THE CASE of the ARGENTINE SENATE By
FEDERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS: THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINE SENATE by Hirokazu Kikuchi LL.B. in Political Science, Keio University, 2001 LL.M. in Political Science, Keio University, 2003 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2012 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Hirokazu Kikuchi It was defended on November 2, 2012 and approved by Ernesto F. Calvo, Associate Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland Scott Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University Dissertation Advisor: Aníbal S. Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science ii Copyright © by Hirokazu Kikuchi 2012 iii FEDERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS: THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINE SENATE Hirokazu Kikuchi, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2012 Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? Many studies of federal countries have regarded governors as national veto players even though they do not have such a constitutional status. However, the statistical tests of comparative legislative studies and those of comparative federalism have not succeeded in showing gubernatorial effects on a national political arena. In this dissertation, I study the conditions under which governors can be national veto players by focusing on the treatment of presidential bills between 1983 and 2007 in the Argentine Senate. The dissertation shows that the Senate serves as an arena for subnational governments to influence national politics.
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