The Political Vision of the Association) in Lebanon 2010

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The Political Vision of the Association) in Lebanon 2010 Appendix The Political Vision of the A L- JAMA’A AL- ISLAMIYAH (Islamic Association) in Lebanon 2010 In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful Thanks to almighty God, and prayer and peace be upon all God’s prophets, upon the seal of prophets, our master Muhammad, and upon all his com- panions. Thereafter: al- Jama’a al- Islamiyah in Lebanon is a reformist, ideo- logical, and Islamic movement whose objective is satisfying almighty God and accomplishing the total meaning of worship in the life of the individual and society. Al- Jama’a al- Islamiyah upholds national co- existence with non- Muslims within Islamic law safeguards, and cooperates with all citizens in order to achieve social justice and to protect human rights and his/her free- doms. Al- Jama’a operates in its Da’wa [call to Islam] within Lebanon’s reality and through legitimate means. It seeks to reform, among other things, the moral, economic, and political conditions so that they could become more harmonious with Islamic principles, which, we see, realize the interests of society. General Departing Points Political activism is an undivided part of the program of the Islamic Association. It is similar to all other areas of activisms, be they cultural, physical, societal, or propagational, which cover the life and needs of people in their religion and world. From this departing point, political activism is the ref lection of the think- ing and program of the Association, which works to achieve. Political activism is neither a sheer reaction nor an acquiescence to the political reality in which we live. This necessitates that activism should rely on a clear vision of the intellectual tenets that govern all aspects of al- Jama’a’s activism, including political activism. Moreover, a reading of the environment in which we operate and the transfor- mations this environment goes through at certain times is necessary to enhance the level of harmony and understanding between the people and supporters of the Islamic Association, and the rest of citizens. 154 Appendix The Islamic Associations has identified general objectives, for which it works hard to accomplish. They are the following: 1. To build 1 the Muslim individual who adheres to Islamic safeguards, and who is able to co- exist with others and to contribute to the building of his/her future nation on the basis of justice and respect of human rights and his/her freedoms. 2. To propagate the call [Da’wa] to Islam to all citizens in a clear and pure way, whereby it is connected to the modern world and its problems and the future and its requirements. The call is based on persuasion and rejection of compulsion.2 It seeks to maintain the principles and rulings of Islam, which came to delight humanity and to reject sectarian, denominational, and racial discrimination and all aspects of oppression. 3. To contribute to the opening up of the Islamic society to all segments of civil society in Lebanon; to consider dialogue and cooperation as the foundation of the relationship among all Lebanese groups; and to specify the common ground that would help create a bonded society, whose institutions would serve all citizens in a just, equitable, and meritorious way. 4. To positively participate in all civil society organizations with the objective of reforming and strengthening them alongside the institutions of the state, whose work cannot be rectified without the presence of effective civil society organizations. 5. To participate in political activism within the safeguards of Islamic law. This is done through: a) presenting a political Islamic vanguard capable of guiding the Muslims to the path that gratifies God and protect the dignity and interests of all citizens. b) striving to reinforce national co- existence so as to ensure the creation of a just state without assailing the specificities and rights of the sects. c) requesting the guaranteeing of the freedom of political activism for all Lebanese, and affirming the principle of peaceful exchange of power by the way of honest and free elections. d) seeking to abolish political sectarianism and liberating the institutions of the state from the shackles of political sectarianism so that they could serve all Lebanese citizens without discrimination. e) calling for political and administrative reforms, which would ensure the societal and economic livelihood and interests of citizens, stop waste, and abolish corruption in public sectors. f) working on developing Lebanese legislations so that they could conform with Islamic laws, considering that, from our standpoint, they fulfill the interests of all Lebanese and ensure justice among them. g) adopting al- Da’wa (call to Islam) as a pan-Arab coalescence, in much the same way as the European Union and other international gatherings, con- sidering that unity is a means to achieve the aspirations of the Ummah (community of believers), to perform its message, and safeguard its stance in the international arena. Appendix 155 h) rejecting the recognition of the Zionist entity [Israel], confronting all aspects of normalization, and considering resistance as the ideal solution to liberate the raped lands. Building on the aforementioned, and on the basis of current developments in the Lebanese polity, we identify the political vision of al- Jama’a as follows: First: The Political Regime in Lebanon Lebanon enjoys a democratic political regime that allows political pluralism across wide areas of freedoms, distinguishing Lebanon’s regime from most regimes in the region. The most salient factor for this distinction is the nature of the sectarian, demographic Lebanese arrangement that makes all constituencies- on their own-minorities incapable of individually appropriating power. But this partial, positive description does not negate the presence of many gaps and multiple flaws, which constantly shook the domestic milieu and sub- jected it to tribulations that almost brought down the Lebanese structure from its foundation. Moreover, these gaps and flaws, until today, limit the capacity of the Lebanese regime to develop and move toward real reform in all areas. In addition to ending the civil war, the Taif Accord has contributed to intro- ducing fundamental improvements to Lebanon’s political regime. However, fun- damental parts of this Accord, which became part of the constitution, have not been implemented, thereby impeding the path of political reform that could have reinforced and fortified the domestic milieu against any violent repercussions. Therefore, we see the priorities that cannot be deferred are about moving ahead in implementing the articles of the Accord, in particular creating a national com- mittee to abolish political sectarianism, establishing a modern electoral system that relies on proportional representation, instituting administrative decentral- ization, and upholding the right of all areas to balanced development. Second: Implementing Shari’a (Islamic Law) Lebanon is composed of nineteen recognized sects. It is intuitive that no sect can impose on another its vision, ideology, or laws. Our religion prohibits imposing on the people what they don’t want. The holy Koran states clearly that there is “no compulsion in religion” (Koran 2:256). And religion in the perception of Islam is not sheer creed and worship; but it is holistic since it covers all kinds of legislations for the individual and society. However, this pluralism should not lead to the violation of our freedom by believing as we wish, expressing our thoughts within the limits of society’s order and security, and calling on people [to do] what we see make them happy. These freedoms are bestowed on the human being by almighty God, and this is the special feature of this era, which has been consecrated by the charter of the United Nations. This feature affirms our right in calling for legislations and rules conforming with the rulings of Islamic law, for, on the one hand, it is part of our religion. And, on the other hand, it is our belief that Islamic law 156 Appendix realizes the best structure for societal life among people of different creeds\ religious denominations without discrimination. Correspondingly, we base our Da’wa on the method of dialogue and persuasion, far from imposition and compulsion.3 Third: National Co-Existence Almighty God granted reason to the human being, and He gave him/her the blessing of freedom and free will. He made the duty of human being in this life the worship of God, and his/her mission the building of the earth. On account of this, God created him/her (It is He who has produced you from the earth and settled you therein, Surat Hud, Verse 61); He commanded you to build the earth. Muslims and non- Muslims participate in this mission, for they all live on one earth. In spite of all kinds of disagreements, their fate is co-existence so that they can carry out the mission conferred up on them. If there is a choice for us in Lebanon, it is to put for this national co- existence solid foundations, with which everyone will be at ease. Otherwise, we neglect this and we become from time to time target of civil strife and internal struggles, consuming everybody’s capacity and furthering our backwardness from the civi- lization of humanity. In our perception, the foundations of national co- existence are four: 1) Respecting and recognizing the other and dealing with him/her: This for us, we Muslims, is a legal matter, covering religious and political dif- ference, according to the contemporary division. Almighty God has allowed the human being the freedom of choice between faith and disbe- lief. Moreover, He did not prevent the infidel from what was given to the believer. However, He showed the infidel that faith is the firm grip that does not split, and He called and induced the infidel to this [Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error and whoever rejects false deities and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy firm grip that never splits.
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