NIGHT OF THE

THE SECOND NAVAL BATTLE OF WAS A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN A TURNING POINT CAMPAIGN.

RICHARD H. WAGNER (Originally published in The Log, Navy League of the United States, New York Council, Winter 2005)

t the , the action. It was not until the stopped the action that Japanese hopes of retaking Aforward advance of the Empire the island were ended. Moreover, the of Japan. However, by that time, the battleship action was a desperate gamble Japanese had conquered a great deal of that involved risking the last heavy territory and were poised to resume their surface in the Pacific in a way that march. It was not until the Guadalcanal was contrary to established doctrine and campaign (August 1942 - February in a type of fighting that the Japanese 1943) that the Americans began to retake had shown themselves to be masters. territory and put the Japanese on the defensive. The bitter fighting on that island is legendary. However, there was also a series of naval actions off Guadalcanal that played a crucial role in the campaign. These were not what is USS (BB 56) commonly thought of as the typical World War II naval action. Air power : 41,000 full load only played a supporting part. The tons actions centered upon fierce night LENGTH: 729 feet surface actions in confined waters. : 108 feet The decisive naval actions of the SPEED: 28 knots campaign took place during the period POWER PLANT: 12 November to 15 November 1941. ARMAMENT: Nine 16 inch 45 These actions are called by a variety of caliber: names but the most common Twenty 5 inch 38 caliber; nomenclature is to call the Sixty 40mm; / action on the night of Thirty-six 20mm 12-13 November, the First Naval Battle CREW: 1,880 of Guadalcanal and the battleship action COMMISSIONED: 15 May 1941 on the night of 14-15 November, the DECOMMISSIONED: 27 June 1947 Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. While popular histories have tended to focus on the cruiser/destroyer action, this article will focus on the battleship 1 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. The Campaign the airfield was completed it would pose a threat to the line of communication uadalcanal is the largest island in between the United States and . the Solomons chain. It lies Moreover, it could be used to launch a Gsouth of the equator in the Coral new thrust towards Port Moseby, New Sea, southeast of and Guinea - - the objective the Japanese had northeast of Australia. The Solomons been prevented from taking in the Battle are arranged in a loose column of twos of the Coral Sea. heading northwest from Guadalcanal Although the bulk of American toward . The water lying resources was being sent to the European between the columns was nicknamed Theater, an amphibious assault force was "The Slot" by the Americans who fought quickly scraped together and on 7 in the Solomons campaign. At the August 1942, the First Marine Division Guadalcanal end of The Slot is another was landed on Guadalcanal and Marine body of water with an American Raiders on where the Japanese nickname. It is bounded by Guadalcanal had built a base. The Marines on the south, on the west, captured the Guadalcanal airfield the and Tulagi and Florida islands to the next day, renaming it Henderson Field north. The name for it is "Ironbottom after a Marine flyer killed at Midway. Sound." Then, things started to go bad. Prior to 1942, no one took much Upon hearing of the invasion, Vice interest in Guadalcanal. It was Gunichi Mikawa, IJN, led a discovered by Spanish explorers in the force of and from the 1560s but nothing came of their plan to large Japanese base at Rabaul down The colonize the island. The French Slot to attack the American ships rediscovered it in the 1700s but the supporting the invasion. His force malaria-ridden island was so devoid of entered shortly after natural resources and inhabited by such midnight achieving complete surprise. cantankerous natives that no one wanted Four Allied heavy cruisers and a it. At the end of the 19th Century, the destroyer were sunk and another heavy European powers divided-up the Pacific cruiser and two destroyers damaged. Islands and Britain agreed to take However, concerned that his force might Guadalcanal. A few missionaries and be attacked by carrier-based aircraft if it coconut planters from Australia came to was still off Guadalcanal when daylight the island. However, with its over- broke, Mikawa decided to return to base powering smell of rotting vegetation, without attacking the defenseless dense jungle, swamps, meadows with transports unloading at the beachhead. seven foot tall grass that can cut through The was thus a clothing, and steep mountains, the island humiliating defeat but at least it was not went undeveloped. a complete disaster. In July 1942, aerial Ironically, Mikawa need not have reconnaissance detected that the worried. Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, Japanese were constructing an airfield USN, had withdrawn the three aircraft on Guadalcanal. This information carriers that had covered the landings on required immediate action because when the grounds that his fighter strength had 2 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. been greatly reduced as a result of of action by a in the same operations and that his ships were engagement. starting to run low on fuel. Since after On the night of 11 October, a the Savo debacle there was practically force of cruisers and destroyers under nothing left to defend the transports, the command of RADM , they were withdrawn on 9 August after USN, intercepted two Japanese cruisers unloading only half their cargoes. and two destroyers, which were on the Consequently, the Marines were left way to bombard Henderson Field. In the holding a small area around the airfield Battle of Cape Esperance, one Japanese with very little supplies. cruiser was sunk and the other badly Using captured Japanese damaged at the cost of one destroyer construction equipment, the Marines sunk, and a and a destroyer finished the airfield in early September damaged. and an assortment of Marine, Army, and Two nights later, however, the Navy aircraft were flown in. "The battleships KONGO and HARUNA Cactus Air Force," named for the code appeared in Ironbottom Sound and name for Guadalcanal, gave the bombarded Henderson Field destroying Americans air superiority. However, the 48 aircraft. Although determined attacks campaign stalemated. Each side by PT boats made the battleships so funneled in reinforcements, the nervous that they went away, cruisers Americans by freighter during daylight, carried on the bombardment the next two the Japanese by the " Express" - - nights. primarily destroyers that would speed Another carrier engagement took down The Slot at night bringing supplies place on 26-27 October, when and reinforcements. Still, despite heavy ENTERPRISE and USS HORNET (CV fighting, the Americans (including Army 8) encountered four carriers sent to cover troops landed in October) could not a major land offensive directed at advance and the Japanese could not retaking Henderson Field. Two retake the airfield. Japanese carriers were knocked out of Meanwhile, offshore, the fighting commission but HORNET was sunk in was similarly intense. On 24 August, a the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. This force built around USS SARATOGA left the damaged ENTERPRISE as the (CV 3), USS ENTERPRISE (CV 6), and only operational carrier in the Pacific. USS NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55) engaged a force centered around three The Barroom Brawl Japanese carriers and sank the carrier RYUJO. Shortly after the Battle of the y early November, the Japanese Eastern Solomons, SARATOGA was realized that two conditions had torpedoed by a and rendered Bto be met in order to win on out of action for three months. USS Guadalcanal. First, the Japanese had to WASP (CV 7) was not as lucky. She significantly outnumber the Americans was torpedoed and sunk while escorting on the ground. This would require a a group of transports to Guadalcanal. large-scale reinforcement of the NORTH CAROLINA was also put out garrison. Second, Henderson Field had to be neutralized so as to give the 3 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. Japanese control of the air and the seas. relief force would not arrive in time and The Cactus Air Force was shooting that defending the island was up to the down Japanese planes at a ratio of 10 to escort ships. one. Accordingly, between 2 November After thwarting an attack on the and 10 November, 65 destroyer loads of transports by Japanese on the troops landed on the island tipping the afternoon of 12 November, Callaghan scale so that the Japanese outnumbered took the transports to sea. After dark, the Americans for the first time. the escort ships broke away from the Furthermore, on 11 November, the transports and formed into a line of Japanese assembled eleven transports battle to wait for the Japanese in loaded with 13,500 troops and supplies. Ironbottom Sound. Unfortunately, This convoy would be supported by a Callaghan had little experience with battle group centered upon the radar and put the ships with the best battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA. In radar, USS FLETCHER (DD 455) at the addition to escorting the convoy, this end of the column. Compounding this force was to bombard Henderson Field error, he kept his flag on SAN into rubble. FRANCISCO, which had a relatively American intelligence got wind poor communications suite. Nor did he of the apanese plan and Vice Admiral inform the other ships of his battle plan. William Halsey, USN, who had replaced The Japanese bombardment Vice Admiral R. Ghormley, USN, as group was not expecting a naval battle as South Pacific , dispatched it entered Ironbottom Sound in the ENTERPRISE screened by USS moonless early hours of 13 November, WASHINGTON (BB 56) and USS assuming that the American SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57) as well as had departed the area at sunset. As a by two cruisers and eight destroyers to result, the two virtually crashed counter the Japanese attack. Since into each other. At almost point blank ENTERPRISE was still under repair in range, the ships began firing shells and Nouema, Halsey ordered that the two torpedoes. Japanese searchlights battleships and half the destroyers to illuminated American ships. Tracers and proceed ahead if the carrier could not star shells lit the night. A series of make the battle zone in time. confusing orders emanated from the Meanwhile, two American American flagship including directions convoys reached Guadalcanal. The first to cease fire, fire at the "big ones," and was escorted by the antiaircraft cruiser that odd numbered ships should fire to ATLANTA (CL 51) and four destroyers port and even numbered ships fire to under Admiral Scott while the second starboard - - failing to take into account was escorted by the SAN the actual position of the various ships in FRANCISCO (CA 38), three other relation to the enemy. Friendly fire cruisers, and five destroyers under Rear smashed into nearby ships in the general Admiral Daniel Callaghan, USN. When confusion. A destroyer came so close to coastwatchers and aircraft reported a a battleship that the battlewagon was large force of two battleships, a light unable to depress its to fire. cruiser, and 14 destroyers moving down However, the destroyer's torpedoes were The Slot, the Americans realized that the unable to arm before hitting the 4 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. battleship. Machine gunners raked the placed under the command of Vice battleship’s but a 14 inch shell Admiral Nouburke Kon caused the destroyer to disappear as she do, IJN, and given the task of attempted to escape. neutralizing Henderson Field. The raid In a half hour it was all over. was planned for late on the night of 14 Callaghan and Scott were dead. All of November. the American cruisers were heavily damaged and incapable of further The Big Guns’ Turn fighting. ATLANTA would sink the next day. Four destroyers had sunk and a oncern that the only operational fifth was heavily damaged. However, carrier in the Pacific was in a HIEI was badly damaged and was Cvulnerable position led Halsey to limping slowly home. Two Japanese order the ENTERPRISE task force to destroyers were sunk and two others return to Nouema. Most of the aircraft badly damaged. Most importantly, the had already flown off to operate out of bombardment group had turned back Henderson Field. Most importantly, without destroying Henderson Field. Halsey recognized that the However, the Americans knew that the cruiser/destroyer action had only delayed Japanese would return. the Japanese, not stopped them. In daylight, aircraft from Accordingly, on 13 November, Henderson Field, found HIEI crawling WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA, up The Slot and finished her. But the and four destroyers were detached under Japanese struck back. A submarine sank the command of Rear Admiral Willis USS JUNEAU (CL 52) and two heavy “Ching” Lee Jr., USN, and ordered to cruisers bombarded Henderson Field just proceed at “best speed” to Guadalcanal. after midnight destroying 18 planes and However, even at top speed, they would damaging 32 others. Still, the field was not arrive until the morning of 14 operational. November. On the following morning (14 Lee’s assignment was contrary to November), airmen from Henderson established doctrine. Battleships were Field and ENTERPRISE, now some 200 not supposed to be used in confined miles from Guadalcanal, and B-17s from waters such as Ironbottom Sound. , found the transport Moreover, the force had never operated convoy and managed to sink six together as a group. The four destroyers transports. But even this was not enough were of different classes and different to stop the attack. The Japanese loaded divisions and were selected because they the survivors from the sinking transports were the ones in the ENTERPRISE Task onto destroyers. The remaining Force with the most fuel. Neither had transports eventually were able to beach WASHINGTON and SOUTH themselves on Guadalcanal and DAKOTA operated together except as disembark their troops. parts of the ENTERPRISE screen. Meanwhile, at Rabaul, a new WASHINGTON had only heavy bombardment group, including entered the Pacific for the first time in KIRISHIMA, two heavy cruisers, two late August. She was the second of the light cruisers and eight destroyers, was NORTH CAROLINA class, the first 5 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. class of fast battleships. Ironbottom Sound. Lee had arranged the WASHINGTON had been ships in a column with the destroyers commissioned in May 1941. Her first USS WALKE (DD 416), USS assignment when the war began was to BENHAM (DD 397), USS PRESTON escort the supply convoys from Britain (DD 377), and USS GWIN (DD 433), in to Murmansk, Russia, in case the the lead, followed 5,000 yards later by German battleship TIRPITZ should WASHINGTON and then another 1,000 emerge from her lair in the Norwegian yards by SOUTH DAKOTA. While Lee fjords. Since arriving in the South knew that the Japanese were more Pacific, she had largely been assigned experienced than his force, “we entered missions independent of the carrier task the action confident that we could forces and had not seen much action. outshoot the enemy.” Admiral Lee, who was a gunnery expert, At the same time, Kondo was however, required his flagship to approaching down The Slot. His force maintain a rigorous schedule of gunnery was divided into two groups: the main practice. body consisting of KIRISHIMA, and the SOUTH DAKOTA was the heavy cruisers ATAGO and TAKAO; a name-ship of the second class of fast screening group composed of the light battleships. Designed in the late 1930s cruiser NAGURA, and six destroyers; when the United States was still trying to and the sweeping group, light cruiser live within the requirements of the SENDAI and three destroyers, which London Naval Treaty, she attempted to was to comb the waters for American remedy the perceived shortcomings of ships. the NORTH CAROLINAs in a shorter WASHINGTON picked up radio and more compact . Commissioned traffic from American PT boats in March 1942, she had run aground indicating that they had two “big ones” shortly after entering the Pacific in in sight and were about to attack. Lee August. This was a blessing in disguise took the microphone and tried to since when she went to for convince Guadalcanal that the PT boats repairs, her antiaircraft battery was were about to attack American ships. improved with new 40mm and 20mm When they refused to believe him guns. These showed their worth during because he did not know the proper the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands when code, Lee bet that Maj. Gen Alexander she shot down 26 enemy aircraft that Vandergrift, USMC, commanding were attacking ENTERPRISE, thus general on Guadalcanal, might saving that carrier from the same fate as remember his nick name at the Naval HORNET. However, after a collision Academy and told the skeptical radio with a destroyer, sailors were saying operator: “This is Ching Chong China SOUTH DAKOTA was jinxed. Lee! Chinese catchee? Refer your boss Informed by radio of the air about Ching Lee. Call off your boys!” battle against the transports, Lee decided The PT boats, which had been listening not to risk his ships in confined water to this exchange, responded: “Identity during daylight. As a result, it was not established. We are not after you.” until 2100 on 14 November that the Near midnight, WASHINGTON WASHINGTON task force entered detected targets on her radar. A few 6 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. minutes later, the main battery was firing effective as the battleship continued to at SENDAI while the secondary battery have power failures throughout the targeted destroyer AYANAMI. Joined engagement. by fire from SOUTH DAKOTA, the fire Ahead of the battleships were the from the secondary battery sank the burning remains of WALKE and Japanese destroyer. PRESTON. In order not to be Japanese lookouts reported four silhouetted by the fires, the officer of the American destroyers and two Lt. Ray Hunter, USN, ordered battleships. Kondo dismissed these WASHINGTON to turn to the left so reports. The Americans had no that the burning destroyers would be battleships. The large ships must be between the battleships and the enemy. cruisers. He was not going to let such a SOUTH DAKOTA, however, force distract him from his main mission did not follow. Instead, either because of neutralizing Henderson Field. The of her electrical problems or to avoid a screening force would engage the collision with BENHAM, she continued Americans. on the original course. Meanwhile, the American WASHINGTON proceeded into destroyers raced forward to attack the the darkness. Since GWIN and Japanese screening force. However, BENHAM were badly damaged, Lee searchlights illuminated PRESTON and ordered them to retire. Passing the within minutes s the crew was survivors of the sunken destroyers, abandoning the burning wreck. WASHINGTON jettisoned her life rafts WALKE was hit by a torpedo and into the water. The destroyer sailors exploded. Another torpedo blew off a cheered and called out “Get after them portion of BENHAM’s but she WASHINGTON!” continued to shoot. GWIN was hit by a The flagship upon her SG radar shell in the engine room that caused a to maneuver and locate enemy ships in series of explosions. Within minutes, all the darkness. However, a problem four American destroyers were emerged when SOUTH DAKOTA failed effectively out of the action. But, the to follow WASHINGTON’s course destroyers had broken up the Japanese change. When the radar had been formation and absorbed torpedoes which installed at the otherwise would have been fired at the earlier in the year, there had been a battleships. “It was beyond admiration,” heated argument about where the radar Lee wrote later, “and it probably saved antenna should be placed. The ship’s our bacon.” gunnery officers had argued for placing SOUTH DAKOTA had a history it on top of the so as to give a full of electrical problems and to avoid such 360 degree view. The designers argued a problem now, the chief engineer tied that a more secure location would be down the circuit breakers. slightly lower. Although that location Unfortunately, this put the system into left an 80 degree blind spot to aft, the series and the ship lost all electrical designers won out. Now, the radar gave power. Guns, radar, communications, a good reading on a large target. It was turret motors were all gone. Attempts to probably one of the heavy cruisers or restore power were only temporarily KIRISHIMA. However, Lee refused to 7 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. give permission to open fire. He had guns depressed to minimum elevation, heard nothing from SOUTH DAKOTA. she fired some 75 16 inch shells and 107 The large target could be Japanese or it five inch shells at the enemy battleship. might be SOUTH DAKOTA. With the “Salvos were walked back and forth blind spot in the radar, Lee did not have across the target.” a full view of the battlefield. A false report that the target was On board SOUTH DAKOTA, sunk, caused WASHINGTON to cease everything was going wrong. She was fire. This gave KIRISHIMA time to turn now between the burning destroyers and her guns on WASHINGTON. The two the Japanese and thus silhouetted against ships then traded salvos but the Japanese the flames. As a result, searchlights first were unable to find their mark. In a few from the screening force and then from minutes, KIRISHIMA, glowing cherry the main body found her and she was red, was out of commission and had to took hit after hit. Her superstructure was be abandoned. heavily damaged, her radar plot, radio WASHINGTON’s appearance communications, and five of six fire diverted the Japanese fleet from their control radars were out of action, and pummeling of SOUTH DAKOTA. she was leaking oil. When she According to Washington’s Action attempted to reply, a salvo from her Report: “From 0100 to 0107, fired 120 number three main battery set fire to one rounds 5”, at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 of the float planes on her stern catapults. yards, in succession at three enemy Luckily, a second salvo blew the plane cruisers illuminating and engaging overboard and the crew put out the SOUTH DAKOTA and also under fire flames. by her; they were silenced.” As the It took some time to convince enemy searchlights swung round to him but Kondo eventually realized that locate the ship that was firing out of the he was not fighting a cruiser. Rather, darkness, SOUTH DAKOTA decided it this was one of America’s latest class of was time to make an exit. With her battleships, embodying the best of electricity partially restored, SOUTH American technology. It would be an DAKOTA limped into the darkness. honor to sink such an adversary. But, in SOUTH DAKOTA’s departure the excitement, did he remember that the left WASHINGTON engaging six ships lookouts had reported that there were single-handed. (Three destroyers had two large American ships? been assigned to rescue survivors from Suddenly, KIRISHIMA shook as KIRISHIMA). As WASHINGTON shells from WASHINGTON’s main headed north along the coast of Savo, the battery tore into her. In the moonless remaining Japanese ships gave chase. darkness, WASHINGTON had come up However, discouraged by on KIRISHIMA’s other side. When the WASHINGTON’s heavy fire, the Japanese battleship illuminated SOUTH Japanese withdrew under cover of a DAKOTA, Lee knew who was where. smoke screen. As they did, they fired a “Their searchlights provided excellent series of torpedoes. WASHINGTON illumination of SOUTH DAKOTA, but maneuvered and the torpedoes exploded attracted our fire and provided a point of in her wake. aim.” With WASHINGTON’s 16 inch 8 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission. Kondo had lost his largest ship campaign. With Henderson Field and his cruisers were damaged. It was destroyed and the waters around impossible to proceed further and attack Guadalcanal swept of all Allied Henderson Field. Accordingly, he combatants larger than a PT boat, the signaled his disorganized force to retreat Japanese would have had control of the back up The Slot. air and the sea. No supplies or The next morning, reinforcements could reach the WASHINGTON met SOUTH beleaguered soldiers and Marines on the DAKOTA at a prearranged rendezvous. island. In contrast, the Japanese would Having sustained 42 hits, SOUTH have been able to supply and reinforce at DAKOTA was badly damaged and will. Moreover, there was nothing left in would have to return to the U.S. for the Pacific to stop them. Thus, the repairs. WASHINGTON, amazingly, pivotal nature of the battleship action is had sustained no casualties and the only clear. Admiral Chester Nimitz, USN, damage was a hole in one of the radar wrote: “The success or failure in antennas. BENHAM had had to be recapturing Guadalcanal, and the vital abandoned and was sunk by gunfire naval battle related to it, is the fork in the from GWIN. With the survivors from road that leads to victory.” BENHAM, GWIN proceeded to Espiritu This article is dedicated to the Santo. PT boats and a destroyer rescued late William R. Wagner, whose first- 266 survivors from WALKE and hand account of the battleship action PRESTON. was the genesis of this article. The battleship action of 14-15 November put an end to Japanese hopes of driving the Americans from Guadalcanal. They had been thwarted in their attempts to neutralize Henderson Field and although some reinforcements were able to land, they did so without supplies and, in some cases, without their rifles. There would be other surface engagements in the waters off Guadalcanal but they would be in connection with Japanese attempts to evacuate the island. The Marines and the Army would encounter fierce resistance until February 1943 but that fighting would be in connection with taking the remainder of the island rather than defending the small area around Henderson Field that the Marines had held since August. If the battleships had failed, it is difficult to see how the United States could have won the Guadalcanal 9 Copyright Richard H. Wagner All rights reserved. This article may only be used by permission.