MASTER’S THESIS M-1995 LEE, Ung Hwan THE BACKGROUND OF THE KOREAN- JAPANESE NORMALIZATION TREATY OF 1965.

The American University, M.A., 1969 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE BACKGROHNP OF THE KOREAN-JAPANES F. NORMALIZATION TREATY OF 1965

by

Ung Hwan Lee

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Signature of Committee:

Chairman:

r> L D&a/n of the School

Date: 2 / f / f AMERICAN UNlVERSiïr 7 LIBRARY AUG 4 1969 WASHINGTON. 0. C. The American University Washington, D. C.

¥ ù ^ â r TABLE OF OCWTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER

I. THE BACKGROUND OF OONTEMPORARY KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS...... 1

Korean-Japanese Relations to 1945...... 1

Korean-J^janese Relations from the Surrender to the Peace Treaty...... 4

Korea's Reaction to the Separate Peace Treaty...... 7

II. THE KOREAN-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION TALKS (1951-1960)...... 9

Negotiation Talks during the Korean War (1951-1953)...... 9

Ihe fisheries dispute...... 10

Kubota's statement and first deadlock...... 12

Ohe Broken Dialogue between Korea and Japan (1954-1956)...... 14

The dilenma of Japan's new foreign policy...... 15

Korea's reaction to new Japanese diplomacy...... 20

American mediation and the Shigemitsu-Kim agreement...... 23

The priorities in JcÇ>anese foreign policy...... 28 y The Resurnption of Dialogue and Seme Initial Ccnprcmises (1957-1960)...... 34

Kishi's new task and his Korean policy...... 34

The Fujiyama-Kim joint ocmnunique...... 41

Disputes over repatriation...... 46

Dilemna of Syngnan Rhee's anti-J^ianese policy...... 54

III. AMERICA'S NEW FAR EASTERN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON KOREA AND JAPAN...... 62

The Nature of the U.S.-J^ianese Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. . 63

The re-evaluation of U.S. foreign aid...... 64

The strategy of flexible response...... 66 The liipact. of the Anerican Policy Change on Korean-Japanese Relations...... 68

The Korean military coup and the Five Year Economie Plan...... 72

Ikeda's double inccme policy and the Hakone conference...... 79

IV. A NEW PHASE IN THE KOREAN-JAPANESE T A L K S ...... 86

America's Positive Mediation...... * ...... 86

The Kennet^-Park joint cotmunique...... 86

The foreign ministers' conference...... 88

j^ïan's July election and the recess of t a l k s ...... 92

Political Bargaining over the Property Cl a i m s ...... 95

The Ohira formula for the property claims i s s u e ...... ' 99

The Kim-Chira Memorandum...... 102

Korea's Internal Political Instability and a New Stalemate...... 106

The power struggle in the Korean Junta...... 108

Japan's reaction to the Korean situation...... 115

The resumption of talks on the fisheries...... 118

Anti-Treaty Movement and a New Stalemate...... 123

The fall elections in Japan and K o r e a ...... 123

The progress of the talks and the de-Americanization of aid . . . 126

The opposition movement in Korea...... 129

V. A NEW STIMULUS AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT...... 134

The Tonkin Incident and its Inpact on Korean-Japanese Talks .... 134

The escalation of the Vietnamese War and the pcwer vacuum in the Far East...... 134

Bundy's trip to Japan and Korea...... 137

The Process of the Final Ccnpromise...... 142

The resumption of the seventh round t a l k s ...... 145

The dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam...... 150 The final round of talks...... 154

The Park-Johnson meeting...... 158

The Treaty...... 159

Signing of treaty...... 159

Major contents of treaty...... 161

Ratification and its aftermath...... 163

SUMMARY...... 165

CONCLUSION...... 168

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 174

APPENDIX...... 181 INTRODUCTION

Relations between Korea and Japan since the end of the Second World War cannot be separated from their relations withethe United States since she occupied both countries until they regained their Independence and still maintains security forces within them. The present relations between Korea and Japan are founded not only on contemporary history, but also on thlrty-slx years of colonial rule and, more re­ cently, on the postwar International problems of the Far East. Among these crucial problems are the divided status of Korea, the emergence of Communist China and her threatening influ­ ence on her neighbors, and Japan's difficulty in adjusting to the vastly altered political map of Asia. Confronted with these complex problems, Korea and Japan were forced to find solutions to a number of Issues resulting from con­ flicting Interests, These included mutual property claims, fishery disputes, and Japan's treatment of her Korean mi­ nority. When analyzed In this broad context, the recent diplomatic negotiations, as well as the final agreement of 1965 between the two countries, provide an Insight Into what Is likely to be a continuing basis for International prob­ lems In this area.

-1- The Far East has undergone a number of remarkable changes since 1945. The Initial Sovlet-Amerlcaun confron­ tation In the early phase of the cold war turned Into a totally different power configuration than the one that was originally conceived. The first great change was pre­ cipitated by China's fall to the Communists; the subsequent counter measures were reflected In American occupation policy In Japan. A second dhsinge was the Korean War and the sudden Increase in the strategic value of Japan ddr the defense of the free world. In September, 1951. the United States and her allies signed a separate peace treaty with Japan. During the Korean War, Communist China played the major role, overshadowing Russia; China thereby became the principal enemy of the United States. On the other hand, Japan, rapidly recovering her Industrial power, gradually assumed a greater share of America's responsibility for the security and economy tf the Far East. A third great change was the new United States-Japanese Mutued Security Treaty of i960 Along with Its Impact on Asia. Through the new treaty, Japan gained a substantially Improved status in re­ turn for her assumption of a more positive role In Asia. During this period of great change America's Far Eastern policy was re-eveCLuated and reformulated In an effort to ad­ just to the new International environment. Naturally, both Korea and Japan, being closely tied to the United States In economic matters and neourlty were profoundly affected by this altered American policy In Asia. Japan's economic

-11- power now provided her with a greater margin of freedom In dealing with the United States than was enjoyed by a di­ vided and very dependent South Korea. Not surprlsingly, America's attitude toward Japan and Korea has been deter­ mined primarily by their respective roles In Washington's global strategy, and more specifically, by America's de­ pendence on her two Aslan allies for the Implementation of her ^containment policy" against China. The Korean-Japanese normalization talks were consider­ ably affected by the everchanging nature of American-Japanese economic and military co-operation. America's China policy, whether a policy of containment or of containment without Isolation, was to confine the expansion of Communism. For a successful Implementation of this policy, a partnership between the United States and Japan was essential. There­ fore, Japan became the focal point of America's Aslan policy. As a result, the original victor-vanquished relationship had become a full partnership by the late 1950*s. In the process, however, Americans Japem-centered policy frequently exacer­ bated frictions among her Aslan allies, psurtlcularly be­ tween South Korea and Japan. There has probably been no more bitter diplomatic conflict In recent times than that which divided Japan and Korea. A deep mutual distrust In­ herited from Japan's forty-year domination of Korea, various conflicts In vital national Interests, and strong, personal hatreds felt by aged leaders In both countries made settle­ ment tt the dispute difficult.

-Ill- Although neither party to any dispute ever has a mo­ nopoly on right and justice, nevertheless there can be lit­ tle doubt that the South Korean president, Syngman Rhee, was the single most Important obstacle to any adjustment of Jppmnese-Korean differences. There Is no question but that he deliberately widened the gulf between these two Aslan neighborsi how much from personal hatred, suid how much from a genuine conviction that Japan Is the greatest threat to Korea's continued Independence, no one can say. At any rate, it Is clear that many Korean leaders were continually obsessed by âhsense of military Insecurity caused not only by the threat of the Communist North but also by their fears of economic domination by Japan. Many other nations In Southeast Asia held similar trepidations. In the late 1940*8 , when the U.S. Government hurried through a separate peace treaty with Japan, Imposing a moratorium on Japan's reparation payments to Its Pacific war victims, most Aslan nations. Including the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and particularly South Korea, registered airong protests against American policy. As late as 1957» when Japan proposed the Aslan development program as a joint Amerlean-Japanese ven­ ture, nations in Southeast Asia rejected the proposal, la­ beling It a renewed attempt at realizing the old dream of the "Create# East Asia Prosperity Sphere". When a great nations, such as the United States, de­ velops a foreign policy, the order of priority of objec­ tives, or the Incompatibility of short term objectives and

-iv- the long term goal, often becomes a source of discontent to senior and Junior allies alike. The proposed study, a case In point, will attempt to contribute to our understanding of the dilemma of American foreign policy In the triangular relationship of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Another purpose of this study Is to present the first com­ prehensive coverage of the fourteen year long diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. In addition, this study will attempt to test the conceptual framework of the phenomenon often called "downward chain react log", or the Impact of a great power's policy changes on Its allies, who are In different stages of development — In this case, the effects of American policies on those of Japan and Korea, This analysis may also provide some Insight Into the Inter­ action between a super-system and Its substructure as well as Into some Inherent defects in alliance systems as a whole. This study will concentrate on the following three questions i 1 ) What are the major obstructing factors that prolonged the negotiation talks? 2} Why did Korea and Japan finally sign a treaty despite the violent opposition in both coun­ tries? 3) What are the effects of the treaty on both Korea and Japan, and on Asia as a whole? In so doing, the broad outline of postwstr Koresm-Japanese relations will be traced with a pair tl oui sur emphasis placed on the Impact of America's Fsur Eastern policy on Its Aslan allies and vice versa. Sources for this paper are hlstorlosCL materials, gov­ ernment documents Indludlng the Congressional Records,

-V- journals, newspapers, and social survey reports. For addi­ tional Information the author has conducted several Inter­ views with persons who participated In the negotiations. Although the above sources have provided valuable In­ formation, several research problems have been encountered. First, access to all of the literature pertaining to the negotiations Is limited; second. It Is difficult to place the treaty In Its proper historical perspective since It was completed only bllghtly over%se; years ago. The author, however, has dared to tackle this question In the belief that Immediate research gives him the opportunity to ob­ serve a living, three-dimensional reconstruction of history as It happened.

- v l - CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

I. KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATI IS UP TO 1945

Since both Korea and Japan are located In the eastern­ most portion of the Aslan continent, they were under the op­ pressive Influence of the old Chinese culture. For centuries Korea was afflicted by an almost Incessant series of Inva- sione by powerful Chinese tribes who used land routes opftn In the North. Since the Korean Peninsula Is a bridgehead of the Aslan continent, It served as a channel for cultural communication between China and Japan and as a route for military maneuvers. As early as the late Sixteenth Century Hldeyosh's seven-yaar campaign made Korea a land of ruins. "So great has been the destruction," wrote one Japanese historian, "that the Koreans have ever since fostered great enmity toward the Japanese." Even today, Korea adds fuel to the fires of hatred with patriotic monuments, traditions, and literature which deal with the horrors of a weur which ranks among the most cruel and senseless that the world has ever seen. "Thus (the Koreans) keep alive the history of Japanese atrocities from one generation to the next. After the celebrated Meljl Restoration, Japan borrowed from the superior culture and Industrial technology of the

^Yoshlm Kuno, Japanese Expyislon on the Asiatic Con­ tinent (BerkeleyI University of California, 1937), P. 175» western world to become the strongest nation in Asia. While the Western powers were busily engaged in competition for spheres of Influence in China, modernized Japan turned her attention towards the hermit kingdom of Korea. Japan allegedly thought of Korea as a potential victim of Western ImperlsLllsm; she therefore exercised her dominant Influence In Korea to declear herself the rightful protector of the weak and Isolated peninsula. Under the threat of superior Japanese military power, Korea signed a first treaty of peace and amity In 1876. Later, by means of decisive vic­ tories over China In the Slno-Japanese War i 1894-1895) and over Russia In the Russo-Japanese Wsir (1904-1905), Japan not only secured a monopolistic control over Korea, but also emerged as a world power. In 1905 Japan forced Korea to sign an agreement by which Chosen (Korea) became a Japanese protectorate. As a result, Korea was deprived of her sover­ eignty and was forbidden entrance Into any agreement with foreign countries without Japanese endorsment. Finally, In 19D0 Japan formally annexed Korea by means of the so- 2 called Treaty of Annexation.*^ In succeeding years, a series of Korean Independent movements were crushed by Japanese guns and swords. Peace­ ful demonstrations by Korean patriots were brutally put down In 1919 (3am. 11 Movement) and In 1925 (Mansal Inol-

^Chong-Shlk Lee, The Politics of Korean jtotlonallsm tBerkeleyi University of CalifornlaT, p. 70-85. dent)I numerous other reslstamoe movements followed these two monumental incidents. Furthermore, the Japanese sought to destroy distinctively Korean social life and culture. Under Japsmese rule, Koreans were controlled by the Japanese police force and their army; the police operated throughout the country In eac|i community. As a part of the Japanese assimilation policy, Koreans were even forbidden the right to study or use their native language. Japanese colonists and capitalists plundered and monopolized both land and capital. Thousands of Koreans were relocated In the northern part of Manchuria beginning In the early 1930's In order to provide land for Japanese Immigrants In the mild climate of the Korean Peninsula, Other millions of Koreans were conscripted Into labor forces for Japanese Industries across the Sea of Japan. The Korean economy and Industries were organized so as to be subordinate to those of the Japanese home Islands.^ Thousands of Korean natlonsillsts were ar­ rested and killed by various Inhumane methods, ~lncludlng death by burning, by drowning, and by burlsLl alive. A large number of people were crippled by torture. According to official Japanese statistics, 17,697 Korean Insurgents were killed by the Japanese authorities, and another 3?06 were wounded during just the four years of Japsmese ocoupa-

^Edward Wagner, TheKKorean Minority In Japan {New York; Institute of Pacific R e l a t i o n s W p . 12. See alsq Andrew J. (k-ajdansorzen, "Korea under Changing Order", Far Eastern Survey. December 20, 1939, p. 293. tlon from 190? to 1911.^ When Korea was liberated from the despotic rule of Ja­ panese colonialism In 1945, about elghty-flve percent (Q5%) of all tangible properties In Korea had been owned by Ja­ panese. There were approximately two million Koreans In Japan along with their descendants; most had been conscrip­ ted for military service or mobilized for labor before or during the second Slno-Japanese War (1937) and the Second World War.^

II. KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS FROM THE SURRENDER TO THE PEACE TREATY

When the Pacific War was over In 1945, the United States occupied both Japan and South Korea, and set up two military governments, ruling through native provisional governments, Thèimgwere many conflicts between Korea and Japan that required Immediate settlement In order to liqui­ date the colonial legacy,^ However, the series of events that have greatly complicated postwar Korean-Japanese re­ lations. First, liberated Korearwas divided Into two for­ eign military occupation zones. Second, Japan was brought under the monopolistic occupation of the United States.

^Headquarters, Japanese Garrison Army in Korea, BOto TSbatsushl (Record Subjugation q£ Inswgents ), Seoul, December 1913» P. 25-2ol ^The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korean Nationals Overseas. (Seoul, July 1965), p. 5. ^The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Handbook (Seoul, April 1965), P* 1026-1028 (Treaty of Peace with Japan). Third, In the three years immediately after 1945» the Soviet Union and the U.S. debaoled unsuccessfully over the question of Korean unification and the timing of Indepen­ dence . Finally, on August 15, 1948, through free elections held under the auspices of the UN, South Korea gained Its Independence. However, the American occupation of Japan lasted for three more years, ending in April 1952. The American occupation of Japan was carried out in a more orderly fashion than was that of South Korea. Oarl Berger has said, "Korea was the only Important area occupied by American troops In the Pacific for which detailed, con­ crete preparation had not been made" by the machinery of the American government.^ FTom the outset, America's concern for Korea was overshadowed by her Interest in the strategic significance of the Japanese islands. The American occuap- tion policy in Korea was based upon three major objectivesi Korean!zation, democrat!zation, and economic rehabilitation. The chief aim was to make Korea a self-sufficient and inde­ pendent nation which would be friendly to the United States. On the other hand, the original objectives of the American occupation of Japan were "to insure the country will never again menace the peace and security of the world". The key words of the American policy towards Japan was "demoorati-

^Carl Berger, Wie Korea Knot, A Military-Political History (New York«1965), p. 2-4. See also Maj. General Charles Wllloby, MacArthur 1941-1951 (New York, 1954) P. 355-358. o zation and pacification**. The original goal of occupation policy In Japan, how­ ever, soon had to be modified when the Ear East tmderwent drastic changes as the Cold Vtar was Intensified in the late 1940*8 and early 1950*s. The initial reason for the modi­ fication of America's Japanese policy was * ... to lighten the burden on the American taxpayers and prevent Japan's becoming an enoumbrance to the U.S. The strategic and political consideration, however, would soon enter the field of Internation­ al planning and the latter became the predominant influence. 9 As early as May 194?, Dean Aoheson, Assistant Seoretaury of State, revesLled an American plan for the reconstruction of Germany and Japem, labeling these countries the "work­ shops" of Europe and Asia. Toweurds the end of 1949, when the victory of Communism in China had become unmistakable, American leaders were increasingly convinced that retaining Japan as a bulwark in the defense of the Pacific was In the interest of the United States and the rest of the free world. The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, re­ confirmed the validity of America's strategic considerations. Japan's strategic position slowly grew more Importemt as the Korean War raged on with mounting intensity. The United States tried to conclude a peacy treaty with Japan as soon as possible.

®George M, McCune, "Korea, The First Year of Libera­ tion", Pacific Affairs (March 1947), p. 4-5.

9e ,J. Lew von Aduard, Japan from Surrender to Peace (New York, 1957), p. 78. III. KOREA'S REACTION TO THE SEPARATE PEACE TREATY

On September 8, 1951, the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed at San Francisco and was to be enforced the fol­ lowing spring. Korea at first attempted to participate In the San Francisco Peace %eaty as a signatory, but failed to be redognlzed on the grounds that she had not been a belli­ F gerent party against Japan during the Pacific War.^® How­ ever, although Korea failed to become a signatory, some of her rights were recognized by the treaty under Article 4 (property claims), Article 9 (fisheries agreement). Article 12 (trade and navigation), and various other articles. Two questions demanded urgent settlement : the legal status of Korean residents in Japan and the fisheries disputes. The former was directly related to the fate of more than six hundred thousand Koreans In Japan who were living in miserable conditions because of the discriminatory poliby of the Japanese people. The latter Issue was directly re­ lated to the "MacArthur Line" which was proclaimed In Sep­ tember 1945 to protect the sea resources along the Korean coast. This line warn to be liquidated in April 1952 when 1 2 Japan was to regain her sovereignty. It was certain that with the abolition of the "MacArthur Line" the Japanese

lOfisyung-Jlk Limb, Limb Bvumc-Jlk Hwulgo rok (Mémoire of Limb Bvung-Jlk). Seoul, lfo5, p. 495 ^^The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Handbook (Seoul 1965), P. 4-5. ^^Ibld., p. 6 8

fishing fleets would. In a matter of months, devour the fishery resources In the adjacent seas of Korea. The Korean government was therefore anxious to prevent this catastro­ phe from occuring. The arrest of Japanese vessels by the Korean coast guard became the main source of friction be­ tween the two nations. Until late 1951, American authorities In Japan made vain efforts to mediate the fisheries disputes. However, with or without settlement of the above mentioned Issues, Japan was nonetheless entitled to the restoration of her sovereignty the following April. Therefore, the Korean government was convinced of the necessity for prompt nego­ tiation with Japan while the United States still had some effective Influence over the Japanese government. The Japanese government, however, was faced with numerous prob­ lems of higher priority and as a result wished to avoid any concrete commitment to Korea at that tlme.^^

^^The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Korean View of Korea-Janan Relations and Japan's Asian Policy. Reference No. 13 (September 1957), p. 7. Reference No. 13 (^ CHAPTER II

THE KOREAN-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION TALKS (1951-1960)

I. NEGOTIATION TALKS DURING THE KOREAN WAR (1951-1953)

Through the mediation of General Ridgwmy, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces In Japan, and his diplomatic ad­ visor, Mr. Sebald, Korea and Japan finally agreed to meet on October 20, 1951» for a preliminary session. The first found of preliminary discussions revealed wide differences of opinion about the agenda. The basic position of the Kor­ ean government was that the Individual pending Issues should be settled before the normalization of relations, whereas the Japanese government insisted on normal i zati on before any individual settlements,! It was obvious from the beginning that the Japanese delegate was deliberately st£ü.llng at the meetings and preventing any effective consultations. He believed Japan would be in a more advantageous position after the Peace Treaty came Into effeot and independence was restored. Eventually, however, on November 28, 1951, the two sides agreed on an agenda for future discussions which included I 1) legal status of Koreans residing in Japan; 2) ship ownership; 3) Property rights and claims de- riwlng from the colonlsüL past; 4) fisheries agreement ; smd 5) fundamentsd relationship.^

! Jin-Woo Yu, "Koresui-Japanese Relations and Our Atti­ tude", The Road to Democracy (Seoul, October, 1954), p. 248. 2The Korean Foreign Ministry, The Korean View of Korea- Janan Relations and Japan's Asian Policy tSeptember 1957), p. 7. 10

The fisheries dispute. In early January 1952, the Korean government proposed to gain a settlement on the fisheries dispute prior to any settlements of other issues. The Japanese delegation refused this proposal on the grounds that Japan was not prepared to enter Into a discus­ sion of the fisheries question. When the hope for an early fisheries agreement disappeared. President Rhee proclaimed the "Peace Line" which set up a boundary around the adjac­ ent seas of Korea. Wlthlngth&s area South Korea was to have sole jurisdiction.^ In this proclamation Japanese fishing vessels were excluded from waters less than sixty miles from the Korean coast. This unilateral action by the Korean government was immediately and severely denounced by the Japanese government. The first meeting of the Korean-Japanese Conference con­ vened in Tokyo on February 15, 1952. Five committees were formed, one to study each issue on the agenda. The commit­ tees made little progress, however, because the basic dis­ agreements on each side were reflected in the proceedings. While the Koreans remained uncompromising on the "Peace Line" issue, on March 6 the Japanese delegate demanded that Korea compensate for all private property owned by Japa­ nese nationals in Korea before August 1945.^ Due to this

3l)ong A ll-Bo. February 18, 1952, The Presidential Proc­ lamation on~the Adjacent Sea issued by Syngman Rhee on Feb­ ruary 18, 1952 was based on International precedents and on the theory of conservation zone. ^The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Bulletin (March 1958) p. 101. See also George McCune "Korea, The First Year of Liberation", Pacific Affairs (March 194?), P . 7 • 11 disagreement and strong residual national resentments, the negotiation talks went Into a stalemate. In April the first meeting was recessed Indefinitely. Disputes over the fisheries continued and tension was further heightened In mid-September as the fishing season approached. A large fleet of Japanese fishing boats were found near the Jeo-Joo Island off the southern coast of the Korean Peninsula. The Korean President ordered his Minister of Justice to issue an administrative order giving power to the local courts to deal with the seized Japanese ves­ sels. In addition. Admiral Son Won-n, the Chief of Korean Naval Operations, also strongly warned Japanese fishing ves­ sels against future violations. Related to this issue was the report on the Communist prisoners* riot at Kuje Island which indicated that the prisoners* unrest had been insti­ gated by North Korean Communist conspirators who had infil­ trated through the sea route on the Korean coast.3 On September 26, 1952, General Clark proclaimed the Korean Defense Water along the Korean coast which included an area which the defunct "MacArthur"Line" had covered. This mee- tion by the Supreme Commander of the UN forces was gener-

GLlly Interpreted as having a twofold purpose — to rein­ force Korean coastal defenses and to prevent further aggra­ vation of the fisheries disputes between Korea and Japan.

^William Vatcher, Panmuniom (March 1956), p. 12

General Clark now felt the neoesslty for a positive mediation between the two contending allies. In January 1953 President Rhee visited Tokyo. The visit was arranged by General dark, and the President met with a number of Japanese leaders. Including Prime Minister Yoshida. Presi­ dent Rhee and Prime Minister Yoshida once sigaln agreed to resume talks. The Second Korean-Japanese Negotiation Con­ ference convened in Tokyo on April 14, 1953. As previously, the conference was broken up Into five committees.^ Ini­ tially the conference appeared to be making considerable progress. This round of talks, however, soon began to bog down for the seune reasons that had caused the rupture during the first talks. On the questions of ship ownership and the conservation of fisheries, there was no basis for agree­ ment. Japan bitterly attacked the "Peace Line" as Illegal. This prolonged discussion continued fruitlessly until July, when the end of the Korean War was In sight. Now the Japanese government wanted to postpone any settlement with Korea until the Conclusion of the scheduled Political Con­ ference over Korean Problems at Geneva In the fall. The s second round of the conference was adjourned at the request 7 of the Japanese delegation on July 23, 1953. Kubota's statement and first deadlock. However, a

^See footnote No. 2, ^Yosaku Nakayatsu, Nlkan Shin Jidai (New Era for Japan etnd Korea) (Tokyo, September 1964), p. 139. 13 few months after the Korean armistice, the political con­ ference discussing the Korean questions still had not been held; and the prospect of a political settlement was dar­ kened by the uncompromising stand of the Communists. The fisheries disputes between Korea dnd Japan became even more intense. On August 27, 1953» the "Clark Line" was abol­ ished, and Japanese vessels were freed from the restric­ tive wartime control of the UN command. This measure by the Supreme Commander was severely criticised by the Kor- - Q ean government. On September 8, the Korean Navy announced its plan to launch a massive arrest operation against Ja­ panese fishing vessels caught violating the "Peace Line". The atmosphere along the Korean coast was so tense that American Naval vessels had to be dispatched to thwart the Korean move. As a result of American mediation, the mas­ sive arrest operation was withdrawn by the Korean Navy, However, the number of captured Japanese vessels sharply in­ creased. Since public pressure for the immediate release of the vessels increased, the Japanese government proposed the resumption of talks. The Korean-Japanese conference, which had been in ad­ journment for more than two months, was reconvened on October 6, 1953, However, the second plenary session was barely over when the end was in sight. At the committee meeting on the controversial property claims, insulting

8Dong A ll-Bo. September 5» 1953» P. 1. 14 remarks by the chief Japanese delegate Kubota provoked a harsh protest from the Korean delegation. Hr. Kubota said that* 1) the evacuation of the Japanese from Korea In 1945 haul been in violation of International law# 2) the estab­ lishment of an Independent Korean state before a Japanese peace treaty had been signed was in violation of interna­ tional law; 3) Japan's property claims in Korea were in­ violable; 4) the Cairo Declaration describing the "enslave­ ment" of the Korean people to Japan was based on wartime hysteria; and, finally, 5) Japem's occupation of Korea had o been beneficial to the Korean people. The Kubota state­ ments were so insulting that the Korean delegation demanded an immediate retraction. When the Japanese government re­ fused to withdraw or change the statement, the Korean dele­ gation boycotted the subsequent sessions and the conference was suspended on October 21, 1953. The impact of this in­ cident was so great that there were no formal negotiation talks for the next three years,

II. THE BROKEN DIALOGUE BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN (1954-1956)

When the Korean War ended in July 1953» Communist China entered into Its ambitious industrialization program, while Japan set out to solve her own foreign policy prob­ lems and play her own role within the narrow margin of mani-

9Korean Foreign Ministry, The Korean View of Korea- Japan Relations (September 1957), p. 15. 15 pulatlons provide* between the Bast and West. Although Japan had signed a separate peace treaty with the nations of the free world, many of her neighbors were excluded from the San Francisco treaty. Her relations with the Soviet Uhlon and Communist China were extremely complex and em­ barrassing. The Japanese government was under ^ e a t public pressure to obtain an early release of Japanese nationals taken prisoner by Russia and China during the Second World War. Japan's fishing Industries were silso crying for pro­ tection, seeking a guarantee for safe fishing activities sQ.ong the Sea of Okhtsuk and the Yellow Sea.10 Soviet and Chinese patrol boats continually harrassed Japanese fishing vessels. Various commeroletl elements pressured the Tokyo government to open up Chinese trade. In addition Japan had to settle the thorny question of repsœatlons to the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia eü.though the United States and Great Britain had voluntarily discarded their claims at the time of the San Francisco treaty. The of Japan's new foreign policy. Exploit­ ing the Intemalppressure of Japsmese people who wished to join with the Communists, Moscow and Peking took the ini­ tiative by pulling Japan toward them. Communist China was putting forth every effort to undermine America In Japanese

^^Shlnlohi Kamlmura, Nihon Gaiko no ffolunen (Fifty Years of Japanese mpimmamyi Toinro. September, i960, p. 277-301. See also W.J. Jordan, Japan between East and West (New York, 1957), P. 259. 16 eyes, to frustrate the rearmament of J^Muri by the United States, and to bring her into the neutralist camp. Another important objective probably was to gain access to Japanese capital and technical skill In order to boost China's own Industrialization. As early as May 1952, a three-man Ja­ panese trade mission visited Peking on Its way back from Moscow and signed the first unofficial trade agreement be­ tween the two countries,In December 1952 Peking offered to repatriate some 30,000 Japanese In China. Through the Red Cross organizations of the two nations, the first ship arrived on March 23, 1953, and over the next two years about 29,000 Japanese were repatriated by being tmansported I p aboard the Koan Maru to the little port of Malzuru. Since 1953 Communist China had' made major gains In Its energetic campaign to pull Japan Into the neutreillst camp, to bring her Into closer relations with the Cbmmunlst world, and to reduce American Influence there. During 1953 and 1954 pro-Chlnese sentiments prevailed In Japan. Responding to public opinion, the Hatoyama cabinet, formed In December 1954, announced Its plan to correct the various reforms In­ augurated under the occupation and to carry out an "autono- 1 3 mous people's diplomacy". The Hatoyama government favored

William Jorden, 0£, olt.. p. 208, l^Ibld.. p. 213. 13Hlkomatsu Ksmlgawa, Nihon Galko no M l shuppatsu (The New Departure of Japanese PlPlomacyT. Tokyo, 1900, p. 532, See also Tokyo Shlnbun. April 24. 1958, p. 3. 17 negotiation for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and normal trade with Comnunlet China, As a consequence, the volume of Japan's trade with China increased from 195^ to 1955 — rising from nineteen million dollars to twenty- eight million dollars. However, the Russo-Japanese negotiations for a peace treaty broke down completely In March 1955 when the two par­ ties could not find a basis of agreement on territorial Issues. Shortly thereafter Ichiro Kono, the agricultural minister of the Hatoyama cabinet, went to Moscow against the will of conservative Foreign Minister Mamoru Shlgemltsui and while he did secure a temporary fisheries agreement, he also committed the Hatoyama government to a reopening of Soviet-Japanese negotiations for the "normalization of re­ lations between the two countries". Following the Chinese boom In Japan, North Korea also made smme friendly overtures to Tokyo. As early as Febru­ ary 25, 1955, Premier Kim II-Sung proposed a normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. This proposal was warmly received by many Japanese people Including some In leading business circles as well as Communist sympathizers.^^ The Leftists In Japan emerged as fanatical reactionaries preaoh-

^^Shlnlokl Kamlmura, op . olt.. p. 274-276. l^Takashl Hatada, Nihon o Uirokasu Nikkan- KmyAel ( Japan- Korean Relations that Disturbed Japanj. Tokyo. 1903, p. 52-5^ 18

Ing neutrality for Japan and thus they stepped out of the Western oamp. The Bed terror had quickly spread to all quarters of social and political life In Japan. Sabotage and other subversive activities endangered the Internal stability of Japan. In the face of this Imminent danger of Red terror, the two conservative polltlcal p#rtles were forced to stage a united front. In mid-summer 1955 the two major conservative parties of Japan, the Democrats and the Liberals, merged to form the Llbereü. Democratic Party, and opened a united front against Communists and other radical liberals. On international Issues the new party favored greater independence of Japan from the United States In matters of foreign policy, particularly In Japan's relations with Com­ munist China; In other matters it favored the continuation of a close Japanese-Amer1oan Alliance.After this Initial recognition of self-confidence, the Japanese people claimed even greater political and economic Independence from Ameri­ can Influence, In August 1955 Foreign Minister Mamoru Shlgemltsu, of the Hatoyama cabinet, visited Washington with Nobutsuke M s h l , the Secretary-General of the Liberal I^mo- oratlc Party. During their visit they discussed with Ameri­ can leaders revisions of the American-Japanese Security Treaty. Under the new system Japan was to take over a greater burden from the United States by playing an Important role

l^Hugh Borton, Japan Between East and West (New York, 1957). p. 28-29. 19

in the économie development of Asia and subsequently In the Aslan security problem. The Dull es-Shlgemltsu jolng communique Issued on August 31, 1955» Included the follow­ ing points I 1) Japan would assume the prime responsibility for Japanese security and contribute to the peace and se­ curity of the Western Pacific, 2) In order to Implement this plan, the two nations agreed to renegotiate the Ameri­ can-Japane se Security Treaty, calling the new agreement the American-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty, 3) The United States would gradually withdraw Its armed forces from Japan as the Japanese government Increased its self-defense forces, 4) The two nations would plan for a gradual reduction of American expenditures for Japanese defense. As the United States and Japan embarked on the renego­ tiation of the security treaty, Aslan countries of both camps, Communist and non-Communlst, showed an active Inter­ est In this development In the American-Japanese oo-operatlon in Aslan affairs. The Soviet Union and Red China accused the United States of attempting to create another anti­ communist alliance In the Far East. The attitude of other non-Communlst abluhtries varied from country to country ac­ cording to their past experiences and present Interests. Most of Japan's Aslan neighbors feared her rearmament. Among them, the Philippines and South Korea were partiou- leurly concerned about America's effort to make Japan the

^^shinlchl Kamlmura, 0£. olt.. p. 295. BO main power base against Communist expansion In Asia. Korea's rsaction to new Japanese diplomacy. While Japan was pursuing Its new. Independent foreign policy, Korea became further alienated from Japam, In the first place, Japan's neutrallstlc approach to the East-West con­ flict created a great difficulty with which the Ideologi­ cally divided Korea was forced to deal. Furthermore, Presi­ dent Rhee of South Korea often exaggerated Japan's friendly overatures to the Communist countries; and the Korean Presi­ dent's harsh criticism of Japanese foreign policy was fre­ quently Interpreted as a smoke screen for his dmmestlo- politioal failure which was causing great discontent among the people. However, President Rhee's criticism of Japan's attitude toward the Communists had some validity, empeclally in reference to the question of South Korea's security and her relations with Communist countries — particularly rela­ tions with North Korea. Greatly disturbed by the pro-Communlst approach of the Japanese government. President Rhee Issued a special state­ ment on June 15, 1955, criticizing Japan's friendly over­ tures to the Communists as a sign of a revival of Japanese militarism. And Byun Young-Tae, the Korean Foreign Minis­ ter, severely criticized Japan's proposed Southeast Aslan development plan declaring that: "The Japanese scheme may be aimed at resurrecting the so-called Greater Asia Co- prosperity Sphere at the cost of American aid. We oppose 21 the project,"^® Faced with such harsh criticism from the Korean government, Prime Minister Hatoyama called Kim Young- shlk, the chief of the South Korean Mission In Tokyo, to his office and pledged that Japan would not establish any formal relationship with North Korea. But, In August 1955, when Japan continued to trade with Communist countries, the Korean government ordered a total suspension of trade with Japan. But as In similar actions thereafter, the trade sus­ pension created more trouble for the Koreans than It did for the Japanese. The economic sanction, then, was not an effective weapon for subduing the Japanese government. Un­ der the growing economic pressure, the Korean government made a number of informal overtures for the resumption of negotiation talks. However, It made two conditionsi a general retraction of the Kubota statement and the with­ drawal of Japan's property claims In Korea. Despite South Korea's mounting complaints about Ja­ panese dealings with North Korea, In November a group of Japanese people who were friendly to North Korea, organ­ ized the Nltchc Kyokal - (Japan-North Korea Co­ operation Committee) in an effort to promote trade and cul­ tural exchange between the two natlons.^^ As Japan con­ tinued her dealings with the Communists, the South Korean government Increased Its pressure on the Japanese government

^^Yung-Tal Byun, "American Role In Korean-Japanese Rela­ tions", Korean y - LV-1 (Autumn 1962 ), p. 25. l^Takashl Hatada, Nihon to Chosen (Japan ted Korea), Tokyo, March 1965, p. l52l 22 by seizing greater numbers of Japanese fishing vessels which were violating the Peace Line. On November 17, Gen­ eral Lee Hjrung-Keun, the Joint Chief of Staff of the Korean Armed Forces, announced a government plan to mobilize air force planes to patrol the "Peaoe Llne**.^® This announce­ ment by Korea was received by the Japanese government with great shock and the Japanese government Immediately warned her fishing vessels to withdraw from the "Peaoe Line**. The charged atmosphere which hung over the Sea of Japan seemed to be a precursor of war. As the relations between Japan and Korea beceune cri­ tical, General Wilber M. Brucker, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff who was then visiting Tokyo, offered to mediate the dispute between Korea and Japan. In Washington, Secretary Dulles also Indicated his willingness to act as a go-between for the disputing parties. There was even a rumor that the U.S. Seventh Fleet had dispatched Its vessels to the troubled waters in order to prevent any physical confron­ tation between Korea and Japem. On December 15, 19551 Ad­ miral Adlelgh A. Burke, the Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, told reporters that "the Seventh Fleet would not Involve Itself In the Korean-Japane se fisheries disputes". The Korean President's dramatic demonstration of his hostility toward Japan was generally believed to be a manifestation

^Qpong A 11-Bo, jfevsmber 17, 1955. Japan Times, Jb- Vmmber 18, 1955. 23 of his disoontent with America's Japan-centered Asia policy as well as a retaliatory act against Japan's neutrallstlc diplomacy.Certainly, America's Japan-centered policy and the rearmament of this country before she and Korea had normalized their relations and settled the Issues de­ rived from their common past made President Rhee Impatient. He feared that an abrupt reduction of American aid would force Korea under the Japanese economic umbrella. On this assumption, President Rhee consistently opposed any plan for Amer1can-Japanese co-operation that would give Japan more voice In Aslan affairs. Therefore, President Rhee's utmost concern was to obtain America's pledge for continu­ ous aid to Korea, enabling Korea to be Independent of Ja­ panese economic and military ald.^^ American mediation and the Shlgemltsu-Kim agreement. Aware of President Rhee's concern, the ranking American officials visiting Seoul repeatedly assured him of the con­ tinuation of American military and economic aid. For In­ stance, on December 13, 1955, a few days after President Rhee's critical statement about America's policy toward Japan, the State Department Immediately released a counter statement, saying that "the U.S. has no intention of en­ riching Japan at the cost of South Korea." When the Ikxlted

^President Rhee told the Associated Press reporter In late 1955 that some officials In the United States are deter­ mined to build up Japan at the expense of Korea. There are those who blindly love the Japanese and fall to suspect what they say," Los Angeles Times. December 12, 1955, P. 3. 22Yung-Tal Byun, oj^, olt. , p. 25. 24

States proposed the creation of a free Aslan collective security system — often called North East Asia Treaty Or­ ganization (NEATO) — South Korea rejected any possibility of Japanese membership In the proposed organization "unless she severed her connections with all Communist countries."23 South Korea was not the only country with hostile feelings, for other Aslan countries which had been occupied by Japan during World War II had not forgotten the dreauiful invasion of imperial Japan. Under this clrcximstance, leaders of both Japan and the United States were convinced of the necessity for two Im­ portant ground works to precede the new plan of AmeAmerntean- Japanese co-operation system In Asia. The first was an early rapproaohement between Japan and South Korea* the sec­ ond was the re-establishment of a friendly Image of the new democratic Japan among the nations of Southeast Asia. The former Is an Indubitable prerequisite to any satisfactory anti-Communist regional co-operation in Asia since Korea Is of great importance to the free world. Without Korea's full co-operation, Japan would have experienced great dif­ ficulty In playing her role In the new system. Therefore, a gradual reduction of America's responsibility In the Far East required closer co-operation between Korea and Japan. The ohange In Japan's Image was Important for her economic

"Seoul Sees Difficulties In Tripartite Pact", Korean Times. July 23, 1956, p. 1. Steve Heiisly, "NEATO Denied by U.S.", Washington Post, December 3, 1957» p. 6, 25 development In the future. Only the great markets in Southeast Asia could compensate for the closing of the Chinese market that Japan had enjoyed during prewar years. Through a positive effort at mediation on the part of the American government, Japan and Korea gradually resumed Informal contacts In early 1956 and explored the possibili­ ties of future negotiations. In addition to the positive American mediation effort, both Korea and Japan began to recognize the necessity for both of an early reconciliation. For Japan, Korea's Increased threat to Japanese fishing vessels had become a serious social Problem for the coastsO. population* and In turn this matter had become an acute political issue. During the three years from 1954 to 1956, more than ninety Japanese fishing vessels and eight hundred fishermen had been captured by Korean patrol boats.The dependents of those captured fishermen as well as the major fishing Interest groups werepputting great pressure on the Jf^mnese government throughttheir political representatives. Many Influential figures in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, including NobusukA.' Kish, the Secretary General of the LDP, were under the direct fire of the fishing indus­ tries of the southwestern coastal eureas of Japan which were calling for "more positive government efforts to bring those Imprisoned Japanese back home" . This combination

25Korean Times. October 10, 1952, p. 2. 26YQkuryumhAmogoLsha%lhq, (Simultaneous Release of the Detainees), Sekal. (March 1958), p. 128-131. 26 of strong political pressure and American mediation forced Japanese leaders to renew their efforts to bring about reconciliation with South Korea or at least to ease the ten­ sion between the two nations. On the other hand, the Korean government was also con­ vinced that reconciliation with Japan was Inevitable because of this new phase In American-Japanese oo-operatlon. But President Rhee was not willing to come to the negotiation table until Japan met the two basic conditions which Korea had proposed — the retraction of Kubota's Insulting remarks of 1953 and the withdrawal of Japan's property claims against Korea. As early as February 1956, Prime Minister Hatoyama ex­ pressed his sincere interest In resuming talks and Implied his willingness to send a special envoy to the Korean Presi­ dent for high level political talks. On March 28, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu said that "the Japauiese government was ready to withdraw the controversial Kubota statement If It is a big enough step for resumption of talks. After this offer, the Korean delegation In Tokyo approached the Japanese government. Shlgemltsu-Kim agreement. After a month long nego­ tiation, on April 2, 1956, the Japanese delegate Shlgemltsu and the Korean envoy Kim ïong-shlk agreed upon the following points I 1) the Korean government would release some eight hundred Japanese fishermen who had completed their Peace Line violation sentences at Pusan jail, 2) the Japanese 27 government would release some 1400 Koreans detained In Omura Concentration Campi and of these 1400, nine hundred Illegal Korean residents would be deported to Korea and the rest, who had come to Japan before the end of World War II, would be permitted to remain In Japan. But this agreement, initiated by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, was Immediately injected by the Japanese Ministry of Justice on the grounds that the wording In the agreement — "detainees...completed their sentences..." — would be oontradlotory to the previous Japanese position that Japa­ nese fishermen detained In the Korean jails were Innocent whereas the Koreans In the Japanese jails were criminals. Japanese Vice-Minister of Justice Klshlmoto warned the Foreign Ministry "to avoid any commitment that would effect the Implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Peace Line by the Japanese government."^®The Vice-Minister also argued that any Koreans committing crimes after the release should be deported to Korea regardless of the length of their residence In Japan, Including those who had been re­ siding there before the end of World War II, Despite differences of opinion within the Japanese government, Korea and Japan entered preliminary negotia­ tion talks on the detainee Issue. The Japanese government was willing to retract the Kubota statement If It would be

27"ROK can't take Japan's Terms7, Korean Times, Octo­ ber 10, 1956, p. 1. Sekal (March 1958), p. 128. 26

enough to continue the negotiation talks but refused to Withdraw Japanese property claims prior to the formal meet­ ings. The Japanese stand was generally interpreted as an effort to minimize the Korean property claims against Japan or as an attempt to obtain mutual cancellation of the pro­ perty claims of both countries If they failed to achieve their first goal. Korea's stand was as firm as ever — that the Japanese withdrawal of property claims was the condi­ tion for the resumption of formal negotiation meetings. President Hhee was also very critical of Japan's Informal trade relations with Communist China, with the Soviet Union, and psortl oui surly with North Korea. Due to this disagree­ ment on the key Issues, the negotiations entered Into an­ other deadlock. Faced by the strong and unyielding stsmd of President Rhee, many Japanese lesuiers gave up hope that any full-fledged rapprochement with South Korea could be achieved as long as Hhee was aJLlve.^^ The orlortt&esltn Jaosmese foreign policy. The cause of the new stsü.emate was deeper them a superficial disa­ greement on the questions of the property cleU.ms and the treatment of the detainees. More Important were the domes­ tic and International situations of the two negotiating countries, espeoleKlly those of Japem. Domestlcedly, the Japanese government was beset by two contradictory pressures — the Japanese fishing Interests were exerting pressures

2 9 «Rok-Japem Relations Likely to Grow Sour", Kcreem Times. Seoul, August 28, 1956, p. B. 29 for an early agreement with Korea, whereas the socialists and some business groups Interested In Chinese trade op­ posed a rapprochemeht wlthCSodthiKcrea alone. Internation­ ally, Japan had already engaged In a series of peace negot) tlatlons with Communlst China and the Soviet Union over fishing boundaries and tendtorlal settlements. A reason­ able flsAlng agreement with the Soviet Union over the Sea of Okhts was a more pressing foreign policy Issue than was the Peace Line with Korea,The Japanese government, there­ fore, did not want to create disadvantageous precedent for fisheries settlements by making any concessions to South Korea. On the other hand. In 1956 Korea also had Its reasons for maintaining a strong stand against Japan. Domestically, the ruling Liberal Peurty had been concentrating Its full ef­ fort on re-electing President Syngman Rhee for his thSXd term. President Rhee had ammended the Constitution against the will of the people. Furthermore, a series of dictatorial measures were forced upon the people and this domestic frus­ tration hadctbebeosmoothed over by diverting public atten­ tion to foreign affairs. In both cases Japan was exploited as an easy target for the people's Irritation. President Rhee's tough measure against the Japanese fishing boats was lauded as a sign of his patriotism and provided him with a convenient excuse for his dictatorship at home, It was

^^Wllllam Jorden, o p . clt., p. 258-259. Sec also Paul Langer, "Communism In Independent Japan", Japan Between East and West (New York. 1957). P. 106. Mark Hoblus, "The Korean Press and Public Opinion about Japan", Journalism Quarterly. 42*4 (Autumn 1965), P. 35. 30

for this reason that he had never seriously attempted any reasonable or realistic solution. In October 1956 Japan had the Soviet Union signed a fisheries agreement. Following the example of the Soviet Union, Japan signed a similar treaty with Communist China. By the end of 1956, most of Japan's key foreign policy problems with neighboring countries. Including Communist countries, were settled. The only major foreign policy tasks which remained were the renegotiation of the American- Japanese Security Treaty and the normalization of relations with South Korea. Prerequisite to successful negotiations with the United States were a number of conditions. The creation of a reoonclllatory mood between Japan and Korea was one of the most Important steps toward an Increase of Japanese influence on her Aslan neighbors because, her con­ tinual friction with South Korea was a constant reminder of Japan's colonial past and therefore a major obstacle to the restoration of a favorable Image of a democratic, free Japan. If this condition was not met, Japan's role In the new system of American-Japanese co-operation In Asia was doomed to be handicapped by the suspicions of her neighbors. Therefore, on December 4, 1956, Prime Minister Ichiro Haotyama told the House of Representatives that he was wil­ ling to send a delegation to Seoul to help reopen the dead­ locked talks. Foreign Minister Mamoru Shlgemltsu, appear­ ing before the same body, repeated his previous déclaration that "If Japan's withdrawal of the Kubota statement would be 31 enough to get talks going, Japan would withdraw It. " This statement by Japanese leaders was promptly welcomed by the Korean government through Korean Counselor Ylu Tal Hwa. However, this momentous optimism was once again dhp- pflsred by the subsequent action of the Japanese government. On December 6, 1956, Japan sent twenty Koreans who had just been released after serving their Japanesepprlson terms to North Korea via Shanghai aboard the Norwegian freighter 32 Hellke. Ever since Japanese attempts to repatriate large numbers of the Korean residents to the Republic of Korea had been completely shattered by South Korea's refusal, the Japanese government had been maneuvering to send Korean nationals In Japan to North Korea If they were willing to go. Taking advantage of the alleged desires of these pro- North Koreans, the Japanese government, with the co-operatlo^ of the Japanese Red Cross Society, made strenuous efforts to provide these Koreans with travel documents prepared by the International Red Cross and subsequently maintained close contacts with North Korean Red Cross Chapters. Through Intelligence sources the Korean government found out about this effort and lodged a strong protest with the Japanese government. Japan's activities, however, were not hampered by Korea's protest. She justified her action on the basis of humanltarlanlsm. The Korean government's charge against Japan was thati

^^"ROK Protest Japan against Korean Exit", Korean Times. December 7, 1956, p. 1. 32

... those deported Koreans were unequlvooaXly na­ tionals of the ROK and they were not displaced per­ sons who were in need of humanitarian aid by the Red Cross. They had been permanently settled In Japan as legal residents since before World War II* therefore, Japan's unilateral action against Kor­ ean nationals without consent of the ROK govern­ ment was an infringement of the sovereign rights of Korea. This Japanese action posed a serious question which In­ volved more than those Koreans In question. There was euaple reason for Iü)rea to fear that Japan might proceed with a scheme to deport the bulk of the 600,000 Korean residents In Japan to the North Korean Communists. Because of this Incident, Korean-Japemese relations were once again severed and Japanese fishing vessies were harassed by augmented Korean Coast Guard Patrols, Apparently reflect­ ing America's desire to mediate between the two Aslan allies, / I Walter Robertson, Assistant U.S. Under Secretary of State for Par Eastern Affairs, visited both Seoul and Tokyo. On December 19, after his conference with leeulers of both coun­ tries, Mr. Robertson said that "Korea and Japan will come to a satisfactory and Justifiable settlement to mark stn end to the now deadlocked relationship between the two coun­ tries."^^ The day before Mr. Robertson's arrived In Tokyo, the Japanese cabinet had decided to release edl Korean na­ tionals being held In Japan and to deport them to South Korea.

"Statement charging Japan's Deportation of 20 Koreans to North Korea as an act of Defiance", Foreign Ministry Bul­ letin. No. 9» (April 1957), P. 17. 34Korean Times. Seoul, December 20, 1956, p. 2. » K 4 33

After years of hmggl&Ag&ovemrthe subject, the Japanese government made the important concession which cleared the way for treaty relations with South Korea. The Korean gov­ ernment welcomed Japan's apparently conciliatory attitude towards Korean-Japanese relations. On December 20, Tanzan Ishlbashl, former Trade Minister, took over the Premiership from the retiring Hatoyama. NDbusukho Klshl was appointed the new Foreign Minister under Ishlbashl's cabinet. On De­ cember 27, at a press conference, the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Nobutsuke Klshl, pledged that "Japan will not re­ cognize the Feplng regime bedause It Is not a United Nations member." In an Interview with Kyoto News Service, Klshl said he would give top priority to the question of normali­ zing Japanese-South Korean relations" including the release of Japanese fishermen Interned In P u s a n . 33 As If responding to the conciliatory remarks of Japanese Foreign Minister Klshl, President Hhee of Korea also disclosed his desire to normalize the relations between the two countries. On January 5, 1957, when the Korean Congressional leaders visited him at his Presidential residence. President Rhee told his visitors that "the repudiation of the Korean Armis­ tice and normalization of relations with Japan are two major foreign policy tasks of this year." At this time, Japan's Immediate concern was to bring

33j » w m Times. Tokyo, December 27, 1956, p. 1. ^^Dong A 11-Bo. Seoul, January 5, 1957» P. 1. 34 her detained fishermen home. Japan asked the Korean govern­ ment to release the detained Japanese Immediately, claiming that "those Japanese fishermen detained In Korea should be treated differently from the criminal Koreans detained In Gtaiura concentration camp because the former had not viola­ ted any legitimate rule of International law, "37 goon Ja­ pan realized that the simultaneous release of the Korean detainees was the only way to Insure the return of her own nationals. On February 22, 1957» with the consent of For­ eign Minister Klshl, who was representing ailing Prime Minis­ ter Tanzen Ishlbashl, a tentative verbal agreement for the simultaneous release was made between Toru Nagakawa, the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Aslan Affairs Bureau, and Korean minister Kim Yong-shlk, On Februaory 25 Nobusuke Klshl was named Japan's seventh Prime Minister.

III. THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE AND SOME INITIAL COMPROMISES (1957-1960)

Klshl'8 new task and his Korean policy. These Impor­ tant foreign policy tasks, therefore, were Inherited by In­ coming Nobutsuke Klshl's administration In February 1957. Japan's new Prime Minister, who had long been an advocate of an equal partnership with the United States, called for top level talks with the U.S. and other governments on mutual problems. In an official statement of Its defense policy Issued fcn May 1957, the Klshl government declared Its inten-

3*^See Asahl Shlnbun. Tokyo, December 7, 1956. Also Tanaka, Naoklchl, o r . olt.. p. 2. 35 tlon to develop gradually a military establishment of Its own capable of handling all the requirements of Japanese security. "Until such forces could be developedV'»' the Ja­ panese said, they "would continue to base their security structure on the Japan-United States Security Fact, but only "for the time being"^' Prime Minister Klshl, however, was reluctant to place the prime responsibility for the na­ tion's defense on Japem, for the Constitution prohibited rearmament and radical socialists were fanatically opposed to It* however, he did wemt a more positive role for Japan In Asia In order to decrease her dependence on the United States. But neither could Prime Minister Klshl Ignore the great concern felt by American leaders over the rapid Improve­ ment of Japan's relations with Communist c o u n t r i e s , 39 since diplomatic relations with seversü. of the Eastern European nations had been restored by the Ishlbashl cabinet early In 1957, the Communist propaganda drive was now mainly aimed at mobilizing public opinion to push the cautiously indepen­ dent Klshl government towsurd a rapprochement with Communist China. When Japan considers developing better relations with Peking, every move has to be argued In Talpü , Nor cam the possible effects In Washington be Ignored. Every suggestion of Japanese co-operation with Pyong-yang Inflamed

"The Statement of the Japamese Defense Council", Ja- pam's Dlplomaoy between East etnd West. (New York 1957), p. 277. 39Kamlmura, Shlnlshl, ttbl clt.. p. 278-282. 36

South Korean opinion. Economloally, certain clear objectives emerged as Japan's Immediate and future goals. The primary aim was the maximum development of Japan's foreign trade. She hoped to develop that trade both as Intensively and extensively as possible. Certain areas absorbed most of Japan's atten­ tion. One of them was Southeast Asia, which It hoped to develop both through Its own efforts and as a partner In any American program for economic development. Japan saw her­ self playing a role of ever-Increasing Importance In the economic development and trade of Southeast Asia. A lead­ ing position there would give her peaceful access to sup­ plies of raw materials which she had fought so hard and un­ successfully to acquire by conquest. There were, however, unresolved disputes with Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia and other countries. After all, most Aslans still recalled with bitterness Japan's record of aggression. Therefore, In order to gain the more positive support of the American government for Japan's Immediate foreign policy goals, Prime Minister Klshl planned to take two ac­ tions prior to his discussion with the American president scheduled for June of 19571 The first was to restrain Japan's dealing with Communist China and thereby lessen the existing tension In her relations with anti-Communist South Korea. Through this first st$p towards a more positive com­ mitment to the Western Camp, Mr, Klshl hoped to strengthen his position In the forthcoming White House Conference with 37 the American President* He said that he had "no Intention of opening negotiations at present for establishment of dip­ lomatic ties with the Communist North Korea.Reaffirm­ ing his endorsement of the Klm-Nakamura agreements for the slmultsmeous release of detainees, the Japanese Prime Minis­ ter said on March 6 that he hoped the Korean-Japanese talks would resume soon. Although Korea and Japan had reached a tentative agree­ ment on the detainees Issue, there remained a wide gulf be­ tween bhe views of the two nations on other Issues. During the conference held between Prime Minister Klshl and the Korean envoy Kim Yon-shlk on March 29, Mr. Klshl promised to withdraw the Kubota statement that hsul angered the Kor­ eans, but was still reluctant to renounce Japan's property claims before the formal conference resumed. In fact, Japan feared that she might be laying all of her cards on the table and would have nothing left for bargaining If she withdrew her property claims against Korea prematurely. On the other hand, the Korean government reaffirmed her position of adherence to the Peace Line. It Is also understandable that both sides were reluc­ tant to resume formal negotiations without some guarantee that they would be successful. On April 3, the Korean Minister, Kim Young-shlk, said that "the present Informal talks are aimed at working out a detailed agenda which will precisely define the area to be discussed. It was re-

Japan Times. Tokyo, March 7» 1957, p. 1. 36 ported that the Japanese government waspposl tlvely engaged In an effort for an early normalization of relations between the two nations. The Japanese Rrlme Minister was consult­ ing with his Minister of Agriculture about making efforts to bring about a decision on the Peaoe Line Issue and with his Minister of Finance about the property claims Issue. As the preliminary talks did not make any noticeable progress on the Peaoe Line and Japanese property claims Issues until mid-April, only two months before his scheduled visit to the United States, Prime Minister Klshl offered to meet President Rhee In an effort to solve these unre­ solved problems through a polttlcetL summit conference. Klshl said that "If the formal talks are resume, I am will­ ing to meet President Rhee and discuss major differences be­ tween the two countries. The Japanese Prime Minister's offer was motivated by smother practlosü. necessity. Many of the previous negotia­ tion talks heul been hampered by the Inflexible position of the Korean delegation which usually received extremely limited Instructions from the home government. Since Japsm did not have emy diplomatic representatives In Seoul, this diplomacy by Instruction led to much time wasting. Direct contact between the Japanese head of state smd his Korean counterpsurt seemed to offer a shortcut to a flnsü. settle­ ment. However, although the Japanese government was eager

Hankook 11-Bo. Seoul, April 3, 1957, P. 2. 39 to settle the pending Issues, It did not want to reveal Its Impatience. Mr. Klshl warned the leaders of Korea and the United States against attempting to exploit the Korean- Japanese negotiations as a prerequisite condition of or bargaining weapon for the forthcoming United States-Japane se renegotiation of the security treaty. On April 18 Mr. Klshl questioned at a meeting of the Japanese House of Counselors Foreign Affairs Committee, said that he had no Intention, furlng his Coming visit to Washington, of asking the United States to mediate the current deadlock between Japan and South Korea. There was no doubt that the Japanese gov­ ernment wanted to reconvene formal negotiations with South Korea prior to the Prime Minister's visit to the United States In June. The next major task of Prime Minister Klshl, prior to his scheduled visit, was to reinforce Japan's goodwill diplo­ macy toward the countries In Southeast Asia and to pave the way for the expansion of Japanese economic activities In this area. Japan's growing Industries needed more raw ma­ terials as well as broader markets. Both the abundance of raw materials and the heavy population In Southeast Asia provided ideal conditions for Japanese economic development. However, much unfinished business, such as reparation prob­ lems with Indonesia and Vietnam and remaining national re­ sentment against earlier Japanese invasions hampered Japan's

Japan Times. Tokyo, April 18, 1957. 40

efforts to expand her cowercial relations.Nr. Klshi* the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit this area after the Paolflo War, met with the leaders of Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia during his two-week visit which be­ gan in late May, 1957. IXirlng his visit to these countries, Nr. Kishl noticed that the Communist Chinese threat to his neighbors was more serious than he had originally thought. As a result of his visit, therefore, Hr. Kishi felt that it was necesseiry for Japan to declare her political neutrality, thereby encouraging the threatened Asian coun­ tries to co-operate with her without any fear of Chinese retaliation. On June 2, toward the end of his trip. Prime Minister Kishi said that "Japan would stay clear of such alliance systems as SEATCt and he proposed "a neutral al- iLh, liance composed of Korea, Formosa, Japan, and Vietnam". This statement by the Japanese Prime Minister was, in a sense, an indirect answer to the leaders of the United States and Nationalist China who had allegedly proposed a new eü.- lianoe system in the Far East — often called the Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO).^^ This personal visit by

^McNally, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asia", Current History. XLIX (November 1965), P. 293, The poverty of South­ east Asia is also a principal impediment to Japanese trade in the area, and some of the aid projects are directly associated with the improvement of the production of essential raw materi­ als which may be exchauiged for Japanese manufactures. LL Japan Times. June 2, 1957. ^^NEATO is the Asian version of NATO dreamed up by Secre­ tary Dulles during the mid-1950*s. This has never materialized for various reasons, particularly beoause of the deep antago­ nism between Korea and Japan. See Korean Report, Vol. Ill, Office of Public Information, Korea 1955* p. 92-93. 41 a Japanese Prime Minister removed a great deal of the sus­ picion which these nations had felt regarding her role in the proposed Southeast Asian Development program. They no longer feared a Japanese attempt at neo-colonialism. Upon his return to Tokyo, Prime Minister Kishi hurried up the reopening of the Korean-Japanese Normalization talks. On June 11 he conferred with Kim Yu-Taik, the new Korean Minister to Japan, and agreed with him on the principles for the simultaneous release of detainees and a winding up of the preliminary talks by June l6. However, the Korean government still stubbornly insisted on the withdrawal of the Japanese property claims as a precondition for the re­ sumption of formal negotiation talks. In the face of such an unyielding stand by Korea, many high ranking officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry concluded that the resump­ tion of teJ.ks would not be possible until the Prime Minis­ ter's return from his visit to the United States, The Fu.liysuna-Kim joint communique. It was reported that, during the Prime Minister's visit to the United States at President Eisenhower's invitation, the two leaders agreed to withdraw all land combat forces from Japan by mid-August. The reason for this agreement was that with the rapid development of nuclear weapons it was no longer necessary to have a large number of standing U.S. armed forces on Japanese soil. So the Prime Minister's main con­ cern now was the early adjournment of the renegotiation of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty. Upon his return 42 from the United States, then, Mr. Kishl appointed Hr. Ish^i as Deputy Prime Minister and Hr. Fujiyama as Foreign Minis­ ter. Both men were exponents of a positive foreign policy for Japan as was the Prime Minister himself. As the Amerloan-Japan negotiations entered their major phase, the Philippines expressed her dissatisfaction with America's plan to rearm Japan. Clearly, this rearmament was arousing fear among Japan's neighbors. On July 13 the Filipino Ambassador to Japan, Pherina Neri, released a statement opposing the American policy of rearming Japan, This statement was immediately supported by South Korea. The Korean Foreign Minister also criticized Japanese trade with Communist China and the American plan to rearm Japan. Although faced by such criticisms. Prime Minister Kishi felt that Japan could not make any further concessions to Korea because of the risk of political instability at home, caused by agitating socialists who opposed a separate treaty negotiation with South Korea alone. Resentment among the opposition parties in Japan might endanger a more Important foreign policy task which lay ahead — the rene­ gotiation of the Amerlean-Japanese Security Treaty. Con­ sequently, the negotiation talks entered another stalemate. After Japan and Korea discontinued their dialogue. Nationalist China attempted to mediate between the two

^^Asahi Shinbun. July 13, 1957» p. 1. 43 disputing neighbors. On September 26 Chang Keun, the spe­ cial envoy of Generalissimo Chlang Kai-Shek, presented the Generalissimo's personal letter to the Japanese Prime Minis­ ter, offering mediation if Japan so desired. Mr. Kishi told the Chinese envoy to "wait for some time and observe a further development. On November 18, Prime Minister Kishi left Tokyo for his second trip to Southeast Asia. This trip was purportedly to re-exeunine the possibility of a Southeast Asian develop­ ment plan directed by Japan alone because the American Con­ gress had rejected the proposed American-Japanese joint economic development plan for Southeast Asia. Prior to his departure, Mr. Kishi conferred with his Ministers of Com­ merce and State, and with the Director of the Asian Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, and ordered them to attempt to settle the deadlocked issue of the property claims with South Korea by means of informal contact with the Korean delegation in Tokyo. As the American-Japanese Security Treaty talks entered their main phase, many of the high ranking officials in the American Department of State also concluded that "the rapprochement between Korea and Japan was an essential pre­ requisite for any attempt to create a more viable and effec­ tive anti-Communist system in the area." In fact, it was urgently necessary for the free world's security in the Far

^^Asahl Shinbun. September 27» 1957, P. 2. 44

East to provide a strong conventional military force against potential Communist aggression. In order to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of American land troops from Japan, a regional system that would provide a unified military strategy for Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea was imperative. Behind this shield of a conventional defense system, the United States was to support its allies with nuclear weapons which were based on the Yukyu. But the establishment of an effective multilateral security system in East Asia was considered impossiblei it could not serve its purpose even if it were created because the two important members, Korea and Japan, would not co-operate with each other in matters of common interest. In spite of the need for a defense system, there was little hope for improved relations be­ tween the two nations as long as Syngman Rhee was in power. If any settlement at all was to be made, Japan would pro­ bably have to make some concessions to Korea. Upon his return from the second Southeast Asian trip, Prime Minister Kishi hurried to settle all issues pending with South Korea, even if this meant making a major conces­ sion to her. The reason for this willingness to compromise was directly related to his economic policy in Southeast Asia. As Professor Theodore NcNelly explained, "Japan has evidently felt, if they greatly expand their economic aid and co-operation to other countries in Asia before settling

James Horly, "Japan's Security Policy in Transi­ tion", Current History. 49*3 (August 1965), p. 213. 45 with Korea, the demands of the Koreans would become even 49 more higher," Therefore, the Japauiese government indi­ rectly demonstrated its willingness to give up the Japanese property claims against Korea if Korea would be willing to come to Japanese terms on the detainees Issue. This deci­ sion by the Japanese leaders was only partially based on the belief that some kind of political bargaining was the only way to break the deadlock. The Japanese government also hoped to ease domestic political pressure in order to help the LDP in the forthcoming Diet election and to strengthen the Japanese position vis-a-vis Korea in future negotiations by bringing the fishermen back to their fami­ lies. After negotiating for a month in a preliminary session, however, the two governments finally reached an agreement on December 31» 1957. Kim, Yu-Taik, chief of the Korean Mission in Tokyo, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Fuji­ yama Aiohiro, issued a Joint Communique providing the sub­ stance of their agreements for the benefit of the forth­ coming meetings. The following is a part of the communique t The Japanese government agreed to release Koreans who had been residing in Japan prior to the end of World War II and who were being detained in the Alien Detention Camps in Japan* and the gov­ ernment of the Republic of Korea agreed to re­ patriate all Japanese fishermen detained In Ko­ rea. The Korean government also agreed to ao-

49 Theodore HcNelly, "Japan's Hole In South Asia", Cur­ rent History. 4914 (November 1965), p. 291. 46

oept the deportation of those Koreans who had Illegally entered Japan after the end of World War II. At the same time the Japanese government retracted the con­ troversial statement made on October 15* 1953* by Kubota Kaniohlro, the chief of the Japanese delegation, and with­ drew her claim to properties in Korea. As a result, the fourth round of the negotiation talks was scheduled to be held in Tokyo on April 1, 1958. These agreements were printed in the morning papers of both countries as a "Happy New Year" message. Disputes over rauatriation. The Korean-Japanese agreement to a simultaneous release of detainees on New Year's Eve was loudly welcomed not only in Seoul and Tokyo but also in the United States. The Washington Post, in its editorial, praised Prime Minister Kishi for his "decisive and wise decision" to retract the Kubota statement. On the other hand, it denounced President Bhee's pbllcy of "trade suspension as an act of stubbornness and irrationality." *3316 editorial critically questioned the legality of the "Peace Line".^^ On January 3 Nr. Kishi, in his New Year's press conference, repeated his willingness to meet the Ko­ rean president or dispatch a personal envoy to Korea for the settlement of the Peace Line issue and Korea's property

^^Korean Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry Bulletin. No. 13, (March 1958) p. 102-103. 47 claims against Japan if the Korean president so desired. President Rhee again rejected this proposal on the grounds that all pending Issues should be settled through normal diplomatic negotiations instead of through suiy hurriedly arranged political bargaining. This reiterated position of the Korean president was motivated by the fact that the Korean government could not make a concession of its only strong bargaining weapon — the Peace Line — to Japan un­ til the two nations had eorrived at satisfactory solutions for all other pending issues. Among many thorny problems, the treatment of its Ko­ rean minority was the major headache for the Japanese gov­ ernment. There were 1256 Koreans in the Japanese Aliens* Detention Camps. Of the 1256 detainees, 128 desired to be repatriated to North Korea. These 128 North Korean sym­ pathizers were accommodated in separate lodgings in the Ohmura Camp and had been registered as members of the Demm- cratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) for the last four years or since late 1953.-^^ In december 1957 the Japanese Red (hross asked the International Red Cross (IRC) to in­ tervene to help those Koreans who desired to go to North Korea to do so. The IRC promised to assist the Japanese government in resolving this controversial issue by making arrangements for the Japanese Red Cross to meet with the North Korean Red Cross for negotiations on the terms of

^^^Mltorial of Washington Post. January 3* 1958. 48 repatriation. The IRC announced that its role as mediator was Justifiable on the gprounds of the Principle of the Re­ union of Separated Families which was a part of the "Toron­ to Resolution".Since Japan was continuing her efforts to settle the problems of the Korean minority by repatri­ ating them to manpower-hungry North Korea in bulk, the South Koreans refused to comply with the PuJt/ama-Kim agree­ ment on the detainees issue. The Korean government did not submit a list of Japanese detainees in Korea until Janu­ ary 22, a month before the scheduled date for resumption of formal negotiation talks as established in the Fujyama- Kim Joint Communique of December 31» 1957. The unyielding stands of the two governments on the detainees' issue bade nothing good for the forthcoming talks. The Japanese government once again attempted to un­ tie this knot through a political compromise. Prime Minis­ ter Kishi sent his personal envoy, Mr. Yatsugl, to Presi­ dent Rhee on February 2, 1958. He delivered a personal message from Kishi to Syngman Rhee. Prime Minister Kishi emphasised the necessity of rapprochement for the common interests of the two nations. Yatsugl himself was an ardent exponent of early rapprochement. He once said in an inter­ view with a reporter from Shukan Asahi. a weekly newspaper, that t The Korean-Japanese relations should be normal­ ized while Syngman Rhee has the Presidency beoause

5jSekai (March 1958), p. 132. 49

his dessendanoe from power will entail a period of chaos and political instability in Korea. Nehruism (neutralism) is no longer appealing to Asians. The co-operation of Japan, Korea,^#nd Taiwan is important for stability in Asia.^ Mr, Yatsugl*8 opinion was widely supported by the right wing faction of the Liberal Democratic Party which was headed by Prime Minister Kishi. The envoy's trip, however, produced no tangible results other than a slight lessening of President Rhee * s personal hatred and animosity. The Japanese envoy's apologies for his country's past coloni­ alism did accomplish this purpose at least. When the final hope for a political compromise through i the envoys' visit was not realized, the Japanese government decided to take unilateral action. On February 3» Mr. Kh- rasa*a, the Minister of Justice, announced that ninety- three persons out of the 1259 Koreans just released from Japanese jails had requested to go to North Korea, and that therefore the Japanese government had no intention of repatriating these Koreans to South Korea against their will. He added that "the Japemese government would have to respect their free will on a humanitarian basis. After the Japanese government had made its stand clear, the South Korean government, as a retaliatory measure, re-

33Ibid.. p. 133. ^Mr. Yatsugl, the president of the National Pol key Re­ search Institute in Tokyo, Japan, is a close associate of Prime Minister Kishi and an ardent exponent of an early nor­ malization of relations with Korea, See Asahi Shugan (Asahi Weekly). January 26, 1958.

95 Jjapan Tiroes. February 3, 1958, p.2. 50 fused to release 422 Japanese flshensen who had completed their prison terms and were scheduled to be returned to Japan. South Korea denounced Japan's repatriation policy as the "immoral act" of selling free people to the Commu­ nist prison. The main contention of the Korean government was that Japan was responsible for the miserable living conditions of the Korean minority in Japan since they had been deprived of the opportunity to earn their living in the highly segregated Japanese society, and eventually they had become degenerate beggers or criminals out of hopelessness, In any event, when the Japanese government realized that the Korean government was not willing to release the remaining Japanese fishermen, the Japanese Foreign Ministry declared that it would not come to the scheduled negotia­ tion talks unless Korea released euLl the detained Japanese fishermen. When the Japanese government hardened its posi­ tion, the Korean government had to soften its stand because any further stubbornness by Itorea would result in the mas­ sive deportation of Koreans to North Korea. Through infor­ mal contacts the two sides reached a compromise, with the Korean government expressing its desire to resume talks and its willingness to compromise on the issue of the detainies, while the Japanese government promised to hold back on Its repatriation plan. Thus the formal talk was finally con­ vened on March 1, 1958, as it had originally been scheduled. But the Korean government did not release all of the Japanese 51 fishermen* but only those who had completed their prison terms. On March 22* Itagaki Osamu, the Director of the Asian Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry* proposed the exohamge of the Japanese detainees for the Korean cultural sœticles held in Japan, This deal was Immediately re­ jected by the Korean government on moral grounds. With shcurp disagreement from the beginning* the reopened nego­ tiation talks again dragged on without any noticeable achieve­ ment. On the other hand* it was reported that high ranking officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry agreed that the normalization of relations should come about at the earliest possible date despite the many difficulties. They pointed out the necessity of co-operation between the two nations in order to protect common interests by strengthening security against Communist expansion in the area. Throughout the summer of 1958, both Japanese and American leaders were greatly disturbed by the crisis over the Formosa Strait brought on by Communist China's bombardment of Nationalist China's outpost islands. There were some* though* who op- psed a sepsorate settlement with South Korea because it would offend North Korea and their sympathizers in Asia. Despite the positive enthusiasm of the Japanese Foreign Ministry for rapprochement with anti-Communist South Korea* the approaching general election of the Japanese Diet dis-

^ Ministry of Foreign Affairs HOK* The Official Records of Committee on Property daims (Deoember 1950). p. 25-111. See also Dona A il-Bo. March 22* 1958. 52

couraged the leaders of the ruling LDP from pushing this controversial political issue for fear their candidates would lose in the election for the Diet. On August 20I the Korean government informed Japan that the Peace Line question would not be discussed until the detainees issue was settled. The Tokyo government* on the other hand* announced its plan to submit the detainees issue to the IRC in Geneva and ask their mediation. Be­ cause of disagreement on the detainees issue* the negotia­ tion talks were suspended from late March until October 1* 1958 * when they were resumed at the initiative of the Korean government which feared Japan's dealing with North Korea. But the renewed talks did not make any progress on the deadlocked Issue. However* the Japanese Foreign Ministry suggested that the cabinet members and the leaders of the LDP reconsider the deadlocked issues and attempt to normal­ ize relations with South Korea by making a concession on the detainees issue before the new American-Japanese Security Treaty came Into effect. On November 18* the Japanese government proposed a renegotiation of the detainees issue and offered a "fisheries co-operation plan" to Korea. The essential points of the Japanese version of the proposed fisheries plan were the elimination of the Peace Line in return for Japanese tech­ nical aid to Korea in developing the Korean fishing indus­ tries and preserving marine resources along the Korean coast. But thisnplan of the Japanese government was rejected 53 by the Koreans on the grounds that the Peace Line was an indispensable fisheries boundary for conservation of scarce marine resources around the Korean coast as well as for the security of South Korea, The Korean government asked its Japanese counterpart to catrry out its obligations under the Pujiyama-Kim Agree­ ment of December 31» 1957» by repatriating all Koreans who desired to leave Japan to South Korea* then Korea would con­ sider the Japanese proposal on the fisheries issue, includ­ ing the readjustment of the Peace Line. Beoause of this disagreement on the key issue, however, the negotiations of the sub-committees did not make any noticeable progress. The Japanese chief delegate to the normalization talks sug­ gested a high level political conference — at the Foreign Minister level — for a package deal on all the pending issues. Mr. Kishi promptly approved this recommendation, but the Korean government rejected it. The proposed poli- tioail settlement was rejected by the Japanese Foreign Minis­ try itself. When the leading members of the LDP, acting under the advice of Prime Minister Kishi, planned a good­ will visit to Korea, Foreign Minister Fujiyama registered his opposition saying that "the Korean-Japanese normaliza­ tion talks should be handled by the Foreign Ministry alone. The Korean government maintained an uncompromising at- 54 tltude toward any solution until Japan would accept its proposal on the detainees issue. On February 13, 1959, the Japanese cabinet decided to resume ttpaeffatts to re­ patriate the pro-Communist Koreans to North Korea in accor- dance with their desires. This decision by the Japanese geVefkmemt was tranmitted to the IRC through the Japanese Red Cross. The International Red Cross immediately arranged contact between the Japanese Red Cross and the North Korean Bfetd Cross in Geneva. On June 10, the two nations agreed on the general terms of repatriation. South Korea sharply criticized the Japanese action and attacked the Japanese government for its "violation of the sovereign rights of South Korea by making arrangements with an illegail regime to expell Korean nationals without the consent of their legiti­ mate government in the Korean peninsula. On June 15, the Korean government ordered an all-out suspension of trade with Japan. This action by the Korean government did not hurt Japan as much as it hurt South Korea herself. Dilemma of Syngman Rhee * s anti-Japanese policy. On July 19, Mr. Ikeda replaced Mr. Kishi and became the eighth

Japanese Prime Minister. On July 3 0 , South Korea, under the instructions of President Rhee, proposed to the Japan­ ese government an unconditional reopening of negotiation talks in an effort to stop Japan from signing the Japan- North Korea Repatriation Agreement. Despite South Korea's

^^Asahi Shimbun. Deoember 12, 1958.

58, Korean ^'oreign Minister Oho Ohung-Hwan issued a special statement criticizing Jspp'^o#^ action on Korean resid­ ents, See Dong A il-Bp. June I 3 , 1959, 55 harsh denunciation, Japan and North Korea quietly continued with the final details of their negotiations, The Japanese government effectively played the two Koreas against each other to settle the troublesome issue of unwanted Korean minorities in Japan by repatriating them to manpower-hungry North Korea, Japan's dealings with North Korea over repatriation were euLso well timed since they occurred right before Japan and the United States signed their new Hutustl Security Treaty. The Japanese Socialists and Communists aligned their strength against the American-Japanese Security Pact. The entire nation was shaken by continuous mass demonstra­ tions.^® As a result of such violent public opposition, the United States was in the weakest position in its rela­ tions with Japan since the war ended. Japan's dealings with Communist North Korea were effective manipulations to counterbalance the current anti-security pact movement in Japan — by holding up an image of neutrality and indepen­ dence before the eyes of the Japanese people. Under these conditions the Korean government was naturally unsuccessful in persuading the Americeui leaders to intervene in the Japanese-North Korean negotiations and to stop Japan's plan of repatriating Korean nationals to Communist North Korea. The American government was rather sympathetic to the Ja-

%

^^Jin-Woo Yu, OP. cit.. p. 2 7 3 , ^^Takashi Hatada, o£., cit.. p. 153-158. 56 panese stand on this Issue. Firm State Department support of Japan's repatriation program helped restrain Seoul from emy rash action against the chartered Soviet ships taking repatriates across the Sea of Japan to North Korea. President Rhee once more ordered the Chief of the Ko­ rean Mission in Tokyo to propose to the Japanese government an unconditional reopening of the negotiation talks. As a result, on August 12, in Tokyo, the Koreans and Japanese once again sat across from each other at the negotiation table. The chief purpose of the Korean government was still to prevent Japan from signing an agreement with North itorea on repatriation. On the other hadd, the Japanese government was attempting to exploit her newly strengthened bargaining position to force a settlement of the remaining major issue, the fisheries dispute, by demanding that the Peace Line be withdrawn. However, this effort was unsuooesful because of the unyielding position of the Korean government. On August l4, only two days after the negotiations had resumed, Japan and North Korea signed a repatriation agreement in Geneva, After receiving this news, the Korean government lost its enthusiasm for further talks, and fruitless nego­ tiations dragged on for two more months until November 1959. Finally on Deoember 14, 1959» the first group of 975 Koreans aboard a Russian vessel left Niigata, Japan, and sailed to Chungjin, a naveO. base in North Korea. On Janu-

Dugulas Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreipai Policy (BerkeleyI University of California), 1961, p. 190. 57 ary 19, I960, the American-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty was signed in Washington. In a sense, then, the interests of the Korean minorities in Japan were sacrificed in order to effect a successful implementation of a major Japanese foreign policy task — the American-Japanese Security Pact of i9 6 0 . The failure of Syngman Rhee's attempt to stop the Ja- paneMorhh Korea Repatriation Agreement ceuae as a hard blow to both his anti-Communist and anti-Japanese policies. The deportation of Korean residents from Japan to North Korea was the first massive defection from the Free World to a Communist nation. In the Korean presidential election of March I960, the opposition party seized upon this disas­ trous foreign policy failure and domestic misrule, exploit­ ing both issues In an attempt to discredit the government. In Korea the ruling Liberal Party, headed by Syngman Rhee, had almost completely lost the support of the people because of its dictatorial measures and misrule. Several events had caused this loss of popularity. In the election held in May 1958» Rhee's Liberal Party had won only 126 seats out of 232 in spite of a great election fraud which 1 included open bribery and the support of the pro-government police force. In 1958, when the ruling Liberal Party had pushed a new National Security Act through the Korean Con­ gress, the American government had opposed its enactment because it feared the abuse of this new law as a political weapon to oppress the political activities of the opposi- 58 tlon party In the name of deoommunlzatlon.®^ Then, In the summer of 1959* when the Japanese government had attempted to repatriate unwanted Koreans in Japan to North Korea, the American government had not supported the Korean government beoause President Rhee's stubborn anti - Japanese policy did not leave any room for the Japanese government to compromise with South Korea. Economically, Rhee's emotional resentment against Japan, a strict trade barrier against the Japanese goods, and fre­ quent trade suspensions had caused South Korea great eco­ nomic loss. Despite the advantages of low priced Japanese goods and geographical proximity, Rhee, in his deliberate political retaliation against Japan, ordered more expensive commodities from more remote countries. This unrealistic economic policy was the result of the psychological animosity and stubbornness of the Korean lesulers Criticising this stubborn policy, Douglas Dillon, the United States Under Secretary of State, visiting Korea in November 1957, said that the early normalization of relations between Japan and Korea was the short out to Korean economic development and in the supreme interest of Korea, For years people had been saying that American aid had bred In South Korea an unde­ sirable degree of dependence on the United States. Now the American government began to feel that some decisive mea­ sure wasnneoessary in order to convince Rhee that Korea had

President Rhee hanged Cho Bong-Am, his rival, in Presidential election of 1956 by this National Security Act of 1958. 59 to develop a self-sustaining economy. As part of this ef­ fort the American government forced Korea to reset the dollar-Hwan conversion rate (the conversion rate between the American dollar and Koreein currency) at 1 1650 Hwan. This American action reduced the purchasing power of Amerie can aid dollars and brought direct pressure on the Korean economy, which was still heavily dependent on American financial aid. President Rhee's effort to win a fourth term as Presi­ dent caused him to rig the election of March 1 9 6O to an un­ precedented extent. As a part of its campaign strategy, the Liberal Party played upon the anti-Japanese feeling of the Korean people in order to divert their attention from domestic, political and eoonomid dissatisfaction and from the corrupt bureaucracy. President Rhee renewed his tough measures against Japanese fishing vessels. But this time his manipulation did not provoke the desired response from the people. For the first time since Korea's independence in 1948, Syngman Rhee's anti-Japanese policy was severely denounced by the opposition party as unrealistic stubborn­ ness and an attempt to disguise domestic failure. Further­ more, Rhee's strategy put American leaders in an embar- raslng position since the gradual reduction of United States forces in the Far East demanded closer co-operation of the

®^The increase of the dollar to Hwan conversion rate was always considered a yamftatiok for measuring the Korean economy. According to an Amerioem-Koresin agreement, the oon< version rate was to be readjusted when the whole sale index rose above 200 per cent in Korea. 60 free Aslan nations. The relations between Japan and South Korea became a serious concern of the American government. On March l6 , Secretary of State Hurter summoned Dr. Yang Yu-Chan, the Korean Ambassador to the United States, to the Department of State and advised that South Korea reconsider Korean- Japanese relations and take a more realistic position. Secretary Burter was known to have expressed to Dr. Yang America's great concern over the increased arrests of Japanese fishing vessels by Korean patrol boats, and told him that the United States would not tolerate a further de­ terioration of the relationship between the two nations. It was also reported that the American government was ex­ tremely unhappy about the rigged Korean presidential elec­ tion which had been held on the previous day. President Hhee's appeals to the Korean people to reject American in­ terference in Korean domestic affairs had not been well ac­ cepted by the Korean people. As a consequence of America's political and economic pressure and the attack of the opposition party, Syngman Hhee's government gradually eased the restrictions on Korean-Japanese trade. The Japanese government also asked South Korea to resume the simultaneous release of the de­ tainees still in the Pusan and Omura camps and to resume trade as well. Since the troublesome American-Japemese

^^Washington Post. March l6 , I960, p. 4. 61

Security Treaty had been signed In January, the Japanese government was now ready for its next major foreign policy task — the normalization of relations with South Korea. Through informal contacts between the Japanese Foreign Mi­ nistry and the Korean Mission in Tokyo, the two sides fi­ nally agreed to resume negotiation talks on April 15, I960, The new negotiation talks lasted only four days, however, for on April 19 Syhgman Rhee's twelve year old regime was finally toppled by the Student Revolution.

^^Washlngton earned popular respect in both Japan and South Korea by its sympathetic attitude toward the mass up­ rising that swept Rhee's regime from power in April I960, See Dong A 11-Bo. April 22, I960* Japan Times. April 27, I960, p. 2. 62

CHAPTER III

AMERICA'S NEW FAR EASTERN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON KOREA AND JAPAN

A series of polltioal and social changes in Korea and Japan, as well as the international environment surrounding

these two nations, made the year 1 9 6 O a watershed in the history of intemational affairs in Asia. In Korea, Presi­ dent Rhee, a dictatorial leader and a symbol of the anti­ communist, anti-Japanese policy, had been overthrown. Until

April i9 6 0 , the hostility of the Korean president had vir­ tually doomed a series of negotiations and had tended to overshadow all other considerations. His policies had also increased the deep feelings of distrust and antipathy with which the people of these two countries generally regarded each other.^ After Rhee's overthrow, a more moderate and positive attitude was evident in Korean government circles. The new government of the Democratic Party, headed by Pre­ mier John M. Chiang, was more liberal and co-operative with Japan and enjoyed the strong support of the United States. On the other hand, as a result of the new security treaty signed in January of i9 6 0 , Japan had entered into a new phase of American-Japanese co-operation with a greater voice in Asian affairs as well as in her relationship with the United States. The old security pact hsid been replaced

^For a detailed discussion of President Rhee's anti- Japanese policy, see Mark J. Mobius, "The Korean Press and Public Opinion," Journalism Quarterly. 4 2 14 (Autumn, 1965), R85'* 63 by the new "U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty" with spe­ cial emphasis on the word "MutualUnder the new system Japan was to obtain a greater degree of independence in matters concerning her security and economy by developing her own national capabilities. The United States had pledged to actively support this effort of the Japanese government. In return, the Japanese were to play a more positive role in promoting the welfare of free Asia, there­ by helping to lessen America's military and economic burden in Asia. However, far away from both Korea and Japan, more in­ fluential changes were being made in America's global stra­ tegy. These changes and a re-evaluation of American foreign policy were the outcome of America's effort to readjust her­ self to a new domestic and international environment. In this process both Korea and Japan, closely tied to the Uni­ ted States in economic and security matters, were profoundly affected by the sp.tered American policy in Asia.

I. THE NATURE OP THE U.S.-JAPANESE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF I960

The new American-Japanese Security Treaty signed in January I960 reflected two outstanding problems of Çhe Uni-

^Kamimura Shi ni chi, SQgo Kroryjaiat Anzen JoyàkU Kalsetsu.(Illustration of the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between Japan and the United States). Tokyoi jijl €em#hWi#hya #s#p4amSè» Pv see ai#m- UçS.-Japanese Joint Communique issued after Hakone confer­ ence on November 3» 1961, Asahi shimbun. November 4, 1961, P. 1. 64 ted States In Its domestic and foreign policy — the so called "dollar deficit" problem caused by foreign aid and a new challenge to America's military concept of "nuclear deterrence". The re-evaluation of U.S. foreign aid. Economically, the growing problem of the beü.ance of payments and in­ creased criticism of foreign aid at home had forced the American government to take drastic measures to reduce for­ eign spending. In recent years, the general bsdance of foreign pay­ ments had been steekly but showed an annual balance deficit of three to four billion dollars, an amount equivalent to the American aid rendered to free nations. With the advent of the Kennedy administration, a new foreign aid program was proposed by the White House, and in September I96I it was translated into a congressional act called the "Foreign Aid Act of 1 9 6 1 . The purpose of the new foreign aid pro­ gram was to encourage reform and the development of a self- sufficient economic foundation in the recipient nations. A great portion of American foreign aid was changed from free grants to long-term development loans administered by the newly organized Agency for International Development (AID). It was hoped that these loans would stimulate the initiative and responsibility of the recipients.

^Herbert Peis, Foreign Aid and Diulomaoy. New York (March, 1964), p. 71-7fe. See also President Kennedy's spe- cietl messager^titled Urgent ^tionaû. Needs. Washington 1 Government Printing Office (March 1961), p. 3. 65

As a oonaequenoei United States aid to South Korea was greatly reduced. On November l6, 196Of the American Govern­ ment Informed Korea of this change — from grants to long­ term development loans. This policy change darkened the future of Korean economy, which was heavily dependent on A American aid. Already the dollar to Korean Ewan conversion rate had changed from 1 165OW In January to 1 ilOOOW In Oc­ tober i9 6 0 , and again to I 1I3OOW In February 1961. In ef­ fect, the Increase in the dollar to Korean Hwan conversion rate reduced purchasing power of Korea's aid money by twenty- five million dollars per yearUnder the new foreign aid bill, U.S. aid to Korea In 1962 was only seventy-five mil­ lion dollars, or one-half that of the previous year. Furthermore, the Japanese economy eü.so suffered a great deal from a number of restrictive American economic measures. The "Buy American" and "Ship American" policy and other various trade restrictions imposed by the Ameri­ can government led to an additional economic problem for Japan, who was already suffering from a trade Imbalance problem with the United States. From as early as 1957 on, the Japanese government had faced serious economic prob­ lems resulting from overgrowth and depression. In 1957, Japan had Imported $230 million more than whe had exported, and $860 million more In 196I. Thus, Japan showed a serious

^Korean Productivity Center, Dlrectlonsand Background of Korean-Japan Eoonomlo Cooperation. (Seoul, 1961), p. 06-97, 66 deficit in her balance of payments and a nerve-racking drop in her foreign currency reserves, because the suction of her too rapidly expanding economy pulled in far more im­ ports than could be matched by the flow of exports.^ In addition, the American government had repeatedly urged Japan to assume a greater share of the responsibility for the se- curit and economic development of the free Aslan countries. The strategy of flexible response. Militarily, the intensification of unconventional warfare as well as the emergence of guerrilla wars denominated "wars of national liberation" had forced American leaders to re-evaluate their strategic concepts and provide a more flexible means of de­ terrence to meet this new challenge. The answer to the new challenge was the "strategy of flexible response" which was a combination of three types of warfare -- conventional, guerrilla and nuclear.^ The thinly spread American mili­ tary forces around the world had proved Inadequate to the new challenge. In addition, the stationing of great num­ bers of American forces on foreign soil had not only caused an economic over-burden but also provoked nationalistic antagonism which frequently became a source of embarrass­ ment to the American government. In short, the burden of America's military and economic commitments was growing be-

^"A Sun Still Rises " The Economist (March, 1962), p. 786. ^Raymond Aron, The Great Debate. (New York: Double Day & Co., 1965), p . ^9. 67 yond her capacity in the early 1960*8, Under these circum­ stances, American leaders were attempting to find a more viable and effective system of regional co-operation in Asia. The first concrete attemt in this direction had been xpade in the renewed American-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty of 1960."^ According to the new American military strategy which was disclosed in 1962, any future contingency of conventional warfare in East Asia was to be met by the unified armed forces of six hundred thousand troops from Korea, five hun­ dred thousand from Nationalist China, and 270 Japanese pe- fense forces. In case of a nuclear attack, the American nuclear forces on Guam and at other Pacific bases were to

Û respond. For the successful execution of this unified ac­ tion closer co-operation between South Korea and Japan was the most urgent prerequisite condition. South Korea had the strongest land troops in Asia, whereas Japan was the most highly developed industrial nation in the area. For­ tunately, the overthrow of the stubborn dictator of South Korea and the advent of a more liberal Korean regime pro­ vided a favorable opportunity for reconciliation between the two countries. Already In late I960, Influential Ja­ panese political leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic

^William P. Bundy, "U.S.-Japanese Trends and Prospects," Department of State Bulletin. LJII (October 11, 1965), P. 770-777. Q James W. Morley, "Japan's Security Policy in Transi­ tion," Current History. 46"2 (April 1964), p. 215. 68 party, including former Prime Minister Kishi and ex-For- elgn Minister Ishii, had organized a special policy advi­ sory committee called "The Discussion Committee on Korean- Japanese Relations'.’^ which had Initiated a positive effort at normalizing relations with South Korea,

II. THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN POLICY CHANGE ON KOREAN-JAPAN RELATIONS

Because of this new American foreign policy, especially her changed foreign aid policy, the Korean leaders were now convinced of the necessity of building up a self-supporting economy that would free Korea from American aid. The new situation dictated an expansion of trade with developing nations, and most particularly, economic co-operation with her neighbor Japan. Unlike the previous regime, the interim government of Huh-Chung ranked the early normalization of diplomatic re­ lations and economic co-operation with Japan as the top priority in the nation's foreign policy. Realizing the friendly attitude of the new Korean regime, the Japanese government asked for the establishment of a Japanese diplo­ matic mission in Seoul for future negotiations. However, instead of accepting the Japanese proposal outright, the Korean government gave permission for Japanese reporters to enter Korea for the purpose of gathering necessary informa-

9 "Korean Political Instability and Korean-Japanese Re­ lations," Sekai (June, 1963 ), p. 46. 69 tlon. On Hay 17, i9 6 0, fifteen Japanese reporters visited Korea for the first time since 1945. The next few months brought a rapid succession of encouraging events. Premier John M. Chiang and the Second Republic regime announced on August 21, during a press conference, that the new govern­ ment's utmost concern was "economic reconstruction and nor­ malization of relations" with J a p a n . on September 2, the Korean Foreign Minister, Dr. Chung I. Hyung, issued a statement announcing a full resumption of trade with Japan. On September 6, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Kosaka, visited Korea. He was the first Japanese Foreign Minister to visit that country since World War II. A week later the first eight-man Japanese economic mission, headed by Mimoto Kotsuke, visited Korea to examine Korean Industries in order to study the feasibility of investments. Meanwhile, the Japanese mission in Tokyo had contacted the Tokyo government for the purpose of resuming negotiation talks.

Finally, on October 25, i9 6 0 , the preliminary talks preceding the fifth round of negotiation talks were opened in Tokyo. The main negotiation talks had had to be post­ poned until the November general election for the Japanese Diet. Unfortunately the feelings typical of the anti- security pact movement still prevailed in Japan, and the ne­ gotiation talks with South Korea became a new target for the opposition parties. Aware of public sentiment. Prime Mlnis-

10Dong A 11-Bo. August 21, 1961, p. 1. 70 ter Ikoda, speaking before the Japanese Diet, said that "the Japanese government Is proceeding with the Korean- Japanese negotiation talks on the premise that there are two Korean governments on the peninsula.The Prime Mi­ nister's statement was intended to soothe the alarmed feel­ ings of the Communists and Socialists. Nonetheless, the leaders of the Japanese Socialists and Communists warned the Japanese government against entering any new military commitment with South Korea by signing another separate treaty with that pro-Western nation, thereby offending North Korea, one of the Socialist countries of Asia. Despite the hesitant attitude of the Japanese govern­ ment, South Korea's Democratic Party government was pre­ pared to settle all pending issues through political deals. Furthermore, the Korean government was impatiently eager to expand its trade relations and economic co-operation with Japan, even on a private basis, in order to develop the nation's economy by attracting private Japanese capital and technicalxknow-how. On January 22, I96I , during a press conference. Premier Chiang indicated that the Korean govern­ ment was willing to allow the inflow of the Japanese pri­ vate capital investment even before the normalization of diplomatic relations. This JiJprean policy was interpreted as a direct result of the changed Amerloeui aid policy under

See Ikeda's statements to the Foreign Relations Com­ mittee of the House of Representatives In Asahl Shimbun. August 2 9 , 1 9 6 2 . 71 which aid to Korea was expected to he reduced year by year. Then, on February 9, 1961, Korea and the United States signed a new Economic Aid Agreement, which provided detailed guiding principles for future American aid to Korea, and stipulated the conditions under which aid would be given.^^ The Korean Congress adopted a resolution demahding a re-évaluâtIon of the American aid policy toward South Korea. It recommended the development of key Industries as long­ term investments rather than short-term consumption Indus­ tries. Responding to the aspirations of the Korean people, Hr. Moyer, the director of the United States Operation Mis­ sion to Korea (USOM), promised the Korean government that the U.S. government would support the Korean government in developing a foundation for long-term economic development with an aim at achieving a self-standing economy. As part of Its plan for national reconstruction, the new Korean government attempted to mobilize idle domestic capital by confiscating the Illegal fortunes of big business corpora­ tions who had accumulated their wealth by means of politi­ cal ties with the corrupt regime of Syngman Rhee. And on April 10, the Korean Congress passed the "Illegal Fortunes Confiscation Act".^^ In addition, the rapid Industrlall-

^^The Joint U.S.-Korean Economic Coordination Committee is equivalent to the U.S.-Japanese Committee for Trade and Economy organized as a working organ of the new U.S.-Japanese security pact in November 1961. John M. Chiang*s government attempted to mobilize Idle domestic capital for productive Industries by confiscating some property ammassed by businessmen by Illegal means under the defunct Rhee regime. 72 zation of Korea required positive Japanese economic oo-oper­ ation. Realizing this fact, the United States assumed an active role as mediator to help bring about an early ra­ pprochement between the two Aslan Allies. For a while It seemed that real progress was being made. On Jiay 6, 1961, a group of Japanese congres»!onal leaders and some junior Japanese Foreign Ministry officials Includ­ ing Isekl, the director of the Aslan Bureau of Japanese For­ eign Ministry, visited Korea on a goodwill mission. Then, on May 8, Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda Invited Korean Prime Minister Chiang to come to Japan on a state visit. And on May 14, the Japanese government announced its policy toward South Korea, Including a proposal to trade Korea's property claims for a certain amount of Japanese economic aid In the form of a free grant. However, like the earlier attempts at negotiation talks, the fifth round came to a dramatic halt -- this time the Korean-Japanese meetings were inter­ rupted by a military coup d *etat in Korea on May l6, 1961, just four days after the Japanese congressional leaders had returned to Tokyo, The Korean military coup and the five year economic plan. The Korean military coup d*etat of May 196I marked another turning point in Korea's interneuL and external af­ fairs. The initial reaction In Washington and Tokyo was confusion and surprise. However, the American government gradually changed Its attitude and began to take It for granted. The leaders of the Korean Military Junta soon 73

accomplished their initial revolutionary gosLls of strength­ ening the national security, eliminating graft and corrup­ tion, and making various plans for national reconstruction.

However, the main concern of the military Junta was to launch a long-term economic development program, for the fundamental cause of the social insecurity and polltlceQ. In­ stability of South Korea was an economic problem. The Ko­ rean leaders were convinced that, in spite of the great en­ thusiasm of the Korean people, there was no real hope for progress unless the nation's economy were improved. In par­ ticular, they felt that it was necessary to create jobs for

Korea's highly educated intellectuals who were poverty- stricken because they were so often unemployed

Despite some noticeable achievements In restoring social stability and in putting through government reforms, the

Korean military leaders were anxiously awaiting America's formal recognition of the Korean Junta. Furthermore, a more flexible and open-minded image of post-revolutionary

Korea was necessary for the expansion of her diplomacy and trade with other nations. The much desired long-term eco­ nomic development program also required a re-orlentat1on of the nation's diplomacy.

Acting on this premise, the military government organ­ ized five goodwill missions to be dispatched to the five continents to explain that the military coup had been inevi-

^^Park Chung-Hee, Our Nation's Path, (Seoul: Dong A Publishing CO., 1962), p. 22-25. 74 table and to win world-wide support for the new Korean military junta and its national reconstruction plan. On July 4, the first of five goodwill missions, headed by re­ tired General Choi Duk-Shin, an ex-ambassador to Vietnam, arrived in Tokyo and visited Prime Minister Ikeda. General Choi delivered a personal letter from General Park, asking for an early resumption of the normalization talks. But the Japanese leaders still doubted the viability of the Korean military Junta, The Japanese government observed the atti­ tude of the Washington government toward the Korean mili­ tary junta. On July 27# 1961, after two months of hesita­ tion, Secretary Rusk announced America's willingness to support the Junta's national reconstruction plan.^^ On August 12, General Park Chung-Hee also issued a statement promising the transfer of government power to civilians by

Auguse 1963. These two developments in Korea assured the Japanese of the stability of South Korea's military govern­ ment. While the Japanese leaders were still hesitating about making any concrete commitment to South Korea's military government, the American officials in Seoul and Tokyo were quietly exerting themselves to convince the Japanese govern­ ment of the viability of the Korean military regime. Dr. Reischawer, the American Ambassador to Japan, frequently conferred with high ranking Japanese Foreign Ministry off 1-

^5Washington Post, July 29, 1961. 75 cials, keeping them Informed of American opinions,The Japanese government also wished to examine the official standing of the Korean government on major issues before any formal opening of the sixth round of negotiation talks. In early September, Kim Yu-Taik, the Korean Minister of the Economic Planning Board was invited to Tokyo to con­ fer with leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party and leading Japanese businessmen. At this meeting, Japan's main con­ cern was to examine Korea's stand on the Peace Line and to determine the amount of Korea's property claims against Ja­ pan.1? Through General Choi's goodwill mission and Minister Kim's personal visit to Japan, both sides reached the con­ clusion that future talks would be productive and success­ ful. Finally, on October 20, 1961, exactly ten years after the first Korean-Japanese meeting held'in 1951» the sixth round of the formal negotiation talks opened in Tokyo, A thorough understanding of the negotiations that fol­ lowed demands a good knowledge of the economic situations of both Korea and Japan at that time. A somewhat detailed discussion of Korea's Five Year Plan and of Japan's new economic policies seems in order, then.

^ For the role of American ambassadors as behind the scene mediators in Korea and Japan, see "The Japanese-Korean Normalization Process and anti-Americanism," Asian Survey. (February, 1966), p. 244-245. l^Hinister Kim Yu-Taik reportedly explained the major projects of Korea's Five Yeeur Economic Program to the Japam- ese leaders and invited Japanewe capital. See Asahi Shimbun. September 3 and 7» 1961. 76

since the end of World War II, Korea had received more than five billion dollars worth of American military and economic aid under various programs, including GARIOA, the Foreign Assistant Act and, later, the Mutual Security

Act (MSA). However, American foreign aid to Korea had not make any substantial contribution to the formation of capi­ tal or to authentic economic development. Rather, it had been effective in alleviating a temporary economic crisis and in maintaining Korea's military security. An American economic specialist once asserted that "American aid in Ko­ rea should be considered as defense aid rather than economic aid," and said that it was no more than a temporary measure to relieve part of the unemployment in Korea.

In addition to ineffective American aid, the autocratic rule of Syngman Rhee was also responsible for Korean economic difficulties and bureaucratic corruption, as were opportu­ nistic Korean businessmen as well. Constant inflation dis­ couraged bank deposits, and investmen was concentrated in real estate. For example, from 1954 to 1955 the price index of consumer goods went up eighty per cent. Korean agri­ cultural products, upon which sixty-five per cent of her population depends, comprised only thirty-one per cent of her gross national product in 1961. Korea's agricultural products were barely enough to keep her from famine. And,

iSp.B. Simson, A Study on Korean Economic Development Plan quoted on p. 193 by Sung-Yu Hong, ^ Study on U.S. For­ eign Aid to Korea. Seoul, 1963. 77

although Korea Is surrounded by water on three sides. Inade­ quate fishing equipment and facilities had kept her fishing industry poor. As a matter of fact, one million of her fishing population were not even free from the threat of starvation since their per capita annual income was only twenty-seven dollars up until 1961

These poor economic conditions were the first and most urgent target of the revolutionary government, which publically pledged economic reconstruction as one of the main tasks of the military revolution. Consequently an ambitious Five Year Economic Development Plan was drawn up late in I 9 6 I . Under this plan, the Korean government hoped to develop key industries such as fertilizer plants, power plants, and cement factories, as well as the mining and fishing industries by means of massive foreign investments and loans. The first Five Yeenr Plan was formally announced in February 1962. The Korean government hoped to attract

2,4 billion dolleoi's from overseas in the form of either

Joint investments or government and private loans. Of this sum, Korea expected 1,1 billion dollars from the United

States over a four year period beginning with 1962 and the remaining 1.3 billion dollars primarily from Japan and in­ dustrialized Western nations such as West Germany, Italy, and France. Clearly, economic co-operation with Japan

^^Korean Information Service, Han Kook Soshik (News from K o r e a ). Seoul (April 1965)» p. 9.

20 Korean Productivity Center, op. cit., p. 134. 78 was an Important factor that would decide the outcome of this first Five Year Economic Plan since Japanese capital goods are cheaper than others and the geographiceOL propinquity of the highly developed Japanese industry promised Korea many advantages. However, the Japanese government was extremely cau­ tious in dealing with the new Korean regime. Consequently the expected economic co-operation with Japan was delayed and the Korean military leaders became impatient in the face of ever worsening economic conditions. Deprived of their > hope for massive foreign investment as well as of Japan's payment for Korea's property claims, the Korean leaders now r decided to carry out the Five Year Economic Development Plan by mobilizing idle domestic capital and by obtaining special American aid. They attempted to develop major industries by means of a tightly controlled economic policy. For the mobilization of idle domestic capitsü. two measures were attempted — a currency reform and the confiscation of property from leading businessmen who had illegally ammased their wealth under the corrupt previous regimes. But this coercive measure soon resulted in a seriew of eco­ nomic setbacks. During the spring and summer of 1962, the failure of this initial economic policy disrupted normal economic activity and created great tension in the nation's

Princeton N. Lyman, "Economic Development in South Korea, Prospects and Problem," Asian Survey (July 1966), p. 382-383. 79 economy,22 Consequently, after this initial bitter experience, the Korean leaders soon turned to a more moderate alterna­ tive measure. Since foreign investment was the key to the successful implementation of the first Five Yesir Economic Plan, the Korean government reformed the nation's foreign policy by placing great emphasis on economic diplomacy in the hope of attracting foreign capital to Korea. Ikeda'8 double income policy and the Hakone Conference. Korea was not the only Asian country with economic problems. Japan, too, found herself facing difficulties caused by the change in American policy. Prime Minister Ikeda, who had succeeded Kishi after his resignation during the second security pact crisis, followed closely the three established principles of Japanese diplomacy. These three principles were co-operation with the free nations, a United Nations- centered diplomacy, and co-operation with the Afro-Asian nations. Although the latter two principles are virtually inconsistent, the first one had been as closely followed by Prime Minister Ikeda as by his predecessors. The basic rea­ son for Japan's close adherence to the West was her concern for her economic interests and her security. The volume of trade between Japan and other advanced industrial countries, which had been expanding rapidly in recent years, made it quite impcssible for her to separate herself from the West,

Robert A. Scslepino, "Which Route for Korea?", Asian Survey (September 1962), p. 1-13. 60 particularly from the United States. In addition, Japan depended greatly on the united States for defense, since economizing on military expenditures promoted her high rate of economic growth.^3 When Ikeda succeeded Kishi, his primary task was to implement Japan's obligations under the new Amer lean-Japanese Security Treaty. According to the Mew pact, Japan was gra­ dually to take over the burden of Japanese security from the American people. At present, however, Japan could not assume any meaningful share of the total defense expendi­ ture without seriously damaging her economic growth and draining her national resources. In addition, the growing desire of the Japanese people, both left and right, for an automomius diplomacy required stronger economic power. These factors were the major motives of Ikeda's "Double In­ come Policy", launched in early 1960.^^ Two things were essential to the rapid growth of the Japanese economyi access to greater capital for expanded investment and larger markets for Japsuiese goods. The world economic trend, however, was developing against her inter­ ests: the compartmentalization of the world economy on re-

^3gaburo Hayashi, "Autonomous Diplomacy and Defense," Keizai Oral. (January 1964), p. 18-26. James W. Morley, 0£. cit., p. 215. Mr. Morley says that "if Japan is successful in doubling its per capita in­ come by 1970 as planned.. .continued economic growth would seem to make possible a gradual, but significant and con­ tinuing expansion of expenditures for her defense," 81 glonal bases had narrowed the market for Japanese goodsi and the United States, her major source of capital, was suf­ fering from a money deficit problem. As a remedy for the first difficulty, Japan hoped to negotiate with Western industrial nations for membership in the GATT thereby hur­ dling the barrier of European markets. However, Japan's export trade with Western Europe had natural limitations because these nations were also producers of high quality commodities. Therefore, in the early I960's, the solution to Japanese problems seemed to lie in expanded economic relations with Southeast Asian countries as well as with free nations in the Far East. The major problem with South­ east Asian countries was their lack of purchasing power, since most of these oountries still produce primary com­ modities and have very little to export to Japan except rice, which Japan does not need. Therefore, the question of how to develop this area was an urgent problem.Since such a program requires a great suaount of extra capital, Japan had to compromise with the United States, which was also interested in developing this area, though more for political and strategic reasons than for economic ones. This was the partial purpose of Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to Washington and his discussion with President Ken­ nedy in June I96I. In their joint communique, the American

^^Yolohi Ztaf9k^j "Guldlines for Japan's Southeast Asian Policies," The Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan (Autumn 1963), p. 117. 82

president assured Japan of his positive support for her new policy In return for the Prime Minister's pledge of more ac­ tive co-operation with the United States in Asia. It was apparent that it was especially to Japan's benefit to co­ operate with the United States in helping Korea. Notoonly was this latter country near Japan, but she also had a plentiful supply of highly educated and skillful manpower.

A combination of Japanese capital and technical know-how with cheap Korean Labor would lower production costs, bene- fitting Japan in her search for other markets.And heavily populated South Korea also promised to provide a great market for Japanese goods. Nor were Japanese busi­ nessmen with long experience in Korean markets unaware of the desirability of better trade relations with that coun­ try ; in fact, after the overthrow of Rhee's regime, many of these businessmen had begun to bring pressure to bear on the government for an early normalization of relations with South Korea. Both Korean government and Korean busi­ ness officials responded favorably to these efforts by the

Japanese businessmen, for they were eager to introduce into

Korea capital and technical know-how from advanced mations in order to further their ambitious Five Year Economic De­ velopment Plan, However, Korea's domestic political situa­ tion prevented co-operation between the two nations.

Korean Productivity Center, Direction and Background of Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation, Seoul, August, 19^5i p. 252. 83

As the economic problems besetting both the United States and Japan grew aouter, the two nations held an economic con­ ference to seek a way of mutual help beginning November 2,

1961, At this meeting in Hakone, Japan, the Japanese gov­ ernment reportedly requested increased exports to the United

States and other areas in order to realize Japan's "National

Income Doubling Plan", so that she could effectively main­ tain her economic growth and political stability. To back up their demands, the Japanese pointed out that "public opinion within Japan called for the opening of commercial trade with the Communist bloc, especially with China.

But the United States expressing her sympathy indicated her difficulty in allowing further Japanese export to the

United States because of her own financial |>roblems. The

United States reportedly explained that the healthy economy of the United States was vltsü. to the stability of world trade and the security of the free world.

Since the United States had little room for more Ja­ panese goods, her government suggested an alternative meas­ ure as a solution. As later disclosed in the report pre­ pared by Senate Democratic Leader Mansfield, the American delegates pledged their support to "Japan to develop mar­ kets in her neighboring nations and Southeast Asian nations, since the United States can not remove the barrier of tar-

^7Park Chung Hee, o£. oit. . See also Yomiuri Shimbun, (November 4, 196I), p. 2. 84

Iffs against Japan, although Japan's balance of payments in respect to the United States is adverse."^®

After the conference the American delegation, led by

Secretary Dean Rusk, visited Korea and confirred with Gen­ eral Park and his financial, economic, and defense cabinet members at the Presidential Residence. During the meeting

Secretary Rusk reportedly urged the Korean government to make an effort to normalize relations with Japan and develop the Korean economy through Japanese-Korean economic co-opera­ tion. He reiterated the American pledge of continuous Amer­ ican aid for Korea's defense expenditures and economic de­ velopment until she developed a self-sufficient economy.

Mr. Rusk is also known to have discussed General Park's scheduled visit to meet President Kennedy in mid-November.^9

While the American-Japanese economic conference was be­ ing held in Hakone, Prime Minister Ikeda abruptly sent his special envoy to Korea. On November 2, Sugi Michisuke, the chief Japanese delegate visited General Park, the chairman of the Korean military junta, and delivered the personal letter of Prime Minister Ikeda inviting General Park to visit Japan on his way to the United States. Through a per­ sonal letter and envoy, Prime Minister Ikeda expressed his opinion on the future settlement. The purpose of Sukimit-

^®Ibld.

^^Han Kook il-Bo, (November 4, 1961), p. 1. 85

sugi's visit to Korea was to pave the way for high level

political talks between the two countries. On November 12,

President Park visited Japan as a state guest. Prime Minis­

ter Ikeda personally came out to Haneda International Air­

port to meet the visiting Korean military leader. The two leaders discussed a wide range of problems involving common

interests. They both agreed on the necessity for an early rapprochement and close co-operation for the security and economic development of the two nations. In connection with

the Korean property claims, they agreed to confine the claims

to items that were recognizable by documents. The overall mood of the discussion between the two leaders was co-opera­

tive and positive.

In the press conference following the summit meeting,

General Park said that there was nothing that could not be worked out if the two sides sat together and discussed frank­ ly. He also make it clear that the Korean government had no

intention of asking for the property claims as war repaira-

tions, but was rather confining the claims to those that

had a legal basis, "If the Japanese government was willing

to show a sincerity in the property claims issue," he added,

then "the Korean government would be willing to bargain po­ litically over the property claims and fisheries boundary.

^^Asahi Shimbun. November 3, 1961, p. 1. Dong A il-Bo. November 4,1961, p . 1. Editorial in Asahi Shimbun, November l4, 1961, p. 1. 86

CHAPTER IV

A NEW PHASE IN THE KOREAN-JAPANESE TALKS

I. AMERICA'S POSITIVE MEDIATION

Kennedy-Park joint communique. On November 14, General

Park arrived at Dulles Airport and was received by Vice

President Johnson as a state guest. General Park met a number of high ranking American officials, including Secre­ tary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and President Kennedy. In a joint communique. Issued after the White House meeting be­ tween the two leaders, President Kennedy indicated a con­ tinuation of American economic and military aid for the se­ curity and economic development of South Korea. The Ameri­ can president also encouraged Korea to make an effort at national reconstruction. In return, General Park, the chairman of SCNR, promised to transfer the power of the government into civilian hands and to continuously co-oper­ ate with the United States in their common Interest. The

American President expressed his sincere hope for an early normalization of the relations between Korea and Japan,^

Through these political initiatives on the part of

Washington and Tokyo, the negotiation talks were resumed the following February after a winter recess. In the newly resumed sixth round of the negotiation talks, technical and substantial negotiations were carried out by five sub-

^Washington Post, November 17, 1961, 87

committees set up according to subject issues. It was re­ ported that in the property claims committee, the Korean demand of seven hundred million dollars was countered by a

Japanese proposal of seventy million. Since on the major is­ sues of the negotiation talks, the two nations seemed sep­ arated by such a wide gap, both negotiation teams advised their home governments to attempt to untie this diplomatic knot by means of political bargaining, It seemed now that only a political solution could resolve the deadlock.

On February 21, Colonel Kim Chong-Pil, the chief brain of the military junta, returning from his Southeast Asian trip stopped at Tokyo and conferred with Japanese leaders,

Including Prime Minister Ikeda and Foreign Minister Kosaka,

The men agreed after their long talks to settle all pending issues in high level political talks by arranging a For­ eign Ministers'conference for the earliest possible date.

Tentatively the date was set for early March. His trip to

Tokyo was allegedly for the purpose of elaborating on the contents of the discussion between the Prime Minister and

General Park during the previous November. As had been in­ dicated by General Park in Tokyo, the Korean government was

"willing to reconsider the Peace Line issue if Japan offered acceptable terms for Korea's property claims and economic p co-oceration."

^Asahl Shimbun. editorial of November 14, 1961. See also "General Park's Thirty-hour Stay in Japan", Sekai. January, 1962. 88

The Korean government's proposal was the reflection of

the Impatience of Korean leaders who were eager for an early

normalization of relations with Japan in order to gain eco­ nomic support from her. In addition, the growing tension in

Southeast Asia, the gradual shifting of America's military attention toward Southeast Asia, and the subsequent power vacuum in Northeast Asia had aroused genuine fear in the hearts of Korean Leaders. From March 10 to 13, high level

American military and diplomatic officials met at Manila for a series of conferences under the co-chairmanship of

President Kennedy's special envoys, Mr. Averell Harriman and Mr. Chester Bowles. After the three day meeting, Mr.

Harriman and Mr. Bowles visited both Korea and Japan and urged both nations to try for "early normalization of re­ lations and closer co-operation for the free world's secur­

ity and common economic interests, Mr. Harriman's party made a stop in Tokyo on its way to Korea and conferred with

Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Ikeda, Foreign

Minister Ohira, and the Director of Self-Defense Forces.

They discussed Far Eastern security problems.

The Foreign Ministers * conference. On March 12,

Korean Foreign Minister Choi Duk-Shln, conferred with

Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda, delivering a personal mes­

sage from General Park, General Park had expressed his de­

sire to wind up the ten-year-old negotiation talks by set-

^Dong A 11-Bo. March l 6 , 1962, 89

tllng all pending issues through "a package deal" in a po­ litical compromise. They discussed the property issue and

the question of the fisheries boundaries. On March 15» the

first Foreign Minister level political talk opened in Tokyo.

As soon as March l 6 , a tentative agreement was made between

the Korean Foreign Minister, Choi Duk-Shin and Ohira Masa­

yoshi, the Japanese Foreign Minister, to submit a package

proposal made by both sides, including the fisheries issue,

in the forthcoming talks,

In spite of America's ardent desire to see an early

rapprochement between her two allies, followed by closer co­

operation, the Foreign Ministers * conference made almost no

progress. There was still a wide gap between the two nations

on the property claims issue. It was reported in Tokyo that

the Japanese government had informally offered a three hun­ dred million dollar free grant including fifty million in

pure property claims. In return the Korean government made a counter proposal of five hundred million dollars including

a free grant and long-term loans.^ Furthermore, the Japanese

government claimed that Korea's property claims should be

limited to south of the 38th parallel, whereas the Korean

government insisted that South Korea was the only legiti­ mate government on the peninsula and should be able to make

claims for all of Korea. In addition, the Japanese govern-

Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 1962, See also Misao Obota's article in Sekai. November 1961, p. 28-35* "Skepticism on Japan's Talks with South Korea." 90 ment also differed in opinion with South Korea on the in­ terpretation of Article 4 of the ^ n Francisco Peace Treaty. ^ Article 4 says in part that “Korea's right for property claims against Japan was mutually cancelled to a certain extent hy the Japanese property left in Korea by the Japanese people at the time of surrender in August 194-5." The Ja­ panese government interpreted the words "to a certain extent" as "substsmtially" and attempted to minimize the basis of Korea's claims. There was disagreement on other Issues as well. On the question of the treatment of Korean minorities in Japan, the two governments reached an agreement except for Korea's demand for an Immediate suspension of further repatriation of Korean residents to North Korea. The Japanese government also demanded that the Korean government submit to the In­ ternational Court of Justice the controversial Issue of the

Jurisdiction of Takeshima (In Japanese) or Tokdo (in Korean), a barren island lying two hundred Liles from the east coast of Korea. The Korean government, however, refused the

Japanese proposal on the grounds that the disputed island was historically under Korean jurisdiction; and furthermore, the Jurisdiction of the island had never been included in the agenda for the negotiation talks. Regarding the Peace

Line, the Korean government still maintained the necessity

^For the full text of "The Treaty of Peace to Japan", see appendix in Lew vonAduard, Japan from Surrender to Peace, New York, 1957. 91

for its preservation for the sake of Korea's national secur­

ity, especially against Communist Infiltration through sea

foutes. The Japanese government found this Korean stand

totally unacceptable. On March 17, due to a wide difference in opinion be­

tween the two governments, the foreign minister level con­

ference also ended fruitlessly. The major causes of the

failure of the Foreign Ministers' talks as observed by ex­

perts in foreign policy were as followsi 1) the great gap

between the fundamental stands of the two countries; 2) the undecisiveness of many of the influential politicians of

the Liberal Democratic Party; 3) the inflexible stand of

Korea's Foreign Minister Choi Duk-Shin.^ After the unsuc­

cessful discussion between the Foreign Ministers, only in­

formal talks were held between Sugi Michisuke, the chief J^>aîœe delegate and his Korean counterpart Pal Ui-Hwan, And on

April 8, the Japanese Prime Minister said that an early set­

tlement would be difficult because of the wide gap between

the basic positions of the two negotiating parties.

Naturally, when the foreign minister level talks ended

fruitlessly, the Korean government, which was anxiously

awaiting a political settlement because of the need for im­

mediate economic co-operation, was deeply disappointed.

Therefore, it denounced its Japanese counterpart for bad

faith in breaking the agreed time schedule for negotiations

^Asahl Shimbun, Tokyo, March 18, 1962, 92

between the Korean Presidential envoy Colonel Kim Chong-Pil and Prime Minister Ikeda on February 21, 1962.^

Japan* 5 July election and the recess of talks. On the other hand, when the negotiation talks failed once more, the Japanese leaders again split into two major camps 1 those

who supported the political settlement and those who opposed such a solution and insisted on immediately suspending fur­ ther talks with the unlawful and domestically unpopular mi­ litary Junta In Korea, This lack of agreement among the leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was closely related to the forthcoming election of the Japanese House of Councilors in July 1962, Many Japanese leaders within the Liberal Democratic party were reluctant to support negotiations with the unpopular Korean military junta at the cost of their political careers. They feared they would be providing their political enemies with a strong political weapon.® Finally, on April 24, Prime Minister Ikeda and eight other influential members of the Korean-Japanese Re­ lations Committee in the Liberal Democratic Party confirmed their position that the Japanese side would not come to the negotiations table until the Korean side had made a substan­ tial concession on the property issue. On April 25» Colonel

Kim Chong-Pil told reporters at the International Press Club

?The two men agreed to settle all pending issues through high level political talks.

®Mainichl Shimbun. April 10, 1962. Dong A 11-Bo, April 25, 1962, "Colonel Kim Chong-Pil's Press conference at the Foreign Reporters* Club" in Seoul. 93

In Seoul that Korea would wait until the end of the Japanese

Diet Election in July to settle all pending issues between the two nations, Since the hope of an early settlement with Japan had been frustrated by both the existing gap between the posi­ tions of the two governments and Japan's own domestic- political situation, capital hungry Korea turned her efforts toward attracting foreign capital from the United States and industrialized nations in Western Europe. However,

General Park's efforts to gain additional United States aid were obstructed by growing distrust on the part of the

American government for the Korean military junta* partic­ ularly because of the devastating failures of its early economic policy. Many of the Korean Junta's early economic policies had been implemented without any consultation with the American economic advisors in Seoul, and this had wrought great confusion in the Korean economy due to the military officers* inexperience and ignorance of economic policy.9

The American government began to exert its pressure on the Korean Junta by suspending the normal flow of aid money.

The main objective of the American government then was to help accelerate the transfer of government power to more capable civilians. This effort of the American government

See Robert Scalapino's article in Asian Survey (Sep­ tember 1962), p. 11-12. See also Seoul ^(An Up KvungJe Shin Mu (Seoul Industrial Economist Daily, March 22^ 19o47 94

was Immediately countered by strong resistance from some hard core members of the Korean Junta. As part of their effort to lessen Korea's dependence on the United States and thereby gain a greater voice in her relations with that country, the Korean leaders intensified her diplomatic ac­ tivities with the developed European nations including

Germany, Italy, and France, negotiating public or private loans for Korea's first Five Year Economic Development Plan,

This unprecedented move toward the de-Americanization of foreign aid soon induced vigorous international invest­ ment competition among major western industrialized nations in Korea. As early as April 10, a contract for technical assistance and labor service for the construction of the

Ulsan Steel Mill was signed between a West German firm and a Korean company.^^ Although the American government had cut its aid to Korea, American businessmen were encouraged to participate in the capital Investment race initiated by Korea's ambitious Five Year Economic Development Plan.

In May 1962, a group of twenty-five American businessmen, representing various industries and led by a popular Korean

War veteran, General James A, Vanfleet, visited Korea for the purpose of exploring the feasibility of capital invest­ ment by American industries. General Park, the Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, assured

the visiting American businessmen that any future foreign

^^Dong A il-Bo, April 10, 1962. 95

Investment would be used with maximum effect through effec­

tive planning and careful administration.

One major Seoul dally predicted that the discussion be­

tween the visiting American business representatives and

the Korean government would decide the outcome of the com­

petition between the United States and West Germany over

the Ulsan Fertilizer Plant construction project.Stimu­ lated by this investment boom in Korea, many Japanese busi­

nessmen were anxious to participate in the race despite

their government's hesitance to make any concrete commit- ment before the July election. This desire of private

circles in the Japanese business world brought definite

pressure on the Japanese government. Under the repeated appeals of pro-Korean lobbyists representing major Japanese

industries, the government decided to permit private in­ vestment in Korea even before the normalization of relations,

II. POLITICAL BARGAINING OVER THE PROPERTY CLAIMS

In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party won the

Diet election by a majority of more than two-thirds over the

opposition party. On July 2, when the party's smashing vic­

tory in the House of Councilor's was hardly over. Councilor

Choi of the Korean Mission in Tokyo, met with Mr. Isekl, the

^^An editorial in Han Kook II Bo. May 12, 1962.

^^On September 1?, Mr. Kimura, the director of the Ja­ panese Economic Mission, told reporters that "we should hurry otherwise Japan will lose investment opportunities to those Western European countries," Asahi Shimbun, September 18, 1962 96

Director of the Aslan Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Minis­ try to arrange the second foreign minister level talks.

Then, on July 4, the Japanese government notified North

Korea that it would not extend the Djakarta Agreement on the repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea on the grounds that there were no longer enough Korean: residents who desired to go to North Korea.This action by the

Japanese was pleasant news for the Korean government because it provided a more favorable psychological climate for future negotiations. Japan's two Koreas policy, although not granting North Korea formal recognition, had become a source of frequent dispute during the preceding talks.

On July 14, shortly before he was re-elected for his second term. Prime Minister Ikeda told reporters that he would try to normalize relations with South Korea within two years if he were re-elected Prime Minister at the Li­ beral Democratic Party convention. On July 18, Mr. Ikeda, having been re-elected Prime Minister, appointed Mr. Ohira as his new Foreign Minister to replace Mr. Kosaka who re­ presented an opposing section of the party, Prime Minister

Ideda's second cabinet monopolistically occupied by Ideda's own faction and therefore gave him a freer hand than his first coalition cabinet had,^^ Foreign Minister Ohira had been known as an ardent exponent of Ikeda* s positive foreign

Asahi Shimbun, July 4, 1962.

^^See Hans H. Baerwald, "Factional Politics in Japan," Current History, (September 1965) p. 224-225. 97 policy and was In favor of an early normalization of rela­ tions with South Korea. He realized that a political solu­ tion, through a high echelon conference, was the only way to break the present deadlock. Mr. Ohira advised Prime

Minister Ikeda to bring the negotiation talks up to a higher level than the present working level discussion — if neces­ sary, even to a summit conference level.

On July 2 5 . Foreign Minister Ohira, in his foreign policy speech before the newly elected Japanese Diet, em­ phasized the necessity of an early normalization of rela­ tions with South Korea and put this on the top of his list of foreign policy tasks. Mr. Sugi Michisuke, the Chief Japanese delegate on the Japanese negotiation team reportedly told

Foreign Minister Ohira that "if the forthcoming normalization talks ended in failure it would be due to a lack of support by the Japanese government; then I will resign from my post as the chief Japanese delegate.

In fact, the Japanese government, especially the For-- elgn Ministry and Finance Ministry, had itself been deeply divided over the Korean property claims. In addition, the

Japanese government feared not only some domestic opposition by left-wing factions but also direct retaliation from Com­ munist China, with whom Japan wanted to expand her trade.

This hesitant Japanese attitude became the target of the

Koreans as well as by American officials. On August 6, 1962,

l^Yomiuri Shimbun. July 2 5 1 1962. 98

the New York Times commented on the stalemate In the nor­ malization talks between Korea and Japan, sayingt

It seems that Japan is responsible for the present stalemate in the normalization talks since it is the Japanese government that is hesitating to com­ promise with the unprecedentedly flexible South Korean regime which existed after Syngman Hhee’s decendence.1°

The Times felt that the Japanese government was too concerned over domestic and foreign reactions to her reconciliation with South Korea. Despite the hesitant attitude of the

Japanese government, it became certain that Japan would fi­ nally compromise on the six hundred million dollars property claim proposal of South Korea. On August 14, Mr. Nakayatsu

Yosaku, the director of the Japanese-Korean Affairs Re­ search Institute in Tokyo, who was visiting Seoul, indica­ ted that "the Japanese government would finally offer a sum of five to six hundred million dollars to Korea in the form of a combination of a gree-grant, long-term loan, and short­ term commercial credits.

The Korean government was also busily preparing for the forthcoming negotiation talks. In order to moderate the po­ tential public criticism of a flexible position towards Ja­ pan, the Korean government launched an intensive propaganda * campaign to enlighten the people on the government's position.

^^Editorial in the New York Times, August 6, 1962.

l^Mr. Nakayatsu Yosaku is an expert on Korean affairs. He was an editor of KeiJo Mainichi Shimbun, {Seoul daily) during the Japanese rule of Korea. See eü.so his book, Nikkan Shin Jidai. (The New Era on Japanese-Korean Relations), Tokyo, 1965. 99

On July 6, the Korean government invited a group of people representing various professions, including journalists, businessmen, scholars, and some government officials, to a public hearing on the progress of the negotiation talks.

The government's efforts were supposed to convince the gener­ al public of the inevitability of more flexible dealings with Japan. The attitude of the Korean government was a clear indication of its willingness to settle the old prob­ lems through political bargaining and acceptable conces­ sions for the sake of economic co-operation with Japan.

The Ohira formula for the property claims issue. While the schedulet^preliminary talks between the two chief dele­ gates were approaching, the Foreign Minister of Japan sug­ gested that the Prime Minister offer a certain amount of money in the form of a combination of property claims, free grants, and long-term loans. Hr. Ikeda promptly agreed to this idea in principle. For the time being, however, the

Japanese Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry disagreed over the amount to offer. Finally, on August 21, 1962, Japan proposed a total of three hundred million dollars, including a one hundred fifty million dollar free grant and a one hun­ dred fifty million dollar long-term loan^9 The Japanese gov-

^®See Korea's Five Year Economic Plan and its foreign capital Inducement plan In "Economic Planning in Korea" by Charles Wolf, Jr., Asian Survey. 2ilO (December 1962), p. 22-28. See also, "Promotion of Foreign Capital Introduc­ tion", Korean Economy (Seoul t Korean Ministry of Information), (January 1966), p. 222-223.

^ ^Asahl Simbun. August 2, 1962. 100

ermnent Justified this new proposal on the grounds that the

traceable basis of the Korean property claims was extremely limited. Most of the necessary, supporting documents in both Korea and Japan had been either lost or destroyed during

the Pacific War and the Korean War. Furthermore, Japan had to present a reasonable justification to her people for the suddenly increased amount of the property claims. The rul­ ing Liberal Democratic Party feared a domestic-political de­ bacle over this issue since the Japanese public and the op­ position parties were observing the high level political dealings across the channel with suspicion. For this rea­ son, the Japanese government called its offering of one hun­ dred fifty million dollars a "free grant" or "economic co­ operation fund" instead of "property claimsThe words

"economic oe-operation" were apt to be interpreted in Japan as an expansion of Japanese trade with South Korea by means

of which Japan would be eventually rewarded by increased ex­

ports to South Korea. This idea was widely supported by

the leading Japanese industries, who were anxious to ex­ pand their market in near-by Korea.

In Korea, however, it was clear that Japan's recent

offering was not an acceptable amount. Through its chief

delegate in Japan, the Korean government proposed six hun­ dred million dollars, reducing its previous claim by a hun-

®Prime Minister Ikeda*s statement before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Japanese House of Councilors, Asahi Shimbun. August 28, 1962, 101

dred million. To this counter-proposal, the Japanese gov­ ernment reacted hesitantly, fearing domestic-political re­ percussions among the opposition and the left-wing radicals.

Realizing the embarrassing position of the Japanese govern­ ment, General Park, the head of the Korean junta, at a specially arranged press conference on September l4, called for !

...decisive action of leaders of both Korea and Japan for closer co-operation in the area of common interests — security and economic development -- in the face of the ever increasing menace of Com­ munist expansionism.21

This appeal was also aimed at enlisting official American support at the critical moment in the negotiation talks.

’/Hien the negotiation talks reached a crucial moment.

General Park planned to send his confidential emissary.

Colonel Kim Chong-Pil, to Japan in order to settle the pre­ sent deadlock through direct contact with Japanese leaders.

Colonel Kim's trip to Japan was scheduled for sometime in mid-October because the Japanese Foreign Minister would be visiting the United States until the beginning of the month, and the Japanese Prime Minister's own trip -- a European tour — was scheduled for early November, In late September, the Japanese Foreign Minister con­ ferred with Secretary of State Dean Rusk during a brief stopover in Washington on his way home from the United Na­ tions. Ohira was reported to have discussed with Secretary

Dong A IIBo. September l4, 1962, 102

Rusk the approaching second Amer lean-Japanese economic con­ ference to be held in Washington in December 1962. The

American Secretary reportedly urged Japan to try to normal­ ize relations with Korea by the earliest possible date. It was also reported that the final amount of Japan*f' offer on South Korea's property claims would be determined by

America's economic concessions to Japan at the Rusk-Ohira talks. There was no doubt but that the Japanese govern­ ment wanted to settle her problems with South Korea prior to the scheduled American-Japanese Joint economic confer­ ence in December at Washington and to strengthen its voice vis-a-vis the United States by convincing American leaders of Japan's substantial contribution to America's efforts to lessen her foreign spending,

Kim-Ohira Memorandum. On October 20 Colonel Kim vis­ ited Tokyo and delivered a personal message from General

Park to Prime Minister Ikeda. During his three day visit, the Korean envoy conferred with a number of high ranking

Japanese leaders, including Mr. Ohno Banboku, the Vice Pre­ sident of the Liberal Democratic Party. In Colonel Kim's series of meetings with Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira,

Just returned from Washington, the two sides reached a ten­ tative agreement on the property claims issue — Japan was

to offer three million dollars in a free grant and a two hundred million dollar long-term public loan. The detailed

^^Asahl Shimbun, September 24, 1962, 103 terms were to be filled In by means of working-level discus­ sions at the formal negotiations table,^3 More concrete terms, In the form of a memorandum, were to be maAe upon the return of Prime Minister Ikeda from his European trip In mln-November. After his conference with Japanese Foreign Minister, Colonel Kim left Tokyo for Washington, In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Ohira said to the members of the Policy Committee of the LDP that "the normalization talks would be finished- by the next spring. On the other hand. In the press conference after his arrival In Washington, Colonel Kim, as If Implying the suc­ cessful results of his meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister, told reporters that "the Korean-Japanese normali­ zation talks had recently entered into a new phase by solv­ ing one of the crucial problems." Korea's main concern before she reached the final agreement on property claims with Japan was America's aid policy to Korea after Korea entered Into positive economic co«operation with Japan. This concern on the part of the Korean government was a direct result of Korea's fear of potential economic domination by Japan in case the United States placed Korea's economic development under Japan's

^^Malnlohl Shimbun, October 22, 1962. ^^Asahl Shimbun. October 27* 1962. 104 umbrella.In Washington, Colonel Kim met with a number of high ranking United States officials. Including Secre­ tary Rusk; Robert Kennedy; Secretary Hodges; Mr. Hamilton, the director of AID; and General Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Colonel Kim discussed the pro­ gress of the normalization talks with Secretary Rusk and appealed for a continuous U.S. economic aid to Korea even after the Korean-Japanese rapprochement until Korea had self-standing economy. On October 31, Colonel Kim told re­ porters that the United States government had pledged to continue aid to South Korea. On November 12, Colonel Kim once again stopped at Tokyo and met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, At this second Kim-Ohira meeting, the two men reached a tentative agreement on a formula for the property claims settlement, which later became known as the "Klm-Ohlra Memorandum". The contents of this formula were the result of compromise between Korea's recent demand of six hundred million dollars claim and Japan's three hundred million dollar offer. According to the memorandum released In December after final confirmation by the heads of each respective country, Japan was to offer six hundred million dollars to Korea including three hundred

^^Slmllar concern expressed by General Park with re­ gard to the contents of the U.S.-Japanese economic talks at Hakone, Japan, In November 1961. General Park said, "As already mentioned, we can not overlook the possibility that so-called economic cooperation with Japan may bring forth an­ other form of Japanese agression against Korea.", Park Chung- Hee, Our Nation's Path, Seouli Dong A Publication Co., 1962, p. 1 6 3 . 105 million In free-granta, two hundred million in long-term loans, and one hundred million In commerclaG. private loans. In return, Korea promised to reconsider emd adjust the fisheries boundaries In favor of Japan, provided that the marine resources around Korea were preserved. Japan also promised to offer positive support for Korea's economic de­ velopment.^^ While the Korean government was examining the contents of the Klm-Ohlra Memorandum, a group of forty Japanese on a good-will mission headed by Ohno Banboku, the Vice President of the LDP, vlsltèd Seoul on December 10. The forty con­ sisted of ten members of the Japanese House of Cone 11 ors representing various political factions within the ruling LDP, four Foreign Ministry officials, and thirteen reporters. The purpose of their mission was to determine the final opinion of the Korean government on all the pending issues and also to provide an opportunity for the representatives of various factions of the LDP to become convinced of the advantage to Japan of an early normalization of relations with South Korea. After a few weeks, on December 29, 1962, official Ko­ rean consent to the Klm-Ohlra Memorandum reached Tokyo through the head of the Korean delegation, Mr. Pal Ul-Hwan.

General Park’s press conference of December 27, 1962, Dong A 11-Bo. ^^Regardlng the normalization talks with Korea, the mem­ bers of the Liberal Democratic Party split into two groups t namely the Careful Faction and the Positive Faction. See Nao- klchi Tanaka, o£. olt. .and Dong A il-Bo, December 10, 1962. 106

III. KOREA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND A NEW STALEMATE

When the most controversial property claims issue had been settled through the Kim-Ohira Memorandum, the only remaining stumbling block for future settlements was the fisheries dispute over the Peace Line, Since It had been Japan's concession which had untied the knot In the property claims Issue, It was Korea's turn to show some flexibility In order to reach any agreeable terms on the fishery Issue, espaolally as the controversial Peace Line was the result of a unilateral declaration by President Syngman Hhee In 1952. The Korean government, however, did not want to abolish the Peace Line until Japan had gueuranteed a certain degree of self-restraint in her fishing activities along the Korean coast. The Korean government, as well as the coastal popu­ lation of South Korea, feared that unregulated fishing ac­ tivities by the Japanese fleets might endanger the conser­ vation of marine resources along the Korean coast. In addi­ tion, the Korean government was reluctant to liquidate com­ pletely the Peace Line for security reasons because there might be Communist infiltration through the sea routes along the unguarded Korean boast.This stand of the Korean gov­ ernment appeared totally unacceptable to the Japanese who

The Peace Line or Rhee Line had the nature of a "conservation zone" when it was first proclaimed, but later, especially after the proclamation of the Clark Line In Sep­ tember 1952, the Korean government insisted "defense rea­ sons" as the Justification of the Peace Line. 107 thought thé Korean government would abuse the Line In order to provide fishing privileges to Koreans alone. Therefore, this Issue remained as another difficult problem. After the two nations had discovered a great distance between their respective stands on the fisheries Issue, the Korean government proposed to deal first with other, less controversial. Issues such as the treatment of Korean mi­ nority groups In Japan and the basic relations question. In­ cluding a formal recognition of the Republic of Korea's Jurisdiction over the entire Korean peninsula. On January

12, 1963, the Korean Foreign Minister, In his first press - conference of the new year, said that It might be better to settle the fisheries Issue after the normalization of relations with Japan. A week later, however, as If responding to this state­ ment by the Korean government. Prime Minister Ikeda emphasized the priority of the fisheries Issue over all the remaining issues awaiting resolution. He said that "If the Korean government refused to accept the Japanese proposal for the fisheries settlement, the bilateral agreement Just made on property claims would not be honored by the Japanese govern­ ment. Soon thereafter, the Japanese government submitted a new proposal on the fisheries Issue, The essential points

20 Although not expressly mentioned, the readjustment of the fisheries boundary was a condition of Japan's eco­ nomic concession In the Klm-Ohlra Memorandum. See Dong A 11-Bo. January 20, I963. See also Asahi Shimbun, January 1 9 , 1963. 108 of the Japanese proposal were * 1) the establishment of an exclusive fishing zone and a Joint Control Zone within nine nautical miles outside of the tliree mile territorial waters, and 2) the establishment of a Joint Control Commission by the two governments to regulate fisheries activities within the Joint Control Zone. The Korean side submitted a com­ promise as a counter-proposal. Korea's counter-proposal was to keep the Peace Line as a defense line and to establish both an exclusive zone and a controlled zone within It. With this disagreement on the fisheries Issue, the negotia­ tion talks entered a new deadlock In spring 19^3. The power struggle In the Korean Junta. As forçast by Korea's Prime Minister Kim Hyun-Chul the previous autumn, the year 1963 was unfavorable for the Korean-Japanese nor­ malization talks because of Korea's domestic-political calen­ dar. It was the year of Korea's presidential election and the general election of a congress through which government power was to be transferred from the military junta to civil­ ians. After January all political activities that had been prohibited since the May 1961 milltsury coup were to be re­ sumed. This was also a bad year for Japan since the Japanese general election was to be held in November, Many politi­ cians In the ruling Llbersü. Democratic Party were reluctant to commit themselves on this controversial foreign policy Issue until they Imd been re-elected. Most of all, the Japanese government was very much concerned over the growing 109 tension within the Korean military Junta. As soon as the political activities of sill parties were allowed to resume, the representatives of the malnstreeun thought of the military Junta launched an open movement to organize a new political party, the Democratic Republic Party, Some key leaders of the military junta were promoted and discharged In order to participate In the newly emerg­ ing political party with civilian status. In the process of the organization of the new party, a serious power strug­ gle erupted among key figures of the ruling Junta over po­ sitions In the new party. As a result, the Junta was split Into two opposing factionsi the so-called Mainstream Fac­ tion headed by Colonel Kim Chong-Pil, the main architect of the Military Coup, and by General Park Chung-Hee; and the Non-mainstream Faction headed by Marine General Kim Dong- Ha and Army Colonel Yoo Won-Shlk.31 As the'conflict became more acute and an actual physical confrontation between the two factions was expected. General Park Chung-Hee reluctantly persuaded his best confidant and brain trust man. Colonel Kim Chong-Pll to resign from his chairmanship of the Or­ ganization Committee of the DRP. In order to deflate the explosive tension of the factional strife. Colonel Kim re-

30 In his statement before the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Councilors, Foreign Minister Ohira saidi the "Japanese government has no plan to suspend the current talks because of Korea's domestic political Instability, but I also doubt whether Korean government is capable of continuing the talks." 3^For further details seei Mura Tsuneo. Kan Koku gunsel no Kelfu (The Genealogy of the Korean Military Junta), Tokyo 1965. 110

signed his chairmanship, saying that he would resign from all public positions. Five days later Colonel Kim, a strong exponent of an early normalization of relations with Japan and the Initiator of the celebrated Klm-Ohlra Memorandum of November 1962, left Korea to visit nations In Southeast Asia and Europe with the status of Generetl Park's special envoy.3^ The American military and civilian officials In Korea were very concerned about the weakened morale of the six hundred thousand Korean soldiers whose main function was to be fully alerted against the threat of North Korean Commu­ nist Infiltration, In order to prevent further damage to the nation's security preparedness, the American government decided to intervene with its civilian and military officials, Including the Commander of the Far Eastern Army, General Meloy, and Ambassador Berger, and offering to mediate be­ tween the competing factions In the Korean armed forces. Furthermore, the civilian politicians of various defunct parties were beginning to exploit this power struggle among the coup leaders. Realizing the potential danger of another military coup by an alliance of the Non-mainstream Faction and discontented civilian politicians, General Park appealed to the heads of the three military branches as well as to

32In fact. Colonel Kim left Korea with the status of a lobbying ambassador. He stayed in the United States for several months, contacting many high ranking U.S. officials In an effort to win the American government's \inderstanding and support for Park's Junta. See Dong A 11-Bo, February 25• 1963. Ill the leaders of the defunct political parties to co-operate In restoring internal polltlcELl stability by accepting his Nine Point Proposal, Including his pledge of non-partlclpa- tlon in the new civilian government, general amnesty for all politicians, and the designation of general election date as desired by the public.33 on February 2?, a cere­ mony took place In which the leaders of the Armed Forces pledged their "neutrality In the present crisis," Through a positive mediation role by the American ambassador and military leaders, a political crisis was avoided. From early March on, however, the Korean CIA launched a massive arrest operation and fifteen former civilian and military officials of the Junta were accused on various grounds including bribery In connection with four famous financial scandals.3^ This massive arrest was known as a direct seinctlon upon the Non-mainstream Faction within the junta. In mid-March an abortive coup was disclosed by the Korean CIA. Among those arrested on the charge of having plotted a coup were key figures of the former junta such as Marine Corp Major General Kim Dong-Ha, Army Lieutenant Gen­ eral Park Im=Hang, and Colonel Lee Kyu-Kwang, the former pro­ secutor of the Military Revolutionary Court which had been established In June 196I. Paced with serious disunity

^3Dong A 11-Bo. Seoul, February 18, 1963. 34'it was reported that four financial scandeuLs wore connected with the unclear sources of the newly emerging Democratic Republican Party’s political funds. 1 Dong A il-Bo, March 6, 1 9 6 3 . 112 among his top mlllteury leaders, General Park's Junta was on the verge of collapse and a physical confrontation be­ tween the military factions was widely expected. There were rumors circulating among Junta members that a pro­ longation of military rule for an extended period was In­ evitable in this extremely unstable political situation. On March 15» an unprecedented event In Korea's long history took place. This was a demonstration by some twenty young Korean military officers appealing for a prolongation of military rule for another four years. They even threatened "to topple the present military Junta If It bogged down un­ der American political pressure and to set up a new antl-

U . S . Junta for Korea's Independent r u l e . "35 As if responding to the sentiment of the young offl- cerAf patriotic revolt, on March l6 General Park, In a spe­ cial statement on nationwide radio, proposed the prolonga­ tion of military rule for four more years In order to pro­ vide social and political stability to the nation and to complete the revolutionary tasks. This statement by General Park was Immediately criticized by the American government. The American Ambassador to Korea, Samuel D. Berger, con­ ferred with General Park and urged the fulfillment of the General's original pledge to restore civil rule. On March 25» the United States' government through Mr.

^^HanKook H Bo, March 15, 1963, Also seei J. Mark Moblus, "The Japan-Korea Normalization and Korean anti-Ameri­ canism", Asian Survey.(February 1966),P, 245-244. 113

Lincoln White, a spokesman for the Department of State, strongly urged Genereü. Park's military Junta to transfer Its power to civilians Immediately. Responding to the offi­ cial stand of the home government, the United States aid offlcleüLs In Korea exerted strong pressure on the Korean government by strengthening their control of aid money by means of the newly established Joint U.S.-Korean Economic Co-ordination Board.3^ When America's economic sanction became greater, the Korean Junta openly expressed Its dis­ content with the American authorities In Seoul. On March

26 , Prime Minister Kim Hyun-Chul said In an Interview with a UPI reporter that the American government should not ex­ ploit economic aid to bring political pressure on the Korean government. The Prime Minister suggested that further pres­ sure would lead to serious consequences. However, the Junta's attempt to counter-balance American pressure by creating anti“American feeling among the Korean people ended In vain. Korean students, oppressed under the strict msnrtlal law, suddenly broke the silence. Approximately three hun­ dred students of Seoul National University, the political

hotbed of the Korean Student Revolution of April i960, staged a massive demonstration In Seoul protesting against the pro­ longation of military rule. As the Internet situation In

36According to the regulations of this Co-ordination Board, the Korean government's budget for American aid money was to be submitted to the U.S. government's AID office In Seoul for screening and advice. See Sung-Yu Hong; A Study of U.S. aid to Korea. Seoul, 1963, p. 17. 114

Korea was expected to deteriorate further, the American government Issued, through Its State Department spokesman, a second strong statement urging "an Immediate suspension of military rule and restoration of a democratic system through reconciliation between military leaders and civil­ ian politicians. " 37 As the American government pressure became greater, General Park appesJ.ed through his ambassa­ dor In Washing to President Kennedy to try to understand the necessity for his recent decision on the basis of the pres­ ent domestic situation In Korea. On April 2, President Kennedy's response to General Park's appeal came to General Park through Ambassador Berger. The next day In Washington President Kennedy, In a press conference, said that he was "very much concerned about what was happening In Korea" and desired "to see a quick restoration of democracy In South Korea". ?Following this statement, all American aid money WAS eompletely Auspended.3^ Exhausted by InternsQ. and external pressures against his Idea of prolonging tjrie military rule. General Park Is­ sued a special communique on April 8 announcing a four point emergency measure which Included the postponement of the na­ tional ref erendum39 to determine whether the junta, should

37vashlnp:ton Post, fteroh 29, 1963. 3®"President Kennedy Urged early transfer of Power to civilian," New York Times, April 3, 1963, p. Ii6. 3^The United Press International In Seoul reported that "General Park beosune subdued under American pressure and withdrew his plan,", Chosen 11-Bo, April 6, I963. 115 be extended xmtll September and lifted the ban on political activities. Through this action by General Park the junta eased its dangerous situation. Japan * s reaction to the Korean situation. As the situ­ ation in Korea becsune fluid, the Japanese government once again showed a negative attitude toward the negotiation talks. As a consequence, the leaders of the ruling LDP also split into two camps over their Korean policy. These camps were called the Positive Faction and the Careful Faction, Those in the former faction still insisted that the normali­ zation of relations with South Korea under the military re­ gime would better serve the interests of Japan and would be easier to get ratified than under the less powerful civilian regime which was to follow. The stand of the latter faction was that "Japan should wait and see because it was highly risky to deal with an instable and unpopular military Junta. In these circumstances, the Japanese government was uncertain whether to continue negotiations. Foreign Minister Ohira, appearing before the Foreign Relations Com­ mittee of the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet said that Japan had no intention of suspending the present negotiation talks although it was questionable whether General Park's regime was capable of carrying out its com­ mitment. The Foreign Minister's remeirk was a clear indica­ tion of the predominance of the Careful Faction in the LDP.

40Asahi Shimbun, March 20, 1963. 116

On April 1 3 , after the internal political situation had been stabilized a little, the Korean government announced a time schedule for future negotiations with Japan, Its pur­ pose was to encourage the Japanese government to act in con­ formance with the Junta's determined desire. In the announce* ment then, the Junta formally disclosed its plan for settling all pending issues between the two countries by September

1963.^1 General Park's confidence for an early settlement seemed to have been greatly strengthened by some moral sup­ port from Prime Minister Ikeda and his sympathy for the Ko­ rean military leaders. On April 2, two days after President Ifennedy had urged the Korean Junta to transfer governmental power to civiliansj Prime Minister Ikeda announced his plan to authorize the inflow of Japanese capital through private Japanese business firms into Korea's Five Year Economic De­ velopment Plan. On the same day, in his meeting with visit­ ing British Foreign Minister Hume, Prime Minister Ikeda de­ clared that the American policy of asking the Korean mili­ tary Junta to transfer the power immediately to civilians was unwise.It was widely reported that the Japanese gov­ ernment was attempting to convince the Americans that un­ duly hurried transfer of governmental power into civilian hands would not be the best policy In Korea under the pres-

^GenereCL Park wanted to finish the negotiations be­ fore the October Presidential election and November Congres­ sional election. See Dong A il-Bo. April 13» 1963.

^^See Asahl Shimbun, April 2, 1963. 117 ent situation. The Japanese government gave instructions along this line to its new Ambassador to the United States. Takeutsi. prior to his departure for Washington. A similar view prevailed among a group of leading poli­ ticians within the Japanese LDP, a group often called the Korean Lobbyists. Among them were Miki Takeo, the Chair­ man of the LDP Policy Boardj Kishi Nobutsuke. former Prime Minister» sato Eisaku. Secretary General of the LDP» and othersThe leading members of the Foreign Research Com­ mittee and the Korean-Japanese Affairs Committee concluded that the political instability of South Korea was attribu­ table to America's unrealistic Korean Policy. When the United States' government issued an official statement cri­ ticising General Park's plan to prolong military rule in Korea, a group of conservative members of the Japanese Diet visited Ambassador Reischauer and suggested to the American government that it re-examine the Korean domestic situation before making any further Korean policy. Allegedly they told the Ambassador that it would be useless to expect that a decent democratic system such as the Americans are used to could be effectively applied in all foreign countries. The Japanese government had already submitted its official view regarding the Korean domestic situations to the Ameri­ can government through its Washington Ambassador AsaUmi as

43 Hatada Takashi, 0£. cit., p. 145-146. 118 early as March 11, 1963. ^ The resumption of talks on the fisheries. The Japa­ nese government consistently tried to continue the negotia­ tions as long as the Korean Junta was available for such talks. While the South Korean Junta was under the heavy pressure of political instability, the formal negotiation talks were suspended. But officials of both Foreign Minis­ tries were busily preparing for future talks, especially on the presently pending fisheries issue, with the aim of set­ tling it by the September deadline, a month before Korea's presidential election. Finally on April 23» the fisheries sub-committee meet­ ing was resumed in Tokyo. The Japanese side asked Korea to withdraw the Peace Line emd to establish an exclusive zone twelve nautical miles from the Korean coast. The Japanese government repeated its previous proposition that Japan willingly "offer special loans as well as technical assis­ tance for the modernization of the Korean fishing indus­ tries if Korea accepted the twelve mile exclusive zone and removed the Peace L i n e " . The fisheries sub-committee was deadlocked, however, when the Korean side refused to li­ quidate the Peace Line for security reasons. However, the Korean side expressed its willingness to make a concession on the fisheries issue if Japan offered a one hundred fifty

^ Yomiuri Shimbun. March 11, 196 3 .

Asahi Shimbun. Tokyo, May,3 0 » 1963. 119 million dollartspecial loan for Korea's fishing Industries. The Japanese government soon propoaéd the adjournment of the fisheries teilks until June 7 when she would submit her final plan on the issue. It had been clearly indicated in the negotiations over the fisheries issue that Korea's main concern was to obtain urgently needed foreign capital for her Five Year Economic Plan whose implementation had been hindered by the lack of necessary foreign investments. Realizlhg this weakness of the Korean government, the Japanese government was con­ vinced that further delay of normaüLization would make the Korean leaders more impatient and thereby weaken their own stand in the fisheries negotiations. Japan's strategy at this point was to buy time which might force Korea to come to Japan's terms. The chief Japanese delegate informed his Korean counterpart of Japan's willingness to "authorize up to one hundred million dollars in the form of a private Japanese loan to Korea right away. This proposal by the Japanese government was purportedly to pave the way for private Japanese business circles who were anxious to go into Korea in time to participate in the international investment competition. Ironically, Prime Minister Ikeda and leading politi­ cians in the LDP were under the pressure of another interest group which consisted of the Japanese fishing industries

Asahi Shimbun. June 13, 19&3. This is the same amount designated in the Kim-Ohira Memorandum of 19^2, 120 along the southwestern coast of Japsui. For Instance, during May and June while the fisheries talks were in a stalemate, a huge fleet of Japanese fishing boats had penetrated deeply into Korean waters, taking advantage of Korea's internal political instability. Such a massive intrusion by the Japanese fishing boats along the Korean coast had provoked anguish among the Korean fishing interests. This soon be- ceune a domestic-political issue between the ruling junta and civilian politicians. A group of fishermen along the southeastern coast of Korea staged a radical protest demon­ stration appealing to the Junta to take a counter measure and to protect their life lines. In fact, the Korean Junta had lessened the guard at the Peace Line against the Japanese fishing boats ever since Korea had embarked-on positive ne­ gotiations with Jpaan, But under the pressure of public sentiment and the attack against the Junta, the Korean gov­ ernment arrested a few Japanese fishing vessels. This ac­ tion provoked the sensitive Japanese fishing interests. On

June 1 5 , the Japanese government registered its formal pro­ test to the Korean government through the chief of the Korean delegation, Mr. Bai Ui-Hwan. In his protesting statement, the Japanese chief delegate said that "Japan (would) complet- ly suspend the current negotiation talks if the Korean side (continued) the arresting operation.Under this direct threat from the Japanese government, the Korean government

47 Asahi Shimbun, June 15, 1963. Dong A il-Bo. 121 released forty-two detained fishermen and five fishing boats as a gesture of goodwill to ease the tension between the two nations. When the two negotiating parties did not make any noti­ ceable progress, the American government began to analyze the positions of both sides and Korea's internal political situation in order to formulate a concrete American atti­ tude toward the present situation. In early June the Ameri­ can Ambassador to Korea, Samuel D, Berger, was summoned to Washington for a briefing to receive new instructions. Am­ bassador Berger advised President Kennedy to support General Park's junta since it was certain that General Park would be elected in the October presidential elections,^® Following Mr. Berger's visit, Korean Foreign Minister Kim-Young-Shik visited Washington and conferred with high ranking American officials, including Secretary Rusk. They discussed the procedure for transferring the government into civilian hands and the lending of positive economic aid to Korea for its Five Year Economic Plan, thereby strengthening the posi­ tion of the Korean government at the negtlation table by decreslng Korea's dependence on Japanese economic aid. He further emphasized Korea's Justification for the Peace Line, insisting it was for security reasons. On July 25 the Americem Ambassador to Japan, Edw&a 0. Reishauer, visited the White House and discussed with Presi-

4 8 A United Press release in Dong A il-Bo, May 30» 1963. 122 dent Kennedy the current negotiation talks between Korea and Japan. During a press conference immediately after his visit to the White House, Ambassador Heishauer told repor­ ters that he was "optimistic about the progress of the future talks because the public opinion of both sides (was) favor­ able for the present talks." With the mediation of the two American ambassadors, frequent meetings among high ranking officials of Korea and Japan tookv:place during the summer of 1963. In early July, on his way back from the United States, Korean Foreign Minister Kim stopped in Tokyo and conferred with Jpanese Foreign Minister Ohira over the fisheries boundaries and Peace Line issue. As he found a much narrower discrepancy between the two sides, he pro­ longed his visit to explore further Japan's final stand. Finally, on July 30, in the second Foreign Ministers' Con­ ference the two sides reached a tentative agreement over the fishing boundariesMore details, however, were to be filled in at a later date. The agreement was that an exclusive zone would be established within a twelve mile limit and the Joint control zone within forty miles of the Korean shore beyond the twelve mile exclusive zone. Through these high level political talks the two most controversial Issues, the property claims and fisheries issues, were set­ tled. The other issues remaining to be settled were the

^9won Yong-Sok. Hanil Huidam Shipssnyun. (Fourteen Years of Korean-Japanese Megotiations), Seoul, 19o5, PP*78-89, 123 treatment of the Korean minority in Japan and the terms for the basic relations between the two nations including the formal recognition by Japan of Korea's independence and Jur­ isdiction and the liquidation of all treaties made in the past against the will of Koreaf® However, as the Presiden­ tial election In Korea And the general election for the Japanese Diet were approaching, the negotiation talks went into another stalemate,

IV , THE ANTI-TREATY MOVEMENT AND A NEW STALEMATE

The fall elections in Japan and Korea. Fall 1963 was a trial period for General Park's power structure and the internal cohesiveness of the military leaders of South Korea. After the Presidential electinn in October, a new civilian head of state was to take the power of the govern­ ment. In November, after the general election, the newly elected congress was to take over the powers of the three year old military debating organ, the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction (SCNH), Finally, on October 17, General Park was elected President of Korea by a narrow margin over his civilian rival, the former President of the second republic, Yoon Bo-Sun,^^ Upon the victory of General Park in the presidentieü. race. Colonel Kim Chong-Pil, the main architect of the DRP

^®See appendix, article 2 of the Treaty on Basic Rela­ tions. General Park won by a nsurrow margin of 1.6 per cent. 124 and the exponent of a political settlement with Japan, re­ turned to Korea after an eight month long foreign trip. Upon his return, the resumption of negotiations talks was busily prepared by the Korean government. On October 29, in the first press conference after the election. General Park told reporters of his desire to in­ vite Japanese capital investment by private Japanese firms to Korea before the normalization of relations, if necessary. On November 7, in Tokyo, the Korean-Japanese Economic Con­ ference was formally convened. Its purpose was to pave the way for the inflow of Japanese private investment into Korea. In order to create a working organ for Japanese businessmen and their Korean counterparts, the Korean-Japanese Co-opera­ tion Commi ttee^^was organized during this meeting on Novem­ ber l6, 1 9 6 3 . On November 28 General Psirk's DRP again won a smashing victory in the general election for the Korean Congress by winning over Its opposition party by a two- thlrds majority, 108 i43. Through this victory in the con­ gressional race and Presidential election, General Park's DRP was guaranteed continuous rule for the next four years. On November 20, the Japanese ruling Liberal Democratic Party also won in the general election over the opposition Socialist Party by an almost two-thirds majority. Up until this general election of the Japanese House of Representa-

^ This organ was prepared as a channel of discussion between Korean businessmen and their Japanese counterparts for economic co-operation until a formal diplomatic channel was opened. 125 tlves and Korea’s two elections, the formal Korean-Japanese Normalization Talks had been suspended except for some work­ ing level contacts over the remaining issues. The smashing victories in the two elections in Korea and the triumph of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the Japanese election for the House of Representatives cleared the way for smoother progress in future negotiation talks. Now the hesitant Japanese government became more con­ fident and openly declared its commitment to a final settle­ ment with South Korea even in the face of violent opposition movements by Japanese leftists. On December 17, in Seoul, the newly Inaugurated Korean President Park Chung-Hee con­ ferred with Mr. Ohno Banboku, the Vice President of the LDP who was visiting Korea to participate in the inaugural cere­ mony of the Korean President. The two men agreed in their private meeting to open another Foreign Minister level talk in eith Seoul or Tokyo sometime during January for the poli­ tical settlement of the remaining Issues separating the two nations Finally, on January 11, the negotiation talks in the fisheries sub-committee meeting Informally reached a deci­ sion on the fishing boundaries through mutual concession. According to this Informal agreement, the exclusive fish­ ing zone was to be established within twelve miles of the Korean shore whereas the Joint Controlled Zone would be be-

^^Ohno Banboku was the main exponent of an early nor­ malization of relations with Korea. His role behind the scenes was similar to Kim Chong-Pil’s role In Korea. 126

tween twelve and eighteen miles from the Korean shore. Con­ sequently the only remaining area of disagreement on the fisheries issue was the question of the Peace Line, The progress of the talks and the de-American!zation of aid. De-American!zation of foreign aid had been suggested by the United States'government to the Korean leaders ever

since the early part of the Kennedy administration in 196I. But because of Korea's economic situation and the slow pro­ gress of talks with Japan, the application of new aid policy in Korea had been postponed. However, as tbeppapproehement with Japan neared after the recent fisheries agreement, the American government began to consider its application in Korea. On January 21, 1964, in Washington, David Bell, the Director of AID, told reporters that United States''Aid to Korea would switch from its traditional "supporting aid" to "development aid" and that he was confident that Korea could be as successful as Greece and Taiwan, This policy of the United States was reconfirmed by Secretary Dean Husk when he visited Seoul on January 29 on a brief stopover after his peurticipation In the third Joint United states-Japanese Trade and Economic Conference in Tokyo.It was widely re­ ported that the current talks between Japan and Korea, as well as the terms of future Korean-Japanese co-operation had been Important topics at the Tokyo Conference.

54pong A 11-Bo. January 29, 1964. 127

In the Joint communique released at the end of the three- day conference, the American government criticised Japan f-'r her growing expansion of trade with the Communist camp, par­ ti ouleurly with Red China, and emphasized the necessity of Japan's co-operation in America's efforts to develop the Asian economy and thereby strengthen the ties of free Aslan people. Although South Korea was not specifically indica­ ted in the Joint Communique, the United States officials asked Japan to assume a greater share of responsibility for the success of Korea's Five Year Economic Development Pro­ gram. Despite the recognition of mutual benefits for both sides, Korea and Japan could not easily reach a satisfac­ tory agreement on the Peace Line issue because of domestic pressures. Finally, the Japanese government asked for an Agricultural Ministers' conference to seek another politi­ cal compromise on this issue since there was little hope for the Peace Line issue to be settled through working level negotiations. With the consent of Korean Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-Ha, the conference was finally set for March 10 in Tokyo. President Park demonstrated his willingness to make a mdjor concession on the fisheries question if Japan were willing to co-opetrate to settle all pending issues with Korea in the shortest possible period.He said that he

^^Asahi Shimbun, January 28, 1964, ^^Dong A il-Bo, February 28, 1964. 128 hoped all pending issues between the two nations would be settled by the end of March, The Agricultural Ministers* Conference convened in Tokyo on March 11, 1964. Kim Chong-Pil, who was again the chairman of Korea's ruling DRP, left Korea for a trip to Southeast Asia. On his way he stopped in Tokyo and conferred with high ranking Japanese leaders, Including Prime Minister Ohira; and Kohno, the Construction Minister, discussing the settlement of all the remaining Issues. Mr. Kim's visit to Tokyo was known to have been planned to accelerate the political talks by making authoritative Korea's views on current Issues. Mr. Kim's presence in Japan was expected to help shorten the length of Political talks by saving time for the Korean negotiation team,^^ With the arrival of Kim Chong-Pil, who had participated in all major settlements in the past through his frequent and direct contact with the Japanese leaders, the nearing of the end of the negotiation talks was expected. Already in Korea the opposition party leaders had positively em­ barked on an anti-treaty movement through their political propaganda machine, criticising the government's approach to Japan as "low posture diplomacy" or "sellout diplomacy". In response to nationwide unrest with regard to the final settlement, President Park disclosed his clear intention.

^^Klm Chong-Pil was In fact the main brain behind President Park as far as Korean-Japanese relations were con­ cerned. 129 saying that if the other side accepted his demands, he would normalize relations with Japan, regardless of the opposition party's rejection. Opposition movement in Korea. Finally, In mid-March, reports from Tokyo confirmed a mutual agreement between Kim Chong-Pil and Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira on the timetable for future negotiations. They hoped for the sign­ ing of the treaty by early May, As soon as this news reached Seoul, a massive demonstration erupted. On March 24 some five thousand Seoul National University students clashed with heavily armed riot control police. By the next day the student demonstration had spread to all major cities in South Korea, producing bloody street brawls with police forces. The nationwide student demonstrations and angry crowds reminded people of the eve of the i960 student demon­ stration against Syngman Rhee's regime. As nightfall came the government was afraid of further mass demonstrations during the night. Under the order of President Park, mar­ tial law was Imposed in the Seoul area. However, despite martial law, violent demonstrations continued throughout the nation. On March 26, Kim June-Yun, the Three People's Party congressman, disclosed the fact that President Park's DRP chairman, Kim Chong-Pil had already received one hundred thirty million dollars from Japan as the first installment of the property claims in order to provide political funds for the DRP for the last two elections.5® In fact, the stu-

58 Dong A il-Bo, March 26, 1964. 130 dents * protest against the treaty had been in part aimed at the secret mission of Kim Chong-Pil, the main architect of the military coup of 1961 as well as the main architect of Park's Japan policy. Under the ever escalating danger of public revolt, even President Park's party leaders urged him to summon Kim Chong-Pil from Tokyo immediately. There­ fore, on March 27, President Psurk ordered Kim to return to Korea at once, suspending his talks with Japanese leaders. While the Korean government was under strong public pressure, the opposition party in the Japanese Diet also warned its government against making any secret commitments to South Korea. With the return of Kim Chong-Pil, Korea's motl calmed somewhat. But a week later, Korea's Foreign Minister, returning from his Bangkok meeting with heads of Korea's diplomatic missions in Southeast Asia, stopped in Tokyo and conferred with both the Japanese Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. It was reported that Foreign Minister Chung had completed some of the unfinished talks left by Kim Chong-Pil. On April 7» the Japanese Agricul­ tural Minister, Akagi, , reported at the Japanese Cabinet meeting that the fisheries boundaries had been finally set­ tled in his recent political talks with his counterpart, the Korean Minister of Agriculture. 59 The current political bargaining with Japan, as well as

^9Asahi Shimbun. April 7, 1964. 131

Kim Chong-Pli * 8 personal role as the oommander-in-ohief be­ hind the negotiations scene, became the *ajor target of the opposition pEurty and a political football among leading DRP members. The direct impact of this incident was the revi­ val of old factional strife within the ERP, but with an un­ precedented intensity. The Central Committee of the DRP, consisting of the Mainstream Faction of the 1961 military coup, recommended a nine point emergency measure, including the reshuffling of cabinet members. As the tension between the government and the public further mounted as a result of sporadic demonstrations attacking the corruption and mis­ rule of President Park*s regime, internal conflicts among leading members of the DRP developed into open accusations of each other for the present failure of their policies. Finally, on May 1, this open conflict between the two fac­ tions reached a climax when Kim Chong-Pil, the chairman of the DRP, was directly criticized for his inefficiency. Chang Hyung-Soon, the Vice-Chairman of the party, demanded that he resign. On May 9, under this pressure. President Park reshuffled his cabinet for the second time since his election. In this second cabinet, the Mainstream Faction headed by Kim Chong-Pil, monopolistically occupied the cabinet posts. This immediately became a complaint of the Non-Mainstreeun Faction. Taking advantage of the internal factional disputes among the leaders of the ruling DRP, the encouraged students staged another massive demonstration against the government's 132

Japan policy. They even burned Kim Chong-Pil in effigy, and the figure they burned wore the label "Lee Wan Yong". This man had been the last Foreign Minister of the Yi Dynasty and was nicknsuned "the seller of the fatherland" because he had signed the annexation document in 1910, In this broad daylight demonstration in Seoul, more than sixty-five stu­ dents were seriously wounded by police clubs and another 182 were arrested by the police. The next day thirteen armed peuratroopers raided the Seoul Distrie Court and warned the prosecutors to issue warrants for the arrested students. This incident Immediately became an acute political issue because members of the Korean CIA were eunong these soldiers. Anguished public sentiment reached its peak on June 3, 1964, when the students of the Seoul Agricultural College in Suwon, twenty miles from Seoul, planned a marching demon­ stration toward Seoul. They expected massive participation by throngs of citizens. An emergency conference was held at President Park's mansion with Ambassador Berger of the United States, General House, and the Commander of the United Nations and the Far Eastern U.S. Armed Forces. That evening, with the consent of the U.N. commander, emergency martial law was reimposedd in the Seoul area. Finally, on June 5» Kim Chong-Pil, under the persuasion of President Paurk, announced his resignation from all public posts in order to ease tension. On June 18, Kim Chong-Pil once again

60 Dong A il-Bo, March 24, 1964. 133 left Korea for the United States, but this time as a self- chosen political exile. With the depeurture of Kim Chong- Pil, the negotiation talks entered another stalemate be­ cause of Korea's Internal political instability. Although formal negotiation talks were suspended until early December, economic co-operation through private chan­ nels grew stronger during this period. In fact, Japam's private capital had begun to flow Into Korea in early Sep­ tember 1963 after the two countries had reached a tentative agreement on the fisheries boundaries, the second of the two most controversial issues that had been the main stumbling blocks during the last twelve years of negotiation. In September, the ItoJoo Firm in Japan loaned fifteen million dollars to the Korean Textile Company on the Korean govern­ ment's guarantee of reimbursement. And in late May 1964, Mr. Maeda, the director of the Aslan Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry visited for a week in order to arrange a one hundred million dollar Japanese pri-V^e Investment In Korea,

For a further detailed account on private economic co-operation prior to the normalization, see Hatada Takashi, op, cit. 134

CHAPTER V

A NEW STIMULUS AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT

I, THE TONKIN INCIDENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE KOREAN-JAPANESE TALKS

The escalation of the Vietnamese War and the power vacuum In the Far East. A series of Communist military ven­ tures in Southeast Asia, especially the guerrlla wars In South Vietnam In the early i9 6 0 's, had been a source of gi'eat concern to the leaders of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. As early as February 20, 1962, Secretary McNamara had Indicated that the Vietnamese War seemed to be momentsnrlly, stabilized, but predicted 1 Guerrilla fighting could continue in the South­ east Asian nations for years. We must be prepared to be patient in our approach and not expect an overnight solution or clear cut results for some period of time.1 The SecretGLry of Defense made this prediction after his dis­ cussion with American military and diplomatic leaders at the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Forces In Hawaii. The day before, on February 20, Colonel Kim Chong-Pil, General Park's special envoy who was touring countries of Southeast Asia including Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Philippines, told reporters in Manila that "Korea (was) willing to send armed forces to South Vietnam to repel the Communist aggression if the South Vietnamese government

^New York Times, (February 20, 1962), p. 1-3. 135

2 so desired." During the latter peurt of October 1962, Colonel Kim visited Washington and discussed the common strategy of the IMited States and Korea against the Commu­ nist challenge in Asia. Secretary Rusk; Averell Harriman, the Assistant Secretary for the Far East; Harwell Taylor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Senator Dodd, an Asian expert in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were present at this meeting. In December 1962, President Kennedy appealed to the Japanese cabinet members who were visiting Washington to participate In the American-Japanese Economic Conference to lend more positive support to America's effort to contain Red Chinese expansion In Asia, Despite the restriction in Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and sensitive public reaction to rearmament, on January 9. 1963» Ambas­ sador Edwin Reischauer asked permission for the entry of a United States nuclear submarine into a Japanese port. A week later. On January 19» the Second U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Committee meeting was held with the peurtlclpation of General Wheeler, the Commander of U.S. Pacific forces; Ambassador Reischauer; the Director of the Japanese self- defense forces; and Foreign Minister Ohira. It has been reported that, at this joint security meeting, the leaders of the two nations studied the possibility of a two front

^Manila Times. (Februeury 19» 1962), p. 1. Han Kook il-Bo, (Seoul), (February 20, 1962), p, 1, 136 war with enemy action in both Southeast Asia and Korea,^ In order to prepare a detailed common strategy for dealing with eventual hostilities in Korea, they agreed to open working level study talks. Early in February, an American military fact-finding mission arrived in Japan. Following this mission, Under-Secretary of Defense Gilp a t r i e visited Tokyo and Seoul to discuss regional military co-operation aunong the United States, Japan, and Korea to cope with any conventional military contingency which should occur in the Far East. On April 17, in his address to foreign reporters at the Washington National Press Club, Under-Secretary Patrick said that the United States desired Japan's vigilant alertness for the security of the Far East — Including the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, He further said that "swift action by Japan would make It possible to counter effectively any future resumption of hostility In Korea without reinforcing Ameri­ can divisions in Korea. This new strategy of the United States had been examined during the months of February and June by the U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Committee. This plan had been tested during July by means of a Commander

^Yomiuri Shimbun. (January 20, 1 9 6 3 )» p. 1. See also Okada Haruo, "Mitsuya sakusen to. Bei-Nichi Ampo Talsei", (The Three-arrow plan and the U.S.-Japanese Security System), Sékai. (April 1964), p. 168-177.

^Okada Harüo, 02.. oit.. p. 1 6 9 . For other views of American leaders on Japan's future role in Asian security problems, see Robert McNamara's statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress on January 18, 1965» Washington Post. January 19» 1965. 137

Post Excerclse called the "Three Arrows Operation" In late January 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Korea and conferred with the potential military challenge In the area. On Meurch 17, Colonel Kim Chong-Pil again visited South Vietnam and discussed the Vietnamese situation, exploring effective ways of mutual co-operation with Premier Kahn and his Defense Minister Kiem. Immedi­ ately after the Tonkin Incident, on August 13» a South Viet­ namese goodwill mission led by Deputy Prime Minister Doman, visited Seoul. A week later, in a conference between Ameri­ can Ambassador Brown and Korean Foreign Minister Lee Dong- Won, a five point memorandum was signed. According to the memorandum issued after their conference, they agreed on such matters as Amerlean-Korean co-operation in Vietnam, and America's positive mediation role in the early normaliza­ tion of relations with Japan. This agreement made between American Ambassador Qhown and Korean Foreign Minister Lee was later called the Brown Memorandum.® Bundy * s trip to Japan and Korea. While the formal ne­ gotiation talks between Korea and Japan were stalemated be­ cause of Korea's internal political instability brought on by student demonstrations protesting President park's; "loA posture diplomacy" with Japan, the growing tension in South­ east Asia began to be a threat to America's security system

^Okada Hsœüo, o^. cit., p. 170. ®Dong A il-Bo. (August 17» 1964), p. 1. 1 3 8

In all of Asia. The sudden escalation of the war in Viet­ nam not only increased the burden of American military and economic aid in that region, but also entailed a gradual shift of America's power core from the Far East to Southeast Asia. The transfer of some American combat units from South Korea in the latter part of 1963 created the potential dan­ ger of a power vacuum in the Far East. In this regard, the celebrated torpedo attack on American vessels by North Viet­ namese gunboats in the Bay of Tonkin in early August 1964 marked a turning point not only in the Vietnamese War but also in America's Asian policy. This sudden change In the military situation in Asia began to greatly affect America's attitude toward the presently deadlocked Korean-Japanese normalization talks. Up to this point, although encouraging the negotiation talks from the sidelines, the American government had not taken any Initiative In obtaining an early rapprochement. But because of the imminent and practical necessity of fill­ ing the power gap in East Asia, American leaders were now eager to mediate so as to procure a quick normalization of relations between her two Asian allies. For this purpose, William P. Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, visited Tokyo and Seoul, On September 29, 1964, in Tokyo, Mr. Bundy saidi I believe it is essential to the interest of the free world that South Vietnam not be permitted to fall under Communism...the security of others has an important beeuring in the security of the soci­ ety, and this was especially evident in the close 139

relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea.' It had been America's policy to remind the Japanese people of the fact that they should not expect any more free riding on the American security vehicle In the Far East merely because of the disarmament clause!in Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. As if emphasizing this position, Mr. Bundy also indicated Japan's obligation and common responsibility for the maintenance of peace and se­ curity in East Asia by saying that: The Republic of Korea stands as a bulwark against the forces of aggression that threaten the peace of the Far East and the situation of Japan is vi­ tally connected with the ability of the Korean people to develop a strong and prosperous economy. As a great power, Japan beeurs special responsibili­ ties to settle outstanding problems with Its smal­ ler and heavily burdened neighbors.® On September 30, Mr. Bundy met with Japanese leaders including Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shlina to discuss re­ gional co-operation to meet the new Communist challenge In Asia. Mr. Bundy offered to be a mediator, saying that the United States was anxious to see an early normalization of the relations between Korea and Japan, and for this end, the American government was willing to assist In appropri­ ate ways to bring about a quick settlement. The American Assistant Secretary also suggested readjusting the sharp trade imbalance between Korea and Japan through an increase

^William P. Bundy, "Progress and Problems East Asia: An American View-Point," Department of State Bulletin, 51*537i October, 1964. ^^Ibid. 140

in Japanese Imports from South Korea,9 Such direct advice from high ranking Americeun offiolaü.8 to Japanese leaders was indicative of America's unprededented desire to see the reconciliation of the two Aslan allies in the face of ever-increasing Communist aggression in the area. In re­ sponse to this suggestion by American officials, Mr, Yokada, the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister, indicated some prere­ quisite conditions for a quick settlement with Korea. Mr. Yokada asked the Korean government to suspend the arresta­ tion of Japanese fishing boats along the Korean coasti and asked Korea to stop doubting the sincere goodwill of the Japanese people toward Korea. "Korean people," said Mr, Yokoda, "should erase the concept that Japanese private in­ vestment in Korea is motivated by Japanese neo-colonial- ism. On October 2, Mr. Bundy's mission arrived in Seoul and conferred with high ranking Korean and American officials, Including Korea's Prime Minister Chung Il-Kwon, Foreign Minister Lee Dong-Won, Ambassador Brown, and General House, who was the United Nations' commander. At this meeting the three important'issues — the normalization of relations and economic co-operation with Japan, the question of South Korea's gradual assumption of her own defense expense, and the terms of American-Korean co-operation for the common

^Mainiohi Shimbun, September 30, 1964, ^^Asahi Shimbun. September 30, 1964. I4l security burden in Southeast Asia — were discussed. The Korean government reconfirmed its willingness to dispatch Korean volunteer forces to South Vietnam if necessary. The Korean government clearly indicated its view that "the Uni­ ted States' armed forces presently stationed in Korea should be maintained in order to readily meet any future potential Communist aggression in East Asia and especially as long as the war in Vietnam continues. This view of the Korean government's was a direct answer to the American-proposal to withdraw one half of her combat forces from Korea in or­ der to ease the troop shortage problem in the Vietnamese War. On October 3» after a private conference between Mr. Bundy and Korea's Foreign Minister Lee Dong-Won, a joint communique was Issued which made the following points ; The Foreigh Minister and Mr. Bundy agreed thati 1) the normali­ sation of relations between Korea and Japan was essential for the mainenance of peace in Asia; 2) Mr. Bundy reiter­ ated his assurance that the basic American policy of extend­ ing military and economic aid to Korea would be continued after the normalization of relations with Japan; 3) Mr. Bundy repeated the earlier United States expression of will­ ingness to assist in appropriate ways to bring about a suc­ cessful resolution of this long-standing problem. They also

Han Kook 11-Bo. October 2, 1964. See also William P. Bundy, "United States and Korea Reaffirm Policy of Cooperation" Department of State Bulletin. LI (October 1964), p. 542. 142 reviewed the Brown-Lee Memorandum of August 17, 1964, made between Ambassador Brown and Foreign Minister Lee, in their meeting over the terms of co-operation in opposing Commu- 1 p nlst aggression in Vietnam.

II. THE PROCESS OF THE FINAL COMPROMISE

In this final process, Korea had been successful in ob­ taining America's support by pledging to dispatch Korean volunteers to South Vietnam. Under these circumstances, it became clear to Japanese leaders that their country might have to make some economic concessions to South Korea to pay for Korea's physical contribution to the security of free Asia. Furthermore, ailing Prime Minister Ikeda had been re­ placed by Eisaku Sato on November 9, 1964, The New Prime Minister was the brother of the former Prime Minister Nobusyk» Kishi, an ardent exponent of closer co-operation with the United States. Sato frequently insisted upon the inevita­ bility of a gradual rearmament of Japan because of the radi­ cally changed International situation. The emergence of Prime Minister Sato forecast the opening of an independent, but more pro-Western, diplomacy In Japan. Mr. Sato, known to be a "hard line" politician in dealings with the leftists, was even critical of incumbent Prime Minister Ikeda's "low posture," as the Japanese called his subtle approach to

"Joint Communique released in Seoul on October 3, 1964, at the conclusion of talks between Mr. Bundy and Korean For­ eign Minister Lee Tong Won," Department of State Bulletin, LI (October 1964), p. 542. 143 battles with the opposition,While considered strongly anti-Communist, Mr. Sato went along with the trend of 'Japa­ nese leaders to favor the expansion of trade between Japeui and Communist China. On November 11, in his first press conference as Prime Minister, Mr, Sato told reporters that "it s(was) time for Japan to have a voice in international affairs commensurate with her status as one of the world's leading economic pow- l4 ers." The policies he outlined in this press conference seemed to forecast vigorous steps to bring Japan out of the shadow of international disgrace caused by her defeat in World ?War II. Sato gave no details on progrsuns in Asia, but an early rapprochement with South Korea was high on his list of diplomatic priorities. On November 21, about two weeks after he became Premier, Mr. Sato expressed his desire for an early normalization of relations with South Korea in the course of a policy statement made before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Japanese House of Council ers. The trend of thinking in Tokyo was toward more active participation by Japan in assisting the underdeveloped coun­ tries of Asia. This attitude was attributable to the un- precedentedly successful Japanese economic development. Japan now enjoyed economic power greater than that which

"Japan, The Pilgrim on Flight 800," Times, January 15» 1965, p. 24. ^^"Sato Urges Japan Regain World Role," New York Times. November 11, 19o4, p. 1. For Premier Sato's view on other For­ eign policy issues, see "Sato Interviewed," ^ News & World Report. January l6, 1965, p. 42-47. 144 she had lost during World War II, This economic prosperity however, had brought her into conflict with some of the re­ quirements of the contemporary internatio al system. Her highly developed economy had elevated Japan from an Article 14 nation to an Article 8 nation in the International Mone­ tary Fund, and it had also gained her membership in OECD on April 1, 1964.^^ According to the charters of IMF and OECD, she was obliged not to apply any control system In foreign exchange and world trade regardless of any situation of In­ ternational balance. An American Journalist described this unique position, sayingi "Willing or not, ready or not, Japan is emerging as one of the few nations that could have a decisive role in the world. In addition to this economic situation, the rapidly changing military and strategic environment of East Asia had created a further source of impatience. Communist China's nuclear experiment in late 1964 and the sudden escalation of the Vietnamese War made the Japanese leaders feel extreme­ ly insecure. When the major emphasis of America's military establishment was directed toward Southeast Asia, the sub­ sequent power vacuum raised the first and most serious ques­ tion in the minds of the Japanese leaders and intellectuals and convinced them of the necessity of a re-evaluation of Japanese security. George F. Kennan described the latest

"Japan, Holding the Lead," The Economist. December 20, 1963. p. 1356. ^^A.M. Rosenthal, "Japanese feaoc* of assuming leadership» " of becoming involved in world affairs," New York Times. June 24, 1963, p. 1. 145

Japanese attitude, as followsi "The earlier passivity has not been everywhere overcome, but there Is a growing con­ sciousness that the major responsibility for Japan's securi­ ty must be borne, in the long run, by Japan herself."^7 The resumption of the seventh round talks. On Novem­ ber 11, Mr.Cbire. Mss^ayombl, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, said that Japan would consider economic aid to Korea inde­ pendently of the yet unsettled fisheries question. The only remaining question with regard to the fisheries issue was whether or not to include in the new treaty clearly expressed words about the liquidation of the Peace Line. Since this issue was so Important to public opinion in South Korea, the two sides had to compromise to find a way to escape pub­ lic attack on this touchy matter. Regarding the Peace Line, a number of alternatives to an explicit declaration of li­ quidation were suggested. For Instance, the two governments could eliminate the Peace Line by a verbal agreement, just recording it in the minutes of the negotiation talks and T_8 disclosing it later when the public was more calm. At any event, the Japanese government was tentatively satis­ fied with Korea's assertion that "the Korean government (had) no intention of interfering with Japanese fishing activities outside the eighteen mile control zone limit." The only remaining procedure, therefore, was a mere formality

17 George F. Kennan, "Japanese Security and American Policy," Foreign Affairs (October 1964), p. 20.

^^Asahi Shimbun. October 28, 1963* January 18, 1965. See also Dong A il-Bo. April 1, 1965» P. 1. 146 as far as the Peace Line was concerned. On November 14, the Japanese government proposed the opening of the seventh round of formal negotiation talks on condition that Korea release all detained Japanese fisher­ men in Pusan before the new talks began. On December 1, Akagi Munenori, the Japanese Agriculture and Forestry Minis­ ter, announced the Japanese government's plan to Import two million dollars worth of rice and seaweed from South Korea In order to balance the trade scale between the two nations. The next day, the Korean government released sixteen Japanese fishermen and three fishing boats which had been detained in Pusan, In this warm atmosphere, the formal ne­ gotiation talks were resumed in Tokyo on December 3» 1964 .^9 Now the only issues remaining to be settled were i 1) ques­ tions with regard to the restoration of formal diplomatic relations, and 2) the status and treatment of sixty million Koreans in Japan. But these were not such seriously con­ troversial matters as the property claims and fisheries questions. On December 25» the Japanese International Trade and Industrial Ministry Issued its authorization of an 8.3 million dollar private credit loan to South Korea. This was the first private credit loan to result from the Kim-Ohira Memorandum of 1962. And on December 29, Korea's Prime Minister Chung Il-Kwon reconfirmed his country's policy of

^^Han Kook il-Bo (November 14, 1964), p. 1. 147

allowing the Japanese private credit loans as provided In the Klm-Ohlra Memorandum, By the end of 1964, after these reciprocal actions by the two governments, as well as the agreements on the two most controversial issues — the pro­ perty claims and the fisheries — the channel for economic co-operation was praoticELlly opened, although the treaty packages had not yet been signed, Japan's enthusiasm for the policy of economic co-opera­ tion prior to the normalization of relations was partly stimulated by President Park's trip to West Germany in eeœly December to pave the way for expanded economic co-operation with that European country, a pivotal member of the EEC group. The Japanese leaders were now anxious to go into Korea before major western European nations swamped the Korean economy with lucrative investments. Japanese lead­ ers were particularly sensitive to the penetration of EEC members into Asian markets since the flow of Japanese goods into European markets was neatly obstructed by the 20 barrier of the European Common Market. As for the basic relations issue, the most difficult area of agreement was the limit of South Korea's Jurisdic­ tion, since the Japanese government was virtually dealings with two regimes in Korea. This was a problem arising from Japan's so-ceLlled "two Koreas Policy". Ultimately, the source of this confusion was the ambivalent attitude of

^^Virginia Galbraith, "Japan's Position in World Trade," Current History. 46i2 April 1964, p. 208. 148 the Japanese government toward the North Korean regime dur­ ing the period of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato's "low Pos­ ture" diplomacy. Ikeda himself had often emphasized that the Japanese government did not ignore the d^ facto exis­ tence of the northern regime, implying that Japan would ne­ gotiate with North Korea someday in order to settle issues pending between the two governments.^^ The new Prime Minis­ ter Sato also closely followed this policy line in the principles of "Seikei Bunri" (the principle of the separa­ tion of politics from economy). On December 17, 1964, Prime Minister Sato even said before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Japanese House of Councilors that "the ap­ plication of the forthcoming normalization treaty would be limited to the area where the present Jurisdiction of South Korea extended. Not surprisingly, the South Korean government strongly denounced this attitude on the part of its Japanese counter­ part, asserting that Japan was "a fence sitter" in the struggle of the free world against Communism, and merely seeking her own economic interests. At the negotiations table, the Korean delegate persistently maintained that South Korea was "the only lawful Korean government, having Jurisdiction over not only South Korea, but also North

^^See Ikeda * s statement to the Foreign Relations Commit­ tee of the House of Representatives, in Asahi Shimbun, August 29, 1962.

^^Asahi Shimbun. December 17, 1964. 149

Korea. "^3 However, Ih the faoe of vehement opposition at home, the supposedly more determined Sato government became extremely cautious about the wording of the agreements re­ garding- South Korea's Jurisdiction and wanted to choose a flexible terminology which would permit it easily to defend its policy of normalizing relations with South Korea as well as its position on the status of the two Korean regimes. However, by late January 1965, the negotiations of the Sub­ committee on Basic Relations wère moving toward a final com­ promise which would be acceptable to both nations. Meanwhile, the SUb-Committee on Legal Status had been encountering difficulties in its discussions of the Korean minority resident in Japan. The major area of disagreement was the definition of "permanent resident" and whether the descendants of all the Koreans who had been living in Japan before the close of World War II should be accorded per­ manent residence or not. Another problem was the amount of remittance that Japan should give to Koreans who voluntarily chose repatriation. Japan had set a ceiling of five thous­ and dollars on these payments, while Korea insisted on a ten thousand dollar limit.However, the Japanese gave in late in March, since the number of Koreans who wanted to return

^Naozaki Mltsuharu, Nlkkan K8sho (Japan-Korean Nego­ tiations 1 (Tokyo I Ni bon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu Sho, 1962), p. 56-^7. Won Yong-sok, Hanil Huidam Sips Nyun (Fourteen Yestrs of Korean-Japanese Negotiations). Seoul, 1965, P* 34. Korean Information Service, Hankook Soshik (News from Korea), No. 58, Special Edition (April 21, 1965), p. 10. 150

to Korea was very small. Thus, this Issue too was finally resolved. Dispatch of Korean troops to South Vietnam. Toward the end of 1964, when the adjournment of the thirteen year long negotiation talks was in sight, a rumor was spread in Seoul about Korea's troop commitment to the Vietnamese War. As early as late August, journalists had been speculating on this matter after Ambassador Brown had conferred with Korea's Foreign Minister Lee and issued a memorandum including such points as the Korean-Amerlean co-operation in America's ef­

fort to repel Communist aggression in Southeast A s i a . ^5 This memorandum had been formally reconfirmed by William P. Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, in early October on the occasion of a visit to Seoul after a meeting with the Japanese cabinet members in Tokyo. Finally, on De­ cember 17, 1964, Ambassador Brown verbally relayed Presi­ dent Johnson's desire for Korea's troop contribution to the Vietnamese War. However, this request by the American President was not disclosed to the public until mid-January 1965/^ The Korean government, however, had already sent one field mobile medical unit and ten paratroop instructors to

^ Han Kook il-Bo. August 17» 1964, p. 1. See also "Joint Communique released at Seoul on October 3» 1964, at the conclusion of talks between Mr. Bundy and Korean Foreign Minister Lee Tong-Won," Department of State Bulletin LI (October 1964}, p. 542,

Dong A 11-Bo, January 17, 1965» P. 1. 151

Vietnam In September 1964, shortly after the Tonkin Inci­ dent. In October, when the Vietnamese War was beginning to escalate rapidly because of new American combat troop com­ mitments, American troops in Korea and the Korean armed forces had conducted a joint counter-guerrilla field maneuver excerclse including a massive helicopter rescue operation. However, it was not until December 29, 1964, that the gov­ ernment's plan to dispatch some two thousand Korean troops to Vietnam was disclosed by Defense Minister Kim Sung-Eun. At that time he formally requested that the chairman of the Korean Congress help him obtain Congressional approval. The Korean people Immediately responded with shock and puz­ zlement. The next day General House, the United Nations' commander in Korea, announced that the Howark Missle unit would be organized in Korea before the end of 1964. By announcing this action publically, the commander hoped to raise the morale of the Korean people, who feared a military imbalance in Korea. It was in this tense atmosphere that the Korean govern­ ment announced Its time schedule for future negotiations with Japan, as if imposing Japan's co-operation on Korea before Korea dispatched troops to South Vietnam. Then on January 8, 1965, the Korean cabinet agreed to send Korean soldiers to South Vietnam. On the next day President Park told reportersi Korea will try to normalize relations with

^^Kyong Hyang Shinmoon, December 2 9 , 1964 , p. 1 . 152

Japan by the end of this year and will dispatch two thous­ and troops to South Vietnam In order to assume a share of the common burden of the free people who are fighting 28 against Communists. The major newspapers commented un- vaforably upon the government's decision, criticising it for a lack of adequate Justification for troop commitment to Vietnam with whom Korea had no treaty obligations. Fur­ thermore, this venture did not seem consistent with the spirit of collective security. The Dong A il-Bo, the Korean newspaper with the largest circulation, wondered "why the Korean government decided to dispatch troops, an important overseas commitment, without having enough time to discuss and study its long-run conse­ quences for the nation's future. Y^9 ^s a matter of fact, the hurriedly made decision of the Korean government was made in order to influence the American President's State of the Union message and, subsequently, American Congressional ac­ tion on the Korean aid bill. In addition, the Korean gov­ ernment also hoped for an effect on Prime Minister Sato's American visit the following week. Prime Minister Sato was going to Washington with a long list of demands including American approval of Japan's transworld airline system, the lifting of the American barrier against Japanese cottons, and looser control of Okinawa island. In a Joint communi-

28 Korean Times, January 9, 1965» P> 2. Also Dong A il-Bo. January 9» 1965, P. 1. ^9pong A il-Bo. January 27, 1965» P. 1. 153 que Issued after the Johnson-Sato White House Conference, the two leaders re-emphaslzed the necessity of an early nor­ malization of relations between Korea and Japaui,^® On the other hand, in Korea the oppositlomparty was exerting great pressure on the government, inquiring into the reasons and Justification for the troop commitment to the Vietnamese War, When President Park's government was under still heavier fire from the opposition party and when it had become a heated political issue, Ambassador Brown disclosed the fact that the initiative for the troop dis­ patch had come from the White House, The next day 4“t>assa- dor Brown met with leaders of the opposition party in order to convince them of the validity of America's view. On January 26, the Korean Congress passed the "troop dispatch" resolution after a majority of the opposition party members had walked out of the chamber. But the opposition party did not raise any radicsû. opposition thereafter. It was later disclosed that the leaders of the opposition party were persuaded when the American government asked for "a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and re­ distribution of these to Vietnsun if Korea refused to send 32 her own troops into Vietnam.

^^The Washington Post. January 13, 1965, p. 1. ^^"Kankokù no Betbnamu Hahei to genron", (Dispatch-of Korean Troops to Vietnam and the public Opinion), Sekai (April 1965) See also Dong A il-Bo, January 23, 1965» P. 1. ^^Ibid. 154

The final round of talks. When the troop dispatch is­ sue was settled on February 6, 1965, the Korean Prime Minis­ ter Chung Il-Kwon visited Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo to discuss the procedure for the final settlement. At this meeting the two men agreed to sign each treaty as it was completed instead of signing all the treaties in a package as originally planned. This change was made in order to effect a practical normalization of relations first and set­ tle the remaining problems later through normal diplomatic channels.A few days later, in the Basic Relations Sub­ committee, the two governments reached a final agreement on the question of South Korea's Jurisdiction and the method of liquidating old treaties made between Imperial Japan and Korea prior to 1910. The application of the treaty was to be confined to the present Jurisdiction of South Korea. As to the method of liquidating the old treaties, Japan proposed a bilateral declaration that all treaties made be^ tween the two nations prior to 1910 were "null and void". Finally on Februsory 20, the basic relations treaty was initiated by Korean Foreign Minister Lee Dong-Won and Japan­ ese Foreign Minister Shllna in Seoul. Through this prelimi­ nary treaty, Korea and Japan normsLLized their relations for

^^The Korean government wanted to normalize relations with Japan before Korea sent troops to South Vietnam. "Hearing at Korean Congress on Korean-Japanese Rela­ tions," Dong A il-Bo. February 27, 1965, p. 1. 155 all practical purposes although they had not yet completed three other treaties. On the eve of the Japanese Foreign Minister's arrival in Seoul, the opposition party congress­ men staged an anti-treaty demonstration. However, despite such opposition in Korea, the two nations embarked on talks for economic co-operation wince it was all too plain that the first Korean Economic Development Program had not been realized as originally planned because of the slow Inflow of Japanese capital and know-how due to the delay of nor­ malization talks. On March 11, in Tokyo, the first Korean-Japanese Eco­ nomic Conference was convened. At this economic conference, the Japanese delegate offered his country's co-operation to develop custom bonded processing Industries in Korea, by merging Japanese capital with Korean labor.The same day Korea's Foreign Minister met with Prime Minister Sato to make a final compromise on the treatment of the Korean minority and their legal status, the Peace Line, and the detailed conditions of the property claims. At this meeting the Japanese promised to increase the one million dollar private credit loan designated In the Kim-Ohira Memorandum to three hundred million in return for Korea's pledge to remove the Peace Line.

«Johnson-Park Joint Communique," Department of State Bulletin. See also Princeton N, Lyman, "Economic Develop­ ment in South Korea", Asian Survey (July 1966), p. 382-383. Ibid.. p. 383. "Kim-Ohira Memorandum," Dong A il-Bo, January 29, 1963, p. 1. See also Hanïfook, Soshik (News from Korea). LVIIIi Spe­ cial Edition (April 1965), P. 8, 156

Now the way had been cleared for the final agreement on all pending Issues with Japan. However, the Korean leaders wanted to make sure, before they put their signatures on the treaties, of the continuation of America's economic aid to Korea in the post-rapprochement period. There was fear in the mind of President Park that the American government might abruptly reduce its Korean aid or suspend it completely. On March 15, In Washington, visiting Korean Foreign Minister Lee Tong-Won and Secretary Rusk exchanged their views on the progress recently made in the negotiations for the normali­ zation of relations between Korea and Japan. They also dis­ cussed the possibility of some twenty thousand additional Korean troops being sent to Vietnam.^® In this regard, Ko­ rea and the United States agreed to adjourn the Status of Forces agreement between the two countries that would give Korean civil courts the right to try American servicemen who committed crimes In Korea. In a joint communique released after their talks, Secretary Rusk reaffirmed that the nor­ malization of relations between the two countries in no way affects the basic U.S. policy of extending military and economic aid to the Republic of Korea for the main­ tenance of its security and development of its economy. It was also agreed that both governments would expe­ dite the negotiations so as to achieve a final agreement

^^Dong A il-Bo. March 17, 1965, P. 1. 39Department of State Bulletin^(^pril 1965), ÿy 491, 157 as soon as possible. On his way home, on March 24, the Korean Foreign Minis­ ter once again met with Japanese Prime Minister Sato to arrange the time schedule for the signature ceremony. Fi­ nally, on April 3, 1965, in Tokyo, the two governments ini­ tial ea three more treaties including* 1) a new fisheries treat., -hat would redraw the old Rhee Line, 2) a property claims treaty which would make available Japan's three hun­ dred million dollars in grants, two hundred million in pub­ lic long-term loans, and three hundred million in commer­ cial credit loans to Korea over the next ten years, and 3) a treaty on the legal status of Korean residents which would redefine their right. On the eve of the signing of these draft treaties In Tokyo, students in Seoul denounced the treaty as a "sell out" of the country. Opposition par­ ties expressed their fear that normal relations would again bring Korea under Japan's economic and politiceO. domination.

In Tokyo, South Koreans paraded under a banner reading 1 "Don't sell our fatherland for cheap money." But such peri­ pheral protests did not much affect the signing of the treaty. Originally, the Korean government hoped to have the formal signature ceremony before President Park's scheduled visit to the United States in mid-May, but the disturbing anti-treaty demonstrations of the Korean students and the opposition party prevented any proceedings toward the final settlement. Within the ruling DRP itself, some members were critical of Park's unduly hurried treaty negotiations. 158

Therefore, Korea and Japan agreed to sign the final treaty during the school vacation in order to avoid massive stu- 40 dent demonstrations. The Park-Johnson meeting. Korea's President Park Chung-Hee visited the United States ten days, from May 17-27, During this visit he received an unprecedentedly warm welcome. In his discussion with President Johnson he reiterated the necessity of continuous American military and economic aid to South Korea until the threat of Communist aggression disappeared from the area. President Park pledged more posi­ tive support for American efforts to repel aggression in South Vietnam. In return President Johnson promised a one hundred fifty million dollar special development loan to Korea to insure the successful Implementation of her first Five Year Economic Development Program.A detailed in­ vestment plan was drawn up by Korea's Deputy Prime Minister Chang Kee-Young and Mr. Burnstein, the Director of AID, dur­ ing President Park's visit. Meanwhile, some of President Park's party, including Kim Sung-Eun, Defense Minister; General Chong Chiang Kook, Korea's Joint Chief of Staff; and the chairman of the National Defense Committee of the Ko­ rean Congress, had flown to Hawaii to discuss the dispatch of additional Korean troops to South Vietnam. On June 1,

"Jyoyaku chain ni kl kl shinkokuna Kankoku., " Sekai . (August 1965), p. 142. 41 Department of State Bulletin. (June 14, 1965) p. 952. 159 the Defense Minister returned from Hawaii after his meeting with high ranking American officials, and discussed with the leaders of the Korean congress the additional dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam as an alternative to the with­ drawal of American troops stationed in K o r e a .

III. THE TREATY

Signing of treaty. On June 9» Korea and Japan agreed to hold a signing ceremony In Japan on June 22. When this date was announced, the opposition party as well as stu­ dents staged sporadic demonstrations shouting anti-treaty slogons. Actually, the anti-treaty demonstrations were in part a manifestation of the students* accumulated discon­ tent with the corrupt and heavy-handed government of Presi­ dent Park. Greatly oppressed by the newly enacted Demon­ stration Control Act, students avoided direct criticism of the ruling regime, and hence by demonstrating they found the only outlet to their frustration over the current diplomatic Issue. A public opinion poll Indicated how much the people desired a cautious approach both to the negotiations and to the inflow of Japanese capital. Of the college graduates questioned, 81 percent favored rapprochement with Japan, but had a cautious attitude, while 21 percent supported an im-

J[l o ^^Sekai (April 1965). p. 135. 160 mediate restoration of normal ties.^^ At any event, despite such disturbances, the Defense Committee of the Korean Con­ gress passed a resolution to dispatch additional troops to Vietnam. On this same day, approximately fifteen hundred university students took to the streets, staging a massive and violent demonstration, appealing to angry citizens to participate. Nevertheless, the next day the Korean Con­ gress again passed the additional troop bill with the parti­ cipation of only ruling DRP members.This action by the fullng party and the government gave the angry students ad­ ditional ammunition. As a result of this massive demonstra­ tion, on June 21, a day before the treaty was signed, thir­ teen universities and colleges and fifty-eight high schools In Seoul were closed twenty days earlier for the summer holi­ days by the special order of the Ministry of Education. The next day, on June 22, 1965, Foreign Ministers Lee and Shiina signed the twenty-five separate treaties and protocol in the Japanese Prime Minister's official residence, surrounded by seven thousand riot control policemen. Immediately after the signing ceremony, the Japanese government appointed Maeda Rilchl, the former chief of the Northeast Asia sec-

"Echo of History, Student Riot," Times LXXXV (April 23, 1965), p. 39. "Student Riots in Korea," New York Times (March 26 , 1965), p. 34. "Opinion Poll on Korean-Japanese Relations," Dong A il-Bo (December 12, 1964), p. 3. ^^Dong A il-Bo. January 26, 1965, P. 1. ^^See appendix for full texts of treaty. I6l

tlon of the Foreign Ministry, and Mldani Shizuo, former in­ vestigator of the Asian Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, to be the first Japanese counsellors to Corea, The day after the treaty was signed in Tokyo, President Park issued a special statement over a nationwide network, saying! It indeed is imperative for us to make a wise judgment to assure our national security and prosperity. The world situation today makes it more imperative than ever before for us to nor­ malize diplomatic relations with Japan...Will It not be a wise judgement to co-operate with our foe of yesterday If It Is necessary for our pros­ perity of today and tomorrow?^' In Tokyo, Prime Minister Sato also praised the treaty by say­ ing that It would enhance the Interests of the two nations by opening new era of mutual co-operation. This treaty be­ tween Japan and Korea was also warmly welcomed by Washington; Secretary Rusk Issued a special statement, describing this event as highly constructive and important for the strength­ ening of the ties among free nations. Major contents of treaty. The treaty package Is com­ posed of the Treaty on Basic Relations, Fishery Agreement, Property Claims and Economic Cooperation Agreement, Agree­ ment on Legal Status and Treatment of the Korean Nationals in Japan, Cultural Property and Cultural Cooperation Agree­ ment, and Exchange Notes on Settlement of Disputes between

Sekai. August 1965, p. 140. See also "Assembly rati­ fied treaty by 110lO?", New York Times (August 5, 1965), p.7tT Korean Ministry of Public Information, Korean Infor­ mation, Seoul (July 1965), P. 6-7. 162 the two nations. The Basic Relations Treaty calls for, among other things, recognition that the Republic of Korean regime is the sole lawful government in Korea as manifested in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), De­ cember 1948. The two nations also agreed to establish dip­ lomatic and consular relations by exchanging ambassadorial level envoys. The treaty affirmed as "null and void" all treaties and agreements concluded on or before August 22,

19 1 0 , between the former Empire of Korea and the former Em­ pire of Japan, including the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty concluded in August 1910, in particular. The Fishery Agreement features establishment by each nation of an exclusive fishing belt twelve nautical miles from the base coastal line, as well as a Joint fishing zone outside the exclusive belt. The two countries agreed to establish and maintain a Korea-Japan Joint Fisheries Com­ mission to achieve the purpose of this agreement. The Claims and Economic Co-operation Agreement is high­ lighted by the provision of a three hundred million dollar grant by Japan and a two hundred million dollar long range, low interest government credit over a period of ten years, as well as a commercial credit of more than three hundred . million dollars. The Legal Status and Treatment Agreement calls for the granting of citizenship to the Koreans, who have resided in Japan since before the end of World War II and their direct descendants, provided they apply for cl- 163 tlzenshlp within five years after effeotivation of the Agreement. The Culturaû. Agreement calls for the delivery by Japan of specified Korean cultural properties to the Government of Republic of Korea within six months after effectivation of the Treaty. The exchanged official note on Settlement of Disputes states that both Governments should try to set­ tle their disputes first through diplomatic channels and if this proves a failure, then through mediation according to procedures to be agreed on between the two Governments. Ratification and its aftermath. Despite violent demon­ strations in Korea and Japan, neither Prime Minister Sato nor President Park doubted that their Parllsunents would ratify the treaty by the year's end. In Korea the treaty package was submitted to Congress on July 12, while Presi­ dent Park and his Defense Minister were discussing the con­ ditions of the dispatch of twenty thousand additional Korean troops to South Vietnam. Under tense circumstances brought on by a series of confrontations between rioting students and helmeted police forces, the Korean Congress first passed the additional troop dispatch bill on August 13 with the participation of only the ruling Democratic Republican mem­ bers. On the next day, again in the absence of boycotting opposition assemblymen, Congress ratified the treaty by a Q vote of 110 to 0. Following the ratification, the stu-

48 President Park Chung-Hee's statement on treaty ratifl cation in Dong A 11-Bo. August 1965, pL 1. 164 dents* demonstrations became more intense. When the students returned in late August for the delayed final examinations which had been postponed the preceding June when the schools were abruptly closed by government order, clashes increased daily. After some 875 students had been Jailed and one thous­ and injured, an anti-American mood grew more apparent. A typical slogan was "Yankee Keep Silent," underscoring the student belief that Washington was behind Park's Japan policy. This opposition movement was encouraged by Journalists. "While Korean soldiers are to shed their blood in Vietnam, Japan Is to enjoy the economic windfall," muttered a Seoul newspaper, 49 On the other hand, in Japan, Sato's government was also under heavy fire from an opposition movement launched by a united front of Communists, radical Socialists, and Zenkakuren students. Finally, the treaty was ratified by the House of Representatives on November 12, and by the Upper House on December 11, 1965. That session was attend­ ed only by the ruling Liberal Democrats.Thus, finally Korea and Japan restored formal diplomatic relations for the first time In the sixty years since 1905 when Korea had lost her sovereignty to Japan.

Korean Republic. July 3, 1965.

Asahi Shimbun, December 12, I965. 165

SUMMARY

During almost two decades, beginning in 1945, Korea and Japan made seven attempts at reconciliation by trying to settle the problems inherited from their colonial past. For several years, their efforts were retarded by a number of factors which Included the residual hostility and mutual dis­ trust deeply rooted in the hearts of both peoples. The first strong pres­ sure for an immediate reconciliation came in the wake of the Korean War.

Negotiation talks during the war were unproductive, however, primarily be­ cause of the unfavorable timing and the wide disparity in the positions of the two nations. In addition, aged leaders still remembered their bitter prewar experiences and their antagonism left little room for a compromise favorable to the long-run interests. In this regard. President Syngman

Rhee's firm and unyielding stand against Japan was one of the decisive obstructing factors, but by no means the greatest or the only one, Japan also had her own good reasons for her delaying tactics and half-hearted efforts at an immediate settlement with South Korea of the pending issues between the two nations.

When the Korean government approached the Japanese government for the settlement of two urgent issues — the fisheries agreement and the treatment of the Korean minority in Japan -- Japan was in fact engaged in carrying out many other more urgent foreign policy tasks. Among these crucial tasks were the Amer lean-Japanese administrative agreement on the status of Ameri­ can forces in Japan; fisheries agreements with the United States, Canada,

Australia, and the United Kingdom; and the separate peace treaty with Taiwan

-- a Japanese obligation resulting from the San Francisco Peace Treaty,

Since she was greatly pressured by these urgent Issues of higher priority. 166

Japan wanted to postpone her settlement with Korea until these problems were solved. Other priority objectives in Japan's new independent foreign policy included her efforts to make a ^ facto peace treaty with the Soviet

Union and an Informal fisheries agreement with Communist China. These goals were not accomplished until late 1956. The principle of "priority choice" dictated that Japan avoid any concrete settlement with Korea, especially since her demands on the matter of fishing boundaries were great and her property claims, high. Therefore, Japan attempted to settle reparations problems with nations in Southeast Asia whose demands were more reasonable and less controversial than Korea's. In addition, Japan feared that a con­ cession to South Korea on the fishing boundaries might establish a prece­ dent that would work to her disadvantage in her negotiations with Russia and China over a similar issue.

However, toward the end of the 1950's the gradually fchanging inter­ national environment and Japan's rapidly recovered and developing economy provided her with a new incentive for the resumption of the delayed nego­ tiation talks with Korea. This time the stimulus came from changes in

American military and economic policy as spelled out in the second U.S.-

Japanese security pact of 1960. The militarily and economically overbur­ dened American government asked that Japan, who could now make some pay­ ments for what the Americans had invested during the postwar period, help her shoulder this burden. In Korea, the stubborn old dictator was replaced by more liberal and conciliatory leaders in the early I960's. The new

leaders of post-revolutionary South Korea embarked on national reconstruc­

tion through the modernization of Korean industries. They also hoped to

further Korea's economic development by merging her ample but cheap labor

forces with foreign capital investments. Furthermore, Japan herself had 167

reason to be actively Interested In another attempt at reconciliation with neighboring South Korea.

The unprecedentedly successful economic development of Japan and the restoration of the political and psychological self-confidence of her peo­

ple demanded that she play a greater role in Asia. Furthermore, Japan's

high rate of economic growth required a larger market as well as sums of

fresh capital investments. When Japan's prewar markets, including the vast

Asian continent and Western Europe, were closed to Japanese goods for vari­

ous reasons, she was forced to try once more in Southeast Asia and neigh­

boring Taiwan and Korea, By the early I960's the Korean industries had also

recovered a great deal because of more than two billion dollars in American

aid and these industries could at least meet the immediate demands of

daily needs. This steady economic development had restored some confidence

to her people, and there was even hope that Korean industries would soon

reach a take-off stage if fresh foreign investments boosted the economy a

little more. Now both Korea and Japan began to recognize their common in­

terest in economic co-operation, and this recognition was immediately re­

flected in the more concrete terms of their negotiation talks during the

early I960's. 168

CONCLUSION

The great influence of changes in the political climate and the shrewd awareness of their self-interests shown by leaders of both nations raises great doubts about the validity of some of the views of writers who have previously discussed this diplomatic episode. For instance, many writers indicated that old nationalistic resentments rooted in the colonial period had been the principal cause for the failure of early attempts at rapproche­ ment. In particular, Syngman Rhee's stubbornness and his strong antago­ nism to Japan were exaggerated in these generalized accounts. However, a careful study of public opinion, the terms of the negotiations, and the chronological development of the negotiating aims and tactics leads to a different conclusion. It was, in fact, a rational fear of superior Japan­ ese economic power rather than emotional resentment that caused the Ropean

government to hesitate during the early period. In addition, Japan's dubious position in East-West relations, though fully justified from the

Japanese standpoint, created further difficulties. Ideologically divided

Korea simply could not afford to identify herself with such flexibility.

There is no doubt but that Syngman Rhee's unyielding attitude was one of the greatest obstacles, but not the most serious or the only one. Fur­ thermore, his policy and, more specifically, his anti-Japanese position can not be fairly and objectively evaluated unless the motives for his Japan policy are placed in the broad context of Korea's contemporary interna# tional and domestic situation.

When the first round of talks opened in Tokyo in November 1951, dur­ ing the bitterest part of the Korean War, President Rhee and his people were engaged in a vigorous war against Communism, whereas Japan was en­

joying a war boom. Since Korea's industries were being severely damaged as 169

a result of the war, the nation's economy was literally paralyzed. At the same time,smuggled Japanese goods filled flattened Korean cities. At the negotiation table the Japanese were evasive in their discussion of the property claims and the fisheries issue because of their own foreign policy problems. For instance, Japan refused to talk about the Korean proposal on the fisheries issue before the MacArthur line was removed by the en­ forcement of a peace treaty in the spring of 1952 on the grounds that she was not ready for it yet. The reaction of Korea was the proclamation of the Peace Line for her own defense. President Rhee's action was immedi­ ately and harshly criticized as an act of international piracy, whereas the Truman Doctrine and similar actions by Latin American countries as well as by the Philippines were not challenged nearly as much.

President Rhee was also unpopular with American leaders because of his stubborn war aims. The American government was anxious to see the nor­ malization of relations between her two Asian allies so she could estab­ lish a more viable regional security system, giving an increased role to

Japan. When these attempts were delayed by continuous disagreement between the two Asian allies, as Professor Richard Allen has declared: "Ameri­ can leaders were inclined to believe that the major blame was on the

Korean side." "This view of American officials both at home and abroad," as Professor Allen put it, "was basically formed by their prejudice over the potential role of Japan in the area." In addition, "the American lead­ ers had had a difficult experience of their own in dealing with Korea's

President during the Korean Armistice Conference and thereafter," Many of these opinions were further exaggerated by journalists and scholars.

On the other hand, by exploiting this unpopular image of the Korean

President, Japan seems to have effectively manipulated her propaganda ma- 170

chines in Tokyo and Washington in order to win American sympathy and sup­ port. For example, Japan Reports. published in English at the Embassy in

Washington, presented the Japanese position in the most favorable light.

However, inexperienced Korean leaders merely blamed Japan for a lack of

sincerity -- and in very abstract and unconvincing words. Nevertheless,

the Peace Line was Korea's strongest bargaining weapon in her negotiations with Japan, and she successfully maintained it until the last moment. For

instance, the Korean property claims and the removal of the Peace Line

were finally settled through political bargaining, which opened the way for

the final accord, Korea made this long withheld concession only when she

was convinced of the greater value of Japanese economic aid for her ambi­

tious Five Year Economic Plan which would make her a self-supporting na­

tion.

Thus, the suddenly intensified efforts for reconciliation and co­

operation between Korea and Japan in the early 1960's are attributable to

the following three factors; the completion of urgent Japanese foreign

policy tasks by the late 1950's; changes in the methods of American for­

eign policy and their direct impact on these two Asian allies; and, lastly,

the rapid escalation of the war in Vietnam, which unmistakeably accelerated

the final rapprochement by making it urgently necessary for Japan and

Korea to co-operate to maintain their common security. In the final analy­

sis, then, it was the pressing realities of the changing international en­

vironment and the mutual recognition of a common interest in economic co­

operation in the early 1960's that turned the two contending neighbors into

co-operating allies.

At any event, by means of the normalization treaty, Korea and Japan

established for the first time in modern history a means of co-operating 171

on an equal footing. Economically, fresh Japanese capital and technical know-how have provided substantial help in the realization of Korea's am­ bitious Five Year Plans -- promising a self-supporting economy, and thus

reducing the burden of American economic aid. Considering the long­

standing bitterness and animosity of the pre-treaty era, the achievements

during the three years since the treaty was ratified have been truly re­

markable, The South Korean economy has already been vitalized by three

years of economic co-operation with Japan, making Korea's second Five Year

Economic Plan (1966-1971) more successful than the first one (1962-1965)

both in terms of its timetable and efficiency because of the ample inflow

of Japanese capital and goods. There are, however, some serious problems.

At the moment of writing -- March 1969 — this trade imbalance stands at

a ratio of 6:1 in Korea's disfavor. There are also some problems in ad­

justing the interests of the two countries. Since Japan can take greater

initiative in the economic co-operation program than Korea, the letter's

consistent demands for more liberalized investment conditions for Japanese

businessmen are more often ignored than not. In this connection, some in­

tellectuals in Korea are warning the government about the possibility of re­

newed Japanese economic domination. However, these problems must be solved

by means of patient compromise for the sake of long-term interests, if a

truly constructive relationship is to be sustained.

Politically, this treaty, the last ^ facto peace treaty that Japan

signed with her former colony, has substantially solidified the American

regional security system in the Far East, and placed an additional burden

on Japan for the security of the area against Communist aggression. In

Korea the long drawn out treaty negotiations with her colonial ruler and

public suspicion of the government's motives for hurriedly arranging a 172

political settlement became a highly controversial political issue. Public opposition was closely connected with the uncertain sources of a great sum of campaign money. In late 1963 this question became a critically contro­ versial issue that endangered the existence of President Park's regime.

In Japan, although the treaty negotiations caused some turmoil and the op­ position parties threatened massive anti-treaty demonstrations similar to earlier ones, the final accord was received with considerable calm. The accomplishment of the long sought liquidation of the fishing restrictions

Imposed by the Rhee Line was considered a great political victory for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. In addition, Japan also effectively avoided direct criticism from her Communist neighbors by leaving room for a later accomodation with North Korea, This was the result of Japan's suc­ cess in defining the jurisdiction of South Korea according to UN Resolution

195 (December 1948) which says that the Republic of Korea was the only le­ gitimate government in the area to which the UN authorities had access.

In addition to the problems mentioned above, some more serious ones are awaiting settlement such as the jurisdiction of the barren island called

Takeshlma (in Japanese) or Tokdo (in Korean) which lies in the Sea of Japan.

Other problems include the co-ordination of the Joint Control Commission in its policing of the fishing zone, the Japanese government's treatment of the

Korean minority under her jurisdiction, and Japan's continued repatriation of pro-Communist Koreans to North Korea, Any of these difficulties could embarrass Korea's foreign policy and lead to internal political repercus­ sions from the opposition party, which is quite critical of the government's ineffectiveness in trying to solve these problems. Therefore, although the two nations have reached an initial agreement on the most pressing issues, a more permanent and fundamental rapprochement is yet to be achieved. Only 173

through continuous common efforts based on mutual respect and a greater appreciation of long-term interests can Korea and Japan reach this goal.

In this sensé, the Korean-Japanese Normalization Treaty is another example of the triumph of necessity over idealism. 174

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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In Engllah: Allen, Richard, Korea's Syngman Rhee, Tokyo, i960. Barnett, A ,D, Communist China and Asia; Challenge to Ameri­ can Policy. Berger, Carl. The Korea Knot, A Military-Political History. 1965. Cary, James. Japan Today, Reluctant Alley. Reedrich A. Prae- ger. New York, 1962, Council on Foreign Relations, Japan between East and West. New York, 1957- Grajdanzov, A.J, Modern Korea, Her Economic and Social Devel­ opment . 19^^. Hinton, H.C. Communist China in World politics, Boston, I966. Kawai, Kazuo, Japan’s American Interlude, Chicago: The Univer­ sity of Chicago Press, i960. Lew Von Aduard, E.J. Japan from Surrender to Peace, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957* McCune, G.M. Korea-American Relations (1908-19^8), Cambridge. 1950. Korea Today, Cambridge, 1950» Mendel, Couglas. Japanese People and Foreign Policy. I96I. Morley, James W. Japan and Korea, America's Allies, New York, Reischauer, E,0, The United States and Japan, New York: Viking Press, 1965- Wagner, E.W, The Korean Minority in Japan (1904-1950). 1951• Yoshida, Shigeru. The Yoshida Mémoires, trans, by Kenich Yoshida, Boston"! Houghton Mifflin and Co., I962. 175

In Japanese; Hatada, Tekashi. Nihon to Chosen (Japan and Korea). Tokyo, 1965. Kamlkawa, Hlkomatsu, Nihon galko no sal shuppatsu (The New Departure of the Japanese Foreign Policy), Tokyo, 1^60. Kamimura, Shinichi. Shutang anjen hosho .loygku no gaisetsu (The Illustration of Mutual Security Treaty). Tokyo,

Mura, Tsuneo, Kan koku gunsei no keifu (The Genealogy of the Korean Military Junta). Tokyo, 1966. Nakayatsu, Yosaku. Nikkan shin jidai (The New Era of Korean- Japanese Relations). Tokyo, 1965. - Ohira, Jengo, Alia gaikS to Nikkan Kankei (The Asia Diplomacy and Japanese Relations). Tokyo. 1965. Tamura, Kosaku. Jlyu sekal no boel to nlchibei shin ampo .loyaku (Defense of the Free World and New Japanese-U.S. Security Pact). Tanaka, Naokichi, Nihon o ugokasu nikkan kankei (The Japanese- Korean Relations that Disturbed Japan 1; " " . Tbkyo# Î9S3I ’K^fcpimunsi, Shinichi. Nihon gaiko no go.ltlnen (Fifty Years of the Japanese Foreign Policy). Tokyo, I960. Yamamoto, Susumu. Tok-vo*^Washinton. Nihon no Kei.lai gaiko (Tokyo-Washington, The Japanese Economic Foreign Policy) . Tokyo, 1963. Yoshida, Shigeru. Sekai to Nihon (The World and Japan). Tokyo, 1963.

In Korean; Hong, Sung-yu. 0 Kae nyun kyung.je kehuik haesul (The Illustra­ tion of the First Five-Year Economic Plan), Seoul, 1962. Korean Production Center, Hemll Kyong je hyupryuk ul bae kyung (The Background of Korean-Japanese Economic Cooperation^7 ^ ------Limb, Byung-Jik, Limb Pyung-iik hwulgo rok. (The mémoires of Limb Byung-Jik). Seoul? 1964. Park, Chung-hee. Uri miniok ui na kalgil (The Path of Our Na- tion), Seoul, 1962. 176

Won, ïong-sok. Hanll huldsun shlpsanyun (Porteen Years of Korean-Japanese Negotiation}. Seoul. 1965. Yoo, Jln-woo. MlniJu Juui ul gll (The Road to Democracy). Seoul, 1963Z

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U.S. Dept. Of State, "Korean Foreign Minister T.W, Lee talks with Husk", Dept, of State Bull., LII (April, I965), pp. 491-93. U.S. Dept. Of State, "Secretary Husk Holds talks with Presi­ dent of Korea", Joint communique released at Seoul on January 29, 1964, Department of State Bull.. (January 1964) 177

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In English; Barnett, R.W. "New Role of Japan in World Affairs; An Ameri­ can Views", Dept, of State Bulletin. LX (October, 1964), pp. 586-91. Berger, Samuel D. Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Far Eastern Affairs, "Korea— Progress and Prospects", Dept. of State Bulletin, LIV (April I966), pp. 840-65.

Bundy, William P. "Korea, a Free World's Partner in the Far East", Dept, of State Bulletin, LIII (October 11, I965 )» pp. 593-^.

Bundy, William P. "U.S. -Japanese Trend and Prospects", Dept. of State Bulletin. LIII (November, 1965), pp. 770-77.

Champner, O.K. "Japan-Korea Accords", Christian Century, LXXXII (December, I965), pp. I6l2-ïïïl Jorden, William J. "Japan's Diplomacy Between East and West", Japan Between East and West. Ed. by Hugh Borton, et al., New York; Council of Foreign Relations, 1957.

Kennan, G.F. "Japanese Security and American Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs XLIII (October, 1964), pp. 14-28.

Kishi, Nobusuke, "Political Movement in Japan", Foreign Af­ fairs . XXXLIV (October, I965), pp. 99-99. Lee, Chong-shik. "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective", Asian Survey, 11-11, (November, 1962), pp. 315-2 6 ,

Lim, Jong-Chul. "American Aid and Korean Economy", Korean Quarterly, VIII-3 (Autumn, I966), pp. ?6-92. Lymen, Princeton N, "Economic Development in South Korea and Problems", Asian Survey. (July, 1966), pp. 381-8?.

McNally, T, "Japan's Role on South Asia", Current History, XLIX (November, 1965), pp. 284-93, 178

Park, Chung-Hee. "New Years Message to the National Assembly", Koreans Quarterly VII-1 (January 16, 1965).

Pyun, Yung-Tal. "American Role in Korea-Japan Relations", Koreans Quarterly IV-l (Autumn 1962), pp, 21-32,

Scalaplno, Robert A. "Which route for Korea", Asian Survey. II-9 (September 1962), pp. 1-13.

Vanfleet, James A, "Emergence of new leadership In Korea", Koreans Quarterly IV-4 (Autumn 1962), pp. 13-20.

Yamamoto, Susumu. "The Prospective of Ikeda's Foreign Policy and Japanese-Korean Relations", Sekai (February 1962),

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Kato, Chuichi, "Nikkan I^idan to Betonarau sen" (The Japanese- Korean negotiation talks and the Vietnamese War), Sekai (April, 1965), PP. 45-51. Hatada, Yoshlo. "Nikkan kaidan to ajla shlnryaku" (The Japanese- Korean talks and the agression In Asia), Zen'ei , (July, 1965), PP. 117-23. Miyake, Kensuge, "Nichibei Kaidan go no Sato galko" (Sato's Diplomacy after the Japanese-U.S. talks), Sekal (April, 1965), pp. 67-7 6 .

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— ---. "Sekai keizai chuno Nihon" (Japan in the world economy) panel discussion, Sekai ( January, 1962), pp. 80-92.

Yamamoto, Susumu, "Ikeda galko no tenbo to Nikkan mondai" (The prospective for Ikeda's diplomacy and the question of Korean-Japanese relations), Sekai (February, 1962). 179

In Korean: Jung, Chong-Shlk, "Dae Ya shl raehan ul Kokjul" (The purpose Of Mr. Ohno's trip to Korea), Shlnseke, 1-3 (March, I963), pp. 136-41, Kira, Chul. "Ilbon Sahwui Dang ui Daehan Jungchaek" (The for­ eign policy of the Japauiese Socialist Party), Sasangke, (October, 1965), pp. 62-7 0 , Park, Chun-Kyu. "Keukdong ui Jangrae wa Hankuk moonJe" (The future of the Far East and Korean question), Sassangke, (April, 1963), pp. 487-93. Yoo, Jin-woo, "Hanil hwaedam ee yulrigi kkaji" (Until the opening of Korean-Japanese talks), Sassangke. (October, 1965). pp. 92-99.

NEWSPAPERS

Asahi Shinbun. February, September, November, 1962, June, July, October, I963. February, March, April, June, 1964. February, March, April, June, October, Decem­ ber, 1965. Dong A ilbo, Hankuk ilbo. Japan Times, 1958-59. Korea Times. 1956-60.

New York Times. I96O-6 5 .

REPORTS

Hong, Sung-Jik, "A pilot survey of Korean student's value", Korean Affairs. Seoul, No, 1, I963.

The Bank of Korea. Economic Progress in Korea, A report on Korean economic progress during the ^irst five-year eco­ nomic plan, 1962-1966, Seoul, April, 1966. The Ministry of Public Information, Korean Economy, An illus­ trated survey report on Korean economy including foreign investment, Seoul, January, I9 6 6 , 180

INTERVIEWS

Japanese Embassy. Personal Interview with Hr. Chiba, the first secretary of the political section of the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. was made on January 6, 196?. Korean Embassy. Personal interview with minister Kyu Sung Lee, the chief of political section of the Korean embassy in Washington, D.C., who was in Tokyo during the last round of Korean-Japanese negotiations, was made on January 20, 196?. 181

APPENDIX

1. Treaty on Basic Rsla-tions Treaty Serial Nuirber 8471

2. Agreement on Fisheries Treaty Serial Number 8472

3. Agreement on the settlement of problems concerning property claims and on ecxjnomic oo- cpera-tion Treaty Serial Number 8473

4. Agreement on the legal stzatus and the treatment of Nationals of Korea Treaty Serial Number 8474

Source of Appendix: Hie UN, Treaty Series Vol. 583, Vol. 584, Belgium: UN publicatrLon, 1966, PLEASE NOTE; Appendix pages are not original copy. Print is indistinct on many pages. Filmed in the best possible way. UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS. fk. ' %, U m( **«V- •**>■ .^.. f: J- -1*,:/. >'V 4^

44 United N'ations ■-- Treaty Series

No. 8471. TKlùAj'V» ON BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC 01' KOREA, SIGNED AT TOKYO, ON 22 jUNE I9t>5

Jiipiin and the Ke|iul>lic of Korea,

Considering the historical background of relationship between their people- and their mutual desire for good ncighborliness and for the normalization of tlieir relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty ;

,1 Recognizing the importance of their close cooperation in conformity with the ’V principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the promotion of their mutual t. / welfare and common interests and to the maintenance of international peace and à>. security ; and vc- Recalling the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the Francisco on September 8, 1951 • and the Resolution 195 (III) adopted by m m A / ' / S Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1948 ; ' A:;:'-'! Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty on Basic Relations and have accord­ L. VI- J ingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

Japan r

Etsusaburo Shiina, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Shinichi Takasugi

The Republic of Korea ;

Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Dong Jo Kim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Korea

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles :

‘ Came into (orcc on 18 December 19iVS. iho baten< I be exchange o( instruments ot rati lie atm n at Seoul, in acoordancu with article V I1. . J; • United Nations, 'i r,'aiy Serits. Vol. 13fl. j>, 4,S. • United Nations. 0]j\cial HfCvrdt of the lliiii/ .fesfitni of the (ienentl Wwr udi/v. Part I, Keeolti- tiers (A/BIO), p. 25.

■ ( > J f#/ t

4 8 U Hill'd Xif/iotts Trcnlv Series 1 9 6 6

Arlirlt' I

Dipli'inatù' ami consular relations shall he established between the High Con­ tracting Parties, The High Contracting Parties shall exeliaiige diplomatic envoys with the Ambassadorial rank without delay. The High Contracting Parties will also establish consulates at locations to he agreed npm by the two Governments.

Arlidc II

It IS cmilirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Jai>nn and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.

Article III

It is cun firmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Go\ eminent in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly. ■r /_ " ' f,. V . > ' Article IV , . , '7'i? .;* ■ Cy'i " (a) The High Contracting Parties will be guided by the principles of the Charter *C ■ ‘ of the United Nations in their mutual relations.

■ '■■t *t'. 'r ' (5) The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in conformity with the prin­ t ciples of the Charter of the United Nations in promoting their mutual welfare and common interests. -f4- Article V

The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest pr.ic- ticable date for the conclusion of treaties or agreements to place their trading, mari­ tim e and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

Article VI The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest practi-t cable date for the conclusion of an agreement relating to civil air transport.

Article 1 7 /

The pii*sent Treaty shall be rat died. The m-trumenls of rati beat ion shall be exchanged at Seoul a- soon as possible. The ]rre.scnt I'reat y shall enter into lorce .is from the date on wltieli tie- iiislruineiils of ralilieation are exeh.m ged. So. S47I M 48 United X niions 'I'renlv Series 1966

Ix u'lTM.’s.s \v (m;kioi-', till' respective Pleiiipnlonliaru's liavi; signed the pic.-ent Treaty and have alhxed theietn their seals.

Donk in duplicate at Tnkyo, this twenty-second day of .[tine of tfrc year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-ftve in the Japanese, Korean, and English languages, each text being ctpiully authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Fur Japan :

•c Etsusaburo SltltNA Shinichi T ak .vsuci

For the Republic of Korea ;

T ong W on L ee Dong J o K im

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'A- i;w Uniled Salions -~ Tmilv Scries 19% >v rrUANSI-AllON * T h APUCTION=* i *4 , "'k. No. 8472. AGREEMEN'r=* ON FISHEKIES • BETWEEN . . JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. SIGNED AT TOKYO, ON 22 [UNE 1965

Japan and the Uopublic of Korea, VJ', r Desiring that the maximum sustained productivity of the fishery resources in waters of their common interest be maintained ; G Being convinced that tiie conservation of the said resources and their rational exploitation and development will serve the interest of both countries ;

Confirming that the principle of the freedom of the high seas shall be respected',' unless otherwise sjiccifically provided in the present Agreement ;

' '-I Recognizing the desirability of eliminating causes of disputes which may arise from their geographical proximity and the intermingling of their fisheries ; and

Desiring to cooperate mutually for the development of their fisheries ; ■» ■ % A .u/' Have agreed as fpjlows :

Article I

1. The Contracting Parties mutually recognize that each Contracting Party has the rights to establish within twelve nautical miles measured from its coastal baseline a sea zone over which it exercises exclusive jurisdiction with respect to fisheries (hereinafter referred to as "fishery zone"). However, in case where either Contracting Party uses a straight baseline in establishing its fishery zone, it shall determine such straight baseline upon (through! consultation with the other Contract­ ing Party.

> Translation by the Government of Japan. The Secretariat also n-eciveil an IfiiRiish translation ol this agreement from the Government of the Uepublie of Korea which on cerl.iin points differs from that provided by the Oovernment of Japan. .\i the request of the Government %' of the Itcpuhlic of Korea, thc.-e differences have been shown by printing in italics the pertinent word or phrase in the translation of the Government of .Japan and providing in square brackets the corresponding expre.ssinn in the translation by the Government of the Uepulilie of Korea. •Traduction dn Gouvernement japonais. I.c Gouvernement de la Itdpnbli.pio de ("ori'e a. ' •» • également tnmnuiuiqinS au Secrétariat nnu traduction anglaise de cet accord qui diffère en certains

• ivf points de celle transmise par le Gouvcrneineiit japonais. A la demande du Gouvernement de la Ucpublique

i p : -ft - : - ■

' ■

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4 . . ' ' • - V- '• . ■

132 United Xations Trcoty Series 1966

, * 'l. Tlir Contr;u-tiiig l’nrlics sliall not niiso ngainst vîuli ot!u*r anv objei-tinn to ^ ' , the exclusion hy cither Contmeting Party of the fishing vessels of the other Contract- ing Party from engaging in fishing operation in the fishery zone of tliat either Contract- • ‘ ing Party.

3. The overlapping ]iart of the fishery zones of the Contracting Parties shall he divided into two by tin* straight lines joining the two end-points of the part with < ‘ the mid-point of the straight line drawn across that area at its widest point.

I . H, l* Articlf II The Contracting Parties shall establish a joint regulation zone enclosed by tiie lines described below (excluding any territorial seas and the fishery zone of the Repub­ lic of Korea).

(fl) Meridian 124° East Longitude north of 37° 3 0 'North Latitude. s. Of'.j 'I . • . . - 1 . . i (6) Lines connecting the following points in order :

e ® r - " (i) Intersection of 37°30'North Latitude and 124° East Longitude , ' " I ' ,/ ' (ii) Intersection of 36° 45' North Latitude and 124° 30' East Longitude I (iii) Intersection of 33° 30' North Latitude and 124° 30' East Longitude f>, * ■ '* (iv) Intersection of 32° 30'North Latitude and 126° East Longitude ^ ' ' (v) Intersection of 32° 30' North Latitude and 127° East Longitude Cji ./A, (vi) intersection of 34° 34' 30" North Latitude and 129°2' 50" East Longitude ■' . (vii) Intersection of 34° 44' 10" North Latitude and 129° 8' East Longitude ‘ . (viii) Intersection of 34° 50' North Latitude and I29°'14' East Longitude \ (ix) Intersection of 35° 30' North Latitude and 130° East Longitude ... (x) Intersection of 37“ 30' North Latitude and 131° 10' East Longitude * .. .■ (xi) Highest peak of Uamryung

° ./'r \ , ' Arlidc III

, The Contracting Parties shall implement in the joint regulation zone, until such time as conservation measures nece.ssary for the maintenance of the maximum sus- 0-^ . . taincd productivity of fishery resources arc implemented on the basis of sufficient ; r.e,, >/,' . scientific surveys, the pro\ isioual regulation measures for fisheries described in the ■ Annex, which constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement, with respect to drag-net fishing and seine fishing and to nisckcrel-angling fishing hy fishing vessels of ‘ ,r\-.' not less than 60 tons. (Tonnage is in gross tonnage and is indicated hy deducting the f -J ' % tonnage allowed for improving living quarters of the vessel.) ' ^ Nn. IMJ3 vV*»

.V. ' Y,'

P'/ ' • '■H -/‘t

UÎ4 (hiitcif Snlintis - Trealy Séries iy

Article / r • I I. IViliciiig (including halting and itispediiij^ ,visiting) of vessel) and court jurisdiction in the waters outside the lishery zone shall hi; carried out and exercised C" only hy the Contracting Party to which the fishing vessel hulongs. t i

2. Each Contracting Party shall give and exercise pertinent guidance anrl super­ vision in order to ensure that its nationals ;uid fishing vessels observe faithhilh' the provisional regulation measures for fisheries, and shall enforce domestic measures, including appropriate penalties against violations thereof.

Article V

Joint resources survey zones shall be established outside the joint regulation zone. The extent of the said survey zones and the survey to be conducted within these zones shall be determined upon consultation between the two Contracting Parties on the basis of recommendation to be made by the Joint Fisheries Commission provided for in Article VI of the present Agreement. , < ‘ ' - ■ , ■ . Article V I ; .

1. The Contracting Parties shall establish and maintain the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Fisheries Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission"! in order to realize the objectives of the present Agreement.

2. The Commission shall be composed of two national sections, each consisting . .4- of three members appointed by the Governments of the respective Contracting Parties. s 3. All resolutions, recommendations, and other decisions of the Commission shall be made only by agreement between the national sections.

V.. 4. The Commission may decide upon and amend, as occasion may require, rules for the conduct of its meetings. 3. The Commission shall meet at least once each year and at such other times A ■ as mav be requested by either of the national sections. The date and place of the * > first meeting shall he determined by agreement between the Contracting Parties. d- 6. At its first meeting, the Commission shall select a Chairman and a N'iee- Chairman from different national sections. The Chairman and the \'ice-Ch.iirm.m . * shall hold office for a period of one year. Selection of the Chairman and the N ice Chairman from the national sections shall he made in such a manner as will provide V'-. in turn each Contracting Party with representation in these olliees. S, • 7. A permanent secretariat shall be established under the Commission to e,m \ A *■ out the business of the Commission. N.v V' ■•'I' i

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.r " -v -./y--. " l 7-;* ‘'‘v c

186 Lhtih'd Sadons - Trcn(\ Series 1966

S, The (itlieial languages ol the Commission shall he japam se and Korean. Proposals and data may hi* snhmitled in eitliei ofheial language, or. if nete.ssar)-, in English.

9. In case the Commission eondudes that joint exjx-nses are neeessavy, smli exjrenses shall be paid by the Commission through eonlribulions made by the Con­ tracting Parties in the form and proportion reeommcnded by the Commission and f .1 appro* ed by the Contracting Parties. 10. The Commission may delegate the disbursement of funds for the joint expenses.

% \{ ArticU VII

1. The Commission shall perform the following functions ; ' (a) Recommend to the Contracting Parties with respect to scientific survey to J ; be conducted for the purpose of studying the fishery resources in watersof their . common interest and to the regulation measures to be taken within the joint regula- C ' tion zone on the basis of the results of such survey and study ; ' (6) Recommend to the Contracting Parties with respect to the extent of the ^ . joint resources survey zones ; , ' ' . ' ‘ * (c) Review, when necessary, matters concerning the provisional regulation measures for fisheries and recommend to the Contracting Parties with respect to ''V ’ '■ measures, including the revision of the provisional regulation measures, to be taken } / * '■* , on the basis of the results of such review ; ' ^;i • / \ : (d) Deliberate on necessary matters concerning the safety and order of operation between the fishing vessels of the Contracting Parties and on general principles of J measures for handling accidents at sea between the fishing vessels of the Contracting 'T' Parties, and recommend to the Contracting Parties with respect to measure.s to be

' Y y y V , taken on the basis of the results of such deliberation ; " * ' (gj Compile and study data, statistics and records to be provided by the Contract- .-*' '*S . , ‘ ing Parties at the request of the Commission ; , I if) Consider and recommend to the Contracting Parties with respect to the enact­ ment of schedules of equivalent penalties for * iolations of the present Agreement ; /

. ' ‘ (g) Submit annually to the Contracting Parties a rejwrt on the operations of the 7 ' ■ , ■‘.'j ‘ Commission ; and (/() In addition to the foregoing, delibcvate on various technical questions arising , from the implementation of the present Agreement, and recommend, when deemed 'V- , necessary, to the Contracting Parties with res]K*ct to measures to be taken.

2. Tlie Commission, in order to perform its functions, may, when necessary, S ', , establish subordinate organs comjxised of ex|wrtb.

- ^ ■ - Mp, M7J 4 -S' ; I * #

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i

K W UiiUi'ii y at ions ■ I'mitv Sctias IWHfj % . ■ 1 ;i. T h e (’lovcnunom s i»f the Cnmniotmj^ I’arties sluill respctt tu tlic rx tru t ■,»< possible the recoiiimendtitions made by the ('.(unmlssiuK iimler the provisions of pnrnfjniph 1.

Artidc Vin

1. The liltr;u'tinn I’ailies shall take measures deimefl pi itiiiciil toward their respeeti\ e ii.itinnals and lisiiiiin vessels in order to have them obser\'e international praetices i oiieerninn nax iftalion, to ensure safety and maintain jimper order in opera­ tion between tiie Itsbin^ \essels of the Cnnlrtn lin^ I’aities and to seek smooth anel speedy settlem ents of aeeidents at sea between the lishin^ \ esseU of the Contraetmtr Parties.

2, I'or the ]nn poses set forth in païa^raph 1, the anthoi ities eoncerned of tin* f'on traeting Ihirties shall, to the extent possible, maintain close eontart and cooperate with each other.

», Article IX

-, • 1. Any dis])iitc between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation — V. and implementation of the present Agreement shall be settled, first of all, through '*

3. If, within the periods respectively referred to, the Government of either ‘ f/ ' Contracting Party fails to appoint an arbitrator, or the third arbitrator or a third • .i ' ' country is not agreed upon, the arbitration board shall be comjtosed of the two .irbi- *■ . trators to be designated by each of the governments of the two countries respectively

■ ® , chosen by the Governments of the Contracting Parties within a period of thirty days ,*■ ' and the third arbitrator to be designated by the gm eminent of a third country lo be determined upon consultation between the governments so chosen.

4. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall abide by any award m.ule

; ■ d . by the arbitration board under the provisions of the present Article.

Na. M73 • » 1 •I t d ■ • 1 ■ V t.

:f,c ^ ■ ...... ÿ-V iiV ^ 'W. * . ■’ \* ; ’.u. .- ..•'VI' ,y*r ■ •■■*•■ vv,.-'■'■■- A I

V. V . 140 Ifnilcil Xtilinns ■'i'rcalv Si'rii's 19(ifi

I ' .4 rlicic A' » 1. Till' pii'si'iU .\giceinent shall be ratil’irii. The instniiiicnts n( nitifi'atimi tr shall be I'xrluingccl at Seoul as snun as possible, The present Agreement shall enter ^ , ( I into liirce mi the date id the exehaiige of the instruments of ratilication.

2. I'he present .Agroemcnl shall rem.iiii in force for a ]>ei iod ot fne years and thereafter until one year from the day on whirh either Contracting I’arty shall give notice to the other of its intention to terminate the present Agreement. ) In \virxitss w h f .hf .o f the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Do n e in duplicate at Tokyo, in the Japanese and Korean languages, both being equally authentic, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five.

For Japan :

Etsusaburo S h hn a Shinichi T akasuci I For the Republic of Korea :

T o n g W o n L e e ‘ . " ' , Dong J o K im

• f • A X X 1-: X

/ The provisional regulation measures for fisheries provided for in Article 3 of the present Agreement shall apply to each of the two Contracting Parlies and shall be as , follows ; I I.The maximum niimhcr of fishing vessels or fishing units in operation (that is. the maximum number of fishing vessels or units operating at a given time within the joint r regulation zone, iiolding licences and bearing identification marUings for fishing operation '■ . within the said zone) ; ■d ^ ’■ (fl) For drag-net fishing by fishing vessels of less than Sh tons. 1 l.s vessels. .'4 sL' (il) For drag-nel fishing by fishing vessels of not less than ôh tons ' (i) 270vessels during the period Xoveinbcr 1 to April 30 of the follouing year.

■ A' (Ü) ion vewels during the [leriod .May J to (_ictidier 31.

f t No. «471

■S' .

4*«. ■ ».* i '.f. r .s , '%v • * • ' • ^ J.: V * A 258 Unilt'ii Xafitnis Trcatv Series 19W

i'I'H.WSl A rU iN ' - ‘l'K.Ain'CTlOS *' - No. 8478. AGKFJvMlCN'r:» ON THE SETTLEMENT OE EkOH- ’ . > j LE MS CüNCERNlNTi PROEEKTV AND CLAIMS AND ON ■ '!' ' f ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION DETWEEN JAPAN AND THI-: * * V T REPUBLIC OE KOREA. SIGNED AT TOKYO, ON ■ ' 22 JUNE 1963

Jap.in and the Kepuhlic of Korea, Desiring to settle fthej problem concerning property of the two countries anti their nationals and claims between the two countries and their nationals ; and

Desiring to promote the economic co-operation between the two countries ; rJ V- Have agreed as follows :

Article I

1. To the Republic of Korea Japan shall : s i » . ’ . ' . ' (fl) Supply the products of Japan and the services of the Japanese people, the ■ total value of which will be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to three hundred S i S : ' million United States dollars ($300,000,000) at present computed at one hundred 'T • and eight billion yen (¥108,000,000,000), t« grants [on a non repayable basis] within ^ the period of ten years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement. *'' * ' The suppi}’of such products and services in each year sAa//ÔC/jtmVcd to [shall be such] ^ ■ * such amount in yen as shall be equivalent to thirty million United States dollars X . . •* ($30,000,000) at present computed at ten billion eight hundred million yen <■'' '■ (¥10,800,000,000) ; in case the supply of any one year falls short of the said amount, the remainder shall be added to the amounts of the supplies for the next and subse­ quent years. However, the ceiling on[*j the amount of the supply for any one year can be raised [increased] by agreement between the Governments of the (’ontract- ' ing Parties. (6) Extend long-term and low-interest loans up to such amount in yen as shall * ! ^ ' ' be equivalent to two hundred million United States dollars (S20O,O0n,tXK)) at present

' ' .1 computed at seventy-two billion y<’U {¥72,000,000,(M)0), which the Government of

; ^ ^ --- * Suf footnntu I, ]>. KUj of this volninu, *' * \ oir notr -, p. 130 ilu cu voluniu. ^ ______- w * ^ ^ Came into force on 18 l>ecej»il»et lOfîS» the date of the of thr inslniimTTis ol ^ ■' nLtification at Scmil. in mcordancc with article IV. < Does not apfx'ar in tiie Knplish translation provitlcil by thr tioviTumenl of thr Ilepublir 'If / ^ r of Korea ‘ t Cfs mots n apparaissent p^o* (Ltus la trathu tiou anttlaise Inornir par U* t ’.oiivrrneiiioht tic li y -ï -evV " ' ' ’ \ I ' '' ,

; , A s I • i * <»•*!%

*.) ' \' A‘ ‘'"’ h 260 VniteilXulions Treuty Scries ' ~ ' 1966

^ the R,-publie of Korea may request and whieh shall be used for the prueurenicnl hy^^ ______'■ ' * the Republic of Korea of the produets of Japan and the services of the (apimese ^ ^ jH'oplc necessary in implementing the jirojects to be determined in accordance with *. ; ^ * arrangements to be com baled under the provisions of jiaragrajih 3 of the present ' s Article, within the period of ten years from the date of the entry into force of the \ ‘ present Agreement, Such loans shall be extended by the Overseas iiconoinic Co- \ 4 '' . ' ojwration Fund of Japan, and the Government of Japan shall take necessary measures \ , in order that the said Fund will be able to secure the necessary funds for implementing \ < the loans evenlv each year. i'. The above-nieutimied supply and loans should he such tliat will he conducive « to the economic development of the Republic of Korea. 2. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall establish, as an organ of con- ' ' su It at ion between the two Governments with powers to recommend on matters t' /' concerning the implementation of the jirovisions of the present Article, a Joint 1^ ’ I ^ ‘ Committee composed of representatives of the two Governments. ■ 3. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall conclude necessary arrange- I ments for the implementation of the provisions of the present Article.

I^ „ J y. . , 1. The Contracting Parties confirm that [the] problem concerning property, rights • .c/ . and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their nationals (including juridical ./ • ' J^persons) and concerning claims between the Contracting Parties and their nationals, L ‘ including those provided for in Article IV, paragraph (a) of the Treaty of Peace with * Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8. 1951, is settled completely ■ and finally. . 2. The provisions of the present Article shall not affect the following (excluding ]' ■ S those subject to the special measures which the respective Contracting Parties have \ taken by the date of the signing of the present Agreement) :

A f - 1- ■ {a) Property, rights and interests of those nationals of either Contracting Party who have ever resided in the other country in the period between August 15, 1947 if*.- and the date of the signing of the present Agreement ; jfj.* ' ^ . • (fc) Property, rights and interests of either Contracting Party and its nationals, '1' Tb'E*’ which have been acquired or ha\ e come within the jurisdiction of the other *'.*** V' e. , Contracting Party in the course of normal contacts on or after .\ugust 15, 1945. 4. ■'*{«/

. J',^ 3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, no contention shall be made with • 4 ' respect m the measures on property, rights and interests of either Contractinç I’.irty ' * f' null its nationals which are within the jurisdiction of the othei Coutiactinit Party v*,'j ' t on the date of the signing of the present .\greement, or with respect to any claims of y*^‘, S '. either Contracting Party and its nationals against the other Contracting Party and Its nationals arising from the causes which occurred on or 1 . fore the said date.

^ - N.,. IM7.1

. 'I i' / . In

? ;

VV ... ■'■ ' '

262 United Nations - Treaty Series 1966 *. ■ . ' ■ ,'^ Article fit i‘i •' I. Any dispute between the Contracting I’arties loiu crning the interpretation and ' ; ■ iiuplementatinn of the present .\grcement shall he settled, first of all, through dipln.- ^ ^ , inatic channels. * '■ ■ 2. .\»y dispute which fails to he settled under the provision of paragraph I shall he f ■ referred for decision to an arbitration board composed of three arbitrators, one to he appointed by the Government of each Contracting Party within a period of thirty ■ J days from the date of receipt by the Goveniment of either Contracting Party from the jj-*' ^2 ** Government of the other of a note requesting arbitration of the dispute, and the third E;,, • ■ ‘ arbitrator to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen within a further period • * of thirty days or the third arbitrator to he appointed by the government of a third . * country agreed upon within such further period by the two arbitrators, provided that ^ the third arbitrator shall not be a national of either Contracting Party.

I.W .'A. • ^ 3. If, within the periods respectively referred to, the Government of cither Contract- t. i, ^ \ ing Party fails to appoint an arbitrator, or the third arbitrator or a third country is ' not agreed upon, the arbitration board shall be composed of the two arbitrators to ^ be designated by each of the governments of the two countries respectively chosen

4 , V ~ ,^by tlie Governments of the Contracting Parties within a period of thirty days and \ s the third arbitrator to be designated by the government of a third country to be deter- tp" ^ ■■ .t.M ■ m ined Upon consultation between the governmentsso chosen.

1 * 4. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall abide by any award made by the arbitration board under the provisions of the present Article. y -' V VG * T /•' Article IV % ' t '■ ' ' The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall 'y‘ . be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall enter into k T force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification. In w i t n e s s w h e r e o f , the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their * respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

' ' . W ' iV- Done in duplicate at Tokyo, in the Japanese and Korean languages, both being . ’ equally authentic, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine T V A-, , fV ./ ' ' hundred and sixty-five. -■ 7;,:%''- For Japan;

.1 f^ ^ 'J Etsusaburo Sh u n .\ a' ’/.-Aif ' ' •' Shinichi T akasuc .i . 'A|' ^ For the Republic of Korea : % ' ' . ^ , I'oNu Wo.N Lei; ' Donc . J o K im No. *W7J 't,

(

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32 United Nations — Treaty Scries 1966

[T r a n s l a t i o n '—'J’iia d u c t io n -] No. 8474. AGREEMT-:NT3 ON THE LEGAL STATUS AND THE TREATMENT OE THE NATIONALS OF THE REPUB­ LIC OF KOREA RESIDING IN JAPAN BETWEEN JA­ PAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. SIGNED AT TOKYO, ON 22 JUNE 1965

Japan and the Republic of Korea, Considering that nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan for many years have come to have special relations with Japanese society; and

Recognizing that enabling these nationals of the Republic of Korea to lead a stabilized life under the social order of Japan will contribute to the promotion of . ‘ r friendly relations between the two countries and their peoples; ' .i _ \ Have agreed as follows : t

, . ' I. The Government of Japan shall give permission for permanent residence in J ^ * Japan to a national of the Republic of Korea falling under either of the following , categories, if he applies for such permission within five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement in accordance with the procedure ■ ‘ to be established by the Government of Japan for the implementation of the present Agreement : (a) A person residing in Japan since August 15, 1945, or a date prior thereto, continuously until the time of his application; or ' {b ) A person born in Japan on or after August 16, 1945 and before the period * ■ - of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agroe-

' Translalioii by tlic Government of Japan, The Pcerctariat also recei' cU an Rnglisb trans­ lation of this agreement from the Government of the Hcpiiblic of Korea which on certain points ditfors from that provided hy the Government of Japan. At the request of the Government nt the Itepublic of Korea, these differences have been shown hy printing in italics the pertinent word of phrase in the translation of the Government of Japan and providing in square hraekets the corresponding expression in the translation hy the Government of the Uepiihlic of Korea. * I'radiiction du Gonvcrncment japonais. Le Gouvernement de la Kepuhltque de Corce n également communiqué au Secrétariat une traduction anglaise de eel accord qui dill ère en certains points rie celle transmise par le Gouvernement japonais. A la demande du Goinvrnemrnt île la République de Corée, on a indiqué en italique dans la traduction ir.insmisv par le Goui eniemeni japonais chaque mot ou groupe de mots donnant lieu à divergence et iiitruiiinl a la suite entre crochets l'expression correspondante ilans lu tnidiiction fournie par le Gouvernement de la Répu­ blique de Corée. ' Came into force on 17 January the thirtieth day follow ing the e.xehangc of the instru­ ments of mtiHcation, which tc«>k place atSemil on IH IJecember I9(»5, in ai coniance with article \ ’|.

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nicnt expires, as a lineal descendant of a person falling under (a) above, and residing in Japan continuously until the time of his application.

2. The Government of Japan shall give permission for permanent residence in Japan to a national of the Republic of Korea who is born in Japan after the lapse of live years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement as a child of a person who is given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 above, if such child applies for such permission within sixty days from the date of birth in accordance with the procedure to be established by the Government of Japan for the implementation of the present Agreement. 3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 above, the application period for permission for permanent residence shall be sixty days from the date of birth in the case of a person who falls under paragraph 1 (b) above and is born after the lapse of four years and ten months from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement. i J' 4. No fee shall be levied for the above-mentioned applications and permissions. I .A-.:*!'' I ■' Article II '■ _ fit 1. With respect to the residence in Japan of the nationals of the Republic of Vs Korea bom in Japan as lineal descendants of the persons who are given per­ .1 mission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I, the Government of Japan agrees, if requested by the Government of the Republic of Korea, to holding consultationsuntil twenty-five years will have elapsed [by the lapse of twenty-five years] from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement. 2. In the consultations under the preceding paragraph, the spirit and purposes which form the basis of the present Agreement shall be respected.

Article III A national of the Republic of Korea who is given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I shall not be deported from Japan unless he comes to fall under any of the following categories by his act [acts] committed on or after the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement : (a) A person who, for crimes concerning insurrection or crimes concerning foreign aggression, is sentenced in Japan to imprisonment or to a heavier punishment (except a person who is granted the suspension of execution of such sentence or who is sentenced for reasons of responding to an ‘ agitation or following the lead of another in an insurrection);

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36 United Nations — T reaty Series 1966

(ft) A person who, for crimes concerning foreign relations, is sentenced in Japan to imprisonment or to a heavier punishment, or a person who, for his criminal acts committed against the head of-a foreign state, a diplomatic envoy or his othcial premises, is sentenced to imprisonment or to u heavier punishment and thereby prejudice vital interests of Japan in its foreign relations;

(c) A person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan concerning control of narcotics with protitmaking intents, is sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for life or for not less than three years (except a person who is granted the suspension of execution of such sentence), or a person who, hy violating the laws and regulations in Japan concern­ ing control of narcotics, is sentenced to penalties not less than three times (twice in the case of a person who was sentenced to penalties not less than three times hy his acts committed prior to the date of the entry into force o f the present Agreement) ; or (d) A person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan, is sen­ tenced to penal servitude or to imprisonment for life or for more than seven years.

Article I V !*r t f L V'-' • ’ . The Government of 'Japan shall pay due consideration to the following fiutters w & " (d) Matters concerning education', livelihood protection and national health \u:- - . • insurance in Japan for the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I; and

(ft) Matters concerning taking property with them and remitting funds to the Republic of Korea in the event that nationals of the Republic of Korea, who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan * (1 '.V in accordance with the provisions of Article I (including persons who are qualified to apply for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of the said .Article), renounce their inten­ tion of residing permanently in Japan and return to the Republic of Korea.

■ p Article V It is confirmed that, with regard to all matters, including entry into and exit from Japan and residence in Japan, the nationals of the Republic ot Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I shall be subject, unless specifically provided for in the No. 1474 .. _____ *

38 United Nations — Treaty Series ~ 1966

present Agreement, to the laws and regulations in Japan applicable equally to all aliens.

Article VI The presen' -greement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall ______enter into force on the thirtieth day after the exchange of the instruments "of ratification.

In w i t n e s s w h e r e o f the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by , their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement. \ \ D one in duplicate at Tokyo, in the Japanese and Korean languages, both \ being equally authentic, this twenty-seçond day o f June of the year one thousand \ nine hundred and sixty-five.

For Japan : Etsusaburo S h h n a Shinichi T akasuci ' y I*. ■ ‘ . For the Republic of Korea : , 1 A •' ' ■ Tong Won Lee ' , 1

‘ ■ " ' ■ " • ' ■ d o n g jo k im :

/ ÿ / : ■ ! r AGREED MINUTES TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE LEGAL STATUS t ; AND THE TREATMENT OF THE NATIONALS OF THE REPUB- ■ " Lie OF KOREA RESIDING IN JAPAN BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The representatives of the Governments of Japan and the Republic of ’ ' Korea have reached the following understandings concerning the Agreement on the Legal Status and the Treatment of the Nationals of the Republic of Korea Residing in Japan between Japan and the Republic of Korea signed today : Re Article I : 1. For the purpose of certifying that a person who applies for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 or 2 of ^ ' _ the Article has the nationality of the Republic of Korea (i) Such person shall produce his passport or a certificate in lieu thereof, or shall submit a written statement that he has the nationality of the Republic of ; Korea; and : ^ No. <474

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