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Reflections on Stoic Pragmatism

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Reflections on Stoic Pragmatism limbo Núm. 33, 2013, pp. 167-179 issn: 0210-1602 Th e Lachsian Version of San ta ya na: Refl ections on Stoic Pragmatism Charles Padrón John Lachs (2012): Stoic Pragmatism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 204pp. To sense the culmination of another human’s life achievement approximating its mature zenith is a moment that most of us experience only rarely, at fi rst-hand, in our own lives. One calls that, speaking in plain words, “in one’s prime.” As I have read, reread, and refl ected on John Lachs’Stoic Pragmatism, I have undergone an experienced appreciation of an attained trajectory of accomplishment. Th e renowned San ta ya nan scholar, teacher, and original philosopher in his own right, has given us an elevated piece of scholarship: a work that elucidates the evolutionary development of both his own thought, and indirectly, though not in a defi nitive manner, a fi nal say on where he stands with his lifelong involvement with San ta ya na’s thought and writings. Lachs informs us in the “Introduction”: “I take delight in thinking that I have now discovered my beliefs about some of the deepest problems, beliefs I think I have acted upon all my life. In my writing, I have come closer and closer to expressing these ideas, but I have not formulated them explicitly until a few years ago” [Lachs 2012, p. 1]. It could be argued that no scholar or thinker, living or deceased, can match Lachs’ accomplishments in studying, teaching, and writing about San ta ya na’s œuvre. Yet Lachs himself would react with amusement to a statement like this, as if it mattered or was of any importance. Th is includes both his M.A. thesis and 167 168 Charles Padrón Ph.D. dissertation at Yale University, some twenty-three articles, encyclopedic and dictionary entries, and introductions, with “San- ta ya na” mentioned in the title (and these do not include the many articles among his nearly 200 smaller pieces that mention San ta- ya na at some point or address some aspect of the individual or his writings), four reviews of scholarly publications on San ta ya na, six books (and I include Stoic Pragmatism here) that have San ta ya na as the primary focus, along with having been Chair of the Editorial Board of Th e Collected Works of George San ta ya na, currently being published by Th e mit Press, and on the editorial board of Overheard in Seville, the San ta ya na Society’s annual publication. Strictly speaking, when Dr. Lachs talks or writes about George San ta ya na, one should listen to, or read, what is expressed, for there is gravitas and authority behind it. Yet there is an openness also, along with a willingness to listen to others who might think diff erently. Th ere is a learned modesty that enriches anyone who has had contact with him. As a result, what is unmistakable is that Lachs furthers his lifelong, engaged interpretation of, and dialogue with, San ta ya- na’s œuvre in Stoic Pragmatism. Helpful in understanding this evolution is to note that Lachs identifi ed San ta ya na as related to the pragmatists in 1992, in Ávila, at the 1st International Conference on San ta ya na. In that paper, “San ta ya na as Pragmatist,” are to be found some principal claims concerning his position of viewing San ta ya- na as sharing many tenets of pragmatism, but never the claim that San ta ya na himself was a pragmatist, and this background aids in understanding the arguments in Stoic Pragmatism. Th ey are cautious claims. Among them are the following: My aim, accordingly, is not to reveal such hidden truths as that San- ta ya na is or is not a pragmatist, but to see how much viewing him as a pragmatist contributes to our understanding, assessment and appreciation of his philosophy… [Pragmatists] do not think that our primary mode of contact with reality is cognitive and that the world Th e Lachsian Version of San ta ya na 169 exists in or for consciousness alone. Th ey are fallibilists, dispense with the solitary subject and remain resolute in the attempt to situate knowledge as an incident of animal life… Viewed in this perspective, San ta ya na is in complete agreement with the pragmatist… On the positive side, both the pragmatists and San ta ya na ground the good in the needs and desires of living creatures. An unmistakable family resemblance connects James’ account of the source of obligation in “Th e Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” Dewey’s discussion of the construction of good in Th e Quest for Certainty, and San ta ya na’s comments on animal nature and the good relative to it in “Hypostatic Ethics.” Th e naturalization of knowledge and the naturalization of value are one piece: both must be situated in the life-cycle of animals making their way in a diffi cult, sometimes even hostile, environment [Lachs 2003, pp. 156-160]. I quote these claims at some length in order to prepare the ground for what comes in Stoic Pragmatism. Lachs reveals his own pragmatic proclivities in the book’s fi rst chapter, “What Can Philosophy Do to Make Life Better?” Ranging from such discussions as philosophy and progress, whether the discipline of philosophy can actually form public intellectuals in today’s world, and even whether philosophy has anything to accord to human life in the twenty-fi rst century at all, the chapter concludes with the modest assertion that it does, in fact, have something to off er, but that somehow individuals need to make a serious venture “in regaining for philosophy the power it once enjoyed and making it again a central player in the drama of gradual human self-improvement.” Lachs has in mind here both the professoriate in academe, and the thoughtful lay contingent of serious-minded people who actually take philosophical problems critically. In fact, it is with the latter that Lachs tends to place the greater stress on, as he anticipates Philosophy departments in colleges and universities dwindling in infl uence and prestige, both within the realm of higher education and without. On the whole, however, Lachs is optimistic notas críticas 170 Charles Padrón as to philosophy’s future role and its contribution to our collective well-being and the social fabric’s enhancement. In taking a couple of lines from the “Epilogue,” these pragmatist proclivities, his own, are confi rmed: “Th e activist element in American philosophy seems to fi t well with my temperament. I value the sort of robust engagement with the world that evokes personal activity and aims at social improvement” [Lachs 2012, p. 193]. Only the future’s actual eventualities will unveil to us how these tensions and questions play out. What Lachs is trying to convince others to be aware of is, as in other periods of history when philosophical thought was suff used throughout the entirety of a culture, a country, a nation, or a society, that for philosophy as a possibility to become and remain relevant, to thrive in vital, general everydayness, then it needs to be freed from any form of institutional, appropriative exclusivity, and any idea of it (philosophy) adhering to a singular kind of activity or belonging to a specifi c group of people. Is this a feasible idea? I am not so sure. Philosophy can be a great leveler. Th e pragmatist outlook historically, on the whole, has always championed this supposition. No artifi cially erected barriers by individuals with professional interests should ever be able to contain it, and thereby artifi cially control its on-turnings and off -turnings. Th is is a Lachsian version of philosophy for all serious adults, similar to the Cavellian notion of philosophy “as the education of grownups.” Considerate, decent, humane awareness that we are all in this thing called life together, fraught with highly serious issues and threats, challenges and confusions, compels us, as Lachs understands it, to be attentive to the shared, social commonweal. Dewey’s opening line in Th e Quest for Certainty is relevant here: “Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security” [Dewey 1960, p. 3]. Th is external facet to pragmatist concerns, more than any epistemological or metaphysical ones, is what stands out as the pragmatist undergirding of Lachs’ arguments. Again, lift ing lines from the “Epilogue,” Lachs asserts: “I am interested in ordinary people and their problems because I see myself as no diff erent from Th e Lachsian Version of San ta ya na 171 them… In the end, I do not want to be absorbed in the technical details of the problems of philosophy” [Lachs 2012, p.193]. Stoic Pragmatism consists of fi ve chapters. Apart from the above- mentioned fi rst one, they are the following: 2) “Stoic Pragmatism”; 3) “Infi nite Obligations”; 4) “An Ontology for Stoic Pragmatism”; and 5) “Epilogue: Th e Personal Value and Social Usefulness of Philosophy”. As my intent is to concentrate on chapters 2 (delineating the concept behind the title of the book, stoic pragmatism) and 4 (the one containing Lachs’ discussion of how San ta ya na’s ontology provides a skeleton to his own stoic pragmatism), I will now turn my attention presently to chapters 3 and 5. Lachs delves into and dissects two instances of interesting psychological/philosophical phenomena, among others, in chapter 3: forms of blindness and moral holidays, both discussions stemming from the insights of William James.
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