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The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’. IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES No. 5 TECHNICAL GUIDANCE IDENTIFICATION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AND DEVICES REFERENCE MANUAL INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, 2007 COPYRIGHT NOTICE All IAEA scientific and technical publications are protected by the terms of the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952 (Berne) and as revised in 1972 (Paris). The copyright has since been extended by the World Intellectual Property Organization (Geneva) to include electronic and virtual intellectual property. Permission to use whole or parts of texts contained in IAEA publications in printed or electronic form must be obtained and is usually subject to royalty agreements. Proposals for non-commercial reproductions and translations are welcomed and considered on a case-by-case basis. Enquiries should be addressed to the IAEA Publishing Section at: Sales and Promotion, Publishing Section International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramer Strasse 5 P. O. B o x 1 0 0 1400 Vienna, Austria fax: +43 1 2600 29302 tel.: +43 1 2600 22417 email: [email protected] http://www.iaea.org/books © IAEA, 2007 Printed by the IAEA in Austria September 2007 STI/PUB/1278 IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Identification of radioactive sources and devices : technical guidance, reference manual. – Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 2006. p. ; 24 cm. – (IAEA nuclear security series, ISSN 1816–9317 ; no. 5) STI/PUB/1278 ISBN 92–0–111406–0 Includes bibliographical references. 1. Radioactive substances. 2. Radioactive substances — Transpor- tation. I. International Atomic Energy Agency. II. Series. IAEAL 06–00469 FOREWORD In response to a resolution by the IAEA General Conference in September 2002, the IAEA has adopted an integrated approach to protection against nuclear terrorism. This approach coordinates IAEA activities concerned with the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, nuclear material accountancy, detection and response to trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, the security of radioactive sources, the security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material, emergency response and emergency preparedness measures in Member States and at the IAEA, and the promotion of adherence by States to relevant international instruments. The IAEA also helps to identify threats and vulnerabilities related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. However, it is the responsibility of States to provide for the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and the associated facilities, to ensure the security of such material in transport, and to combat illicit trafficking and the inadvertent movement of radioactive material. Early in the nuclear age, radiation for research and application came from naturally radioactive material. Radium and radium-beryllium mixtures, encapsulated for safe and easy handling, provided sources for gamma rays and neutrons. Such sources had numerous widespread applications and their use grew rapidly. Control procedures gradually improved, but physical protection remained weak, and inventory information was irregular and incomplete. The subsequent development of nuclear reactors led to stronger sources, a greater diversity of sources and applications, and an overall increase in use. Expanded use was, unfortunately, accompanied by a number of accidents, injuries and fatalities. This trend, and a particularly severe accident in 1987, prompted the IAEA to begin a programme to provide information and, in the case of radium sources, direct assistance in controlling and conditioning sources. Since 1999, the IAEA has been implementing the Action Plan on the Safety of Radioactive Sources and Security of Radioactive Material. This has led to the adoption of a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources to reduce the threat of legitimately used radioactive sources being diverted or misappropriated for malicious use and to enhance the safe use and control of sources in legitimate use. The IAEA is involved in assisting its Member States with implementing the Code of Conduct, together with other initiatives, such as the development of an Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), assistance in the life cycle management of radioactive sources, promotion of safe work practices, and enhanced security during use, transport and storage.
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