Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina Lee J. Alston Andrés A. Gallo Professor of Economics Department of Economics Director, Program on Environment and Society University of North Florida University of Colorado Coggin College of Business, Room 3404 Research Associate, NBER e-mail:
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[email protected] April 2007 For comments and support on earlier drafts we thank A. Leticia Arroyo-Abad, Blanca Sánchez-Alonso, Vanessa Baird, Dan Bogart, Michael Bordo, John Drobak, Bertrand Du Marais, Alan Dye, Samuel Fitch, Wolfgang Keller, John Londregan, Gary Libecap, Joseph Love, Geraldo Munck, Larry Neal, Douglass North, Leandro de la Escosura Prados, Sebastian Saeigh, Mary Shirley, Carol Shiue, Pablo Spiller, Sven Steinmo, Thomas Ulen, Werner Baer and seminar participants at the University of California, University of Colorado, University of Illinois, University of Paris X, and the NBER. We also received valuable feedback from participants at the 2004 meetings of the New Institutional Economics. 2 Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina Abstract The future looked bright for Argentina in the early twentieth century. It achieved high levels of income per capita and was moving away from authoritarian government, towards a true democracy, with a system of checks and balances. Unfortunately, Argentina never finished the transition. The turning point away from the road towards checks and balances occurred in the 1930s. To stay in power in the 1930s, the Conservatives in the Pampas resorted to electoral fraud, which neither the legislative, executive, or judicial branches checked.