montecristi," best express the political thought of Marti. See, Obras Completas (Habana: Edit Lex, 1946), I, pp. 298-353,end II, pp. 24o-247. 11

aspirations of Marti were not fulfilled. Par from a short and glorious war, the struggle for independence dragged on for more than three years with the utter destruction of the sugar fields and mills as one of the principal weapons of the Cuban forces.

As early as June, 1896, General Maceo, in his order, Number

824, instructed Brigadier Josd M. Aguirre "que se destruya todo edificio que pueda ofrecer refugio y defensa al enemigo, as! como se inutilice todo el tabaco y maiz que se encuentre depo- sitado en ese territorio.'*1® The basic idea was to avoid the mistake of the Ten Years War, and to force Spain to pay for the war with her meagre resources a.nd not with the agri­ cultural resources of Cuba. The results were terrible. In the first census taken after the war it was estimated that the population of the island had decreased by 12$ and that two thirds of its wealth had been destroyed.H

On the other hand, the event that Marti had feared the most eventually occurred: American intervention.

■*•0 " ...to destroy every building which could offer shelter and defense to the enemy, and to destroy all tobacco and corn which could be found gathered in that territory." Unpublished order of Maceo. The original in the personal records of the author of this dissertation.

H-Informe sobre el Censo de Cuba (Washington, D.C.: De- par tament^d^Guerra^ 1900), p . 44. 12

b) American Intervention and the Platt Amendment

On April 11, 1898, President McKinley submitted his

famous message to Congress declaring that "in the name of hu­ manity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered

American interests . . . the war in Cuba must stop.” Those

endangered interests had been growing in Cuba throughout the nineteenth century, for the rich island had attracted the in­

terest of the United States in almost every period of the nation's history. Preceding McKinley, Grover Cleveland had

stated in his annual message to Congress (December 7» 1896)

that the nation's concern for Cuba was "by no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character . . . our actual pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and government of Spain. " ^

The reply of Congress to McKinley's message was the

Joint Resolution of Spril 20, empowering the President to use

the Army and Navy to end Spanish rule in Cuba. This resolution,

following the traditional policy of the American government, did not recognize the existance or independence of the Cuban republic. Nevertheless, the famous Teller Amendment stated

l^David Healy, The United States and Cuba, 1898-1902 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 19&3)» P« 11• 13

that the United States had no disposition or intention to ex­ ercise sovereignity, jurisdiction, or control over the island.

By December, 1898, the "splendid, little war" was over.

The ideology of expansionism defended by such men as Fiske, 13 Strong, Burgess, and Mahan J had received the best of blessings, that of an easy victory, and American businessmen, who had accepted reluctantly the necessity of war, were hailing the in­ calculable opportunities for trade and exploitation opened up by the conquest of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. To this new appetite, -which many Cubans began to realize with growing apprehension, the Teller Amendment was an obstacle that should be overcome or, at least, as the Journal of Commerce suggested,

"must be interpreted in a sense somewhat different from that which its author intended it to bear." The American flag should float over Cuba until "law" and "order" were assured.

It is worth mentioning, for a balanced picture of the sit­ uation, that there were numerous groups in the United States who opposed this attitude and combated the emergence of "Amer­ ican imperialism". While American Catholicism expressed its

13see, Julius W. Pratt, "The Ideology of American Expan­ sion," Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935)•

1 ^.Julius W. Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish Amer­ ican War," Hispanic-Amerioan Review, XIV (May, 193*0* 200. 14 doubts and mild opposition through the voice of Cardinal Gibson,

Archbishop of Baltimore, whom President McKinley consulted on the matter of retaining the Philippines,15 many labor leaders, who had previously supported the necessity of helping the

Cubans in their fight for freedom, were now outspoken in their criticism. In November, 1898, a disillusioned Samuel Gompers wrote: "Where has flown this great outburst of our sympathy for the self-sacrificing and liberty loving Cubans? Is it not strange that now, for the first time, we hear that the Cubans are unfit for self-government...?"-^

Meanwhile Cuba was under American control. The military occupation of the island lasted from January 1, 1899* to May

20, 1902. As it was state^L before, the economic and social conditions of the island were terrible. General Brook, the first Military Governor, and his successor, General Wood, under­ took with great energy the work of reconstruction: roads were built, hospitals and schools erected, yellow fever was stamped out of the island, and cities received proper sanitary atten­ tion .

15See, John Bilshi, "The Catholic and. American Imperial­ ism," Historical Records and Studies (New York: The United States Catholic Historical Society, 1959)» XLVII, l^-0-195»

• ^ S a m u e l Gompers, "Imperialism, Its Dangers and Wrongs," American Federationist, V (November, 1898), 182. 15

They also had to face innumerable problems in dealing with the population and in calming the natural anxieties of many Cubans who waited for a clear definition of the political

future of their nation. As no government or representative of

the Cuban nation had been officially recognized, the relations with the leaders of the so-called National Assembly*? and with the officers'of the Cuban Army were far from easy. After

several conflicts and bitter disputes between American author­

ities and Cuban representatives, and among Cubans themselves,

on the payment of $3>000,000 to the Cuban soldiers who had

fought in the War, the Assembly and the Army disbanded, and

the task of governing Cuba easied.

But the cloud over the future of Cuba persisted. After a visit of Military Governor Wood to Washington in July, 1900,

President McKinley decided that it was time to initiate the

process of establishing an independent Cuba. As a first step,

a convention would be summoned to prepare a Cuban constitution.

Naturally, the drafting of a Cuban constitution would not com­ mit the United States to withdrawal by any particular date,

but it would be an easy way to soften the Democratic Party's

*?The National Assembly,, or "Asamblea del Cerro" was formed, without national elections, in 1899* 16

charges of Imperialism "which were being hurled at. the admin-

1 8 istration with renewed vigor in that election year."

At the end of July, Wood issued a. call for the election of delegates to be held in September. On November 5> the Con­ vention met in Havana. It would be the duty of the delegates,

Wood told them in the opening speech, first to frame a consti­ tution for Cuba, and only "when that has been done," to decide 19 on future relations with the United States. 7 Working slowly but without any interference from the American authorities, the delegates, many of whom had been members of the National

Assembly, finished in early February, 1901, the body of the

Constitution and began to study the touchy subject of relations with the United States. On that subject, the American offi­ cials were not so tolerant. Slowly, while the American Congress studied the problem on its own, Wood began to talk with the

Cuban delegates about the necessity of concrete concessions for the American government.2® On February 25, 1901, Senator

Platt introduced the famous Amendment, that bears his name, as

l^Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 1900- 1935 (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Pub., Co ., 1935), P* 71*

l^Rafael Martinez Ortiz, Cuba, los primeros anos de Inde- pendencia (Paris: Imprimerie bux, 1921) , p. 173*

2®Domingo Mendez Capote, Trabajos (Habana: Imprenta Serrano, 1926), p. 39» 17 a rider to the Army appropriation bill. On March 2, after

Congressional debate and signature by the President, it became law.The relations between Cuba and the United States had been clearly defined by the Congress of the United States. It remained only for the Cubans to accept the "fait accompli” .

In spite of the assurances of the then Secretary of War of the United States, Mr. Elihu Root, that "the United States

Government does not wish and is not attempting to intervene in the Cuban government,"21 there was strong opposition in

Cuba to the terms of the Amendment and especially to Point III.

In a speech on March 26, at the Cuban Convention, Enrique

Villuehdas, one of the members of the Commission appointed to consider the Amendment, presented an adverse report. He ob­ jected to the entire Amendment, for, he said, its acceptance was beyond the powers of the Convention, and specifically be­ cause "it reserves to the United States the faculty of deciding when independence is threatened, and when, therefore, they ought to intervene..."22 Other members of the Convention were less explicit, but many sectors of Cuban_public opinion: the press, patriotic clubs, and political groups expressed their

21Ibid., p. *H.

22Memoria de los Traba.jos realizados por la Convenei6n Constituyente (Habana: P. Ruiz, 1905)i P» ^25• 18

vehement opposition to it.

But the situation was in fact unalterable. After visiting

Washington and receiving further reassurance from Mr. Root in respect to the self-determination and sovereignty.of Cuba, the

Commission returned to Cuba and presented its report. On

June 12, by a majority of one, the Constitutional Convention adopted the Platt Amendment as an annex to the Cuban Consti­ tution.

From this time on, the evident imposition of the Amendment, the bitter denunciation of it, the analysis of all its impli­ cations for the healthy development of a true and responsible government, will remain an ever present subject in Cuba, and a continuous source of anti-American feeling in small but active groups of political figures and writers. From the very begin-' ning, none other than Maximo Gomez, the former General-in-

Chief of the Cuban Army, then in retirement in Santo Domingo, made an ominous prophecy on the future of the Republic under the shadow of the Amendments

Con el enemigo adentro, y las Haves de la casa en manos del extranjero, habremos de necesitar una austeridad sin lfmites, un patriotismo ejemplar y una. gran ddsis de buena suerte para no descender al nivel de un protectorado. La menor quiebra polftica, (y siempre habrd. manos intere- sadas que la provoquen) y nos veremos sometidos a una nueva y mucho mas perniciosa ocupacidn militar...^3

^With the enemy inside and the keys of the house in 19

After some of the initial steps taken by the Republic,

which encouraged a general wave of optimism and confidence,

the almost literal exactitude of this prophecy was evident.

c) The First Steps of the Republic. 1902-190&

The Constitution of 1901 provided a presidential system

of government similar to that of the United States and incor­

porated a lengthy Eill of Rights with particular emphasis on

the separation of Church and State. The President could be

reelected for a second term and universal manhood suffrage was

established, modifying the previous electoral law of the mili­

tary government which had given the franchise only to adult

males who were literate, owned a small amount of property, or

had served in the Revolutionary Army.

As provided by the Constitution, presidential elections were held in December, 1901, and on May 20, 1902, Torres

Estrada Palma, who had succeeded Marti as the head of the

Revolutionary Party, received the government of the island

foreign hands, we will need an unlimited austerity, an unfailing patriotism and a large dose of good fortune to avoid descending to the level of a protectorate. The slightest political failure (and there will always be in­ terested. hands to provoke it) and we will be submitted to a new and more pernicious military occupation... Amalia Rodriguez Rodriguez, Nuevos Document os de Maximo C-omez (Habana: Biblioteca Jos£ Martf^ 1963)5 P* 62. 20

from the hands of Governor-General Leonard Wood.

Apart from the initial and deep disillusion caused by the Platt Amendment, the future of the island seemed” bright at the moment. Many of the tremendous social and political problems which had disturbed Latin America for decades were not present in Cuba or appeared much less important: Cuba had no powerful and traditional oligarchy trying to control every political recourse and paralysing all progress. As was stated before, the nucleus of this potential oligarchy was dispersed in I878; their successors or those who would have been their successors, were hard hit by the years of revolution and destruction from 1895-1898. In more than one way, Cuba was a fresh society, a nation where class divisions were not stratified or definitive. But, for almost the same reasons, the absence of native capitalists or of a. landed aristocracy, it was also, as will be seen, a land open and defenseless be­ fore the invasion of foreign capital.

There was no religious conflict in Cuba. The Church was not the all-powerful institution of Mdxico or Colombia, and the Catholic feeling of the population lacked the fanati­ cism or intense concern that existed in Spain or other coun­ tries of Latin America. The laxness of this religious feeling, which already had been criticized by certain ecclesiastical 21

voices,2^ was clearly shown by the easiness with which Church and State were separated in the Constitution, and in the abso­ lute absence of religious slogans or ideas in the first poli­ tical parties organized in the Republic. As Rafael Martinez

Ortiz stated, the attitude for or against religious ideas was not strong enough to justify a political banner. 2 5

Finally, the racial situation was also different from the rest of Latin America. The relationship between white and negro (the Indian population had disappeared very early in Cuban history) had been, in comparison with other places where slavery reigned, rather relaxed. As far back as 1826, the Baron of Humboldt had noticed the easiness with which the slaves could obtain freedom under the Spanish laws and the familiarity with which slaves and ’'libertos” were treated by the Cuban families. ^6 The proverbial laxness of the

Spaniards in sexual relations furnished another bridge between the races. A whole section or theme of Cuban literature, beginning with Cecilia Vades in 1859 and ending with El

2^See, for instance, Oradores Cubanos Coloniales (Madrid: Serafin Hdez y Hermanos, 1879)» pp. 46-^8. ~

2-5Martinez Ortiz, Cuba, los primeros anos..., p. 8 8.

^Alejandro de Humboldt, Ensa.yo Politico sobre la isla de Cuba (Habana: Archivo Naciona.1 de Cuba, i9 6 0), p. 179. 22

regreso de Chencho in 19^6, showed the importance of this

intersexual relation.

The economic recovery of the island was quick, but the

price payed was high. The political influence established

by the Platt Amendment was followed in 1903 by a commercial

Treaty of Reciprocity, which embodied terms diametrically

opposed to the old warnings of Marti. This treaty assured

Cuba of a 20$ tariff preference on her sugar entering the

United States. 'The market was thus open, which_meant that

Cuba could supply all the sugar the United States wanted to

buy. In return, Cuba granted tariff preferences to certain

American products.

The effects of having such an advantageous treatment was

to send Cuba down the road of monoculture and into an almost

•total dependency on the American market and the price of sugar.

Sugar production rose steadily from 850,000 long tons in 1900

to 1,535>599 long tons in 1909*^ At the same time, American

investments in Cuba jumped from $50 million in 1896 to $205

million by 1911.^® In 1905 an estimated 13,000 American

^ Resumenes Estadisticos Seleccionados (Habana: Minis­ ter io de Hacienda, 1959)» .p"» 1^«

^ Investment in Cuba (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1956), p^ 9"T 23

colonists had bought land in Cuba for about $50 million. ^

The first term of President Estrada Palma was, generally, very good. The President was an honest man whose main concern was to build more schools than barracks and who kept a watch­ ful eye on the manipulation of public funds. In 1905 the government could show a very positive balance of its activity.

The reserve in the Treasury of the Republic in 1902 was- "

$539*99^*99; in 1904 it had increased to $7*099*584.86. Apart from the tremendous sugar expansion, which has already been mentioned, other branches of agriculture were also growing rapidly. Cattle, for example, which numbered 125,229 in 1901, had jumped to 1,703,069 in 1904. Another good sign was the growing number of immigrants, principally Spaniards, who were coming to the island: in 1902, 6,316; in 1905* 3 8,6 2 8. ^0

Unfortunately, as Maximo Gomez had forseen, political mistakes were soon to plunge the recently born Republic, with its shaky institutions, into civil strife and, consequently, a second military occupation.

At the beginning of 1904, the different regional political

29ju]_j_0 Le Riverand, Hjstoria Econdmioa de Cuba (Habaria: •^scuela de Comercio, 1963)"* £>"• 214.

3°R. Iznaga, Tres anos de Repdblica (Habsna: Ramble y Souza, 1905)» PP* 28-29 and 32. 2k

groups had gathered into two national parties; El Partido

Republicano Conservador (Republican Conservative Party) and El

Partido Liberal wacional (National Liberal Party). l‘Jhile both were preparing themselves for the presidential contest of 1 9 0 5»

Estrada Palma, extremely satisfied with the results of his government, listened to those who advised him to seek reelec­ tion. Immediately, a new party was organized, El Partido Mod- erado (Moderate Party), and to the consternation of all other political sectors, the powerful machinery of the government was used to build the electoral strength of that party. Forced by this pressure, the two other parties united to present a common ballot opposed to Estrada Palma. And, while tension mounted in Cuba, Maximo Gomez, the old hero of independence, perhaps the only man who could have averted the tragedy, died.

On September 23» 1905» the elections were held. Consid­ ering the unfairness of the situation and the governmental con­ trol over the electoral machinery, the opposition refused to participate, and Estrada Palma, probably in ignorance of what was really'happening, was elected for a second term. The fraud of the elections, the continuation-of a policy of harassing the opposition to the government, provoked an insurrection.

In August, 1906, rebellion was general and the government seemed incapable of controlling it. Facing the reluctance of 25

of the American government to intervene on his behalf,^

Estrada Palma decided to resign creating a political vacuum which would force the Americans to intervene. On September 28,

1906, the President presented to the Congress his own and his cabinet's resignations. That same day he asked that Commis­ sioners Taft and Bacon be relieved of custody of the treasury.

Taft immediately ordered the landing of a small body of Marines to protect the treasury. The following day, Taft, with

Roosevelt’s approval, issued the proclamation of intervention by the United States under the Platt Amendment. 'The Cuban

Republic had failed.

31president Roosevelt -had sent Secretary of War Taft and Assistant Secretary Bacon as Commissioners to find a solution. However, their report was critical of the Cuban government and hurt ^strada Palma. See, Fitzgibbon, Cuba..., pp. 118-119. CHAPTER II

THE FAILURE OF THE REPUBLIC, 1906-1925

a) The Second American Intervention and Its Consequences

The second American occupation of Cuba lasted from Sep­

tember, 1906 to January, 1909* A great deal has been written

on the government of Magoon, but, for the purpose of this dis­

sertation, it is unessential to evaluate this second inter­ vention or to analyze his government. It is sufficient to note that Magoon, at least from the Cuban point of view, is 32 certainly the ,,bete_noirM of this period.

Although an objective historical judgement of the second

American intervention is difficult, it is quite important to

32A new criticism has been recently added to the old charges of leniency, corruption, and wastefulness, that of the submission of Magoon to American businessmen: Steinhard..."In the second intervention, he actually controlled Magoon and was the invisible government,” wrote Crowder. See, Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba (New Haven: Yale University Press, I960), pT 25•

26 27

point out the consequences that the political setback of 1906-

1909 had for Cuba. On this point, the testimony is overwhelm­

ing. Psychologically or, perhaps, sociologically speaking,

the second intervention proved disastrous for Cuba.

The presence of American troops in the island, the evident

failure of the first government, the fact that the Cubans them­

selves had attracted a foreign rule, provoked a wave of pessi­ mism and disillusionment throughout every level of Cuban soci­

ety. It was no longer possible to maintain even a pretense of

capacity for self-government, or the shadow of an illusion about independence. The nucleus of Cuban writers and politi­

cians, who had fought for independence and had remained firmly

optismistic about the future of the island, expressed now dis­

may and depression. In 1906, Gonzalo de Quesada, the closest

friend of Marti, wrote in this somber mood to Ambassador

Marquez Sterling:

Recuerdas mi profundo pesimismo de antes? ... Recuerdas como tti entonces me tachabas de no verlo todo sino bajo un prisma negro? ... Pues bien, despuds te volviste tambien pesixista y se realizaron los temores de ambos.33

Almost at the same time, Francisco Figueras in the pro-

3300 you remember my previous deep pessimism? . . . Do you remember how you then accused me of seeing everything through a dark glass? . . . Alas, later you. yourself turned pessimistic and the fears of us both were real­ ized. See, Gonzalo de Quesada, Documentos Historicos (Eiabana: Editorial de la Universidad, 1965) > p. 311. 28

logue to a serious study on Cuba, expressed this bitter conclu­ sion: "Cuando concluf mi lectura estaba vencido y convencido.

Vencido en mis viejos ideales y convencido de que Cuba carecla de capacidad para ser una nacibn independiente."3^

With this weakening of the forces which represented the best hopes and dreads for a hea.lthy, honest, and vigorous re­ public, all the latent elements of irresponsibility and immo­ rality were unleashed. Profitting from the still vast igno­ rance of the population, encouraged by a large Spanish popu­ lation who, harboring resentment for the still recent defeat, voiced their contempt for and mockery of every Cuban effort, and supported by the increasing political and economic control of the United States over the island, the x\Torst political ele­ ments emerged as the driving forces of the nation. 'The period of 1909-1925 is one of continuous decline of the moral and po­ litical standards of the island, while the mass of the popu­ lation took refuge in an attitude of permanent and humorous

"When I finished my reading I was both defeated and con­ vinced. Defeated in my old ideals and convinced that Cuba lacked the capacity to be an independent nation." Francisco Figueras, Cuba y su Evolucibn Colonial (Habana: Imprento 8ouga., 1907) , p . 5"*

3^The influence of the Spanish population in Cuba has been studied by Alberto Lamar* Schweyer in La Crisis del Pa­ triot ismo (Habana: Ramble y Hno, 1929)* 29

irreverence to everything which represented Cuba. (This soci­ ological trait, called choteo. has been profoundly analyzed by

Jorge Manach.)36 The best voices of Cuba reacted to this de­ terioration with bitterness and desperation. In 1920, the most illustrious writer of the island, Enrique Josd Varona, made this sarcastic summary of Cuban history: "Ha sido la Repiib- 37 lica un progreso? ... Si, un encharcamiento progresivo

And, in 192^, Fernando Ortiz wrote an essay with this signif­ icant title-La Deoadencla Cuba. (The Decadent Cuba) .

Without understanding this negative atmosphere, this debilitation of the Cuban national conscience, it is difficult to grasp the significance and the appeal of the generation which in the twenties revolted against this whole enviornment of corruption and decadence, appealing, with all its energy, to the dormant nationalism of the Cuban—people.

Having stressed the point which can be considered the most important consequence of the second American intervention, a brief profile of the period 1909-1925> the antecedent of the revolutionary uprising, can be made by presenting some of its

36jorge Manach, Indagacidn del Choteo (Habana: Editorial Lex, 1936) . -

37"Has the Republic been progressive? . . . Yes, a pro­ gressive muddle!" Enrique J. Varona, Con el Eslabdn (Barcelona: Editorial Mauci, 1929)» p. 102. 30

most important political and economic characteristics.

b) Political Developments, 1909-1925

During the second intervention, two political parties were

organized in Cuba, the Conservative Party, which tt? s born

mainly from the dissolution of the ill-fated Moderate Party of

Estrada Palma, and the Liberal Party, which defending a plat­

form stressing nationalism and reforms was the more popular of

the two. In the elections of November lk, 1908, due to a split

in the Liberal Party, General Jqs£ Niguel Gomez, the Conserva­

tive candidate won the presidential elections. In 1912, the

permanence of the division within the Liberal Party allowed

another Conservative candidate to triumph, General ?/!ario

Menocal, who was reelected in 1916, among outcries from the Lib­

erals of fraud and coercion. In 1920, Alfredo Zayas, an ex-Lib-

eral now running as a Conservative candidate,won the presidency

and remained in power until 1925> the year in which Machado was

sworn in as President of the Republic. __

But the names of the candidates or the parties do not

mean very much. The real meaning of politics, the interplay of

programs and ideas did not exist. Conservatives changed posi­

tion with the Liberals and vice versa: the political struggle was basically limited to different slogans and the personal appeal of certain individuals. The real objective was to gain 31 power in order to distribute positions and advantages among followers. In 1919» speaking in the Chamber of Deputies, Josd

Antonio Lanuza, a professor at the University of Havana and an honest man who lived and died in poverty, brilliantly defined the situation in Cuba: "En Cuba, los partidos politicos no son mas que cooperativas organizadas de consumo burocrdtico." ^8

Accordingly, bureaucracy grew abnormally to satisfy the neces­ sities of each victorious group. Public funds were wasted or used for the personal benefits of those who had access to them.

Illegal contracts for public works were awarded at exhorbitant rates, piling up obligations far in excess of the government's ability to pay. Several times, in 1908, in 1917 > in 1919> £>-nd in 1921, opposition groups revolted claiming, not without reason, that elections had been fraudulent. But the revolts usually led to more shady transactions among the antagonists, or were put down by American intervention or the simple threat of such intervention.

For the real and decisive factor in that period was

American influence. Every political aspirant looked to the

American Embassy, and American money supported many national and anti-national causes.

3®Josd Gonzalez Lanuza, Discursos (Habana.: Camara de Representantes, 1929)> p. 86. 32

On the other hand, the policy of the United States toward

Cuba had been modified. The embarrassment of a new occupation should be avoided, but the ever growing American interest in

Cuba must be protected. The result was the famous "preventive policy" of Taft and Anox, which directed the United States to stay out of Cuba and thus maintain peace in the island. This meant, naturally, the abandonment of Root’s cautious interpre­ tation of the Platt Amendment. The manifestation of that pol­ icy was "the adoption by the Department of State of an attitude of constant and critical watchfulness in order that representa­ tion might be made to avoid, if possible, the development of any situation in Cuba which might call for intervention." ^9

In January, 1911, for example, a bill authorizing the improve­ ment of the port of Havana and several other ports was intro­ duced and approved in the Cuban Congress. The improvements were needed, and the work was to be done by an American firm, but it was to be paid for by increasing the port dues. Despite the protest of several American groups, the American Minister,

John B. Jackson, considering the pro.iect a beneficial one for

Cuba, requested from Knox a statement of policy. The reply of- -

Secretary Knox was very enlightening:

39Fitzgibbon, Cuba..., p. 1^5* 33

because of its special treaty relations with Cuba...the Department considers that besides the direct protection of American interests you are to endeavour, by friendly rep­ resentation and advice, to deter the Cuban government from enacting legislation which appears to you of an undesirable or improvident character.40

On other occasions, the “friendly advice" took more concrete

forms. On January 17, 1912, Secretary of State Knox sent a no.te to the Cuban Government in regard to the increasing un­

rest created by a movement of veterans of the War of Indepen­ dence, who were demanding that pro-Spanish elements should be

ousted from political positionsHis note stated that the

United States felt “grave concern" about the situation, and recommended that Cuba should prevent any development which might compel the United States “to consider what measures it must t a k e .

^ODana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p . 472.

4lThis “Movimiento de los Veteranos", formed by General Emilio Nunez (1861-1919)> represented another aspect of Cuban struggle against the still powerful Spanish elements in the island.

^Fitzgibbon, Cuba..., p. 149.

43E1 Pals (Habana), February 4, 1912, p. 1. In May of that same year, the Marines landed In Cuba, against the express opinion of President Gomez, to protect

American interests from the disorders created by a racial up­ rising. In February, 1917» the Liberal Party took up arms against the fraudulent elections held by President Menocal. So popular was this cause, so evident the abuse, that in the first- two days the rebels controlled Santiago de Cuba, a. great part of Oriente province, and almost all of Camaguey province.

Spreading like fire throughout the island "it seemed as if the government could not stop it."^ Then, William—Elliot Gonzalez, the American Minister, received instructions to issue notices to the press to the effect that the United States would not support a government that came into power by unconstitutional means.^ Shortly afterward, the "powerful" revolution dissolved into the air. In spite of its failure, the Marines occupied

Santiago, Guantanamo, Manzanillo, and several other cities. The

"notices" of Mr. ^onzalez became a landmark in the history of

Cuba.

In 1919» both political parties, Liberal and Conservative, agreed to the revision of the electoral code and decided to in-

^Juan M. Leiseca, Historia de Cuba (Habana: Lib. Cer­ vantes, 1925)» p. 513*

^5Fitzgibbon, Cuba..., p. 157* 35

vite General Enoch H. Crowder, who had remained in contact with

Cuban affairs since the first intervention, to help them in re­ writing the code. In spite of the opposition of President

Menocal, Crowder was sent to Cuba as a personal representative of the President of the United States to supervise the settle­ ment of political disputes and to give advice as to the imple­ mentation of financial reforms. He remained in that position until January, 1923> when he was appointed the first Ambassador to Cuba, an office which he held until 1927. The struggle between President Zayas and Crowder was a long and, at times, a bitter one. To Chapman, in a rather superficial simplifica- tion, it was a struggle between "Evil** and ‘'Good*'. Crowder,

”the personification of that aggressive altruism which has given the world its great proconsuls,did try to impose cer­ tain fiscal and economic reforms on Cuba: a reduction in the budget, a revision of the bank system, etc.. He had in his favor, helping him curb the resistance of Zayas, the extreme economic condition of the island, and the need for loans, and, naturally, the usual threat of intervention. He was also the

^Charles Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927),'p.' 413.

^?Leland H. Jenks, Nuestra Colonla de Cuba (Buenos Aires: Edit. Palestra, i960), p” 224. 36

representative of powerful American business interests and had

the backing of several Cuban financial groups. Until approxi­

mately 1923» the influence of Crowder was nearly supreme in

Cuba. That year, President Zayas, with a loan of $50,000,000

received from the Morgan firm, decided to strike back, attack­

ing the famous "Honest Cabinet" which had been imposed or "sug­

gested" by Crowder in 1922. Some of its members considered

themselves immovable because they had American backing.**'® For

this battle Zayas had in his favor a growing resurgence of na­

tionalism in Cuba, and a change of attitude in the State De­

partment. In June, the entire Cabinet was reorganized. While

Crowder asked for a more "aggressive attitude by the United

States," Secretary of State Hughes assured the Cuban Ambassador

that the United States had no intention of intervening in Cuba as long as the Cuban Government proved to be stable and sound.^

The era of clear and open intervention was ending. It was a typical trait of the period that one of the most corrupt Cuban

Presidents had won a battle for nationalism.

**'®Wifredo Fernandez, "El Gabinete de la Honestidad," Cuba PolItlea, No. 3 (February, 1925), 116-17.

^Smith, The United States and Cuba, p. 97« 37

c ) Economic and Social Developments, 1909-1925

Economically, two important characteristics could he noted during this period: a) the expansion of sugar and the growth of latifundio; and h) the growing penetration and domi­ nance of American capital. Neither of these phenomena were horn in this period, rather they represent the acceleration of past currents; hut their impact and influence was deeply felt in the social hody of Cuha in those years.

As has been mentioned before, the conditions with which

Cuha started its independent life: the existence of the Platt

Amendment and the Treaty of Reciprocity of 1903 encouraged both phenomena, the expansion of the sugar industry and the invest­ ment of American capital in the island. The Reciprocity Treaty, toy granting a 20^ reduction on the duty paid on Cuban sugar marketed in the United States further oriented the Cuban sugar industry toward, the -United States and led other potential mar­ kets to be disregarded for a long period of time. It is true that already in 1902, sugar had become the main source of the island's national income, leaving far behind the other resources: cattle, tobacco, and coffee.-^ But the new incentives acceler­ ated this process and turned sugar into the all-powerful king

50ln 1902, sugar represented ^7 >9% of the total production of the island. Resdmenes Estadlsticos..., p. 26. 38

of the Cuban economy. During the eleven year period, 1903-

191^, Cuban sugar production and sugar-exports to the United

States more than doubled.^ In 1900, the Cuban percentage of world sugar production was 2.7#» in 1915> H increased to

15.h%.52

The First World War added tremendous momentum to this al­ ready great expansion. In July, 191^-» the average price of sugar sold in Havana was 1.93 cents per pound. The following month, when the war started, the price jumped to 3*3& cents per pound.. Until 1920, to is upward trend remained, almost constant, creating a wave of investment, speculation, and ex­ pansion. During the period 1900-1913> in spiteof the favor­ able conditions, only seventeen new mills were constructed in

Cuba, while in the five years from 191^-1918, twenty-five new mills were built. To maintain this growth, almost everything was sacrificed, to sugar: cattle ranches, corn fields, and

"viandas" . One author has estimated that about one third of the total forest area in Cuba was destroyed and converted into

51-Anuario Azucarero (Havana: Ministerio del Comercio Ex­ terior ,—T9^TT7_XXV» 2? and 33*

52jose R. Alvarez Diaz et al., TJn Estudio sobre Cuba (Miami: Miami University Press, 1963), p. ^ 1 . 39

sugar fields.53

The expansion of latifundia for sugar purposes very

quickly affected not only the peasants and, those who cultivated

other minor agricultural products, but also a very important

economic group in Cuba-the "colonos", formed of those who cul­

tivated the cane and, unable to grind it themselves, sold it

to the mill. This group, who had remained independent and rather powerful until the second, intervention, began to loose ground rapidly when the sugar mills initiated a vast program of

land acquisition in order to guarantee their own supply of cane and reduce their production costs. In 1927, for example, the

Cuban-American sugar company owned six sugar mills and 14,867 54 caballerlas of land. (One caballerla is eoual to 32 acres.)

As the majority of these great companies were owned by American firms, more and more the "colonos’* began to press for some protection from their government and, consequently, joined those who were becoming more and more nationalistic in their attitude.

The agricultural workers also felt the impact of this

53fiyron White, Azucar Anargo (Habana: Cultural S.A., 1955), p. 52.

5.4lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 195171 P* 96. 40

overwhelming sugar expansion. To keep the cost of production low and, at the same time, to meet the demand for more and more

"macheteros" (cane-cutters), the powerful interests of the sugar mills pressured the government to authorize the immigra­ tion of. Haitians and Jamaicans, who were willing to work for less than the Cuban workers. In 1912, reversing a policy that had been traditional in Cuba since the time of Felix Varela,

President Gomez gave the United Fruit Company permission to import 1,400 Haitians.55 From then on, legally and illegally, thousands of poorly paid workers, from the lowest social level, poured into the island, keeping salaries down and halting, at least in some provinces like Oriente, the "whitening" process of the nation.

The year 1920 marked the peak and, to a certain extent, the turning point of this period. An unexpected demand for sugar in the international market and the suppression of war price controls in the United States sent the sugar prices sky- high. From ?.28 cents per pound in November, 1919, the price of sugar climbed to 13*5^ cents in March, 1920, 19*56 in April, and 23*57 in May. The sugar crop of 1919-1920 was sold at

55Ramiro Guerra, La Industria Azuoarera en Cuba (Habana: Cultural SA, 1940), p. 179* bl

$1,022,000,000.00 and in one year brought the island more money than had all the crops from 1900 to 191^-. A golden era seemed to open up for Cuba. The suddeness of this opportunity-made everyone dizzy with dreams and greed. Everything was sacrificed for the smiling golden idol of sugar; everybody borrowed money to riant more sugar and the b*nks were more than generous in lending it. With no government control a wave of speculation, fiscal irresponsibility, and inflation swept the island. As a poet said: "hasta las cefnas se volvieron doradas..." ("even sugar cane became golden..."). Then disaster came. In June,

1920, the price of sugar dropped to 20.31 cents per pound, in

July it was 18.56, in 'September 10.78, in October 9*00, and in

December 5*51* At the beginning of 1921, the dream was over and Cuba was facing the terrible reality of a devasting eco­ nomic crisis.

The crisis cut deep, into the very bones of the popula­ tion. Peasants, "macheteros", "colonos", and "hacendados" suffered enormously. The Cuban banking system almost totally collapsed, abandoning the field to foreign banks. In 1920, foreign banks held only 20^ of the total deposits in Cuba; in 1923j over 76? of the total deposits were in foreign banks,

•5^Henry C. Wallich, Monetary Problems of an Export Eco­ nomy: the Cuban E x p e r i e n c e 191^-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 195^)» pp. 65-69* k-2

which also meant a greater penetration of American capital. In

1919 > American interests already controlled 68 sugar mills and

51$ of the total sugar production. During and after the crisis, with neither credits or reserves to continue production, many

’•colonos" and "hacendados" lost their property or were forced to sell it at ludicrous prices. In 1921, one single bank, the National City Bank of New York, was said to have teraporar- 57 ily taken control of over fifty sugar mills.

But the crisis had its salutary effects. It had shown how dangerous government irresponsibility could be, how neces­ sary it was to put some check on the economic forces that were controlling the destinies of Cuba. After 1920, a new generation, awakened by the impact of the crisis, began to demand, energetic reforms, to clamor for drastic changes in the political and social structure of the island. As a re presentstive of that generation once said: "La miseria econdroica del 20, nos hizo rebelarnos contra todas las miserias sociales que le dieron origan" ("The economic misery of 1920 made us rebel against all the social miseries that were its origin").-

5?Luis Valdes Hoig, El Comercio Mundial de Cuba y la ■ruerra mundial (Habana: Imorenta el Avisador Comercial, 1922), pp. 206-07.

58This phrase was told to roe- by one of the members of the "generation of the 30's", professor and writer Carlos Gonzalez Palacios, who was my professor of sociology at the Instituto of Santiago de Cuba. PART II

WINDS OF CHANGE CHAPTER III

THE ELECTIONS OF 1924

In 1924, the corruption of the Zayas government and the long association of the Conservative Party with that government, produced a powerful revival of Liberalism. Divided among

Zayistas, who wanted the President to seek a second term, and

Menocslistas, who followed ex-President Menocal in his new bid for power, the Conservative Party was suffering internal dete­ rioration and weakness. It was clear, to the majority of the observers, that the candidate which the Liberal Party would select in 1924 was going to be the next president of Cuba. Thus, the attention of the nation was focused on the internal struggle of the Liberal Party.

With the death of Josd Miguel Gomez in 1921, two figures appeared as the potential leaders of the Liberal Party: Colonel

Carlos Mendieta and General Gerardo Machado. Mendieta was by far the more popular of the two. A veteran of the War of Inde-

44 45

pendence, he had always been a steadfast supporter of the

Liberals, and had showed, in a country famous for its turn­ coat politicians, a remarkable loyalty to his party's princi­ ples. Famous for his courage, he was still more respected and admired for his reputation of honesty. In a nation which, after the economic disaster of 1920 and with newly emerging political forces, was crying for change, the figure of Mendieta was sur­ rounded by an increasingly vast popularity. For many Cubans he seemed to be the instrument of regeneration. But Mendieta's capacity did not match his historical task. Neither a well- read man nor one of many words, full of a sort of passive patri­ otism, Mendieta was more prone to follow decisions than to make them. Still worse, he seems to have never quite understood the complexities of any political situation.^9

Machado was quite the opposite. Outspoken and friendly, he made a. point of being attentive to everyone to win support from all circles. He did not have an impressive record in either war or peace, although he had been Secretary of Government

-59Thanks to the generosity of Mendieta's grandson, Dr. Jorge Beruff, I have been able to read some of the private letters of Mendieta. In a letter to Domingo Mendez Capote, written on January 22, 1924, he says: "Tti bien sabes como me confunden las algarablas que arman los pol-lticos por cualquier asunto." ("You know perfectly well how confused I am by the stridencies of the politicians in regard to any matter.") 46

under Gomez; but he was very ambitious and understood the mysterious dialectic of political transaction. u Furthermore, he had powerful economic supporters: Henry V/. Catlin, President of the Electric Bond and Share Company, and Laureano Falla

Gutierrez, a very wealthy Spaniard and founder of a well-known

Cuban family.

The two rivals operated on different levels. Mendieta had the sympathy and the support of the masses of the party. Where- ever he went spontaneous popular demonstrations greeted him.

Machado worked quietly for the control of the assemblies of the party, visited the leaders of different cliques, made promises, and negotiated deals. Mendieta was a popular man but not a politician; Machado was above all a politician. "The triumph of Machado," said, one of his most distinguished followers later,

"is basically due to his being the most perfect and complete of all Cuban politicians." 'Which, considering the species, was very dubious praise.

In June, 192^ , the General Assembly of the Liberal Party elected Gerardo Machado as the official candidate. The disap-

^OSome of these "transactions" will be mentioned in the discussion of Machado's election.

6lClemente Vazquez Bello, Revista Parlamentsria de Cuba, Ano VI, Nos. 54 sttd 55 (September-October, 1926), 250. ^7 pointment of the masses of the party was so deep, the opposi­ tion to this decision so general, that a word from Mendieta could have provoked its complete rejection, causing the disso­ lution of the Assembly and the convocation of a new one. Many of iiendieta’s sympathizers urged him to appeal to the Liberals to overturn the decision of the Assembly.^2 But Mend.ieta hesi­ tated and finally decided to retire into private life. As he wrote, "I don’t want my popularity to be used against the high levels of my party."^3 With this not very wise decision, the road was open and clear for Machado.

The following month, Machado published his political plat­ form for the upcoming elections. In this platform, he cleverly incorporated all the elements which were already in the atmos­ phere of Cuba. He called, it the "Platform of'Regeneration.”

Its ten points are worth summarizing:

1) Strict limitation on the powers of the state;

2) Opposition to the growth of bureaucracy in all public

services;

3) Constitutional reforms to assure honesty in elections;

/ A See, for example, Eduardo Abril Amores, ” Ahora o nunc a Coronel!," Diario d.e Cuba, June 28, 192^!, p. 1.

63Letter from Mendieta to "-■arqpez Sterling, July 1, 192^ (from Dr. Beruff's collection). 48

4) Revision of the Permanent Treaty to ’’free our Constitution

from the Appendix,^ /so that7 Cuban sovereignty shines

with complete national independence";

5) Construction of roads and improvement in communications;

6) More schools;

7) Better sanitary services;

8) Promotion of "good immigration";

9) Professionalization of the Army and the avoidance of any

military interference in political or civil affairs; and

10) Payment of public debts and the avoidance of new national

loans.^5

This platform was condensed, for political purposes, into

one slogan■which caught the imagination of the Cubans: "Water,

roads, and schools". And when the Conservatives, with Menocal

as their candidate, published a photo of the General on horse­

back, the Liberals answered wirth a photo of Machado among the

masses and the slogan "Con el pueblo y a pid" ("With the people

and on foot").

In November, 1924, after a political campaign in'Which

^ T h e Platt Amendment was generally referred to as the Appendix in Cuba because of its adoption as an annex to the Cuban Constitution in 190T. See above, p. 17.

^ Revista Parlamentaria de Cuba, Ano III, No. 28 (July, 1924), 316-319. 4 9

violence was not totally absent, ° the elections were held.

Machado carried five of the six provinces of Cuba. The following day the newspaper El Pals proclaimed: "una era de Regeneracic5n ha empezado en Cuba” ("an era of Regeneration has begun in

Cuba")

It was highly symptomatic of the new atmosphere in Cuba that the word "Regeneration" was on all tongues, even before

Machado adopted it for his campaign. So it was also symptomatic that the triumphant political party expounded the necessity of revising relations with the United States. A general desire for reform and a revival of nationalism were the key sentiments of the period.

Sut Machado was hardly the man to carry out these high ideals. On the contrary, Machado represented a conservative position in the Liberal Party, and his many connections with

American businessmen and companies mode his nationalistic stand highly vulnerable. (He was, for example, until 1924, Vice Pres­ ident of the Electric Bond and Share Company, and, in 1925, after being elected, his son-in-law, Josd Emilio Obregdn, vras

^ E1 Pals (Eabana), for example, reported on October 19, a shooting attack on the train carrying Menocsl to Oriente Prov­ ince. One person was killed.

6?Ibid., November 24, 1924, p. 1. 50 made notarial attorney for the Chase Bank in Havana.) His pro­ clamations of "Regeneration” had. clay feet, for through trickery and shady deals he had obtained the nomination of the Liberal 68 Party; and a none too honest pact with President Za.,yas had assured the benevolent neutrality of the government during the 69 elections. 7 He had proclai-ned the necessity of avoiding mili­ tary intervention in political affairs, but even before his elec­ tion he had already convinced General Monteagudo of his sympathy and support for the Army, offering also certain privileges for the officers if he were to be elected.

After the elections, and before taking office as President,

Machado paid a visit to the United States where he met Presi­ dent Coolidge, and was received and entertained by several Amer­ ican business groups. He assured everyone that he was a cham­ pion of better commercial and political relations between the

United States and Cuba and, as Smith writes,' "returned to Cuba and the Presidency in May, 1~9£5> with the praises of American

Machado’s son-in-law, Josd Emilio Obregdn, told me in an interview in New York, October 2k, 1965* that as the Assembly of the Liberal Party was to be held in a town near Havana, Nueva Paz, connected with the capital by a single railroad, Machado bribed the conductors of the only train, so only half of the Mendietistas were able to reach the town on time to vote.

^Allegedly, but supported by numerous sources, Zayas re­ ceived the right to control half of the total "collecturias" (places where Lottery tickets were sold) of the Republic.

^Olnterv^-iew with Jos6 Emilio Obregdn, who was present when this arrangement was made. 51

■businessmen ringing in his ears."^ On May 20, 1925 > amidst unusual cheering and enthusiasm, Machado was inaugurated as the

fourth President of Cuba. His term was supposed to last until

1929.

71 Smith, The United States and Cuba, p. 114-. For Machado's speeches and those in his honor during that trip see, The Visit of the President-elect of Cuba (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1925). CHAPTER IV

.MACHADO THE PRESIDENT, 1925-192?

Finally, Cuba, seemed to have entered an era of stability, progress, and true nationalism. The new President had emphat­ ically stated that "the tragedy of our politics, from Estrada to Zayas, has been re-electionism. "72 Ancl in his first informal message to the Congress of the Republic, he made a realistic analysis of the economic difficulties of Cuba and promised "a government sober, honest, and constructive." 73 His Cabinet was formed by well-known and respected men and one of them,

Josd Maria Barraqud, Secretary of Justice, announced that the basic task of this new government was "to put Cuba in contact again ivith her high destinies."

7^Revista Parlamentaria de Cuba, Ano IV, Nos. 35-?6 (March- April, 1.925), 207.

73ibid. ., p. 157 •

7^Memorias del Lyceum (Habana: Editorial Sopena, 1938), p. 68. 53

Almost Immediately after taking office, the President presented to Congress a Public Works Bill which initiated the most ambitious projects that the Republic had known. Salient features in the final law were: a) the construction of a much needed Central Highway X'rhich would connect Santiago de Cuba, ir. the extreme eastern province, Oriente, to Pinar del Rio, the most western of all Cuban provinces, with a road 1,179 kilo­ meters long; b) the construction of a National Capitol for the

Congress of the Republic; and c) the initiation of several pub­ lic works projects, as the later famous Malecdn (an esplanade), for the embellishment of Havana.^

For the first time, the Cuban government began to try to control sugar production in order to avoid the, until then, almost absolute freedom of the "hacendados". On Nay 3, 1926, the so-called "Verdeja Act" became a. lavr of the Republic. Con­ sidering the decline in prices experienced in 1925, and the ever present risk of over-production (the "zafra" of 1925 had reached 5>190,000 tons), the Law limited the sugar crop of 1926 to 103? less than the previous year. Supplementary decrees pro­ hibited the cutting of virgin forest for the purpose of plant­ ing more cane and stipulated that work in the sugar mills (the

^^Milo A. Borges, Compilacidn ordenada y complete de la Legislacidn Cubana (Ha banal Editorial Lex, 1952), II 585. 5^

start of which could vary from early December to late Febru­ ary) would not begin until January 1, 1927- The sugar crop could not exceed four and one half million tons and a quota system (which provided that sugar mills were to buy cane from all the "colonos" in proportion to their production) was estab­ lished for the protection of the "colonos".^ In view of the fact that this restriction on Cuban production, even if bene­ ficial in the short run, had encouraged other nations to ex­ pand their sugar industry, in October, 1927, the government created a Sugar Defense Commission and a Sugar Export Company which would control the production and the export of sugar.

Machado had also announced the necessity of diversifying agriculture and protecting the development of Cuban industries.

In 1927» tariffs were raised in the Law of Aranceles, to pro­ tect certain agricultural products and nascent, small industries.

As a result, certain sectors of the Cuban economy began to im­ prove: fruits, rice, and cacao, for example, increased produc­ tion rapidly after 1927- In July, 1929, another law created a commission "For the Defense and Propaganda of Tobacco." Certain industries as textiles and fishing, also received the necessary encouragement to grow.^

?6Ibid., p. 627.

^According to Alavarez Rios, "Undoubtedly, the Custom 55

Simultaneously with this firm direction of economic matters, the government proclaimed its purpose to carry out the program of regeneration. A proposed law for the protection of public employees-was announced in June, 1925, by the Undersecretary of

Justice Ricardo Eguilior, which stated that "merit and honesty and not political considerations will be the only roads to pro­ motion in every branch of the State."?® jn 1927, in a series of laws issued in April, Technical Schools and Schools of Com­ merce and Manual Work were created in the Republic.

As the crowning effort, much publicized if not very effec­ tive, the government announced in December, 1926, a vast pro­ gram for the regeneration of the prostitutes of H>vana, and the creation of special schools for their rehabilitation. In a speech at the Lyceum, Secretary Barraqud reiterated that the government of Machado was making a supreme effort "to clean all the rooms of our Cuban h o u s e .

Tariff of 192? was the most important legislation of an ec­ onomic nature enacted during the first three decades of the twentieth century, and may be called the first economic effort made by the Cuban government directed toward augmenting the na­ tional production...." Alvarez Diaz, Un Estudio sobre Cuba, p. l! 21..

?®Ricardo Eguilior, "Los Uuevos Proyectos," Diario de Cuba, June 26, 1925» P* 1*

^^piemorias d.el Lyceum, p. 71. 56

Considering the recent past of Cuba and the spectacular programs and actions of the new government, it was no wonder that Gerardo Machado became, after a few months in power, the most popular President the island ever had. In September, 1926, the University of Havana conferred on him the title of "Doctor

Honoris Causa"; in November of that same year, a popular col­ lection provided the funds to erect a monument to his mother (!) in Santa Clara; ha was proclaimed "hi.jo oredilecto" (favorite son) of 25 towns in the first two years of his government; pol­ iticians and .journalists scrambled amongst themselves "searching for titles in the fathomless oit of their servility; he was called "El Tit£n", "El Egregio", "El Supremo". A story spread throughout the island that once, ,>Then Machado vras visiting a town, he asked the Mayor-, "What time is it?" and the Mayor, with a smile which would have been the envy of the most abject cour­ tier of Versailles, answered, "The ti^e you wish, my General."

Par more dangerous than this fawning atmosphere vras the attitude of the political parties. Already in December, 1925*

Wifredo Fernandez, a brilliant writer and a leader of the Con­ servative Party, proclaimed that Machado’s programs were so

"full of patriotism and devotion for Cuba that true opposition was unpatriotic."®^ Instead, Mr. Fernandez proposed "la oposi-

®^Wifredo Fernandez, "Los Nuevos Horizontes," Heraldo de 57

cl(5n cooperativa" (cooperative opposition). The suggestion was immediately adopted by all parties, and in 1926, Liberals,

Conservatives, and the Popular Party were working together sup­ porting Machado in a movement that was popularly known as ”co­ oper a tivismo" . In 1926, for all practical purposes, Machado had no political opposition. In a manifesto to the people, pub­ lished in October, 1926, the President declared his profound satisfaction at the spectacle of "all Cubans working for a common ideal. Today in Cuba all is harmony."®^

Under this facade, barely visible at first, there was grumbling and resistance. The picture was not as bright as it seemed. From the very beginning, Machado had shown that he was not a soft politician who hesitated to take drastic measures whenever someone crossed his path. In August, 1925 j the news­ paper El Dla whose editor was Commandant Armando Andrd, pub­ lished a series of cartoons criticizing several political fig­ ures. One of these cartoons was directed, with extremely poor taste, toward s. personal affair of Machado. On August 20,

Andrd was assassinated at the door of his home. It vras a warn­ ing to everyone that the new President had indeed a very somber

Cuba., December 9> 1925» P- 2.

SlRevista Parlamentaria de Cuba, And VI, INTos. 5^-55 (September-October, 1926), 217 • ~ 58

sense of humor. Andrd was the first n^me in a steadily growing list.

From the beginning, the group that suffered the greatest pressure from the government was labor. Machado had repeated, several times that foreign end private capital should receive maximum guarantees for development; end he intended to keep those guarantees. On the other hand, he had also showed his authoritarian character when he declared in a public speech:

"ahore. en la Presidencies de la Reoublica actuo del mismo modo que lo hice en 1895 cuando me fuf a pelear en la Guerra de Op Independencia." Which meant, actually, that he intended to solve political and civil problems '''ith the sa^e "manu mi 11 tarlft of his previous years as a soldier.

The political conscience of the proletariat in Cuba, and its desire for reforms had been growing in the island since the beginning of the century. In 1899> sn ephemeral Socialist

Party had. been organized by Diego Vicente Tejera and. others, including a friend of vartf, Carlos Balino, who hod definite

Q - 3 Marxist inclinations. ^ In 1902, guided by the tobacco workers,

82*«No w , as President of the Republic, I act in the same manner as when in 1895 I went to fight in the War for Indepen­ dence.” Gerardo Machado, Per la Patria Libre (Ha.bana: Imprenta de F. Verdugo, 1926), o. 12.

83jos£ Rivero "■'runiz, El Primer Partido Sociallsta Cuba (Las Villas: Universidad Central, 1962) . 59

the first general strike was attempted in the island. The failure of that strike represented a set back for the proletar­ iat, but they recovered and, during the period 1906 to 1911 j s series of favorable measures were passed and recognition was gained. In 1907 > for example, another strike of the tobacco workers, who demanded the payment of their salaries in American money and not in Spanish money (still in use as a medium of exchange in the island), ended with a complete victory for the workers. The strike, which lasted 145 days, demonstrated the possibilities open to organized labor.On June 2 3 , 1909» the so-called Arteaga Law was passed, prohibiting the payment of wages, salaries, or any other remuneration in scrip, coupons, metallic chips, or any other substitute for money recognized as legal tender. In 1925 > after several regional organizations of workers had been founded, the first meeting to organize a

National Conference of Workers met in the city of Cienfuegos, from February 15 to 1 9 . As a result, the following year, the

National Confederation of Cuban Workers came into existance.

Machado clashed almost immediately with this first national organization.

In 1925» the influence of certain labor leaders grew

®^Josd Rivero Muniz, El Movimiento Laboral Cubano Durante el Perlodo 1906-1911 (Las Villas: Universidad Central, 1962), p~T~W. 60

smong the sugar workers. The first labor unions of these workers were organized by Enrique Verona, leader of the rail­ road workers in Csmaguey province. The alarm of the "hacend.ad.os" aroused. Tschado. On August 23, 1925» Enrique Verona was shot a c; in the town of Nordn. Fro'r> then on, the Cuban labor movement suffered from the direct opposition of the government. On "-'ay

15s 1926, Decree To. 6^9 authorized the Secretary of Interior

"or any other authority" to use the Army of the Rural Guard p ^ against those who fomented or participated in strikes. The next month, the entire directorate of railroad workers was R 7 arrested in Co maguey'

The snsassinnti-'n of Armando Andrd, the unrelenting atti­ tude of the government toward organized labor, and certain other symptoms of a "tough" poiicy against too vocal opposition did not affect Machado's popularity at the beginning. Not even the fact that the President had betrayed his word and had ob­ tained two lo^ns in 1927, one from the J. P. ’'organ firm for

C9,000,000 and the second from the Chase National Bank for •

®5calixto Naso, "El Fovimiento Obrero Cubano," Panoramas, No. 9 (Nayo-.Junio, 1 9 6^1), 7lx.

°^Borges, Comnilacidn ordensda..., I, 615.

p n '•'’'Revista Parlamentaria de Cuba, .Vno RI (Julio-Arosto, 1926), 20T. 61

.. op 5**0 ,000 ,000,'"' provoked any severe criticism. After all the central highway ws.s under construction and everybody could see the new improvements in Havana and other cities of the republic.

But very soon additional motives encouraged different groups to take a firm stand against the government. The most impor­ tant of these was the increasingly clear evidence that Machado had decided to remain in power.

SB "'■'Alvarez Diaz, Estudio sobre Cuba..., p. ij-11. CHAPTER V

PROROGUE OF POWERS AND RE-ELECTION, 1927-1928

The Impact of Machado's personality, the lack of true leadership in the political parties, and the noxious proclivity to follow dogmatic individuals were felt in Cuban politics from the very beginning. As early as July, 1925* two months after taking office, the leaders of the Liberal Party visited

Machado to propose his re-election.®^ In 1926, when "cooper- ativism" was working smoothly and the three political parties were competing for the favor of the President, the idea of re-election gained more force. But an obstacle remained:

Machado's repeated declaration that "re-electionism is the source of all evils" and his promise to not seek re-election.

On the other hand, with increasing impudence Machado began to

89Revista Parlamentaria de Cuba, Ano IV (Mayo-Junio, 1925)» 206.

62 63

show his appetite for power. On November 11, 1926, speaking to the provincial delegations of the Liberal Party, the Presi­ dent suddenly expressed himself in this arrogant tones

My government hopes to go on receiving, as up to now, the decided cooperation of the Congress, but if it should not have it, for the benefit of the Fatherland, under the banner of the Constitution, I, myself, alone, am capable of avoiding two years of lost effort.

And then he added:

I know that some of those who are hearing me will brand these declarations as anti-constitutional, and will think that I am a disguised partisan of dictatorship: but if dictatorship were necessary to keep alive the memory of those who fell on the field of heroism. I, myself, alone, with the help of those of you who are willing to follow me, am more than capable to carry out this p u r p o s e . 90

With these words, there could be no doubt, Machado was willing to move toward dictatorship if necessary, to carry out what he considered his "ideals of government". It was neces­ sary then to find a formula which could avoid re-election and yet keep Machado in power. Wifredo Fernandez, whose fertile political imagination created "cooperativism", is credited with having found the answer: to reform the Constitution and

90Revista Parlamentaria de Cuba, Afio VI (Noviembre-Diciem- bre, 1926), 268-2 6 9. (The translation and the underlining are mine.) It was highly symptomatic of the situation that after the speech the magazine reproduced an AP cable which stated that Machado’s words "had created surprise in Washington, but the feeling in the capital is that there would be no objection to support a dictatorship in Cuba." Ibid., p. 270. to prolong for two years the mandate of the President and the

Senators. The pretext for this modification was supposed to be the elimination from the Constitution of the right of re- election. So, under the aegis of suppressing once and for all the root of all evils, "re-electionism", the modification of the Constitution would, at the same time, extend Machado's term until 1930*

The idea of prolonging Machado's term while avoiding the hated re-election was a brilliant one. But neither Machado nor Wifredo Fernandez took into consideration the snowballing effect of-this move on the political ambitions of others. With the bait of a general prorogue of power, all the politicians jumped into the project with such wholehearted supported that it exceeded the initial plan of the President. The Chamber of

Deputies (Cdroara de Representantes) debated the proposal in

April, 1927, and agreed to present it to the future Constitu­ ent Convention with a modification which would extend the term of the President, Senators, and Deputies to May, 1933— an addition of three more yearst With mounting opposition to this proposal (in the Chamber of Deputies it was approved by a vote of 9^ to 8; the best speech in opposition was made by Ramdn

Zaydin^l), the Congress finally approved a plan for the modi-

91see, Ram<5n Zaydin, Dlscurso contra la Prdrroga de Poder- es (Habana: Imprenta Bouza^ 1928). 65

fication of the Constitution which contained these basic points:

a) Inclusion of the Isle of Pines as territory of Cuba; b) Extension to women of the right, to vote;

c) The right of minority parties to have representation in

the Senate; d) Stricter rules for the future modification of the Consti­

tution; e) Augmenting the number of senators to 6 for each province,

elected for a term of nine years;

f) Elimination of the vice-presidency; g) Election of the President for a 6-year term, without the

right of re-election; h) Prolonging the term of the present President for two years;

and

i) Holding an election for a Constituent Assembly to consider

this project.

Immediately, the President proclaimed his satisfaction at being spared "the necessity of re-election, "^3 and criticized, with his usual acrimony, those who had opposed the formula.

The opposition came basically, as shall be seen later, from a

92see, Texto del Proyecto de Reforma de la Constitucidn (Habana: Congreso de la Repiiblica, 192?) .

93Heraldo de Cuba, Abril 16, 1927, p. 1. 66

recently founded political group called "Unidn Nacionalista'1,

from some members of Congress, and from the students of the

University. But it is very doubtful that, if passed with such

terms, the project for reforming the Constitution would have

provoked general opposition. After all, the prorogue was for

only two years and it represented the disappearance of the

dreaded right of re-election. Even Juan Clemente Zamora, Pro­

fessor of Constitutional Law at Havana University and certainly not a partisan of Machado, wrote a series of articles defending

the project and maintaining that the two extra years were nec­

essary "to guarantee the transformation from one system to the

other."9^

According to the plan, on April 1U-, 1928, after being

duly elected, the members of the Constituent Assembly met for

the first session. According to Article 115 of the 1901 Con­

stitution, then in effect, the Constituent Assembly had to

limit itself to approval or rejection of the reform project

approved by Congress. But the delegates were all "Machadis-

tas", they all came from the ranks of the parties which had defended "cooperativism", and they were all eager to show

their loyalty to the President. Breaking all protocol, the

9^Juan Clemente Zamora, Estudios sobre el Proyecto de Re­ forma. Constituclonal (Habana: Imprenta Rambla, Bouza y Cia, 1927), P. 55- 67

Assembly unanimously declared in the session of May 10:

The Constitutional Convention does not hesitate to reaffirm that General Gerado Machado y Morales, because of his com­ mitments and his antecedent work as founder of the Repub­ lic, is faced with the inevitable obligation of accepting a new presidential term.95

And so, the Assembly violated the rules of the Constitution of 1901, modified the Congressional project, and declared that the principle of no re-election could not be retroactive.

Machado could run for a new six-year term in 1928; his presi­ dential administration would end on May 20, 1935* From now on, no president could aspire to a second term.

When the text of the new law was made public the evident illegality of its provisions, the abject attitude of the As­ sembly, and the applause throughout the government dispelled the last doubts: the shadow of dictatorship had been extended over

Cuba. It was necessary to fight.

Since 1927, when the first articles and statements_defending the reform of the Constitution appeared, Colonel Carlos Mendieta abandoned his retirement and organized an association, "La

Unic5n Nacionalista", with the intention of forming a political party to combat Machado's policy. In February of that same year, the protest of the students against the prorogue was so violent

^ Diario ae Sesiones de la Asamblea Constituyente (Habana: n .p., 1928), XII Session, p. 5• "" 68

96 that the University was closed "indefinitely11. In opposition to this attitude, Wifredo Fernandez used his peculiar dialec­ tics "in Cuba," he warned, "revolution is not legitimate be­ cause it brings the foreigner."97 Privately, he assured the

President that there was no reason for concern. He is sup­ posed to have said: "We have the support of the American gov­ ernment and the most important political forces are with us.

Who cares about the shouting of some groups of "muchachos"?"98

They should have cared. Eventually, those shouting "muchachos" destroyed all plans, sent Machado into exile, and forced Wifredo

Fernandez to commit suicide. They represented the forces of a new Cuba. It is now time to draw a profile of these emerging forces.

96Revista Parlamentaria de Cuba, Ario VII _(Marzo-Abril, 1927), W. “

97Ibid., (Septiembre-Octubre, 1927)» 201.

^interview with Josd Emilio Obregdn. CHAPTER VI

WINDS OF CHANGE

As in the rest of Latin America, the "Roaring Twenties" signified in Cuba a period of unrest and transformation. From every direction revolutionary winds blew their portents. Echoes of the Mexican Revolution and the Constitution.of 1917 awak­ ened the political conscience of many young groups. The effect of the University Reform of Cordoba, Argentina (1918) spread rapidly through Latin America. The post-war years' economic crisis shook the political structure of many Latin American nations. The vibrating thunder of the Russian Revolution, although remote and obscure, attracted the attention of the workers. Voices of rebellion and anti-Americanism became a chorus: from the Uruguayan, Rodd, to the Argentine, Ingenieros; from the Colombian, Vargas Vila, to the Peruvian, Haya de la

Torre; from the Mexican, Vasconcelos, to the Chilean, Recabarren; a new creed of Latinism, Indianism, Nationalism, or, essentially,

69 70

anti-Yankeeism resounded throughout Latin America. Even Rubdn

Dario, the poet of castles and princesses, cautioned with his famous somber quiry: " Es que tantos millones de hombres hablaremos ingles?" ("Will so many million men speak English?")

"As an answer to that question," wrote Gabriela Mistral pas­ sionately, "Sandino has said 'No1 in Nicaragua."

The first signs of the new attitude appeared in Cuba in the early twenties. In 1922, a group of young writers who wanted a complete renovation of the intellectual life of Cuba, joined efforts and formed the "Grupo Minorista", to put their ideas into action. As usual, they were soon involved in politics.

On May 18, 1923* at a meeting of the Academy of Science, a mem­ ber of Zayas' Cabinet was invited to sit at the Presidential table. Immediately, a fiery young poet, Rub6n Marinez Villena, raised his voice expressing his disagreement with the invitation, and repudiating, on behalf of all Cuban intellectuals, the cor­ ruption of the government, represented there by Secretary of Jus­ tice Dr. Erasmo Reguiferos Ramos. He then abandoned his place, followed by thirteen members of the "Grupo Minorista". The following day they published a famous document, "La Protesta de los Trece", in which they energetically condemned all the social and political evils of C u b a . 99 They were all put on trial by

99For a condensation of the Protest of the Thirteen, see, 71

the government, but the process died out with no consequences.

The names of all those who signed the protest soon became fa­ mous in Cuba.l®°

Almost simultaneously, the students at the University of

Havana began their fight for reforms. In November, 1922, Dr.

Josd Arce, Rector of the University of Buenos Aires and a de­ fender of reformist ideas, arrived in Havana and was invited by the students to speak at the University. His discussion of the

Argentine student movement and the process or renovation created a deep impression on the Cuban students. In January, 1923* under the leadership of Julio Antonio Mella (who was already influenced by Marxism), the students occupied the University and demanded a "purge" of professors and text books, autonomy 1 09 for the University, and free education for all. After some conflicts and discussions, President Zayas decided to yield: by governmental decree an University Assembly was formed, with

Max Henriquez Urena, Panorama Histdrico de la Literatura Cubana (New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 19&3)» II> 35&•

lOOAmong the better known were: Jorge Maftach, Juan Marin- ello, Francisco Ichaso, Josd Z. Tallet, Calixto Mas<5, and Felix Lisazo.

-1-According to Raul Roa, Retorno a la Alborada (Habana: Imprimex, 1963), p. 11^, the role of Dr. Arce has been exag­ gerated. "He was more a pretext than a cause."

102juiio Antonio Mella, "La Agitacidn Universitaria de la Habana," Juventud, No. 6 (Junio, 1925)> 72

thirty professors, thirty graduates, and thirty students, responsible for electing the Rector and establishing new reg­ ulations for the University. At the same time, the government granted legal authority to the recently formed Federacidn de

Estudiantes Universitarios (F.E.U.).1^ With this victory, the students began to play a growing role in the political events of the island. In October, 1923» the First National Congress of Students was held in Havanas 128 delegates came from all over the country. They not only adopted resolutions affecting educational problems, expressing the increasing influence of radicalism and Marxism, but the Congress also condemned "Yan­ kee intervention in Cuban affairs" and proclaimed the necessity of profound changes "in the present economic system of Cuba."!®^

In 1924, the students invited Victor Raiil Haya de la Torre, then on his way to Europe, to speak and applauded when he proposed:

"a common front against imperialism and for Latin America." l®-5

On March 1, 1925, Josd Vasconcelos visited Havana. Symbolic of the new spirit and, to a certain extent, prophetic of things to come, Juan Marinello saluted him with this significant state-

10 3Ganeta_Oficial_de_J;a__Re_2^ Marzo 22, 1923* P* 2.

lO^Erasmo Dumpierre, Mella (Habana: Instituto de Historia, 1965), p. 31.

105lbid., p. 42. 73

ment:

Por eso, Profesor, en nombre de una juventud que no quiere morir a manos de enemigos extrafibs ni domesticos, pues para corabatirlos empieza a organizarse, permitid que al escucharos esta tarde como un Maestro, os saludemos tam- bien como un precursor.

Clearly then, the University which was confronted by the

illegal extension of Machado's powers was quite different from

that somnolent institution which had passively watched the

previous political problems of Cuba. The "shouting boys" whom

Wifredo Fernandez dismissed so easily, were a partial, but 'de­

cisive, expression of new ideals and a new conscience. With

radical programs, although vague at the beginning, willing to

follow for a while the leadership of some member of the older generation whom they considered patriotic, these students were

to show in a long and bloody struggle how passionate were their

ideals for a new Cuba.

As has been said before, as soon as the Project for the reform of the Constitution was published, the turmoil created

in the University forced the government to close it. In March,

1927, a decree was passed which prohibited "the existence and

106por this reason, Professor, in the name of a youth who does not wish to die at either the hands of foreign or domestic enemies, but that is beginning to organize to combat them, permit us that while we listen to you this afternoon as a teacher, we salute you also as a pre­ cursor. Revlsta Parlamentarla de Cuba, Afio IV (Marzo- Abril, 1925), 117. 74

functioning inside the University of any association, group, or organism with no specific educational or administrative purposes."107 Legally speaking, the recently founded Federacidn de Estudiantes Universitarios (FEU) had ceased to exist. The answer of the students was to create the first Student Direc­ tory and to organize the first meeting opposed to what they called "the dictatorship of Machado." Immediately, the Univer­ sity authorities expelled the leaders of the opposition and the members of the Directory. But new members replaced those ex­ pelled and the fight went on. In 1928, after several clashes with the police, the University stood in open war against the government.

Adding fuel to the forces which were promoting change in the intellectual groups, in the University, and among the workers, the Cuban Communist Party was founded in Havana, in

1925* Showing the links of the party with the agitation in the University, one of the signatories of the constitution was Julio Antonio Mella, who by then had been expelled from the University.108 Initially, the party was very small, formed

10?Eduardo Suarez Rivas, Un Pueblo Crucificado (Miami: n. p., 1964), p. 34. The testimony of Dr. Suarez Rivas is impor­ tant because he was one of the founders of the first Student Directory.

108i»coino se fundt5 el Partido Comunista de Cuba," Hoy (Havana), May 1, 1943» p. 45. Special issue. 75 basically by intellectuals like Martinez Villena, student leaders like Mella, and middle-class professionals like Dr.

Bernal del Riesgo. It bad to face numerous problems in its development: the control of the labor unions by anarcho-syndi­ calist leaders, the lack of experience of its first cadres, and persecution and repression on the part of the government. In

1928, the single party organ, "El Comunista", had a circulation of about 1000 copies.1®9 But the influence of the party in the radical atmosphere of Cuba went far beyond the number of its members. Following the pattern set in Europe by Willie Muzen- berg, a series of peripheral organizations, more or less con­ nected with the party, appeared in Cuba: "Ala Izquierda. Es- tudiantil", "Liga Anti-Imperialista", "Asociacidn de Escritores

Libres", which served to multiply the echo of Marxist propa­ ganda on the island.

In sum, all the forces already mentioned, plus the growing nationalistic feeling among the Cubans and the sober realization of the weakness of the island's economy brought about by the crisis of 1919-1920, had begun to transform the mentality and the attitude of vast sectors of the population. Machado and his advisers, Wifredo Fernandez, Barraqud, Ferrara, were

109The Communist International (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1928), p. 371. 76

thinking in terms of the past. They thought that, as in the time of Presidents Menocal or Zayas, opposition could be bought, the simple menace of American intervention could paralyze po­ litical antagonists, everything could be solved with a secret and profitable transaction. They did not realize, until it was too late, how different was the attitude of these new forces, how willing they were to fight all the way, to wipe out of Cuba what they considered, as Martinez Villena put it “la costra tenaz del cdloniaje,” (the tenacious scab of the colonial pe­ riod) of which Machado and Company were the typical representa­ tives .

But, for the time being, things looked well for the govern­ ment. Before embarking on the adventure of constitutional mod­ ification and re-election, President Machado paid a visit to the United States (1927) and sounded out President Coolidge concerning his plans. He was told by the President of the^United

States that '‘this was a question for the Cuban people and their government to decide.. Qn his return to Cuba, bn

July 20, 1928, an Emergency Law was passed by the Congress by which presidential nominations could not be made by other

llOForeign Relations of the United States, 1927 (Washing­ ton, D.cT s U.S. Government Printing Office, 19^2), II, 527* 77

parties than the Liberal, Conservative, and Popular. l -l-l As a result, the National Union of Carlos Mendieta was kept out of the race.

Prior to the elections of November 1, 1928, running as the only candidate of the three above-mentioned parties, Machado published a political platform explaining why "the high patriotic duties and present circumstances’* had forced him to make the sacrifice of running-again for President. He also reviewed his past achievements: ”in three years my government has made more public works than all those that preceded me put together,” acknowledged the_ opposition of the University, and proclaimed,

"I have not hesitated in regard to my attitude. I will never hesitate in the future. Our country will be free, but orderly and quiet.” He defended the soundness of his sugar policy, his true concern for the workers, and ended with his traditional note of authoritarianism: "the spirit of order which is inher­ ent in me does not permit me to temporize with the mob or with irresponsibility."-*--^ Having closed the University and par­ alyzed the Union Nacionalista, the elections were held without

H l Gaceta Oflcial de la Repifbllca de Cuba. July 21, 1927> p. 2.

H^Gerardo Machado y Morales, Declarations Regarding His Electoral Platform.(Habana: Imprenta Rambla, Bouza y Cia., 1928), pp. 7> 9-1 0 , and 2 6. 78

serious problems and Machado was duly elected for the term

1929 to 1935-

The American charge in Havana refrained from congratulating

Machado upon his re-election until he was instructed to do so.

He thought

that this might be a suitable occasion to .convey in a neg­ ative manner to the mind of General Machado the fact that the Government of the United States was not giving him personally the wholehearted support which he is apparently trying to have the people of Cuba believe he is receiving.^

A wise opinion that unfortunately was not shared by the majority of his countrymen (or by his Government) living in Cuba. From a quite different viewpoint, the Tlmes~~of Cuba, the organ of the American colony in Cuba, expressed in July, 1928: "The new

Machado administration should be one of peace and prosperity for

Cuba, and all elements, native and foreigners, should put forth their best efforts to make it s o . " ! ! * 1'

It was soon obvious that these hopes were false. Neither peace nor prosperity, but misery and civil war were to be the results of Machado's second administration.

113chargd (Curtis) Dispatch, November 6, 1928, Department of State papers (DS/2713)• National Archives.

H^Times (Havana), July, 1928, p. P A R T III

THE FIGHT AGAINST MACHADO, 1929-1933 CHAPTER VII

THE SITUATION IN 1929

Apart from some small clouds looming here and there over the political horizon, there was nothing but brilliance and optimism surrounding Machado on May 20, 1929* the day of his second inauguration. With unusual solemnity, the act took place in the new and impressive Congressional Palace - "a visible proof of Machado’s dynamism," as one of the speakers remarked - and before representatives from more than one hundred nations. That same day, among many articles devoted to him, El Heraldo de Cuba compared Machado with Cavour,

Bismarck, Gambetta, etc....^-*

Certainly there had been troubles with students and workers. Just a few months before, a workers meeting had to

H5viriato Gutierrez, "Machado el Politico," El Heraldo de Cuba, May 20, 1929> p. 6.

80 81

be interrupted by the police because of the fiery speech of an unexpected speaker, a student named Barcel<5, whose revolution- 1 1 6 ary words were received with "thunderous applause". Once in a while the leaders of Unidn Nacionalista made a proclamation accusing the government of being unconstitutional. But these were minor incidents. As Machado's partisans never tired to repeat, the international prestige of Cuba had never been higher. One year before, in 1928, Havana had seen the gathering of delegates for the Sixth International Conference of American

States and Machado had received the President of the United

States as his guest of honor. Furthermore, on arriving at the capital, U.S. Delegate Charles E. Hughes had declared: "The

American delegation considers it a privilege to be able to participate in the noble vision of President Machado..H**7

The American-Cuban friendship seemed, thus, extremely firm. During the Sixth Conference, the Cuban delegation msde every possible effort to prevent anyone from mentioning the name of Sandino (who was at the time fighting against the

American forces in Nicaragua) and refused to condemn the right of "intervention", as many Latin American delegates were insisting on, because, as Cuban delegate Ferrara

H ^ Dlarlo de ia Marina, May 2, 1928, p. 3.

Ibid., January 17, 1928, p. 1. 82 explained, "We can't join the general chorus of non-inter­ vention...in my country the word "intervention" has been a word of honor, a word of glory, a word of triumph, a word of A A Q liberty; it has been a word of independence."(!)

It was natural then that in May, 1929» when his government asked him for a report on the political situation in Cuba,

Ambassador Judah sent a long dispatch defending Machado from every accusation and asserting that the President was "in complete control of all the political parties because all of the constituted political parties support him and his policies."^9

Actually, those last words of the Ambassador were very close to the truth, with "cooperativism" working smoothly, with fair economic conditions on the island> and his program of public works showing results, the popularity of Machado was still great. In mid-1929» the forces of opposition could still be classified into three important groups: a) the slowly growing National Union Party of Mendieta which rallied almost all of the old political figures of Cuba who were against

Machado; b) the student groups in the University, already organized under the Student Directory; and c) some labor

H 8 E m i]_i_0 Roig de Leuchseunring, Historla de la Enmienda Platt (Habana: Cultural S.A., 1935)j I, 2 8 3.

-^Dispatch, May 10, 1929» Department of State papers(DS/27^7) . National Archives. 83

groups and the Communist Party. For reasons of prestige and

national reputation the first group was the most important

and the one which by natural gravitation seemed to be the

leader. But there was no important contact among the three,

nor were they fighting for the same purpose or under the same

conditions. The students had limited their action to the

struggle inside the University; the workers and the Communists

were basically defending themselves from a policy of harsh

repression and persecution. Both received much more severe

punishment than the political leaders of the National Union.

In January, 1929» Julio Antonio Mella, the main leader of the

students, by then a full-fledged member of the Communist Party,

was assassinated in Mexico. Almost everyone in Cuba added his name to the list of students and workers murdered by Machado's

forces.

It is important to bear in mind that in mid-1929» none of

the forces which were opposing Machado had proclaimed any

120The responsibility for the assassination of Mella is not quite clear. The Communist interpretation has always insisted on the traditional thesis, accepted by the majority of Cubans, that it was the work of Machado. Anti-Communist sources have, nevertheless, pointed out the possibility of a Communist reaction against the anti-party attitude of Mella. See, for example, Robert Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957)* p. 271. The fact that Mella was in conflict with the party has been confirmed by his daughter Natacha Mella in Diario de las Americas (Miami), October 29> 1961, p. 4. concrete program of action or even announced the necessity of a revolution. The most aggressive declaration of the National

Union. Party stressed that it was the patriotic duty of every

Cuban "to fight for the re-establishment of freedom and legality in our country. 1 P 1 The students limited themselves to shout

"Down with the Dictator!” inside the walls of the University; and the Communists, following the general line of the Comintern, directed their best artillery against "imperialism and its national allies.” To all these attitudes, Machado answered always by pointing out his patriotic past and his accomplish­ ments in the government, "Which actually proves nothing," sharply commented the director of Diario de la Marina, "for a

Dictator is recognizable not as much for what he does but for what he forbids others to d o .”-^2

In the first days of November, 1929» when a few of the exiled figures of the National Union began to make declarations in the United States about the political situation in Cuba, a national movement of support for the President took shape on the island. Promoted by official groups and accompanied by political pressure, the movement nevertheless acquired vast

^ %uestro Propdsito (Habana: Unic5n Nacionalista, 1929)> p. 3*

1^2jos£ Rivero, "Irapresiones,” Diario de la Marina, May 20, 1928, p. 1. 85

proportions. In a common pronouncement, the most important

representatives of nearly all the Cuban city councils proclaimed

their support for a government tha.t had restored peace and

order in Cuba, strengthened national unity, and, above all,

"opened new roads for Cuban economic development and progres­

sive prosperity."123

With a sort of tragic irony, at the very moment when these words were being published, an era of "prosperity" ended with

the sudden collapse of the stock market in New York. That

collapse, and the ensuing measures of the American government

to fight its consequences, plunged Cuba's economy into its darkest period. As usual, the economic disaster had immediate and vast political and social repercussions. It was then that

the voices of protest against Machado and all that he represented

found a growing cry, and the struggle against his regime began to develop into a revolutionary movement.

^■^Dlario de la Marlnay. November k, 1929» p. 10. CHAPTER VIII

DEPRESSION AND GENERAL OPPOSITION, 1930-1933

For the purpose of this dissertation, it is enough to point out by means of certain striking figures how somber and desperate was the economic situation in Cuba from 1929 to

1933 and how inevitable the spread of misery and desperation through all sectors of the population.

In 1928, the price of sugar was 2.18 cents per pound, a rather low price which had forced Cuba to readjust its economy, but which still allowed for certain economic stability. In

1929» after the collapse of the market, the price dropped to

1.72 cents per pound, a level which implied misery and ruin for the island. In 1930., the price was 1.23; In 1931» after the

United States government had aggravated the situation by adopting the Hawley-Smoot tariff on sugar imports, the price declined to

1.11; and in 1932, in what seemed to be an irreversible trend toward the total collapse of Cuba, the price of sugar went

86 87

still further down to the all-time record low of 0.71 cents per pound I In 1929> the Cuban sugar crop had a value of

$225,100 ,000 ; in 1933, the total value of the sugar crop was

$53,700 ,000 , less than one-fourth of the 1929 total value.

This time Cuba didn't find, as had happened on other occasions, a palliative in the expansion of other products.

Tobacco, for example, the second largest export product, also suffered a severe decline. In 1929, tobacco exports represented a total value of $43,067,000; in 1933, they reached only

$13,861,000 .125

The results of this terrible crisis were felt soon enough in Cuba. In 1929, while the government was still talking of expanding Cuban trade and industry, in January, 1930, it announced a general reduction in the salaries of all public 1 o £\ employees, with the exception, naturally, of soldiers. As early as March, 1930, there were protests throughout the island because of the delay in paying the salaries of teachers and agricultural workers.I2? From then on, it was a common trag-

12^Anuario Azucarero (Habana: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1959), PP. 37-38.

125Alvarez Diaz, Un Estudio sobre Cuba, p. 685.

3-26pia.rio de la Mar~ina, January 9, 1930, p. 1.

12?E1 Pals. March 6, 1930, p. 1. 88

edy for all Cuban workers, public or private, to suffer delays

in receiving their monthly check or to wait several months without receiving any payment. Prices declined for all products, and unemployment spread through the island causing, in turn, political unrest. Even taking into consideration the social class with which he was in contact, the comment of Chargd d'Affairs Reed in 1930 is highly significant:

In every conversation I have had with Cubans and Americans who are opposed to the Machado administration I have asked the following question: If sugar were selling at three cents a pound, would the present'political agitation con­ tinue? The answer has invariably been: N o .1^8

There are some doubts about the absolute validity of that conclusion, but at any rate, with the economic crisis hitting progressively hard on all aspects of Cuban life, it was evident that the wind was now blowing in favor of the opposition. The government, far from realizing the necessity of flexibility, responded with more severe decrees. In January,

1930 > all public demonstrations by political parties or groups that were not legally registered were forbidden. Energetically protesting this measure and, at the same time, summarizing the radical change in the political situation, Colonel Carlos

Mendieta wrote:

128pore^ja.n Relations of the United States. 1930. II, 658. 89

cuando se cierran las puertas de la legalidad, es indudable que se abren las de la violencia...Es imposible preconizar lo que habrd de ocurrir tarde o temprano en dste pals, victima de todos los infortunios y sujeto a la afronta de una nueva esclavitud.129

The doors of violence were indeed opened. In the following months a series of events changed the entire panorama of Cuba and cast a sombef shadow over the future. Confronted by crisis on almost every front, the government was forced to move forward toward an open, bloody dictatorship.

On May 19, 1930, the Nationalists held a meeting in the town of Artemisa, near Havana. According to government sources they did it in open defiance of the law; the leaders of the party later insisted that they had authorization from the local authorities. In any case, when the meeting started, a group of soldiers, headed by a lieutenant, tried to interrupt the first speaker, Juan Gualberto Gomez, one of the veterans of the War of Independence. A discussion followed on the platform, a shot was fired and the lieutenant fell. Immediate­ ly, pandemonium erupted. Cries, panic, the soldiers charged

129when the doors of legality are closed, the doors of - — violence are automatically open...It is impossible to visualize what sooner or later is going to happen in this unfortunate country, victim of all misfortunes and subject to the affront of a new.servitude. Diario de la Marina, January 16, 1930» p. 1. 90

the multitude, firing their rifles.... When the disturbance

was over, eight persons had been killed and several dozen

injured. The tragedy, which created a national commotion,

was followed by a wave of arrests of Nationalist leaders.

"The events of Artemisa mean that politics is no longer possible

in Cuba, the answer to brutality must be open rebellion,"

proclaimed Ramdn Zaydin as he went into exile.^ 0

The government was still coping with the aftereffects of

the Artemisa affair when on May 28, less than ten days later,

a general strike of the railroad workers was declared by their

leaders (the strike, apparently, had no relation to the polit­

ical troubles but was a protest against the reduction of sala­

ries) . To avoid the paralyzation of transportation, the army

was ordered to take over the running of the trains and several

labor leaders were put under arrest. The following month, as

a sign of the changing times, ex-President Mario G. Menocal

came out of retirement and began to make public statements which could be interpreted as critical of the regime. -*-31 As a

result, several members of the Conservative Party (the party

in which Menocal had always been a leader) showed a desire to

Zaydin, Un Pasado de Lucha (Habanas Edit. Sopena, 1937)» P* 97-

13lThat was, at least, the impression given by the Cuban press commenting on his political reappearance. 91

abandon "cooperativism" and move toward a policy of "concil­

iation" with the opposition.

Nevertheless, the government neither hesitated nor showed

any sign of weakness. Machado claimed for himself full respon­

sibility for the acts of the Army in Artemisa, the strike

failed to paralyze the country, and the bulk of the Conserva­

tives were kept in line. In June, Ambassador Guggenheim

reported that "a calmer and more optimistic attitude toward

Cuban economic and political conditions prevails."132 ^t the

same time, the Ambassador was trying to mediate between the

government and the opposition. A movement that failed, ac­

cording to the Ambassador, "because of the obstinacy of Colonel

Mendieta and his associates in demanding Machado's resignation."^33

— Mendieta, on his own, later explained that he was sure that the

promises received from the government were only "an attempt to

gain time and overcome the critical conditions of the moment."13^

After the failure of conciliation between government and

opposition, the situation clouded again. On September 30»

1930, the third group of anti-governmental forces intervened.

132Foreign Relations..., 1930. II. 6^9*

133Ibid., p. 650.

13^Letter to Carlos Hevia, August 14, 1933* in Dr. Beruff's collection. 92

The students organized a street demonstration that was sup­ posed to reach the Presidential Palace. A few blocks after emerging from the University, the demonstrators clashed with the police; one policeman and two students were badly injured.

The nex.t day, one of the students, Rafael Trejo, died in the hospital. The death of Trejo marked a turning point in the student's struggle. Photos of the "student-martyr" were sent to all high schools and institutions of learning in the island; proclamations calling for a general fight against the dicta­ torship were issued by the Student Directory; and, for the first time, student organizations sought to establish contact with other opposition groups, principally, the National Union.^35

In other words, the student's action erupted out of the Uni­ versity and took on national dimensions. In October, after constitutional guarantees had been suspended and press censor­ ship had been established by the government, the Student

Directory organized small groups in many towns of the Republic and prepared its forces for an open confrontation with the government.

In the meantime, Menocal and Mendieta had reached an agreement to join forces against Machado. Their first concern

135lnterview with Carlos Prio and Josd Antonio Rubio Padilla (both members of the Student Directory) in Washington, D.C., July 22-23, 1965. 93

was naturally the attitude of the American Embassy.

In September, 1930, Chargd d'Affairs Reed complained in a report that exaggerations in the publicity circulated in the United States with regard to every Cuban incident

"only serve to exasperate the Cuban authorities and to en­ courage the Government's enemies to look to the United States for assistance in turning out President Machado."^-36 He added that the Nationalists "neither expect nor desire American intervention in the sense of a temporary occupation," but only wanted the American Government to put enough pressure on

Machado to force a "given course of action," with the hope that this would be more than enough to ruin him politically.*-^

Probably as a result of that report, on October 2, 1930, Sec­ retary of State Stimson held a press conference. When asked if the American Government would land forces in Cuba in the event of a revolution, he was careful in answering that the

American forces had never landed in Cuba when there was any regime in existence, but only when there was no government.

Furthermore, these were only the precedents under which guidance the government would have to act should action become

136Foreign Relations..., 1930. II, 657.

137lbid.. p. 657. 9^

necessary. The Secretary added that there was always danger in intimating that the United States will not intervene for it was possible that a junta might take that as encouragement to revolt. "Every case in the future will be judged on its merits and a situation might exist which would distinguish it from the preceding one s.

The hint was readily accepted in the governmental circles of Cuba as definite proof of American support for Machado.

"Los irresponsables que planean la lucha violenta estan llamando al extranjero," stated Wifredo Fernandez.*39 »»The hope inspired by the sugar stabilization plan and the growing realization that your policy is not to intermeddle or interfere with the affairs of the Cuban Government have created a dis­ tinctly better atmosphere here..." reported the Ambassador to the Secretary of State on October 13.^®

In spite of that discouraging atmosphere, Mendieta visited the American Embassy to request application of the "preventive" policy and to invoke the Platt Amendment for the restoration

138ibid., pp. 663-665*

139"The irresponsible ones who plan violent struggle are summoning the foreigners." Excelsior (Habana), October 7* 1930, p. 4.

l^-Oporeign Relations..., 1930. II, 667. 95

of a constitutional government in Cuba.1**'1 From the beginning

then, there was a point of discord between the old and the new

factors of opposition. For Mendieta, Menocal, and his followers,

violence was apparently a means basically directed toward con­

vincing the American government to intervene by "pressure"

and, in that way, bring about the downfall of Machado and the

"return" of constitutional liberties. For the new groups, even

if at the beginning they only showed mild disapproval, the

object of the fighting was to put an end to the Machado regime

and also to dependency on the United States. When Mendieta

reported to the Nationalists his visit to the Embassy, the

representatives of the students, who attended the meeting for

the first time, declared that they did not approve the position

taken toward the American government.

These new groups were the ones who slowly began to under­

take the bulk of the fight. In November, the government pro­ hibited a ceremony to commemorate the death of Trejo. On

November 10, the old philosopher Enrique Josd Varona protested the suppression of this commemoration. On November 12, the

Cuban press reported disturbances and riots by the students

1^1Ibid., p. 668.

l^jnterview with Prio and Padilla. 96

all through the island; several deaths wefe reported. On

November 16, the Ambassador was forced to report that: "Cir- cumstances had been altered by events of the last few days, and General Menocal undoubtedly has hope of arousing public opinion in the United States to interfere in Cuba. " vras evident that whst had changed everything was the mounting strength of the students. Guggenheim recognized this point when, in a lengthy report dated. November 15» 1930> he recorded:

Immediately after your statement of policy and upon my re­ turn here, there was a marked decrease in revolutionary agitation...it seemed at one time as if my good offices would blf helpful in arranging a modus viviendi between Government and the opposition, since the latter was in mood for compromise. The situation changed rapidly, however; the students agitation became critical, public opinion was inflamed....

At the end of November, all schools were closed in Cuba; a law was passed punishing even those i*rho "spread false rumors"; and the Army vras patrolling the streets of Havana and several other important cities. By then it was increasingly evident that the basis of Machado’s power was shifting from "coopera- tivism" and the backing of the political groups to the support

1^3Forelgn Relations...,1930< II»

l^The underlining is mine.

•^^Forelgn Relations..., 1930< II» 675* 97

of the Army. The loyalty-or the disloyalty-of the Army was a matter of prime concern to every element involved in the

Cuban crisis: the government, the opposition, the American

Embassy. CHAPTER IX

CONSPIRACY AND REBELLION a) The Army As A Political Factor

It should be remembered that up until this time, the

Army in Cuba had played a secondary role in politics. As the preceding chapters have attempted to show, Cuban political problems were usually solved by American intervention-direct or indirect-or by some type of "political" compromise. But the importance of the Army was continuously growing.

On April 4, 1908, during the second intervention of Cuba, the Armed Forces Law was promulgated creating a permanent army. Governor Magoon left to the next Cuban President the actual organization of the Army, but he appointed a well-known 146 member of the Zayista faction as commander-in-chief, Gen­ eral Faustino ("Pino") Guerra, who had been one of the leading

■'•^Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, p. 299*

98 99 officers of the revolt against Estrada Palma.

In spite of this initial (later traditional) contact of

the high officers of the Army with certain political groups, it

is basically true that, in comparison with the rest of Latin

America, the Army in Cuba remained nonpolitical and, as has been stated, “could be regarded as a professional army on the 1^7 European model" until Machado. When in 1920, Alfredo Zayas, a civilian who lacked the prestige of being a veteran of the

War of Independence, was elected President of the Republic, the military respected his constitutional powers and backed him in every crisis. Zayas, on his part, allowed Army officers to occupy administrative positions, thus sharing in the corruption 1 An of his regime.

With the growing political tension created by Machado's rule, the importance of the Army and its participation in politics grew proportionally. During the Zayas' administration, the Army's share in the national budget fluctuated between

15 and 16 percent.*^9 in 1925-26, the years of Machado's

■^^International Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the Rule of Law (Geneva: n.p., 1962), p. ^7*

l^Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 19&5)> P* 178.

*^German Wolter del Rio, Historia de la Nacidn Cubana (Habana: Edit. Historia.de la Naci<5n, 1952) , IX, 1^3• 100

popularity, military appropriations decreased to 111-• 3 percent.

In 1927-28, they rose to 15.2 percent; in 1930-31, in spite of the economic depression, they surpassed 16 percent; and in

1932-33> they went up to 19 percent.

Excluded from the reduction of salaries (only officers suffered a small reduction), receiving their pay punctually, and backed by the President in every incident, the soldiers remained loyal to Machado to the end. According to Edmund A.

Chester-who is not a very reliable source-in 1928, Colonels

Julio Sanguily and Horaeio Ferrer, planned to use junior__ officers and enlisted to incite rebellion against Machado when the prorogue of powers was announced. Edelmira

Gonzalez, who was the secretary to Colonel Rosendo Collazo, maintains that the first meeting of the conspiracy in which some officers were involved took place in the first months of

1930* The principal, high-ranking officers vrho were in con­ tact with Mendieta, Juan Gualberto Gomez, and other Nationalist leaders were Colonel Collazo and Colonel Julio Aguado.-*-^ Ap­ parently both conspiracies failed for lack of support among the

150Edmund A. Chester, A Sergeant Named Batista (New York; Henry Holt & Co., 195*0» P* 102. According to many versions, this book was written by the author under contract to Batista.

151-Edelmira Gonzalez, La. Revolucidn en Cuba (Habana; Editorial Hermes, 193*0» p. 20. 101

rest of the officers and enlisted men.

This attitude of the Army and its progressive involvement

in political support for Machado’s government, forced the op­

position to abandon the idea of a military plot and to look

for new ways to fight against the dictatorship. And here,

once more, a disagreement regarding the tactics to follow be­

came apparent between the older and the younger members of the

opposition. Favoring their traditional methods, Menocal,

Mendieta, and the majority of the Nationalist leaders favored

a classical uprising in the Cuban "manigua" (a colloquial Cuban

term for "open country") and a glorious advance toward the

capital. The new generation regarded this plan as obsolete

and incapable of success when faced with airplanes and modern weapons. But the old leaders had the prestige, the economic

resources, and the necessary contacts. The coup against

Machado was to be attempted in their way.

b) The Last Effort of the Old Guard

At the beginning of 1931 > different opposition groups, of which the most important was the one formed by the students, had begun to explode some bombs in Havana and other cities

of the Republic. But still their aim was not terror, in the

sense of killing people and destroying property. The majority

of these bombs were crude devices, planted in isolated areas, 102

intended more to create alarm than to cause damage. No attempt

to assassinate any member of the Machado regime had been made.

At the beginning of 1931 j the direction of the struggle against

Machado still rested in the hands of the old guard.

In a defiant speech on January 1, Machado referring to

the profusion of leaflets that were being distributed by the opposition, declared scornfully ”a mi no se me tumba con pape-

litos."-^2 a few days later, Ambassador Guggenheim reported:

'•The Government continues to have the upper hand and there is as yet no question of the loyalty of the army and police force."^53

The plan of Mendieta, Menocal, and the other leaders of the opposition was, apparently, threefold: a) put more and more pressure, legal and illegal, on the government to force it to grant concessions and accept as many conditions as possible; b) convince the American Government, with propaganda in Cuba and in the United States-where several groups had already been organized for that purpose-that Machado could not guarantee stability and should be forced to resign; and c) if these methods failed, then armed insurrection would begin. This insurrection,

152»They can’t overthrow me with scraps of paper.” Heraldo de Cuba, January 2, 1931» p. 2.

153Foreign Relations..., 1931. p. ^2. 103

as almost all rebel movements in Cuba, was planned to take

place during the "tiempo muerte'*, that is when the sugar mills were not working and unemployment was high in the country.

To carry out the first step, all the important opposition

figures were urged to make speeches against the government as

often as possible; innumerable leaflets were distributed; threats

of armed insurrection were dealt with through interviews with

several members of the Government to demand changes; and even

charges of unconstitutionality were presented to the Supreme

Court with the purpose of establishing the illegality of the regime. These charges were an intelligent maneuver of the

opposition, for they focused attention on a great financial mistake of the government. In trying to avoid a decline in revenues, the government on January 29* 1931* issued an Emer­ gency Tax L a w ^ ^ by which a series of new taxes were created and the former ones were raised. The law was a new and heavy burden which fell upon a society in economic crisis, and which provoked immediate antagonism and resistance. Furthermore,

the law failed in its purpose: in the fiscal year 1930-31*

the revenues of the Cuban government were $59*739*000; the

15^Gaceta Oflclal de la Repdblica, Edicidn Extraordinaria, January 29* 1931* The whole issue was devoted to the law. 104

following year, after the Emergency Law, revenues declined to

$46,940,000.^5 By using this unpopular law as a pretext to

demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the regime, the opposition

won vast support among all those who were affected by it. On

June 30, 1931* the Supreme Court rejected all the arguments

presented against the law and thus, with one dissenting vote,

closed the possibility of throwing the government into crisis

by a legal technicality.

In the meantime, the propaganda of Cuban exiles and the news and information about the Cuban situation published in the

United States were producing some results. In January, 1931*

Assistant Secretary of State White reported in a memorandum

to Stimson that "Machado is getting more dictatorial every day...* 156 Shortly afterwards, Stimson called Orestes Ferrara,

the Cuban Ambassador, to. express his concern about the events

in Cuba, hinting that the continuation of such a situation meant that the Cuban government was unable to fulfill the con­ ditions of the Platt Amendment, adding finally that "the thing

that he most wanted to avoid was a revolution with its con-

l55Rogelio Pina, Los Presupuestos del Estado (Ha.ba.na: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1936), p. 137*

156Memorandum, January 17, 1931* Department of State papers (DS/2951)• National Archives. 105

comitant, a possible intervention on our part.” This course of action, searching for a solution while avoiding a revolution, expresses the basic policy of the United States government during the entire period.

With mounting tension in Cuba, it was necessary to clarify still more the position of the American government. In May,

Ambassador Guggenheim received a Memorandum from Stimson, authorizing him to inform the opposition, if specifically asked about the point, that in the event of a revolution, the Amer­ ican government would send war vessels to protect lives and property, but, as long as there was a government in Cuba, it would not intervene in the revolution.'*'-^

In June, Cuba was boiling with rumors about a revolution in the near future. Impatient as usual, the younger members of the opposition demanded action and pressed for energetic operations. The old leaders, with no more legal maneuvers and a green light from the Embassy, had no other recourse than to fight the battle they had been promising from the beginning.

Menocal told the students in Miami that "in less than two

157Foreign Relations..., 1931» p* 5^•

1^Memorandum of policy in Cuba, May 19, 1931> Correspond­ ence , American Embassy, Havana, Part 10, 1931, P* 800. Nation­ al Archives. 106

months, Mendieta, he, and many other leaders of the War of

Independence would be fighting in Cuba, and tyranny was going to be defeated. " Everybody waited for the announced action.

In August, 1931j the old caudillos fought their battle.

'The result was a miserable fiasco. Menocal and Mendieta went to the open country in what seemed to be a coordinated movement with certain sectors of the Army, a landing of forces in C-ibara-Oriente Province-and a rebellion in the Navy. The history of this episode-known as Rio Verde-is still very con­ fused.^® But evidently everything went wrong. No one rebelled in the Army, the landing in Gibara took place so late it was only an isolated episode, and the Navy remained immobile (later one of the Captains of the cruiser Patria was accused of be­ traying the plans). On August 1.4, four days after their "re­ bellion" was initiated, Menocal and Mendieta were captured in a swampy area in Pinar del Rio Province.

The governmental circles were jubilant. The storm had dissipated and proved to be no more than a sprinkle. For sev­ eral days El Heraldo de Cuba kept ridiculing "the inglorious

159inte rview with Prio and Padilla.

”*-^®A sympathetic, although unclear, account of the events can be read in Alfredo Lima, La Odisea de Rio Verde (Habana: n.p., 193*0 • 10?

finale" and the "lack of vision of those who can't really read the signs of our time." Ambassador Guggenheim noticed the change in the President. Before Rio Verde, Machado had spoken with the American Ambassador of accepting constitutional reforms and even the possibility of stepping down in September, 1932.

On September 2, 1931» however, the Ambassador was reporting:

"I saw President Machado again...after his return from a short holiday. He was in a very aggressive mood and disavowed that he had been in agreement in regard to announcing at this time his intention of retiring in September 1932."1^1- Two months later, resuming his usual defiant tone, Machado announced that he would stay in office until May 20, 1935 "ni un minuto mds ni un minuto menos."-*-^

Conversely, with their leaders in prison and their hopes down, the opposition, at least that represented by the Nation­ alists and followers of Menocal, began to speak in a more con­ ciliatory tone. After Rio Verde, many of the articles that were allowed to be published and meetings with officials of the

American Embassy were directed to obtaining amnesty for the

l6lForeign Relations..., 1931, p. 73*

: l62«not a minute more or a minute less," Diarlo de la Marina, December 23, 1931> p. 108

prisoners.

But not all forces were affected in the same degree by the failure of Rio Verde. Quite the contrary, as has been mentioned before, the younger groups had had many reservations on the possibility of a triumph brought about by a rebellion in the "manigua". The disaster of Rio Verde seemed to prove them right. Furthermore, it put Mendieta and Menocal out of the picture. They felt free now to carry out the struggle in their own way and with their own forces. As one of the more intelligent participants in the events of the period wrote:

"When Mendieta and Menocal climbed the gunboat that took them prisoners, the prestige and the dominance of a generation, now broken and defeated, climbed x\Tith them."1^3

It was time for the new generation to act.

l63Enriaue Fernandez, La Razdri del k de Septiembre (Habana 1950)j P* 21. The author or this pamphlet was Undersecretary of Government and War during the revolutionary government of Grau San Martin in 1933* wrote this essay in 193^* The author of this dissertation agrees with many members of the "generation of 1930" in considering it one of the most lucid and penetrating analyses of the revolutionary situation of 1933* Fernandez was assassinated by Batista's police in 1935> when organizing a general strike against the government. He died at Jk. PART IV

THE REVOLUTION, 1932-33 CHAPTER X

NEW TACTICS AND NEW PROGRAMS

On November 3, 1930, the major leaders of the Student

Directory fell into the hands of the police. They were sent to prison, remaining there until March, 1 9 3 1 This Directory was formed by new leaders who filled the vacuum created by the gradual arrest, death, or exile of many of the leaders of the

Student Directory of 1927 and 1929* The Secretary General was

Carlos Prio Socarras (later President of the Republic), other members were: Raul Roa, Justo Carillo, Aureliano Sanchez

Arango, and Josd Antonio Rubio Padilla. They also organized a procedure for the immediate replacement of leaders so as to always maintain the organization of the Directory.

In prison, waiting for an amnesty, they devoted their time to reading and to discussing the Cuban situation. It was

l^Interview with Prio and Rubio Padilla.

110 Ill

there that ideological differences appeared. A group with

Marxist tendencies broke away from the Directory and founded

the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student Left Wing), its principal

leader was Aureliano Sanchez Arango. Probably because of the

pressure of this split, the Student Directory decided to make

up for its lack of ideology and published a ’'minimum program”

of what they wanted for Cuba. This program was circulated in

Cuba in November, 1931 > after the affair of Rio Verde. It

contained the following basic points:

a) Reform and modernization of the Constitution, and abolition

of the Platt Amendment;

b) Reform of education;

c) Nationalization of the labor force (this phrase denoted a

growing tendency among many revolutionary groups to promote

the obligation of all companies and industries to employ a

percentage of Cuban workers, the exact number was not

established); d) Distribution of land to the peasants;

e) Labor legislation providing for minimum wages, labor

unions, protection of children, etc.; and

f) Creation of a Labor Commission to solve conflicts between

workers and their employees. 165

l^Enrique Lumen, La Revoluci6n Cubana (Mexico: Ediciones Bota, 193^)» PP» 55-56« 112

At the end of 1931» when the results of the failure of

Rio Verde were evident, the Student Directory decided to ini­

tiate a program of sabotage and terror against Machado's gov­ ernment. Their justification was that official terror and brutal repression were rampant on the island and that it was necessary "to be ready to die and to kill for the triumph of the Revolution1^6

The program and tactics of the Student Directory represented a radicalization of the popular struggle. They no longer spoke, as Menocal, Mendieta, and the Nationalists, of a return to the

Constitution of 1901 or of the recognition of political rights.

Their ideas, even if less radical than those of the Ala Izquierda or the Communists, were aimed at a profound social and political transformation of the "old order" in Cuba of which even Menocal and Mendieta were considered as representatives.

Almost at the same time a new group was organized in Cuba that was going to play an important role in the course of events. In October, 1931> in the office of a well-known lawyer,

Dr. Juan Andres Lliteras, Sr., a group of young professionals, who had been meeting there since 1930 to discuss politics and ways to fight against Machado, decided that the failure of

l66Ibid., p. 58. 113

Rio Verde was a signal for action and formed a new organization.

The principal figure of that group was Joaquin Martinez Saenz, with him were, Dr. Lliteras, Jr., Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, Dr.

Costales Latatii, and some others. Following the plan of

Martinez Saenz, they decided to organize a secret, cellular society, to promote terrorism and punish the principal members of Machado’s government who had been notorious for their bloody deeds against the opposition. Each cell would be formed of seven members, and each member would be responsible for a new cell of seven members, and so on. The members of each cell only knew their respective leader and, at the same time, every leader only knew the other six members of his cell. This structure was to prove extremely successful in avoiding the collapse of the organization each time the police managed to arrest one or several of its members, as their knowledge was always limited to a small nucleus. The directing cell was known as A; the second level of cells B; the third level C; etc.. The entire organization was known as A.B.C.-^?

Almost immediately, the leaders of the ABC invited some young intellectuals, Jorge Manach, Francisco Ichaso, and others to join the organization and to write a revolutionary program.

l6?Interview with Dr. Juan Lliteras, Jr., February 22, 1964, in Washington, D.C. 114

The success of the organization was impressive. Protected by an atmosphere of mystery and suspense, the ABC attracted numerous members and expanded rapidly through the island. Its principal recruits came from young, middle-class people who wanted to act against the government but had no desire or sympathy for the noisy struggle of the Student Directory or the radicalism of the Communists and other leftist organizations.

On the other hand, its somber reputation as an “underground organization” allowed the ABC to be credited with almost every act of violence carried out against the government.

In 1932, the ABC was strong enough to issue its Program-

Manifesto. Written almost entirely by Manach, Ichaso, and

Martinez Saenz, 1 AR this Program-Manifesto was probably the most serious and deep study of the problems of Cuba, from the begin­ ning of the national period to 1932, written during the entire period. Many of its ideas were later copied and applied even by those who were not members or enemies of the ABC.

A significant sign of the new revolutionary atmosphere, the document began by stating that the purpose of the ABC was “not only the liquidation of the present tyrannical regime

l^^Letter from Martinez Saenz to the author, February 16, 1965. Dr. Martinez Saenz is at present living in Madrid. The author submitted to him two questionnaires which were answered in two letters dated January 25 and February 16, 1965* 115 but also of the causes which had determined its existence .'*1^9

Starting- with an analysis of the economic, political, and social causes which had produced the crisis in Cuba, this document continued with a review of Cuban history and finally proposed solutions for each of the evils that had led Cuba

"to the present level of oppression and misery."170 The remedies were not radical. The Program declared that the ABC:

No pretende ir mas alia de las posibilidades reales de Cuba. No se hace ilusiones fdciles, ni busca concitar unas clases contra otras...no habla en fin de socializar una economfa que estd por conquistar. 171

The Program also had certain other aspects that, from the very beginning, provoked criticism from other revolutionary groups. The accusation of "fascist", which would grow after the downfall of Machado, was based on some unpopular or undefined concepts expressed in the document. The ABC, for example, among its political remedies proposed: substitution of the Senate by a Functional Chamber, and elimination of the

l69poctrina del ABC (Habana: Publicaciones del Partido ABC, 19^2), p. 3.

170lbid., p. 30 .

17lDoes not pretend to go beyond the real possibilities of Cuba. Does not harbor easy illusions or search to incite some classes against others...it does not speak, in short, of socializing an economy which is still to be conquered. Ibid., p. 31. 116

right to vote of illiterates.I?2 These and other articles and clauses were considered by many, who usually quoted them out of context, as definite proof of the reactionary mentality of the directors of the ABC.

At the end of 1931» another organization appeared in the picture: Organizacidn Celular Revolucionaria, known as OCRE.

With much more moderate aims and tactics, the OCRE devoted itself mainly to propaganda work and to promoting a kind of

•’passive" resistance among many sectors of Cuban society. Its most distinguished leader was Nicasio Silveiro, a lawyer and member of the Judiciary. The principal recruits also came from the middle class.

The Communist Party went on with its isolated struggle, condemning every other group as "petit-bourgeois" or "fascist" and trying to gain control of the C.N.O.C. (Confederacidn

Obrera Cubana). Their main interest remained in the field of labor, their main weapon: the strike. When the struggle became hard and terrible, they acknowledged "the transformation of the terrorist association ABC, into a national reformist

172jbid., p. 33* It is worth mentioning that the program of the ABC explicitly condemned communism and fascism as "systems which exclude all political liberties," Ibid., p. 35*

l?3lnterview with Nicasio Silveiro, on February 24, 1966, in Washington, D.C. 117

political party," but immediately added: "What significance can we give in politics to the destruction effected by one or by a hundred bombs...as compared with the effect produced by these thousands of workers in the sugar industry...?" A revolutionary struggle against imperialism was the answer of the masses to the arguments "of all the enemies of the Cuban revolution, that is, of all the enemies of the people from

Machado, through the theoreticians of the ABC, and of the bourgeois-landlord opposition."

While all these groups and others of minor importance were stepping up their fight against Machado, and while Menocal and Mendieta, freed by the government at the beginning of 1932, hurried to the American Embassy to ask that the United States

"should settle the chaotic conditions in Cuba, "17-5 the govern­ ment tightened its repressive measures. A special force called

"la Porra" was organized to fight in the streets and to execute prisoners without the direct authority of the Armed Forces.

Censorship of the press became the rule and not the exception, and on February 17, 1932, a law was passed amending the military

l^Rubdn Martinez Villena, "The Rise of the Revolutionary Movement in Cuba," The Communist, XII, No. 6 (June, 1933)> 565*

175Forelgn Relations..., 1932, II, 5^2. 118

code in order to invest the military courts with exclusive jurisdiction over crimes that were considered related to terrorist activities. ^ 6 On June 21, 1932, the Congress au­ thorized the President to suspend constitutional guarantees for two years if necessary. "The apparent purpose of the measure is to serve notice to the opposition that the Machado

Government intends to continue to proceed with a strong hand,"177 commented Reed.

The opposition took notice and answered accordingly.

While Mendieta was arrested and sent to prison, and Menocal— took the road to exile, on July 9, 1932, the famous or in­ famous Captain Calvo, the chief of the so-called "expertos" became the first well-known governmental fatality when he was shot by a passing automobile. Two months before, a lieutenant who had participated in the affair of Artemisa, was blown to pieces while opening a present scented with perfume sent by mail. After the death of Calvo, terrorism and brutality be­ came the usual weapons of the government and the opposition.

Bombs exploded in central places of Havana, killing or in­ juring people; bursts of machine gun fire spread terror in the

l?^Gaceta Oficial de la Repdblica, February 17, 1932, p. 6 .

177Forelgn Relations..., 1932, II, 550* 119

streets; and in many ingenious and terrible ways, soldiers,

officers, and functionaries received the deadly messages of the

opposition. On the part of the government, homes were violated

by the police, the prisons were filled with young people, the

"ley de Fuga" became the common destiny of many prisoners, and

several names, like that of Arsenio Ortiz or Captain Anciart,

acquired a somber and frightful reputation in Cuba.

As is usual and natural because of the correlation of

forces in that kind of struggle, those in opposition suffered

the most severe losses. At the end of 1932, every important

functionary of the government was forced to live in fear and

seclusion, the international press commented on the "terrible"

conditions in Cuba, and the opposition to Machado was general and active. But the price paid was impressive■and there were no signs of relief.

In September, 1932, the President of the Senate, a close

friend of Machado, was gunned down in his car. The usual wave

of brutal repression followed and among its victims were three borthers who belonged to a very well-known Cuban family, the

Freyre de Andrade. In December of that year, the Cuban and

l? 8 Pora melodramatic account of terrorism in this period see, Carlos Peraza, Machado, Crimenes y Horrores de un Regimen (Habana: Cultural S.A., 1933)• ■ " 120

the international press reported that small bands of revolu­ tionaries were operating in Oriente province.

At the end of 1932, the government released some prisoners and made some advances toward a reconciliation with the op­ position. The Government news organ, Heraldo de Cuba, quoted

Juan Gualberto Gomez, a prominent leader of the National Union, as saying that there was no reason why the factions which opposed Machado could not try to find a way of talking with the government and solving the crisis. But the principal leaders of the opposition-Menocal, Miguel Mariano, and Mendieta- refused to accept what they considered a ’’maneuver” of the government.

The attempts of the government to reach an agreement and the attitude of the representatives of the political opposition were basically due to the apprehensions and hopes brought about by a new factor that had just emerged in the picture: the victory of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the presidential elections of 1931» and the announcement of a new policy of the United

States at home and abroad.

l^See, Charles W. Hackett, "Guerrilla Warfare in Cuba,” Current History (July, 1933)* CHAPTER XI

THE MEDIATION OF SUMNER WELLES, MAY-AUGUST, 1933

In the first months of 1933» a remarkable change could be noticed in the Cuban government propaganda. Evidently real­

izing the growing efforts of its enemies to discredit Machado

in the United States and to pressure the new Administration

into taking strong measures against Machado,180 the government press began to play more and more on the note of "nationalism".

Forgetting all about the role of Cuba in the Inter-American

Conference of 1928, and the multiple declarations of Machado and Ferrara in relation to the United States, El Heraldo de

Cuba stressed the point that Machado represented the dignity

l80it should be remembered that even the "old" leaders only wanted, as Ramiro Guerra put it, "that the U.S. would exert its moral authority to bring about a just revision of the procedures of governing the island." Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez et al., Historia de la Nacidn Cubana (Habana: Editorial de la Nacidn Cubana, 1952), VIII, 78.

121 122

and the sovereignty of Cuba while, as the newspaper put it,

"the opposition in Cuba favors intervention." Each dec­ laration of the Roosevelt Administration, reaffirming the

Good Neighbor Policy and the desire of non-intervention in

Latin America, was hailed as a triumph for Machado and a setback for the hopes of the anti-Cuban forces of his enemies. When in April, Cordell Hull declared that the United States was decisively in favor of respecting the national rights of all

Latin American republics, El Heraldo de Cuba published a headline typifying the new attitude: "The opposition to the

Cuban government received yesterday a mortal blow. Hull says that he will not intervene...‘'182

In the meantime, the government of the United States was confronted wTith quite a dilemma in Cuba. Sumner Welles ex­ pressed part of it when he wrote:

To President Roosevelt two facts were clear. First, that while the existing treaty with Cuba gave this country the right to intervene, any such intervention would be con­ trary to the general line of inter-American policy which he had set for himself. Second, that a state of affairs where governmental murder and clandestine assassination had become matters of daily occurence must be ended.1°3

1-El Heraldo de Cuba., April 9, 1933» P*

l82Ibid., April 16, 1933, p. 1.

l83sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1 9 ^ ) , p* 19^* — 123

There were other considerations that Welles did not mention. The economic crisis of Cuba had affected all the

American investments in the island, and those affected interests had good connections in the Roosevelt Administration. Three members of the '’Brain Trust” were officials in the American

Molasses Company and the American Molasses Company controlled the Sucrest Corporation, a sugar refining company using Cuban 1 Rii sugar. On the other hand, another Inter-American Conference had been scheduled for December, 1933» in Montevideo, and considering the criticism that the Americans had received in

Havana in 1928, because of the policy of intervention, the

American government was very eager to avoid any situation in

Cuba which would force it to take drastic measures.

In any event, in April, 1933 > Sumner Welles, then As­ sistant Secretary of State, was appointed Ambassador Extra­ ordinary and Plenipotentiary from the United States to Cuba.

Prom the beginning, the mission of Welles was surrounded by expectation, mystery, and rumors among all Cuban groups.

The government press, accepting the official interpretation of the State Department, insisted that the Ambassador had basically the mission to restore good economic relations between Cuba

•'•^Smith, The United States and Cuba, p. 1^2. 124

and. the United States and that his appointment had no political

significance.-*-®5 Behind the facade, there was more concern.

Government circles did not know Mr. Welles (they had been

expecting Mr. John Cudahy, whom they said was a member of a

very rich family, to be the Ambassador-*-®®) , nor did they have

a clear idea of what instructions he had received.-*-®? Fur­

thermore, the very month of the appointment of Welles, a Revo­

lutionary Junta had been created in exile in -the United States which gathered representatives from all the principal factions

of the opposition, from Menocal and Mendieta to the ABC and the

Students. For the first time since the beginning of the strug­

gle, the opposition could present a united front against

Machado.1®® The influence of this Junta on the recently ap­

pointed Ambassador was a source of concern for Machado.-*-®^

l®-5secretary of State Ferrara, for example, expressed his assurance on April 21, that Welles was a regular Ambassador and had no category of Special Envoy. Heraldo de Cuba, April 21, 1933, P. 1.

186Ibid., April 8, 1933, p. 1.

l®?See, Alberto Lamar Schweyer, Como Cay<5 el Presidente Machado (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, S .A., 1934), pp. 58-60. The author, a member of the inner clique of Machado, wrote his book in exile. He provides a clear insight into the position and actions of the Cuban government at the time.

l88The Junta was actually formed in March, 1933, in Miami, but the first notice of it appeared in the Cuban press in April.

-*-®^Lamar Schweyer, Como Cay6 ..., pp. 41-42. 125

The instructions that Sumner Welles received from Cordell

Hull were simultaneously broad and. precise. One author has suggested that the degree of independence enjoyed by Welles was so great that he was allowed to write his own instructions,*90 but subsequent events and Hull's own statement seem to point out that the directions for his conduct were given to him.^91

After making a brief and remarkably clear analysis of the situation in Cuba where "the conditions, highly unsatisfactory and even alarming as they may be, do not constitute a just basis for the formal action of the Government of the United

States looking towards intervention,"192 ^ g instructions given to the Ambassador covered four areas. 1) The suggestions that he was to present to the President of Cuba were to be considered as friendly advice and expressions of concern for the situation in Cuba. 2) The Cuban Government should realize that it was essential to take measures to avoid terrorism and especially excesses in the armed forces of the republic. 3) The United

190sryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p . 59•

191as will be seen later, one of the deepest reasons for the confusion of the Cuban government was its idea that Sumner Welles was exceeding his instructions. Cordell Hull affirms in his The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan Company, 19^8TJ T., 313> that he was the author of Welles instructions.

192poreign Relations.... 1933. V, 283« 126

Sts.tes Government desired to offer its mediation between

Machado and the opposition, the chief objection being "the negotiation of a definite, detailed and binding understanding" between those forces that "will lead to a truce in the present dangerous political agitation...until such time as national elections can be held in Cuba." 4) The expression also of

"the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to assist in every feasible manner in the consideration of measures intended to ameliorate the distressing economic sit­ uation now existing in the Republic of Cuba."193

According to the letter of those instructions, and most probably also according to its spirit, the mission was basically reduced to gaining a truce in the political struggle until a legal government was elected while trying to find remedies for the Cuban economic conditions. Apparently, the Ambassador was not a man to be confined by instructions. Perhaps his direct access to the White House or his own character or both gave him a remarkable independence and decisiveness in his conduct. Sumner Welies arrived in Havana on May 8, 1933*

May 11, he presented his credentials to Machado and three days

193Foreign Relations..., 1933, V, 284-285. 127

later he was reporting to his government "if the present acute bitterness of feeling against the President persists or becomes intensified...it would in all probability be highly desirable that the present chief executive be replaced at least during the electoral period."19^ This represented a departure from the

initial plan, where nothing had been said about replacing

Machado. As if concerned with this and other dangerous in­ novations, the Ambassador ended his report saying: "It will be this policy that I shall attempt to carry out unless I am in­ structed to the contrary. I beg to request that a copy of this telegram be sent to the President for his information."195

The expanded policy of the Ambassador was followed with increasing swiftness. On May 22, he was already reporting on his contacts' with the leaders of the opposition and his hopes for their cooperation . Once assured on that point, the

Ambassador decided to make his formal proposal of mediation to the Cuban President. But first, he added a new point to his strategy: economic pressure. "It is obvious to my mind that no accomodations or concessions, financial or economic, should

W l b i d . , p. 290.

1 9 5 l b i d . , p. 290. 196rbid.? p. 292. 128

be made to the Cuban Government until a positive understanding is had as to the course the President will be willing to pursue..."197

So apparently, even before making any proposal to Machado, the

Ambassador was taking a definite anti-^Machado stand, and was willing to depart from his instructions to put pressure on the

Cuban government to force it to accept a mediation that accord­ ing to the general Interpretation of both factions, government and opposition, was going to work against Machado.

The attitude of the Ambassador, his initial and friendly contacts with opposition groups, especially with the leaders of the ABC, produced an open split in the ranks of the enemies of

Machado. Almost all groups, after making strong declarations against American intervention,19® accepted the Mediation of the

Ambassador. Only the Student Directory, which hesitated for two d a y s , 199 Menocal, and the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil refused

197ibid., p. 296.

198

199The members of the Student Directory that were in Cuba were willing to accept Welles mediation. A stern telegram sent by those in exile decided them against it. Interview with Carlos Prio Socarras and Rubio Padilla. This point was corroborated by some of those who were in Cuba. Interview with Felipe Pazos and Justo Carillo, February 12, 1965* in Washington, D.C. 129

to accept it, with the argument that it was a new form of

American control. The Communists, naturally, condemned the

Ambassador and those who allowed his intervention as "enemies of

Cuba and lackeys of Yankee imperialism." Significantly enough, for the first time in its history, the government press repro­ duced the arguments of Communist leader, Rubdn Martinez Villena, denouncing the "false opposition"Even inside the ABC, acceptance was not general. In open protest against the deci­ sion of the leaders, a group split and formed the ABC Radical, which condemned the interference of the American Ambassador.

In spite of these problems, considering that he was backed by the most representative forces of the opposition, on June 2,

1933» Sumner Welles offered his good offices to President

Machado.At the same time, he was taking steps to avoid any interference coming from those groups which, as Menocal for example, had not accepted his mediation and were still talking pnp of armed insurrection.

Machado's position was very difficult. Everyone in the

20®Heraldo de Cuba, May 10, 1933» P» 1«

201]?orelgn Relations.... 1933, V, 299»

202yen es asked several times that measures should be taken to stop the sending of weapons from the United States to Cuba. See, for example, his report of June 6, Ibid., p. 30^. 130

government understood that to accept the Mediation was to give an appearance of weakness and encouragement to the opposition.

An open refusal, on the other hand, was a direct challenge to the United States which Machado was far from willing to make.

The best road seemed to be, as Rafael Guas Incl£n later re­ ported, "to accept mediation while maintaining open all pos­ sibilities of maneuver."203 a balanced study of the governmental press of those critical days, of the opinions of Machado ex­ pressed later, and the declarations of persons who were deeply involved in the events^O^ seems to sustain the thesis that in the face of the Mediation of Sumner Welles, Machado based his conduct on three basic points: first, that he could not afford a direct confrontation with the American Ambassador; second, that no matter what the appearances, the American government was basically friendly and willing to support him as they always had; and third, that when Welles began to show a growing pro­ opposition attitude, it was due more to a personal decision than to the general policy of the American government.

203Guas Incl£n was at the time President of the Chamber of Representatives. See, his "Recuerdos politicos," in Avance (Habana), November 25> 19^3* P* 6.

204por Machado's version, see the series of articles pub­ lished by the New York Post, from May 22 to May 26, 1933* under the general title, "Fugitive Tells His Own Story." All of them begin on page 1. 131

So the Mediation was gracefully accepted the very day it

was offered, But the request of the Ambassador did not come

alone. Slowly but steadily, Welles pushed the government toward

many other concessions: reform of the constitution, restoration

of the Vice-Presidency, relaxation and eventual disappearance

of press censorship, guarantees for those who were in exile

or taking part in the Mediation, and freedom for political

prisoners. Machado yielded to almost all of these demands.

Professor Lee McBain, from Columbia University, was invited by

the government to come to Cuba and assist in the reform of the

electoral code; and the President began to issue a series of

decrees dealing with the other requests. As a result, the

press began to write with more freedom about the Cuban situa­

tion and several groups of anti-Machadistas returned to Cuba.

After the ABC, the OCRE, the Nationalists, the Women in Op­

position, the University Professors, and the High School Pro­

fessors had officially accepted the Mediation and nominated

their delegates, on June 22, Machado designated the three

representatives of the political parties which supported his government and who would represent it in the Mediation. On

July 1, 1933» in an atmosphere of expectation, the first meeting of all the delegates took place in the American Embassy.

The Ambassador read a message from President Roosevelt to both 132

groups #which ended: "The representatives of all factions may rest assured that the moral support of the American people will be behind these attempts at the peaceable adjustment of Cuban problems through the orderly procedure of Constitutional gov­ ernment ."205 The reference to "constitutional government" was not absolutely pleasant to the opposition, but the Ambassador was enthusiastic. It was true that, as he reported, the op­ position had already split into two sectors, the radicals and the conservatives, but he immediately added:

...in the former category is of course the ABC. Fortunately however the representatives of that organization are both intelligent and well-disposed.... /So/ I am happy to state that there is very evident on both sides not only a con­ ciliatory disposition but an apparent feeling of expectancy that these negotiations will have a successful outcome.2®°

So optimistic was his report, that on July 7, Acting Secretary of State Phillips was asking Welles: "Could you give me any idea how much longer you feel that, in justice to the work which you are now doing you should remain in Havana...?"20?

But the optimism would be short lived. The Mediation, as a political instrument to solve the Cuban crisis, had actually

205Telegram, June 21, 1933* Department of Stsite papers (DS/3556)• National Archives.

206Foreign Relations..., 1933, V, 317.-

2°7lbid., p. 3 1 7 . 133

small chance of success. To understand its failure it is

necessary to consider the handicaps which from the beginning

were affecting the instrument. First of all, Machado was not

a man to yield easily or completely to pressure. He had re­

treated to a degree, he had accepted some conditions, but he

was playing for time, seeking any opportunity to paralyze or

destroy the Mediation. Long before him, under less favorable

circumstances, Zayas had won a battle against Enoch Crowder, so

"from Ferrara to Wifredo Fernandez, all members of his govern­

ment were convinced that a break will eventually come to allow

Machado to survive the crisis."^0®

Secondly, the factions which were present in the Mediation were, with the exception of the ABC and the National Union,

representatives of minor groups or disorganized forces. Worse

still, some of these groups, as the Women in Opposition, had

been formed specifically to participate in the Mediation and

consequently, had no revolutionary prestige or real popular

support. For their part, the ABC and the National Union were

separated by a deep ideological and generational chasm. The ABC

was supposedly a revolutionary organism with a far reaching

program; Cosme de la Torriente, the representative of the

208Quas Incl£n, "Recuerdos Politicos," p. 6. 13^

National Union, according to Welles, had expressed himself as

"positively opposed to revolution."20^ The ABC had condemned

the entire past of Cuba and was thinking in terms of a new

constitution with radical changes; Cosme de la Torriente had repeatedly stated that his party was in favor of "a return to

the Constitution of 1901."2^0 Finally, the Mediation allowed

the groups in opposition which had not accepted it to raise the banner of nationalism and use it against the ABC and all those who were participating in it.

Why then did the ABC accept the Mediation? According to the declarations of the party in 1933» because it was "a for­ mula of transit to restore normality and thus provide the at­ mosphere for carrying out the basic programs of reform."2^

Further, the leader of the party added that they did it because they thought that "Mediation was better than intervention. And if the Mediation failed we believed that the American govern­ ment was going to be forced to more direct action."2^-2 To which the ABC Radical, the group which split from the party, answered in their first declaration:

2°9Foreign Relations.... 1933. V, 295.

2l°Plario de la Marina. July 2, 1933, p. 3.

211ibid., July 5, 1933, p. 1.

2^2Letter from Martinez Saenz. 135

By saying that with this act we have avoided intervention we are only recognizing that intervention. We have only spared Cuba the landing of the Marines, but a simple men­ ace has forced us to accept the responsibility for acts dictated by others, and has made us look as if we are freely accepting what in reality is an imposition.213

At the conference table, the opposition sectors felt that, as the Mediation was the creation and responsibility of the

Ambassador, whose prestige was involved, they could threaten him with their withdrawal from the talks every time the govern­ ment refused or delayed some concession. On July 10, the ABC refused to continue to participate in the Mediation because a lot of weapons had been discovered by the police in the house of one of its members and the government refused to free him.

Immediately, the Ambassador visited Machado and obtained his release.21^ On July 17, both the ABC and the Women in Op­ position announced their intention to withdraw unless a law of amnesty was passed freeing all political prisoners. Once more the Ambassador put pressure on Machado, adding this time that full constitutional guarantees should be reestablished in the province of Havana. Machado was already reaching his limit.

Apparently, the Cuban Ambassador in Washington, Oscar B. Cintas,

213Quoted in Fernandez, La Raz6n del k de Septiembre, p. 31.

21^Foreign Relations;.., 1933, V, 321. 136

kept informing him that Welles was exceeding his powers2-^

and that he could fight hack. So the President, who knew the weakness of the opposition as represented in the Mediation and

thought that the position of the Ambassador was not quite firm, decided to resist. He had even agreed that the opposition could

study a project for the reform of the Constitution, but when

on July 21, the Ambassador insisted on the restitution of

guarantees in Havana, the President answered him: "the re­

establishment of the guarantees is a prerogative of the Presi­ dent of Cuba and will be done when the President so considers

it.«2l6 was beginning of a formal crisis for the

Mediation.

The moment of truth came five days later and, if judged by the reports of Mr. Welles, it took him by surprise. On

July 26, the government approved a law giving general amnesty

to all prisoners. The law had been a constant demand of the

opposition, but its provisions were so general that it included members of the police, the army and the "Porra" (an unofficial

organization formed to punish the enemies of the government and.

^^Larnar Schweyer, Como Cayd..., p. 105*

2 l6Ibid., p. 106. 137

even common delinquents). Immediately, various sectors of the opposition, headed by the Women in Opposition, proclaimed their dissatisfaction and called for an immediate interruption of talks on the Mediation. The following day, President Machado paid an unexpected visit to the Congress and, amidst an atmosphere of tension, proclaimed that:

the Mediation of Mr. Welles could not damage our sovereignty, because it responds to his spontaneous desire and not to any instructions received from the Government of the United States. If it should have been otherwise I would never have accepted it.21?

The President added that he would remain in office until May

20, 1935* On July 27, Welles reported the event and added:

If an appropriate opportunity is presented to comment on President Machado's speech it would be helpful if the Department would state that while of course my tender of good offices has been spontaneously as stated by President Machado, it could not have been jngde other than with full authorization of my Government,21«

For all practical purposes, the Mediation was dead. It was now a matter of struggle between Sumner Welles and Presi­ dent Machado, a battle fought with all kinds of diplomatic and non-diplomatic weapons in Havana and in Washington. On

August 4, the Liberal Party delegates asked the Ambassador to suspend the Mediation negotiations, while almost at the

217piarlo de la Marina. July 27, 1933, P« 1

2l8Forejgn Relations..., 1933, V, 330. 138

same time the Cuban Ambassador in Washington increased his complaints about the attitude of Welles. The reaction of the

American Ambassador was to widen his contacts with the op­ position groups and with members of the Army, and to spread word of impending disaster for Cuba if a radical decision was not made. More than once, to high members of the Cuban govern­ ment, the Ambassador spoke somberly of ”the necessity of inter­ vention.”^ ^ At the same time, Welles insisted on asking for a formal declaration from the Secretary of State to back him in his battle.22® At times the tone of his demand sounded des­ perate. When Machado reassured the Senators and Representatives that the plans of Welles had no support from Roosevelt-and the absence of any public statement backing the Ambassador seemed to show that Cuban Ambassador Cintas was not totally wrong-

Welles once more sent an urgent cable to Secretary of State

Hull: MI understand that you are seeing Cintas at noon to­ morrow. I beg that you inform him that I am acting in every detail with your fullest authorization and approval.”221 ip^g

219The testimony is too numerous to doubt, see, for ex­ ample, Orestes Ferrara, ”La Misidn de Welles,” Politics, V (March, 19^2), 76.

220see, his Telegram of August 7* in Foreign Relations.... 1 2 2 2 . v » 3 3 6 .

221Ibid., V, 339-^0. 139 whole telegram dwells on the necessity of telling Cintas that

the attitude that the Ambassador had adopted, including the

threat of direct intervention did not constitute a bluff.

Actually the position of the Ambassador had changed from

a "friendly Mediator" to an open demand for Machado's resig­ nation, a form of ultimatum that President Machado was resisting

convinced as he was that Roosevelt would never order the landing

of troops in Cuba. And even after a meeting between Ambassador

Cintas and President Roosevelt in which the latter indirectly

supported his Ambassador's demands for Machado's resignation 222 hailing it as "a noble act," it seems as if the diplomatic battle was not entirely won by Sumner Welles. On August 11,

Cordell Hull wrote to the American Ambassador in Cuba:

Out of the mass of information which has been sent to the United States from Cuba some misapprehension has arisen as to what you are doing, and there has been some adverse comment, both here and in Latin America, that the United States is attempting to coerce rather than to persuade.223

More dangerous still for Welles was the warning that Cordell

Hull in his press conference was going to clarify that: "it was a mistake to speak of a 'Welles' plan' as the plan under

discussion is a Cuban plan, agreed upon by Cubans and put for­

222I b i d . , p. 348

22 3 l b l d . . p. 354 ward by yourself on their behalf."224

Fortunately for the Ambassador, at the very moment in which these misapprehensions were expressed, a decisive factor had appeared in the picture, a factor which, even if unforeseen by the Ambassador and the majority of the opposition leaders, was going to give them the opportunity for a final victory over Machado.

22Z

THE DOWNFALL OF MACHADO

While the Mediation evolved into open warfare between

Machado and Sumner Welles, and the different factions of the opposition were clarifying their positions in that battle, a minor event occurred in Havana which would, in a few days, be transformed into the most unexpected and menacing weapon of the opposition. On July 25» 1933* exasperated by an unfair tax imposed on the omnibus by the Mayor of Havana, Josd

Izquierdo, who also demanded that every omnibus was to obtain gasoline only at the garages of the Sinclair Oil Company (the

Mayor had an agreement with the lawyer of the Company), the workers of several unions of bus drivers declared a strike.

Apparently, the Communists moved in swiftly and efficiently; their two best men were Cesar Vilar and Rub6n Martinez Villena who had just returned from Russia, extremely ill with tuber-

141 1^2

culosis.22^ On August 1, because of a clash between police and workers, according to some,22^ or because of a pact between

the workers and Frank Steinhart-the owner of the Company22?- who was anti-Machado, the street car workers joined in the

strike, followed quickly by the stevedores and newspaper em­ ployees. On August 4, the strike had become general and the

capital was almost entirely paralyzed.

Sumner Welles was so involved in his campaign against

Machado that it seems as if, at the beginning, he could not

see the implications of the movement. As a matter of fact,

the first mention of the strike in his reports is to attribute

it to "probable government complicity" with the purpose of

stopping the M e d i a t i o n^28 .

But if the Ambassador failed to realize the importance of

22^The complete history of the general strike is still un­ known. Unless other sources are noted, the general impressions of the author have been gathered from interviews with Cesar Vilar (Habana, July 6, 1959) and Eusebio Mujal (Washington, D.C., February 2-3» 1963)* Both men played an important role in labor struggles in Cuba. Mujal, an ex-Communist was later the Secretary-General of the CTC.

226Charles A. Thompson, "The Cuban Revolution: Reform and Reaction," Foreign Policy Reports, XI (January 1, 1936), 25^»

227cesar Vilar was supposedly present at the meeting.

228pore^p.n Relations..., 1933« V, 33^» 143

the strike, Machado did not. He immediately returned from a fishing trip and called several leaders of the C.N.O.C. (Con- federacidn Nacional Obrera de Cuba), mainly Communists, and promised them his support and legal recognition if they called off the strike. At the same time, he issued strict.orders to avoid any clash with the workers. Defying the advice of the delegate to the Third International, the leaders of the Com­ munist Party decided to accept the d e a l . ^ 9 On August 6, they tried to convince the omnibus workers to go back to their jobs.

Many of the non-Communist leaders opposed this position and postponed the decision to the following day. But the next day there was no time for discussion. A clandestine radio station announced that Machado had resigned and called the people to a celebration. In spite of the immediate and desperate warnings of the official radio stations denying the news, a mob surged into the streets and tried to advance toward the Presidential

Palace. They were met by police fire. When the tragic event ended, about twenty persons had been killed and several others

229Many sources point toward the verisimilitude of this deal. Apart from those which have already been mentioned, see, for example, Juan Ardvalo, "La Organizacidn Obrera en America y las Actividades del Comunismo Internacional," Problemas de la Unidad Obrera de America (Habana: Julian Martin, 1946), p. 5* See, also, Alexander, Communism in Latin America, p. 272. 144

injured.2-^

This massacre affected the entire situation. It was then, according to Lamar Schweyer, when Machado and his followers realized that they could not win,^31 that now Ambassador Welles had a magnificent weapon to back his argument and demand the resignation of Machado. It was also then that the maneuver of the Communists failed; far from going back to work, the strike extended now to almost every sector of Cuba. On August 9» the whole island was affected by a general paralysis. On

August 10, in a supreme effort to appeal to nationalism, the

Conservative Party, following the suggestion of Machado, adopted a resolution supporting the Mediation but condemning ’’foreign intervention” and denying that it had ever ”asked the President to shorten his period by one minute. "232 ip^g following day,

Sumner Welles, with the backing of the general strike, the im­ pact of a massacre, and probably the assurance of the anti-

Machado stand of several high-ranking officers of the Army,

230it is now an almost established fact that the radio station belonged to the ABC Radical, headed by Oscar de la Torre.

23lLamar Schweyer, Como Cayd..., p. 140.

2'32por the complete text see, Ibid., pp. 156-57. 1^5

presented his plan-ultimatum to President Machado.2^3 The plan consisted of: a) An immediate leave of absence for Machado; b) The immediate resignation of all of his cabinet, with the

exception of General Herrera, who would then become head of

the Government; and c) The acceptance of this proposal as if it were on the initia­

tive of the Cuban President.2^

Knowing that the backing of the Army was essential, Machado, who never lacked physical courage, went, on the morning of Au­ gust 12, to visit some military barracks which were under the con­ trol of rebellious officers. In Columbia military barracks, a group of officers, headed by Colonels Julio Sanguily and Erasmo

Delgado, Brigadier Lora, Captain Torres Menier, and Colonel

Horaeio Ferrer, informed him that to save Cuba from intervention he should resign.235 Deprived of his basic source of power, the

233Marj_o Riera Hernandez in Historial Obrero Cubano (Miami; Rema Press, 1965), p. 83, contends that Welles', through the American Military Attache Gomperlick, had been inciting the of­ ficers to rebel since the last days of July. The contact of the Ambassador with the rebellious officers and their quick accept­ ance of his suggestions seems to verify that assertion. Lamar Schweyer, Como Cay6 ..., p. 172, also mentions the conspiracy of the Ambassador.

23^Foreign Relations..., 1933, V, 355*

235Horacio Ferrer, "Los Ultimos dlas de Machado," Trimestre, I (January-March, 19^5), ^6. 146

President yielded and went back to the Presidential Palace to follow the plan of Sumner Welles.

In the meantime, the officers had changed their minds. They had previously accepted Herrera as the proposed President ad interim, but now they thought that Herrera had been too close to Machado to guarantee stability; a new man had to be found.

Sumner Welles then proposed Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, who had been Cuban Ambassador in Washington, and was, according to the

Ambassador "a most sincere friend of the United States.,"^36 ^ g officers and later the representatives of the opposition that had taken part in the Mediation accepted the proposition. That afternoon, Machado asked for a leave of absence, and his entire

Cabinet, in which Cespedes had been designated Secretary of

State, resigned with the exception of Cespedes. Machado then took a plane for Nassau in the Bahamas.

So finally the battle had ended. It was a complete victory for Ambassador Welles. Machado had been ousted, a revolution had been avoided, the substitution of power had followed a

236Foreign Relations..., 1933, V, 359* Cosme de la Tor- riente suggests in his book, Cuarenta Afi'os de mi Vida (Habana: Editorial Siglo XX, 1939)» P» 318, that Cespedes had been se­ lected by the principal factions of the opposition, but the author of this dissertation tends to believe the more common theory that it was Welles who made the selection. For this last point, see, for example, J. Perez de la Riva, "Cuba y el Imperialismo Yanqui," Revlsta Bimestre Cubana (May-June, 1934), 396-98. 147

constitutional pattern, and the new President was a good friend of the United States. While cheering Cubans went to the streets to celebrate-and also to take revenge on the lives and property of well-known Machadistas-the Ambassador sent an exultant report to Washington. Remembering the apprehensions of Cordell

Hull, whose message had been received the preceding day, Sumner

Welles took pains to stress that:

the solution which has now been elaborated and which I have every confidence will be acceptable to the enormous majority of the Cuban people has been worked out solely by the Cubans themselves and represents in my judgement the expression of the volition of nearly the totality of the Cuban people.237

In spite of that rather artificial humbleness, that same night, the Ambassador received a telegram which, in much more realistic terms, stated: "The President and Secretary have asked me to express their warm congratulations to you and their appreciation of what you have d o n e ." ^ 8

237Foreign Relations..., 1933. V, 359* (The underlining is mine ."5

238lbld., p. 3^0. (The underlining is mine.) CHAPTER XIII

THE FAILURE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AUGUST 12-SEPTEMBER 4, 1933

As was natural after so long a struggle, the atmosphere in Cuba after August 12 was one of effervescence end revolt.

Ainciart, Gomez, and many other hated members of Machado’s armed forces were persecuted and killed in the streets, houses were burned, statues were demolished. A flow of exiles poured into the island making speeches and writing articles exalting their own participation in the fight and calling for "revolu- tionary reforms". Labor organizations began to reorganize and to study social demands. The air was charged with radicalism.

Welles could not quite understand this attitude. For him everything had been solved and the struggle had ended. Knowing better than anyone else how the provisional government had been established, these revolutionary gestures seemed unfounded:

"They are taking the attitude that a triumphant revolution has

148 1^9

placed the Government in power and that they are consequently

entitled to dictate the policies of the Government."239 Ap­

parently, the Ambassador was forgetting that these exiles, the

majority of them belonging to student groups, had been fighting

against Machado long before he arrived as a Mediator, that many of them had been in prison and suffered persecution for

their cause. He didn't recall that they had not compromised

on accepting the policies of a government which was born from

a political maneuver which they had rejected. Possibly, he didn't know that in June, 1933» Alma Mater, the official organ

of the students, had expressed:

No, Mr. Sumner Welles, Cuban students don't sell their soul to the Devil: they don't want the Mediation. We have begun a duel to the death which can not be stopped at the first drop of blood.... American Chancellory has never ''medi­ ated.'* in any nation to truly protect the rights of men.... Forget about us Mr. Welles and. organize your Mediation without us, the youth, for we are not willing to be ac­ complices in a pact with crime....^ 0

In such circumstances what was basically needed was an energetic government, which could work with speed and show that

old grievances were going to be corrected and a new justice was

on its way. Unfortunately, in the middle of a revolutionary

239poreign Relations..., 1933. V, 366.

2^0fteprOcLUce4 j_n Julio Cesar Fernandez, En Defensa de la Revolucidn (Habana: n.p., 193&), PP» 99-103• 150

situation, the government of C^spedes looked everything but revolutionary. The provisional President of the Republic, who had been Machado's Ambassador, was a man unknown to the Cuban people, and lacked the presence, oratory, or decisiveness to cope with the difficult moment. The rest of his Cabinet, with the exception of the members of the ABC, belonged more or less in the same category. The Secretary of War and the Navy, at a time when the restoration of discipline in the Army demanded a strong hand, was Demetrio Castillo Pokorny, a grey figure who had been in retirement and had participated in the Honest

Cabinet that Crowder had imposed on Zayas in 1922! The Sec­ retary of Communications was Dr. Nicasio Silveiro of the OCRR

(a fragment of the OCRE which had split because of the Media­ tion), a fine gentleman but with no political or true revolu­ tionary experience. The only known qualification of the Secre­ tary of Agriculture was his friendship with Miguel Mariano

Gomez. It was natural that the people jokingly called this group: "El Gabinete de las sombras" ("The Cabinet of shadows").

Only the members of the ABC could have given C^spedes' government the revolutionary momentum which it urgently needed. But the ABC failed in this first test of its political capability. Basically, they failed because they made one of the most dangerous mistakes any revolutionary group can make: to 151

share the responsibility of a government which they did not control. The leaders of the ABC had a clear idea of this crucial matter and when, on August 13» the Ambassador invited them to take part in the provisional government they demanded four Secretaries: Gobernacidn (Government), Hacienda (Treas­ ury), Agriculture, and Guerra y Marina (War and Navy). They thought that with these four positions which controlled the

Armed Forces, the national budget, and agrarian problems, they could push their revolutionary program and carry out the quick measures that were needed. According to the testimony of some of the leaders, the Ambassador accepted. But on August 1^, when they were called to C^spedes* home (at 2:00 A.M.), the provisional President was already announcing his Cabinet# Only two positions were given to the ABC: Secretary of Justice,

Carlos Saladrigas and Secretary of Hacienda, Dr. Martinez

Saenz. The three members of the ABC that were there: Sala­ drigas, Martinez Saenz, and Dr. Lliteras, hesitated. They realized how dangerously weak their position would be. Final­ ly Saladrigas, whose close relations with Sumner Welles had always been a cause of ugly gossip in Cuba, urged them to ac­ cept. As a result, the most powerful of the political organi­ zations which had participated in the Mediation, the only rep­ resentative of the new generation, became a minor factor in a 152

weak government.2^1

Another factor which hindered the efficiency of the ABC was a growing friction between Martinez Saenz, the leader of the party and Carlos Saladrigas, the second-in-command, but who had always wanted to become the leader. This latent antagonism paralyzed many decisions and provoked, after the downfall of

C^spedes' government, an open crisis in the party in November,

1933.

It would not be fair to the ABC to saddle it with the responsibility for the failure of the C^spedes' government. No, it is doubtful that even with full control by the organization, the provisional government could have survived. The problems were enormous. But there is no doubt that a certain passivity in making decisions, a lack of energy and leadership on the part of the government percipitated the final crisis. It seemed as if C^spedes and Sumner Welles believed that by maintaining the appearance of normality, normality was going

The report of these events was given to me in an in­ terview with Dr. Lliteras, and confirmed personally by Dr. Martinez Saenz. Furthermore, in their declaration of November 3, 193^» the ABC indirectly recognized the mistake by saying: "The Government (Cespedes government), without proper tools, had to act as arbiter to reestablish the economic process. But it was an arbiter without authority and power." See, Doctrina del ABC, p. 65. Also, the point is presented in Jorge Marfech's article in El Pafs, October 16, 1933* P* "if the ABC would have had the control of the armed forces the story would have been otherwise." 153

to be automatically restored. And so, while newspapers, mag­

azines, pamphlets, and the radio were clamoring for reforms and,

above all, for the disappearance of every trace of persons and

institutions which had survived from the "old order"-the Machado

regime-the Provisional President was sworn in before the Supreme

Court (the same Supreme Court which had rejected all legal ar­

guments against Machado). The President maintained the Congress

and left the majority of positions in the bureaucracy and in the

Army untouched. To the man in the street, jobless and impatient,

the government of C^spedes looked as if it were doing nothing

to solve the basic problems of Cuba.

The weakness of the government was conspicuously evident

in a very dangerous area: the discipline of the Army. The

intervention of the Army in the downfall of Machado, had pro­ voked a deep crisis in the institution. Many of the officers who remained in their positions had been loyal to Machado to the

end; others had acted too late to save themselves from the ac­

cusation of Machadistas. On the other hand, the soldiers were

in the street and had fraternized with the people. The moral authority of the officers was thus undermined, the majority of

them were unwilling to give orders to to take any step which plip would provoke a hostile reaction. To solve the problem, the

2^2por the crisis in the Army see, Ricardo Adam y Silva, 154

government recalled, to active service several retired officers who were appointed members of a special Military Court which was entrusted with the task of purging the Machadistas. ^ 3

But these officers, free from the imputation of collaboration with the dictator, lacked also contact or prestige among the troops. And Communists, members of the Student Directory, and the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil, approached minor officers to incite them against the government and spread rumors about re­ duction in salaries and new regulations for promotions

On August 24, Sumner Welles, who a few days before had suggested that he should be recalled and Cafferey appointed in his place,^ 5 spoke with dismay about “a general process of disintegrationrt246 which was going on in Cuba. It was only then, after losing two precious weeks, that the provisional

La Gran Mentira (Habanas Editorial Lex, 1947). The author, a former Army officer, wrote the book in defense of the officers deposed in September, 1933* It is a well-documented book. The author traces the beginnings of lack of discipline in the Army to the “special favors* of Machado to many low-ranking officers and sergeants. Ibid., pp. 57-58*

2^3Riera, Historial Obrero Cubano, p. 88.

2^Adam y Silva, La Gran Mentira, p. 163} also Suarez Rivas, Un Pueblo Crucificado, p. 45.

245Foreign Relations..., 1933. V, 3^7*

2^6Ibid.. p. 371. 155

government decided to act with some speed and abolished the

hated Constitutional Reform of 1928, declared the legal ter­

mination of Machado's presidential term, and called general

elections for February 24, 1934. The ABC, according to its

members, pressed for more reforms: nullification of the Am­ nesty Law of Machado, confiscation of all property of the ex­

members of Machado's government, etc..^?

But they never had time to implement these reforms. Al­

ready on August 26, 1933* a so-called "Junta de los Ocho",

formed by dissatisfied sergeants, began to hold periodic meetings

in the enlisted mens* Club at the Columbia military barracks.

The result was the formation of an organization known as the

Columbia Military Union. The program of this junta aimed at

organizing the lower ranks of the Army in order to obtain better conditions and better opportunities for promotion. Very

soon, realizing the disorganization and weakness of the high-

247These decrees, according to the official publication of the ABC, were ready to be signed when the government of C^spedes was toppled. See, "El ABC ante la Crisis Cubana" in, Dootrina del ABC, p. 264.

248The Junta was formed by Sergeants Pablo Rodriguez, Fulgencio Batista, Eleuterio Pedraza and others, and joined later by Lieutenants Manuel Benitez and Francisco Tabernilla. All of them later reached high positions in the Army. See, Aristides Sosa de Quesada, 4 de Septiembre de 1933 (Babana: P. Fernandez y Cia, 1938), pp. 43-^6. 156

ranking officers of the Army, they began to plot for a general

insurrection against those officers.2^9

At the same time, the Student Directory, the Ala Izquierda

Estudiantil, and the ABC Radical were stepping up their activi­

ties against what Alma Mater repeatedly called "the government

of Mr. Welles."250 a result, at the beginning of September,

1933 > while the Cespedes Government was confronted with the

internal crisis of discord between the ABC and the other groups,

and was making some feeble attempts to speed up some reforms,

two general movements of opposition were taking form: one military and one civilian. Neither had real contact or com­ munication between each other, but, by a sort of natural

gravitation, were ready to work in a common effort against

the provisional government.

It is a curious fact that one of the members of the Co­

lumbia Military Union, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, was a member of_ the ABC.^1 Apparently, Batista .tried to establish

contact with Martinez Saenz and other leaders of the party to

Z^rbid., p. 58.

25C>Alma Mater, August 26, 1933* P» !•

25lThe seldom mentioned affiliation of Batista with the ABC was confirmed by him when he declared that he "no longer belonged to the ABC." See, El Pafs, October 21, 1933» P« !• 157

ask their support in an attempt to overthrow C^spedes. But because of loyalty to their anti-militaristic principles,^52 or perhaps because they did not realize the importance of the movement, Martinez Saenz and his friends turned down the offer.

The Sergeants, then, had no other recourse but to appeal to opposition groups like the Student Directory.

On September 4, 1933» the coup of the Sergeants took place. The demoralization and lack of unity among the high-

ranking officers was so pervasive that the insurrection by the

lower ranks met with almost no resistance. Proclaiming that

they were acting "for the improvement and just vindication of the soldiers of the Cuban Army,"253 in a matter of hours

the Sergeants were in full control of Columbia headquarters and

the majority of the military barracks of the capital. Im­ mediately they established contacts with other garrisons in the interior of the Republic, which quickly joined in the rebellion.

As soon as the news of the revolt spread in Havana, several

leaders of the Student Directory rushed toward the military

252This is the version given by Martinez Saenz to the author of this dissertation in his letter of February 16, 19&5*

253E1 Pafs, September 5» 1933» P« 158

barracks in Columbia. The first to arrive were: Juan Antonio

Rubio Padilla, Carlos Prio Socarras, Ruben de Leon, and Justo

Carillo. They joined the group of Sergeants and talked them into widening the movement. Because of their action, a mili­ tary rebellion inside the Army was transformed into a general movement against the government of C^spedes and everything it represented; or to express it in Enrique Fernandez words:

"they transformed an insubordination into a Revolution.

They were also accepting the tremendous historical responsi­ bility of backing the open intervention of the Army in the political struggles of Cuba.

A Revolutionary Junta was formed immediately in Columbia, a proclamation to the nation was issued, and, following the example of Uruguay, a government with five members was an­ nounced, At 1:00 P.M., September 5* 1933* President C^spedes was informed of the movement and of his deposition. He im­ mediately abandoned the Presidential Palace with his Cabinet.

That very day, La Semana, a popular newspaper directed by

Sergio Carbd, published a headline that very rapidly became the symbol of the moment: "Paso a la Aut^ntica Revolucibn"

25^Pernandez, La Raz<5n del 4 de Septlembre, p. 40. 159

("Open the way for the .Authentic Revolution"). The Provisional

Government had ceased to exist. CHAPTER XIV

THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER, 1933-JANUARY, 193^ a) The Significance of the Moment

On assuming political power, the Revolutionary Junta organized itself in the Columbia military barracks, issued a proclamation which in its principal aspects said:

The revolutionary group of Cuba composed of enlisted men of the Array and the Navy and of civilians belonging to various sectors headed by the university students group declares:

First: That it has constituted itself in order to carry out, in whole, the revolutionary program for which the great majority— of the Cuban people are contending and will continue to contend within ample lines of modern democracy and based upon the pure principles of national sovereignty.

Second: This program in brief is as follows:

1) Economic reconstruction of the national and political organization on the basis of a constitutional convention to be held immediately;

2) Immediate elimination and full punishment of all those responsible for the previous situation...;

3) Strict recognition of the debts and obligations con-

160 l6l

tracted for by the Republic;

4) Immediate constitution of adequate courts to insist upon the responsibilities above mentioned;

5) Reorganization...of all services and national activi­ ties obtaining a rapid return to normality;

6) Finally, to take all of the measures not foreseen in this document in order to commence the march towards the creation of a new Cuba founded upon an immovable founda­ tion of justice and of the most modern conception of democracy.255

The proclamation was signed by Sergeant Batista as "Revo­ lutionary Chief of all Armed Forces of the Republic", by several members of the Student Directory, including Carlos Prio

Socarras, Rubio Padilla, and Justo Carillo, and by the members of the newly appointed Pentarchy: Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin,

Sergio Carbd, Porfirio Franca, Guillermo Portela, and Josd

Irizarri.

To understand the events that followed, and the victories and tragedies of this new revolutionary period, it should be remembered that the group that was now in power, or better, which was trying to reach power, did not represent a political party or even a well-structured organization like the ABC. They were basically an heterogeneous alliance of several factions who found themselves bound together by their common aspiration

255e i Pais, September 5» 1933* P* !• 162

to carry on the revolutionary program or, as in the case of the

Army, by the force of events. One of the members of the Pen- tarchy, for example, whose name was proposed amidst the shouting of the first disorganized meeting, Porfirio Franca, never took possession of his office or even appeared at the meetings.^56

Others, like Irizarri and Portela, had accepted reluctantly the responsibility of power and were ready to resign at any moment. Factions which immediately joined the movement, like the ABC Radical, had their own program and had expressed an enthusiastic if vague approval for the "authentic revolution".

The two most important elements in the new government, the Student Directory and the Army, had different origins and aims. For the students this was their real opportunity, their chance to apply all the ideas of reform and revolution that had been developing since they began their fight in 1927. They were a bunch of boys, eager to act, impatient for radical reforms, but without a concrete program or even a common ideo­ logical background. They all shared a profound feeling of nationalism, a general desire to wipe out all the evils of the past and build a new Cuba, but the manner and extent of the

2-5^Interviews with Prio, Padilla, Carillo, and Pazos. 163

measures for destruction and reconstruction had not been

studied or discussed. Consequently, disagreement and divisions were to appear almost immediately.

The Sergeants represented quite a different position.

They came from very humble origins and had no real political

ideas. Men, that until very recently were obeying orders, were now in command of entire provinces or in other positions of

importance. Their basic concern was to remain there, to cling

to their command and their newly acquired power. They spoke

of revolution, of the appeal to the people, but they were ready

to ruthlessly crush anyone or anything that could endanger

their position, be it the anti-revolutionary forces or the perilous radicalism of their occasional allies, the students.

Their recognized chief was Batista., by far the most intelligent

and politically minded of them all, but his authority was based

on partnership not on personal authority. As it was clearly

explained by one of the analysts of the situation: the Army was now divided into sort of feudal zones under different

leaders. "To be obeyed, Batista had to guarantee others their

freedom to command."257

Nevertheless, this heterogeneous government, which nearly

257carlos Gonzales Palacios, Revolucidn y Seudo-Revoluoidn en Cuba (Habana: Editorial Lex, 19^6), pp. 78-79* ” 16*1-

always gave the impression of disorganization and disorder, which according to the American Ambassador was incapable of

lasting for more than a few days,^58 stayed in power against formidable odds for more than four months, carried out the most radical and profound process of transformation that Cuba had had since becoming a republic, and established the basis for the most important political forces that ruled Cuba for

the next twenty-five years.

The best explanation that the author of this dissertation has for the immediate and lasting popularity of this govern­ ment, for its impact on Cuban society,^59 is that the Student

Directory instinctively interpreted the most general desires

of the Cuban people; that for a brief historical moment they were the hope and the symbol for all the forces of nationalism, patriotism, and renovation that began to appear in Cuba since

the first cry of protest of the Thirteen in 1 9 2 3;^® that for

four months they were, to use a beautiful expression of

^®The opinions and attitude of Sumner Welles will be studied later.

2590f the figures who emerged from this period, Batista ruled Cuba from 193^ to 19*14, followed by Grau San Martin, 19*4- *+8, and Prio Socarr^s, 19*1-8-52, and then Batista again until 1959* The Autenticos, the political party which was formed after the revolution, was the most popular and largest party of the entire period.

260see above, p. 70. 165

Ortega y Gasset, "the interpreters of history".

On September 10, 1933» a cartoon appeared in La Semana which was immediately reproduced and posted in almost every

Cuban town. It was extremely expressive of the new situation, of the new taste of dignity and real independence that Cubans were enjoying. It pictured an American tourist looking at a high pole with the Cuban flag flying on the top. The tourist was asking a Cuban, "How come your flag is smaller now?!* The

Cuban answered, "It is not smaller, Mister, it is just that for the first time in our history we have raised it to the top." b) The Rise of Grau San Martin

For reasons partially mentioned before, the Pentarchy could not work. After the first three convulsive days in which the Student Directory and the other revolutionary factions tried to reach an understanding with the ABC and the rest of the polit­ ical forces displaced by the revolt of September 4,^61 the in­ capacity of the organism to act with the required decision was so evident that the students decided to adopt the Presidential formula. The majority of them supported Ram6n Grau San Martin,

26lThe ABC on September, 5> issued a proclamation "de­ clining all responsibility for the revolt" and assuming an attitude of "expectant vigilance." On September, 7» its rep­ resentatives Lliteras and Martinez Saenz, together with dele­ gates of Menocal and the National Union, had a meeting with the students, but no agreement was reached. See, Doctrina del ABC, pp. 259-262. 166

a very well-known physician who had opposed Machado from the beginning (he was the only professor who voted against con­ ferring on Machado the title of Doctor in Honoris Causa in

1926), who had suffered imprisonment and exile and who had

shown enough character to move ahead with the students on every occasion, before and during the Pentarchy. But the other

three members of the Pentarchy-as was stated before Porfirio

Franca never appeared-defended the idea that the Provisional

President should be an apolitical figure who could receive the support of the students, the Army, and the rest of the po­ litical forces who had been with Cdspedes and were now moving toward opposition. On the night of September 8, the Student

Directory decided to give a vote of confidence to the four

Pentarchs to select the man; their only condition was that it

should not be a figure representative of the old order.^62 The following day some of the students learned that the Pentarchs were going to hold a meeting in the Presidential Palace to choose Gustavo Cuervo Rubio as President. Cuervo Rubio was a respected physician considered by many as nonpolitical. But

some members of the Student Directory knew of his close rela-

262Etiuar30 ChiMs, "Como cayd la Pentarquia, ” Bohemia (May 12, 19^-), 96. 16?

tions with Menocal. Another urgent meeting was convened, and while the members of the Pentarchy were deliberating on the third floor of the Presidential Palace, on the second floor, in a turbulent assembly, the Student Directory, formed now by more than thirty members (they had decided that all those who at any time had been a member of the body had equal rights to partic­ ipate in the sessions), revoked the vote of confidence and choose Grau San Martfn as Provisional President. A commission formed by Rubdn de Le<5n, Rubio Padilla, and Carlos Prio went up to see the Pentarchs and to inform them that they were no longer Pentarchs, nor had they the right to select the President.

The Student Directory, on its own authority, had nominated

Professor Grau San Martin as the head of the revolutionary government.

With the disappearance - of the Pentarchy, Grau and the students proceeded to select the revolutionary Cabinet. They made a good selection: Jos£ Barquin, a public accountant, well- known for his honesty, as Secretary of the Treasury; Carlos

Finlay, son of the famous physician who helped to discover the cause of yellow fever, as Secretary of Sanitation; Eduardo

2^3juan Antonio Rubio Padilla, "Como fu£ nombrado el Dr. Ramon Grau San Martfn," Bohemia (July 12, 1942), 46-4?. Dr. Rubio Padilla and Dr. Prio Socarras gave the author a full account of the events in the interviews cited above. 168

Chib^s, the father of the student leader, as Secretary of Public

Works; and last, but by no means least, Dr. Antonio Guiteras was designated Secretary of Governments Of all the members of

this revolutionary government, two figures would quickly emerge as the centers of power, as the figures who would carry out

the real fight for a revolutionary program: President Ram<£n

Grau San Martin and Secretary of Government, Antonio Guiteras

Holmes.

With a deceptive appearance of very gentle mannerisms

(the author had the privilege of meeting him personally), Ramon

Grau San Martin hid a strong character and a capacity for making decisions and keeping them to the point of stubbornness. He had also an instinct for doing the things people were expecting from him, and a political consciousness of being on stage. On

September 10,'when he was going to be sworn in as President of the Republic, the members of the Supreme Court gathered in the

Presidential Palace to administer his oath. At the last moment,

Grau decided to take the oath on the balcony in front of his people who, as he proclaimed, "are the real basis of our power."264

Leaving behind the embarrassed magistrates, he said: "I

26^e i Pals, September 10, 1933* P* 1» also, G. Rodriguez Morejdn, Grau San Martin (Habana: Ediciones El Mirador, 19^)» pp. 67-68. 169

swear to fulfill the program of the Revolution," amidst the

cheering of the multitude. From then on, he never hesitated

in taking the course he considered the most convenient, no

matter what the consequences.

Antonio Guiteras Holmes was a different type of person.

Born of a middle class family, he studied Pharmacy and was a

member of the Student Directory of 1927* Expelled from the

University in 1928, he became a sales agent for medical products

and traveled throughout the island. In 1932, he organized an

attack on a military barracks in San Luis (Oriente Province).

Captured by the Army, he was sentenced to eight years in

prison. Freed by the general amnesty of 1933» he was in the

interior of the island when the revolt of September, 1933» came.

There he heard the news of his appointment and rushed back to

Havana. He was 27.

A man of few words and less writings, Guiteras' political

ideas are hard to define or study. According to some members

of the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil who knew him well, Guiteras was deeply impressed by Marxist ideas.To others, from

Marxism he only took a definitive anti-imperialist stand.

^^Interview with Porfirio Pendds, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1967.

^^Interview with Carlos Martinez, Washington, D.C., January 18, 1967. (Both men were founders of the Ala Izquierda.) 170

There is no doubt that he was fervently nationalistic, radical, and convinced of the necessity of cutting deep into the econom­ ic and political conditions of Cuba. For him, imperialism was the root of evil.

Our program, he wrote later, could not simply stop with the principle of Nonintervention. It had to go to the root of our evils: economic imperialism.... For us that labor, together with the growing belligerency of the proletariat was in reality the Revolution.^®'

These two men, backed by an ever diminishing group of students, were the real architects of the revolutionary sit­ uation. Together with Prio, Padilla, Rub£n de Le<5n, and a few others who remained to the end, they fought for their program until the last moment of the revolutionary government.

The national program of the government began to take shape very quickly. On September 20, 1933, Decree No. 1693 establish­ ed the eight hour day for workers. That same day, by Decree

No. 1703, all professionals in Cuba (lawyers, physicians, ar­ chitects) were forced to register in their respective associa­ tions. On October 2, according to Decree No. 2lM, the position of Secretary of Labor was created. On October 18 (Decree No.

2232), the immigration of workers from Haiti and Jamaica was

26?Antonio Guiteras, "Septembrismo, Bohemia (April 1, 193*0, 30-32. — 171

declared illegal and orders were passed to begin the deportation

of those who had been illegally brought; and so on.

In a deluge of decrees, the government created the first

"colonos" Association; the right of "permanence” for the peas­ ants on the land they were occupying; proclaimed the beginning

of a program of land distribution for the peasants; created free registration for all poor students in all centers of learing;

established the autonomy of the University; reduced the payment

of electrical taxes; made illegal the'confiscation of the

salaries of workers for any reason; dissolved all political parties which had cooperated with Machado; gave the right to vote to Cuban women; etc..

From labor to commerce, from lawyers to teachers, all

sectors of Cuban society felt the impact of the new legislation which, under the proclaimed slogan of "Cuba for the Cubans” ,

tried to, as one of the student leaders said: ’’push Cuba into the heart of the 20th Century.M269

It was not an easy task. Deprived of any real propaganda media-only the newspaper Alma Mater, directed.by Julio Cesar

268The series of laws has been taken from Morejdn, Grau San Martjfn, pp. 3-7, where they are classified according to subject.

269Rubdn de Lec5n, "Nuestra tarea," Alma Mater (October 22, 1933), 4. 172

Fernandez, was a sort of official organ of the government-through which to explain and defend its measures; without time to clar­ ify or deny the wave of alarming rumors that were sweeping the island; proclaiming its honest revolutionary intentions in a general chorus of revolutionary stridency (there vrere more than twenty radio programs of different ’•revolutionary" organiza­ tions)^^®; each new law produced confusion, expectation, a.nd polemics. Naturally, the economic sectors were the most alarmed with the speedy transformation of the political and social structure. As early as September 18, the Cuban Economic Cor­ poration, in a public manifesto addressed to President Grau, expressed their deep concern with the impact of so many laws, 271 and projected laws, on the economic stability of Cuba. '' Ac­ cording to them, the government needed to study and analyze more seriously each law before passing it.

On the other hand, as will soon be seen, some labor move­ ments, many of them under the influence of Communists, were de­ manding more changes, waving red banners, and speaking of "soviets in Cuba". A situation which multiplied the fear of the middle

2?0j os£ Perez Acosta, La Radio en Cuba, 1920-19^-0 (Habana: P. Ruiz y Hno, 19^8), p. 115.

2 7 1 « E 1 Comite Conjunto de las Corporaciones Econdmicas expresa sus orientaciones," El Mundo (September 18, 1933)» !• 173 class and expanded the accusation of HCommunist" to many mem­ bers of the government.

In spite of everything, the students and Grau moved on toward more radical reforms. An American observer tried to put it in Cuban terms:

This is Cuba's golden hour for a social revolution. Foreign dominance, political corruption and political intervention have created a servile state. We live in a land no longer our own. We must regain our heritage, reform our financial system, expropriate lands, clip the wings of foreign capital and build a free republic.272

There were thus many things to do, and they knew they had a brief time to do them.

The growing opposition of many factions, the increasing alarm of many sectors, the uncertitude of what was the right thing to do, made many revolutionaries hesitate. The firm anti-Grau attitude of the American Embassy added fuel to the conviction that Cuba was moving toward disaster. On October

24, the ABC Radical withdrew its support of the revolutionary g o v e r n m e n t .273 On November 5» in a general assembly in which many expressed their disapproval of the situation, the Student

Directory made the sad decision to dissolve.When the gov-

2?2Hubert Herring, "Can Cuba Save Herself?," Current History (November, 1933)» 152.

273E1 Mundo, October 24, 1933, p. 1.

274Alma. Mater, November 5, 1933, P* !• 17^

ernment decided to deal with American companies, the ranks of

its supporters grew thinner.

When our terrible blows began to break the gigantic machin­ ery which chokes us, the Cuban people, as many others in Latin America, came onto the scene to fight all its servants and lackeys and their clamor sent back our collaborators one by one. They preferred the defeatist exclamation ’this way we will never be recognized by the Americans', or the even more frightening ’the Americans will land', 'we won't be able to sell our sugar'. I saw them in their moment of retreat, for they always came to see me trying to convince me that we should diminish the attack, that we should compromise,275 wrote Guiteras later. "Compromise, compromise was the only ad­ vice of those false revolutionaries who never understood the real

lesson of Danton, that in Cuba, as in any other place, what a

revolutionary needs is audacity, audacity and more audacity."276

But it was not really a problem of audacity versus cow­

ardice. "It is a matter of knowing where radicalism ends and

irresponsibility begins,"277 answered Jorge Manach. And cer­

tainly the appee.rance of the government, the coming and going

in the Presidential Palace of boys of twenty-two or twenty-five

2?5Antonio Guiteras, "Septernbrismo," pp. 30 and 38.

2?6pablo de la Torriente Brau, "La Revolucidn en Cuba," La Vanguardia (November 12, 1933)> P* 20.

277Jorge Manach, "Respuesta a una Encueste," El Mundo (October 2, 1933)> P» 175

shouting of the necessity to enact some decree to solve this or that problem was not reassuring. The improvised speeches from any balcony, the radical declarations that appeared in every corner of the island (El Mundo, for example, in its edition of October 5> 1933> carried an article of Giberto Perez

Castillo (p. 2), defending the necessity of a "proletarian system of education" in Cuba) helped to convey the impression of irresponsibility. Many concurred with Martinez Saenz when he wrote that this was the government of "efebocracia" (ado­ lescents) .278

In November, the government began to deal directly with

American business interests. As loans from the Chase National

Bank had become very unpopular, Grau San Martin decided to sus­ pend payment on them. Later, to resolve some labor and econom­ ic problems, two sugar mills of the Cuban-American Sugar Com­ pany were seized.in December, to avoid the legal way in which American and Cuban companies tried to escape from any fiscal requirements by selling their sugar mills or lands to another company, usually related to the first, at very low

2?8joaquin Martinez Saenz, "Frente al moment o'," Bohemia (November 24, 1933)> 27.

279carles A. Thompson, "The Cuban Revolution...," p . 267. 176

prices, the Cuban Government proclaimed "El Derecho de Tanteo"

(The Right of the Estimate, i.e., the right to he considered as a potential buyer in any of these transactions at the price fixed by the Company that was selling).In January, 1934, when a strike paralyzed the Cuban Electric Company, Decree No. 172 authorized an "Administrator-Intervener" representing the gov­ ernment to take over the company.2®1

With all these laws (and many others that there is no ne­ cessity to enumerate) the cries of "Communism!", "irresponsibi­ lity” , etc. had reached the skies. In January, 1934, finally, the basic enemies of the revolutionary government, foreign and domestic, had reached an agreement and formed a common front.

It was now just a matter of days before President Grau would be forced to resign. c) The Enemies of the Revolutionary Government

1) The Left.— As in any revolutionary period which opens the way for a multiplicity of ideological positions, in Cuba there were those who complained because the government was doing too much, and those who protested that the government was doing

2^®Carlos Raggi, "El Derecho de Tanteo," Legislacidn Cubana. Ill (March, 1935). 46-51.

28lJorge Quintana, "Iconografla de Antonio Guiteras," Bohemia (May 18, 194-7), 10-13* 177

too little. To this latter classification belonged the groups of the left, who from a distorted perspective that they them­ selves accepted as a mistake when it was already too late, bitterly opposed Grau's government.

More or less connected with the Communist party, split by internal factions, Ala Jzquierda Estudiantil, nevertheless, main­ tained a position of'criticism to Grau from the beginning.As early as September 22, 1933» the organization was protesting the intervention of the government in certain schools in Havana, and from then on the accusation of "a dictatorship worse than that of Machado" or "betrayal of the ideals of the Revolution" were common charges of the leaders of the movement.

But as the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil was formed by students who had moved away from the Student Directory, they represented a minority group, very vocal in its opposition, but without any real capacity to cause trouble. As a matter of fact, they were the most important of a rash of leftist groups which appeared in

Cuba at the time without any mass support but with very impres­ sive titles. 28**-

2®2xnterviews with Porfirio Pend£s and Caflos Martinez.

283E1 Pals, September 22, 1933» p. !•

28^The author has found, for example, the mention in Masas, October 26, 1933» of a Cuban Bolshevik-Leninist Party, of which no further news or trace could be found. 178

More important was naturally the attitude of the Communist

Party. Following the path set forth by the Sixth Congress of

the Comintern (1928), where all socialist, progressive, or

nationalist parties were condemned as fascists or pseudo­

fascists, the Communist Party of Cuba maintained the line ex­

pressed by Rubdn Martinez Villena in 1933»^^ and made no

— distinction between Machado or the anti-Machado forces which

had triumphed in 1933 • The ABC was branded as "fascist1' and

according to them the government of Grau San Martin was a

"bourgeois-landlord government...placed in the presidential

chair on the fourth of September, 1933» by the petty bourgeoisie,

and by the army...a. government which defended the interests of

the bourgeoisie, the landlords, and the imperialists...."

Consequently, the Party moved to stir agitation in the country

and among the workers in the 'city. Some sugar mills were

seized, a red flag was raised over the former offices of Her­

ald o de Cuba, an Anti-Imperialist League was created and the

party proudly announced on September 18, 1933> that the "social

285see above, pp. 11? and 129*

286»«The Communist Party and the Cuban Revolutionary Situa­ tion," The Communist (New York), XIII, No. 9 (September, 193*0 > 875-887. 179

revolution was on its w a y . " 2 ® 7

But it was a premature declaration. The party, as they also realized later, was not ready for the task and the position

pOO taken against the Grau government was basically a mistake. 00

On September 29, when the Communist Party tried to make a public manifestation in honor of Julio Antonio Mella-whose ashes had been brought back from Mexico-they were dissolved by the police and the Array.^89 During the latter part of September, the strike wave began to recede, ^90 an(^ the nationalist stand of the government began to pay dividends among the mass of workers who

increasingly moved toward cooperation with the revolution. In

November, the labor situation was almost normal in the island.^91

The criticism and the attack of the Left had failed to produce any direct results.

287t»un Mitin de la Liga Anti-Imperialista en Manzanillo,” El/.Mundo, September 18, 1933» P* 11 •

288in 1937, the Great Soviet Encyclopedia declared: "The government of Grau undertook a series of basic reforms....The leadership of the Cuban Communist Party adopted wrong positions toward that government and did not support it.” Bol1shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 35 (Moscu: 1937)1 P* 355*

289Alma_Mater, September 30, 1933* P*l> suggests that the shooting was by unknown snipers from several windows.

290problems of the New Cuba (New York: Foreign Policy As­ soc iatiorTi 1935)» P* 18^.

29lRicardo Despaigne, "Jornadas Obreras," Trabajo (September, 193^). 23. 180

2) The Right.— The term "right" is used here in its widest

connotation as applied to those groups who after September, 1933*

for one reason or another, were fighting to reestablish a pre­

revolutionary situation, be it the Constitution of 1901,

Cespedes, or a coalition government headed by some of the old

leaders as Menocal or Mendieta.

As has been mentioned before, on September 10, 1933> after

the designation of Grau San Martin as Provisional President, the

ABC moved from "expectant vigilance" to open opposition. Fol­

lowing the ABC, the National Union, the partisans of Menocal,

and the ex-officers of the Army began to take positions against

the revolutionary government. The OCRE and the OCRR were al­

ready in the process of disintegrating and did not count as

important factors. The Women in Opposition had completely disappeared.

Naturally, all these factions turned avidly toward Welles

asking for American support in the upcoming struggle. Their

first objective was, apparently, the restoration of Cespedes

as President of the Republic. The first group to move was the

former officers of the Army who had gathered in the National

Hotel waiting for an opportunity to act. On September 10,

they publicly declared that if the United States recognized the

government of Grau they would decline any responsibility in 181

the course of the events, but if recognition did not come they would try to reinstall Cespedes.292 ^ same time, they sent Colonel Horacio Ferrer to ask that "a sufficient force of

American Marines be landed to disarm the soldiers and the in­ numerable civilians who are armed.” The Ambassador refused to even hear such a petition.293

All attempts to reach an agreement with the officers failed.

Encouraged by their contacts with the ABC, the National Union,

Menocal, and probably by Sumner Welles, who had moved to the

National Hotel, the officers even defied an order from the gov­ ernment recalling them to active duty.2^^ On October 2, the

Army attacked the Hotel and in the ensuing battle 14- officers were killed, 17 wounded, and the rest were taken prisoner. As a menace, or even as a group, the former officers of the Army disappeared. The Sergeants, by now Colonels, were in full control of the troops.

As a result of that failure, the hopes of the counter­ revolutionary forces moved from Cespedes toward Mendieta as a figure of prestige, capable of attracting mass support, while

292e i Pafs, September 10, 1933> P» 1»

293Foreign Relations.... 1933. V, 4l8.

29^Chester, A Sergeant Named Batista, p. 102. 182

the American Ambassador began to sound out Batista on his political position, assuring him that in his judgment "he him­ self was the only individual in Cuba who represented author­ ity."295

With the officers out of the picture, it was the turn of the ABC. On October 29, they had already reached an agreement with the National Union to defend a provisional government headed by Mendieta. But as Mendieta, as usual, hesitated,29^ they began to prepare an armed insurrection against the revolu­ tionary government. Apparently they were counting on the sup­ port of Batista. But the Student Directory moved quickly; they called Batista for a meeting with Grau and the rest of the rev­ olutionary leaders in the house of Sergio Carbd" on November 3»

After receiving reliable information that the rest- of the Army leaders were not involved in the conspiracy of Mendieta and the ABC, they decided to kill Batista and substitute Major

Pablo Rodriquez who was loyal to Grau. At the same time, they publicly attacked Sumner Welles as "an envoy of Wall Street" who

295Forelgn Relations..., 1933. V, ^70.

296«j; was horrified at the possibility of more bloodshed," wrote Mendieta later. Letter to Marquez Sterling, February l4, 1935. From Dr. Beruff's collection. 183

was plotting against the revolutionary government.^97 Batista went to the meeting and, according to the testimony of those who were present, proclaimed his loyalty to the government and his desire to cooperate in any possible form. Then Grau re­ fused to let Batista be killed. Supposedly, he said: "After all we already know this man, and the next is going to be at least as bad as he.1*

With these maneuvers, the Student Directory and the gov­ ernment succeeded in at least neutralizing Batista. The ABC had to strike alone. Knowing the situation, and probably wanting to wait for more favorable conditions, Martinez Saenz 9QQ postponed the uprising and went to the United States.-77 In his absence, Carlos Saladrigas, still desirous of becoming the leader of the movement, gave the order to rebel on November 7*

For a moment it seemed as if they were going to win: several

297por the attacks on Sumner Welles, see Alma Mater, Novem­ ber 3» 1933* PP* 5-6; also, Foreign Relations..., 1933, V, 513»

298iphe events of the meeting with Batista had been told to the author by Prio and Padilla in the interview cited above, and confirmed by Sergio Carbo*7 in whose house the meeting took place, in an interview in Miami, November 20, 196^. The man that was in charge of killing Batista was ‘Major Pablo Rodriquez.

299or. Lliteras, in the interview cited above, told the author about the attitude of Saladrigas. Martinez Saenz in his letter cited above, only acknowledged that he was not in Cuba at the time of the uprising. 184

police stations fell into the hands of the Abecedarios; some airplanes attacked the Presidential Palace (which Grau refused to abandon); and uprisings were reported in a few cities of the interior. But the Army and the students fought back. In the afternoon, all police stations had been recaptured and the

Abecedarios retreated to the castle of Atares, on the out­ skirts of Havana, where they were surrounded, attacked, and defeated by the Army. In desperation, the ABC broadcast that they were going to attack and destroy American and British property. But it was a useless threat directed towards pro­ voking American intervention.300 Qn November 9> the last 400 men who were in Atares surrendered. The great blow of the ABC had resulted in another tragic failure. That night, a multi­ tude gathered in front of the Presidential Palace shouting:

"Long live the Revolution! Down with old politicians!"301

With the defeat of the ABC, the counter-revolutionary forces had exhausted their fighting power. Menocal went into exile and the members of the National Union devoted themselves to political struggles, not to street fighting.

300Foreign Relations..., 1933. V, 518.

30lLumen, La. Revolucidn Cubana, p. 140. 185

But for the revolutionary government the victory brought

no real respite. The basic enemy remained out of reach, and,

by then, the American Embassy had found the Achilles heel of

the revolution.

d) The Ambassador, the Army, and the. Downfall of the Rev­ olutionary Government

As can be noticed from this exposition, from the very beginning, the attitude of the American Ambassador, Mr. Sumner

Welles, was a key factor in all the developments. It should be added now that, from the beginning to the end, the attitude

of Mr. Welles did not change an iota: he opposed the rev­

olutionary government in every way he could. His first task was to present a black-or should one say red?-picture of what was happening in Cuba. Maybe he did this because he was ir­ ritated by the sudden interruption of his plans and the shadow

that had been cast over his victory over Machado. Maybe he had extreme confidence in the sources who had been working with him since the Mediation and tended to accept at face value their information. Maybe he was truly convinced that

these groups represented a direct and dangerous menace to

American interests and should be stopped. In any case, he did not hesitate to use all of his influence with the American 186

Government to avoid any recognition of Grau San Martin's gov­

ernment. And to do that, consciously or unconsciously, he

at times distorted the facts or failed to mention important

points which could have helped the revolutionary government.

The first report Welles sent to Washington mentioned the

proclamation of September 5» as signed *'by a group of the most

extreme radicals of the student organization and three uni­

versity professors whose theories are frankly communistic."302

The Ambassador failed to mention that the Ala Izquierda

Estudiantil which was really the most radical element among the

students, not only did not join the movement but condemned it.

There were only two professors, Portela and Grau. Portela

never had any definite political ideology, but if any, he could

be considered as a Conservative who wanted a quick restoration

of order in Cuba. Grau was a physician who later defined him­

self as "national-socialist",3^3 but who was always anti-Com- munist. Later on, the Ambassador acknowledged the existence

of Porfirio Franca, but he immediately added an evaluation of

him as "a supposedly conservative business man of good repu-

302poreip;n Relations.... 1933. V, 3^2.

303Ram6n Grau San Martin, La Revoluoidn Cubana ante Amer­ ica (Mexico: Ediciones del Partido Revolucionario Cubano, 193&), pp. 104-105. 18?

tation who is being used as window dressing.”30^ por once,

Mr. Welles was almost right.

Not satisfied with sending these telegrams, the Ambassador called, that very day, on Secretary of State Cordell Hull and asked for the landing of some Marines, first only to protect the E m b a s s y , 305 but later on he added: "I have just had another meeting with the political leaders and they seem to be all of the opinion that the only possible way is for a temporary landing of possibly one thousand men until a new government can be restored'... ."306 After talking with President Roosevelt,

Cordell Hull refused the demand.3°7 In spite of that refusal,

Welles insisted that same day, in another telegram, on asking for the landing of troops, this time not only in Havana but also

Min Santiago de Cuba and perhaps one or two other points in the i s l a n d . "308 The following day, Cordell Hull called him by

30^-Foreign Relations..., 1933. V, 382.

305ibld.. p. 38^.

306ibid., p. 385.

307Ibid., p. 386.

308ibid., p. 388. After reading this insistence of Welles on landing the Marines one can't understand how Cosme de la Torriente could have written much later that Welles "always refused to allow or order one single American soldier to put his foot on Cuban land," Cosme de la Torriente, "La Renuncia de Sumner Welles," Revlsta de la Habana. ArTo II, T. Ill (Oct- ubre, 19^3), 201. 188

phone and reiterated that they could land if compelled to but only as an “ultima ratio1* . 3°9 attitude of Cordell Hull seemed to have been much more realistic and thus, more willing to recognize the revolutionary government. When Welles said:

“for the time being we ought not even to consider recognizing any government of this character in my opinion," Hull answered: “until it has shown its ability to preserve law and order."310

Cordell Hull, after all, was also receiving information about the Cuban government from a variety of sources. Already on September 6, the American Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) was informing Hull that the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him that “he knows the four men composing the junta are educated men with good background and no taint of Com­ munism. “311 DayS later, Ambassador Daniels was giving him an exceptionally clear report about the origin of the rumors of- communist influence in Cuba which he found “very exag­ gerated. “312

309Foreign Relations.... 1933. V, 389*

310rbid., p. 390.

3lllbid.. p. 394.

312ibld.. pp. 414-415. 189

With the landing of the Marines blocked by Hull, it seems

as if Welles then decided to justify the other point, the in­

capacity of the revolutionary government to preserve law and

order. In doing this, the Ambassador established a terribly vicious circle for the Cuban government, for as everybody knew, the lack of American recognition encouraged all counter­

revolutionary forces to resist the government, and this open resistance justified the interpretation that there was no law

and order in Cuba. This is what Grau so aptly once called

"intervention by inertia"; by simply not doing anything,

the American government encouraged other people to do something.

That Sumner Welles must have known the real consequences of his attitude was shown in his comment after the revolt of the

ABC in November:

I have noted in certain reports from the American press of today that the assertion is made that recognition of the Grau government would have prevented revolutionary outbreaks.... Recognition would probably have delayed revolt but it would not have prevented it.313

A curious opinion coming from a man who had been receiving

urgent appeals' from those who revolted to land the Marines as

the only way possible to restore the Cespedes government.

313lbid., p. 520. 190

In his desire to present the Cuban situation as chaotic,

the Ambassador seems to have listened and believed all types

of rumors. On September 7> he was reporting to his government

that

the situation is breaking fast. Dr. Belt, Secretary of Public Instruction in the Cdspedes Cabinet /quite an impartial source_l7 has informed me that Sergeant Batista has requested an interview with President Cdspedes in order to inform him that the Army wishes to place it­ self at his disposal...he further informs me that Carbtf, one of the five members of the revolutionary group has fled, and that the others are only waiting in order to seek some solution which will guarantee their safety.314

Later, on September 8, he wrote "The Army mutiny was originally

engineered by a few Communist leaders in Havana under the guidance of Rubdn Martinez Villena."3l5 And each of these reports, and many others, which insisted on announcing the

immediacy of a definite crisis in Grau’s government, was ac­

companied by the suggestion that the Cuban government should not be recognized. —

It is not necessary to burden this Dissertation with a multiplicity of quotations to prove the partiality of Sumner

Welles. It is only necessary to remember, for example, that

the same man who had reported on July 7, when Menocal was

31^Ibid., p. 400.

3l5rbid., p. 405. 191

opposing the Mediation that "Menocal has been consistently- losing prestige during the last three weeks," 316 and later dismissed him and his "constantly diminishing group"317 as lacking importance in Cuba, was later using that same Menocal

(who certainly had done nothing to increase his prestige or his followers) to prove that all powerful parties were op­ posing Grau3l8 or ^o somberly comment: "I have every reason to believe that it is only a question of short time before

General Menocal will attempt to lead a revolution."319 attempt that naturally, Menocal was wise enough never to try!

Note also how the Ambassador always referred to the exiguous minority that was supporting Grau32® as counterbalanced by his continuous praise of the ABC as "in many ways the best organized and most energetic political organization in Cuba."32l

3l6lbid.. p. 318.

317lbid., p. 323.

318ibid., p. ^79.

319lbid., p. 520. This announcement is still more incred­ ible when one realizes that it was made after the failure of the ABC and when Menocal was on his way into exile.

320lbid.. p. 528.

321ibld., p. 419. 192

Not once did Welles mention the growing fragmentation of the

ABC-by November there were already four different factions in the party-or its internal disputes. It is very symptomatic that the first time the failure of a conciliation movement between the Revolutionary Government and the opposition was attributed "to reported declarations of General Menocal that he would accept no solution involving continuance of Grau as

Provisional President and divergent tendencies in ranks of the

ABC," it was done when Welles was absent, by Chargd d'Affairs

R e e d .322

To these and many other documentary proofs to this effect, it should be added as a final point, what supposedly took place on the S.S. American Legion, the ship that was taking the

American and Cuban delegations to the Montevideo Conference.

The Cuban delegation was formed by Angel Giraudy, Carlos Prio,

Juan A. Rubio Padilla, and Herminio Portell Vild. The author of this dissertation has interviewed three of the members of the Cuban delegation. The three men have assured the author that, on November 18, Cordell Hull, the chief of the American

Delegation and the Secretary of State of the United States, told them that in the next two days the government of the United

322rbid., p . 527. 193

States was going to recognize Grau's government for "they wanted to have that problem off their backs at the opening of the Conference." Later they learned that Welles had flown to the United States to convince the President not to do this.

The story seems very credible and receives certain support from the Foreign Documents of the United States.323

The attitude of Sumner Welles had a decisive effect in

Cuba. From the officers who revolted in October, to the Abe­ cedarios who failed in November, and the Menocalistas who were always threatening a revolution, they all had always been

323on November 27* Hull was asking by telegraph about "the controlling facts and conditions to date against recog­ nition of Grau San Martin." Welles was already in the United States talking with Roosevelt. The answer to his request was sent on November 28, it is worth citing it; We have maintained that the criteria of Cuban recognition are: 1) popular support, and 2) ability to maintain law and order.... The Embassy at Havana insists that these criteria have not been met. With regard to No. 1, Mr. Welles emphatically expressed to me his judgement that Grau does not have the confidence of the mass of the Cuban people but is supported by a minority bent upon remaining in power at all costs. With regard to No. 2, Mr. Welles believes that the Grau government can maintain order only by the most extreme and dictatorial methods, (although it appears to have strengthened itself by the suppression of the November 8th revolt, which has tended to discourage counter-revolutionary movements...." After receiving that message, Hull took the trouble to send another telegram denying that he had given an interview, which appeared in the press in Montevideo, in which he was quoted as being "in favor of recognizing the present government in Cuba...." Ibid., pp. 527-28. in close contact with the Ambassador. But they had all failed.

Against all expectations the Revolutionary Government was still

in power, still issuing decrees, still attempting to transform

the structure of Cuban society. It was then necessary to

search for other allies.

It is curious to note that the faction which was going to prove decisive in the struggle against Grau San Martin and his government, had been trying to reach an agreement with the Ambassador from the very beginning. As early as September

5, the very day of the revolt, Sergeant Batista, payed an urgent visit to Sumner Welles. He was the only member of the

Revolutionary Junta_who took that step. According to the Am­ bassador, "the purport of the visit was to ascertain what my attitude was toward the so-called revolutionary group."32^

But perhaps because he was still looking toward the former officers of the Army, the ABC, and the other political factions who had been involved in the Mediation, Sumner Welles did not attach too much importance to the visit.325

32*+lbid., p. 383.

325The indifference of Sumner Welles is more striking when one remembers that from Washington, Cordell Hull was insisting that "everything now revolves around the Army." Ibid., p. 389* 195

Batista, nevertheless, was willing to be insistent. On several occasions, he tried, to convince different members of the Revolutionary Government that '*it was necessary to reach an agreement with the American A m b a s s a d o r ,"326 ancj Yie always seemed worried by what the American thought.327

Having more talent and far more ambition than the rest of his fellow Sergeants, Fulgencio Batista realized immediately that he could not depend on his relations with the students or with Grau. He tried to reestablish contacts with the ABC and with Mendieta, political factions which he knew had the

Nihil Obstat of the American Ambassador, but he was rejected.

These political groups were still counting on a restoration of

Cdspedes or on a victory over all the forces that had pro­ duced the uprising of September. And Batista, willingly or not, was a. part of that movement. "The supporters of the

Mediation negotiations insisted that the only possible solution was for me to resign,” wrote Batista years later, "they re­ garded me as unacceptable because I was a newcomer who had climbed to supreme command.”328 gut then came the first

326jU]_to Cesar Fernandez, Yo Acuso a Batista (La Habana: Construyendo a Cuba, 19*4-0), p. 90.

32?Sergio Carbd, "Como y por culpa de qui£n cayd Grau San Martin," Bohemia (Marzo 25» 193*0 j 28-29*

328puigencio Batista, The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1964), p. 11. 196

significant failure of the counter-revolution, the battle of the National Hotel. The Sergeants had proved their force, and

Batista immediately paid another visit to the Ambassador.

This time he was received and heard, with much more attention.

He asked for advice again, received praise from the Ambassador for his anti-Communist and anti-radical stand, and confirmed his desire to find a solution for the Cuban situation through an agreement with Mendieta and the ABC. He left out Menocal

(possibly because Menocal had always been talking about his contacts in the Army) from any agreement and humbly asked the

Ambassador if he would let him see him frequently during the next few days in order to work out a solution.3^9 gu^ the

Ambassador was not yet quite convinced. However, he did end his report of that meeting stating: "The situation as regards my relations with Batista is, of course, anomalous... in the event of further disturbances which may endanger the lives and properties of Americans or foreigners in the Republic it seems to be essential that this relationship be maintained."330

After that interview, Batista continued his contacts with

Mendieta and with the Ambassador. The ABC appears to have been

329poreiP:n Relations..., 1933. V, 469-4?2.

33°Ibid., p. 472. 1 9 7

more reluctant to deal with him. On October 7> he was telling the Ambassador that he realized "that the present regime was a complete failure,"331 an^ proclaimed his support of Mendieta.

But by the beginning of November, the Student Directory was already aware of his maneuvers and had, as has already been explained, forced him to recant his counter-revolutionary sins.

In retirement in Columbia military barracks,^32 trying p0 reinforce his position among the military, Batista had to face the insurrection of the ABC. As no agreement had been reached with that organization and his position was not quite firm, the ex-Sergeant fought on the side of the Revolutionary

Government. As had happened before, after the apparent vic­ tory of the revolutionary forces, Batista sent his aide,

Captain Hernandez to visit the Ambassador. "It was plain," wrote Welles, "that Batista is very much exercised as to my own views concerning the present situation."333

After November, the Revolutionary Government moved toward a period of increasing radicalization. Guiteras was then

331-lbld.. p. 477.

3320atista would never venture from the barracks, after a threat on his life. He lived in fear of both the officers and some of the students who still wanted to kill him.

333Foreip;n Relations.... 1933. V, 523* 198

Secretary of Interior, the principal social and nationalistic laws were issued, and Alma Mater rightly proclaimed "we are beginning the decisive battle of the Revolution."33^ Further­ more, Guiteras was trying to erode the influence of Batista

in the Army and to replace him by revolutionary officers.335

But while the revolutionary forces were fighting inter­ nationally at the Montevideo C o n f e r e n c e ,33^ an^ nationally against the economic crisis and political opposition, the basis of their power was slipping away. The Student Directory had been dissolved, the attempt of Guiteras failed in the face of a united front of the new Colonels around Batista,337 3nd the approaching zafra (sugar crop) turned the non-recognition of the American Government into a cause of genuine alarm for many sectors of Cuba-hacendados, colonos, and, even, workers.

Many groups were now willing to accept any modification in the political situation if that modification could reopen the doors

33^Alma Mater, November 29* 1933j P*

335"La batalla de Guiteras," Gente (Marzo 12, 19^6), 20.

336por the events in Montevideo see, Herminio Portell Vild, "Cuba en Montevideo," Bohemia (January 6, 1935)* 3^-37; also Hubert Herring, "Pan-Americanism New Style," Harpers Monthly Magazine (May, 193^)> 683-69^.

337"La batalla de Guiteras," p. 21. 199

of the American market.338 This "intervention by inertia" was finally producing results. So sure was Welles that it was now just a matter of time, that he wrote on December 8,

In view of the possibility which seems more favorable today that a political crisis is in fact approaching, be­ cause of the serious issues involved in the questions af­ fecting the interests of the Cuban Electric Company and the Cuban Telephone Company and because of the general belief that labor disturbances on a large scale are impending, I have decided that it is inadvisable for me to make any definite plans at this moment for my r e t u r n . 339

Five days later, Sumner Welles departed for the United States.

On December 14, the group of students that was still loyal to Grau, made a final attempt to convince the American

Government to recognize Grau. They had a meeting with Chargd d'Affairs Matthews and they pleaded their case. Rubdn de Le<5n,

"expressed fanatically the determination of the students to con­ tinue fighting for the aims of the revolution, which means not only a change of leaders but a change of system," and also pointed out that the Revolutionary Government had been in power long enough to deserve recognition .3^® They believed that the departure of Sumner Welles represented a change of policy and

338ju]_^0 Cesar Fernandez, Yo Acuso a Batista, p. 91*

339Foreign Relations..., 1933. V, 536.

3^'Olbid., pp. 200 tried to convince the Chargd d*Affairs. Grau tried to do the same thing four days later, but Matthews went to the Palace simply to tell the President that Mr. Jefferson Cafferey,

Personal Representative of the President of the United States would arrive the next day.3^1 The revolutionary leaders very soon realized, at the first meetings with Cafferey, that nothing had changed.

On January 10, 193^» Cafferey was reporting: "I agree with former Ambassador Welles as to the inefficiency, ineptitude and unpopularity with all the better classes in the country of the de facto government."3^2 That same day, Colonel Batista, now in full control of the Army, asked Cafferey "what we wanted done for recognition."3^3

Both the Ambassador and Batista knew what was to be done.

On January 13, 193^* all the forces of opposition, the ABC,

Menocalistas, Nationalists, and many other groups representa­ tive of different political and non-political organizations, visited Batista and reached an agreement: Grau must go.-^^

3^1lbid., p. 543.

3^2;poreip;n Relations..., 193^. V, 95*

3^3lbid., p. 97.

3 ^Eduardo Chibds, "Los ultimos dias del gobierno rev- olucionario," Avance (February 12, 19^^), *+. 201

The so-called Revolutionary Junta supported Carlos Hevia,

Batista supported Mendieta, who was hesitating to the end.

On January 14, 193^» Batista delivered his ultimatum to

Grau and the following day, Ram<5n Grau San Martin turned over the Presidency to Carlos Hevia who lasted as President 48 hours.

On January 18, the candidate of Batista, Carlos Mendieta, was proclaimed President of the Republic.

On January 28, a vast multitude of Cubans went to the harbor to see the departure of Grau San Martin to Mexico.

The ex-President said, "Hasta la vista,” and the multitude sang the national anthem.3^5

The following day, an official telegram was received in the American Embassy at Havana: "Under authorization of the

President you will please extend immediately to the Government of Cuba on behalf of the United States a formal and cordial recognition."3^6

The revolutionary period had ended.

3^5lbid.. p. 5.

3^6Forelgn Relations..., 1934, V, 107. EPILOGUE

THE AFTERMATH

It would, not be exact to say that the period which fol­ lowed the revolutionary episode of 1933 was a period of counter­ revolution or reaction. No, Fulgencio Batista was intelligent enough to realize how popular and necessary revolutionary laws and ideas had become. He didn't want to push Cuba backwards.

If he had any hesitation about it, a general strike in March,

1935» which forced, his government to take harsh and bloody measures, reminded him of the still latent revolutionary cur­ rents. As a consequence of the strike, Guiteras and Enrique

Fernandez were killed, but the most important body of the rev­ olutionaries organized themselves into a political party: El'

Partido Revolucionario Cubano Aut^ntico-popularl.y known as the

"Autenticos,,-under the guidance of Ramdn Grau San Martin.

Batista swiftly moved toward reforms and civil rule. On Sep­ tember 4, 1936, he spoke in the military barracks of Columbia

202 203

of "Social transformation as a work of art" (I).3*7

In 1938, the Communist Party was given legal recognition.

In 1939> with the Autenticos back as a political party, elec­

tions for a Constitutent Assembly were held. The following year the Constitution was proclaimed and Batista was legally elected President of the Republic. All of the decrees of the revolutionary period and many other social ideas were incor­ porated into the Constitution.

In 19^» Batista held honest elections and Grau San Martin became President of the Republic. The Autenticos were back

in power merely because of their past record during the rev­ olutionary period. By then, Cuba had been transforming herself quickly. The "colonos" now had a powerful national Association,

so had the "hacendados"; labor organizations had merged into a vast national organism, the C.T.C., with full legal protec­ tion. The Cuban economy had recovered rapidly. The price of sugar was high again and the commercial treaties with the United

States assured prosperity. In 1933> the sugar production was less than 2,000,000 tons; in 1952, the production reached a record of almost 8,000,000 t o n s .3^8 s t i l l more important, na-

3^7Fulgencio Batista, Revolucidn Social o Polltica Re- formlsta (Habana: Prensa Indoamericana, 194^), pT 53•

3i+8Anuaric> Azucarero (Habana: Editorial Lex, 1953)> P* 82. 204-

tionalism revived by the national forces in 1933 was gaining momentum: Cubans were rapidly and silently recovering their control in the sugar and banking spheres. The Cuban share of the sugar production rose from 22$ in 1939 to 56% in 1953* De­ posits held by Cuban banks rose from 16.8$ of the total deposits in 1 9 3 9, to 6 0 .2$ in 1950.

The Platt Amendment had disappeared in 1934.

Yes, the revolutionary momentum of 1933 was not stopped or pushed back by Batista and his henchmen. But something was lost in the process. The nationalistic "fanaticism" of

Rubdn de Ledn, the courage and decision of Antonio Guiteras, the possibility of carrying out a revolutionary program without military intervention or without the necessity of continuous political transactions had been lost. From 1933 to 194-8, Cuba had, instead of a Revolution a pseudo-Revolution. It was much more than many other Latin American countries, but maybe it was not enough.

Even recognizing that the game of "if" is a dangerous game for any historian, it is difficult not to listen with a sort of melancholy to what Ezequiel Ramirez Novoa wrote in i960: "if

34-9lnvestment in Cuba, p. 10. 205

the United States, in 1933> had respected the decision of the

Cuban people, the process of independence would have been freely

carried out, and there would have been no need for the sacrifice

which the present generation of Cubans have had to make."350

Maybe so. Maybe if the Right would not have frustrated

the Revolution of 1933» the Left would not have been able to

frustrate that of 1959* Both revolutions are very much linked.

But both stand, at least in the opinion of the author of this dissertation, as distortion of a national struggle. Anyhow

the comparison between both episodes and the study of their relation is quite another story. Our task ends with the melan­ choly and prophetic nHasta la vista" which Grau San Martin

shouted to a vast multitude of Cubans at Havana harbor, on

January 20, 193^•

350EZequiel Ramirez Novoa, Historia de una Gran Epopeya: Cuba y el imperialismo Yankee (Lima: Ediciones 28 de Julio, I9 6 0), p. 108. CONCLUSIONS

As was stated in the Introduction, this dissertation

is an attempt to demonstrate that in 19 3 3» twenty-five years before Castro's triumph, Cuba had already passed through a

significant revolutionary period from which she emerged deeply and radically transformed. Relative to this assertion, an analysis of the events of 1933 should demonstrate the following

conclusions.

A) The Movement of 1933 Can Be Characterized As A Revolu­ tionary Movement

Considering how difficult it is to define the term

"revolution," and even more so in Latin America where every

form of political unrest is labeled as "revolutionary," this

term will be limited here to its more general concept as a violent and popular movement aimed against a government or a

political system, with the intention of radically transforming

its social bases. It is possible to point out what can be

20 5a 205t

considered the essential elements of a revolutionary phe­ nomenon: 1) violence; 2) intervention of large segments of the population; 3) radical programs; and 4) fundamental changes in the economical and political structure of the society. To some degree, all these factors can be found, in the Cuban episode of 1933*

1) Violence. As has been seen, sporadic political violence appeared in Cuba as early as 1925-26, with the assas­ sination of the first journalists who opposed Machado's gov­ ernment. After the bloody affair in the town of Artemisa (1931) » the political struggle became more and more a violent fight, reaching its peak in 1933 with continuous terrorism in the cities and the appearance of some guerrilla warfare in the countryside.

2) Intervention of large segments of the population. In

1927, the opposition against Machado was limited to small political groups and some student organizations. After the crash of 1929» with the desperate economic conditions prevailing, opposition to the government grew daily until, by 1933» it undoubtedly represented the majority of the Cuban people.

From the old political leaders of Unidn Nacionalista, to the

Communist Party, from the Student Directory, to the middle class organization of the ABC, in 1933» every important sector of 20fS c

Cuban society was represented by some type of political or­ ganization which was fighting against the dictatorship. To prove this point it should be enough to remember that Machado's regime was finally toppled by a general strike which paralysed the entire nation, a general strike which comprised workers, professionals, public employees and businessmen.

3) Radical programs. The increasing rsdicalization of the political struggle in Cuba is a phenomenon that can be traced back at least to 1923j when the Protest of the Thirteen explicitly proclaimed that the new generation was fighting

"not against Zayas, but against the entire system of political corruption which had made it possible for Zayas to be President of the Republic." The "old guard" was still dreaming of a return to the Constitution of 1901, but, as has been seen, the

"old guard" was, for all practical purposes, eliminated from a position of leadership in 1931* After that date new political groups took the initiative under the standard of fresh and more radical political pngrams. The sober analysis of the ABC, the extremism of the Student Left Wing, the international approach of the Communists, proclaiming the necessity of

"soviets" in Cuba, and the program of the Student Directory all had one thing in common, the fight was not against Machado but against everything which Machado represented: political 20f5d

corruption, American domination, exploitation of Cuba by foreign interests, and the necessity for basic social and economic transformation in Cuba.

Further, the presence and influence in Cuba of the

Argentine Josd Arce, the Peruvian Victor Radi Haya de la Torre, and the Mexican Josd Vasconcelos, among many others, shows how the new Cuban generation felt itself linked with the revolutionary spirit which was shaking Latin America at the time.

k) Fundamental changes in the economic and political structure of the society. That these programs were more than political rhetoric, but rather expressions of a general desire for transformation, can be measured by the impact of the laws and spirit of the revolutionary government of Grau San Martin.

An enumeration of some of the most significant changes which occurred in that brief but radical period show the legacy of the Grau government.

Of the three political parties which had existed prior to the revolution, Popular, Conservative, and Liberal, only the Liberal party reappeared in Cuba in 1937» to live a rather precarious life until 1959* The entire officer corps of the Army was expelled and a new one established. The

Constitution of 1901 was abolished and the Congress dissolved. 20.5'e

More than half of the members of the judicial branch of the government, including all but one of the members of the

Supreme Court, were purged, as vie re many of the University professors.

On the positive side,- the vast scope of the revolutionary laws brought about the emergence of the first national labor organization (CTC) which was to become the most important labor power in Cuba. The ColonosI and Hacendados Associations developed, in the forties and fifties, into the basic economic forces in Cuba. University autonomy, free education for poor students, woman's suffrage, professional associations, abolition of latifundio, and the first attempts at agrarian reform were also some of the results of the legislative action of 1933*

All of them were later incorporated into the Constitution of

19^0. And last but not least, from the convulsion of 1933 a political party was born, the Autenticos. This first real popular party to appear in republican Cuba held power from

19^8 to 1952 guided by the same leaders of 1933*

B) The Revolution of 1933 Was A Frustrated Revolution

In spite of all of its positive achievements and its revolutionary momentum, the abrupt collapse of the government of 1933 represented a setback for the plans and programs of the new generation. It is true, as was stated earlier in 205f

the dissertation, that the period that followed oannot be termed counter-revolutionary, but it was not revolutionary either. Using the same themes and the same slogans as the revolutionary groups, many of the old pre-Machado forces managed to reassert themselves. And when the revolutionary leaders of 1933 returned to power in 19^ » for reasons that are beyond the scope of this dissertation, they failed to recover the lost momentum. After 19^> a general feeling of frustration and disillusion grew throughout many of the best Cuban sectors.

It is relevant, then, to point out two of the basic frustrations of the revolutionary movement of 1933*

First of all, militarism. The necessity of forming an alliance with the Sergeants’ revolt weakened the revolutionary forces from the beginning. The alliance was broken in January

193k, vrith the victory of the army over the students. The basic result was that a revolution carried out with the support of the army against a civilian dictator, Machado, produced a military dictator, Batista., and the rise to power of the armed forces, who would rule Cuba from 193^ to 19^1-» and again return Batista to power in 1952.

Second, corruption in the ma.nipulation of public funds.

From the first political platform of Machado, to the demands of the Student Directory in 1933> the word "regeneration" and 20'5g

the desire for honesty among public servants was a common objective of Cubans in the entire period. The triumph of

Batista and his ability to bribe and corrupt friend and foe alike, initiated a new era of dishonesty in the Cuban gov­ ernment. When the Autenticos returned to power in 19^>. either the state machinery ran too smoothly or the temptation were too great, but they relinquished their old dreams and folloxtfed Batista's example. The Autenticos rule gave birth to an herculean capacity for illegal manipulation of public funds. The- old dream of morality and regeneration, of honesty and integrity in the government, dissolved into an era of unprecedented, immorality. The hope of 1933 remained ' a hope of the Cuban people, waiting for a new individual in whom to deposit their frustrated confidence.

The revolution of 1933 transformed many things in Cuba, promoted economic recovery, widened the political role of the middle class and of the workers, created a new healthy feelin of nationalism. But, its frustration left, many problems un­ solved, many dreams shattered, and, consequently, opened the door for a new revolutionary attempt. In 1958, the Cuban people were fighting, once more, against a corrupt military dictatorship which was basically rooted in the most negative elements of 1933* BIBLIOGRAPHY

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PERIODICALS

Abril Amores, Eduardo. "Ahora o nunca Coronelf," Dlario de Cuba (June 28, 192*0.

Adan y Silva, Ricardo. "Las conspiraciones en el ejercito durante la tirania," Bohemia., XXVI (August 26, 193*0*

Alvarez, Aurelio. "Mendieta: La Estafa. de la Revoluci6n," Bohemia (September 30, 193*0*

"La batalla de Guiteras," Gente (Marzo 12, 19*1-6) .

Batista, Fulgencio. "Los Soldad.os y el Cuatro de Septiembre," Bohemia, XXVI (August 26, 193*0*

Carbd, Sergio. "Cdmo y por culpa de quidn cayd Grau San Martin," Bohemia (Marzo 25» 193*0*

Chibas, Eduardo. "Cdmo cayd la Pentarquia," Bohemia (May 12, 19*1*0*

______. "Hacia ddnde va Cuba?," Bohemia, XXXI (August 26, 193**')*

______. "Los Ultlmos Dias del Gobierno Revolucionario," Avance [February 12, 19*1*0 •

"El Comite Conjunto de las Corporactiones Econdmicas expresa sus orientaciones," El Mundo (September 18, 1933)*

"The Communist Party and the Cuban Revolutionary Situation," The Communist (New York), XIII, No. 9 (September, 193*0*

"C<5mo se fundd el Partido Comunista de Cuba," Hoy (May 1, 19*1-3) • (Special issue.) 214

Despaigne, Ricardo. "Jornadas Obreras," Traba.jo (September, 193*0-

Eguilior, Ricardo. "Los Nuevos Proyectos," Diario de Cuba (June 26, 1925).

Fernandez, Wifredo. "El Gabinete de la Honestidad," Cuba Polltica, No. 3 (February, 1925).

. "Los Nuevos Horizontes," Heraldo de Cuba (December 9j 1925).

Ferrara, Orestes. "La Misidn de Welles," Polltica, V (March, 1942).

Ferrer, Horacio. "Los Ultimos Dias de Machado," Trimestre, I (January-March, 1945).

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Grau San Martin, Ramdn. "El Nacionalismo 'Autentico' y sus Leyes," Bohemia, XXVI (August 26, 193*0*

Guas Incldn, Rafael. "Recuerdos politicos," Avance (November 25, 194-3).

Guiteras, Antonio. "Septembrismo," Bohemia (April 1, 193*0 •

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Hackett, Charles W. "Cuba's Unconstitutional President," Current History (July, 1931)•

______. "Guerrilla Warfare in Cuba," Current History (July, 1933). Herring, Hubert. "Can Cuba Save Herself?," Current History (November, 1933)*

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Le6n, Bubdn de. MLa. crisis del Gobierno del Grau San Martin," Bohemia (March 25, 193*+).

______. "El cuartelazo del 15 de enero. La renucia de Cuba," Bohemia (March 18, 193*0*

______. "Nuestra tarea," Alma Mater (October 22, 1933)*

Machado y Morales, Gerardo. "Fugitive Tells His Own Story," New York Post (May 22-26, 1933)•

Manach, Jorge. "El A.B.C. y la Crisis del Gabinete," Bohemia (July 1, 193*0*

______. "Respuesta a una Encuesta," El Mundo (October 2, 1933)*

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Mella., Julio Antonio. "La Agitacidn Universitaria de la Habana," Juventud, No. 6 (Junio, 1925).

Morell Romero, Josd. "La Universidad y la Revoluci6n," Futuro, IV (August, 1935).

Perez de la Riva, J. "Cuba y el Imperialismo Yanqui," Revlsta Bimestre Cubana (May-June, 193*+) *

Portell Vild, Herminio. "Cuba en Montevideo," Bohemia (January 6, 1935).

Porter, Russell B. "Cuba Under President Machado," Current History (April, 1933).

Pratt, Julius V/. "American Business and the Spanish American War," Hispanic-American Review, XIV (May, 193*+)*

Quintana, Jorge. "Iconografla. de Antonio Guiteras," Bohemia (May 18, 19*+7) .

Raggi, Carlos. "El Derecho de Tanteo," Legislacidn Cubana, III (March, 1935). 216

Revista Parlamentaria de Cuba, Ano III, No. 28 (July, 1924) to A?To VII (March-April, 192?).

Rivero, Josd I. "Impresiones," Diario de la Marina (May 20, 1928).

Rubio Padilla, Juan Antonio. "Cc&no fud nombrado el Dr. Ramdn Grau San Martin," Bohemia (July 12, 1942).

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"Un Mitin de la Liga Anti-Imperialista en Manzanillo," El Mundo (September 18, 1933).

NEWSPAPERS

The newspapers listed beloxv were surveyed for a period of several years. For specific references to dates and pages see the footnotes. Signed articles are included in the Period! cal section of the Bibliography.

Alma Mater

Diario de las Americas

Diario de Cuba

Diario de la Marina

El Dia

El Heraldo de Cuba

El Mundo

El Pals

Excelsior 217

Hoy

La Prensa

La Semana

Masas

New York Post

Times of Cuba

INTERVIEWS

Carbd, Sergio. Miami, Florida. November 20, 1964.

Carrillo, Justo. Washington, D.C. February 12, 1965*

Lliteras, Dr. Juan. Washington, D.C. February 22, 1964.

Martinez, Carlos. Washington, D.C. January 18, 1967.

Mujal, Eusebio., Washington, D.C. February 2-3, 1963-

Obregon, Jos€ Emilio. New JTork. October 24, 1965*

Pazos, Felipe. Washington, D.C. February 12, 1965*

Pend£s Porfirio. Washington, D.C. May 12, 1967*

Prio Socarras, Carlos. Washington, D.C. July 22-23, 1965*

Rubio Padilla, Jos£ Antonio. Washington, D.C. July 22-23, 1965*

Silverio, Nicasio. Washington, D.C. February 24, 1966.

Vilar, Cesar. Habana., Cuba. July 6, 1959*

OTHER SOURCES

Collection of Dr. Jorge Beruff containing the private letters of Colonel Carlos Mendieta. 218

Department of State papers. National Archives. Washington, D.C.

Letters of Dr. Martinez Saenz to the author, January 25 and February 16, 1965*

Unpublished order, Number 824 of General Maceo. June, I896. In the personal files of the author.