DOCSLIB.ORG

^Fthe Peninsula (OK E I KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE Covering the Economic and Foreign JPP Policies That Impact the Korean Peninsula

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
^Fthe Peninsula (OK E I KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE Covering the Economic and Foreign JPP Policies That Impact the Korean Peninsula Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/25/2020 12:26:58 PM 6/25/2020 What Can We Learn from Korea-Japan Normalization? What Can We Learn from Korea-Japan Normalization? blog.keia.org/2020/06/can-learn-korea-japan-normalization/ June 24, 2020 ^fThe Peninsula (OK E I KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE Covering the economic and foreign JPP policies that impact the Korean peninsula By Mintaro Oba Fifty-five years ago, on June 22,1965, the foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan signed the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea to formally normalize the bilateral relationship between the two countries. It had been a long, complicated road to get to that point. Negotiations on the treaty had started thirteen years before, in 1952. They had sputtered along since. Ten years later, as close as three years before the treaty was signed, the State Department was assessing in a briefing memo that “prospects for early normalization ... are not bright.” It noted the array of difficult issues requiring resolution between South Korea and Japan, from fishing rights to sovereignty over what the paper referred to as “an inconsequential islet.” But, it emphasized, the “Korean claims for compensation, based on Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945,” was the central dispute, and “if it can be settled, the other issues can be settled.” Some observers will rightly take this fifty-fifth anniversary to reflect on the substantive legacies of the normalization treaty - how it created the formal framework for the bilateral relations and cooperation between Japan and South Korea today, or on the opposite side of the spectrum, how it defined the battlefield in Korea-Japan disputes for over half a century in resolving some issues, resolving some in a way that left the door open to future controversy, and simply declining to address others. But one legacy that deserves more attention is the precedent that the normalization treaty set for how Korea-Japan deals come to fruition - and the lessons it holds for progress between the two countries has so often been unsustainable. The Korea-Japan normalization process was finally made possible after thirteen years by a very narrow alignment of domestic and geopolitical factors: a strong Korean leader able and willing to prioritize practical benefits of cooperation with Japan, outside pressure from the United States, and Japanese conservatives seeing Korea as strategically indispensable. It is easy to overemphasize one or both of the first two factors. It certainly wouldn’t be hard to correlate Syngman Rhee’s virulent anti-Japanese sentiments with the lack of initial progress toward normalization; or Park Chung-hee’s 1961 rise to power in South Korea with new momentum in the long-stalled normalization talks given his https://www.printfriendly.eom/p/g/tAVsnh Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/25/2020 12:26:58 PM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/25/2020 12:26:58 PM 6/25/2020 What Can We Learn from Korea-Japan Normalization? practical interests in leveraging the treaty to generate national growth and maintain U.S. support. But these explanations by themselves don’t quite cut it, especially since they don’t account for the fact that Prime Minister Chang Myon’s democratic government, which succeeded Syngman Rhcc’s authoritarian regime and was ultimately overthrown by Park Chung-hee, had made normalization a priority. In fact, a 1961 U.S. government assessment observed that “just prior to [Park’s] coup the Japanese and Korean governments had begun to make progress in their efforts to reconcile their differences.” It also wouldn’t be hard to assume that U.S. pressure was the reason South Korea and Japan came together. But that explanation by itself, too, isn’t sufficient given that the negotiations still took thirteen year's. The documentary record shows that U.S. officials were highly sensitive to the complex politics around alliance management in both Japan and South Korea, and sought to nudge the normalization process along without triggering a backlash through more direcl intervention. “BoLh sides resent any American role that that could be interpreted as interference - almost any overt U.S. role would be so interpreted by Communist propaganda and the Japanese Left,” assessed a 1962 background paper for an NSC meeting, “at the same time, each side is constantly seeking to invoke U.S. influence and money against the other in a complex tangle of issues where a misstep for the U.S. would be very easy and could be quite damaging.” By 1964, the U.S. Embassy Tokyo was advocating in a cable that while the United States had “played a game of sincere friend of both sides, encouraging them to settle differences but not wishing to mix in ourselves,” it was time for a “more positive U.S. role.” Still, the contemplation of more proactive U.S. pressure on the normalization talks was a reflection of the fact that they had made progress and ware close to the finish line. It was not the cause of the two countries reaching an agreement. The critical ingredient that effectively leveraged ncwr Korean leadership and U.S. influence to conclude the normalization treaty was the support of Japan’s mosL conservative political leaders and factions. On the Korean side, Syngman Rhee’s authoritarian regime had been replaced by South Korea’s Second Republic in i960. But the Japanese Prime Minister who was in charge from i960 to 1964, Hayato Ikeda, did little to take advantage of the situation and drive the normalization talks fonvard. Ikeda - wiiom Charles De Gaulle famously derided as “that transistor salesman” - was focused on economic growth and favored a “low posture” that aimed not to rock the boat at home and abroad. Below the formal level, though, the foundation lor progress was being laid. By 1961, a pro- South Korean group within Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party was strongly pushing for progress on Japan-Korea normalization negotiations. Led by former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, the group included major LDP faction leaders and members - including Shigeru Yoshida, Eisaku Sato, Kakuei Tanaka, and more. Kishi in particular wras a nationalist and revisionist who had no qualms about papering over war crimes but envisioned Japan playing a stronger, more independent regional role. The group saw normalizing ties with South Korea as key to Japan playing a stronger role in the Cold War. https://Www.printfriendly.eom/p/g/tAVsnh Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/25/2020 12:26:58 PM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/25/2020 12:26:58 PM 6/25/2020 What Can We Learn from Korea-Japan Normalization? Increasingly, too, the LDP and Japanese business constituencies were also seeing both economic and political value in investing in South Korea. Ichiro Kono, a major LDP faction leader, reportedly told Ikeda that the Korea’s need for money was “the greatest opportunity since the end of the war to solve the Japanese-South Korean problem.” Even as Ikeda’s modest approach kept formal progress between Japan and South Korea slow, informal parliamentary and business interactions were thus growing and a critical consensus in favor of prioritizing normalization was taking hold in key LDP factions. When Eisaku Sato, Kishi’s brother and a key player in this consensus, succeeded Ikeda as Japan’s prime minister in 1964 - combined with efforts by Park Ohung-hee and the United States - normalization was finally made possible. Most critically, Japan’s foreign minister and lead negotiator, Etsusaburo Shiina, made a visit to Seoul to deliver an apology that helped pave the way for the conclusion of the normalization negotiations. That couldn’t have happened without Sato and other Japanese conservatives viewing some form of apology as a necessary move in service of Japan’s strategic objectives. U.S. pressure to make helpful gestures to move normalization forward and a receptive leadership in Seoul were also critical elements. At the end of the day, the stars had to align between Korean leadership, Japanese ruling part}' conservatives, and U.S. diplomats to make the normalization treaty happen. No one or two of these factors in isolation could have led to the conclusion of the normalization treaty. In the fifty-five years since, almost every agreement between Korea and Japan has also required the alignment of these three factors. Most significantly, and ironically, because of the dominance that the LDP has managed to cement in Japanese politics over those decades, these agreements have often continued to require at least the tacit acquiescence of the conservatives most likely to embrace the sort of historical revisionism that has fueled many Korca-Japan disputes. This continuing salience of right-wing voices in Japanese domestic politics has been a huge factor in why Korea-Japan relations has been so unstable, ensuring that moments of reconciliation rely on a temporary strategic calculations rather than lasting shifts and why Japanese apologies are constantly called into question soon after they’re made. And it raises questions about whether a U.S. approach to Korea-Japan relations that emphasizes reconciliation is really the right fit for an era in which the foundation for further reconciliation is fragile. Reporting on the signing of the normalization treaty in 1965, UP I explained that it “put a formal end to fifty years of mutual enmity.” In retrospect, normalization wasn’t a formal end to anything, but a formal start to a nuanced, complicated bilateral relationship that has seen - and will continue to see — both cooperation and enmity. The normalization treaty was not a treaty to end all treaties. The more Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington recognize it was just a beginning - and reflect on the lessons of how it was negotiated to generate more sustainable outcomes - the more likely it will be that the next fifty-five years will be better.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • An Examination of the US-Japan Relationship and Nuclear
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2015 Deterring Nuclear Attacks on Japan: An Examination of the U.S.-Japan Relationship and Nuclear Modernization Alyssa M. Minamide Claremont McKenna College Recommended Citation Minamide, Alyssa M., "Deterring Nuclear Attacks on Japan: An Examination of the U.S.-Japan Relationship and Nuclear Modernization" (2015). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 1165. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1165 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE DETERRING NUCLEAR ATTACKS ON JAPAN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP AND NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR JENNIFER TAW AND DEAN NICHOLAS WARNER BY ALYSSA MINAMIDE FOR SENIOR THESIS SPRING 2015 APRIL 27, 2015 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my reader, Professor Taw, for a wonderful four years of critical thinking about international relations, doodle sessions, and cats. Professor Taw is one of the most caring, supportive people I have met at CMC, though I know she hates compliments. Her guidance will continue to inspire me as a strong, independent woman. I would also like to thank my parents for teaching me the importance of self-motivation and for being my cheerleaders through the highs and the lows. Their patience and encouragement only provide further incentive for me to succeed. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………….. 1 II. Extended Deterrence and the U.S. Superpower………………………………… 13 III. Origins of the U.S.-Japan Alliance……………………………………………… 25 IV.
    [Show full text]
  • Air University Review: March-April 1966, Volume XVII, No. 3
    Air Universlty Ubrary OCT I ^ lf c b6 Maxwell afb, Ala. 36112 -| fcAIR UNIVERSITY R eview REVOLUTION IN AIRLIFT...THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE... CHINA—THE NUCLEAR THREAT...ANALYSIS (CONTINUED) MARCH-APRIL 1966 THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE T he Revol ut ion in Air l if t ........................................................................................................................... 2 Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., usaf M a n a gemen t for Defen se...................................................................................................................................16 Maj. Gen. William S. Steele, usaf China—T he Nuclear Threat............................................................................................................................ 28 Lt. Col. Joseph E. Fix III, usa Analysis in W.AR P lanning...................................................................................................................................40 Lt. Col. Richard C. Bowman, usaf Cost-Effectiveness Analysis as an Aid to Wea pon Syst em Sel ec t ion ......................... 49 Lt. Col. Robert S. Berg, usaf I nformation Sciences: S ome Resea r c h Dir e c t io n s ............................................................................... 56 Mrs. Rovvena W. Swanson Military Opinion Abroad R efl ec t ion s on Vie t n a m ............................................................................................................................ 68 Gen. André Beaufre Translated by Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence Over Japan: a Study of Invisible Deterrence Between 1945 and 1970
    The University Of Reading The Development of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence over Japan: A Study of Invisible Deterrence between 1945 and 1970 Hiroshi Nakatani PhD, Politics Department of Politics and International Relations February 2019 Declaration of Original Authorship Declaration: I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all materials from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged Hiroshi Nakatani 1 This thesis is dedicated to the late Colonel Matuo Keiichi for his service to Japan. 2 Acknowledgments Throughout my PhD life, many people and institutions have thoughtfully supported and encouraged my work. It is probably most appropriate to begin by acknowledging the School of Politics, International Relations and Economics, University of Reading for its financial assistance for three years. I am also extremely indebted to the Lyndon Johnson Library, the British Association for Japanese Studies and Reading Travel Research Grants for providing me with research grants, which enabled me to travel and research abroad. Without their generous financial support, this research project would not have been possible. I would also like to express my appreciation to my supervisors. I have been fortunate to have three supervisors. It was my greatest honour to work under Professor Beatrice Heuser, for whom I came to Reading. She has taught me many invaluable things which otherwise I could have never learned. She has taught me how to conduct great research and treat your students in particular. As a matter of fact, finding a greater supervisor than her can be more difficult to finish a PhD. I would also like to thank Professor Alan Cromartie for his supervision and patience.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward Conflict Transformation of the Japan-Korea Territorial Dispute
    Takeshima or Dokdo? Toward Conflict Transformation of the Japan-Korea Territorial Dispute 1* Daisuke Akimoto This article examines the territorial dispute between Japan and Korea over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands from a perspective of peace research and conflict resolution. This article employs a modified version of conflict analysis framework and analyzes the historical, political, legal, economic, and social aspects of the bilateral territorial conflict. Indeed, the dispute has long been insoluble due to the complicated historical, political, economic, and social factors underlying the relationship between the two countries. Moreover, it is difficult to legally settle the bilateral dispute because the Korean government has declined to refer the conflict to the International Court of Justice. In order to overcome the deadlock of the territorial conflict, this article proposes applying the transcend method for conflict transformation of the Japan-Korea territorial dispute and to conduct Ho‘oponopono—a traditional Native Hawaiian dispute- resolution approach for a mutual reconciliation—between the Japanese and Korean people. Keywords: Dokdo, Ho‘oponopono, Liancourt Rocks, Takeshima, transcend method I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 52 II. METHODOLOGY: POLICY ANALYSIS ASPECTS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION METHODS ............................................................. 55 III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ORIGIN OF THE TAKESHIMA/DOKDO ISLANDS DISPUTE .............................................. 58 IV. POLITICAL ASPECT: THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE *Daisuke Akimoto is a research fellow of the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at Temple University Japan Campus, the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) Stockholm Japan Center, and the Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation. Akimoto holds a Ph.D. in Asian Studies and International Relations (University of Western Sydney), an M.A.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of the Motivations That Led to Park Geun-Hye's
    THE COMFORT WOMEN AGREEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVATIONS THAT LED TO PARK GEUN-HYE’S ACQUIESCENCE A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Asian Studies By Kangkyu Lee, A.B. Washington, DC January 19, 2017 Copyright 2017 by Kangkyu Lee All Rights Reserved ii THE COMFORT WOMEN AGREEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVATIONS THAT LED TO PARK GEUN-HYE’S ACQUIESCENCE Kangkyu Lee, A.B. Thesis Advisor: Victor D. Cha , Ph.D. ABSTRACT Since normalization in 1965, bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea have been perennially mired in historical acrimony. However, in December 2015, the South Korean and Japanese Foreign Ministries consummated an unforeseen and sudden accord that sought to irreversibly resolve the comfort women issue. Why did President Park Geun-hye agree to finalize and pursue implementation of an agreement on comfort women with Japan, despite the longstanding discord between the two countries and widespread public opposition in South Korea to the resolution? I offer two complementary, alternative explanations in the form of security and economic prospects and deduce that case studies exhibiting strong external threats or economic opportunities have been insufficient in a vacuum to explain South Korean behavior vis-à-vis Japan. I argue that the absence of any ‘final’ reconciliation on historical issues in the past, despite these alternative explanations, demonstrates that the agreement was a manifestation of Park Geun-hye’s unique leadership. I posit that the ‘shadow’ of Park Chung-hee has made a lasting impression on her leadership because of her father’s strong and bold leadership style and the consequent role he played during Japanese-ROK normalization.
    [Show full text]
  • How the Japanese Protest Movement from 1964 to 1968 Changed the Japan-United States Bilateral Relationship During the Vietnam War
    How The Japanese Protest Movement From 1964 To 1968 Changed The Japan-United States Bilateral Relationship During The Vietnam War How The Japanese Protest Movement From 1964 To 1968 Changed The Japan-United States Bilateral Relationship During The Vietnam War Justin Gervais, History Dr. David Obermiller, Department of Social Inquiry ABSTRACT Despite the outward appearance of U.S. leadership during the occupation, and despite U.S. military domination in the years following, Japanese policymakers managed to follow their own paths. The Japanese people had the power to change, through demonstration and other means, the foreign policy of the decision makers at the top leading up to and during the Vietnam War. Historically the social upheaval that occurred within Japan during the Vietnam War was not precedent setting, but rather, existed in varying degrees of strength since the Occupation of Japan by the United states commenced in 1945, both in government and in public venues. A number of groups encompassing all scopes of Japanese society arose to protest during two tumultuous periods in Japanese history: the 1961 renewal of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty and the use of U.S. military bases located in Japan during the Vietnam War. The Japanese people made their voices of dissent heard to both the Japanese and U.S. governments through mass demonstrations and rallies. The United States, recognizing its need for Japan as a strategic waypoint in East Asia, had no choice but to honor the requests of the Japanese government, who was feeling pressured by the protests of its citizens, to limit their demands.
    [Show full text]
  • Visitas Entre Argentina Y Japón De Japón a Argentina 1959 Primer
    Visitas entre Argentina y Japón De Japón a Argentina 1959 Primer Ministro, Nobusuke Kishi 1966 Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Etsusaburo Shiina 1967 Sus Altezas Imperiales el Príncipe Heredero Akihito y la Princesa Michiko 1970 Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Kiichi Aichi 1978 Ministro de Construcción, Yoshio Sakurauchi 1979,81 Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Sunao Sonoda 1981 Ministro de Comercio e Industria, Rokusuke Tanaka 1983 Ex-Presidente de Senados (Enviado Especial), Masatoshi Tokunaga 1989 Ex-Jefe de Gabinete de Ministros (Enviado Especial), Keizo Obuchi 1990 Presidente de Senados, Yoshihiko Tsuchiya 1991 Sus Altezas Imperiales el Príncipe y la Princesa Takamado 1992 Ex-Primero Ministro, Noboru Takeshita 1994 Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Yohei Kono 1995 Ex-Ministro de Construcción (Enviado Especial),Kiyoshi Mizuno 1997 Sus Majestades el Emperador Akihito y la Emperatriz Michiko 1998 Sus Altezas Imperiales el Príncipe y la Princesa Akishino 2003 Ex-Ministro de Defensa, Seishiro Eto 2003 Vicecanciller, Toshimitsu Motegui 2004 Ministra de Ambiente, Yuriko Koike(COP10) 2005 Viceministro de Ambiente, Hiroshi Takano 2006 Presidente de Senados, Ohgi Chikage 2007 Ministro de Agricultura, Forestación y Pesca, Toshikatsu Matsuoka 2007 Ex-Ministro de Asuntos Interiores y Comunicaciones, Yoshihide Suga 2007 Ministro de Finanzas (Enviado Especial), Koji Omi 2008 Su Alteza Imperial la Princesa Takamado 2009 Ministro de Asuntos Interiores y Comunicaciones, Hiroya Masuda 2011 Ex-Primer Ministro (Enviado Especial), Naoto Kan 2013 Su Alteza
    [Show full text]
  • REMEMBRANCE Motoo Shiina: Teacher, Patriot, and Friend (1930–2007)
    March 23, 2007 REMEMBRANCE Motoo Shiina: Teacher, Patriot, and Friend (1930–2007) Michael J. Green The Japanese press announced today that former conservative politician Motoo Shiina has died. He succumbed to pneumonia on March 16 at 6:15 pm. After grieving in private for one week, his family today released the news to the public. Motoo Shiina never held a cabinet post or headed a faction. At the height of his career in 1990, he was one of seven deputy directors of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Policy Affairs Research Council. He only rose to four terms in the Lower House and two in the Upper House. He never held a leadership position in a faction. He never had an “initiative” or a “doctrine” or a building named after him. But in the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Motoo Shiina was a giant. With modesty, selflessness, and an unswerving focus on Japan’s national interest, he became the moral and strategic compass for a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) trying to find its way through the turbulent times of the 1980s and 1990s. When the Soviet Union started on an aggressive arms buildup in the Far East in the early 1980s, Motoo Shiina quietly convinced senior LDP leaders to break Japan’s 1 percent cap on defense spending, helping to contain the Soviet threat and contribute to the end of the Cold War. When Japanese political leaders were uncertain how to respond to President Ronald Reagan’s missile defense initiatives in 1985, it was Motoo Shiina who helped broker a new U.S.-Japan dialogue that set the stage for the closest bilateral cooperation on missile defense in the world today.
    [Show full text]
  • JAPANESE NORMALIZATION TREATY of 1965. the American
    MASTER’S THESIS M-1995 LEE, Ung Hwan THE BACKGROUND OF THE KOREAN- JAPANESE NORMALIZATION TREATY OF 1965. The American University, M.A., 1969 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE BACKGROHNP OF THE KOREAN-JAPANES F. NORMALIZATION TREATY OF 1965 by Ung Hwan Lee Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations Signature of Committee: Chairman: r> L D&a/n of the School Date: 2 / f / f AMERICAN UNlVERSiïr 7 LIBRARY AUG 4 1969 WASHINGTON. 0. C. The American University Washington, D. C. ¥ ù ^ â r TABLE OF OCWTENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I. THE BACKGROUND OF OONTEMPORARY KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS......... 1 Korean-Japanese Relations to 1945............................ 1 Korean-J^janese Relations from the Surrender to the Peace Treaty............................................ 4 Korea's Reaction to the Separate Peace Treaty...................7 II. THE KOREAN-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION TALKS (1951-1960)............... 9 Negotiation Talks during the Korean War (1951-1953)............. 9 Ihe fisheries dispute...................................... 10 Kubota's statement and first deadlock....................... 12 Ohe Broken Dialogue between Korea and Japan (1954-1956)....... 14 The dilenma of Japan's new foreign policy................... 15 Korea's reaction to new Japanese diplomacy................... 20 American mediation and the Shigemitsu-Kim agreement.......... 23 The priorities in JcÇ>anese foreign policy................... 28 y The Resurnption of Dialogue and Seme Initial Ccnprcmises (1957-1960)............................................ 34 Kishi's new task and his Korean policy....................... 34 The Fujiyama-Kim joint ocmnunique........................... 41 Disputes over repatriation.................................. 46 Dilemna of Syngnan Rhee's anti-J^ianese policy...............
    [Show full text]
  • Museums and Cultural Heritage
    City Research Online City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Kim, J (2018). Museums and cultural heritage: to examine the loss of cultural heritage during colonial and military occupations with special reference to the Japanese occupation of Korea, and the possibilities for return and restitution. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London) This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/20813/ Link to published version: Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ [email protected] Museums and Cultural Heritage: To Examine the Loss of Cultural Heritage During Colonial and Military Occupations with Special Reference to the Japanese Occupation of Korea, and the Possibilities for Return and Restitution Jongsok Kim This thesis is submitted to City, University of London as part of the requirements for the award of Ph.D. in Culture, Policy and Management School of Arts and Social Sciences September 2018 1 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………..…….7 Declaration…………………………………………………………………………....8 Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….....9 Abbreviations…………………………………………..……………………………10 Introduction……………………………………….……………………………..….11 Chapter 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Open Brown Gregory Apologyculture.Pdf
    THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES PROGRAM WAR GUILT AND JAPANESE APOLOGY CULTURE GREGORY S. BROWN SPRING 2012 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for baccalaureate degrees in History and German with honors in History Reviewed and approved* by the following: Jessamyn Abel Senior Lecturer in History Thesis Supervisor Catherine Wanner Professor of History and Religious Studies Honors Advisor *Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College. ! "! ABSTRACT Through a comparative study of Japan and Germany I will explain the political and historical factors that contributed to divergent modern day reputations related to the apologetic actions of both states. While the wartime atrocities committed by Japanese and Germans vary greatly in their scale, these two examples will be compared in order to explore the use of apology as a diplomatic tool for reestablishing and improving diplomatic relations. This analysis juxtaposes the postwar apologetic addresses given by official government leaders of each state and the Emperor of Japan, in order to highlight not only the historical truth, but as to uncover the way in which each state sought to atone for war guilt. The juxtaposition will shed light on the effects of apologetic addresses on a nation’s potential acceptance or denial of atrocities. This paper focuses on the post-war period and the efforts made in both Japan and Germany since the war to remedy the past, and the extent to which it was seen as necessary to do so. This will involve a chronological study of reparations and public speeches year by year following the conclusion of World War II.
    [Show full text]
  • Competition Law Reform in Britain and Japan
    Competition Law Reform in Britain and Japan What drives the reform of competition law in Britain and Japan? As market competition replaces state regulation in many economic fields, competition policy has become an area of increasing significance. Against this background, Suzuki highlights the importance of the domestic political structure for competition policy. He does this through the comparative analysis of compe- tition law reforms in Britain and Japan. He argues – controversially – that a country’s domestic political structure should be considered a major factor in causing the reform of competition law, and modifies the established view that it is necessarily a result of changes in international economic and political conditions. The book outlines the history of competition law reform in Britain and Japan throughout the post-war period, and also contains case studies of the most remarkable reforms of the 1970s and the 1990s. Suzuki uses the policy network approach in order to understand the domestic political structure, viewing the policy-making process as the interaction of relevant parties with their own inter- ests and power resources. Thus he interprets competition law reform as the result of interactions between ‘core actors’, such as leading business organisations, government politicians and public officials in charge of industrial policy, and existing competition policy. Competition Law Reform in Britain and Japan makes comparisons based on over half a century of competition law reform, demonstrating that while British and Japanese competition policies are apparently following the same trend of inter- national convergence, the interests and power relations of the core actors in the competition policy network are quite different.
    [Show full text]