KAZAKHSTAN AS AN EMERGING REGIONAL POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA

BY

MR. TANAPAT VATCAHRANGURA

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIALFULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC YEAR 2017 COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL KAZAKHSTAN AS AN EMERGING REGIONAL POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA

BY

MR. TANAPAT VATCHARANGURA

A THESISSUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OFPOLITICAL SCIENCE IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC YEAR 2017 COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL

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Thesis Title KAZAKHSTAN AS AN EMERGING REGIONAL POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA Author Mr.Tanapat Vatcharangura Degree Master of Political Science Major Field/Faculty/University Politics and International Relations Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University Thesis Advisor Asst. Prof. M. L. Pinitbhand Paribatra, Ph.D. Academic Years 2017

ABSTRACT

World politics is moving towards multipolarity and has even been considered by some scholars as a post-American international order. William Wohlforth argued, based on a realist assumption, a multipolar system is the result of the emergence of regional unipolarity that builds a coalition vis-à-vis the superpower. Multipolarization has become one of the main priorities of developing countries in order to transform themselves into a future power bloc in the future multipolar system. Therefore, IR literature contains discussions of a variety of rising powers with overlapping concepts and definitions. Different IR scholars define different power categories based on their conceptualization. For instance, the definition of an emerging middle power by Daniel Flemes contains similar characteristics to Samuel Huntington's major regional power definition. So, the discussion of rising powers, apart from the BRICS countries, is the focus of IR literature. The collapse of the Soviet Union has dramatically shifted political geopolitics and has particularly contributed to five newly- independent states in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. A power vacuum occurred in Central Asia after the demise of the Soviet Union and Russia lost its hegemonic status in Central Asia. For this reason, leadership in Central Asia is empty and the leadership of the region is obscure and ambiguous. Historically Kazakhstan has not been considered a regional power, unlike Uzbekistan, which was once considered a historical regional power before being incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1924.

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However, Kazakhstan, since its independence in 1991, has demonstrated remarkable potential with its rapid socio-economic development and it has established itself as the only middle-income country (MIC) in Central Asia. With its superior economic supremacy and material capabilities, Kazakhstan is now considered as an emerging player in international politics, despite not being considered as a regional power candidate. To assess Kazakhstan’s recent development and its potential regional position, this paper utilizes regional power indicators based on the power theory proposed by Daniel Flemes, which includes– leadership claims, possession of necessary power resources (material and ideational resources), the employment of foreign policy instruments (foreign policy and institutional instruments) and acceptance of leadership. This paper concludes by evaluating the findings and advances further questions related to regional power theory and Kazakhstan. This paper argues that Kazakhstan possesses sufficient regional power qualifications and Kazakhstan can be regarded as a regional power in Central Asia.

Keywords: Kazakhstan, Regional Power, Emerging Power, Power Theories, Central Asian States, Daniel Flemes

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is part of the Master Degree in International Relations, Thammasat University. This thesis could not have been completed without Asst. Prof. Dr. M.L. Pinitbhand Paribatra, whom I would like to express my gratitude for offering indispensable comments and advice for my thesis. I would also like to thank the external examiner, Asst. Prof. Dr. Natthanan Kunnamas, and the committee chair, Asst. Prof. Dr. Chanintirana Thalang, for their advice, time, and suggestions. I would have not finished this research without their great knowledge and experience, which provided significant contributions to this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my family, especially my mother, who always understood and gave moral and financial support to me during the entire procedure of my research. Moreover, I would like to thank BMIR’s officers, particularly Kanchana Kumhun (P’ Nong) for helping me throughout my master’s degree studies and research. In addition, I would like to thank all my BMIR4 friends, particularly, Mimi, Gurnam, Karn, Apache, Pentor, Film, Tong and P’ M for their support and cheering me on. Lastly, thanks to Arm, my closest friend who travelled with me to the China-Kazakhstan border in 2015, which inspired me to write about Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The writing of this thesis was another step in my life overcoming my “self”. It helped me grow and become a more disciplined person. Hopefully, this thesis will pave the way for my career in academia, particularly my academic career in Post-Soviet Studies. Moreover, I hope my dedication to Central Asia studies will contribute additional academic debate in this regard.

Mr. Tanapat Vatcharangura

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT (1)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (3)

LIST OF TABLES (7)

LIST OF FIGURES (8)

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Background and Issues 1 1.2 Research Questions 5 1.3 Objectives of Study 6 1.4 Theoretical Framework 6 1.4.1 Regional Power Theory 7 1.5 Hypothesis 10 1.6 Research Methodology 10 1.7 Scope of Study 11

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 12

2.1 Power Hierarchies 12 2.2 Kazakhstan’s Domestic Affairs 15 2.3 Role of International Actors 18 2.4 Comparative Case Study of Rising Powers 20 2.5 Regional Leadership 23 2.6 Conclusion 24

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CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 26

3.1 Pre-Independence Kazakhstan 26 3.1.1 Pre-Tsarist Kazakhstan 26 3.1.2 The Russian Empire 27 3.1.3 The Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic 28 3.2 The Republic of Kazakhstan 30 3.2.1 Demographics and Geography 31 3.2.2 Political System 34 3.2.3 Economic System 36 3.2.4 The National Fund of Kazakhstan 42 3.2.5 The Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund 46 3.2.6 2050 Eternal Kazakhstan 49 3.3 Conclusion 50

CHAPTER 4 KAZAKHSTAN’S CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP AND POWERRESOURCES 51

4.1 Kazakhstan’s Claim of Leadership 58 4.2 Kazakhstan’s Material Powers 61 4.3 Kazakhstan’s Ideational Powers 68 4.4 Conclusion 72

CHAPTER 5 KAZAKHSTAN’S EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT AND REGIONAL ACCEPTANCE 73

5.1 Material Foreign Policy Instrument 73 5.2 Institutional Foreign Policy Instrument 79 5.3 Discursive Foreign Policy Instrument 84 5.4 Acceptance of Leadership 91 5.5 Conclusion 98

CHAPTER6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 99

6.1 Research Problems and Findings 99

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6.2 Theoretical Contribution 103 6.3 Caveats and Future Research Agenda 105

REFERENCES 107

APPENDICES

Appendix A: A Meeting between Nazarbayev and American Officials Including Secretary of State James Baker 122 Appendix B: Lagarde: Kazakhstan Is a Country with a Promising Future 126

BIOGRAPHY 131

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LIST OF TABLES

Tables Page 4.1 Region-based Military Expenditure and Comparison 64 4.2 Region-based Material Power Comparison 2015 65 4.3 Region-based Economic Power Comparison 67 5.1 Proportion of Kazakhstan’s FDI from 2005-2015 89

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figures Page 1.1 Kazakhstan’s Crude Oil Exports by Destination, 2016 3 3.1 Kazakhstan’s Ethnic Composition 32 3.2 Kazakhstan’s Administrative Division 33 3.3 Kazakhstan’s GDP Annual Growth Rate 38 3.4 Kazakhstan’s Export Composition 39 3.5 Kazakhstan’s Trade Summary from 2005-2015 40 3.6 Sources of the National Fund Income I 43 3.7 Sources of the National Fund Income II 43 3.8 Organization Chart of the National Fund 44 3.9 Guaranteed Transfer of the National Fund 45 3.10 Samruk-Kazyna Assets 48 3.11 Samruk-Kazyna and Temasek Holdings 48 3.12 Samruk-Kazyna Organization Chart 49 4.1 Flow Direction of Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers and Dams 70

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Issues

Before being incorporated into a peripheral region under the Soviet Union, Central Asia was an important hotspot for the so called “Great Game”, one of the geopolitical significant regions in international politics, bridging Europe and Asia (Eurasia). One of the most influential and famous international geopolitics work in the 20th century, which emphasized Central Asia, was written by Halford Mackinder – an English geographer and politician who advocated the geopolitical significance of Eurasia (modern Central Asia). Mackinder (1919) regarded the region as the Heartland, as a pivot point between Europe and Asia. He furthered his theory by expressing his idea that “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-island controls the world” (p. 150). Although Mackinder’s heartland theory was written almost a hundred years ago, the theory has a significant influence on foreign policy makers in international politics and in the mind of geopolitical decision makers. Consequently, journalists and post-Soviet space scholars are now convinced that a “New Great Game” in Central Asia has started, after roughly 20 years after the birth of the modern Central Asia region (Zabortseva, 2012). There are various factors contributing to the revival of the New Great Game in the 21st century, including the discovery of untouched hydrocarbon and natural gas. Energy politics has long been at the center of a longstanding power struggle within global politics. It is believed that untouched natural resources and energy discovered in Central Asia could serve as an alternative energy diversification channel outside off the unstable Middle East. Furthermore, multipolarization under a rising China and the resurrection of Russia’s power in international politics are important factors. China and Russia both share geographical space near the Central Asia region. Arguably, Central Asia is situated in a place where there is a lot of potential geopolitical strategic importance. Moreover, it is believed that a number of jihadist fighters from Central Asia have exponentially increased their presence in the Middle East by joining the Islamic

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State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) against the Western coalition in Syria. In addition, homegrown Islamic fundamentalist networks in Central Asia are becoming a concern for authorities. They have been inspired by terrorist networks in the Middle East and Europe to turn Central Asian states from “secular” to areas of the Islamic Caliphate. For this reason, Central Asian governments have label edit as a threat to their national security. Apart from being a concern of Central Asian governments, homegrown radical Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia is gaining global attention because of Central Asia’s location. It can serve as the center of a terrorist network in recruiting Jihadist fighters outside the Middle East (Pale, 2015). Within that context, Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all participated in the security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).1 Each member is committed to combating separatist groups or campaigns operating in each member’s state territory. Under this rapidly shifting international and regional system Kazakhstan has been effectively adapting itself.Kazakhstan’s potential and its abilities to cope with the changing environment has contributed to Kazakhstan’s accumulation and possession of certain levels of power in the region compared to its neighboring countries, which it has politically and economically outperformed. For this reason, Kazakhstan seems to have dominated and established itself in a better position relative to other countries in the region. Kazakhstan is the second largest state in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after Russia, and the 9thlargest state in the world by its geographical size with a population of around 17 million. Situated between the ex-superpower Russia and arising China, Kazakhstan is an energy-rich state, which has achieved economic development with a dramatic annual GDP growth rate of almost 10% since 2000, according to Figure 1.1. That is despite a growth slowdown in late 2016, after the fall of commodity prices and economic sanctions were imposed on Russia (Hille, Barber & Foy, 2016). Kazakhstan has achieved its desired rapid economic growth within its 25 years of independence. Under the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has been in power since 1991, the strongman-president has

1 In 2017, the SCO is composed of 8 members namely China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 3 improved the standard living of the Kazakh people, whose income was below 8,000 USD per capita (PPP), to more than 26,500 USD per capita (PPP) in 2017. The main source of Kazakhstan’s revenue is from the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. Kazakhstan ranks in the top 15 countries in the world, possessing approximately 3% of the world's total oil resources. In fact, 62% of Kazakhstan’s territory covers oil and natural gas. Kazakhstan is now a potential alternative to the tense and unstable Middle East in providing energy. Kazakhstan’s energy export destinations are portrayed in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 Kazakhstan’s Crude Oil Exports by Destination, 2016

Note: Reprinted from Country Analysis Brief: Kazakhstan by U.S. Energy Information Administration, retrieved from http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/ Internacional/2017/EIA_Country_Aanlysis_Kazakhstan_10may2017.pdf

Moreover, Kazakhstan has received the largest proportion of FDI compared to other CIS countries, which means Kazakhstan is in an attractive position in the eyes of foreign investors (Wolowska, 2004). Kazakhstan is diversifying its economy through its Sovereign Wealth Funds, including the National Fund and Samruk-Kazyna, to

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 4 attract more foreign investors. The Sovereign Wealth Funds are the main driving forces of Kazakhstan’s manufacturing industry and the diversification of the country’s economy, which is weaning Kazakhstan off its dependence on the massive oil sector. Furthermore, Kazakhstan, especially in Astana, has become the destination for economic labor immigrants from throughout Central Asia looking to grab economic opportunities (Kuchins, Mankoff & Backes, 2015). Known for his vision of sustainable development, President Nursultan Nazarbayev is determined to make his country different from other CIS countries. Araral (2016) praised Kazakhstan’s development as being among the few newly-independent countries opened to so much institutional reform in such a short time. His strategy has been prioritizing a country’s development based on market liberalization, financialization, trade reforms, and particularly human resource development. Compared to other CIS and Central Asia countries, Kazakhstan’s government has heavily invested in education reforms, particularly in sending its bright students to study in the western world. Kazakhstan has been able to translate revenue into the region’s best military-equipped state in Central Asia. Nursultan Nazarbayev has detailed Kazakhstan’s 2050 National Strategy, which follows the remarkable success of South Korea and Singapore, both of whom have proved the feasibility of successful economic transition with strong conservative governments.He has vowed that Kazakhstan will be an internationally-respected country and will be a top 30developed country by 2050.The goal of Kazakhstan’s National Strategy is to move away from economic dependence on its energy exports and successfully diversify by engaging in a knowledge-based and green sustainable development economy and take advantage of its geographical position as the hub of the modern Silk Road trade (Weitz, 2014). Kazakhstan has achieved certain levels of acceptance and leadership roles at the international level. Since its independence, politically and diplomatically speaking, Kazakhstan’s leadership role has been recognized in the issues of denuclearization and nuclear non-proliferation. Being regarded as a pivotal player on the international stage has not gone unnoticed (Michael, 2016). Dana Rohrabacher2

2A California Republican and the U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 5 recently praised Kazakhstan’s domestic development and emerging international profile. Similarly, Nisha Biswal3 has mentioned Kazakhstan’s promising development, which has contributed to its tremendous potential on the international stage. Evidently, Kazakhstan has successfully established itself as a new emerging international player in international politics by grounding its strategy on its national interest-oriented calculation. In late 2016, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country, under the Asia-Pacific group, to be elected to sit on a non-permanent UNSC seat in 2017-2018. Kazakhstan gained 138 votes against the prominent-international profile of Thailand. The election demonstrated Kazakhstan’s active involvement in international politics. Kazakhstan seeks to utilize this UNSC framework to further its national and regional agenda as well as to influence international politics. At the regional level, although Kazakhstan is committed to its multi-vector foreign policy in balancing the interests of the U.S., Russia, and China, Kazakhstan views itself and has been aiming to become a new regional power by competing within the Russia-dominated regional framework (Zabortseva, 2011). Kazakhstan has expressed its regional aspiration and its determination to play a leadership role in the Central Asia region. With the lowest number of regional integration initiatives in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has been the backbone of regional integration. Moreover, Kazakhstan portrays its identity as neither European nor Asian, but Eurasian. Kazakhstan seeks to serve the region by reviving and reconnecting Eurasia and bridging two continents with its leadership, especially in Central Asia. As a result, this paper will assess Kazakhstan’s regional power position in the region.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What are the sources of Kazakhstan’s power? 2. How does Kazakhstan become an emerging regional power in Central Asia? 3. To what extent has Kazakhstan’s regional power status been accepted by other Central Asian states?

3An assistant secretary of state for Central Asia under Secretary of State John Kerry

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1.3 Objectives of Study

1. To understand factors which contribute to Kazakhstan's regional power position 2. To assess Kazakhstan’s power 3. To understand to what extent Kazakhstan’s regional power position could impact international relations in Central Asia

1.4 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework in reference to the regional power will offer a systematic assessment of Kazakhstan’s regional power position. In IR literature, theoretical frameworks concerning sources of power and rising powers are frequently associated and discussed within the framework of realism. For example, a balance of power theorist like Morgenthau (1948) tended to view military force as the most important source of power and winning wars is the measurement of power determining which state has superior power. Moreover, a structural realist like Waltz emphasized the distribution of capabilities by examining economic capabilities, military strength, political stability, size of population, resource endowment and other capabilities of each state. Likewise, Mearsheimer’s (2001) offensive realism viewed power as the currency of great-power politics. Offensive realism regards military strength as the most important source of power. In contrast to structural realism, offensive realism argues that states seek to expand their capabilities in the anarchical system for the purpose of hegemony rather than for of survival. Mearsheimer himself argued that, “I define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the ultima ratio of international politics” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 56) . The overreliance on material capabilities of state power has led realism to be often criticized. In addition, realism often sees the state as a unitary actor in international politics and ignoring the influence of multilateralism and other positive economic development variables, which can contribute tremendously to the capabilities of state power. For example, Nye (2004) views sources of power as being generated through ideas, attraction, culture, policies and particularly by acceptance (soft power) without using coercion through military

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 7 strength and economic sanctions (hard power). As a result, the theoretical framework used in this paper requires a combination of all of the main IR approaches to comprehensively analyze all influencing factors on one power unit. This research utilizes Daniel Flemes’ power theory to help answer the research questions. Flemes (2007) developed a comprehensive theory to systematically identify and classify regional powers in International Relations. He has suggested that there is a precondition for a country to be identified as a regional power. His regional power theory is based on a combination of main IR approaches: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. He has suggested sources of power are generated through economic and military aspects. Similarly, he also suggested looking at sources of power originating from membership in multilateral institutions, which can create and circulate discourse to influence other actors in global politics. As a result, he proposed four pivotal criteria for assessing and identifying regional power candidates, including, - leadership claims, possession of necessary power resources (material and ideational resources), the employment of foreign policy instruments, and the acceptance of leadership.

1.4.1 Regional Power Theory

Flemes’ first assessment criterion is the claim to leadership indicator, which can be examined through a country’s regional role in expressing efforts to be the facilitator in regional organizations as well as through a regional role in being a mediator during a regional crisis. The claim to leadership could be visibly observed through a country’s foreign policy doctrine and a leader’s rhetorical discourse for regional aspiration. The second criterion is power resources, which extends from material power sources (social, economic, political historical and security aspects). In tangible terms, high military expenditure is the most significant indicator of power in a realist perspective, but other non-military indicators, which realism doesn’t emphasize, are also considered as a prerequisite for military capabilities. Other non-military indicators include GDP, National Power Index, Income per Capita, Economic Competitiveness, GINI index, income inequality, and trade volume, which all translate into material power capabilities of a state. Flemes argues that an education system is also regarded as an important source of material power because a developed education

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 8 system produces quality human resources which could generate economic prosperity by creating innovation, particularly for military purposes. Apart from tangible material capabilities, power can also be generated by ideational power resources, which can be observed through how a state transfers its domestic values, legitimacy, credibility, accountability and authority to the regional level for the purpose of influencing regional (agenda setting, persuasion and norm diffusion) affairs, i.e., soft power. Nye suggested that, “When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive” (Nye, 2005, p. 34). However, although he regards soft power as a necessity, he admits that power is the combination of both hard and soft power mixed together. The third assessment criterion is the employment of foreign policy instruments: including the employment of material foreign policy instruments, the employment of institutional foreign policy instruments, and the employment of discursive foreign policy instruments. This third criterion assesses a country’s ability and effectiveness in influencing other states through its foreign policy. The material foreign policy instruments include the employment of hard power to enforce its foreign policy (military, economic, diplomatic and institutional means) to influence others. For example, the deployment of military troops along borders signifies the employment of hard power to influence the targets as well as the participation of multilateral military missions against terrorism. Combined with the proposal of economic sanctions, it could be utilized to influence states that have violated international law. The institutional foreign policy instruments involve the enforcement of foreign policy to influence the behavior of other states and to assert interests through the use of formal and informal procedures and rules by a state. Argued by neoliberals, Dunne (2017) states that multilateralism and institutions are able to exert a causal force on international relations by shaping state preferences and forcing them into cooperative arrangement. Meaning that, powerful states also believe the competence of international institutions for them to exercise its influence and preferences over other

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 9 states. Flemes suggested that there are various reasons for states to use institutional foreign policy instruments instead of other instruments, for instance, a state seeks to utilize regional institutions to project its power into wider global affairs. By building a strong regional institution, it would allow the state to build a stable region and create alliances between its neighboring countries, as well as increasing bargaining power in the region through institutions. Discursive foreign policy instruments refer to the utilization of formal and informal procedures and rules by a country (Parlar Dal, 2016). This instrument involves the use of rhetorical statements of political leaders to influence regions through the process of agenda setting and decision making within the regional architecture. Flemes suggests that discursive foreign policy instruments cover the utilization of classical diplomacy, which consists of agenda setting and discourse control; including mediation, conflict resolution mechanisms, international law and etc). Furthermore, discursive foreign policy instruments cover coercive diplomacy, which includes military and economic threats and sanctions. Flemes has argued that it becomes difficult to notice a difference between discursive and material foreign policy instruments because the outcomes of these two instruments are crisscrossing and overlapping. For instance, coercive diplomacy could be regarded as a discursive foreign policy instrument, which constitutes military and economic threats. Therefore, it produces similar outcomes to material foreign policy instruments as well. The last criterion of Flemes in assessing a country’s regional position is acceptance from third parties (neighboring countries). Acceptance determines whether or not a country possesses sufficient regional authority and legitimacy. Acceptance also involves power hierarchies, which questions the acceptance of authority and legitimacy from lower position states. Therefore, a regional power should secure its acceptance to be positioned as a regional power. To substantiate the importance of acceptance in international politics, Krasner (1999) talked about the international embrace of sovereignty and its pervasive organized hypocrisy, i.e., embraced but often violated. Krasner also talked about state sovereignty having four distinctive attributes: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and independence sovereignty. The acceptance of a state, international legal sovereignty, involves significant international recognition from states in international politics.To sum up, this thesis utilizes Flemes’ four criteria, which

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 10 includes the claim to leadership, material and ideational power resources, the employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance from third parties to help assess Kazakhstan’s regional power position and answer the research questions.

1.5 Hypothesis

The more Kazakhstan has material and ideational capabilities to exert its influence in the region and the more acceptance it gains from neighboring states, the more Kazakhstan will obtain and be recognized as the regional power in Central Asia.

1.6 Research Methodology

This research employs qualitative methodology through analyzing primary and secondary sources. The design of this research is a case study by focusing on Kazakhstan’s domestic and regional political and economic development from 1989- 2017. Primary sources will be mostly collected from Kazakhstan’s and other Central Asian government English publications from 1989-2017. Moreover, data shall be mainly collected from English-translated domestic and international speeches that touch on related issues delivered by the President and Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states. In addition, secondary sources will be collected from reviewing academic journals and textbooks regarding regional power theories and Kazakhstan’s affairs, for instance, publication and journal articles from the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KAZ ISS), Russia Analytical Digest, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, Foreign Policy Journal and Journal of Eurasian Studies and so on. Furthermore, an analysis of opinion sections from major newspapers (The Astana Times, Eurasia Daily Monitor) on Kazakhstan and Central Asia affairs, blogs, both magazines and e-magazine available on internet, including Time magazine, the Diplomat, Foreign Affairs and the Financial Times, will serve as sources of secondary data as well.

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1.7 Scope of Study

In this research, the definition of power will be both material and normative. Sources of power extend from geographical location, demographic change, natural resources, national capacity, military expenditure, GDP, National Power Index, Per Capita Income, Economic Competitiveness, Financial Competitiveness, GINI index, Economic Complexity Index, Income Inequality, trade volume, soft power, media, Human Development index, Global innovation index, environmental vulnerability, foreign aid assistance, educational exchange program, culture and more. This research puts an emphasis on the beginning of President Nursultan Nazarbayev's administration, both pre and post-Soviet. The timeframe starts from 1989-2017.

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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OFTHE LITERATURE

This chapter aims to present the rationale of conducting research in examining relationships and variables with regard to Kazakhstan and its regional power position. Reviewing the literature provides general information regarding historical background, notable work of prominent scholars relevant to Kazakhstan, and regional leadership in Central Asia. Moreover, a literature review also helps the author in learning the application of proper methodological processes from previous research. This chapter aims to understand all significant variables relevant to the research questions and to gather important arguments from prominent scholars to build my research’s argument to fill the literature gap. The following literature review presents literature relevant to this research, including literature on power hierarchies, literature on Kazakhstan’s domestic politics, literature on Kazakhstan and international actors, literature on Kazakhstan and other rising powers, and literature on Kazakhstan and regional leadership.

2.1 Power Hierarchies

As discussed in the theory section of chapter 1, a number of realist scholars also mentioned, at length, the source of power (i.e. Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer), but a few scholars discussed (Walt) the power of rising or emerging powers. This research utilizes the regional power theory and criteria proposed by Daniel Flemes to asses regional power candidates. The concept of regional power has recently been developed in academia. For instance, Russia is considered as both a regional and a major power and Australia is regarded both as a regional and a traditional power (Parlar Dal, 2016). For this reason, I found that concepts and definitions of regional power are overlapping. Different IR scholars have introduced their own regional power theory based on different conceptualizations and different assumptions. Nevertheless, many scholars believe that states in international systems are creating the need for regional powers (Beck, 2008). So far, there is no persuasive indicator and analytical model for the definition and conceptualization of the different dimensions that

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 13 characterize regional power (Nolte, 2010). Therefore, it is essential to examine prominent theories regarding power hierarchies in international politics apart from Flemes’ theory and the rationale of selecting Flemes’ theory is needed to be addressed. The Lonely Superpower by Huntington (1999) argued that the world is evolving into a multi-polar system where states are growing dissatisfied under the uni- polar system. The current international order is being dominated by the U.S. and American interests are being promoted without tackling rising problems on behalf of the international community. Therefore, states with power seek and prefer an international system which allows them to pursue their distinct interests, which the superpower ignores. Huntington (1999) termed these states “major regional powers” and they can be described as being at the second level of the power hierarchy in international politics, which extends from the superpower – the U.S., to the major regional powers – Germany, France, Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran, Brazil, Nigeria and the secondary regional powers – Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Ukraine and South Korea. However, Huntington only briefly discussed the characteristics of both major regional powers and secondary regional powers. He described the relationships between major and secondary regional powers as always being conflictual. The secondary regional powers often stick themselves with the superpower in order to constrain major regional powers in pursing regional interests. Arguably, the concept of a middle power is diversely scattered and unsystematic. There is also little agreement among scholars (Patience, 2017). Specifically, Huntington’s (1999) conceptualization and his samples of major regional power states resemble Randall Schweller’s Middle Power theory. Schweller (2014) defined South Korea, Ukraine, South Africa, Iran, and Nigeria as a middle power through an objective criteria, namely GDP, population size, physical size and military capability. Huntington argued that,

The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power--economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and cultural--with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world. At a second level are major regional powers that are preeminent in areas of the world without being able to extend their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States.

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They include the German- French condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. At a third level are secondary regional powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states. These include Britain in relation to the German- French combination, Ukraine in relation to Russia, Japan in relation to China, South Korea in relation to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran, and Argentina in relation to Brazil (Huntington, 1999, p. 36)

While, Schweller’s (2014) definition of middle power involves states which are not great powers, major powers or minor power and they extend from developed countries, developing countries and underdeveloped countries.Moreover, Osterud (1992) used the term a “regional great power” to describe:

“A state which is geographically a part of the delineated region” “A state which is able to stand up against any coalition of other state in the region” “A state which is highly influential in regional affairs” “A state which, contrary to a, middle power, might also be a great power on the world scale in addition to is regional standing.” (Nolte, 2010)

Therefore, it is obvious that the concept of regional power is frequently associated with other various terms within the scope of power hierarchies within IR theory.Arguably, consensus has not been achieved regarding the defining features of a regional power. The term is often associated with other terms, including major regional power, middle power, major middle power, regional great power and many others. For this reason, Flemes (2007) argued that “as a result of a variety of criterion mixing the characteristics of regional powers and great powers makes the distinction between regional powers and middle powers more difficult” (p.10). Consequently, he preferred to use of term “regional power” as well as provide the four pivotal criteria; formulation of the claim to leadership, possession of necessary power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance of the leadership role by third states. Therefore, this thesis aims to utilize Flemes’ criteria in order to analyze and to include

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Kazakhstan as one of the regional power candidates into the analysis of power theories Moreover, this thesis aims to carefully introduce Kazakhstan into the study of regional powers alongside China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other states which have been studied and regarded as regional power in previous works of power theories literature.

2.2 Kazakhstan’s Domestic Affairs

The second group of literature concerns Kazakhstan and its domestic affairs. Some literature regarding Kazakhstan’s domestic economic and political development gives a clue about the nature of Kazakhstan’s statecraft and its capabilities. It will help the author to learn a historical background as well as help the author to identify the relevant leading scholars and issues. Sally Cummings is a prominent scholar on Central Asia affairs and she has written various interesting books relevant to not only Kazakhstan but the whole of Central Asia. She wrote about Kazakhstan’s socio-politico-economic domestic development, particularly the political and power sharing in Kazakhstan. Cummings (2002) wrote“Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite”, which touches upon the rationale and philosophy of Kazakhstan state-building process. The state and nation building process of Kazakhstan is uniquely influenced by Kazakh elites who have shaped how decision making power is distributed through the setup of socio-politico-economic institutions. She argued that a period between 1991- 2001 has witnessed a strong development of a patronage system, the emergence of rent seeking behavior and the creation of deep-rooted authoritarian practices in Kazakhstan (Cummings, 2002). Furthermore, she argued that a large amount of power still has to be shared with the Russian minority in the Northern area as a result of the Soviet legacy, where there was a huge migration within the Soviet Union in response to the industrialization during the mid-20th century. Consequently, it means that Russians in Kazakhstan still retain politically and economically influential status positions. For this reason, the philosophy and political consideration of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is still based on the rationale of compromising with Russia, from the early years of independence until today (Kazakhstan’s Multi Vector foreign policy). However, Kazakhstan is looking forward to reducing Russia’s influential status. Building its

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 16 strong diversified economy would allow Kazakhstan to have a more attractive bargaining position to have more decision-making autonomy from Russia. On the other hand, bringing powerful actors (China, the U.S.and EU) to counterbalance Russia would allow Kazakhstan to have a more active position rather than passive position compared to the past. The energy sector of Kazakhstan was chosen to serve its desire as a tool to transform its position to become a more powerful economic actor. Olcott (2010) argued that although Kazakhstan has a promising future based on it being rich in natural resources, economically diversified, having secular politics, a multiethnic society, and being one of the biggest energy producers, its energy sector will eventually intensify the patronage system and corruption centered on President Nazarbayev and his family. Besides, recent government policies on Kazakh nationalism will eventually crack Kazakhstan’s multiethnic society. These two factors (oil and nationalism) will determine the promising future of Kazakhstan. Moreover, she disregarded the Islamic factor in shaping Kazakhstan’s future, even though there is a growing concern regarding homegrown Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Moreover, Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov (2009) wrote “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double Curse in Post-Soviet Regimes.” This book elaborates on how Kazakhstan transforms its richness in natural resource to serve its power. However, this book argues that the case of Kazakhstan will definitely fit the idea of a “resource curse” as the natural resource will hinder the political development of Kazakhstan because there is an absence of appropriate governance by the Kazakhstan government. The resource curse and poor governance will further the hierarchical society more and more in the future. Similarly, Kahveci (2007) examined and discussed Kazakhstan’s massive energy sector relevant to three groups of literature including the rentier state model, post-Soviet transformation and critical geopolitics. She argued that to completely understand the development of Kazakhstan’s political economy requires the combination of three aforementioned literatures. Based on the rentier state model literature, she argued that Kazakhstan’s massive dependence on hydrocarbon revenues has negative impacts on the nature of Kazakhstan’s socio-politico-economic institutions. It has created Kazakhstan’s statecraft into vulnerable position which state revenues depends on external dynamics and the influx of foreign reserves. For this

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 17 reason, the influx of foreign reserves has created a weak private sector and an overvalued indigenous currency (Dutch Disease) – Tenge. Based on post-Soviet transformation literature, Kazakhstan’s dependence on petroleum has also created weak civil society where an apathetic population has no representation in the check and balance mechanism, and the decision making process. To elaborate on the literature relevant to the Soviet legacy, Beissinger (1997) provided an insightful understanding regarding the nature of Post-Soviet states, particularly Kazakhstan, where post-Soviet states (Russia excluded) have certain sets of inherited structural continuities in social, political, and economic domains of post- Soviet life. The characteristics of the Soviet Union still exist in post-Soviet states. Soviet rule did not only politically control, but created a particular kind of state alongside a particular kind of society. It still influences the mindset and thinking of post-Soviet leaders, who many of them are still in power today. The Soviet legacy makes post-Soviet states’ post-colonial experience unique compared to post-colonial states after WWII.In addition, the “Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia” by Matveeva (1999) furthered the examination of the Soviet legacy in regards to the democratization of five Central Asian states. She argued that the reason the democratization in this region is not successful is because the democracy cannot provide a basis for political legitimacy for Central Asian elites to stay in power as well as the nature of Central Asian politics which remains conservative. Consequently, these political constraints among post-Soviet states limit the development in five Central Asia states.For example, the legacy of cronyism and conservative political culture needs to be overcome. Snajdr (2007) introduced another area of domestic constraints derived from the Soviet era, which is the multiethnic legacy. Similarly to Cummings, Snajdr emphasized possible violence in Kazakhstan politics as a result of ethnic divisions between the majority Kazakhs and the Russian minority due to the Soviet legacy. Finally, Andrea Ellner (1997) on “Whiter Transition - Development and Security in the Former Soviet Central Asia”, examined three levels of analysis through a domestic, regional, and international lens as she argued that there are a variety of problems that pressured Central Asia into the instability and crisis.She compared Central Asian states in transition with the experience of South Africa because of a similar multiethnic society and nation-building process after colonial rule. Independence from the colonial

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 18 master has triggered problems to rise to the surface that were suppressed during colonial rule. For this reason, Central Asian states are subject and become a source of instability and crisis themselves (Ellner, 1997). This literature has provided information regarding Kazakhstan’s domestic economic and political development particularly the nature of Kazakhstan’s statecraft, which has been influenced by various factors. Impactful factors on Kazakhstan’s statecraft extend from Kazakhstan’s political elites, the Soviet legacy and energy sector. Therefore, these factors contribute to the understanding of Kazakhstan’s domestic factors, which have significant impacts on Kazakhstan’s decision making process, especially Kazakhstan’s foreign policy towards neighbors and the Central Asian region.

2.3 Role of International Actors

The third group of literature is the role of international actors in Kazakhstan and in the region. This group of literature discusses different perspectives on the international relations of Kazakhstan as well as its implications on Kazakhstan as a rising power in Central Asia. This research places Russia as an interesting international factor that could be an obstacle to Kazakhstan’s regional aspiration, particularly, Russia’s Near Abroad doctrine under President Vladimir Putin’s presidency since the beginning of his administration in 2001. Therefore, it is important to examine literature regarding Russia’s foreign policy under President Putin, especially Russia’s foreign policy towards Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Roy Allison’s (2004) Strategic Reassertion in Russia Central Asia Policy argued that Russia under the presidency of Putin is currently pursuing a more proactive policy towards Central Asia and the Caspian region, which Russia is seeking to revive its position in these two regions. Russia is reviving its influence through regional security architectures, particularly through the issue of terrorism. Allison argued that Russia’s revival results from what he termed “the rising domestic nationalist thinking” of new generations of Russian elites who feel the imperative to restore Russia’s position in Central Asia and the Caspian region (Allison, 2004). In addition, the academic journal by Rafis Abazov (2012), “Kremlin Tunes its Foreign Policy: Will Putin’s New Russia Reconfigure its Policy toward China and Central Asia”, elaborated on Russia’s foreign policy and its

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 19 intention as being an obstacle to Kazakhstan’s aspiration.Similar to Allision, Abazov examined Putin’s so called “new Russia” campaign, but Abazov examined Russia’s foreign policy through the evolving domestic political environment of Russia where the authority of the president is gradually increasing and becoming more centralized under Putinism. Passolt (2007) examined Kazakhstan’s relations with its neighboring countries (Russia, China and other Central Asian states) ten years after independence (1991-2001). She argued that domestic and international factors are equally important in influencing Kazakhstan’s foreign policy in dealing with its neighboring countries. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has been preoccupied by security issues, territorial integrity, economic reforms, economic development, and its regional and international status. For Russia, Kazakhstan has been trying to simultaneously “de-link” and “re- link” itself through multi-vector foreign policy and through Russia-dominated multilateral platforms. For China, Kazakhstan has been seeking to diversify its energy networks which are heavily dependent on Soviet-era infrastructure. The construction of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline is an instrument for Kazakhstan to reduce dependence on Russia and for speeding up economic reforms with revenue from oil sales to China. Apart from their energy relations, Kazakhstan and China relations are limited to China’s Xinjiang security issue, which has been conducted through the regional platform – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has been seeking to be a leader and dominate the Central Asia region. Kazakhstan has actively initiated various regional initiatives and has consistently been the backbone of integrative attempts in Central Asia. However, territorial integrity and historical suspicion remains a huge obstacle for regional integration and the development of Kazakhstan’s leadership. Laruelle (2015b) argued that all five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) are no longer passive actors who are subjected to external forces in the 21stcentury, as the Western-centric perspective has assumed. Central Asian states have acquired a certain level of autonomy to pursue their own rights and legitimacy with close relationships between domestic and international forces. Laruelle argued that all five Central Asian states’ foreign policy could be described as an attempt to “be as autonomous as possible from outside

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 20 pressures while obtaining as much recognition as possible…. and want to avoid having to deal with any new big brothers.” (Laruelle, 2015b, pp. 76-77). Therefore, Central Asian states are still rejecting any supranational organization because supranational organizations are designed to limit each Central Asian state’s authority and legitimacy in regional affairs. Rather, Central Asian states have joined regional organizations as a result of attempting to protect themselves through multilateral platforms or what Allison termed,“protective integration” (Allison, 2008). According to Razma (2015), the incorporation of Crimea by Russia has brought the mentality of strategic confrontation back into international relations. It has created the distinction between the “us” and “them” mentality in the whole post-Soviet space. The geopolitical polarization has become apparent since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Razma argued that relations between Russia and Central Asia area rivalry. Russia is being seen as a potential military threat to Central Asia States. Especially the relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, which are deteriorating (Casey, 2014). However, he argued that in spite of deteriorating Kazakhstan-Russia relations, Kazakhstan, alongside with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are still close Russian allies as conductors of Russia influence in the region (Casey, 2014, p. 143).

2.4 Comparative Study of Rising Powers

The fourth group of literature is concerned with the experiences of rising powers, BRICS countries, and other regional power candidates. This part emphasizes literature that particularly analyzes regional powers and its position in highly fragmented and contested regions, which the Central Asia region is. Furthermore, this group of literature allows the author to learn how to present information as well as the application of appropriate methodological procedures in analyzing any rising powers based on experiences of the analyzed powers. Schenoni (2015) argued that Brazil’s position has been regarded as a long dominant regional power since the mid-20th century with its overwhelming overall capabilities when compared to its neighbors in the region. Schenoni utilized neoclassical realism to analyze Brazil’s regional position. He regarded South America as a unipolar subsystem since 1985. However, Brazil’s regional position has been

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 21 hindered and denied by realist behavior of regional secondary powers including Chile, Colombia and Uruguay in employing consistent bandwagoning strategies vis-à-vis Brazil. Main variables in influencing foreign policy of the mentioned secondary regional powers are government instability, limited party-system institutionalization, and powerful presidents. Moreover, external factors, like the U.S., remain a proximate and powerful regional factor in maintaining Brazil’s regional power position. (Schenoni, 2015, p. 8) Beck (2008) regarded Israel as a regional power and as the most powerful state in the Middle East region. However, he put an emphasis on the Middle East’s exceptionalism and he found that the concept of regional power is not helpful in analyzing Israel in relevance to the Middle East region. Although Israel’s position in both military and economic capabilities, compared to its neighboring states, are far superior to the rest of region, according to Beck, the consequences of structural features have significant impacts on regional politics. The structural features make the Middle East region subject to the influence of international actors, particularly the involvement of America in regional affairs. For this reason, Israel’s regional position can merely impose its capabilities only in preventing other potential regional powers from achieving regional supremacy. Shim (2009) analyzed South Korea’s regional position in“A Shrimp amongst Whales?: Assessing South Korea’s Regional-power Status in 2009”. It was the first attempt by Shim to analyze South Korea’s regional position. Then, Shim jointly wrote “Rising South Korea: A Minor player or a Regional Power?” with Patrick Flamm in 2012. Shim and Flamm (2013) developed assessment criteria based on their argument in analyzing any regional power position. Shim and Flamm proposed seven regional power assessment criteria, including: delimitation, pretension, endowment, normative behavior, influence, integration, and recognition to examine South Korea’s regional power position. Based on the aforementioned criteria, Shim and Flamm concluded that South Korea could be regarded as a regional power if it were located in another region, not East Asia (Shim, 2009; Shim & Flamm, 2013). South Korea is located amongst whales (China and Japan) and the regional architecture is heavily dominated by them. However, South Korea could be regarded as an East Asia regional power in the future if the future landscape in regional affairs changes.

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Parlar Dal (2016) wrote about conceptualizing and testing the ‘emerging regional power’ of Turkey in the shifting international order. Similarly to Kazakhstan, Turkey has far been ignored in IR studies on power categorization. Dal utilized Flemes’ regional power theory to empirically assess Turkey’s regional power position and this paper utilizes the same theory. Assessment criteria includes the claim to leadership, possession of necessary power resources (material and ideational capabilities), employment of material, institutional and discursive foreign policy instruments and acceptance of leadership by third parties. Dal concluded her assessment with the application of Flemes’ regional power theory that Turkey has passed most of the assessment criteria, but it relatively failed to be accepted as a regional power from its neighboring countries as well as its reluctance to use material, institutional, and discursive foreign policy instruments (Dal, 2014; Parlar Dal, 2016). That reluctance hinders Turkey’s overall regional performance and limits Turkey’s potential in terms of economics and trade. Apart from proposing assessment criteria for regional power, Flemes (2007) also utilized his theory in assessing South Africa’s regional power position. South Africa is regarded as a minor member of the BRICS countries which possess potential and is regarded as a candidate for global power in the future. He summarized all key academic debates regarding regional power or middle power based on liberal, realist, and constructivist perspectives. He translated and concluded the discussion relevant to power hierarchies into his four regional power assessment criteria, which this paper utilizes to empirically assess the assets of Kazakhstan. In the South African case, Flemes concluded that the regional power position of South Africa is obscure since South Africa avoids articulating its claim to regional leadership as well as South Africa’s neighboring countries are reluctant to accept South Africa as regional power. The lack of acceptance, which is the most important component for regional power, is significant. As a result, this group of literature serves as a model of appropriate application of methodological procedures in analyzing any rising or emerging power. Moreover, this group of literature also shows how each scholar produces different arguments based on the application of selected power theories. As well as, this group also indicates constraints and challenges in analyzing any emerging powers.

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2.5 Regional Leadership

The fifth group of literature is about Kazakhstan and its regional leadership in Central Asia. This group of literature will help the author identify gaps in the literature which this thesis aims to fill.There is a tendency in the current IR literature to study Kazakhstan as a passive actor in international politics and as a passive unit of any study. Most literature regarding Kazakhstan barely assesses Kazakhstan’s regional power position. However, this research is determined to answer those questions.Typically either Russia or China is regarded as the regional power in Central Asia (Dollar, 2015; Mankoff, 2009). Most of the literature referencing Kazakhstan excessively focuses on Kazakhstan’s domestic political and economic development. Moreover, literature in general that talks at the regional or international level regarding Kazakhstan usually emphasizes an excessive significance of either Russia or China in the Central Asia region. That emphasis on Russia and China has intentionally ignored Central Asia’s regional development and each Central Asian state's development in the past decade. However, there are some journal articles which briefly attempt to examine current Central Asia’s leadership situation. Most of Central Asia’s leadership publications are written by Farkhad Tolipov. He made the argument in his book, “Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Two Failed Leaders of Central Asia”, that both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been perceived as two competing actors for the leadership role in the Central Asia region. By applying the school of constructivism and critical geopolitics, he found that the leadership pursued by both countries is not genuine. Tolipov used the term, Pseudo-leadership and called the competition a myth (Tolipov, 2012, 2015). He argued that both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan failed to become real leaders of the region. For instance, Uzbekistan’s leadership aspiration has been distorted by its isolationist policy and behavior. Uzbekistan has been trying to claim leadership but often plays“empty chair politics” at the regional level. Likewise, Kazakhstan has been distorted by its balancing Multi- vector foreign policy. There are difficulties for Kazakhstan to become an active actor in claiming the leadership since it has played a safe regional game since independence so far.

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Similarly, in Laruelle and Peyrouse’s (2012) “Regional Organization in Central Asia: Patterns of Interaction, Dilemmas of Efficiency”, it is argued that Central Asian states prioritize their strategies regarding an increasing territorial integrity and avoiding regionalism, which continues to be an obstacle to Central Asia’s integration. Meaning that, Central Asian states have no will to form a region and especially they have avoided dealing with any potential new big brother in the region (Laruelle, 2015a; Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012). Laruelle even stated that government officers or politicians who have been sent to work in regional organizations or international bodies are perceived as getting a demotion or a dishonorable exile. Therefore, a leadership or regional power position in Central Asia in the Post-Soviet era is unlikely to grow. More importantly, a question has been raised for the readers, is Central Asia a region or not? In contrast to pessimists, there are various short articles examining Kazakhstan’s regional aspiration by arguing that Kazakhstan is in an outstanding position for becoming a regional leader in Central Asia. Wolowska (2004) argued that Kazakhstan after independence has been pursuing a liberal economic model under an authoritarian regime, which has contributed to Kazakhstan receiving a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) compared to other post-Soviet states (CIS). Compared to Uzbekistan, who has been pursuing a model of leadership based on political and military hegemony is domestically failing to liberalize the market as well as failing to pursue economic reforms. Therefore, Uzbekistan is rather seen as a source of instability in Central Asia (Zasada, 2004). In the contrary, Cornell (2000) argued that Uzbekistan is in a good position to become a regional power if it is able to overcome both internal and external factors. He emphasized Uzbekistan’s problems with Tajikistan and Afghanistan as a huge obstacle for Uzbekistan to overcome. And, if Uzbekistan is successful in utilizing the influence of Western counterparts, especially the U.S., it will allow Uzbekistan to play a leading role in Central Asia.

2.6 Conclusion

To conclude and use these ideas as a guiding context, the literature regarding Kazakhstan excessively focuses on domestic political and economic development. In addition, the weakest point is that Kazakhstan’s regional power

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 25 position is not in the focus of the mainstream debate. In addition, most of the literature is not up-to-date and has barely studied regional development. Furthermore, literature that talks at the regional or international level regarding Kazakhstan mostly emphasizes an excessive significance on either Russia or China in the Central Asia region. A predominant debate has always put Kazakhstan as a passive or co-starring actor when compared to China and Russia, the so called dominant actors. Indeed, everything has changed and it requires a new conceptual framework to discuss Kazakhstan’s potential in the second decade of the 21st century. The rapid shifting regional context after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a particularly remarkable potential of Kazakhstan in the regional context makes the study of Kazakhstan and Central Asia worthwhile. Therefore, the author sees that it is significant to argue along the line with a growing number of IR literature concerned with rising powers and the rise of multipolarity. In addition, this thesis is seeking to make an academic contribution to this paradox.More specifically, the author is determined to fill the literature gap within the area of regional leadership in Central Asia by providing an appropriate application of the power theory with systematic analysis. This research intends to start a new debate and produce a solid academic argument on how Kazakhstan is possessing assets and potential to be considered a regional power. Finally, this thesis will be included into a group of rising powers literature alongside with previous studies of regarded regional powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Nigeria, China, India and etc.

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CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Dear fellow citizens! “Kazakhstan of the 21st century is a country created from scratch in just two decades by talented, hardworking and tolerant people! This is our creation in which we take huge pride! It is our great creation that we wholeheartedly love!”

(Address of the President of the Republic of

Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev to the Nation,

2014)

This chapter mainly aims to provide a comprehensive insight of the political, economic, and social dynamics of Kazakhstan after gaining independence. Moreover, this part also gives a historical background of Kazakhstan before Russia’s conquest and Kazakhstan during the Soviet Era, which is the foundation of Kazakhstan after 1991 until today. This part is composed of two sections, including Kazakhstan before independence development and Kazakhstan after independence development.

3.1 Pre-Independence Kazakhstan

3.1.1 Pre-Tsarist Kazakhstan

A variety of empires, khanates and dynasties has ruled Kazakhstan’s modern territory in the past, including the expansion of the Persian Empire until the 7th century and part of the Golden Horde and Chagatai Khanate under Genghis Khan’s empire in the late 13rd century. The Kazakh Khanate emerged as a separate political entity and were mentioned as a Kazakh tribal confederation for the first time in the 15th century where it was situated in a Eurasian steppe and one of the most important trade routes, the so called “Medieval Silk Road” connecting the whole Eurasian continent from Southern Italy, Northern Africa, Middle East and Northern China. Uncommonly, Olcott (1987) argued that most of the information and knowledge relevant to

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Kazakhstan in a period before being incorporated into the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was observed and written by Russian expeditions who travelled to the South in order to open new markets for Russian products at that time. Russian expeditions described a political unit consisting of a Kazakh tribal confederation comprised of three major political clans and all of them were non-sedentary cultures (Neumann & Wigen, 2013). The most powerful clan – the Greater Horde was located in the area of modern day Southern Kazakhstan and this clan still dominates the political scene today. The Middle Horde is located in the Northern and Central Part, and the Little Horde is located in the Eastern part of Kazakhstan, which has been the least powerful compared to the rest of the hordes. The nature of the three hordes was perceived as rivalry and competition among themselves. In order to dominate the rest, each horde always sought to politically cooperate with the outsiders. It made a Kazakh tribal confederation never achieve a unified political entity and low integrated economy among Kazakhs (Glenn, 1999). For this reason, a powerful Imperial Russia was often seen as a significant and reliable partner to acquire military assistance in order to counterbalance Kazakh hordes themselves. Therefore, it paved the way for Imperial Russia to assert political and economic influence in Kazakh territory. The imperial protection was often the first choice of each Kazakh’s clan to balance among each other. However, Russia’s protectorate over the Kazakh Khan did not satisfy the Russia Empire for securing the trade caravan, which was frequently attacked and robbed in the South. Frustrated by the Kazakh Khans and the local elite, the Imperial protectorate had turned into a colonial power structure by eliminating the local power.A Kazakh confederation was incorporated into a Russia protectorate in the early 19th century.

3.1.2 The Russian Empire

The southward expansion of the Russian Empire was an economically- motivated incentive to secure its trade routes for Russian products from attacks and robbery. Moreover, this new territory of the Russian Empire was specially designed to serve as a buffer zone against Imperial China in the late Qing dynasty. Under the Russian Empire, the administrative law, property law, organization of Kazakh territory, agrarian production, and sedentary cultures were introduced to Kazakh’s nomadic

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 28 tradition. Kazakhstan under the Russian Empire was also perceived as a period of the Great Game as a politically strategic competition between Britain and Russia in dominating Central Asia in establishing colonial power and new trade routes. Influenced by Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, foreign policy makers and geopolitical military analysts were convinced that it was essential to conquer the “Pivot Area” in order to dominate the whole world of politics. And, Kazakhstan and Central Asia were located in the area of the Heartland within the Pivot Area which made Kazakhstan and Central Asia subject to Great Power competition. Mackinder (1904) stated that, "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; “Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; “Who rules the World-Island commands the world."(p. 150). The decisive diplomatic victory of the Russian Empire in area between Central Asia and South Asia against the British Empire led to a more inclusive establishment of Russia’s effective control over Kazakh and Central Asia’s territory. The early 20th century witnessed a period of migration of Russians into Central Asia under the plan of the Russian Empire to transform the Eurasia steppe into industrial and agricultural production bases in order to feed the entire empire. The European-style taxation and more complicated land tenure were introduced to develop unsettled-nomadic territory.

3.1.3 The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic

After the collapse of the Tsarist Empire as a result of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, a short-lived independent political unit called Alash Autonomy existed on modern Kazakhstan’s territory for three years until 1920. Alash Autonomy was established by the Alash Orda National Liberation party, appointing the Alash Ordan government to manage two administrative zones of Kazakhs. However, the two administrative zones failed to cooperate with each other and the Alash Autonomy subsequently failed to deal with the rise of communist ideology. Consequently, Bolshevik forces were able to establish leadership by replacing the Alash government and incorporated Alash Autonomy into the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Kyrgyz SSR) in 1920. Later on, the Kazakh political entity was separately created from the Kyrgyz SSR and established into the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic (Kazakh SSR) in 1936. Soviet leaders aimed to transform “backward” Kazakh people from nomadic traditions into the modern “collectivized peasant” (Passolt, 2007,

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 29 p. 55) in order to fulfill the Soviet command economy. Each republic was specifically designed to become specialized in each assigned production within the economy of the Union. For instance, early Kazakh SSR under the command economy system was designed to serve as the “crutch” of the Soviet Union agriculture (Laird & Chappell, 1961). It made Kazakhstan the Kazakhstan it is today. Modern Kazakhstan’s economy is specialized in wheat and grain production. It exported 7.3 million tones to world markets in 2016 (Lyddon, 2016). The Kazakh SSR witnessed rapid industrial and agricultural development in 1953 after Nikita Khrushchev’s campaign to alleviate food and industrial production in the Kazakh SSR. Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands Campaign transformed the Kazakh SSR’s unused steppe into an urban area, which resulted in an influx of Soviet nationals to grab new lands.The Soviets also punished people by sending them to settle and work in the Virgin Lands.Regarding the oil reserves in modern Kazakhstan, Kahvec (2007) argued that although the oil wells were discovered in the territory of the Kazakh SSR, particularly in the Caspian Sea, the Soviet Union at that time was satisfied with the amount of oil production in Baku of Azerbaijan. The oil industry in the Kazakh SSR was not focused on and poorly-developed compared to the South Caucasus oil- producing republics. That is a reason why Kazakhstan has been able to preserve its richness in hydrocarbon resources and is able to extract and generate the prosperity after gaining independence. Besides grain production, the Kazakh SSR became subsequently specialized in mining and the mineral industry, particularly coal production and copper mining. The Kazakh SSR became the third largest industrial administrative unit of the Soviet Union and it received huge investment in industrial structure. The Kazakh SSR was expected to serve the Soviet Union as a manufacturer for the Soviet military complex, a place for space research and nuclear testing. For instance, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, the world largest operational space launch facility, was constructed in the Kazakh SSR in mid-1960 to serve as the base of operations of the Soviet space program. The world’s first artificial Earth satellite, Sputnik, was launched in the Baikonur Cosmodrome during the intense period of the Cold War.

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The Kazakh SSR was a product of new state-territorial entities based on ethnic principles to reduce anti-Russian feelings after the Stalin era (Sabol, 1995). Unfortunately, the Kazakh SSR came under challenge in 1986 as a result of ethnic confrontations between Russians and Kazakhs. The “Jeltoqsan” or “December 1986” was perceived as a USSR-Kazakh split and seen as the rise of the current President Nursultan Nazarbayev in politics. Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the office of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and his “glasnost” and “perestroika” demonstrated the political relaxation and reorientation within the Soviet Union. However, there was a growing discontent from people within the Kazakh SSR after Gorbachev appointed Gennady Kolbin (ethnically Russian) to replace Dinmukhamed Kunayev (ethnically Kazakh) as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR in 1986. Kolbin was perceived as an outsider who was politically manipulated by Gorbachev to play a political game within the Kazakh SSR. The appointment of Kolbin resulted in intense anti-Russian feeling and violent protests in Almaty. In consequence, Nursultan Nazarbayev who was the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR was appointed to replace Kolbin as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR in 1989. It was a watershed and moment of truth of Kazakhstan’s history when people started to be aware of an awakening national consciousness (Kahvec, 2007, p. 78).

3.2 The Republic of Kazakhstan

“The Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, expressing the will of the people of Kazakhstan, recognizing the priority of the rights and personal freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other universally recognized norms of international law, confirming the right of the Kazakh nation to self-determination, proceeding from determination of creation of civil society and the constitutional state, performing peace-loving foreign policy, declaring the commitment to the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon and to process of disarmament, solemnly declares the state independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” (Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of December 16, 1991 No. 1007-XII)

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The Republic of Kazakhstan was declared as a sovereign state on 25 October 1990. Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare independence. Scholars pointed out a unique manner regarding Kazakhstan’s independence which is different from the experiences of other post-colonial states in IR theory. In a referendum before independence roughly 94% of Kazakh people voted for the Kazakh SSR to remain in Gorbachev’s Union of Sovereign States. It could be interpreted that Kazakh people wanted Kazakh SSR to remain within the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union legally ceased to exist and the Kazakh SSR had to declare independence from the Soviet Union. Passolt (2007) argued that Kazakhstan’s independence experience has different characteristics compared to post-colonial African states. For example, there was no nationalist-independent movement in the Kazakh SSR and it was rather the center of the empire which decided to unilaterally abandon the empire and its colonies. (Passolt, 2007, p.26) Therefore, Kazakhstan’s independence offered a unique experience for post-colonial studies in academia.It produced a new conceptualization of post-colonial independence theory.

3.2.1 Demographics and Geography

Kazakhstan is one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world and the largest country in Central Asia by its geographical size. Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country in the world with a total area of 2.72 million square miles, ranking the second among former Soviet countries, after the Russia Federation. Kazakhstan ranks as the third largest country in Asia after China and India by its geographical size. Kazakhstan shares boundaries with its three Central Asian neighboring countries which are all located in the South of Kazakhstan, including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Kazakhstan borders China in the East and shares roughly 7,000 kilometers with Russia in the North. Kazakhstan is also the largest landlocked country in the world, but Kazakhstan is considered to be called a littoral state sharing a littoral zone with Iran, Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea.

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Figure 3.1 Kazakhstan’s Ethnic Composition, 2017

Note: Reprinted from Demographic Map of Central Asia by M. Rossabi. Retrieved from http://asiasociety.org/central-asia-historical-overview

Kazakhstan has a population of only 18 million and the majority of the populace is living in the Southern part of Kazakhstan because the climate in the South is more inhabitable and livable compared to the Northern part of Kazakhstan.The average population growth of Kazakhstan is approximately 1.5% annually and the majority of Kazakhstanis are roughly 29.6 years old. Kazakhstan’s demographics are diversely composed of Turkic, Mongol and Slavic ethnicities. The Kazakh group is holding the majority in Kazakhstan, at roughly 70% or about 10 million and ethnic Russians make up 23% of the population, or 3.8 million. In addition, there are other ethnic groups, namely Tatars, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Belarusians, Uyghurs, Azerbaijanis, Polish, Germans, Korean and Lithuanians. Ethnic Kazakhs are living in the Southern area of Kazakhstan concentrated in the former capital, Almaty and Shymkent. Ethnic non-Kazakhs live in the Northern part, especially Ethnic Russians. Regardless, ethnic

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Kazakhs are the majority in the new capital of Kazakhstan, Astana, which is located in the Northern area of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s constitution identifies Kazakhstan as a secular state,4 although Islam is the largest religion in Kazakhstan accounting for approximately 70% of the total population, who are mainly ethnic Kazakhs and other Turkic peoples in the country. Muslim Kazakhs are Sunni who follow the school of Hanafism. Moreover, Christianity, particularly Russian orthodox, accounts for roughly 30% of the total population. Christians are mainly found in the Slavic population, Russians and Ukrainians. In contrast to the population numbers, the Russian language and Cyrillic script hold official status and is as important as Kazakh, both are national languages. In addition, Russian is a lingua franca and is spoken by more than two-thirds of the population and it is used for inter-ethnic communication and business activities. While the majority of the Kazakh people are fluent in Russian, the Kazakh language is not understood among the Russian population at all.

Figure 3.2 Kazakhstan’s Administrative Division, 2012

Note: Reprinted from Kazakhstan regions and regions capital By B. Tom. Retrieved from https://sites.tufts.edu/zhamilya/kazakhstan-regions-and-regions-capital/

4 According to Article1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995. Kazakhstan has had two constitutions which the 1993 Constitution was replaced by the 1995 Constitution after approved by popular referendum on August 30, 1995.

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Kazakhstan is composed of 14 administrative regions (oblistar) with three municipal districts (audandar), including the territory Russia rents in Baikonur, Kazakhstan’s largest city, Almaty, and the capital, Astana. Each administrative region is headed by a provincial governor (akim) appointed by the president. The old capital, Alamty was Kazakh’s capital before being incorporated as a Russian protectorate and had been the center of the Kazakh SSR and the Republic of Kazakhstan until 1998. Almaty was replaced by a new city called Akmola, which later changed to Astana, which currently serves as the capital of Kazakhstan. Astana is currently the second largest city in Kazakhstan inhabited by roughly 1 million people, it but still ranks behind Almaty.

3.2.2 Political System

“We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historic fate, creating a state on the indigenous Kazakh land, considering ourselves a peace-loving and civil society, dedicated to the ideals of freedom, equality and concord, wishing to take a worthy place in the world community, realizing our high responsibility before the present and future generations, proceeding from our sovereign right, accept this Constitution.

(Report of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1996, N 4, p. 217)

Kazakhstan declared itself a sovereign state on October 25th, 1990 and then formally declared independence from the Soviet Union on December 16th, 1991. The first constitution was enacted by the Supreme Kenges in 1993 laying down the legal framework of Post-independence Kazakhstan with the principles of the separation of powers, recognition of state languages, recognition of state sovereignty, state independence, character of statehood, private ownership of land and citizenship, and recognition of political branches, including the Head of State, Supreme Constitutional

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Courts and Supreme Arbitration Courts. The 1993 constitution designed Kazakhstan to be a parliamentary republic where the executive branch gains legitimacy from and is accountable to the Parliament (legislative branch). However, the competence of political institutions was questioned for its failure to provide the political and social stability to newly-independent Kazakhstan. Later on, the first nationwide referendum on a new draft constitution was held in 1995 and 90.0% of the citizens of Kazakhstan approved a new draft to be enacted. The new constitution identified Kazakhstan as a unitary state and changed the political system from a parliamentary republican to the presidential system having the president as the Head of State and the Head of Executive and Administrative Power. The 1995 constitution also created a bicameral Parliament comprised of two chambers. The national assembly (lower house – Majlis) has a five-year term with 107 seats, with 98 seats from political parties and nine seats from the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan. The Senate is composed of a six-year term with47 seats, with 40 seats from elections and seven seats from presidential appointment. The 1995 constitution has been amended three times, in 1998, 2007, and 2011. Since independence, a number of parliamentary elections have been held and a recent election was held in 2016 where the Nur Otan Party won 84 seats (82%) out of 98 seats. In addition to parliamentary elections, a series of presidential elections have been held which the current president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev has won all four with more than 95% of votes in each election. Article 40 of the 1995 constitution designed Kazakhstan as a presidential republic with the President being elected every five years by popular vote. The President is the Head of State and appoints the Head of the Executive branch at his pleasure.The Prime Minister is Head of the Government. The President has sole power to appoint and dissolve the government, dissolve or appoint government members collectively and individually, dissolve the Parliament, launch a decree to amend the constitution, call referendums and appoint provincial governors.In addition, the President has power to veto laws which have been approved by the Parliament. Article 44 also gives the President power to act as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan as well as grant the President power to appoint and dismiss all diplomatic representation of Kazakhstan. The incumbent President is President

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Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has been in power since the Kazakh SSR, as discussed earlier. He was appointed from Gorbachev to serve as the Kazakh SSR party leader in 1989 and later elected as the Chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet (Supreme Kenges) in 1990. After independence, He was elected as the President for the first time in December 1991 and has been serving as the President of Kazakhstan ever since. He is the most powerful political figure of modern Kazakhstan. Recently, he and his Nur Otan party won the 2015 Presidential election and 2016 parliamentary election, extending his presidential term to 2020.The Nur Otan party has been blended into an entity of Kazakhstan’s state building process, which is similar to the People’s Action Party (PAP) of Singapore that has ruled that country since 1959 (Sholk, 2015). The judicial and legal system of Kazakhstan is civil law based, which has three tiers of judiciary, including the Supreme Court (44 members), the highest authority having power to review all judicial decisions decided by lower courts, the Constitutional Council (7 members) also shares the highest authority with the Supreme Court, the oblast courts (local courts) function as courts of appellate jurisdiction and deal with crimes, and the military courts are courts of specialized jurisdiction and have jurisdiction over civilian criminal defendants who allegedly committed crimes in relevance to military personnel.Regarding political parties, there are numerous political parties participating in parliamentary elections. There were 64 registered political parties in 2016 parliamentary elections, but only six political parties won seats in the national assembly (Majlis).President Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan Party won 84 seats (82.20%), followed by Ak Zhol with 7 seats (7.18%), and 7 seats (7.14%) of the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK).

3.2.3 Economic System

Kazakhstan gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 with an economically and politically collapsed structure from the communist system and poorly developed infrastructure. Esentugelov (1996) showed statistics that Kazakhstan’s GDP dropped almost 50% between 1992-1994 and more than 50% of GDP dropped in industrial sector because the collapse of the Soviet Union no longer demanded industrial nourishment from each republic.As discussed earlier, Kazakhstan was designed as the crutch of the Soviet Union’s agricultural production, growing grain for

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 37 the whole Union and extracting other mineral resources for industrial production during the centrally-planned economic system of the USSR. Meaning that, Kazakhstan, compared to other post-colonial states, had an industrialized and manufacturing economy. Similar to other post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics were not designed to become an independent economy, as a result of the centrally-planned economy system. The absence of experience as an independent state threatened the survival of Kazakhstan economically and politically. Kazakhstan’s decision to transform its Soviet-style economy to a market economy was unimaginable.The absence of a banking system, financial market and particularly personnel with sufficient knowledge worsened Kazakhstan’s economy. However, the discovery of oil and gas fields beneath its land and maritime territories in the early 20th century tuned Kazakhstan into one of leading oil producers worldwide. Previously, the oilfields had not been developed before gaining independence from the Soviet Union because oil production was concentrated in Baku of Azerbaijan, sufficiently feeding the whole Union. Kazakhstan has the second largest oil reserves among post-Soviet states, after Russia, at approximately 30 billion barrels. There are three main oilfields in Kazakhstan, namely, Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan. The first oil field was developed by a joint venture between the Kazakhstan government and Chevron (50-50) in 1993. The Kazakhstan government granted a 40-year concession to Chevron in developing the Tengiz oilfield. Subsequently, a joint venture named Tengizchevroil and has become a driving force in developing Kazakhstan’s oil sector. The discovery of oil reserves has transformed Kazakhstan into one of globe’s leading oil producers. Kazakhstan is currently ranked as holding the 12th largest proved oil reserves in the world, accounting for 3% of the world’s total.5It is expected to be one of the world’s leading producers in the future. Since 1996, Kazakhstan has enjoyed rapid economy growth due to rapid development in its energy sector and mineral extraction. Kazakhstan has experienced positive economic growth with more than 10 years of double-digit growth annually. In

5See further oil reserves ranking in 2016 at Crude Oil – Proved Reserved www.cia.gov

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2008-2009 the global financial crisis led to a decline in global demand for commodity products. Kazakhstan’s economy suffered a 2.4% decrease in its GDP in 2009, but it was able to enjoy healthy economic growth again up until 2017. Overall, Kazakhstan’s economic development is impressive because, so far, Kazakhstan has successfully utilized its richness in petroleum and mineral sectors and translated it to prosperity within a short period of time. Kazakhstan, compared to other post-Soviet states, has achieved the most desirable and satisfied economic development within 25 years.

Figure 3.3 Kazakhstan’s GDP Annual Growth Rate, 2017

Note: Reprinted from Kazakhstan GDP Annual Growth by Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/gdp- growth-annual

Under leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev who has been in power since 1991, the strongman-president and developmental elites have improved the living standards of Kazakhstani people, whose income grew from USD 7,270 (PPP) in 1993 to USD 24,260 (PPP) in 2015 according to World Bank data. In addition, Kazakhstan’s GDP was below USD 20 billion in 1991 and then increased to USD 243 billion in 2013.6 Kazakhstan is one of the most rapid developing economies in the world, alongside China, Vietnam, India, and Brazil. Currently, the service sector is

6 Other indicators can be looked at http://data.worldbank.org/country/ kazakhstan?view=chart

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 39 accounting for approximately 60% of Kazakhstan’s GDP, followed by 36% from the industrial sector, and 4.8% from the agricultural sector. Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s economy has enjoyed a trade surplus.Kazakhstan’s exports in 2016 were worth a total of approximately USD 32.6 billion while imports were worth USD 29.1 billion, according to the World Bank.7 Figure 3.4 describes the trend of Kazakhstan’s total exports and imports from 2005-2015,

Figure 3.4 Kazakhstan’s Export Composition, 2015

Source: /Reprinted from Trade Summary for Kazakhstan 2015 by World Integrated Trade Solution. Retrieved from http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KAZ/Year/ 2015/Summarytext

7 Data of Kazakhstan’s imports and export can be found at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=KZ

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According to a 2014 World Bank report on the contributions of natural resources to GDP,8 natural resources are accounting for approximately 15.5% of Kazakhstan’s total GDP at 11.3% solely on oil production. Kazakhstan experienced an evolving proportion of oil proportion in GDP from 1991. For instance, its lowest share of GDP was roughly 1.2% of GDP in 1998 as a result of 1998 Russian financial crisis, which affected Kazakhstan’s economy from the depreciation of the Russian Ruble. However, oil proportion reached its peak in 2005, roughly 21% of Kazakhstan’s GDP, and then slightly dropped to around 11.3% of Kazakhstan’s GDP in 2017.In addition, oil production is accounting for almost half of Kazakhstan’s total exports, at USD 41 billion, to the world market and it would expand to almost 60% if it included natural gas exports as described in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5 Kazakhstan’s Trade Summary from 2005-2015, 2015

Source: Reprinted from the observatory of economic complexity by Robert Feenstra Retrieved from http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/kaz/

8 The most recent World Bank report on the contribution of natural resources to GDP can be found at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS

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Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are playing a significant role in the economy of Kazakhstan, driving Kazakhstan’s economic development as well as diversifying Kazakhstan’s massive dependence on generating income from energy and natural resources.SWFs are one of the state strategies employed by most resource-rich states in setting up saving funds to stabilize its economy and fiscal revenue. It is a government-controlled mechanism to manage its surplus foreign exchange reserves which have accumulated from exhaustible resource sales. The objectives of a SWF are to invest in domestic and foreign assets in order to accumulate savings for future generations. They specifically aim to stabilize a state’s volatile economy as a potential source of revenue during financial turmoil or plummeting prices of commodity sales in highly volatile world markets. Norway's Government Pension Fund, global managing USD 870 billion of assets, has proved to be a success for resource-rich countries in defeating Dutch Disease9 and the Resource Curse10 with their SWF strategies. For this reason, a newly-independent Kazakhstan sought to imitate the success of oil exporting countries with experience managing their economies. Possession of oil is considered to be significantly valuable to an economy. Oil consumption keeps growing year by year, however highly volatile prices of Kazakhstan’s petroleum products particularly in the 2008-2009 financial crisis and consequences of the West’s sanctions on Russia prompted Kazakhstan to reconsider its vulnerability of its heavily dependent-oil sector. Stated in the 2050 national strategy “Eternal Kazakhstan”, Kazakhstan aims to become one of the top 30 economically developed countries and an internationally-respected player on the world stage. President Nazarbayev addressed the Parliament and said that Kazakhstan must achieve what other developed countries have accomplished, mainly South Korea and Singapore, by developing Kazakhstan’s traditional oil sector and strengthening

9Dutch Disease occurs when the economy of state grounds the majority of income on one sector and abandons the development of other sectors which will be left underdeveloped and will account only small proportion of the economy. And, an overwhelming inflow of foreign currency contributes to the disability of ignored sector to grow competitiveness. For this reason, resource cursed states are naturally less industrialized which causes the economy less diversified which is subjected to volatile prices of commodity products in world market. 10Terry Karl (1997) defines the definition of resource curse as “the inverse relationship between high natural resource dependence and economic growth rate.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 42 manufacturing industry. However, Kazakhstan’s natural resources (forecasted in 2010) are expected to be depleted within 65 years (Lücke, 2010). Therefore, the Sovereign Wealth Fund strategy for economic development was selected to drive Kazakhstan’s development in the 21st century. Subsequently, the National Fund of Kazakhstan became the first Sovereign Wealth Fund established in a post-Soviet state. As a result, Kazakhstan’s SWFs are expected to diversify Kazakhstan’s economy by accumulating surpluses from the high prices of petroleum and from the investment in domestic and foreign assets.

3.2.4 The National Fund of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s SWF is comprised of two SWFs, including the National Fund of Kazakhstan and Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund. The National Fund is not a legal entity but rather a fund of assets established by Presidential Decree in 2000 after the construction of the Caspian pipeline connecting the Black Sea and Tengiz field in Kazakhstan in the late 1990s. Kazakhstan enjoyed tremendous revenue from significant growth in the oil and gas production sector. So, the National Fund revenues are mainly generated by receiving deposits from surpluses and taxes in natural resource sales and by the privatization of state assets in other sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and mining). The National Fund is comprised of direct budget transfer (the initial endowment in 2000), direct taxes collected from approved petroleum corporations (corporate income tax, excess profit tax, bonuses, royalties, product sharing, and rent tax on oil and gas exports), from other income from petroleum operations (fines from violations of an oil contract), from the privatization of state assets in mining and manufacturing sectors, sales of land and significant investment income generated by the Fund itself.

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Figure 3.6 Sources of the National Fund Income I

Note: Reprinted from Sovereign wealth fund issues and the national fund (s) of Kazakhstan by D. Kemme, 2012.

Figure 3.7 Sources of the National Fund Income II

Note: Reprinted from Sovereign wealth fund issues and the national fund (s) of Kazakhstan by D. Kemme, 2012.

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The National Fund has an institutional mandate with the dual purposes of savings and stabilization. Particularly, the main purpose of the National Bank is similar to other resource-rich countries’ SWFs, which is to save Kazakhstan’s economy during an economic downturn involving highly volatile oil-related product prices. It also aims

to save surplus revenue for future generations. In addition, only foreign assets are permitted to be invested in the fund. It is a stabilization-oriented fund consisting of highly liquid assets with low credit risks invested in typical reserve-currency deposits concentrated in U.S. treasuries and in non- U.S. sovereign bonds. In contrast, the saving-oriented fund invests in long-term returns, mainly in fixed income (sovereign, agency, corporate and international institutions) and in public equities. Currently, the National Fund is managing assets worth approximately USD 64.7 billion, according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute in 2017. It is an independent institution, but the National Bank of Kazakhstan serves as the “operational” manager for the fund. Direct control of the fund is done by the President and senior ministers, as shown in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8 Organizational Chart of the National Fund

Note: Reprinted from Sovereign wealth fund issues and the national fund (s) of Kazakhstan by D. Kemme, 2012.

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As the organizational structure describes, the President has the highest authority of the National Fund and the President shares the strategic decision making process with his senior ministers in the Management Council. The Management Council is responsible for all strategy-related issues concerning the National Fund’s investment strategy, which includes the asset allocation, investment horizon and risk tolerance. In addition, the Ministry of Finance and Minister of Oil and Gas has the authority to approve the list of petroleum sector companies whose taxes are collected into the National Fund alongside coordination with the National Bank of Kazakhstan, who serves as the operational investment manager of the Fund.

Figure 3.9 Guaranteed Transfer of the National Fund to the Government of Kazakhstan

Note: Reprinted from Sovereign wealth fund issues and the national fund (s) of Kazakhstan by D. Kemme, 2012.

Furthermore, there have been three significant shifts regarding the direction of the National Fund since its establishment in 2000. The first period was during the establishment, which was created by Presidential Decree 402 in 2000 as the Founding Concept, which was composed of purposes and functions of the National Fund.

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Presidential Decree 1641 brought the fund into the second period and introduced new guidelines in managing the National Fund – the so called 2006 Concept. The 2006 Concept set a target for guaranteed and targeted transfers from the National Fund to the state budget, which guaranteed a transfer amount limit to roughly 30% of the National Fund assets. A formula of withdrawal from the National Fund was also introduced to avoid the depletion of the Fund. The third shift started with Presidential Decree 962 in 2010, which comprehensively clarified specific guidance for the utilization of the fund - the so called “New Concept”. Apart from the stabilization function, it introduced and prioritized the saving funds as a new function of the National Fund by requiring the National Fund to maintain assets of savings of at least 30% of Kazakhstan’s GDP. The New Concept limits the guaranteed transfer amount to the government which is fixed at USD 6.8-9.2 billion.11 Recently, the 2014 Presidential Decree 281 set up a Commission to monitor the National Fund expenses to prove an attempt by the Kazakhstan government to increase transparency and accountability in managing its Sovereign Wealth Funds.

3.2.5 The Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund

The Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund, a merger of two funds, Samruk (State’s Assets Management Holding) and Kazyna (Sustainable Development Fund), was initiated by Presidential Decree in 2008. In contrast to the National Fund, Samruk-Kazyna is a joint stock with a legal entity. It was established in the middle of the global economic crisis and falling oil prices. Samruk-Kazyna received credit for saving Kazakhstan as a stabilizer of Kazakhstan’s economy by providing necessary credit and acquiring Kazakhstan’s worst-hit banks (BTA, Temir Bank, Alliance) during the financial crisis (Kai, 2016). The “Bailout” operation has demonstrated how the government, the Ministry of Finance, the National Fund and Samruk-Kazyna closely worked together in rescuing Kazakhstan’s economy (Kemme, 2012). According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Samruk-Kazyna is currently managing assets worth USD 60.9 billion, roughly equivalent to 50-80% of Kazakhstan’s GDP. On the contrary to the National Fund, it is not expected to

11Kazakhstan’s government annual budget is USD 34 billion approximately in 2016.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 47 accumulate and make profits out of investment in foreign assets. One of the most important purposes of Samruk-Kazyna is to become a leading mechanism in diversifying Kazakhstan’s economy in order to reduce economic dependence on natural resource exports. Furthermore, Samruk-Kazyna aims to play a leading role in restructuring and privatizing state-owned enterprises to increase the performance and efficiency of state-monopolized enterprises. Therefore, the source of Samruk-Kazyna’s income is mainly accumulated through privatization proceeds, which will increase public services efficiency and performance, which will directly improve state enterprise governance and the quality of life simultaneously. Samruk-Kazyna is planned to function as an anti-crisis fund.As mentioned earlier, the fund was essential in lessening the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 and it saved Kazakhstan’s economy. The fund serves as a significant mechanism during plummeting oil prices. However, Samruk-Kazyna is not a commodity-based SWF as it focuses on growing the value of Kazakhstan’s national assets in major sectors, including oil and gas, transportation, telecommunications, and financial and innovative sectors. Samruk- Kazyna emphasizes investment in state assets and the privatization and restructuring of state assets to strengthen state-led industrial development programs. Instead of international acquisition, Samruk-Kazyna plays an important role in maximizing long- term value for national companies. Therefore, it could be understood that Samruk- Kazyna is a key agency in Kazakhstan’s industrialization and is a main instrument for Kazakhstan’s government for implementing policies within the country. Samruk-Kazyna has the Government of Kazakhstan as the only shareholder of the fund and its major assets are in national companies, including Kaz Munay Gas (energy), Kazakhtelecom (telecommunications), Kazatomprom (Uranium), Air Astana (Airline) and many others. Samruk-Kazyna is Kazakhstan’s largest state-controlled company and has stakes in more than 500 companies. Its total assets account for more than 50% of Kazakhstan’s GDP. As shown in figure 3.10, it has huge stakes in Kazakhstan’s national companies.

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Figure 3.10 Samruk-Kazyna Assets

Note: Reprinted from Samruk Kazyna annual report 2015 by Samruk Kazyna Retrieved from http://www.raexpert.kz/docs/annual_contest/fnb_sk/SK_AR_2015_EN_full.pdf

For instance, Samruk-Kazyna monopolizes the oil and gas sector in Kazakhstan. Kaz Munay Gas is owned 100% by Samruk-Kazyna, with revenue of USD 15.5 billion. Samruk-Kazyna completely dominates Kazakhstan’s energy sector. It also owns a 51% share of Air Astana in the transportation sector worth approximately USD 600 million. As shown in Figure 3.11, it describes the proportion of Samruk-Kazyna in each sector compared to Temasek Holding Groups.

Figure 3.11 Samruk-Kazyna and Temasek Holdings

Note: Reprinted from Why Kazakhstan learns from Singapore by B. Z. Kai. Retrieved from http://www.eurasiareview.com/27102016-why-kazakhstan-learns-from-singapore-analysis

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The Prime Minister of Kazakhstan is the chairman of the Board of Directors of Samruk-Kazyna, in contrast to the National Fund, as shown in Figure 3.12.

Figure 3.12 Samruk-Kazyna Organizational Chart

Source: Adapted from Samruk Kazyna annual report 2015 by Samruk Kazyna Retrieved from http://www.raexpert.kz/docs/annual_contest/fnb_sk/SK_AR_2015_EN_full.pdf

3.2.6 2050 Eternal Kazakhstan

“By 2050 we want to have created a society based on a strong state, a developed economy with universal labor opportunities. A strong state is especially important to ensure accelerated economic growth. This is not about survival; it is about planning, long-term development and economic growth” (Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, 2014)

President Nursultan Nazarbayev initiated the “Eternal Kazakhstan” national strategy, or Kazakhstan-2050 national development strategy, as guidance for the country’s development in the next 33 years. Post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan aims to achieve sustainable development by diversifying sources of income generated from energy and mineral sectors. Kazakhstan aims to sustain its rapid economic growth by creating new sources of economic growth namely by strengthening and promoting the sustainable development of small and medium-sized entrepreneurships, strengthening

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 50 the development of knowledge-based and the green economy, becoming the trade hub of the modern day silk road, and eventually becoming a top 30 economically developed country in the world.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter provided a comprehensive understanding of Kazakhstan’s political, economic, and social development, mainly in the post-independence period. Understanding the influence of the Soviet Union on Kazakhstan and understanding the historical background helps us understand Kazakhstan in the past, which made Kazakhstan what it is today in 2017. This part introduced the political, economic, and social structures of modern Kazakhstan and showed how these structures are the main factors influencing Kazakhstan in its relations with major powers and powerful neighboring countries.

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CHAPTER 4 KAZAKHSTAN’S CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP AND POWER RESOURCES

This chapter aims to present Flemes’ first and second assessment criteria of regional power, which include the claim to leadership and power resources (material and ideational capabilities). This chapter aims to understand Kazakhstan’s actions and activities and its claim to regional leadership in both Central Asia and wider Eurasia. Moreover, this chapter touches on various regional issues, particularly transboundary water management, which Kazakhstan has been playing a leading role in solving as a regional problem. This chapter assesses Kazakhstan’s material capabilities and ideational power in comparison to its Central Asia neighboring countries and other post-Soviet states.

4.1 Kazakhstan’s Claim to Leadership

Flemes (2007) explained the claim to leadership as the first indicator to identify any regional power candidate. He suggests looking at how a state assumes a leadership role during any crisis and how it plays the role during crisis management. Regional power leadership can be observed in how effectively a state mediates and how effectively it can engage with all conflict parties to find solutions. Apart from mediation activities, regional leadership can be observed through a state’s proactive engagement in regional and global architecture and to what extent a state is willing to assume the role of a stabilizer in regional security affairs and role of rule maker in regional economics (Flemes, 2007, p. 12). The destruction of the Soviet Union contributed to the newly-independent Kazakhstan’s absence of experience in any field, particularly in foreign affairs.Kazakhstan’s foreign service and diplomatic relations, in the early stage, was conducted through the Soviet Union mission (Cummings, 2002). A weak government and unsettled political-economic institutions, as well as the presence of a large Russian community, limited Kazakhstan’s pursuit of any proactive foreign policy and provocative action in the early period of state-building. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 52 doctrine can be characterized as“Multivectorism” in the early stages of its diplomatic relations. Multivector foreign policy involves a pragmatic act of having balanced relations with all foreign countries equally. Pragmatics and balance have been embedded in nomadic ideology for a long time for the purpose of securing lands and resources.Multivectorism justified Kazakhstan’s relations with all its Central Asian neighbors, former superpower Russia, rising China, the European Union and the U.S. In addition, Multivectorism legitimizes Kazakhstan’s newly-independent questions, for example, questions regarding Kazakhstan’s national identity, Kazakhstan’s landlocked geography, the volatile external political environment, state-building and the nation- building process. This foreign policy doctrine is aimed to strengthen Kazakhstan’s position in the region as a friendly nation to all counties as well as to create an uncontested environment that allows Kazakhstan to pursue consistent economic growth.1 Therefore, Kazakhstan is ready to pragmatically deal with anyone and any issue. In 1997, regarding the fate of Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev stated to the People of Kazakhstan that,

'I, for my part, am sure that by the year of 2030 Kazakhstan will have become a Central-Asian Snow Leopard and would serve as a fine example to be followed by other developing countries. Tigers are not found in Kazakhstan while the Snow Leopard inhabiting our mountains is but a stranger in the world community. Though a relation to the Tiger in the animal kingdom, Snow Leopards bear some substantial distinctions. Therefore, it will be virtually a Kazakhstani Snow Leopard with inherent elitarianism, sense of independence, intelligence, courage and nobleness, bravery and cunning. It will never be the first to attack anyone, ever prone to avoiding direct clashes (Nazarbayev, 1997)

1 Kazakhstan’s multivectorism can be compared to Prime Minister Hu Jintao’s idea of China’s peaceful rise. The idea of China’s peaceful rise depicts China’s economic and military development as friendly and non-revisionist rising power. Moreover, this idea also responded to academic debate so called the China threat theory. i.e. Broomfield (2003), Gertz (2000) and Storey & Yee (2004)

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The President iterated the rationale of friendly Kazakhstan by depicting Kazakhstan with a defensive and cooperative animal like the snow leopard. The manifesto of a Central Asia snow leopard and multivectorism could be observed as an act of Kazakhstan to play a regional role, especially in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy could be observed as an attempt to proclaim its intention to regionally engage with everyone particularly its neighboring countries, namely Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moreover, the snow leopard doctrine projected Kazakhstan as a friendly neighbor who is willing to become a regional mediator during regional crisis. Apart from its friendly foreign policy doctrine, Kazakhstan, since independence, has proposed the concept of “Eurasianism” as a state ideology for Kazakhstan. Mostafa (2013) reviewed a pile of literature in relevance to the concept of Eurasianism and he concluded that the term Eurasianism is a politico- ideological and philosophical concept and with multi-dimensional features and aspects that emerged and re-emerged in various historical stages by philosophers, historians, nationalist, communists, as well as individual groups and leaders pursuing their respective goals and aspirations (Brzezinski, 2016; Shnirelman, 2009). Nevertheless, the term, Eurasianism, has been utilized in various ways in diverse environments by different political leaders. For example, Russian Eurasianism was utilized and perceived as a nationalist attempt to deter disintegration of the Eurasian culture, especially use of the Russian language and values vis-à-vis emerging Pan- Turkism and Pan-Islamism during the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Furthermore, Turkish Eurasianism was used by Turkish intellectuals after the collapse of the Soviet Union to create a sense of historical, cultural and ethno-linguistic solidarity among areas of Turkey, the Balkans, modern Central Asia, the regions of Volga and Afghanistan (Hanmm, 2006; Sengupta, 2009). To conclude, there is no single consensus regarding the homogeneousness of the concept of Eurasianism. But, the most common understanding of the Eurasian area is in terms of physical geography, which covers the landmass of Asia and Europe as a whole. In the case of Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev proposed his own version of Kazakhstan’s Eurasianism for the first time at the Moscow State University while discussing the creation of a regional trading bloc for the sake of post-Soviet economic growth in 1994. It was the first time in the post-Soviet space that the term Eurasianism

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 54 was utilized to advance regional integration for boosting trade and investment in the whole of the Eurasia continent (Europe-Asia).Eurasianism was used to politically justify and economically unite states in the Eurasian continent particularly in the post- Soviet states, apart from the existing Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the defense area. Nazarbayev stated that,

There are individuals who like to make a link between Kazakhstan and Europe; and there are those who also like to see Kazakhstan to be in closes tie with the Asian ‘Tigers;’ still there others who want to consider Russia as our strategic partner, while suggesting not to ignore the Turkish model for development. Paradoxically, they are right in their own way, since they have felt the issue from different angles. In reality, Kazakhstan, as a Eurasian state that has its own history and its own future, would have a completely different path to travel down the road. Our model for development will not resemble other countries; it will include in itself the achievements from different civilizations (Mostafa, 2013, p. 164)

Under the banner of Eurasianism, Kazakhstan sees itself neither as East nor West and neither North nor South, but rather a Eurasian state that shows leadership to strengthen the concept of Eurasianism in advancing Eurasian integration. Kazakhstan has been at the frontline in showing efforts to keep close political and economic relations among states in the Eurasian continent.As previously mentioned, Kazakhstan was the first to call for the creation of Eurasian integration in 1994, which transformed the area into a European-style post-Soviet form of integration called the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). After Nazarbayev’s proposal in 1994, the first tangible outcome was the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in 2000. In 2010 a Customs Union was initiated among Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus. Subsequently, the three leaders of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus signed a historic treaty creating the EEU in 2014 in Astana2.The EEU came into effect on 1 January 2015, creating an economic union and a cross-border single market for the free flow of

2 A signing ceremony was also attended by the president of Armenia and Kygyzstan.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 55 goods, services, capital and labor, among a population of 170 million.3 Satpaev (2015) argued that President Nazarbayev has portrayed himself as a great integrationist who is the founding father of the EEU. Kazakhstan expects the EEU to help it achieve economic goals by integrating itself with its Eurasian neighbors and gaining access to the large market among the EEU members, as well as attracting foreign investors. In addition, Kazakhstan expects the EEU to solidify Kazakhstan’s regional position and strengthen Kazakhstan’s global profile. President Nazarbayev had an interview with Khyber state TV channel on 26 August 2014 in which he stated,

“If the rules set forth in the agreement are not followed, Kazakhstan has a right to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union. I have said this before and I am saying this again. Kazakhstan will not be part of organizations that pose a threat to our independence. Our independence is our dearest treasure, which our grandfathers fought for. First of all, we will never surrender it to someone, and secondly, we will do our best to protect it. Many say that Kazakhstan will be discriminated in the Eurasian Union, but "that's not true. When the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus get together to make decisions, if any one of the three is against something, the decision is not made. This is called consensus. If I do not like their decision, I will speak up against it, and it will not be adopted. This means that we all have equal rights” (Nazarbayev,2014)

President Nazarbayev vigorously and repeatedly stated that the EEU must remain exclusively an economic platform and Kazakhstan will withdraw from the EEU if either Kazakhstan’s independence is threatened or the EEU turns into a political platform. Strong posture from Nazarbayev is directly aimed toward Russia and mirrors how confident and significant Kazakhstan is in the EEU. Holmquist (2015) argued that Kazakhstan is now holding the upper hand and trump card in its relations with Russia within the EEU platform.

3 The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is composed of three founding members (Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan) and two acceding members (Armenia and Kygyzstan)

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Apart from wider Eurasian integrationist leadership, Kazakhstan views itself as a player who has the aspiration to play a regional role in its homeland, Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s 2014-2020 foreign policy concept iterates the promotion of the “politically stable, economically sustainable and safe development of Central Asia” and is the top priority listed in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Concept. It is a goal that Kazakhstan views as best addressed through the dual policies of pursuing integration in Central Asia and addressing regional security concerns ("Foreign Policy Concept,” 2014). Kuchins, Mankoff and Backes (2015) argued that Kazakhstan so far has been the strongest supporter of regional cooperation and integration in Central Asia.On the contrary, there are some scholars who pointed out that post-colonial Central Asian states are still obsessed with strengthening territorial integrity and avoid any regionalism attempts. In simple words, Central Asians always play a regional game to avoid dealing with any new potential big brother in the region (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012). Therefore, it has contributed to the difficulty of regional leadership cultivation in Central Asia. Likewise, Topilov (2015), an Uzbek political scientist, has criticized Kazakhstan’s adherence to Eurasianism and regional leadership as “Pseudo- leadership”. He argued that Eurasianism has distorted Kazakhstan’s regional identity, which is a desire to look like a leader in both Europe and Asia. For this reason, Kazakhstan has already abandoned the idea of Central Asian identity by embracing a wider Eurasian identity instead.He proved his argument by referring to Nazarbayev’s interview with BBC regarding Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship in 2006, which Tolipov commented that the President himself was confused about his personal self- identification.

“He [Nazarbayev] was asked a question: You actively lobby interests of your country in the OSCE in order to achieve the chairmanship of Kazakhstan in it. Why do you believe Kazakhstan is relevant candidate for the status of a Chairman? He responded: Kazakhs are Europeans, not Asians. In fact, we are all Europeans. We were educated this way... I personally perceive further development of Kazakhstan as a democratic free development. (Tolipov, 2012, p. 173)

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He took the argument further that Central Asia is a region that is heavily exposed to geopolitical factors as well as being relatively difficult lead among weak and small states. In addition, he questions the possibility of Central Asian regionalism and integration without the presence of powerful Russia and whether Central Asian states can develop their own platform without residing under the umbrella of the great power in order to reflect and represent their own regional interests. On the other hand, many scholars have discussed the positive regional leadership of Kazakhstan. For instance, Zabortseva (2011)argued that Russia has lost its regional hegemony status in Central Asia and Kazakhstan is gradually replacing Russia and assuming Central Asia’s regional leadership. Instead of breaching Russia’s existing regional architecture, Kazakhstan itself has aimed to become the new regional power, competing in this way with Russia in the regional framework.Kazakhstan itself is on track to play a larger role in the regional integration trends, competing in this way with Russia (Zabortseva, 2011, pp. 10-11). Furthermore, a scholar from Stratfor argued that Kazakhstan is currently Central Asia’s most important state, which has already achieved the status of the current regional leader with the help of Russia ("Central Asia,”2009). As discussed earlier, Kazakhstan’s 2014-2020 foreign policies have manifested as a top priority in Central Asia, seeking to reflect the interests of the region. Strong dedication to the EEU is not only Kazakhstan’s masterpiece in proving its regional leadership attempt so far, but important to the region. The number of regional organizations in Central Asia is relatively low compared to other regions, but it is a common characteristic of a region with a number of post-colonial states who still strongly guard their autonomy and territorial integrity.Despite that, Kazakhstan has been making an effort for more regional organizations. For instance, the Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) was created in 1994 and was transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)4 in 2002. CACO is perceived as a failure of Central Asian regional integration. Therefore, CACO was merged into EurAsEC as one pillar of Nazarbayev’s EEU later on.

4 The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) was comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the primary purpose was to foster the economic cooperation. However, accession of Russia in 2004 in CACO de factor dissolved the CACO which the CACO no longer remained exclusive Central Asian states.

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In spite of a setback in convincing its Central Asian neighbors to participate in official regional organizations, Kazakhstan understands the factors that constrain its neighboring countries. Various constraints in Central Asia’s relations among them can be observed through miscellaneous issues. For example, the issue of transnational water management in Central Asia has been the most intense and violent problem, which has constituted regional divisions and political confrontation since independence of all five Central Asian states.Tursunzod (2001) argued that water is more important than oil in Central Asia. Irrespective of Kazakhstan, Central Asian states are highly dependent on their agricultural economies and hydropower in electricity production, as a result of the geography of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are located in the Southern plateau of Central Asia in the mountains of the Pamir range, roughly 3,000 meters above sea level. Two major rivers of Central Asia, including the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, originate in this plateau and flow westward to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Figure 4.1 Flow Direction of Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers and Dams

Note: Reprinted from Hydropower in Tajikistan. The Economist, 2013.

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The two rivers have created two regional factions, namely Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as two upstream countries and Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as three downstream countries. Low reserves of oil and other natural resources have led to economic hardships in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan when compared to the significant oil and natural reserves in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.As stated, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s economies are sustained by agricultural products and particularly electricity exports. Consequently, transnational water management in Central Asia clearly jeopardizes relations between Central Asian states.Water has turned into a geopolitical weapon by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan against downstream countries, particularly Uzbekistan (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012, p. 34). The construction of the Rogun dam in Tajikistan is in progress and is expected to open in 2018. The Rogun dam is currently the highest priority of Tajikistan as an instrument to increase political leverage vis-à-vis Uzbekistan. Tajikistan’s energy consumption is heavily dependent on energy imports from Uzbekistan. As a result, Uzbekistan feels threatened from the construction of the Rogun dam upstream, which it sees as a threat to its national security (Marat, 2009a). For this reason, Tajikistan has periodically witnessed Uzbekistan’s pipeline politics, i.e. Uzbekistan halting the supply of natural gas and energy, especially during winter to curb Tajikistan’s position regarding the construction of the Rogun dam. Moreover, Uzbekistan also wages a railroad war with Tajikistan. Therefore, Kazakhstan, as one of the countries affected by water politics in the region is aware of its better position as a downstream country. For this reason, Kazakhstan, who is less affected compared to Uzbekistan, has chosen a more compromising and accommodating approach than Uzbekistan in solving transboundary water management (Passolt, 2007, p. 237). So, Kazakhstan sees itself as a middleman among its neighbors to engage with all affected parties within a regional platform to find common solutions. In contrast to Uzbekistan’s harsh response, President Nazarbayev has stated that the construction of dams causing “disputes could be resolved only on the basis of negotiations and the strengthening of mutual trust, without confrontation”. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan invited all other four Central Asian neighbors to sign the “1992 Almaty Agreement” for the purpose of maintaining the Soviet Union water quotas. As a result of national interests and political mistrust, the agreement was rarely respected and ineffective as expected (Izquierdo,

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Stangerhaugen, Castillo, Nixon, & Jimenez, 2010). The same reasons are able to explain inefficiency and ineffectiveness of transboundary water management today. Kazakhstan bitterly experienced manmade environmental and ecological catastrophe as part of the Soviet Union. The case of the Aral Sea demonstrates the ecological consequences of as a result of water irritation, weapon testing, industrial projects, and water diversion. Attempting to prevent another ecological catastrophe in Central Asia, the Astana Green Bridge Initiative was proposed and presented by Kazakhstan at the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). The Astana Green Bridge Initiative aims to promote low-carbon development and adaptation to climate change, sustainable urban development, green business and green technology, sustainable lifestyles and improvement of quality life, and particularly the eco-efficient use of natural resources and investment in ecosystem services. This initiative aims to strengthen the protection of the environment while sustainably building economic growth based on investment and innovation. Primarily, it aims to address regional tensions over energy, food, environment, and particularly transnational water management. Supported by the UN, it aims to engage all partner countries, especially in Central Asia, to participate in multilateral partnerships to jointly resolve the aforementioned issues. Kazakhstan included water management in its agenda presented to the UN and the sustainable use of water resources and the development of high-performance energy are main priorities (Ospanova, 2013). Undeniably, the issue of water management as a pillar5 of Kazakhstan’s core campaign for non-permanent membership of the UNSC (2017-2018) has been positive and has gained favor from the UNGA. Kazakhstan’s core campaign for the UNSC conforms to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda, which the UN has been promoting as one of its “highest global goals”. Kazakhstan and the UNSC will be elaborated on in the next chapter within the section of Kazakhstan’s institutional foreign policy instruments. The Astana Green Bridge Initiative demonstrates Kazakhstan’s leadership in the field of sustainable development.By projecting the significance of water issues in Central Asia onto the global platform, Kazakhstan can

5 4 pillars of Kazakhstan’s bid for non-permanent membership of UNSC include water security, food security, energy security and nuclear security.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 61 be seen as significantly devoting itself to a sustainable green economy and environmental protection.

4.2 Kazakhstan’s Material Powers

Flemes (2007) identified material and ideational power as the second indicator in assessing regional power candidates.Material and ideational power gives a state the power to make a difference in international bargains. Material power (social, economic, political, historical, and security aspects) extend from tangible terms, namely military expenditure, GDP, National Power Index, Income per Capita, Economic Competitiveness, GINI index, income inequality, trade volume and education level, and translate into material power capabilities. Ideational power involves intangible terms, including the projection of domestic norms and values to create legitimacy, credibility, accountability, and authority within a region. Mearsheimer, a realist scholar, advocated explaining the structure and power of international politics with military power. While it is still a critical element in world politics today, many have pointed out the cooperative and hopeful characteristics of international politics today within the globalized world (Mearsheimer, 2007). Table 4.1 demonstrates Kazakhstan’s Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), which is a statistical measure of national power by analyzing material capabilities and hard power, including demographics, economics, and military strength. Kazakhstan has the highest CINC score in the Central Asian region and the third highest among Post-Soviet states (CIS), after Russia and Ukraine. Similarly, Kazakhstan ranks first in defense expenditure in Central Asia and third among Post-Soviet states, again after Russia and Ukraine.Kazakhstan’s material strength and military expenditure as a percentage of GDP can tell a different story than what it appears. Kazakhstan spends ten times more on military capabilities than its Central Asian neighbors combined, but it only accounts for 1% of Kazakhstan’s total GDP, approximately USD 1 billion. Compared to other qualified regional powers, Kazakhstan might significantly spend less than South Africa, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey, but Omelicheva (2016) argued that Kazakhstan’s military, defense, and security closely remains with Russia, who is Kazakhstan’s largest supplier

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 62 of arms and military equipment. Kazakhstan has anchored its military capabilities with Russia and Russia-dominated defense and security cooperation (CIS and CSTO). Moreover, the military institution building process and military security establishment of Kazakhstan have utilized Russia’s advisors as instructional staff for building Kazakhstan’s defense and security. As a result, Kazakhstan is still able to rely on security and defense from Russia as well as multilateralism in CIS and CSTO. Although Kazakhstan’s military power is marginal in continental and global terms, Kazakhstan has far superior military capabilities and the best equipped army in the Central Asian region. When comparing the military capabilities with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan actually has an inferior ranking at 55 compared to Uzbekistan’s 48 according to Global Firepower 2017. That is a result of the smaller size of manpower available. Regardless of man power and fit-for-service availability, Kazakhstan has a larger total active military personnel at 74,500 personnel compared to Uzbekistan’s 56,500. In addition, Kazakhstan overwhelmingly outnumbers Uzbekistan in terms of military equipment: total aircraft (239), total naval assets (15) and armored fighting vehicles (1613).6 Therefore, it leads to military supremacy and dominant power militarily in terms of security and defense. In contrast to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan has chosen the model of economic development in expanding its regional and international position. Uzbekistan chose the model of regional leadership based on political and military hegemony (Wolowska, 2004). President Nazarbayev could be considered as an economic reformist, pushing his country into high levels of economic liberalism, rapid economic liberalization, and promoting a highly educated population. Since independence, Kazakhstan has experienced rapid economic growth, a decline in poverty rates, steadily rising income per capita, high literacy and education levels, decline in unemployment and inflation, a large amount of FDI, and many other successes. Kazakhstan’s short term target, by 2030,is to take advantage of “windows of opportunity”,following South Korea and Singapore’s economic development success by exploiting the increased global demand for Kazakhstan’s energy to develop the manufacturing sector, expand transportation industries, develop mobile, multimedia, nano, space, robotic, biotech and energy

6 See Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan comparative military capabilities available at www.globalfirepower.com

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 63 technologies. Afterwards, development will allow Kazakhstan to achieve its 2050 long term targets in having knowledge-based and a green economy, becoming the trade hub of the Silk Road, achieving sustainable development, and as being regarded as a top 30 developed country (Weitz, 2014). As discussed earlier, Uzbekistan chose the model of political and military hegemony while Kazakhstan chose the economic development path. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are two of Central Asia’s largest states in terms of demographics, economy, and military. In 1999, Uzbekistan had a larger GDP at USD 17 billion compared to Kazakhstan’s USD 16 billion. However, Kazakhstan’s GDP, according to Table 4.2, has become nineteen times larger at USD 184.3 billion, while Uzbekistan’s GDP has only become four times larger at USD 66.7 billion in 2016.

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Table 4.1

Region-Based Military Expenditure and Comparison

Central Asia CIS Regional Powers

Country CINC18 Mil. Expen Mil.expen as % country CINC Mil. Expen Mil.ex Country CINC Mil. Expen Mil.expen (mil. USD) of GDP (mil. USD) pen as (mil. USD) as % of % of GDP GDP Kazakhstan 0.003103 1102 1.03 Russia 0.040079 69245 4.86 Kazakhstan 0.003103 1102 1.03

Uzbekistan 0.002666 73.2 (2003) 0.53 (2003) Kazakhstan 0.003103 1102 1.03 South Africa 0.006941 3160 1.1

Turkmenistan 0.000779 107.1 (1999) 2.90 (1999) Ukraine 0.008231 3423 3.99 Brazil 0.025063 23676 1.36

Kyrgyzstan 0.000333 206 3.58 Belarus 0.001984 597 1.32 Indonesia 0.014447 8183 0.88

Tajikistan 0.000364 55.5 (2004) 2.17 (2004) Lithuania 0.000394 636 1.13 Iran 0.015763 12685 2.32 (2014)

Latvia 0.000293 407 1.05 Saudi Arabia 0.013743 63673 13.49

Estonia 0.000181 502 2.03 Turkey 0.015239 14803 2.12

Georgia 0.000447 315 2.34

Moldova 0.000235 29.7 0.35

*Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC). Source: National Material Capabilities, Correlates of War Dataset, v5.0. See also http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities ** Military expenditure and military expenditure as % of GDP by country. Source: SIPRI Military expenditure Database, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf. and World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CN

18Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) was developed by J. David Signer – an American political scientist – to statistically measure components of hard powers including demographic, economic, and military strength.

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Table 4.2

Region-Based Material Power Comparison 2015

Central Asia CIS Other Regional Powers

Country Population GDP (bil. USD) Country Population GDP (bil. USD) Country Population GDP (bil. USD)

Kazakhstan 17,544,126 184.388,432 Russia 144,096,870 1,365.8 Kazakhstan 17,544,126 184.3 Uzbekistan 31,298,900 66.7 Kazakhstan 17,544,126 184.3 South Africa 55,011,977 314.5 Turkmenistan 5,373,502 35.8 Ukraine 45,154,029 90.6 Brazil 207,847,528 1,803.6 Kyrgyzstan 5,956,900 6.5 Belarus 9,489,616 54.6 Indonesia 257,563,815 861.9 Tajikistan 8,481,855 7.8 Lithuania 2,904,910 41. Iran 79,109,272 314.5 Latvia 1,977,527 27 Saudi Arabia 31,540,372 646 Estonia 1,314,608 22.4 Turkey 78,665,830 717.8 Georgia 3,717,100 13.9 Armenia 3,017,712 10.5 Moldova 3,554,108 6.5

Note: Adapted from World Population Prospects by World Bank, 2015. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL; World Bank National Account Data by World Bank, 2015. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD

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In addition, Kazakhstan’s population is about half the size of Uzbekistan’s, which is roughly 17 million. However, the two times smaller population size has achieved a GDP three times larger. As a result, Kazakhstan unquestionably presents the highest GDP within Central Asia. In the wider CIS, Kazakhstan has the second largest economy after Russia, having a superior economic performance than the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). Furthermore, Table 4.3 suggests that Kazakhstan’s average rates of education, literacy, education and childbirth (HDI) are higher than the rest of Central Asian states at 0.794, which places Kazakhstan higher on the Human Development Index by the UN. In addition, Kazakhstan has the highest GDP per capita at USD 25,044 compared to only USD 5,422 in 1990. More importantly, Kazakhstan has succeeded in attracting significant amounts of FDI, receiving more than half of Central Asia’s total FDI. Kahveci (2007) explained that Kazakhstan was able to attract large amounts of FDI at significant levels compared to its neighboring countries because Kazakhstan has prioritized the privatization of its energy sector. Kazakhstan realized the importance of FDI as a prerequisite of Post- Soviet economic development. Kazakhstan has also pursued legal reforms, especially with the introduction of investment law. The introduction of investment law serves as a guarantee for foreign investors and protects them from nationalization and expropriation.

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Table 4.3 Region-based Economic Power Comparison

Central Asia

Country GDP per capita HDI GINI Index FDI (bil. USD) Growth Unemployment (PPP)(2015) (2016) Competitive Index Kazakhstan 25,044.9 0.794 26.33 (2013) 215 4.5 5.22

Uzbekistan 6,086.5 0.701 35.27 (2003) 2.7 n/a 8.89

Turkmenistan 16,532.5 0.692 40.77 (1998) 3.1 4.5 8.61

Kyrgyzstan 3,433.7 0.664 26.82 (2014) 0.52 3.8 7.68 Tajikistan 2,833.7 0.627 30.76 (2014) 0.47 4.0 10.81

*The Human Development Index (HDI) **The Growth Competitiveness Index Note: GDP per Capita (PPP) Adapted from World Bank National Account Data by World Bank, 2015. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD HDI Adapted from Human Development Reports by United Nations Development Programme, 2016. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506# GINI Index Adapted from GINI Index by World Bank, 2015. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI FDI Adapted from Do Business in Central Asia by Santander, 2016. Retrieved from en.portal.santandertrade.com Growth Competitive Index Adapted from The Global Competitiveness Report by World Economic Forum, 2016. Retrieved from http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/ Unemployment Rate Adapted from Total Unemployment in Central Asia by World Bank, 2016. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=KZ-UZ-TJ-KG

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Kazakhstan has an outstanding position in terms of overall development in comparison with other Central Asian states. In addition, Kazakhstan heads Central Asia and most CIS states, outside Baltic countries, in nearly all development indicators.Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan once had similar Post- Soviet backgrounds and circumstances as Kazakhstan, but Kazakhstan has been able to build the country’s strengths and become far more efficient than its neighboring countries (Robert, 2016).

4.3 Kazakhstan’s Ideational Power

Material capabilities are not enough to explain Kazakhstan’s regional supremacy. Nye (2004) advocates for the significance of soft power utilized by a state to gain sources of legitimacy, credibility, and authority through a persuasive and non- coercive manner. He states that “What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” Therefore, power is a combination of two equally important elements – hard and soft power. However, Kazakhstan’s soft power does not follow Nye’s soft power seduction, namely a lack of human rights, individual opportunities and democracy. Although soft power is difficult to measure, it can be examined through sports, movies, education, and a government’s attempts at soft power building, as well as aid and economic cooperation. The most prominent example of Kazakhstan’s soft power is its success in economic development. As discussed in Kazakhstan’s material powers part, after independence Kazakhstan shared the characteristics of collapsed socio-politico- economic institutions with other former Soviet-states. But, Kazakhstan has been able to achieve desired economic development targets, has lifted the standard of living, and has become a middle-income country within 25 years. Araral (2016) praised Kazakhstan’s economic development, “very few newly-independent countries have been open to as much institutional reforms in so short a time as Kazakhstan.” The commitment in pursing institutional reforms, including market liberalization, trade, monetary reforms, language reforms, higher and vocational education reforms, legal and judicial reforms, which allow the Kazakhstan government to significantly invest in

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 69 education, has made Kazakhstan different from the rest of Central Asia and the CIS. The Kazakhstan government has sent numerous bright students to go study abroad using Kazakhstan government scholarships (Bolashak) in order to support Kazakhstan’s future knowledge-based economy.For this reason, Kazakhstan has proved itself to be an economic development model for the rest of the CIS and particularly in Central Asia. Importantly, what makes Kazakhstan’s development model attractive and seductive is the nature of the political regime, Kazakhstan remains authoritarian. Kazakhstan has had five presidential elections and President Nazarbayev has won all five elections with an overwhelming majority of votes each time. In spite of consistent elections, the West still regards Kazakhstan as an authoritarian state whose political regime shares similar characteristics with other Central Asian states and the CIS. As a result of, Kazakhstan’s economic model shares similar patterns with the Asian Tigers, authoritarian China, Singapore, South Korea and Japan, where politics are not free and civil liberty is rarely guaranteed. Economic development is a top priority and the government expects its citizens to sacrifice individual freedom for economic prosperity in return. Kazakhstan’s liberal economic model under an authoritarian regime state structure has been exported and has attracted its neighboring countries. In addition, Kazakhstan has become the largest destination of economic immigrants within Central Asia, where Tajik and Kyrgyz migrants come to work in the construction and agricultural sectors. For example, Baruah (2010) studied labor migration from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Kazakhstan and Russia in 2008, which he found that Kazakhstan received approximately 340,000-500,000 labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan. The remittances sent back to Kyrgyzstan accounted for 31% of Kyrgyzstan’s total GDP in 2008. Likewise, remittances to Tajikistan accounted to roughly 50% of Tajikistan’s total GDP in 2008, where roughly 50,000 Tajiks were working as seasonal labor migrants in Kazakhstan. Moreover, around 250,000 Uzbeks worked in Kazakhstan, but remittances did not account for a substantial proportion of Uzbekistan’s total GDP. For this reason, Marat (2009b) argued that Kazakhstan has become a new home for labor migrants in Central Asia. Remittances from labor immigrants in Kazakhstan play a powerful role in the neighboring countries’ economies.

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Furthermore, the ethnically diverse society of Kazakhstan is a strength in terms of national identity and citizenship. As mentioned earlier, Kazakhstan’s demographics is composed of various ethnicities, namely Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, Chinese, Koreans, Germans, Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Tajik and Kyrgyz. The diversity of ethnicities and religions represent Kazakhstan’s multinational character. Ethnic and religious conflicts are low compared to other post- colonial states in history. The Soviet Union built inter-ethnic and religious tolerance and that Soviet legacy has played a significant role in building ethnic harmony today. To preserve political stability and authority, Kazakhstan’s government felt the legacy was imperative for coping with ethnic and religious diversity during the early stages of the state-building process within the Post-Soviet environment. Kazakhstan’s government introduced principles fora multiethnic society in an attempt to make a conscious effort to discourage the outbreak of nationalism and to suppress social movements and political parties, which are based on political ethno-national ideologies (Luong, 2002). Regarding Kazakhstan’s religious policy, Orthodox Christianity has official status, as does Islam and other religions, with the prohibition on expressing religious radicalism, particularly in relation to Kazakh ethno-nationalism (Laruelle, 2015b). Article 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan states that, 1. Everyone shall have the right to determine and indicate or not to indicate his national, party and religious affiliation. 2. Everyone shall have the right to use his native language and culture, to freely choose the language of communication, education, instruction and creative activities. As a result, Kazakhstan has rarely experienced ethno-religious conflicts and secessionism since independence. Kazakhstan has presented its Central Asian neighbors and international community an image of how peaceful Kazakhstan’s multiethnic society is and Kazakhstan endorses its Eurasianism notion as a tool in demonstrating how friendly Kazakhstan and its leadership at the regional and global level can be. Apart from being a highly tolerant society, Kazakhstan’s education is perceived as being highly respected internationally, particularly Nazarbayev University. Nazarbayev has become the national brand of higher education in Kazakhstan. Laruelle (2015b) explains that Nazarbayev University is one of “prestige”,

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 71 an institution in Kazakhstan driving Kazakhstan’s research power to the world class level. In Nazarbayev’s words, “[Kazakhstan needs] the establishment of “a unique academic environment” and a “need to create a prestigious, world-class university” to improve the resource rich country’s economic ranking internationally” (Horn, 2012). Interestingly, Fairfax and Napper (2016) also pointed out the role of Kazakhstan’s government during the Afghanistan War.The Kazakhstan government provided more than 1,000 scholarships for Afghan students to study in Kazakhstan as humanitarian aid to help Afghanistan’s post-war rehabilitation. Kazakhstan aims to create an international world class university to attract both bright Kazakhstani students as well as international students to study in Kazakhstan’s University. Surprisingly, what makes Kazakhstan famous and popular worldwide is not relevant to massive petroleum sector or the powerful President. The release of “Borat” in 2006, starring Sacha Baron Cohen, brought Kazakhstan into the eyes of the international media politically and culturally. The film depicted Borat Sagdiyev, a prominent reporter in Kazakhstan, who was sent to make a documentary about American culture and society by the Kazakhstan government. Throughout the film, Borat and Kazakhstan were mocked over backwardness and unadaptable Soviet behavior. The film depicts a politically incorrect image of Kazakhstan in all dimensions.19 Kazakh ambassadors worldwide were assigned with strict instructions by the Kazakhstan government to redress the misinformation of Kazakhstan and Borat to avoid confusion. In 2012, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister Yerzhan Kazykhanov stated that “[he] attributed a great rise in tourism to his country”, with visas issued rising ten times, to the film. I am grateful to 'Borat' for helping attract tourists to Kazakhstan” (Bartlett 2012). Pratt (2015) did research and found that tourism arrivals to Kazakhstan increased by approximately 12% in 2007, one year after the release of Borat internationally. In addition, the Kazakhstan government gave USD 40 million to fund the creation of the state-funded film, “Nomad”. The film became the most expensive Kazakh film that had ever been made in Kazakhstan and became one of the most

19All misinformation regarding Kazakhstan depicted in Borat is summarized at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/life_and_art/2006/11/the_real_kazakhstan.ht ml

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 72 expensive films made outside of Hollywood (Fedorenko, 2012). The film depicts Ablai Khan, a young nomadic Kazakh man in the 18th century attempting to unite his country among tribal wars in Central Asia. Moreover, Kazakhstan has been internationally known for its success in boxing, having Gennady Golovkin as the world’s most famous Kazakhstani (Hammond, 2016). Recently, Golovkin was appointed by President Nazarbayev to become the ambassador for the Astana 2017 EXPO to attract political and media attention for the incoming international exhibition, which will be held in Kazakhstan in 2017.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed a comprehensive outlook of Kazakhstan’s doctrine of Eurasianism and multivector foreign policy as instruments for forming their claim to leadership in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s Eurasianism has contributed to the creation of the EEU, as one of the most significant regional integrations in the Post-Soviet space. It is not only economically beneficial to Kazakhstan, but beneficial to all the post-Soviet states, particularly the Central Asian states in creating politically stable and economically sustainable development. In addition, this chapter discussed and found that Kazakhstan’s material power resources are superior in terms of military and economics in comparison with its Central Asian neighbors and other post-Soviet states.This chapter also touched on Kazakhstan’s ideational power resources, which extend from its economic model, education, economic destination, as well as sports.

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CHAPTER 5 KAZAKHSTAN’S EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTs AND REGIONAL ACCEPTANCE

This chapter aims to present Flemes’ third and fourth assessment criteria of regional power, the employment of foreign policy instruments and regional acceptance. This chapter also aims to understand Kazakhstan’s utilization of its foreign policy to influence and further national interests at the regional and international levels. In addition, this chapter tries to measure and analyze Kazakhstan’s regional acceptance from its neighboring countries and from the international community.

5.1 Material Foreign Policy Instruments

Flemes (2007) has suggested that material instruments involve the application of hard power (military means) by a regional power extending from the application of military coercion and economic means in enforcing its foreign policy. For instance, military means involves military intervention, building of military threats, the deployment of military troops along borders, military alliance building with intra- regional or extra-regional actors, and especially the participation in multilateral military missions. Commonly, a regional power often engages in UN peacekeeping missions to demonstrate its material capabilities internationally and it often allies itself with regional or international collective security and military organizations. Similarly, Cooper, Higgot and Nossal (1993) highlighted the importance of states who participate in peacekeeping missions as one of middle power’s agenda to demonstrate their capabilities and national prestige within the international community. Cooper, Higgot and Nossal suggested that there are three main agendas, including the technical and entrepreneurial leadership agenda (first agenda), economic development and foreign aid agenda (second agenda), and the human rights, human security, environmental protection, and health agenda (third agenda). Outside of transnational water management issues, Central Asia has rarely experienced political and military confrontation among each other, particularly with friendly Kazakhstan.Kazakhstan is the only Central Asia state to have concluded border agreements with all its neighboring

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 74 countries.1 For this reason, Kazakhstan has not been involved in any armed conflict and has never intervened in any neighbor’s domestic affairs militarily. As a result, the short history of modern Central Asia has not seen any interstate war among Central Asian states, but there have been three major intrastate conflicts2 since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, namely the Tajikistani Civil War (1992-1997), Afghanistan War (2001- 2014) and the Kyrgyz Revolution (2010). Regarding the deployment of military means in enforcing its foreign policy, Kazakhstan did not have a prominent military role in shaping the Tajikistani Civil War or Kyrgyz Revolution. In regards to the Tajikistani Civil War, Kazakhstan had no notable presence in solving the regional conflict. The civil war ended with the intervention of a Russia-Uzbekistan military coalition in 1997. Kazakhstan only provided a small number of troops in participating in the coalition force, as well as offering to hold high level meetings concerning the end of the ceasefire, which was considered as symbolic only.One could say that the one-year-old independent Kazakhstan was obsessed with the nation and state building process, institutional reforms, and lacked Foreign Service and diplomatic relations experience. However, Kazakhstan took a more visible role in solving the Kyrgyz Revolution regional crisis during in 2010.3 Apart from offering humanitarian aid to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan demonstrated its prominent role in ending the Kyrgyz Revolution by sending its military transport aircrafts to pick up the ousted Kyrgyz leader, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, at Jalal-Abad in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The departure of exiled Bakiyev marked the turning point of the Kyrgyz Revolution and prevented civil war, which preserved regional stability and prevented further political violence in Kyrgyzstan.

1 Kazakhstan concluded border agreement with Russia in 2005, Uzbekistan in 2003 and Kyrgyzstan in 2001, and Kazakhstan became the first post-Soviet state to resolve and conclude all border issues with China in the 1999 join communiqué. 2 A number of intra state violence incidents have significantly increased after the period of Cold War which armed conflict and violence shifted to involve the conflict between a government and a non-state group within the territory of the state. 3 The Kyrgyz Revolution involved an uprising of Kyrgyz people in protesting the government policy in relevance to government corruption and increased living expenses. The violence erupted in 7 April 2010 which forced Bakyiev to resign in 15 April 2010. The uprising led to the consolidation of a new parliamentary system and the rise of new President Almazbek Atambayev.

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The most impactful conflict did not take place in the territory of the five traditional Central Asia states. Thirteen years of the Afghanistan War completely changed the geo-political landscape of the Central Asia region by shaping the nature of Central Asian states’ relations and activities.Due to the geographical proximity of Central Asia, the American military intervention in overthrowing the Taliban emerged as one of most important determinants in destabilizing newly-independent Central Asian states. Central Asian states inherited independence and territorial sovereignty from the Soviet Union, which was a byproduct of the Bolshevik Revolution that distributed land and territory based on an ethno-territorial criteria. Similar to other post- colonial states, new borders did not accommodate a variety of ethnic groups, which led to volatile and porous borders and the main cause of emerging illegal activities in Central Asia (Bulat, 2001). American intervention in Afghanistan was a significant factor in destabilizing Afghanistan, which provoked cross-border illegal activities as a result of war. For this reason, the greater Central Asia’s environment is ideal for the purposes of Al-Qaeda and other Islamic radical movements because of its instability and ubiquitous corruption. Although Afghanistan doesn’t directly contribute to insecurity in Kazakhstan, other Central Asian states have been affected by the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism, the flourishing of terrorist networks, illegal immigration, human trafficking, and illicit smuggling through porous borders.Kazakhstan did not officially take part in military operations in the Afghanistan War, but rather offered transit routes for American soldiers, financial support, and the use of its territory and airspace as a military base. Although Kazakhstan does not share borders with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan is undeniably a core security and geostrategic factor in the Central Asia region. In addition, Deiss and Pejic (2015) argued that Kazakhstan is on the frontier of regional stability because Kazakhstan with its outstanding military and economic capabilities is expected to play a proactive role in regional security issues.It is evident from the three major incidents in the Central Asia region that the twenty-six- year-old Kazakhstan has never utilized its military supremacy within Central Asia to enforce its foreign policy. McDermott (2012) depicted the most recent 2011 Kazakhstan military doctrine as defensive by nature. Kazakhstan has no potential enemy and will not seek any enemy as a result of its pragmatic multivector foreign

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 76 policy it has followed since independence. However, Kazakhstan seeks to play a more prominent role in the area of defense and security within the international community. Although there is a low possibility of military threat within Central Asia, Kazakhstan has been struggling to develop and to evolve its defense capabilities to meet unprecedented conflicts and challenges within Central Asia. On the other hand, Kazakhstan utilizes its diplomatic, economic, and institutional power more carefully with its Central Asian neighboring countries. Obviously, military means have not been chosen by Kazakhstan as an influential instrument in shaping regional affairs in Central Asia. Arguably, Kazakhstan is unlikely to be involved in traditional military threats or armed conflicts, so Kazakhstan has been dedicating itself in combating non- traditional security threats, including terrorism, extremism, illicit and human trafficking, or any threats which could destabilize Central Asia’s regional stability.Kazakhstan realized the Soviet legacy of borders could motivate illegal activities to take place in the Central Asia region. Kazakhstan’s 13,364 kilometers long border is extremely vulnerable to the penetration of illegal cross-border activities. For this reason, territorial defense is upheld by Kazakhstan as a top priority for military operations and the strengthening of border troop units’ capabilities to overcome the poorly-monitored and porous borders safely is significant. As a result, Kazakhstan is seriously taking part in military operations with regional organizations, particularly in the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) under the multilateral platform of CSTO. KSOR is a joint military operation designed to combat terrorism, Islamic radicalism, cross border illicit and human trafficking along the border in Central Asia. KSOR military exercises are consistently participated in by Kazakhstan alongside Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Tajikistan. In addition to territorial defense vis-à-vis non-traditional security threats, President Nazarbayev identified himself and Kazakhstan as a peacemaker and as the foundation of Kazakhstan’s approach in having relations with other countries (Orazgaliyeva, 2015). Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping profile has significantly increased year after year because Kazakhstan and the President himself view peacekeeping operations as a reflection of its national ideology and its multivector foreign policy in projecting Kazakhstan’s friendly image and as a responsible member of the

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 77 international community. Nigmetullin (2015) analyzed Kazakhstan’s military doctrine and concluded that Kazakhstan’s attempts to uphold peace, particularly peacekeeping operations under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as an instrument to promote Kazakhstan’s military-political position and national prestige internationally are genuine. The Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense created the Kazakh Peacekeeping Battalion (KAZBAT) in 2000, later changed to the Kazakh Peacekeeping Brigade (KAZBRIG). Kazakhstan’s KAZBRIG, consisting of troops from a Muslim country, was sent to Iraq in 2003, joining the U.S.-led military coalition in establishing the transitional government of Iraq.KAZBRIG has succeeded in dismantling 4 million landmines and other land explosives, providing medical care to coalition soldiers and wounded civilians(Foster, 2010). Significantly, the KAZBRIG became the first Central Asian peacekeeping force to be sent outside Central Asia. Subsequently, in 2003 Kazakhstan jointly started Steppe Eagle with the U.S. and the U.K. as an annual peacekeeping joint military exercise. Steppe Eagle peacekeeping military exercises are supervised by NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), which concentrates on peacekeeping capability strengthening. Daly (2015b) explained that Steppe Eagle has helped Kazakhstan’s KAZBRIG improve its ability to participate in global peacekeeping operations, especially the ability to perform standardized peacekeeping operations. Steppe Eagle has helped Kazakhstan increase its ability to comply with international compatibility and standards which later will allow Kazakhstan’s KAZBRIG to fully participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Although Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping force has never been fully sent to join UNSC peacekeeping operations, Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping force has been sent as military observers in various peacekeeping missions, including the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), UN mission in Georgia, Nepal, Liberia and Haiti. In any case, Kazakhstan’s international compatibility is consistently growing to meet international standards of peacekeeping operations and Kazakhstan’s government is developing a legal framework to enable Kazakhstan’s citizens to join the UN missions (Dzhaksybekov, 2013). Finally, Kazakhstan will shortly participate in full UN peacekeeping operations in order to fulfill its international obligation in the near future.

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Apart from joining UN-led and NATO-led peacekeeping operations, Kazakhstan has been an active member in sending its peacekeeping forces to join regional organizations’ peacekeeping operations, CSTO. A CSTO peacekeeping force was created in 2007 to exist along with the KSOR force. Kazakhstan consistently joins an annual peacekeeping exercise alongside with CSTO’s members. The most recent peacekeeping exercise was dubbed “Unbreakable brotherhood 2016” and was held in Belarus. Kazakhstan sent its military personnel peacekeeping force to participate in the CSTO collective peacekeeping units. Kazakhstan is also an active member of the SCO in providing its military personnel to jointly participate in SCO joint military exercises. The Peace Mission was held for the first time in 2003. The SCO joint military exercise aims to increase a member’s military intelligence sharing, military cooperation, anti- terrorist operations, and to provide realistic military training for SCO members. The most recent SCO join military exercise was dubbed the Peace Mission-2016, which was held in Kyrgyzstan. Besides material instruments, economic instruments are used by regional powers to enforce its foreign policy. Economic instruments involve the increase and decrease of (subsidized) foreign direct investment as well as the increase and decrease of grants (Flemes, 2007). Kazakhstan’s large and rich economy has allowed it to increase outward investment, which has made Kazakhstan an increasingly important regional player in the Central Asia region. Kazakhstan’s FDI in Central Asia does not account for the majority of Kazakhstan’s outward FDI, but the FDI to its neighboring countries, mainly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has a significant impact on those countries, based on the sizes of their economies.The majority of Kazakhstan’s outward FDI to its neighboring countries is invested in the commercial banks. Kazakhstan’s commercial banks are holding approximately 30% of the banking sector in Kyrgyzstan (Kapparov, 2012, p. 7). The majority of Kazakhstan’s outward FDI in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan can be understood as a foreign policy instrument because these two countries are politically close to Kazakhstan. On the contrary, Uzbekistan as a regional rivalry and poorer economy, has received a small amount of Kazakhstan’s outward FDI and the FDI trends have remained negative year after year. Kazakhstan has recently set up a development aid agency dubbed, KazAID, which was created under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014. From a recipient to a donor, Kazakhstan became

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 79 the first Central Asian state to set up a development aid agency and the area it will prioritize is Central Asia. The primary objective of Kazakhstan’s development aid is to demonstrate how Kazakhstan is fulfilling its international obligations as a responsible member of the international community. In addition, KazAID will take on a significant role in providing support for development projects in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s foreign minister stated that all ODA4 provided by Kazakhstan will be a reflection of the Foreign Policy concept of Kazakhstan (Sieff & Michelle, 2014). Despite KazAID operations remaining minimal, it marks a significant step for Kazakhstan and Central Asia. For this reason, KazAID could be interpreted as an economic instrument for enforcing Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Foreign aid or development aid has been one of the most important foreign policy instruments since the Cold War period. Donor countries influence the behavior and decision-making process of recipient countries, and further desired national interests without utilizing hard power in achieving desired targets (Feis, 1964; Lancaster, 2008; Woods, 2005).

5.2 Institutional Foreign Policy Instruments

Institutional foreign policy instruments involve the enforcement of foreign policy to influence behavior of other states and to assert interests through the use of formal and informal procedures and rules by a state. So, a regional power often enters into a multilateral platform to further its national interests based on institutional dialogue (Flemes, 2007). This section focuses on how Kazakhstan utilizes institutional instruments to assert its national interests within regional, continental and global platforms. Chiochetti and Maier-Katkin (2015) argued that although Kazakhstan has superior military capabilities and economic strengths relative to its Central Asian neighbors and most of the post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan’s application of hard power is minimal. Kazakhstan tends not to use its military and economic dominance unilaterally, but rather utilizes its extensive membership in regional or multilateral platforms as the leverage to assert its national interests within the region. Stated in its 2014-2020 Foreign Policy Concept, Kazakhstan will be committed to promoting itself

4 Kazakhstan’s ODA definitions involve international grants, soft loans, voluntary contributions to the international organizations for development, creation of joint funds with the partner countries

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 80 with the principles of multilateralism and international organizations. For this reason, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is proactive diplomacy based on negotiation and dialogue by nature, as a result of the deep-rooted multivectorism since independence. The notion of a multivector foreign policy allows Kazakhstan to pursue mutually beneficial relations with everyone simultaneously, which creates an environment that allows Kazakhstan and partners to gain mutually desired interests in all economic, security, and diplomatic aspects. Therefore, it could be argued that Kazakhstan’s active involvement in multilateral institutionalism is the keystone of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy pursued by President Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan’s military and economic power supremacy with minimal utilization could be explained through international law and rational choice perspectives. Abbot and Snidal (2000) argued that international actors particularly states deliberately select softer forms of legalization (soft laws) over hard laws5 because soft laws have advantages in certain circumstances which hard laws have limitations. For instance, although hard laws can reduce transaction costs, strengthen the credibility of their commitment, expand their available political strategies and resolve problems of incomplete contracting, hard laws restrict an actor’s behavior and sovereignty (Abbot & Snidal, p. 422). For this reason, soft laws are chosen as superior institutional arrangements because of their advantages over hard laws. For example, soft laws are easier to achieve and compromise among competing interests as well as being more flexible in dealing with any uncertainty. To increase Kazakhstan’s presence and national pride, multilateral institutionalism, aforementioned, has been pursued by Kazakhstan as a top priority of its foreign policy increase Kazakhstan’s political and international position within the international community.The dedication of rule-based multilateralism has been upheld by Kazakhstan to enlarge its national prestige. Definitely, what the young country Kazakhstan has desired was to receive acknowledgement and recognition as one of the respected members of the international community. As discussed earlier, Kazakhstan’s material instruments are minimal, but its active contribution to a number of UN

5 Hard legalization (hard law) refers to legally binding obligation that are precise or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulation) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 81 peacekeeping operations worldwide has significantly improved Kazakhstan’s international visibility and prestige as a responsible member of the international community. Obviously, Kazakhstan uses its contributions to peacekeeping operations as a tool to promote its national interests which allows Kazakhstan to gain a reputation as a stable and peaceful state. The excellent reputation of Kazakhstan’s international position will allow Kazakhstan to garner international favor in helping it create a suitable environment for economic growth (Chiochetti & Maier-Katkin, 2015). The 70th session of the UNGA held the 2016 United Nations Security Council election in 28 June 2016.Kazakhstan, aside from its valuable contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, demonstrated its greatest achievement of diplomacy since independence, as it became the first Central Asian state to be elected as a non- permanent UNSC member by winning 138 out of 193 votes in the UNGA. Kazakhstan’s foreign minister ErlanIdrissov (2016) stated that after years of a continued lack of a voice from Central Asia, which has been no one’s interests, Kazakhstan succeeded in ending Central Asia being an overlooked region. Kazakhstan’s membership as a UNSC non-permanent member starts from 1 January 2017. In the campaign for the Asia-Pacific group, Kazakhstan’s bid is based on four central pillars: food security, energy security, nuclear security, and particularly water security.Kazakhstan’s foreign minister at that time, ErlanIdrissov, stated that,

“We believe that food, environment, energy and water security can be permanent areas of cooperation between the Security Council and other UN bodies, including the newly established political high-level forum on sustainable development,…Drawing on its own national and regional experience, Kazakhstan intends to promote issues of water, energy and food security – now one of the most serious existential problems of our time – in the body with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,” (Gleboff, 2013)

As the representative of the Central Asia region, Kazakhstan intends to be the voice of Central Asia in UN security issues by bringing the issue of water security to the global platform to be internationally addressed. However, it is too unrealistic to expect a breakthrough in solving long-time intense transboundary water management

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 82 within the UN platform in a short period of time. It could be argued that Kazakhstan has succeeded in bringing water security issues into the international community’s agenda, which resulted in its winning the election. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister, Erlan Idrissov (2014) stated that Kazakhstan has promised to use its UNSC position to push regional security challenges from water security to all major issues, not only from Central Asia but to the wider world into the UNSC discussion. Non-traditional security issues are viewed as being high on the agenda for Kazakhstan as a UNSC non- permanent member. For this reason, Nikolay Barekov, a prominent member of the European Parliament, has regarded Kazakhstan and its UNSC position as a regional leader and global partner to the international community (Stevens, 2016a). Therefore, if Kazakhstan’s national interest is to increase its international reputation, Kazakhstan has already received a great reputation in the international arena and is able to address intense transboundary water management in Central Asia under water security in the UN forum. Furthermore, Kazakhstan, besides obtaining UNSC non-permanent membership, once held the chairmanship of OSCE,6 which had a summit in Astana in 2010. It was the first time the summit was held in Central Asia. Laumulin (2011) argued that OSCE granting Kazakhstan the chairmanship marked an outstanding achievement for Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign policy because the OSCE chairmanship represented Kazakhstan’s international recognition after years of domestic development pursued by the Kazakhstan government and its citizens. Similarly, according to Lillis’s interview of the post-Soviet space analyst Alice Mummery, Kazakhstan’s winning the OSCE chairmanship could be observed as a diplomatic victory for Kazakhstan and a diplomatic coup by Kazakhstan within the OSCE (Mummery, 2011). The OSCE has been known for its hard work on human rights and democratization. The OSCE requires its participating members to qualify and meet OSCE’s standard requirements. For example, OSCE participating members are required to meet the standard of human rights protection and promotion. The ODIHR

6 The Organization for Security and Co-cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was a Cold War dialogue platform between the Western bloc and the Soviet Union. OSCE is current participated by 57 participating states and 11 partners for co-cooperation covering the North America, Europe and Asia.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 83 institution is known for its hard-working dedication on sending personnel to observe elections and its dedication on promoting human rights. For this reason, Kazakhstan’s questionable progress on genuine democratization and its human rights violations divided OSCE participating members into proponents and skeptics in relevance to Kazakhstan’s chairmanship. The proponents argued that Kazakhstan’s chairmanship would bring Central Asia and Europe closer in order to mitigate the East-West division. Contrarily, the skeptics argued that Kazakhstan’s questionable records on democratization and human rights violations would obstruct the principles of OSCE and undermine OSCE’s reputation (Shkolnikov, 2011). Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s diplomatic victory marked a remarkable experience for OSCE and the Central Asia region.Known as the U.S.- dominated security platform, Kazakhstan seized an opportunity to move closer to get accepted by the U.S., NATO and the EU. President Nazarbayev set an overall goal of Kazakhstan’s bid for OSCE chairmanship in 2006, as he stated, “with regard to the situation in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is ready to act as a regional guarantor, ensuring genuine and long-term security” (Laumulin, 2011, p. 322). Subsequently, Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship accomplishment was its role in handling the 2010Kyrgyzstan Revolution (Muzalevsky, 2010; Shkolnikov, 2011). Kazakhstan used its chairmanship for negotiating the departure of President Bakiyev, which then allowed Kazakhstan to send its military transport aircrafts to pick up the ousted President. As a result, Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship was able to influence the situation in Kyrgyzstan by alleviating the political violence through the multilateral institution.In addition, Kazakhstan was selected by the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) to hold an exhibition at the World Expo 2017. Astana Expo 2017’s theme is “Future Energy” which advocates for hosting a significant global conversation as a result of the consensus on the 2015 UN Climate Change (Rio+20). Kazakhstan as a leading energy power, has invested roughly USD 3 billion in constructing the Expo pavilion to host renewable energy innovation. Putz (2017) viewed that Astana Expo 2017 as presenting what Kazakhstan has achieved since its independence. Therefore, Astana Expo 2017 is purposefully political. President Nazarbayev will utilize the Astana Expo to paint Kazakhstan as a key global player, with a strong economy, and a forward-looking convener. In addition, it could be argued

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 84 that the World Expo could have a direct economic impact on the host country, with additional benefits from gaining national prestige. For instance, Canada hosted the Montreal Expo in 1967 and it received a rise in international arrivals and tourism within the same year (Joy, 2017). The 1887 Paris Expo contributed the construction of the Eiffel Tower, which suddenly became one of world’s most visited tourist destinations. In addition, Kazakhstan’s remarkable engagement in international organizations is still noticeable. For instance, Kazakhstan recently became the 162nd member of the WTO in 2015, showing commitment to legal procedures and following the WTO’s regulations of trade and adhering to agreements among participating members of the WTO. Moreover, Kazakhstan has initiated the idea of a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a security framework forum as a platform for advancing peace, security, and stability in Asia and the rest of the world. The CICA format currently has a participation of 26 member states, seven observer states, and four observer organizations. Similarly, Kazakhstan under President Nazarbayev initiated the idea of setting up the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (Turkic Council) in 2006. The Turkic Council is an international organization aiming to foster close cooperation and build stronger relations among Turkic countries’ families. The Turkic Council arranges a civilizational dialogue among members, including Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan.

5.3 Discursive Foreign Policy Instruments

Discursive foreign policy instruments involve the utilization of diplomatic instruments to articulate and further national interests. Flemes (2007) identified discursive instruments as activities of agenda setting, discourse control through rhetoric statement of political leaders in order to influence the region, employment of instruments of international law, e.g. mediation, and conflict resolution mechanism.Compared to the application of hard power (material instruments), discursive instruments are rather the application of soft power to influence the decision- making of other actors as well as to create political discourse which further national interests of a regional power. As discussed in earlier sections, Kazakhstan has been promoting the concept of Eurasianism, which could be observed as Nazarbayev’s

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 85 political discourse to legitimize and advance the progress of Eurasian integration, particularly the EEU as one of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy top priorities. In addition, Eurasianiam discourse also justifies Kazakhstan’s multiethnic society and preserves inter-ethnic tolerance within a harmonious society. Kazakhstan is located in the heart of Eurasia, at the crossroads of the ancient Silk Road where diverse civilizations interacted with each other. Discourse of Eurasianism has been successful in justifying Kazakhstan’s integrative attempt. Similarly, Assyltaeva, Tolen, and Nassimova (2014) pointed out the success of Eurasianism discourse in handling Kazakhstan’s domestic complicated society. Kazakhstan has been able to consolidate Kazakhstan’s people into a single social structure despite the diversity in ethnicities, languages and religions. Therefore, Kazakhstan could serve as an outstanding model for other countries in regulating its interethnic relations in a society. Interestingly, one political discourse which Kazakhstan and President Nazarbayev himself have been struggling to spread within the international community is a nuclear free world and nuclear non-proliferation is relevant to the issue of international security. Kazakhstan’s territory is full of natural resources. It controls one quarter of the world’s natural uranium reserves with full infrastructure and facilities for nuclear-related development. Kazakhstan was once a nuclear power.In fact, it had the world’s fourth largest nuclear weapons and missile arsenal7because Kazakhstan was the Soviet military complex base and nuclear and space research center.In 1995, Kazakhstan voluntarily dismantled and renounced its nuclear power ambition and closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site8 (Idrissov, 2014). Kazakhstan signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and transferred all its nuclear warheads to Russia. President Nazarbayev has delivered a number of speeches regarding nuclear disarmament and the most recent one was, “Building a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World”, at the Plenary Session of the International Conference in 2016. In the speech Nazarbayev stated,

7 Kazakhstan formerly had 1,410 nuclear warheads inherited from the Soviet Union. 8 Semipalatinsk was one of two Soviet nuclear test sites in Kazakhstan where 460 nuclear tests took place.

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I am sure that in the 21st century humanity can manage to make a worthy way to a nuclear-weapon-free world. By marking the 25th anniversary of the closure of Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, we again urge the world to recognize the never disappearing threat of nuclear self-destruction. I believe that the will and intellect of the world community multiplied by energy of well-calibrated collective actions will not permit our planet to step into the abyss of nuclear disaster. Today there is still a chance to make the world safer, releasing it from the most destructive weapons. I am sure that calls and proposals to be voiced from this tribune will be heard by politicians and scientists, by all people of good will. (Nazarbayev, 2016)

Kazakhstan’s discourse and attempt could be understood as Kazakhstan’s unique experience in struggling to create a nuclear-free world in order to save the planet from the proliferation of nuclear weapons which could lead to nuclear self-destruction of humanity. Being affected by nuclear technological development and being one of the most radioactive places on earth made Kazakhstan realize the necessity of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site was regarded as uninhabited and deserted during the Soviet Union era, but 500,000 people were living near the test site. The legacy of nuclear radioactive fallout is strongly present today, creating health problems ranging from cancer, birth defects, deformities, premature aging, cardiovascular disease and thyroid diseases. For this reason, Kazakhstan is taking a leading role to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world by 2045. This dream will be pursued through Kazakhstan’s UNSC non-permanent membership alongside the pursuit of sustainable development. Regionally, Kazakhstan alongside its Central Asian neighbors Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a legally binding treaty – the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) on 8 September 2006 at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear testing site. President Obama praised Nazarbayev’s decision during a bilateral meeting in South Korea by stating,

Twenty years ago, Kazakhstan made a decision not to have nuclear weapons. And not only has that led to growth and prosperity in his own country, but he has been a model in efforts around the world to eliminate nuclear materials that could fall into the wrong hands. So I very much

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appreciate his leadership. In fact, one of the major deliverables that will take place at the summit is an outstanding effort to deal with nuclear materials that were carried over from the Soviet era. Working with Russia and the United States, Kazakhstan has been able to secure those materials, and that makes us all safer. (Obama, 2012)

Not long ago, Kazakhstan received special attention for its non- proliferation model in the dialogue of peace and international security issues because of North Korea’s nuclear tests.The non-proliferation model of Kazakhstan has brought Kazakhstan into a prominent place as a phenomenal leader in renouncing nuclear weapons within the international community (Burton, 2016). To further the nuclear- free world norm, President Nazarbayev, 2016, established the international award for contributions to nuclear disarmament and security. The prize is designed to be awarded to political leaders, activists and business leaders. Consequently, President Nazarbayev awarded King Abdullah II of Jordan for his efforts in promoting international peace and security within the Middle East (Orazgaliyeva, 2016). In addition, President Nazarbayev (2016) also called for the reform of existing international disarmament treaties. Many scholars have tried to explain Kazakhstan’s denuclearization campaign which presents a contradiction vis-à-vis realist assumptions and predictions (Passolt, 2007). The presence of nuclear weapons within a newly-independent country raised uncertainties about retaining the politically-sensitive materials within such a volatile environment. For example, Kazakhstan was in dispute regarding territorial claims and had border issues with China.The presence of nuclear weapons and Kazakhstan’s lack of foreign service experience could trigger a tremendous misunderstanding (Webber, 1996).Similarly, Laumulin (1995) depicted Kazakhstan’s 1,410 inherited nuclear warheads as a bolt of lightning, unexpectedly illuminated the complex system of political, economic, and possible military interests surrounding the nuclear complex in Kazakhstan. It could be argued that the politically massive and sensitive legacy from the Soviet Union hindered Kazakhstan’s state-building process and its nuclear weapons could actually threaten its own political survival. The possession of nuclear weapons could be perceived as a security threat to nuclear powers and major powers in international politics. Furthermore, Laumulin, in an interview with Daniela Passolt,

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 88 pointed out that Kazakhstan basically was unable to financially and technically maintain the nuclear weapons. It turned out to be advantageous and less suspicious for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy with Russia, the U.S. and China at that time to give up the weapons (Passolt, 2007). In addition, Kazakhstan, in the early stages of independence, also utilized the nuclear weapons for political leverage with the U.S. and the negotiation9 was successful. Kazakhstan was able to secure USD 70 million of U.S. financial aid and technical assistance by dismantling its nuclear weapons. Finally, Kazakhstan became a leading power at the UNSC in 2017 in the campaign for pursuing a nuclear-free world. As reflected by Erlan Idrissov, in an address at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, stated that “we have shown that international influence and stature do not depend on nuclear firepower.” (Stevens, 2016b) Regionally, Kazakhstan is the backbone of regional integration and leadership in mediating and solving regional conflicts on water issues. Internationally, Kazakhstan has been known for its peace-driven and regional security-oriented foreign policy and its notable relinquishment of politically sensitive weapons as well as an active engagement of peacekeeping operations. Its international reputation has naturally made Kazakhstan an accepted international mediator. Kazakhstan’s rise as a regional mediator is not limited within the Central Asia region, but has now extended to the international sphere. Kazakhstan hosted the UN Security Council’s five permanent members UNSC’s nuclear deal talks with Iran (P5+1) several times. Kazakhstan has been seriously active in struggling to play a mediating role in the Iran nuclear deals. Regardless of a unique nuclear experience and friendly multivectorism, Kazakhstan has an enormous stake in the normalization of Iran’s relations with the world because Iran could serve as an alternative route for exporting Kazakhstan’s petroleum products to Europe (Putz, 2015). Furthermore, In 2014 Kazakhstan took an unofficial mediator role between Russia and Ukraine during Ukraine’s Euromaidan.10 Kazakhstan has close relations to

9 Full negotiation between President Nazarbayev and Secretary of State James Baker could be looked at Appendix A 10A wave of demonstrations and riots in Ukraine in protesting the Ukrainian government in delaying the singing of the European Association Agreement by President Viktor Yanukovych. The results are the restoration of 2004 constitution and an ongoing armed conflict in Eastern part of Ukraine.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 89 both Russia and Ukraine and shares a brotherhood with both. For this reason, Kazakhstan has advocated mediation for regional stability and world peace since its independence.Kazakhstan could not sit and see its brothers fight each other. In addition, Kazakhstan, a member of the EEU and most economically integrated country with Russia, has suffered a deterioration of its economy from the international sanctions and other restrictive measures by the EU on Russia’s economy. Western sanctions on Russia contributed to a 92% fall of Russia’s inward FDI and 30-40% fall of Kazakhstan’s inward FDI (Zabortseva, 2016). Zabortseva created the following table (Table 5.1) from the data of the National Bank of Kazakhstan11to present the proportion of Kazakhstan’s FDI by country which shows the dynamism of FDI in Kazakhstan from 2005-2015 (million USD),

Table 5.1

Proportion of Kazakhstan’s FDI by Country (million USD)

Country 2005 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2005- 2015

Netherlands 1,944.1 7,310.3 8,692.2 6,520.9 6,795.8 5,758.3 64,037.0

USA 1,181.1 1,810.9 1,975.7 2,438.7 4,123.6 2,780.9 23,807.9

Switzerland 112.2 547.3 3,312.4 1,877.4 2,366.4 1,880.7 14,977.4

China 216.5 1,717.6 2,414.6 2,246.0 1,861.2 442.7 13,187.4

France 774.9 1,561.4 1,168.7 954.0 837.5 963.6 12,218.2

UK 603.7 1,098.0 1,395.7 937.6 747.2 391.0 11,497.3

Russia 226.8 951.6 1,069.5 1,299.2 1,580.1 565.7 9,690.9

Note: Adapted from Russian analytical digest: The impact of the Ukrainian conflict on Kazakhstan's FDI with Russia and its other main economic partners by Y.Zabortseva, 2016. Russian Analytical Digest 188.

Obviously, Kazakhstan’ economy has a strong dependence on FDI from Western European countries. Strong dependence on FDI and a regionally integrated

11National Bank of Kazakhstan http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=172&switch=kazakh

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 90 economy with Russia has put Kazakhstan in an uncomfortable position. Kazakhstan had to make a move in order to diminish the cost of the Ukraine crisis. The EU and the West see the Ukraine crisis as a restoration of Russia’s imperialism and the violation of international law in relation to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In contrast to the West, Kazakhstan did not see Russia’s involvement in Ukraine as renewed Russian imperialism, but rather as an example of inter-ethnic and inter-linguistic confrontation between peoples in the former-Soviet space (Sholk, 2015). Kazakhstan consistently offers itself to host peace talks in solving the Ukraine crisis, but no official confirmation from the conflicting parties has been made. Unofficially, President Nazarbayev is known for his telephone conversations and his visits to Berlin, Kievm and Moscow to have talks with leaders in solving the Ukraine crisis (Abdulova, 2015; Daly, 2015a). Nazarbayev described the Ukraine crisis as “nonsense” and he called on Russia and Ukraine to make a compromise and preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity (“Ukraine Peace Talks,” 2014). Finally, the most prominent role of Kazakhstan as a mediator on the international stage is as the host of the Syria Peace Talks for four rounds.Kazakhstan was chosen as the place for the peace talks because Kazakhstan’s international reputation is known for its strength of neutrality (Pasaylo, 2017). Russia-Turkey profound rapprochement has positively contributed to new developments in the Syria peace process where visible contributions could be observed in the 3rd Astana talk in early 2017. Voloshin (2017) argued that although Kazakhstan has political proximity to Russia, Kazakhstan is still considered by most international observers as an impartial broker and a neutral state without any menacing geopolitical ambitions.The third round of the Syria peace process saw the Kazakhstan government arrange to bring the men who control the guns to the table (rebel commanders) instead of just regular Syrian political opposition (Doucet, 2017). The armed groups now became interlocutors of the peace talks at the3rdAstana peace talk. Ramani (2016) explained Kazakhstan’s eagerness to assume an international mediator role in the Syrian Civil War could be understood by two factors. Firstly, Kazakhstan has strategic linkages with the Syrian government as a result of Nazarbayev’s 2007 visit to Syria. The 2007 visit was a diplomatic and economic move by Kazakhstan to expand its presence in the Middle East through having close relations

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 91 with Syria. The rationale is to expand Kazakhstan’s energy markets because Syria could serve as a gateway to the whole of the Middle East.The Kazakhstan-Syria pipeline project was proposed in 2007. In addition, having good relations with every international player, Kazakhstan seeks to increase its international prestige by expanding relations with Assad’s government allies, mainly Russia and Turkey. Kazakhstan’s position does not undercut political leverage of any participating party. Secondly, peace in Syria will automatically allow Kazakhstan to get rid of one of national security threats, which is the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Kazakhstan has witnessed the growing participation of Kazakh nationals as Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq.12 ISIS-trained Kazakhstanis could return and conduct domestic terror attacks.The outcome of the 3rd round of the Astana talks was the inclusion of Iran and Turkey as guarantors and the affirmation of the exiting ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government and rebel forces. Russia, Turkey and Iran have set up a trilateral monitoring body to enforce the ceasefire. Consequently, Nazarbayev’s enormous contribution to international peace and nuclear disarmament has brought a respectable international reputation to Kazakhstan. For this reason, the Basel Peace Office has nominated President Nazarbayev for the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize as a result of his valuable efforts in the past 26 years of leadership.13

5.4 Acceptance of Leadership

Although acceptance or legitimacy of regional power is difficult to measure and legitimacy of regional power may shift from time to time, from country to country, and from case to case. Hurrell, Cooper, Gonzalez, Sennes and Sitaraman (2000) highlighted the importance of acceptance and recognition from third parties as following,

Historically Great Powers have to do both with crude material power but also with notions of legitimacy and authority. You can claim Great Power status but membership of the club of Great Powers is a social category that

12 Kazakhstan’s intelligence agency reported that more than 300 Kazakh nations have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and formed Kazakhstani fighting unit. 13 President Nursultan Nazarbayev was nominated for the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize along with Karipbek Kuyukov – Honorary Ambassador for the ATOM project.

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depends on recognition by 3 others -- by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy. So a constructivist approach would view power hierarchies in terms of shared understandings that develop amongst groups of states.( Hurrell, Cooper, Gonzalez, Sennes and Sitaraman, 2000)

The emerging role of Kazakhstan as a regional power and to prove its regional position has been a long road. But today, Kazakhstan’s self-perception of leadership exists not only on the top state level but also in the society (Tolipov, 2012, p. 175). Tolipov (2012) explained that from the elites to normal citizens within the society of Kazakhstan, there is a set of beliefs and mindset believing that Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country in the Central Asian region which has gone through institutional, economic and human capital reforms towards the West. The rest of the Central Asia countries are reviving and returning to their historical roots, including the revival of archaic public institutions and social Islamicization. The most difficult task for Kazakhstan to be regarded as a regional power is to get accepted by its neighboring countries within the region as well as acceptance from extra-regional powers. Unquestionably, Kazakhstan’s ability to secure its 138 votes to gain non-permanent membership at the UNSC has guaranteed certain levels of acceptance from the international community. Kazakhstan’s accepted roles as international peacemaker and international mediator have confirmed Kazakhstan’s international recognition. However, Kazakhstan’s regional acceptance presents a worrying dilemma because the progress of regional integration is minimal compared to other regions.Central Asian countries have had only roughly twenty years of sovereignty and are still obsessed with the issue of territorial integrity and sovereignty as a guideline in conducing relations with foreigners. For this reason, they have no will to form a region and avoid dealing with any potential new big brothers within Central Asia, which makes the growth of regional leadership difficult. Regional power dynamics is characterized by the formation of a system of regional balance.Kazakhstan,

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Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan14 are politically close to Russia, while Uzbekistan is politically close to western influences, and Turkmenistan has declared a status of permanent neutrality endorsed by the UN.15 For this reason, the status of permanent neutrality has made Turkmenistan a closed country in the region who has had no role in regional politics since independence (Orozobekova, 2017). To elaborate, characteristics and patterns of interaction of Central Asian states within regional politics, Laruelle and Peyrouse (2012) depicted each Central Asian country as the following, Among the Central Asian (CA) states, Turkmenistan has since independence been a fervent partisan in support of unilateralism or bilateralism, and has limited as much as possible attempts at both regionalism and multilateralism. For its part, Uzbekistan has conducted more contrasting policies, endorsing regionalism when it thinks it is in a leadership position and unilateralism when it views its sovereign rights as not being respected. Tashkent has shown little interest for multilateralism, instead giving priority to pursuing bilateral relations. Kazakhstan has aimed at being a staunch defender of regionalism above all, and of multilateralism to a lesser extent. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, played the card of multilateralism very early on, as symbolized by its accession to membership of the World Trade Organization in 1998. Tajikistan pursues and combines various strategies in accordance with the domain and the actors involved (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012) Consequently, Uzbekistan, aside from Kazakhstan, is another significant regional actor which is able to regionally assert its influence within regional politics. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the region’s largest states and are considered as Central Asia’s leaders. So, a degree of acceptance from Uzbekistan and particularly Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan bilateral relations are crucial factors determining Central

14 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are politically and historically close. In addition, Aliya Nazerbayeva the daughter of President Nazarbayev married with Aldar Akayev the eldest son of former President of Kyrgyzstan President Akayev in 1998. 15 On 12 December 1995, the UN granted the status of permanent neutrality to Turkmenistan. The principles of permanent neutrality are stressed in the constitution of Turkmenistan which prohibits Turkmenistan’s participation in international military organization and international treaties.

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Asia’s regional politics, as well as Kazakhstan’s legitimacy as a regional power. It is significant to include Uzbekistan to the study of regional acceptance because Uzbekistan, before being incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1924, was historically powerful and a longtime regional ruler16 of the region (“Central Asia,” 2009). For this reason, Olcott (2011) explained that regional competition has been deeply-rooted since the 14th-15th century among five ethnic tribes, particularly competition over water control, which still exists today in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, a historic ruler, was the center of Soviet era military bases. The Turkestan Military District was the best equipped military and commanded the military detachments in the other four Central Asia Soviet republics. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan inherited the largest military and viewed itself as the rightful heir to regional hegemony in Central Asia. Moreover, Sobyanin (2013) depicted Uzbekistan as ambitiously aiming to become the economic and military giant of the region. It means that for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, peaceful life has ended. For this reason, Uzbekistan has always been a source of regional tension. Apart from Uzbekistan’s historical position, personal rivalry between President Karimov and President Nazarbayev exists. They have different styles of approaching leadership and that is reflected in the way they play on different factors and images to justify legitimacy of their country’s claim on regional leadership (Passolt, 2007, pp. 242-243). Although President Karimov17 of Uzbekistan once denied regional competition for leadership with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, many scholars have verified the existence of regional rivalry in Central Asia (Kahvec, 2007; Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012; Olcott, 2011; Passolt, 2007). Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are considered Central Asia’s two most powerful leaders. Although both sides signed a Treaty “On Eternal Friendship” in 1997, which makes it appear that Uzbekistan- Kazakhstan relations are fraternal and friendly, post-independence history has implied a divergence rather than convergences of the regional and international policies of the

16 Before Russia’s conquest of Central Asia, Kazakhs were unhappily ruled by the Khan of Kokand (Uzbek’s Khan in Ferghana Valley). 17 President Islam Karimov was the first president of Uzbekistan, serving the presidency from Uzbekistan’s Independence Day until his death (1 September 1991 – 2 September 2016). President Karimov is known for his foreign policy of isolationist doctrine and his pro-Western stance.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 95 two Central Asian pivots (Tolipov, 2013). Numerous worrying exchanges of political statements between the two leaders have damaged Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan bilateral relations, particularly the competition of regional integration and their two economic philosophies, Uzbekistan’s planned economy and Kazakhstan’s market economy (Marat, 2008). To elaborate, Uzbekistan, under President Karimov, has preferred a model of regional leadership based on political and military hegemony and the strengthening of state monopolies in domestic key sectors. In contrast, Kazakhstan has preferred a model of regional economic development through regional integration. Kazakhstan presents a successful economic model under an authoritarian regime, which is fitting to the context of Central Asia’s leadership. The competition between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s economic models has been discussed by economists.18 Tolipov (2012) suggested that Uzbekistan possesses sufficient regional power assets, Uzbekistan’s central location in Central Asia, the strongest military force, a developed economy, transport infrastructure, the largest human capital, and regional center of religions and civilizations. However, what has hindered Uzbekistan’s potential is its non- participation in regional affairs, which obstructs Uzbekistan from gaining recognition, confirmation, and renovation from neighboring countries. Tolipov called Uzbekistan’s regional leadership as the political arrogance of Tashkent. As a result, if Kazakhstan receives regional affirmation from Uzbekistan, as the main counterpart of Kazakhstan’s regional competitor, Kazakhstan’s claim of regional leadership will be more justified than Uzbekistan’s (Dave, 2007; Kahvec, 2007; Passolt, 2007). However, the death of President Karimov on 2 September 2016 alongside with the inauguration of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev who won the presidential election held on 4 December 2016 have totally changed the Central Asia political landscape and unprecedentedly shifted Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan bilateral relations. Muhammed (2017) has compared the political transition of Uzbekistan from President Karimov to President Mirziyoyev to the transition from Joseph Stalin to Nikita Khrushchev, which resulted in the ease of the Soviet regime and the release of political prisoners jailed during Stalin’s administration.President Mirziyoyev did a number of

18 See, for example, Alam and Banerji (2000)

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 96 positive efforts in improving its relations within the region, which could not have been imaginable during Karimov’s presidency. For example, President Mirziyoyev improved Uzbekistan’s foreign relations by visiting all five Central Asian countries during his first month in office. Under President Karimov, Uzbekistan had horrible relations with its eastern neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan regarding border demarcation and transboundary river management. Six days after the death of President Karimov, President Mirziyoyev, as interim president, released four Kyrgyz nationals and withdrew Uzbek troops from Ungar-Too.19 In addition, direct commercial flight routes between Tashkent and Dushanbe20 were reopened again after 25 years under President Karimov.21 Most importantly, President Mirziyoyev has visited President Nazarbayev thrice during the first half of 2017.22 President Nazarbayev stated that Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan ties are the most important bilateral relations in Central Asia.

Kazakhstan wishes prosperity to our strategic partner, neighbor and fraternal people of Uzbekistan. In times to come, we are looking forward to fruitful relations within the framework of bilateral contacts. A certain work has already been accomplished to deepen the interstate partnership. In particular, there is a sharp increase in trade turnover between our countries, the capacity of our borders has increased, and new types of products are being delivered. (Nazarbayev, 2017)

As a result, Kazakhstan unexpectedly has a sudden good neighbor after President Mirziyoyev expressed his friendly position in conducting bilateral and multilateral relations with Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia.

“I would like to assure you that Uzbekistan will support all your activities. Much attention is now being paid to the regional cooperation. I hope that today’s meetings will serve as a basis for further effective cooperation between our countries (Mirziyoyev, 2017).

19 Territorial dispute between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan often results in violence and diplomatic crisis between Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan relations. 20 Capitals of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 21 Uzbekistan-Tajikistan relations were the worst bilateral ties across Central Asia stemmed from territorial dispute, Rogun dam and Kamchik Pass railway dispute. 22 22-23 March, 29 April and 8-9 June 2017

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Finally, the visit of high-ranking delegations from Uzbekistan, the Deputy Defense Minister Atabek Ibadullayev, is a recent bilateral development in Kazakhstan- Uzbekistan bilateral relations. Deputy Minister Ibadullayev, sent by President Mirziyoyev, visited Kazakhstan’s weapons manufacturers and Kazakhstan’s domestic military-industrial enterprises in the northern city of Uralsk. Consequently, The Kazakhstan Minister of Defense Saken Zhasuzakov pointed out that the visit of the delegation of Uzbekistan reflected a shifting in military ties between the two countries.Currently Uzbekistan is interested in buying Kazakhstan’s weapons (Kucera, 2017). Therefore, it could be argued that Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan ties in all dimensions are moving towards a new era in which Kazakhstan’s claim to regional leadership is likely to be possible with the support from Uzbekistan. Sultangaliyeva (2016) argued that Kazakhstan has no contentious issues between its regional neighbors that cannot be resolved. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, which was discussed earlier, Kazakhstan is a major destination of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan and the remittances sent back to Kyrgyzstan account for a substantial proportion of Kyrgyzstan’s total GDP.Similarly, Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 22.5% of FDI, which makes Kazakhstan the largest investor in Kyrgyzstan (Sarabekov, 2015). In addition, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are historically, linguistically and politically close as a result of a political marriage of leaders’ children. Moreover, Kazakhstan is preferred by Kyrgyzstan as Kazakhstan ranks in the top three of the most-favored foreign partners of Kyrgyzstan in terms of political, economic and socio-cultural attractions according to a survey conducted by EDB integration Barometer 2016 (Zadorin, Gurkina, Zhvirblis, Kunakhov, & Shubina, 2016). In the case of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan relations are not disputed, but limited, because Turkmenistan retains its permanent neutrality as a core of its foreign policy doctrine.Relations between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are mainly characterized through the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway which was discussed earlier as one of Kazakhstan’ discursive foreign policy instruments regarding Kazakhstan’s stake in the Iran nuclear talks (P5+1). In the case of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan has no contentious issue with Tajikistan. Tajikistan openly supports Kazakhstan’s various initiatives, particularly Kazakhstan’s candidacy for non-permanent membership in the UNSC. President

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Nazarbayev stated during his visit to Tajikistan in 2015 that “we are grateful to the Tajik side for the support of our candidacy for the UN Security Council non-permanent membership…..your country also takes a constructive stance on issues of water and energy relations [in Central Asia]” (Nazarbayev, 2015). As a result, Kazakhstan’s regional acceptance has entered a new phase where neighboring countries are now having a positive perception and constructive relations with Kazakhstan in 2017. Kazakhstan has already acquired regional leader status with an acceptance both from the regional and international levels, which was impossible to imagine in the past.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed Flemes’ third and fourth criteria of regional power and found that although Kazakhstan has overwhelming military and economic superiority in relative to its neighboring countries, Kazakhstan infrequently utilizes its application of hard power and rarely involves itself in armed conflicts. For this reason, this chapter depicts Kazakhstan as a multilateralism defender, which can further its national interests through consistent involvement in multilateral institutions. The international community has witnessed discourse and roles, which Kazakhstan has been attempted to increase its international visibility and national prestige. In addition, this chapter discussed Kazakhstan and its regional acceptance from neighboring Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan. The development of the Central Asian region and its regional politics is dependent on Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan relations. For this reason, Post-Karimov Uzbekistan presents a desired regional climate for Kazakhstan to acquire legitimacy as a Central Asia’s regional power.

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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis explores Kazakhstan as an emerging power within the Central Asia region, where the regional context has rapidly changed particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the discovery of massive hydrocarbon resources in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan. For this reason, a series of substantial political reforms and economic development have been pursued which contributed to a new context in Central Asia within a new phase of a multipolar international system. The focus of the thesis was the application of Daniel Flemes’ regional power theory, which details four prerequisite qualifications for any emerging power to be regarded as a regional power. Flemes’ four criteria include: the formation of a claim to leadership, power resources, the employment of foreign policy instruments, and regional acceptance from third parties. This thesis probes the following questions: What are sources of Kazakhstan’s power? How does Kazakhstan become an emerging regional power in Central Asia? And To what extent has Kazakhstan’s regional power status been accepted by other Central Asian states?

6.1 Research Problems and Findings

The research questions originate from the fact that a growing number of post-Soviet scholars have pointed out that Russia, under the “Near Abroad” doctrine of Vladimir Putin, has been trying to politically revive its “lost” hegemonic status in Central Asia after more than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. For this reason, it implies that there is a contextual power vacuum with the absence of regional leadership.Naturally, every region has a leader as the core player of each regional bloc regardless of how highly or slightly fragmented the characteristics of the region are. For this reason, Kazakhstan’s economic performance and its international visibility of diplomacy appear to outperform its Central Asian neighbors in nearly all development indicators, as discussed in chapter three and four. As a result, it brings to the questions, despite Kazakhstan sharing similar political characteristics and the nature of its centrally planned economy as a result of the Soviet legacy, what factors have

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 100 contributed Kazakhstan turning out differently when compared to its neighbors? It evokes the circumstances and factors which have allowed Kazakhstan to build its strong influential status within the region as well as economically and diplomatically perform better than its Central Asian neighbors. This research finds that Kazakhstan’s regional power position depends on the superiority of Kazakhstan’s material and ideational capabilities alongside the effectiveness of exercising material and ideational capabilities. To simplify, power resources and the effectiveness of exercising foreign policy to achieve the desired objectives both determine Kazakhstan’s regional influence.These two factors allow Kazakhstan to influentially exercise its influence within the region. Furthermore, the degree of acceptance from Central Asian neighbors, particularly Uzbekistan, is another major factor in determining the regional legitimacy and authority of Kazakhstan in Central Asia. Based on four criteria, the application of Flemes’ regional power theory on Kazakhstan has provided interesting results regarding Kazakhstan’s position within the Central Asian region and at the international level. The results are changing from time to time, from country to country, from region to region and from case to case. This paper focuses on Kazakhstan’s regional position after its independence and particularly after the 2000s, where rapid economic development of Kazakhstan helped it achieve its politically-desired dreams and goals. For this reason, this paper argued that Kazakhstan has acquired the regional leadership in Central Asia, where its influence is legitimate and recognized from its neighboring states. Regarding Flemes’ first criterion, the claim to leadership, it can be observed that Kazakhstan, after years of domestic institutional reforms and rapid economic development, has openly articulated its claim to regional leadership, not only in Central Asia, but also the leadership in the wider Eurasia continent. Under the banner of Eurasianism, which became the ideational foundation of the most important regional organization, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and reflected in Kazakhstan’s 2014-2020 foreign policy concepts and political statement, President Nazarbayev iterated that Central Asian neighbors will remain Kazakhstan’s top priority for the purpose of building “politically stable, economically sustainable and safe development” within Central Asia. In spite of obstacles in integrating Central Asia, evidence shows that Kazakhstan is a strong supporter of any integrative initiative. The case of

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 101 transboundary water management has consistently deteriorated Central Asian states relations since independence. Kazakhstan shows its willingness to be a leading player in resolving this regional dispute and included the issue in its UNSC’s campaign during 2017-2018. Backed by the UN, non-permanent membership of Kazakhstan has helped Kazakhstan legitimize its regional position in solving the water management issue. Regarding the second criterion, power resources, the tables in chapter 4 present Kazakhstan’s military expenditure, Index of National Capacity (CINC), GDP, population size, Human Development Index (HDI), and GDP per Capita in comparison with Central Asian states, former Soviet states, and other regarded regional powers in other regions.These indicators indicate that Kazakhstan’s material capabilities are higher than the rest of the Central Asian states combined and are higher than most former Soviet states, except for Russia. For this reason, Kazakhstan completely holds supremacy within Central Asia in terms of economic and military power. However, Kazakhstan’s material capabilities are minimal at the international level and are significantly less than other regarded regional powers, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia.In addition, Kazakhstan’s ideational capabilities appear to be viable because of its economic success model and successful multiethnic society. Kazakhstan’s economic success could be attributed to strong authoritarianism under President Nazarbayev and the successful emulation of East Asian economic development experiences, particularly those of Singapore and South Korea. For this reason, other Central Asian neighbors, who share similar post-Soviet political and economic foundations, find Kazakhstan’s successful model to be attractive and replicable. In terms of the third criterion, Kazakhstan’s use of material foreign policy instruments is minimal, despite Kazakhstan having economic supremacy and the best equipped military in the region. However, Kazakhstan has never militarily intervened in a unilateral pattern in any armed conflict, especially within the Central Asia region. Kazakhstan’s has a low possibility of getting involved in traditional armed conflicts due to its defensive doctrine. Kazakhstan would rather get involved with combating non-traditional security threats, namely terrorism, extremism, illicit activities, and human trafficking. As a result, Kazakhstan’s application of hard power is conducted through multilateral peacekeeping missions under the supervision of the UN, CSTO

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 102 and NATO. Kazakhstan has greatly projected its power through multilateralism. Similarly, Kazakhstan is committed to its multivector foreign policy, which Kazakhstan’s 2014-2020 foreign policy concepts uphold. Multivectorism allows the involvement of Kazakhstan in multilateral institutions spontaneously. Its active involvement in multilateral platforms, particularly the decisive diplomatic victory in gaining non-permanent UNSC membership, has proved the success of Kazakhstan’s institutional foreign policy instruments. Besides being proactive in multilateralism, Kazakhstan’s international visibility and prestige has increased through the construction of the nuclear free world campaign political discourse. Kazakhstan’s discursive instrument has established Kazakhstan as a leader in nuclear non- proliferation. Regionally and internationally, Kazakhstan depicts itself as a former nuclear power which has successfully dismantled all nuclear warheads for the purpose of creating a nuclear-free world. Moreover, Kazakhstan has assumed a leading role as an emerging international mediator in conflicts both in Central Asia and in the Middle East. Regarding the last criterion, acceptance of leadership, it could be argued that Kazakhstan is internationally and regionally recognized as a legitimate leader of Central Asia. However, Kazakhstan being a regional power in Central Asia was unimaginable during the presidency of Uzbekistan’s former President Karimov. The inauguration of President Mirziyoyev, in late 2016, has completely shifted the whole Central Asian relations, particularly Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan bilateral relations. Numerous unprecedented efforts have been made by President Mirziyoyev to improve relations with Kazakhstan. As discussed in chapter five, Post-Karimov Uzbekistan unexpectedly became a sudden good neighbor with Kazakhstan. Finally, one of the research’s objectives was to try to understand how Kazakhstan’s regional power position affects international relations and what the implications on Central Asia are. It is apparent that Kazakhstan’s economic strength will have significant regional implications on Central Asia.The bigger and more robust economy might contribute to a significant increase in military expenditure for defense purposes or for UN peacekeeping operations. As discussed earlier, Central Asia has witnessed the emergence of non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, illicit trafficking, weapons smuggling, and many others. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s emerging and more

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 103 legitimate regional position could bring all its neighboring countries to participate more in combating emerging non-traditional security threats in Central Asia.So, it would not be surprising to see the rise of military expenditure by Kazakhstan and by other Central Asian states to combat emerging non-traditional security threats. Moreover, I expect Kazakhstan to see itself as an important actor who is willing to take risks and to play a more proactive role in Central Asia as a legitimate representative of Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s non-permanent UNSC membership could change international relations in Central Asia regarding transboundary water management by bringing this issue to the UN-supported platform.The neutrality of the UN platform would help Central Asian states reduce deep-rooted historical suspicion among each other. Hopefully, Kazakhstan alongside its Central Asian neighbors can initiate a water-oriented regional organization for the Central Asia region with the support of the UN and resolve longstanding tensions among Central Asian states. To conclude, Kazakhstan’s legitimate regional position would definitely bring a positive change in the international relations of Central Asia in the near future, particularly greater cooperation with neighboring countries.

6.2 Theoretical Contribution

The theoretical contribution of this thesis is related to the study of regional power theory and this research suggests that emerging Kazakhstan should be included with any studies of countries presenting remarkable potential and should be regarded as a regional power. As discussed in chapter four, this research supports the argument that Kazakhstan is a rising power, but it is not considered as a revisionist power. The study of global politics depicts a narrative which always portrays the rise and decline of power. Most attention has been paid to aggressive behavior and conflict-prone rising powers, which contributes to the debate over two terms – a revisionist state and a status quo state.Known for his “balance of interests” model, Schweller (1996) discussed the significance of revisionist states in IR literature, especially within the scope of neorealism. He discussed the evolution of the concept of a state’s true interests. Contemporary states are pursuing security maximization for the purpose of survival, not power maximization (neorealism). For this reason, Schweller questioned the shift

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 104 of state interests from power to security maximization. A neorealist like Waltz (1979) might base his argument on the neorealist assumption that “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 126). Schweller pointed out the weakness of Waltz’s argument is the belief that the primary interest of a state is security, which is a status-quo bias. As a result, although the neorealist assumption is reasonable, it intentionally ignores the importance of a dissatisfied state.Dissatisfied states (revisionist) are willing to risk all the gains and trade off their survival and security for expansion of power. Furthermore, Schweller (2015) explained that rising powers may not be revisionist and not all rising power are dangerous revisionists. He pointed out how global politics and IR literature consistently depict rising powers as revisionist and states which seek any change in global politics are also revisionist troublemakers without any appropriate distinction.In the case of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan’s behavior and foreign policy has been discussed, which favors multilateralism and soft power over hard power. For this reason, it supports the argument along the line of Ding (2010) which argued that a peaceful rise of rising powers can be achieved through a soft power strategy where a power successfully integrates itself into the existing international and political system. For this reason, a rising power is not always a revisionist state according to a historical narrative of global politics. The nature of Kazakhstan’s statecraft is not assertive by nature as a result of its commitment to its core foreign policy doctrine, multivectorism. Moreover, this thesis expected to fulfill the literature gap within the area of Central Asia’s regional leadership. This research presented a new argument, that Kazakhstan is currently a regional power in Central Asia. Moreover, this research also sheds light on the issues of the absence of Central Asian leadership in the changing regional context.The author of this research looks forward to seeing the argument to be tested and debated in the future. In conclusion, this research utilizes Daniel Flemes’ power theory because his theory includes strengths and advantages from main IR approaches, namely liberalism, realism and constructivism. The combination of main IR approaches provide a comprehensive framework for analyzing Kazakhstan in all aspects from material capabilities, soft power, international institution membership, and discourse, which all

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 105 equally contribute to a state’s power. This research aimed to assess and analyze Kazakhstan by applying the regional power theory to answer the research questions. Clearly, there were obstacles during the application of the theory and testing the hypothesis. It was difficult to justify and make a solid argument regarding Kazakhstan as a regional power. However, Flemes’ regional power theory has helped the author come up with a solid argument in order to prove the hypothesis in the case of Kazakhstan. As a result, the hypothesis of this paper has been proven to be accurate. Kazakhstan possesses superior material and ideational capabilities for the purpose of exerting its influence within Central Asia. In addition, Post-Karimov Central Asia has proved that Kazakhstan has a promising future as it is recognized from its rival as a leader within Central Asia.

6.3 Caveats and Future Research Agenda

This study encountered several limitations.Most of the limitations are relevant to the language barrier in terms of primary sources, such as leaders’ interviews, speeches, and statistics. However, collecting primary and secondary sources of Kazakhstan did not present significant obstacles in this thesis since the information can be found and much of it is available on Kazakhstan’s government websites as well as numerous English-language academic works, from both Kazakh and foreign scholars, on online databases. In contrast, the availability of information and English-translated publications regarding Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan presented difficulty for this thesis in collecting both primary and secondary sources. This thesis had difficulty accessing some information and statistics resulting from a lack of transparency and a lack of consistently published information and statistics in some Central Asian governments. In the case of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, only a few English-translated publications of leaders’ interviews have been published as well as the number of academic works, especially by foreign scholars, regarding Turkmenistan and Tajikistan is relatively small. Nevertheless, this research understands the limitations on the availability of English-language information as Central Asia is roughly only 26 years old, which directly affects the availability of academic works regarding Central Asia. For this reason, this thesis was unable to complete some

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 106 aspects, particularly in the case of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.However, existing academic works of prominent scholars who consistently produce remarkable publications in books and academic journals, namely Cummings (2002), Laruelle and Peyrouse (2012), Allision (2008) and many others have helped provide this thesis with valuable information. Regarding the future research agenda, this research argued earlier that the legitimacy of regional power may shift from time to time, from country to country and from case to case. For this reason, the regional leadership of Kazakhstan could possibly grow or decline as a consequence of the changing domestic, regional and international context. In my perspective, one domestic factor which could substantially impact Kazakhstan’s whole political and economic picture concerns the political succession of leadership. President Nazarbayev is turning 78 year-old this year (2017) and the future of a country that has had only one president since 1991 is in question. For this reason, the discussion of a political successor and the transition of power remain infrequent within Kazakhstan politics, which Kazakhstan and its society will inevitably encounter after the death of its long-time ruler. I forecast that the Post-Nazarbayev regime will witness a peaceful transfer of power from President Nazarbayev to his subordinate within his Nur Otan party. The political stability will remain steady and strong. Kazakhstan’s future regime could be compared to Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP), which has had a dominate position after Lee Kuan Yew’s regime. I personally forecast that Kazakhstan and the Nur Otan party will blend with the statecraft of Kazakhstan, which will later become the same thing as a political force in Kazakhstan politics. Consequently, future research questions can ask similar questions to this thesis, but in a new phase of Kazakhstan’s domestic leadership. Potential future research questions could ask: To what extent did Post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan impact Kazakhstan’s regional leadership in Central Asia? To what extent did Post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan shift the regional context of Kazakhstan and of Central Asia? Moreover, a comparative study between Post-Karimov Uzbekistan and Post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan would also be interesting to explore as well.

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 107

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A A Meeting between Nazarbayev and American Officials Including Secretary of State James Baker

WHY DID KAZAKHSTAN GIVE UP ITS NUKES?

When Kazakhstan became independent 22 years ago and inherited some of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons, it decided to give them up. If you follow Kazakhstan at all, you know this because Kazakhstan's government doesn't waste a single opportunity to mention the fact.

Kazakhstan has made its status as one of the few governments to ever give up nuclear weapons the centerpiece of its efforts to position itself as a responsible member of the global community. It has started the anti-nuclear weapons testing group The Atom Project, and hosted international diplomatic negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.

Kazakhstan, of course, not only hosted Soviet nuclear weapons but was the site of Soviet nuclear weapons testing, with devastating consequences for the long-term health of Kazakhstan's people. In the narrative that Kazakhstan has constructed since then, it was the searing experience of being subject to nuclear tests that made Kazakhstan give up its nukes.

Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in a New York Times op-ed from 2012 entitled "What Iran Can Learn from Kazakhstan," wrote that:

Such was the feeling among our people that we closed the Semipalatinsk site even before we became an independent country on the breakup of the Soviet Union 20 years ago. With independence, we became the world’s fourth-largest nuclear power. One of our first acts as a sovereign nation was voluntarily to give up these weapons.

Since then, we have worked tirelessly to encourage other countries to follow our lead and build a world in which the threat of nuclear weapons belongs to history.

But Nazarbayev is, above all, a pragmatist who is unlikely to have made such a momentous decision on purely sentimental grounds. And you don't have to look very

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 123 far to find the real story of why he gave up nuclear weapons: just look at the officially authorized biography Nazarbayev and the Making of Modern Kazakhstan, and this account of a meeting between Nazarbayev and American officials including Secretary of State James Baker:

[Nazarbayev] reassured his American guests that Kazakhstan had no aspiration to join the military club of nuclear powers; that it was realistic about its inability to master the technicalities and pay the costs of maintaining the missiles stationed on its soil, and that he was a President with a long history of opposition to the presence of nuclear installations in his country. However, Nazarbayev made it clear that he was not going to renounce possession of Kazakhstan's nuclear weapons without getting something in return. “I was initially after security guarantees,” he has recalled.

James Baker, who knew that it would be impossible for the United States to become the security guarantor of a former Soviet republic with a 3,500 mile border with Russia, tried to cool Nazarbayev from this demand with some tough talk. It ended with a stern warning that three American missiles were targeted at each one of the ICBMs stationed in Kazakhstan. “I am not frightened of that and anyway it is not the point,” replied Nazarbayev. “We will decide everything on an equal basis. First of all, we need to know what Kazakhstan will get in return for dismantling these weapons....”

“Nazarbayev also insisted that Kazakhstan did not want a nuclear future. He was unimpressed by the domestic voices, the Kazakhstani equivalent of neocons, who wanted the country's young and untrained military forces to take control of the missiles as if they were a national independent nuclear deterrent. The President was equally contemptuous of the secret approaches he received from Arab envoys urging him to retain what they called “an Islamic bomb.”

One of these emissaries delivered a flowery letter from the Libyan leader, Muammar Ghadaffi, pleading with Nazarbayev to keep the nuclear arsenal in place “for the good of Islam.” Another envoy, from an oil-rich state in the Middle East, offered to provide US$6 billion to Kazakhstan to defray the maintenance costs of its nuclear forces. Nazarbayev regarded such propositions as ridiculous. He wanted international

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 124 recognition, respectability, investment and security. These objectives were incompatible with keeping the nuclear arsenal.”

What Kazakhstan got in return was substantial U.S. aid for the technical work of getting rid of the weapons, and more generally, a status as a responsible member of the international community -- as the biography puts it, "international recognition, respectability, investment and security." As self-serving as the biography can be, that account is largely consistent with independent accounts.

Nevertheless, this mawkish narrative of Kazakhstan giving up its nukes because of its painful history is gaining traction, for example in this recent story in The Atlantic. And with an upcoming nuclear-themed reporting trip to Kazakhstan by the respected International Reporting Project, we will soon be seeing many more features about Kazakhstan's nuclear story.

There is nothing particularly shameful about the real story of why Kazakhstan gave up its nuclear weapons. Indeed, Kazakhs should be pleased that their president negotiated hard and made sure the country benefited from his decision, rather than basing it on an emotional response to nuclear weapons. But the real story is less interesting than the sentimental version. It's better suited for an international relations journal than a popular magazine, and journalists can fall easily for the irresistible hook of the victim overcoming its painful past by making a principled, self- sacrificing choice.

Kazakhstan has a long record of paying for positive coverage. But the genius of this narrative is that it's attractive enough to journalists without having to pay them. Whoever designed this PR strategy deserves the handsome paycheck he or she no doubt received, it's a brilliant bit of spin.

It's a tough balance for journalists to manage. On the one hand, the nuclear story is interesting, and not every story has to be about how Kazakhstan is a dictatorship. But, as Eurasia Net's Joanna Lillis pointed out, this narrative also serves to "shape Kazakhstan's image" and divert attention from international criticism of its steadily

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 125 worsening authoritarianism. But the least we can do is make sure we aren't doing Kazakhstan's PR work for them.

Source: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66967

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APPENDIX B Lagarde: Kazakhstan Is a Country with a Promising Future

International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Christine Lagarde pays her first ever visit to Astana on May 24 to discuss with Kazakh and regional authorities how to address the economic challenges and put Kazakhstan and the region on the right track to growth and prosperity. In this interview with the KazInform news agency kindly shared with The Astana Times, she discusses IMF assessments of economic situations in Kazakhstan, Russia and China, the Fund’s recommendations on tackling the issues at hand, as well as her recent inclusion by Time magazine into the list of the most influential people in the world.

Madame Lagarde, welcome to Kazakhstan. This is your first visit to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. What is the objective of your trip and what are your expectations from meeting with Kazakhstan’s officials?

It is indeed my first trip to Kazakhstan and the region. It is a momentous time for Central Asia, with the 25th anniversary of independence, and it is also a challenging time. The prices of oil and other commodities have declined sharply, growth in key trading partners, such as Russia and China, has slowed, and global financial conditions have tightened. These developments can be long-lasting, and that’s why the regional round table that we are organizing together with the Kazakh authorities comes at the right time. We will be discussing how to address the economic challenges and put Kazakhstan and the region on the right track to growth and prosperity. And this will have to involve national policies as well as regional cooperation.

What are your views on the perspectives of Kazakhstan’s economy?

Kazakhstan has achieved a lot since its independence. The past 15 years in particular have been a time of growing prosperity and rising living standards, mostly as a result of increased production and high prices of commodities. Kazakhstan wisely saved some of the earnings from this period, placing them in a national fund. This helped the

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 127 country navigate effectively through the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis.

Now the challenges are different. Similar to other oil exporters, the decline in oil prices has had a major impact on Kazakhstan. The country is projected to grow by only 0.1 percent this year, much lower than the average growth rate of 7.5 percent during the last 15 years, which was quite impressive. And we don’t expect growth to pick up very quickly over the next few years, so this is really a big change.

Now, it was important that the authorities allowed the tenge to float and strengthened the monetary and exchange rate policy framework, all measures that we think were appropriate. We think the fiscal framework can also be improved to bring more clarity and sustainability. We are suggesting to consolidate the accounts of the state budget, the local government budgets, as well as so-called “extra-budgetary” funds into one presentation. This will help give a clear position of the authorities’ policy objectives and operations.

If oil prices were to stay more or less at the current levels, there may be a need for the government to respond by shifting some fiscal resources. Some budget items should be cut to control the overall balance and create room to provide more resources for social spending – which is needed to help protect the poor and most vulnerable – and for capital expenditures to help the economy grow and create jobs.

We also recommend that Kazakhstan find ways to diversify away from oil as the prime source of national income. This would include making the business environment and the economy more competitive, more integrated regionally and globally, and more open and inclusive. We know that there is considerable interest in Kazakhstan as a “bridge” between Europe and Asia. This interest – and the financial resources that come with it – are a great opportunity for the country and need to be channelled in a way that promotes growth and jobs.

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As you know, the tenge has been devalued lately, what are the IMF views on the current value and exchange rate flexibility?

The devaluation has created new opportunities for exporters, and for producers of goods and services that compete with imports. Of course, the business environment needs to be such that Kazakh entrepreneurs can take advantage of these opportunities, and it is always worth having a look at what can be improved in this regard. But we also should acknowledge that there have been costs to the devaluation, too. Inflation has picked up, and firms and individuals who borrowed in dollars – together with the banks that lent to them – now face more challenging prospects. We therefore think the central bank should use its monetary policy tools to reduce inflation further, communicate clearly about what it is doing, and step up the monitoring of banks.

It is no secret that Kazakhstan, as well as the region, is depending on economies of its neighbouring states – Russia and China. What is the forecast of IMF for these economies and how can Kazakhstan and the region address negative spillovers from these economies?

The Russian economy contracted in 2015, and the recovery has been delayed until later in 2016 due to the additional fall in oil prices. However, Russia’s policy actions have eased the effect of the shocks by allowing the exchange rate to float and adding additional capital to the banking system.

For China, an increasingly important trading partner, we project growth of 6.5 percent this year and 6.2 percent next year. It is true that China faces a challenging period of rebalancing its economy, but China can manage this transition with the right mix of policies and structural reforms.

What should Kazakhstan do about these spillovers? First, as I mentioned on monetary and exchange rate policy, flexibility is the way to go. This has helped stop foreign exchange reserve losses, preserving those buffers for future needs. And currency adjustment has pushed up prices, so monetary policy should focus on inflationary pressures.

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Second, on fiscal measures, some additional targeted and temporary spending may soften the impact of the shocks and support economic activity. Yet, with the shocks expected to last and with public debt projected to rise, a move towards fiscal consolidation in the medium term might be needed, always avoiding spending cuts that can harm long-term growth and safeguarding targeted social spending. Overall, it is important for savings to continue to be set aside as a buffer for future generations, and for public debt to remain on a sustainable footing.

This year Kazakhstan is celebrating the 25th anniversary of independence. Your personal opinion about our country, our capital Astana and President Nursultan Nazarbayev?

The country and its neighbours have made enormous gains over the past quarter century, and have much to celebrate. Kazakhstan is a country with a promising future, an important exporter of oil and other commodities, and it is located very strategically between Europe and China. You have also built a truly beautiful and unique new capital in Astana – a great achievement!

What will be the achievements over the next 25 years? I mentioned earlier the importance of diversification and other reforms. President Nazarbayev has set out an impressive plan for Kazakhstan, including the “Kazakhstan 2050” and the “100 Steps” programmes. The reform agenda outlined in these programmes points in the right direction, and we look forward to discussing them in the course of our regular consultations with Kazakhstan.

Recently, Time magazine had you in the list of the most influential people in the world. How do you react to this and your personal formula for success?

It is a great honour to be considered among the most influential people, alongside several other notable personalities. I’m gratified to have the opportunity to have an impact through my daily work, not only by advising government officials on best policies to improve their citizens’ lives, but by visiting our member countries and talking to a wide range of people. It is particularly important to me to be able to share

Ref. code: 25605803120046NXL 130 my experience as a career woman with younger generations, and listen to their concerns. They influence me as much as I may be able to influence them.

Source: http://astanatimes.com/2016/05/lagarde-kazakhstan-is-a-country-with-a- promising-future/

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BIOGRAPHY

Name Mr.TanapatVatcharangura Date of Birth September 20, 1993 Educational Attainment 2016: The Bachelor of Arts in Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University

Work Experiences Student Internship International Division, the Royal Thai Government Spokeman Bureau

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