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Public Transcript of the Hearing Held on 26 March 2015 in the Case Of 20150326_STL-11-01_T_T136_OFF_PUB_EN 1/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Procedural Matters (Open Session) Page 1 1 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Badreddine, Merhi, 3 Oneissi, and Sabra 4 STL-11-01 5 Presiding Judge David Re, Judge Janet Nosworthy, 6 Judge Micheline Braidy, Judge Walid Akoum, and 7 Judge Nicola Lettieri - [Trial Chamber] 8 Thursday, 26 March 2015 - [Trial Hearing] 9 [Open Session] 10 [The witness takes the stand] 11 --- Upon commencing at 10.05 a.m. 12 THE REGISTRAR: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is sitting in an 13 open session in the case of the Prosecutor versus Ayyash, Badreddine, 14 Merhi, Oneissi, and Sabra, case number STL-11-01. 15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Good morning to you, Mr. Siniora. We hope 16 that you are refreshed. 17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. 18 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: We, of course, note you're kind offer to 19 keep sitting yesterday, which, I think, showed you have the energy of a 20 man one-third of your age, but we couldn't go on yesterday. So we'll go 21 as far as we can with your evidence today. 22 The appearances today are Mr. Cameron for the Prosecution. For 23 the Legal Representatives of the Victims, we have Mr. Mattar and 24 Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra. Mr. Aoun is for Mr. Ayyash. Mr. Korkmaz, who 25 is continuing with his questioning, is for Mr. Badreddine. Thursday, 26 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150326_STL-11-01_T_T136_OFF_PUB_EN 2/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 2 Cross-examination by Mr. Korkmaz (Continued) 1 Mr. Larochelle for Mr. Oneissi. Mr. Roberts for Mr. Sabra. Mr. Khalil - 2 good morning - for Mr. Merhi. And we have one representative of the 3 Defence Office here. 4 Mr. Korkmaz, you've had, like Mr. Siniora, overnight to reflect 5 upon a number of things including where we're up to and how many 6 questions you think you still have left. 7 Can you give us a little progress report? 8 MR. KORKMAZ: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. Good 9 morning to all in the courtroom. 10 Good morning, Witness. 11 The team and myself have discussed this situation. We do not 12 think that we can reduce our cross-examination to less than two days. In 13 fact, we need two days at a minimum. 14 Regarding the number of questions, we are going to try to keep 15 them to as small a number as possible, but there are a large number of 16 items which we would like to have clarified and would like to take 17 advantage of the presence of the prime minister to do so. 18 WITNESS: FOUAD SINIORA [Resumed] 19 [Witness answered through interpreter] 20 Cross-examination by Mr. Korkmaz [Continued] 21 Q. [Interpretation] Very good. Good morning. 22 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: You've heard the good news, Mr. Siniora. 23 Just one observation: Of course, the shorter the questions and 24 the shorter the answer, the shorter the time we spend here, may I say. 25 MR. KORKMAZ: [Interpretation] Very good. Thursday, 26 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150326_STL-11-01_T_T136_OFF_PUB_EN 3/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 3 Cross-examination by Mr. Korkmaz (Continued) 1 Q. Prime Minister, yesterday we were discussing the extension of the 2 president's tenure, President Lahoud. I would like to put a little 3 question to you. Did Mr. Hariri bring you into his confidence as regards 4 his negotiations with the Syrians regarding Mr. Lahoud? 5 A. I don't really understand whether you're talking about 6 negotiations with President Lahoud? Do you mean regarding the extension 7 of the term? I do not think that there were negotiations with 8 President Lahoud, and therefore I do not know. I do not know anything 9 about this. As for the Syrians, it was within the limits that I referred 10 to earlier on. 11 Q. What do you mean by that? 12 A. I've already said everything I know on more than one occasion 13 during my presence here. I am not aware that there were any negotiations 14 with President Lahoud. As for the Syrians, this is what I heard from him 15 and I have told you about it. I have said everything I know. And 16 therefore, if he was trying later on to find a solution to form a cabinet 17 and the -- his efforts were not fruitful and what happened had happened. 18 Q. Do you agree with me that those negotiations were largely based 19 on a battle of force between the parties? In terms of the extension of 20 the tenure, was Rafik Hariri requesting greater influence in the 21 formation of the government in exchange for agreement? 22 A. This is what I mentioned and what I said. After the cabinet 23 meeting during which the extension has been decided, there was a 24 discussion between him and between a Syrian representative, I do not know 25 who it was but I think it was Rustom Ghazaleh, and on that basis it was Thursday, 26 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150326_STL-11-01_T_T136_OFF_PUB_EN 4/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 4 Cross-examination by Mr. Korkmaz (Continued) 1 decided or it was said that there will be a new Lahoud. And as I already 2 mentioned, it turned out that this was not true. 3 Q. Yes, indeed. As you just said now and as you said yesterday, 4 each time there was a standoff, Mr. Hariri discussed directly with 5 Mr. Ghazaleh to smooth out the confrontation; is that correct? 6 A. That's right. The Syrians were -- the Syrian regime was playing 7 the role of -- on the one hand and in my assessment, they were trying to 8 keep the two parties apart; and at the same time, they were trying to 9 achieve a rapprochement between the two. So it's as if they were 10 contributing to igniting the fire and at the same time they were offering 11 their services to put out the fire. 12 Q. Are you aware of the answer given by Mr. Ghazaleh at that time, 13 his response to the favour or the request for Mr. Hariri? Did 14 Mr. Ghazaleh not ask him to intervene with the media and his politicians 15 to reduce the criticism of Mr. Lahoud? 16 A. I do not have any specific information regarding the details of 17 every meeting, what happened, what was requested. I don't have any 18 information. I have some information, generic ones, but there were 19 continuous attempts on behalf of Mr. Rustom Ghazaleh to try to -- he was 20 playing the role that was played by any foreign regime and foreign forces 21 in the country in order to make sure that he would still have a role. 22 This is why he was always trying to keep the parties apart and at the 23 same time he was playing the role of the mediator. 24 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Korkmaz, I'd just ask for a 25 clarification. Can you just clarify the time-period for the transcript Thursday, 26 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150326_STL-11-01_T_T136_OFF_PUB_EN 5/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 5 Cross-examination by Mr. Korkmaz (Continued) 1 in which you are asking the questions and the witness is answering? Can 2 you give us a range of dates for the period you're referring to? 3 MR. KORKMAZ: [Interpretation] The period to which I'm referring 4 is the period at which the extension of Mr. Lahoud's tenure was at play, 5 so 2004. 6 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Okay. Do you mean the entirety of 2004 up 7 till when the Parliament voted on the extension? 8 MR. KORKMAZ: [Interpretation] Well, I would say that there was a 9 background, a context, the questions which I am putting are in relation 10 to the relations between Mr. Hariri and the Syrian regime. In general, 11 my question refers to that general context, but I'm also looking 12 particularly at the period of 2004/2005, the period of extension of the 13 mandate and then the extension of President Lahoud's tenure. 14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Just so that we can be clear, Mr. Siniora, 15 were you understanding Mr. Korkmaz's questions to be directed to you in 16 the period in 2004 up until Mr. Lahoud's extension was voted on by 17 Parliament and then perhaps afterwards? 18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. 19 MR. KORKMAZ: [Interpretation] Thank you. 20 Q. Now, specifically on the matter of information which you had then 21 or may have had, I'd like to know whether you were aware of the position 22 of the Hezbollah leaders on this matter in autumn 2004? For example, did 23 you know - and this is simply to assist you in providing a precise 24 answer - were you aware that Hezbollah, allies of Syria and 25 President Lahoud, was in support of Mr. Hariri's position? Thursday, 26 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication.
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