Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism

Carol Hay

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring 2012, pp. 141-168 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csp/summary/v048/48.2.hay.html

Access provided by University of Massachusetts @ Lowell (23 Sep 2013 11:16 GMT) Abstract This paper is an attempt to identify certain consonances between contemporary liberal- ism and classical pragmatism. I first analyze four of the most trenchant criticisms of classical liberalism presented by pragmatist figures such as James, Peirce, Dewey, Ad- Consonances dams, and Hocking: that liberalism overem- phasizes negative liberty, that it is overly Between individualistic, that its pluralism is suspect, that it is overly abstract. I then argue that these deficits of liberalism in its historical Liberalism incarnations are being addressed by con- temporary liberals. Contemporary liberals, and I show, have taken on board a surprising number of classical pragmatist insights and Pragmatism have responded to a surprising number of Carol Hay classical pragmatist criticisms. I thus argue that both contemporary pragmatism and contemporary liberalism have much to gain by joining forces.

Keywords: liberalism, pragmatism, negative liberty, individualism, pluralism, abstraction

In 1930, John Dewey wrote Individualism Old and New.1 When he wrote this book, political and economic events such as World War I and the beginnings of the Great De- pression had combined to dash many peo- ple’s hopes that classical liberalism could deliver the utopian ideals it had once prom- ised. Dewey responded to these events by arguing that the classical liberal tradition, with its emphasis on individual freedom, required “reconstruction” if it was to ensure a truly progressive and properly liberal cul- ture. Reconstruction, in all of Dewey’s work, had a very particular meaning: recon- struction meant “to construct again”—to reform and rework old concepts so they could accommodate and negotiate new

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 48, No. 2 ©2012 141 142 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 cerns of our contemporary political lives—global justice; the treatment the justice; lives—global political contemporary our of cerns democracy unlikelyorimpossible. Addressing themostpressing con- together butwhere culturalandreligious differences threaten tomake where many believe thatdemocracyofferstheonlyviablewayofliving broadestproblemspolitical present ofour globalized world—a world pragmatism andliberalism matters,Icontend,becauseitspeakstothe ago isneitherintractablenorirrelevant today. This dialogue between debate between pragmatismandliberalismthatbegannearlyacentury byclassical pragmatism.My the establish that doing sowill hope isthat liberalismcan,andhas,learnedmanyofthelessonsgiven tous porary sense ofdemocracy’s potential.My aimistodemonstratethatcontem- to befoundhere, ineffect,anextendedconversation aimedatmaking matists identifyingandgrapplingwiththemselves. Ibelieve thatthere is grappling withthesameideasandissuesthatwe canseeclassicalprag- ing pragmatism’s lessons.Rather, liberalsare still itisthatcontemporary consistentinapply- instance,isperfectly liberal,inevery contemporary ing numberofclassicalpragmatistcriticisms.My claim isnotthatevery number of classicalpragmatistinsights, and have responded to a surpris- liberals,Iwillshow,Contemporary have takenonboard asurprising tism, Iseedeepconsonances. tist colleaguesseeincompatibilitiesbetween liberalismandpragma- past liberalism’s historicalmanifestations. Where manyofmy pragma- pragmatistthinkerstomove ofcontemporary willingness onthepart or un- an inability the liberaltraditionor of either amisunderstanding of “liberalism.”Ihave cometobelieve thatthistendencyisrooted in quite favourably about“democracy,” alltalk buttheygenerallyeschew pragmatists, inthewakeofDewey, happytotalk oftenseemperfectly literature inAmericanphilosophy.of thecontemporary Contemporary with classicalpragmaticthinking. againstthegrainofmuch This runs political philosophyinitiatedby John Rawls—hasmuch in common years,developed inthewakeofresurgent inthelastforty interest in forms—those new. Iwouldliketosuggestthatliberalisminits and New, Iwouldliketoinitiateadiscussionaboutliberalism oldand that Dewey sawintheliberaltradition.Instead ofIndividualism Old this meaningofreconstruction andhave thus neglected thepromise tists who studythewritingsof Dewey and his peers—have forgotten andprogressiveservative aimsofhisunderstandingreconstruction. his title,Individualism Old andNew, reflected thesimultaneouslycon- liberalism, butareformulation ofitscentralidealsandconcepts.Even eralism hadbecome. What heintendedwasnotawholesalerejection of get, instead,wastheantiquatedphilosophicaltraditionhebelieved lib- tar- his whole; a as liberalism to antithetical be to individualism liberal experiences. This paper is an attempt to highlight some of these consonances. This paperisanattempttohighlightsomeoftheseconsonances. pragmatists—thosepragma- My isthatmanycontemporary worry 2 Dewey thusdidnotmeanhispragmaticreconstruction of Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 143 ference and egalitarians defend- ference non- inter is the most important political value. They agree that the They agree liberty is the most important political value. But, as we will see, contemporary we as about almost as liberals disagree But, This paper has three interrelated aims. First, I aim to show that vir- that I aim to show aims. First, interrelated has three This paper ing sometimes significant regulation in the name of fairness. These regulation in the name of fairness. ing sometimes significant many things as they agree on. They disagree about how to best mediate about how They disagree on. many things as they agree the of the individual and the interests the conflicts that arise between to best understand about how They disagree of the group. interests about whether individuals They disagree are. even what these interests whether (or even are always the best judge of what their interests are about They disagree as if they are). they should always at least be treated They are. interests what their collective should determine groups how about the ontological status of both individuals and social disagree to rank the importance of various about how They disagree groups. to mediate the conflicting demands and about how kinds of freedom, much and what kind about how They disagree and equality. of freedom libertarians de- justice requires—with economic regulation of market fending complete laissez- faire What Is Liberalism? What Is agree Liberals, most obviously, is liberalism? what, exactly, first, But that of liberty amount for the greatest best possible state is one that secures They agree with like libertyeach individual that is compatible all. for that this politically important liberty individuals freedoms should give to of others, freedom the unwanted interferences from such as freedom concep- own one’s to choose choosing, and freedom the life of one’s live of the indi- that the rights and interests They agree tion of the good. both the justification of are group, vidual, not those of the larger social and authority of the state. and the limiting condition on the power tually all of the most trenchant contemporary of the most trenchant tually all criticisms of liberalism classical canon of thinkers in the by form in some anticipated were - over (1) that liberalism these criticisms are briefly, Very pragmatism. (3) that individualistic, it is overly (2) that liberty, negative emphasizes its pluralism is suspect, and (4) that it is abstract. overly Second, I aim to that contemporary of responding process in the to show are liberals to namely, a third, lead to These first two aims these criticisms. each of contemporarydemonstrate that kin- liberals can find philosophically pragmatists and in those contemporary spirits in the classical dred My historical figures. of these the work to resuscitate scholars who want antagonism many this might ameliorate some of the hope is that doing contemporarycontemporary liberalism. feel toward pragmatists of women, people of and color, indigenous populations; - hun poverty, theo - resources—requires of distributions unequal and drastically ger, efforts. will enable practical frameworks that that a I believe retical liberalism pragmatism and a key can make con- between collaboration here. tribution 144 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 classical liberalism’s individualismandabstraction.Dewey arguedthat Dewey’s version ofthiscriticismproceeds viahisargumentsagainst up isitscriticismofliberalism’s overemphasis onnegative liberty. John liketotake would The firstclassicalpragmatistcriticismofliberalismI Negative Liberty classical pragmatists. criticisms—many of which,Iwillshow, canbefoundinthework of liberalsare intheprocess ofrespondingtemporary toawidevariety of ingly endless. This diversity ofliberalperspectives existsbecausecon - disagreementsboth practicalandtheoretical,can be andtheyare seem- entity thatis“finalandself-sufficient.” a to amounts pernicious formofabstractionthatpretends thattheindividualisan this society; to prior there,” already something given, But liberalism,hecontended, conceives oftheindividualas“something merely thatindividualsare negatively eralism, writing inthesameyear thatDewey publishedhis Liberalism pragmatism—leveled asimilarcriticism againstthissameaspectoflib- self.” absence ofinterference butthepositive “power tobeanindividualized about freedom foranindividual,hethought,isnotmerely thenegative is socially, ethically, andpoliticallyimpoverished. What isreally valuable tional constraintsonanindividual’s abilitytopursuehisorherends— freedom —wher sense. Deweymeaningful arguedthat liberalism’s negative of view constraints isnotasufficientconditionforfreedom inanymorally nal impedimentsonhisorheractions.But themere absence ofexternal freedom fortheindividualrequires nothingmore thanremoving exter- tutions thismakesitmore tothinkthatsecuring likelythatwe willstart because whenwe thinkoftheindividualasexistingpriortosocialinsti- individual from hisorhersocialcontextisproblematic, Dewey argued, Another philosopher—one notusuallyassociatedwithclassical 5 the problems ofsocialorganizationandintegration. beliefs andmethods of . force doesnotofitselfgive direction totheforce thatissetfree. . social organization. enact] anew and tively articulate ited typeofsocialorganization,[butthatsocietyatlargebeable toposi- emancipate[d] .from restrictions imposeduponthemby theinher - nomic, legalandpoliticalinstitutionsaswell asscienceandart. of conditions,culturalandphysical:—includingin‘cultural,’ eco- achieved, andachieved notinisolationbutwiththeaidandsupport an individualisnothingfixed, given ready- What isreally valuable aboutfreedom forsocietyatlargeisnot e freedom isnothingmore thantheabsenceofinten- liberalism were ineffective whenfacedwith 4 Liberalism’s abstractionofthe made. It issomething 6 The release of . The ... The 3 Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 145 7 I believe that pragmatist I believe 10 “[L]iberalism trains people to 9 Berlin’s argument is that the concepts of positive argument is that the concepts of positive Berlin’s 11 eceivable, there are innumerable duties-payable: innumerable that are there eceivable,

8 Liberalism has infected the Western mind with the disease of Rights- mind with the disease Western has infected the Liberalism forgotten that be- not have] . . . Liberalism [should Duties. without- exploitation from simply an immunity meant and equal’ ing ‘born free exploiting others. from to refrain which carried with it an imperative every right-r For right of ‘equality’ which defends me from the arrogance of a thousand of a thousand the arrogance which defends me from right of ‘equality’ thousand against my own superiors defends a hundred pretending arrogance. This distinction between positive and negative liberty and negative did not origi- positive This distinction between Liberalism’s failure to appreciate that the individual is made, not fixed, not fixed, individual is made, that the to appreciate failure Liberalism’s - Hock freedom, on negative for its overemphasis responsible is what is to, and of the individual as prior liberals conceive ing thought. Because of to conceive primed they are his or her social context, separable from, what is importantsolely in terms of his or her indi- for the individual connection be- to neglect the citizens This causes liberal vidual rights. but rights, liberalism insists, have rights and duties. Individuals tween rights forgotten that with these along the line liberals have somewhere others. duties to come corresponding nate with the pragmatists, however: the thought that there are both are the thought that there however: nate with the pragmatists, conceptions of liberty and negative goes back at least as far as positive been grap- have While both defenders and critics of liberalism Kant. distinction for centuries, it was in pling with the implications of this Concepts of “Two Berlin’s Isaiah the 1950s and ’60s, beginning with that social and political philosophers started examining the Liberty,” concepts in earnest. thinkers such as Dewey and Hocking were right to emphasize the pau- right to emphasize were and Hocking thinkers such as Dewey as a moral or political ideal. And they freedom negative city of merely incarnations of liberalism historical the various right to criticize were otherwise.for pretending Hocking located the problem with this picture of rights without duties of rights without with this picture located the problem Hocking the basis for articulating and enacting a common to secure in its failure itself incapable of bringing social cause. “Liberalism . . . has shown about or maintaining social wholeness.” . William Ernest Hocking argued that because liberals liberals because that argued Hocking Ernest William . Action and Social or her his from, separable to, and as prior individual of the conceive of what is important they conceive social context, for the individual citi- and this causes liberal individual rights, of his or her solely in terms the important to neglect rights and duties. zens between connection receive, and only hopes that they will give.” receive, and negative liberty are best thought of as incompatible ways of under- best thought of as incompatible libertyand negative are Defenders amounts to. standing what the political ideal of liberty really liberty himself)of negative (such as Berlin argue that defending liberty of state inter- amounts to defending the right of individuals to be free vention; defenders of positive liberty argue that defending liberty 146 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 amounts todefendingtherightofindividualsself- tect againstdespotism. inorder topro isnecessary - an educatedandpolitically active citizenry learned from lesson to be republicanismgued thattheimportant isthat among many, goodrequiredas anecessary allcitizens. orof Rawls ar- good isunderstood—whether itisseenasoneimportant participation roughly,tween the two,very do withhow hasto ofcivic the importance and civicrepublicanism, whichhebelieved isnot. The difference be- distinction between civichumanism,whichhebelieved tobeilliberal, is merely thetipofphilosophicaliceberg. with theimplicationsofthistension. The briefdiscussionthatfollows liberalismcan be interpreted asthe attemptto grapple of contemporary to reject liberalismoutright.In fact,alargeamountofthescholarship But recognizes almosteveryone it,andyet theydonotseeitas reason determination. Few, ifany, claimtohave fullydissolved thistension. constraints andamore robust, asself- positive, understandingofliberty classical liberalism’s astheabsenceof negative understanding ofliberty in someway. liberalsnow recognize Contemporary thetensionbetween intotheirliberalframeworks rate thispositive understandingofliberty if theyare free, tocountasmeaningfully andmostattempttoincorpo- ers now recognize thatpeopleneedfreedom to,notmerely freedom from, itself, autonomy. usuallyinsufficientformeaningful Most liberalthink- defendersofliberalismnow recognizeporary is,by thatnegative liberty their historicalincarnations.But thingshave changed.Many contem- of liberty. This picture ofliberalismanditscriticsin wasprobably true while criticsofliberalismwillbeproponents ofthepositive conception liberalism willbeproponents ofthenegative conceptionofliberty, social mobility. cess toeducationandothermechanismsthatassure thepossibilityof such asprograms thatredistribute wealth orprograms thatensure ac- distribution oftheseresources willoftenrequire stateinterventions meaningful decisions about one’s life; they believe that assuring the fair social, material,andpsychological resources toactuallybeablemake are requiresliberty motivated liberty by theconvictionthattrue the to civilstrifeorunjustformsofauthoritarianism.Defenders ofpositive ception ofthegoodhave, historically, badly, tendedtogovery leading recognition orentrench con- thatstateattemptstosupport aparticular conception to of any the particular good; this motivation stems from a vated by theconvictionthatstatemustremain neutralwithrespect with.Defenders are ofnegativeusually becomfortable liberty moti- quire will thandefendersofnegative more liberty stateintervention actualiz Rawls, forexample,wrestles inhis withthelimitsofpositive liberty According thingsup, tothestandard defendersof way ofcarving e, orself- determine, theachievement ofwhichwilloftenre- r ealize, self- Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 147 Other Other 12 15

vern, the actual condition of vern, 17 Civic humanism, Rawls argued, illegiti- Civic humanism, 13 Others ask whether autonomy is a relatively ask whether autonomy is a relatively Others 14 - concerned with articulating pre are And many more 16 vernment, the feature of persons that should prevent paternalis- of persons that should prevent the feature vernment, [W]ithout participation- a vig by politics in democratic a widespread and certainly retreat with a general body, citizen informed and orous institutions political the most well-designed even life, into private and impose who seek to dominate that hands of those will fall into and of power either for the sake the state apparatus their will through not to and economic interest, of class or for reasons military glory, fervor religious mention expansionist and nationalistic fanaticisms. But this understanding of civic republicanism is compatible with of civic republicanism this understanding But Attentiveness to the tensions between positive and negative liberty negative and is positive to the tensions between Attentiveness liberalism, Rawls argued, because it does not entail the imposition of an because it does not entail the liberalism, Rawls argued, What is incompatible with liber- of the good. conception robust overly - republi which differs from humanism,” “civic alism is what he called insisting that “[p]articipationcanism by as necessary is not encouraged and as the basic libertiesof for the protection of democratic citizenship, important for many of good among others, however in itself one form taking part- politics is seen as the privi in democratic persons. Rather, good life.” leged locus of the liberals concern themselves with the question of whether a person needs question of whether with the themselves concern liberals to count as to be able to alter the factors that guide her life in order autonomous. cisely what social and material conditions need to be in place in order cisely what social and material conditions need to be in place in order en- for an autonomous person to be able to engage in the reflective dorsement that is necessary for autonomy. also apparent in discussions by a great number of contemporary a great in discussions by liberal also apparent of what autonomy ultimately philosophers who take up the issue the concept is most profitably amounts to—with some arguing that capacity to set and of as something as minimal as the bare conceived the concept cannot be meaning- pursue ends, and others arguing that of the social account a robust fully understood without incorporating light of In this capacity. and material conditions necessary to exercise such as whether autonomy this debate, some liberals focus on questions self- go is best thought of as the capacity to mately imposes a particular comprehensive doctrine onto all citizens, doctrine onto all citizens, particularmately imposes a comprehensive illiberal. and is therefore self- go tic interventions, external manipulation, a set the independence from or some combina- oneself, over sovereignty one’s of rights that express tion of all these factors. thin ideal that requires merely that agents have freedom of choice, or freedom that agents have merely thin ideal that requires agents are that the choices that whether it is a thicker ideal that requires to make must be free in some sense worthwhile those or who valuable; hold that a state has both a defend the latter conception of autonomy duty to autonomy and a positive its citizens’ duty to respect negative this autonomy possible. foster the social conditions that make 148 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 damental issuesofsocialchoice. favour ofothernormsorprincipleswhenwe are fun- deciding certain fied incriticizingorignoringthepreferences peopleactuallyhave in social conditionstoconsiderquestionssuchaswhenwe might be justi- that people’spreferences influenced canbe by oppressive background the problem ofadaptive preferences, whichmoves from therecognition tions ofautonomyandselfhood. anddefendrelationalbeen pickedupby thosewhoarticulate concep- rable from theinterests ofothers. ception thatrecognizes thattheinterests oftheindividual are insepa- conceptions ofautonomy and theselftoward amore relational con- away from theindividualismthey see underlyingtraditionalliberal feminist philosophers.Many of these feministshave advocated ashift tional idealshave received andattention by mostexplicitarticulation tarian criticsofliberalism. communi - the sameargumentsthatare beingmadeby contemporary who we are asindividuals. and claimavariety ofrelations forourown, andtheserelations define dividual’s identity. Instead, we are socialrelations, bornintoparticular hidden selfuponwhichsocialrelations are layered toconstituteanin- additive, butare, rather, constitutive ofselfhood. There isnocore or claims—and thoserelations thatclaimanindividual—are notmerely These pragmatistsarguedthatthesocialrelations anindividual atomistic conceptionoftheself: tion totheworld,theyargued. William James, too,defendedanon- not made,perniciouslymisrepresents boththeindividualandherrela- overly individualistic.Liberalism’s conceptionoftheindividualasfixed, weAs saw, just both Dewey and Hocking criticized liberalismforbeing Individualism such asone’s gender, race,ethnicity, orreligion actuallyconstitute liberal conceptionofthe person forunder- critique oppressive socialconditions. Some defendautonomyasaconceptthatallows ustounderstandand problematize conventional understandingsoftheconceptautonomy. on understandinghow oppressive socialconditionscomplicateand In thispragmatistcriticismofliberalindividualism,we seemanyof In thissamevein, there isanextensive bodyofliterature thatfocuses bank account. friends, hisreputation andworks, hislandsandhorses,yacht his clothesandhouse,wifechildren, hisancestorsand that heCANcallhis,notonlybodyandpsychic powers, but In itswidestpossiblesense,however, aman’s Self isthesumtotalofall 20

21 This criticismofindividualismhasalso 19 22 23 For whatever reason, theserela- 18 These philosophers criticize the Others takeupwhatisknown as emphasizing how factors Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 149 Lib- 27 26 Other contem- Other 25 And thus these liberals argue 28 24 vernment remains a laudable moral aim, remains vernment But this, too, is a lesson that has been taken on board by a great a great by board been taken on a lesson that has this, too, is But Other liberals take a slightly different tack in defending liberalism’s liberalism’s tack in defending liberals take a slightly different Other number of contemporarynumber example, liberals argue, for Some liberals. be able that an individual to requiring is not committed that liberalism relations, her separate from that is entirely herself in a way to define argue, they requires, liberalism that all commitments; and connections, review. of these factors is beyond is that no single one individualism, arguing that the liberal strategy of focusing on people individualism, arguing that the liberal is superior to non- own of their primarily as individuals with interests primarily in and their interests, liberal strategies that focus on people, such as com- of the larger social groups—groups terms of the interests members. are and families—of which people munities, religions, eralism can (and, indeed, must) recognize that membership in these that membership in these eralism can (and, indeed, must) recognize liberalism also fo- But lives. in people’s role plays a constitutive groups of rational and moral person- cuses on the commonalities, the “core groups. across hood,” that people share one’s identity; failing to recognize this, these critics argue, puts liberals liberals puts argue, critics these this, recognize to failing identity; one’s from themselves separate can that people assuming of wrongly at risk commitments. all their cultural Pluralism and Objectivity Pluralism of the atomic understanding of the individual employed criticism James’ not be confused with a criticism of the impor- classical liberals should by the first to admit been would have tance of individual experience. James that the locus of value is always the individual person, not the larger is always the individual person, that the locus of value When liberals (and in which individuals find themselves. social group it has been because they have on this front, gone wrong others) have that the interests pretended have not been individualistic enough: they of importantthe individual than more the interests were of the group I This defence of individualism is, people who make up that group. in the sorts contend, classical one rooted of concerns raised by pragmatists. porary liberals defend classical liberalism’s attachment to a relatively to a relatively attachment porary liberalism’s liberals defend classical arguing that by of identity and autonomy individualistic conception of self- go ideal core liberalism’s - injustices many people con particularly one of the greatest that given that the quality and quantity of choices of tinue to face is a restriction many can accommodate These liberals argue that we open to them. are liberal tradition— critical of the those who are by of the points made deter- largely are values that by influenced decisions are that people’s mined by interpersonal relations; that these interpersonal relations are individual the of interests the that valuable; also but inevitable, just not of others—without giving the interests not cleanly separable from are people be free up on the liberal idea that it is important that, ultimately, interest. their self- choices and promote to make their own 150 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 ble.” a “working senseoflimitsandconstraints, ofwhatisactuallypossi- r politically andmorallyimpotent.Andersonsays,of Hocking’s anti- ceptions ofthegoodcommitsittoaformrelativism thatleaves it that classicalliberalism’s commitment toneutralitywithrespect to con- sometimes- and criticismsthatwerecertain madeby Hocking, asometimes-friend lot liketheirexperimentalism. many, perhapseven most,liberalsdefendapluralismthatlooksanawful be “impossible,or, atleast,arbitrary.” standards, Hocking thought,judging thesuccessofitsexperimentswill than anyotherphilosophyIknow of.” pluralistic formof[humanism]takesformeastronger holdon reality endorses ahumanismthatispluralistic,forinhiswords, “ethically, the and reconstruction oftheserelations. This iswhyJames, forexample, appropriation he insistedthatthisemergenceisalwaysagenuinelynew lives. While individualitymightemergeinagiven setofsocialrelations, were anduniqueness that particularity real forces driving and our in ism. living. This insightisdeeplyconsonantwithpragmatists’ experimental- oneoftheseways is nottherole ofthestatetoendorseanyparticular and incompatiblewaystolivelives—and meaningful theyarguethatit ments canbesuccessful—thatthere are manycorrect butcompeting of thegoodlife.Liberalpluralistsrecognize thatdifferent liberalexperi- omy requires thestatetoremain neutralbetween different conceptions many liberalsare pluralists,arguingthatarespect forpeople’s auton- and pragmatism’s commitmenttoexperimentalism.Aswe sawabove, pragmatism thushastodowithliberalism’s commitmenttopluralism that definethesphere ofhumanexperience. ries were anduniqueevents alwaystobetestedagainsttheparticular this pluralismgeneratedpragmatism’s experimentalism.General theo- cal, epistemic,andontologicalmatters. When appliedtoepistemology, experience, ledJames toadoptarobust pluralism whenitcametoethi- of individualcases,asingularitythatisreflected inpersonalsubjective epistemology, andmetaphysics.Hocking joinedRoyce andother this debate,namely, thequestionofobjectivityin thefieldsofethics, ism have actuallybeencharacterized by manyofthesame versions of two traditions. ofliberal - ofpragmatism and thehistory The history both pragmatismandliberalism reveals adeepsimilaritybetween these of histime. That Hocking wasabletolevel thesamecharge against similar tohiscriticismsofthepragmatists cism ofliberalismwasvery elativist criticismofliberalism,thatHocking thoughtliberalismneeds In toconsider examiningthese similaritiesIthinkitisinstructive Another consonance between contemporary liberalismandclassical Another consonancebetween contemporary What isinteresting, givenhere, ourpurposes Hocking’sis that criti- 30 31 But, strangely, pragmatistsseemnottorealize that contemporary Unless objective liberalismiscommittedtodefendingcertain foe ofbothliberalismandpragmatism.Hocking argued 29 32 His insistenceonthesingularity Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 151 James, Peirce, Peirce, James, . truth us is for 33 Rorty’s conception conception Rorty’s 34 foe of Hocking, at- foe of Hocking, processes.” . between man’s beliefs about man’s ... between In light of the experimentalism of mod- light In 35 friend and sometimes-

36 the problem of restoring integration of restoring the problem the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and pur- the values and his beliefs about the world in which he lives of the his conduct is the deepest problem poses that should direct modern life. pragmatic “liberal ironism” of Richard Rorty. Hocking would al- would Hocking Rorty. of Richard ironism” pragmatic “liberal Dewey, a sometimes- a Dewey, This remains one of the deepest problems of contemporary one of the deepest problems This remains pragma- Contemporary continued to undertake pragmatists have Dewey’s tempted to defend pragmatic instrumentalism idealist criticisms from to as “The Construction a section often referred of In like Hocking’s. defended an experimentalist bearing, claiming that Dewey the Good,” moral and social and political the seemingly solid foundation of both in science” the conclusions of modern by philosophy was “undermined the 19th and 20th centuries. of solidarity reflects both a nominalism (a term that Peirce and Royce Royce and Peirce nominalism (a term that both a of solidarity reflects odds completely at both derided) and an instrumentalism that are idealistic commitments. with Hocking’s ern science, Dewey sought to “integrate” moral values and the concrete and the concrete moral values sought to “integrate” ern science, Dewey even He and particularsphere. experiences of individuals in the social so far as to claim that went tism, and of moral theory on the whole. Dewey’s response to Hocking to Hocking response tism, and of moral theory on the whole. Dewey’s as much stability in should be to pursue project was that pragmatism’s without sacrificing its fidelity to the unique as possible its moral values a type of required This project of people. of a variety circumstances could Royce, idealism, inherited from moral pluralism that Hocking’s not allow. articulating the tensions between of navigating and defending project idealists of the day in accusing James and other pragmatists of making of making pragmatists other and James accusing day in of the idealists - liberal accused Hocking of which mistakes of relativist kind the same that “our did write, after all, merit: James accusation had This ism. truthaccount of of truths is an account . in the plural . verification- name for collective simply the most certainly cringe at Rorty’s claim that “human solidarity” (Rorty’s (Rorty’s solidarity” claim that “human most certainly cringe at Rorty’s of the standards shared to objectively phrase for referring preferred a common selfish “sharing a matter of than more good) is nothing has woven which one around world—the little things hope that one’s vocabulary—willinto its final not be destroyed.” and Dewey all held that pragmatic experimentalism requires being being requires experimentalism all held that pragmatic and Dewey This of the good. conceptions provisional, to multiple, and committed charge a positions open to the charge of relativism, left their epistemic that certain contemporary to face in the current pragmatists continue for example, in Anderson’s This is evident, philosophical climate. contrast to the stands in marked “liberal spirit” claim that Hocking’s neo- 152 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 civic republican complaintthatitistoorelativistic. situations. attributing autonomytopeopleinoppressive andoverly restrictive life the possibilityof out because theyareso counts do rule concerned to ation. only aconcrete principlespermitsthiskindof evalu- setofperfectionist ing abletoevaluate thechoicesthat thesepeopleactuallymake,and of lifeandsocialstanding membersofoppressed groups requires be- instead claiming thatliberals’ focusshould beonensuringthatcertain there are objective values thatindividualsorsocietiesshould endorse, communitarian complaintthatliberalismistoouniversalistic liberalsstrive tofindamiddleground betweensions, contemporary the pragmatistscontinuetoattemptnegotiatetheseten- contemporary liberals,too,have adoptedthisproject inavarietyrary ofways.Just as open towidestpossiblevariety ofhumanexperiences.But contempo- moral values thatare whileremaining stableenoughtobemeaningful, does notendorsethem. society that claimthere are objective values certain thatanindividualora plying politicalprinciples. accounts These liberalsdefendperfectionist must becommittedtonormative neutralitywhenformulatingandap- liberalschallengetheideathatliberalism ism. Some contemporary andprocedurallem canbefoundinthedebatebetween- perfectionism a societyandonminimizingtheconstraintspeople’s actions, ing theprocedures by whichpeople’s preferences willbeaggregated in the minimalsidetendingtoarguethatliberalsshouldfocusonspecify- between theminimalandsubstantive, withthosewhoare closerto liberalsnow situatetheir theoriesonacontinuum most contemporary competing comprehensive doctrines.In thewakeofRawls’ influence, an overarching politicalframeworkthatisneutralbetween asociety’s yet anothercomprehensive doctrinetothemix,andinstead toprovide to thesequestions,Rawlsarguesthattheliberal’s role istoavoid adding sofar asmodernsocietiesexhibita“reasonable pluralism” withrespect ics, epistemology, andthemetaphysicsofpersonsociety. liberalism thatremains neutralwithrespect toquestionsofvalue, eth- liberalism thatis“political” ratherthan“comprehensive”—that is,a many others,beganwithRawls,who,inhislaterwork, defendeda as a“comprehensive” ora“political” doctrine. This discussion,likeso liberals engageinthedebateover whetherliberalism is bestthoughtof have,tivity taken upprofitablybeen forexample, by contemporary conceptions ofthegoodover others. als mustembracecomprehensive theoriesofvalue and endorsesome those whoare closertothesubstantive sidetendingtoarguethatliber- A related way that contemporary liberalstalkaboutthissameprob- A related waythatcontemporary Discussions surrounding thetensionsbetween pluralismandobjec- 44 ) Otherliberals defend should acceptorendorse,even iftheindividualorpopulation 43 Others do sobecausetheyarguethatimproving thequality 42 (Some ac- liberalswhodefendperfectionist proceduralist accountsthatdeny 41

38 37 andthe 40 39 and In - Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 153 people can dis- Talisse argues that Talisse This is, to be sure, a This is, to be sure, 47 48 He argues that these argues He . we would regard a would regard . we 46 It is also deliberately gen- is also deliberately It The capabilities approach approach The capabilities 51 intentioned 49 y.” 50 The goal of this list is more than mere than mere The goal of this list is more 52 cultural inquir dered society,” when a closer look at current political when a closer look at current society,” dered 45 or ended, because it summarizes the “empirical findings of a the “empirical ended, because it summarizes What activities characteristically performed by human beings are so What activities characteristically performed human beings are by In other is truly of a life that central that they seem definitive human? the functions without which . . what are words, human? life as not, or not fully, The list of capabilities that results from this inquiry from The list of capabilities that results is both empiri- Various contemporary to these added their voices have pragmatists Various Perhaps the most interesting and fruitful of contemporary example most interesting the Perhaps and ongoing cross- broad cal and open- discussions, including Robert Talisse and Colin Koopman. Talisse en- Talisse and Colin Koopman. Talisse including Robert discussions, classical liberalism with is a problem that there contention dorses Rawls’ doctrines— of comprehensive pluralism fact of reasonable because the and well- sincere, the fact that intelligent, agree reasonably over moral ideals—means that a liberal society cannot ideals—means that a liberal society moral over reasonably agree - a comprehen of its citizens unjustly imposing upon at least some avoid reject. doctrine that they could reasonably sive liberals grappling with Dewey’s concern to navigate between actual to navigate between concern liberals grappling with Dewey’s them is that govern and the norms and values experiences people’s who defend and Amartya Sen, Nussbaum of Martha found in the work . a view the capabilities approach they call tenable criticism of Rawls, and one that is clearly supportedtenable criticism of Rawls, and one prag- by criticisms of Rawls’ also fits nicely with the many other matic tenets. It in the wakemany liberal theorists ideal theory by voiced been that have of his Theory of Justice. Rawlsian considerations give pragmatists reason to reject a Deweyan Deweyan a to reject reason pragmatists give Rawlsian considerations doctrine a comprehensive which endorses conception of democracy, which en- one, of a Peircean in favour rejected, that can be reasonably be- rejected doctrine that cannot be reasonably dorses a comprehensive norms social epistemic on and defends irreducibly cause it both hinges actually constitute reasonableness. that themselves has us ask people the following question: has us ask people the following this perfectionist Peircean conception of democracy can thus ultimately conception this perfectionist Peircean that doctrine a comprehensive because it provides problem, Rawls’ solve maintaining a more pluralism. Koopman, is consistent with reasonable view is deficient to the extent that it line, holds that Rawls’ Deweyan well- assumes “a these terms. be described in practices could hardly material and political conditions are in place so that people are free to free are people so that in place are conditions political and material necessary endorsement reflective in the engage for autonomous making. decision- eral, because it attempts “to put forward something that people from eral, because it attempts “to on, as the necessary traditions . . . can agree basis for many different pursuing their good life.” 154 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 which individualscanexplore theirown experientialfrontiers.” communities andsocietiesthatprovide thevistasand pathwaysby interpret himassuggestingthatwe have “a moral obligationtofoster on thenear- ward fosteringindividuals’ various capabilities.Given James’ emphasis thecreation politicalpractices thatareporting ofparticular geared to- John Kaagdescribeshow James endorsesaversionby ofthisview sup- the possibilitiesthattheythemselves have chosenisamoralwrong. various pragmatists,thatfailingtoafford peopletheabilitytoexplore ent ways. haustive, andby allowingspecified inmanydiffer- thecapabilitiestobe pluralism by havingitslistofcapabilitiesbeopen- ments aboutwhattheyfind valuable. Theapproach leaves room for embodied inactualhumanpractices,by usingreal people’s own judge - ing humanlifeby appealingexplicitlytothenormsandvalues thatare itsaccountofwhatisessentialtoaflourish- experientialist: itconstructs dorse. The capabilitiesapproach isbothexplicitlypluralistand pragmatistscouldreadily en- ralist commitmentsthatcontemporary achieve thesecapacities. tion thisapproach hasusaskiswhetherthesepolicieshelp people ure ques- outwhichpublicpoliciestoimplement,themostimportant tofig- andtrying when we are assessingthequalityoflifeinacountry that certain fundamentalcapabilitiesarethat certain notneglected. widespread involvement inpoliticalprocesses istheonlywayto ensure democracystemsfrom therealization that standing ofparticipatory Green defendsasimilarpointwhenshearguesthatDewey’s under- tains thatRawls, unlikeDewey, isinpursuitof one conceptionof justice, capabilities willbejudgedto“fall ofagoodhumanlife.” short human is goal its survival; of the“rigidity” oftheirconceptspersonhoodandjustice. acterizing thedifference between RawlsandDewey primarilyinterms engages Rawls’ conceptionofjusticefrom aDeweyan perspective, char- been makingforyears.” “most ofSen’s critique [ofRawls]arguesforclaimsthatpragmatism has are supposedtomeasure socialandpoliticalequality. Deweywould call“growth”—rather to more than metrics that abstract should attendtothedirect indicatorsofhumanflourishing—what is deeplyconsonantwithDewey’s insistencethatpoliticaltheorists goods,andthatSen’sas amatteroffairlydistributingprimary response proach isbest thoughtofasaresponse toRawls’ understandingofjustice Brian Butler andEric Weber. Butler arguesthatSen’s capabilitiesap- proach and classicalpragmatistthoughthave beenmaderecently by The capabilities approachThe capabilities squares view,the nicelywith expressed by I wanttosuggestthattheliberalcapabilitiesapproach reflects plu- Even more explicitcomparisonsbetween theliberalcapabilitiesap- sanctity ofhumanpotential,Kaagarguesthatwe should 57 Weber echoesasimilarsentimentwhenhe flourishing. Alifethatlacksanyoneofthese 56 ended andnonex- Butler claimsthat 55

58 He main- 54 Judith 53 So, Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 155 Weber also Weber 59

- This conception of the person, Nuss ended ethos. 60 minded and open- oriented approach that supplies a partial that supplies approach oriented of basic so- account Far be it from me to deny the majesty of this conception, or its capac- me to deny the be it from Far class of minds. But comfort to a most respectable ity to yield religious that it doesn’t no one can pretend the human point of view, from is eminently and abstractness. It the faults of remoteness suffer from It temper. the rationalistic to call ventured of what I have a product At the turn of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, when the turn of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, At sides favourably with Nussbaum’s criticism of the overly rigid concep- of the overly criticism with Nussbaum’s sides favourably of other proponents Rawls and by person that is endorsed tion of the social contract theory—one as that understands people fundamentally participate members of a contract who can who citizens,” fully as “equal only by motivated of others, and who are to the interests indifferent are interests. own the pursuit of their - or ne risk of underestimating the carries this single-mindedness and Weber flourishing. of human ends and interests of the plurality glecting “an insofar as it is capabilities approach, the goal of Nussbaum’s prefers outcome- of justice. rigid conception overly to Rawls’ cial justice,” James began to rethink the meaning of pragmatism, he defined prag- began to rethink James of modern philosophy. tendencies matism in contrast to the presiding in rationalist thinkers such as Kant, of these tendencies, reflected One experiences of indi- and lived the concrete was to abstract away from that would lectures his 1907 Lowell viduals and their communities. In experi- claimed that rationalists replaced , James become his Pragmatism of this was to permit that the result ence with abstract conception, and the immediate and to ignore philosophers to ascend to the ivory tower said, of this rationalist James public and it problems.” of “the realities conception, baum argues, leaves out many potential candidates for personhood, in- out many potential baum argues, leaves and nonhuman mental disabilities, foreigners, cluding persons with approach’s by the capabilities implied The contrasting flexibility animals. amenable to prag- thinks, is far more Weber person, conception of the open- matism’s Abstraction use of abstrac- liberalism’s criticized Dewey seen how already have We argued, in effect, that when He tion in its conception of the individual. context it is his or her social from liberalism abstracts the individual - ro more the importance libertylikely to emphasize of negative over that meaningful conceptions of libertybust, positive, that recognize absence of external constraint. than mere more human agency requires seen, it has been taken up by have This is a serious concern, and, as we many contemporary the insights of other pragmatists liberals. Adding criticism of trenchant more yields an even to this concern, however, methods of abstraction. liberalism’s 156 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 method ofauthority”: beliefsandnotothersaccordingsanctions certain towhathecalled“the relevant tothediscussionathand.Here Peirce describedhow society of thewaysthatbeliefscanbefixed. One ofhiscriticismsisparticularly beliefs as,ineffect,abstractionsfrom lived experience—criticized many social hierarchy. Fixation In “The ofBelief,” Peirce—who thoughtof ofabstractioncouldmaskthebeliefsandnormsadominant truths was, however, muchaware ofhow very indubitable thepurportedly as reticent asJames toseethe philosophical benefitsofabstraction. He Peirce1870s. not and was 1860s the from essays seminal his in voiced they live. ence tothelived experience of individualsandthesocietiesinwhich the empiricists. Truths andbeliefs,heargued,are tobejudgedinrefer- empiricism, onthisoccasionhedefinitely sidedwith rationalism and While James oftenenvisionedpragmatismasbeingabridgebetween member Peirce’s words: wholly neglectedinPeirce scholarship. It therefore, iscrucial, tore - experiences ofmarginalized individuals insociety. This pointisalmost that couldprovide alternative principlesornormsthataccount forthe onpolicingthe dissentingvoices authority isthat it dependscrucially fundamentally morallyflawed. Themoralproblem withthemethodof to fixbeliefsandabstractprinciples, Peirce argued thatthismethodis James’ criticismofabstractioniscloselyrelated toonethatPeirce While themethodofauthorityismostcommonly usedmethod a philosophicdisqualification. ‘noble,’ that oughttocount as apresumption andas against its truth, ofthingsis itseemstomethatwhenaview world ofsweat anddirt, In thisrealin whichtobenobleisinaptforhumbleservice. world’s richness. It is dapper; it is noble in the bad sense, in the sense disdains empiricism’s needs.It substitutesapallidoutlineforthereal and thosewho wield thevarious formsoforganized force inthestate mankind; of mass the govern always will authority of method The established beliefby terrifiedintosilence. opinions withhatred andhorror. Then, letallmenwhoreject the passions beenlisted,sothattheymayregard private andunusual thantheydo.should learnofsomereason Lettheir tothink otherwise from men’s apprehensions. Letthembe kept ignorant,lestthey expressed. Letallpossiblecausesofachangemindberemoved power doctrinesfrom toprevent beingtaught,advocated, or contrary perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time correct doctrinesbefore theattentionofpeople,toreiterate them Let an institution be created whichshall have for itsobject to keep 61 62

Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 157 MacKinnon MacKinnon 64 Nussbaum de- Nussbaum 65 63 biased liberal theorists are guilty of taking biased liberal theorists are will never be convinced that dangerous reasoning ought not to be not to ought reasoning dangerous that be convinced will never liberty If untrammeled is to be of speech way. in some suppressed will then uniformity of opinion forms of constraint, the grosser from society of to which the respectability a moral terrorism by be secured is method of authority the Following approval. its thorough will give the path of conformities peace. are Certain permitted; non- certain differ- in different These are forbidden. are unsafe) others (considered ent countries and in different ages; but, wherever you are, let it be may be per- and you a tabooed belief, seriously hold that you known with a cruelty refined less brutal being treated of but more fectly sure wolf. like a than hunting you But not all theorists interested in social justice have viewed this criti- in social justice have all theorists interested not But Combining the insights of James and Peirce, then, gives us the fol- gives then, and Peirce, of James Combining the insights most This very argument has one of liberalism’s been put forward by cism as reason to reject liberalism outright. Nussbaum is one such theo- liberalism outright. Nussbaum to reject cism as reason that not only is liberalism a feminist perspective, rist: she argues, from capable of accommodating these concerns, but the liberal also that the is actually MacKinnon method of abstraction that is scrutinized by strategy for achieving feminist goals. most promising points out that any method of abstraction necessarily involves bracket- necessarily involves points out that any method of abstraction she argues, of focusing on others. But, in favour ing certain features not deci- focus on, are to bracket, and which to deciding which features impartial with or neutral. And, because those sions that can be entirely these decisions, she argues usually the ones making are the most power and serve of reflect that these decisions will tend to both the interests abstract supposedly and impartial Liberalism’s those with this power. ideals can thus actually be particular can function and biased, and they contends This radical criticism thus an unjust status quo. to entrench social justice in contexts of that liberalism is incapable of achieving oppression. fends liberalism’s abstraction by arguing that the extent to which its arguing that the abstraction by fends liberalism’s men’s supposedly abstract and impartial actually reflected ideals have to that is inherent is not a problem and perspectives particular interests it has been because the when this has occurred, Rather, liberalism itself. apply liberalism’s failed to properly liberal theorists in question have When male- ideals. own men’s experiences as the norm, and of ignoring women’s interests, interests, experiences as the norm, and of ignoring women’s men’s lowing criticism of liberalism’s abstraction: the problem with liberal abstraction: the problem criticism of liberalism’s lowing important differences it makes us likely to overlook abstraction is that of a purportedly individuals in favour abstract and generalized between The tyranny of particularself that is in fact a position of power. self in a and those without the social dissenting voices, the majority will silence and at worst will be at best ignored heard make their voices to power persecuted. influential contemporaryMacKinnon. critics: Catharine 158 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 grappling withthedeficienciesofclassicalliberalism. that Addams’ project ofrethinking democraticpracticeshingedonher Addams attheturnofcentury. Judy Whipps hasrecently argued individuals—werestances ofparticular raisedrepeatedly by Jane ing generalmoralidealswithoutever losingsightoftheuniquecircum- abstraction—namely, the problems involved andapply- inarticulating matism. Many oftheissuestakenupby thepreceding discussion about canon thatneedstobeincludedinthisanalysisofliberalism andprag- pressed socioeconomicdemographics.) pects ofallpeople,herfocusisprimarilyonthosefrom themostop- corpus. (And, tobeclear, whileNussbaum is concernedwith the pros- descriptions ofpeople’s throughout lives Nussbaum’s thatrun liberal withpeople,theaccountsofpeople’sviews experiences,andtheconcrete cused ofignoringpeople’s own voices. This isalsoapparent intheinter- ultimately successful, what theyfind valuable. Now, itisnotcleartomethatthismove is embodied inhumanpractices,by usingpeople’s own judgementsabout ing humanlifeby appealingexplicitlytothenormsandvalues thatare heraccountofwhatisessentialtoaflourish- is famous:sheconstructs how Nussbaum justifiestheliberalcapabilitiesapproach forwhichshe or socialcontexts.Aswe sawabove, thisisapparent whenwe lookat is nothinglikeademandthatwe ignore people’s concrete experiences Nussbaum inherdefenceofabstraction,this particularity doeseschew reject liberalism’s ideals,buttoactuallyapplythem properly. Insofar as have notgottenthiswrong. She isarguingthatthesolutionnotto tending thatadepressing numberoftheoristsintheliberaltradition is atoddswiththedeepesttenetsofliberalism.Nussbaum isnotpre- shrining theinterests ofmenattheexpenseinterests ofwomen Thus, insofaraswomenandmenare en- ofequaldignityandworth, capable ofthisasmenare, bitasmorallyvaluable. andsotheyare every dance withone’s own evaluations ofends.” of moralchoice. “equal source ofwhichisour“power theprimary dignityandworth,” Nussbaum reminds thatallofuspossess us,iscommittedtotheview and favouritism. But noneofthisisfundamentaltoliberalism,which, rather ofnotenough. They are guiltyofunjustformsparticularity Nussbaum arguesthattheyare guiltynotoftoomuchabstractionbut nist andpostcolonial positions. femi- critique ofliberalismanticipated awholehostofcontemporary as such pragmatists Whipps andMaurice Hamington note,Addams’ rights wastobeaneducated, male,whitecitizen. Ascontemporary and elitiststandpoint:for thefoundingfathers,tobebearer of defined thefoundingof United States, forprivilegingamasculinist cized classical liberalismand,more specifically, therightsdiscoursethat At thispoint, there isafinalfigure from theclassicalpragmatist . thatconsistsintheability to planalifein accor- 67 but at the very leastNussbaum butatthevery cannotbeac- 69 Hamington even goessofaras to 66 Women bitas are every 68 Addams criti- Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 159 - - Haming 73 But it is important it to But Twenty Years at Hull at Hull Years In Twenty 74 76 This is precisely the view thatThis is precisely 75

70 —is seriously problematic. There is simply no reason to think is simply no reason There —is seriously problematic. While I do not think there is much point in fighting over the the over fighting is much point in While I do not think there 71 72 In any case, I want to suggest that Addams’ work resonates closely resonates work case, I want to suggest that Addams’ any In point this made regarding have The historical mistakes that liberals If Hamington is right, then I would be mistaken to insist that a radi- be mistaken to right, then I would is Hamington If with both radical and liberal traditions in various ways. Here, I want to ways. Here, in various with both radical and liberal traditions her writing and the efforts the consonances between of phi- emphasize to update and amend classical liberalism. losophers such as Nussbaum the applica- central point here—that that Addams’ I want us to realize neglect, or has often tended to marginalize, talk” tion of abstract “rights experiences of women and ethnic minorities—is the wholly overlook liberal, agrees an avowed also one that someone such as Nussbaum, with wholeheartedly. with led many postcolonial and feminist theorists to conclude, have notion of the that the “insistence on a substantive Chantal Mouffe, - is incompatible with the plural moral values common good and shared that must underpin democratic politics. ism” ton, in accepting and endorsing Hoff Sommers’ mischaracterization of mischaracterization Sommers’ and endorsing Hoff ton, in accepting un- perpetuates an inaccurate and unrepresentative liberal feminism, is pre here error His to. derstanding of what liberalism is committed cisely the sort at pains to of misunderstanding of liberalism that I am in this paper. correct that liberal feminism is committed to this kind of conservatism. In fact, is committed to this kind of conservatism.that liberal feminism In of who would both affirm this definition I am aware the only individual - Som Hoff and identify as one under it is Christina of liberal feminism mers. cal feminist account such as MacKinnon’s is not the is only legitimate as account such cal feminist MacKinnon’s - Ham I contend that feminist views. But of Addams’ feminist successor to a view of liberal feminism—as characterization that “seeks ington’s within existing struc women - equal opportunity and empower acquire tures” there is a repeated demand to secure what Addams called “the called “the what Addams demand to secure is a repeated there House for all individuals, not just the ones faculties” outlet for the active proper veryThis resonates closely or social sphere. of the political in control but discussion of the capabilities approach, with contemporary liberals’ feminism feminism radical as “more read is best philosophy that Addams’ claim feminism.” liberal than question of who gets to count as a legitimate feminist, let it suffice to to count as a legitimate feminist, question of who gets feminist by regarded is almost universally Sommers say that Hoff history the and ideas of the femi- misrepresenting scholars as drastically purposes. social and political for regressive nist movement - In herself did not support this type of relativism. note that Addams does imagine a common good and “Addams words, Whipps’ stead, in must come from of the good for Addams the creation yet values, shared voices.” diverse dialogue with inclusive motivates Nussbaum’s approach and it is, I contend, a view and approach that is shared Nussbaum’s motivates many other contemporaryby liberal theorists. 160 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 an irresistible impulse,anupward movement, among themassof agothereof acommongoodasmotive insocialreform. was Acentury ment asaFactor intheLaborMovement,” Addams defendstheappeal common whentheyare infactexclusive. InSettle apassagefrom- “The goods thatare genuinelycommon,ratherthangoodsthatpretend tobe liberalstopursue common also withthewillingnessof contemporary porary liberalsare incorporatingtheinsightsofclassicalpragmatists. porary My goalhere wastoshow merely ofthemanywaysthatcontem- afew Conclusion liberals. contemporary problem thatwasraisedby classical pragmatists now beingtakenupby hardly onethatissettled.But itstandsasanotherinstancewhere a capableofachievingsocialjustice,is tion affectitstenabilityasatheory level ofthesocio- at every economic order. pursued be equality”must and “liberty of ideals abstract the straction; maintain thatthesolutiontothisproblem ismore, ratherthanlessab- peopleandgroups.that ithastendedtofavour Bothalso particular that theproblem withabstractioninthemoralandpoliticalrealm is Addams’ similartoNussbaum’s. positionhere isvery Bothmaintain cisms ofclassical liberalismwouldprovide liberals witha contemporary roots.classical classical pragmatism’sunderstanding of better A criti- theory, andasetof ideals,thatcontinuestoevolve from liberalism’s liberalismisa more attention toclassicalpragmatism.Contemporary pragmatists? First, Ithinkliberalswoulddowell topay agreat deal curiosity. each otherwithmore generosity, more open- liberalsincentive toapproach pragmatistsandcontemporary porary liberals. attentions ofcontemporary hope, giveThis should,I contem- keen torevive theclassicalpragmatisttradition are alive andwell inthe least,thattheissuesoccupy theattentionofthosewhoare very son totakepragmatism more seriously. Ibelieve Ihave shown, atthe liberalism exhibitedby manypragmatists,andwouldgive liberalsrea- ism andpragmatismwouldamelioratesomeoftheantagonism toward My hopewasthathighlightingthemanyconsonances between liberal- This debate,adebateaboutwhetherliberalism’s methodsofabstrac- What elsecouldcomeofmy proposed détentebetween liberalsand industry. ofworking people,butthistimeitisforasharepart in theresults of equality. onthe There isasimilar demandatthecloseofthiscentury and right, butasameansofentranceintothesunshineliberty privileged. The universal franchisewasdemanded,notonlyasaholy people tohave theirshare thelifeof inpoliticallife—hitherto 77

mindedness, andmor 78 e Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 161 Second, I think contemporary I think pay to Second, would do well pragmatists - the pre been made abundantly clear by thing that should have One a few of the many ways merely are here shown What I hope to have ragmatists might have had an argument with classical liberalism, but had an argument have ragmatists might more attention to contemporary liberalism. If we are to take seriously attention to contemporary are more we If liberalism. total that American philosophy risks concern the commonly expressed I the contemporarymarginalization within discipline of philosophy, points of commonality for to search pragmatists would do well believe of contemporary dominant streams philosophical with the more shared for disagreement. emphasizing only the grounds thought, rather than is certainly worthwhile,course, philosophical disagreement espe- Of meaningful. substantial and But are differences cially in cases where the concerns between of meaningful overlap also many areas are there of contemporary and the concerns of contemporary pragmatists liberals. P a turf war with contemporary if not liberals seems counterproductive much to gain simply destructive. Both pragmatism and liberalism have joining forces. by contem- that exists within diversity ceding discussion is the amount of is, I think, perspectives of liberal diversity This porary liberalism. what or confusions about for a number of misconceptions responsible misconceptions have These to. liberalism must ultimately amount academic disciplines— unpopular in some made liberalism extremely particularly historical role those disciplines who focus on the pernicious in causing and justifying imperialism and co- played liberal ideals have involved the problems aim to solve lonialism, and those disciplines who ways of life that multicultural in defining and negotiating the diverse our contemporary a time when economic and characterize world. In populations, liberal- local traditions and political hegemonies threaten viewed as the outdated intellectual handmaid of frequently ism is now marginalization. And many—dare homogenization, colonization, and I say most—contemporary accept this char- pragmatists seem happy to - re this characterization, however, acterization of liberalism. Accepting has changed since the ignoring the ways in which liberalism quires their criticisms. classical pragmatists leveled in the and are that contemporary responded, have liberals can respond, These criticisms, I contend, are to their critics. of responding process our pur- given What is interesting, what is pushing liberalism forward. forward contemporary is that in moving liberalism is draw- poses here, While classical pragmatism ing much closer to classical pragmatism. more solid understanding of the history of this evolution. It could also could of the history understanding solid more It this evolution. of new have that insights pragmatic uncovering of the possibility provide the highlighting By liberal thought. integrated into been fully not yet contemporary pragmatism and classical between consonances liberal- case that further made the to have ism, I hope vein in this scholarship is warranted. 162 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 Royce, Addams, andotherpragmatists. now closelywiththethinkingofDewey, corresponds very James, Peirce, liberalism is no longersusceptible to these criticisms andin fact porary found muchtocriticize inclassicalliberalism,Icontendthat contem- “pragmatic-idealism Douglas Andersonhasnoted,Hocking’s two-sided will see,hiscriticismsofliberalism exhibitsignsofboththeirinfluences.As tant toremember thatHocking was educatedby bothRoyce andJames, and,we Royce pragmatistswho criticized Royce andcertain andhisstudents.It isimpor- work represents intersectionofthesocialand politicalthoughtof animportant with pragmatist thinkers suchasDewey andJames. That said, I thinkHocking’s cues from Josiah Royce’s “absolute” pragmatism,andthis oftensethimatodds Hocking mightstrikesomereaderscontroversial: as Hocking generallytookhis discussion isprobably inorder. This isbecauseacomparison between Dewey and this in Hocking including for explanation of word brief A 2004). Press, versity Hocking Reader, eds.John LachsandD.Micah Hester (Atlanta: Vanderbilt Uni- JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981–1990), 23. 329. 1981–1990), Press, University Illinois Southern (Carbondale: Boydston JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale:Southern Illinois University Press, 1981–1990),7. 291. 1981–1990), Press, University Illinois Southern (Carbondale: Boydston JoAnn tion inPhilosophy (New York: HenryHold &Co., 1920),51. andpossessionofintelligence.”Johning itintoaninstrument Dewey, Reconstruc- inventiveness andintelligentlydirected laborforre- cr magic creates theworld,butasagentwhoisresponsible through initiative, teems theindividualnotasanexaggeratedlyself- re- not astheoriginalshaperandfinalcauseofthings,butpurposefulenergetic sults inawayfreed from incompatibleinheritedfactors.It willregard intelligence tial philosophicreconstruction represents anattempttostatethesecausesandre- hamper andcompromise expression ofthereally modernforces andaims.Essen- was strong enoughtoproject itselfunconsciouslyintowaysofthinkingandto ancienttradition inthefollowingwhy itisphilosophicallyimportant, way:“The 1930). shaper ofthosephasesnature socialwell-being. It andlifethatobstruct es- 7. WilliamErnest Ernest Hocking,Future “The ofLiberalism,”AWilliam 6. John Dewey,Later Works “LiberalismandSocial Action,” The , vol. 11,ed. 5. John Dewey, Public “The andItsLaterWorks Problems,” The , vol. 2,ed. Thought,” and Dewey,John“Context 4. 3. John Dewey,Later Works Future “The ofLiberalism,”The , vol. 11,ed. 2. In Reconstruction inPhilosophy, Dewey explains what reconstruction is,and 1. John Dewey, Individualism Old andNew (New York: Minton Balch &Co., NOTES ” ofhisTheMeaning ofGod inHuman Experience. (See University ofMassachusetts Lowell The Later WorksThe , vol. 5,ed.JoAnn sufficient Ego which by some education isreflected inthe eating theworld,transform- [email protected] Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 163 The - The In Freedom Freedom Self, Soci- Self, - ol to Auton A William A William Ernest A William A William Ernest Autonomous Agents: Agents: Autonomous (London: on Liberty Essays Four Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Cultural and Equality, Liberalism, (New (New of Autonomy Theory and Practice The (New of Autonomy Theory and Practice The (New (New of Individualism The Lasting Elements - NJ: Prince (Princeton, of Freedom the Heart At Contr Self- From Agents: Autonomous of Philosophy Journal 84 (1987): 619–28; and Susan Wolf, 8. William Ernest Hocking, “The Future of Liberalism,” of Liberalism,” A William “The Future Hocking, Ernest Ernest William 9. Hocking, Ernest William 10. 11. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” of Concepts Liberty,” “Two Berlin, 11. Isaiah (New York: Columbia University Press, Press, Columbia University York: (New Liberalism Rawls, Political 12. John 206. 13. Ibid., 14. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Press, Clarendon (Oxford: of Freedom Raz, The Morality e.g., Joseph 15. See, Dworkin, e.g., Gerald 16. See, R. Mele, e.g., Alfred 17. See, - The Capa Development: and Human Women Nussbaum, e.g., Martha 19. See, 18. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Drucilla e.g., See, 18. Douglas Anderson, “W.E. Hocking and the Liberal Spirit,” Spirit,” Liberal and the Hocking “W.E. Anderson, Douglas - Uni Vanderbilt (Atlanta: Hester D. Micah and Lachs John eds. Reader, Hocking versity Press, 2004), 306.) criticism Hocking’s of liberalism was “pragmatic,” in was de- that individuality insofar as he believed sense, or Jamesian the Deweyan the classical liberal that did not map onto ongoing social process in an veloped was also in “idealistic,” the Roycean however, notion of Hocking, personhood. liberal con- from that might stem the relativism as he worried about sense, insofar against both criticisms leveled see, Hocking will the individual. As we ceptions of pragmatism. liberalism and Deweyan/Jamesian - Uni Vanderbilt (Atlanta: Hester Lachs and D. Micah eds. John Reader, Hocking 2004), 153. Press, versity - Uni Vanderbilt (Atlanta: Hester Lachs and D. Micah eds. John Reader, Hocking 2004), 152. Press, versity Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 6. 1937), Press, University Yale Haven: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118–72. 1969), Press, University Oxford 1993), 205. “Theand 1988), Autonomy,” of Concept Press, University Cambridge York: York: Christman (New , ed. John Autonomy on Individual Essays Citadel: Inner Oxford 1989), Press, University 54–62; and Joel “Autonomy,” Feinberg, - Ox York: Christman (New , ed. John Autonomy on Individual Essays ner Citadel: 1989), 27–53. Press, University ford 1986). Mele, R. Alfred and 1988); Press, University Cambridge York: 1995). Press, University Oxford York: (New to Autonomy Self-Control From 1990). Press, University Oxford York: (New and Reason (Cambridge: bilities Approach Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Amartya (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Diana T. Meyers, Meyers, T. 1995); and Diana Press, University Oxford York: omy (New Choice and Personal ety, (New York: Columbia University Cutting,” Genital The Challenge of Female Autonomy: Press, Women’s and 1989), “Feminism and 31 (2000): 469–491. Metaphilosophy Kernohan, Andrew 1998); Press, University ton Oppression (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Marilyn Friedman, Femi- Critique,” the Feminist Rethinking Relationships: and Social “Autonomy 1997), Press, Westview CO: (Boulder, Meyers T. , ed. Diana the Self nists Rethink Autonomy Meyers, “Personal and the of 40–61; Paradox T. - Feminine So Diana cialization,” 164 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 braska Press, 1996[1912]),194. University Press, 1999). 94–108. and Spin: Moral Obligations toResist Sexual Harassment,” Hypatia 20(2005): Them Ignore to Hay, “Whether Carol and 40–61; 1997), WestviewPress, CO: ing theFeminist Critique,” Feminist Rethink the Self, ed.Diana 1995), 17–39; Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethink- Feminist Ethics inEveryday Life, ed.Bushnell (Savage, MD:Rowman &Littlefield, Clarendon Press, 1989). Witt (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002). Essays onReason andObjectivity, secondedition,eds.LouiseAntonyandCharlotte au- tonomy, culturalpractices,andother women,”AMind ofOne’sChoices, own: Own:Feminist their of “Minds Narayan, Uma 151–180; 2000), Press, sity Agency, andthe SocialSelf, eds.MacKenzie andStoljar (New York: Oxford Univer - Opposites Attract,” Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives onAutonomy, Autonomy,” Hypatia24 (2009):26–49. Westlund,York:AndreaRelational “RethinkingUniversityPress,2000); Oxford Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives onAutonomy, Agency, andtheSocialSelf (New Stoljar,Natalie eds., and Mackenzie Catriona UniversityPress,1998); and theFeminist Health Care Ethics ResearchNetwork (Philadelphia: Temple Care,” Reidel, 1983); Susan Sherwin, “AD. Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health and Philosophy of Science,eds. Harding andHintikka (Dordrecht, Holland: Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives onEpistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, Autonomy andSociety”, Journal ofSocialPhilosophy 29(1998):81–102 ties”, Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts andPossibili- and theSocial ConstitutionofSelves”, Philosophical Studies 117 (2004):143–164; ism andtheLimitsofJustice (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981). Liberal- Sandel, Michael and 1989); Press,University Harvard (Cambridge: tity Language; vol. II: Philosophical Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Iden- 1918), 291.(Italics inoriginal .) 20 (2005):109–112. 324; and Anita Superson, “Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests,” 307– Press,1984), MIT and Blackwell MA: Cambridge, and (Oxford velopment Capabilities,” and “Rights and 259–274; Press,1995), ment, ed.Jonathan Glover andMartha Nussbaum (New York: Oxford University Sen, “Gender Inequality and Theories ofJustice,” 29. William James,29. William 28. Ibid., 70. 27. See, e.g.,Martha Nussbaum, Sex andSocialJustice (New York: Oxford 26. See, e.g.,John Christman,“Feminism andAutonomy,” Nagging Questions: 25. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, CommunityandCulture (Oxford: Self: Authentic the and Identity “Intersectional Meyers, Diana e.g., See, 24. 23. See, e.g.,Naomi Scheman,“Individualism andtheobjectsofpsychology,” 22. See, e.g.,John Christman,“Relational Autonomy, LiberalIndividualism, 21. See, e.g.,Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, vol. I:Human Agencyand James,20. William Yale Journal ofLawandFeminism 1 (1989): 7–36; Marina Oshana “Personal The Politics of Women’s Health: Exploring Agency andAutonomy, ed.Sherwin Principles vol. 1(New ofPsychology York: Holt andCo., Essays Empiricism inRadical (Omaha: University ofNe- Women, Culture, andDevelop- Resources, Values, andDe- Meyers (Boulder, Relational Hypatia Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 165 - De Spheres Spheres A William A William A William A William reedom and reedom F 106 (1996): 576– Ethics 12 (1984): 81–96, and Liberalism and the Limits of and the Limits Liberalism Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce S. Peirce Charles of the Transactions Philosophical Papers, vol. I: Human I: Human vol. Papers, Philosophical (New York: Columbia University Columbia University York: (New Liberalism Political (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Dame of Notre University Dame: (Notre mages of the Age - Uni Princeton (Princeton: of Difference and the Politics Justice 15 Politics (2003): Theoretical - 387–403, and of “Free Journal (Notre Dame: University of University Dame: Which Rationality? (Notre Whose Justice? Society S. Peirce Charles of the 41 (2005): Transactions 101–118, and (New York: Agreement By Oxford (New York: Morals University Press, 1987); and - Claren (Oxford: and Government Theory of Freedom A Republicanism: I the Self- Against 40. Mill’s utilitarian 40. liberalism Mill’s falls near the minimal end of the continuum. (New York: Minton Balch & Co., & Co., Balch Minton York: for Certainty (New The Quest Dewey, 35. John 257. 36. Ibid., - and Post Community Gender, the Self: Situating Benhabib, e.g., Seyla 37. See, 38. See, as e.g., “Freedom Antipower,” Philip Pettit, Rawls, John 39. See 32. Ibid., 311. 32. Ibid., - and the Meta James C. Lamberth, cited in David William James, William 33. 34. Douglas Anderson, “W.E. Hocking and the Liberal Spirit,” 30. Though see, contra this claim, the arguments made by Robert Talisse and and Talisse Robert made by the arguments this claim, see, contra Though 30. and the Spirit,” Liberal Hocking “W.E. Anderson, 31. Douglas - Uni (Cambridge, MA: Harvard A Restatement as Fairness: and Justice 1993) Press, 2001). Press, versity Contemporary minimal theories include, e.g., Ann liberals who embrace relatively of “The Ann Cudd, Paradox See Nozick. and Robert Gauthier, David Cudd, ed. in Amy Baehr, and Oppression,” Rationality, Preference, Liberal Feminism: (Roman Liberalism of Feminist Varieties & Littlefield, 2004): 37–62; Gauthier, David A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of the Psychology to the Politics From Theory of Freedom: 1997), and A don Press, 2001), and “Agency- Press, University Oxford (Oxford: Agency Books, 1974). , (USA: Basic and Utopia State, Anarchy, Nozick, Robert eds. John Lachs and D. Micah Hester (Atlanta: Vanderbilt Vanderbilt (Atlanta: Hester D. Micah Lachs and eds. John Reader, Hocking Ernest 2004), 311. Press, University 1957), 257. Mac- Alasdair 1992); Press, Polity (Cambridge: Ethics modernism in Contemporary Intyre, Press, 1978) and Notre Dame Press, 1988); Charles Taylor, - of Mod The Making of the Self: Sources II: Philosophical and Language; vol. Agency Walzer, Michael 1989); Press, University Harvard (Cambridge: ern Identity and 1983); Books, Basic York: (New and Equality of Pluralism A Defense of Justice: Young, Marion Iris 1990). Press, versity 604, and (Cambridge: Harvard Philosophy of a Public in Search Discontent: America mocracy’s 1996). Press, University eds. John Lachs and D. Micah Hester (Atlanta: Vanderbilt Vanderbilt (Atlanta: Hester Lachs and D. Micah eds. John Reader, Hocking Ernest 311. 2004), Press, University 217. 1999), Press, University . (Cambridge: Cambridge physics of Experience Freedom,” Option- - and Pub Philosophy and Jackson,” A Comment on Goodin dom and Probability: lic Affairs (2008) 36: 206–220; and Michael Sandel, Cambridge 1982), Press, University and York: (New Justice “The - Re Procedural Theory Political Self,” public and the Unencumbered “Still Searching for a Pragmatist Pluralism,” Pluralism,” for a Pragmatist Searching “Still Scott Aiken. See Robert Talisse and Scott Aiken, “Why Pragmatists Cannot be Cannot “Why Scott Aiken, and Pragmatists Talisse Robert Aiken. See Scott Pluralists,” 145–160. Society 41 (2005): 166 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 Pluralism,” “Can Democracy bea Way ofLife:Deweyan Democracy andtheProblem of Talisse, “RawlsonPluralism andStability,”173–194, (2003): 15 Critical Review Culture, and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Martha University Press,1993); and Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds., tha Nussbaum Sen, and Amartya eds.,TheQuality ofLife (New York:Oxford Mar - and University1999); Press,Oxford (Oxford: Commodities andCapabilities and and 324, Development (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell and MIT Press, 1984), 307– James, Dewey andRorty (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2009),160. Liberalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75(1994):186–216. rely explicitlyonpragmatistideas.See Jean CommonFaith Hampton, “The of racy (New York: Routledge, 2007). Politics (New York: Routledge, 2005),andAPragmatist Philosophy ofDemoc- MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). lumbia University Press, 1993)andJustice asFairness: ARestatement (Cambridge, bridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1971),Political Liberalism (New York: Co- York:UniversityOxfordJohnRawls, Press, and 1987); Gauthier, David 2000); Press, University Harvard EthicsRonald 343-359; 101(1991): Dworkin, Work: AManifesto for Women ofthe World (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006). ues bridge University Press, 1995). Berofsky, Bernard and 465-86; (1987): Perfectionism and Restraint (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998). Wall,Steven and 1996); Press,University York: Oxford(New Ethics bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); L. W. Sumner, Sher, George 1986); Press, Raz, Joseph 1989); Press, endon Kymlicka, Will 1993); Press, 5(2008):106–128. Epistemology ward aSocial Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism,”Episteme: AJournal ofSocial See Jean Hampton, “Should Political Philosophy by Done withoutMetaphysics?” clude, e.g.,Jean Hampton, Martha Nussbaum, Joseph Raz,andRobert Talisse. liberalswhoembracerelatively substantivetinuum. Contemporary theoriesin- Ethics temic Abstinence,” Oxford University Press, 1999); Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epis- (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); and Linda Hirshman, Linda and UniversityPress,2003); Indiana (Bloomington: 49. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, “Rights and Capabilities,” and “Rights Sen, Amartya e.g., See, 49. in Hope and Historicity Transition: as Pragmatism Koopman, Colin 48. 47. Jean Hampton makes a very similar argument, although one that does not Robert46. Talisse,PragmatismLiberalism: Democracyafter Deliberativeand PositiveFreedom”Individual and “Liberalism Christman, John e.g., See, 45. 44. See, e.g., Kimberly Yuracko, Value” and “Freedom Benson, Paul e.g., See, 43. Hurka, Thomas e.g., See, 42. 41. Kant’s deontological liberalism falls near the substantive end of the con- the of end substantive the near falls liberalism Kant’sdeontological 41. Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1992),and 99 The StandardUniversityCambridge ofLiving(Cambridge: Press, 1989), (1989): Transactions oftheCharles S.Peirce Society39(2003):1–21,and“To - 791–814; Martha Nussbaum, 9(1990): Philosophy &Public Affairs19 Beyond Neutrality: PerfectionismPolitics and (Cam- Liberalism, CommunityandCulture (Oxford: Clar- The Morality ofFreedom (Oxford: Clarendon Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Val- Liberation from Self (New York: Cam- Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge,MA: Sex andSocialJustice(New York: Morals By Agreement (New A ofJusticeTheory (Cam- Journal ofPhilosophy 84 Welfare, Happiness and Resources, Values, and 3-46; and Robert and 3-46; Liberalism, Women, Get to Consonances Between Liberalism and Pragmatism • Carol Hay 167 Daedalus: the Daedalus: Toward a Feminist Theory a Feminist Toward (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907), & Co., Green, Longmans, York: (New Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law Discourses on Unmodified: Feminism - (Chicago: Uni Addams of Jane The Social Philosophy - and Constructivism: the Epistemol On Rawls, Dewey - and Constructivism: the Epistemol On Rawls, Dewey (New York: Oxford University University Oxford York: (New and Social Justice Sex Pragmatism Pragmatism (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1970), 91. Co., Publishing World The (Cleveland: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and 1999), Press, University Oxford (Oxford: Justice and Social Sex Capabilities and Social Justice: The Political Philosophy of Amartya Sen Sen of Amartya Philosophy The Political Social Justice: and Capabilities (Oxford: Oxford University University Oxford (Oxford: and Social Justice Sex Nussbaum, 50. Martha 40 51. Ibid., 40 52. Ibid., 42 53. Ibid., 54. John Kaag, “Pragmatism and the Lessons of Experience,” Pragmatism and Social Hope: Deepening Democracy in Global in Global Democracy Deepening and Social Hope: Pragmatism Green, 55. Judith - Fu the (Pragmatic) to Back Theory of Justice: The “Sen’s Butler, 56. Brian 228. 57. Ibid., 58. Thomas Eric Weber, 59. Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Species Nationality, Disability, of Justice: Frontiers Nussbaum, 59. Martha 60. Thomas Eric Weber, 61. William James, 61. William James, - Pragma The American of Belief,” “The Fixation Peirce, 62. Charles Sanders 97. 63. Ibid., 64. Catharine MacKinnon, Nussbaum, 65. Martha 57. 66. Ibid., be charge that it must, ultimately, Louise Antony’s in mind here 67. I have - Post a Through Theory Democratic Addams’s “Examining Whipps, Judy 68. Hamington, 69. Maurice Press, 1999), 39 Press, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2008). Publishing, Ashgate (Burlington: and Martha Nussbaum Nussbaum, Nussbaum, - Cam (Cambridge: Approach The Capabilities Development: Human and Women and Nationality, Disability, of Justice: 2001), and Frontiers Press, bridge University Capabilities: Creating 2007), and Press, Belknap (Cambridge: Membership Species Approach Development The Human (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011); and John Alexander, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 138 (2009): 67 of Arts Academy of the American Journal 2008), 238. Press, Columbia University York: Contexts (New 7 (2010): 219–229. Pragmatism Contemporary ture,” (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), Group, Publishing International Continuum York: ogy (New of Justice 63–64. (Cambridge: 2006), Membership Belknap 274. Press, As Thomas quoted in Eric (New of Justice and Constructivism: the Epistemology Rawls, Dewey On Weber, 2010), 149, note 52. Group, Publishing Continuum International York: (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 86. Group, Publishing International Continuum York: ogy (New of Justice versity of Illinois Press, 2009). Press, of Illinois versity 71–72. tists: Selected Writings 1991). Press, University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard of State 1999). Press, justificatory commitments that do the antecedent normative in work Nussbaum’s 111 Ethics and Norms,” “Natures Louise Antony, See the capabilities approach. (2000): 5–36. ed. Hamington, Addams, of Jane Interpretations Lens,” Feminist colonial Feminist 2010). Press, University State College: Penn (State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), and 1987), Press, University Harvard MA: (Cambridge, 168 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 48 Number 2 trayed Women the tenetsofpragmatism. progress thatplacesmanyofthetenetsliberalism squarely inlinewithmanyof have reason liberalismhasmade— toattendtheprogress thatcontemporary pragmatists classical pragmatisttradition,itisstillthecasethatcontemporary liberalsforforgettingorignoringthe am misguidedforfaultingcontemporary way ofrefuting suchanobjectiondefinitively. However, whileitmightbethatI that Iamexplicitlynotattemptingtotracethelineagesoftheseideas,have no anonymous referee forthissuggestion.) This is,ofcourse,apossibility, andgiven toan discussions.(Thanks special credit forthecultivation ofthesecontemporary our culture no or ways oflife, in wayssuchthat the classical pragmatists deserve classical pragmatists.Perhaps theseideaswere simplyintheair, orsuffusedinto of theideasIhave discussedhere independentlyofanydirect influencefrom the 179–180. Nineteenth Liberalism Century (New York: Bob-M University Press, 1993) Rawls, John 557–579; (1995): 105 and “CivicEducationlic Affairs22(1993):171–206, andSocial Diversity,” ChallengeofMulticulturalismman, “The inPolitical Ethics,” Gut- Amy 1991); Press,University Cambridge (Cambridge: Liberalin the State (State College:Penn State University Press, 2010),283. colonial Feminist Lens,”Feminist Interpretations ofJane Addams, Hamington, ed. ton, ed.(State College:Penn State University Press, 2010),283. a Postcolonial Feminist Lens,” Feminist Interpretations ofJane Addams, Haming- Philosophy 21(1990):57–58. “More onLiberalism,Gender Hierarchy, andScarlettO’Hara,” Journal ofSocial on Women andMarriage,” Journal ofSocialPhilosophy 21,(1990)75–90,and 72. ChristinaHoff Sommers, WhoStole Feminism?: How Women Have Be - 71. Ibid., 10. 70. Ibid., 10. 78. Of course, it is possible that contemporary liberals came to many or most or many to came liberals contemporary that possible Ofis 78. it course, 77. Jane Settlement Addams, asaFactor “The intheLaborMovement,” Late 76. See, e.g., William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, andDiversity 75. Judy Whipps, “Examining Addams’s Democratic Theory Through aPost- 74. Cited in Judy Whipps, “Examining Addams’s Democratic Theory Through 73. See, e.g.,Marilyn Friedman, Lived Happily Ever “They After:Sommers (New York: Touchstone, 1994). Political Liberalism (New York:Columbia errill Company, 1962), Philosophy andPub- Ethics