COMBATING FOREIGN DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA SERIES SCOTT W. HAROLD, NATHAN BEAUCHAMP-MUSTAFAGA, JEFFREY W. HORNUNG CHINESE DISINFORMATION EFFORTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR4373z3. About RAND The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. To learn more about RAND, visit www.rand.org. Research Integrity Our mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the open publication of our research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. For more information, visit www.rand.org/about/principles. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Corporation is a registered trademark. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0719-1 Cover: James Thew/Adobe Stock; imaginima/Getty Images. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. Preface How are countries using social media—particularly disinformation campaigns—to influence the competitive space? How have govern- ments, the private sector, and civil society responded to this threat? What more can be done? And what do all these conditions mean for future U.S. Air Force and joint force training and operations?1 This report attempts to answer some of these questions as part of a broader study of disinformation campaigns on social media and the implica- tions of those campaigns in great-power competition and conflict. The other volumes in this series are: • Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Joe Cher- avitch, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Jenny Jun, Michael Schwille, Elina Treyger, and Nathan Vest, Combating Foreign Disinformation on Social Media: Study Over- view and Conclusions, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4373/1-AF, 2021 • Elina Treyger, Joe Cheravitch, and Raphael S. Cohen, Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4373/2-AF, forthcoming • Raphael S. Cohen, Alyssa Demus, Michael Schwille, and Nathan Vest, U.S. Efforts to Combat Foreign Disinformation on Social Media, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2021, Not available to the general public. 1 This report was completed before the creation of the U.S. Space Force and therefore uses the name “U.S. Air Force” to refer to both air and space capabilities. iii iv Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media The research reported here was commissioned by the Air Force Special Operations Command and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a larger study entitled “Bringing Psychological Operations and Military Infor- mation Support Operations into the Joint Force: Counterinformation Campaigns in the Social Media Age,” which was designed to assist the Air Force in evaluating the threat of foreign influence campaigns on social media and assessing possible Air Force, joint force, and U.S. gov- ernment countermeasures. This report should be of value to the national security commu- nity and interested members of the public, especially those with an interest in how global trends will affect the conduct of warfare. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corpo- ration, is the Department of the Air Force’s (DAF’s) federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses, supporting both the United States Air Force and the United States Space Force. PAF provides the DAF with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and sup- port of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is con- ducted in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine; Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; and Resource Management. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: www.rand.org/paf/ This report documents work originally shared with the DAF in September 2019. The draft report, issued on September 20, 2019, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and DAF subject-matter experts. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Summary .......................................................................... ix Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Acknowledgments ..............................................................xiii Abbreviations .....................................................................xv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Methodology ....................................................................... 7 Overview ............................................................................ 9 CHAPTER TWO Chinese Social Media–Based Disinformation Operations in Theory ...11 Chinese Approaches to Information Operations ..............................11 No PLA Doctrine for Social Media .............................................13 PLA Messaging Strategy of Content Tailoring and Audience Targeting ...16 Other Uses of Social Media ..................................................... 28 Conclusion .........................................................................31 CHAPTER THREE Chinese Social Media–Based Information Operations in Practice ....33 China’s Initial Social Media–Based Operations .............................. 34 Chinese Command and Control for Social Media Operations ............ 36 Where Chinese Social Media Actors Are Headquartered ................... 38 The Scale of Chinese Social Media Operations ...............................39 China’s Reach to Foreign Audiences ............................................41 v vi Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media Social Media Disinformation Campaign Execution ......................... 46 Enablers of Chinese Disinformation Operations ............................. 50 Service Spotlight: The PLAAF’s Approach to Social Media .................59 Conclusion .........................................................................63 CHAPTER FOUR Case Study: Insights from Taiwan’s Experience as China’s Main Target for Social Media Disinformation ...............................65 Examples of Chinese Social Media Disinformation Against Taiwan .......67 Conclusion .........................................................................73 CHAPTER FIVE Regional Experiences and Responses to Chinese Disinformation .... 77 Singapore ...........................................................................78 Philippines ........................................................................ 88 Japan .............................................................................. 102 Conclusion ....................................................................... 112 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion and Recommendations ........................................ 119 Notional PRC Employment of Social Media Disinformation to Target the U.S. Military ................................................... 119 Policy Options and Recommendations ....................................... 127 Recommendations for Air Force Special Operations Command and the Joint Force .............................................................. 127 Recommendations for DoD ................................................... 130 Recommendations for the Interagency ....................................... 131 Recommendations for U.S. Government .................................... 133 Future Trends .................................................................... 136 Final Thoughts .................................................................. 137 APPENDIX Potential Chinese Vulnerabilities to Social Media–Based Information Operations ................................................. 139 References ....................................................................... 155 Figures and Tables