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LOGOS Summer 2007 Philosophy.Osu.Edu Words from the Chair THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PhilosophyLOGOS Summer 2007 philosophy.osu.edu Words from the Chair The last issue of Logos was published in 2003. It’s not surprising that there have been changes in the department since then, but it may be surprising how much has changed. High on the list of changes are the departures of a number of valuable long-term colleagues, and Canada seems to be the primary destination of choice. new academic locations and George Smithies of NYU and Wayne Wu In 2003, Sylvia Berryman took up in his retirement. of the University of California, a new position at the University of But the flow has been Berkeley. British Columbia. The next year bidirectional. In 2005, we appointed These are exciting times for Peter King left to take a position at David Sanson (Ph.D., UCLA) to the department. It is, I believe, the University of Toronto. In 2005, the Columbus campus and Kevin unprecedented for a department the Canadian universities struck again: Scharp (Ph.D., Pittsburgh) to size of ours and as long-established Diana Raffman went to Toronto, the Marion campus. This past as ours to hire one-third of its thus having Peter again as a academic year, with extraordinary faculty in a single year. We are colleague, and Bob Batterman went support from John Roberts, dean sorry to lose the colleagues who to the University of Western Ontario of the College of Humanities, the have left, either through retirement where he holds the Rotman Canada department has made seven new or relocation. At the same time, Research Chair in Philosophy of appointments. At the senior level, we we’re delighted to welcome so Science. In 2006, U.S. and British have appointed Lisa Downing and many terrific new colleagues. The institutions got in on the poaching. Abe Roth, both from the University extraordinary hiring effort was Louise Antony and Joe Levine of Illinois, Chicago. Canadian the result of a lot of hard work by departed to take positions at the institutions did not escape our many, but the efforts of three of our University of Massachusetts, and attentions. We appointed Ben colleagues deserve special mention. DON HUBIN, CHAIR Gabriel Uzquiano left us for Oxford. Caplan and Tim Schroeder, both Dan Farrell chaired the Senior Also, George Schumm has retired from the University of Manitoba. Search Committee, which reviewed after 35 years in the department. Richard Samuels of King’s College, the writings of many dozens of the With the dramatic changes come Everyone has been sorry to lose London, will join us this coming fall. most gifted senior philosophers in both challenges and opportunities. these wonderful colleagues, and we We also made two appointments at the world and culled from that select We face what is proving to be a wish them all the very best in their the assistant professor level: Declan group a small subset for us to pursue pleasant task of building a new as our top candidates. Dan also community in the department. worked tirelessly in the recruitment Together, we will work to cement the Some things change and some things don’t. For as long efforts of these candidates. William gains we have made and to take bold Taschek, who chaired the Junior steps to move the department even as I’ve been here—since the late 70s—our department Search Committee, led the review further toward the sort of excellence has been lively, intellectually engaged, and friendly. I’m of more than 300 candidates for our to which we aspire. two available junior positions. And Some things change and confident that those characteristics will continue. George Pappas, as chair, oversaw the some things don’t. For as long entire recruitment effort. as I’ve been here—since the late INSIDE What Philosophers Do—from Wide Receivers to Wikipedia Citizendium 3 East Meets West on the Sunny Shore of the Adriatic Sea 7 Words About the Faculty 8 Remembering Bob Turnbull 10 Words About the Students 11 LOGOS Words from the Chair cont’d The department will be increasingly challenged to engage 70s—our department has been Tennant received Distinguished lively, intellectually engaged, and Scholar Awards from the in “development”—the pleasant euphemism for ‘fund friendly. I’m confident that those university, and Dan Farrell raising.’ In a time of shrinking state support for education characteristics will continue. received a Distinguished Service and increasing demands for excellence in research and Faculty continue to be exceptionally Award. These are all extremely active in research areas. Lisa Shabel prestigious achievements teaching, the department needs to find sources of support received a major grant from the and awards, and all of these other than those on which it has traditionally relied. National Science Foundation, and colleagues certainly merit our Justin D’Arms was a fellow at the congratulations. Center for the Study of Human Through the efforts of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). This department isn’t the only thing Values at Princeton. Justin also George Pappas and Dan Farrell, external review team examined that’s changing. The academy—and received a fellowship from the the department has begun co- the department in great detail, the society that supports it—are National Endowment for the sponsoring a major conference in armed with a mountain of data and changing, too. Ohio State is a “state Humanities immediately following Dubrovnik, Croatia, along with interviews with faculty, staff, and university,” but the meaning of that his time at Princeton. Sukjae Lee colleagues from the Universities students. We have already learned a phrase is changing. Many “state has received a fellowship from of Maribor in Slovenia and Rijeka great deal from this review process. university” leaders around the the National Humanities Center in Croatia. Conferences were held We are gratified that our external country are reciting the same quip: in North Carolina where he is in there focusing on metaphysics review team is so enthusiastic about “We used to be state-supported, then residence this year. Abe Roth was and epistemology in 2003 and the department, describing it as state-assisted, and now we are state- honored with a major grant from 2005, and ethical theory and a “Phoenix rising—but on an even located.” The fact is that, in today’s the Spencer Foundation to support practical rationality in 2006. All better trajectory.” world, in order to do the things we his work on the epistemology of have attracted a stellar list of The department will be love in the very best way we can, we testimony. Lisa Downing was participants from around the increasingly challenged to engage can’t simply rely on state funding. awarded a National Endowment for world. This conference will be held in “development”—the pleasant We need to ask for help from those 2 the Humanities fellowship, which annually, with a variety of areas of euphemism for ‘fund raising.’ In a who share our awareness of the she will take in 2008–09. Allan philosophical specialization. time of shrinking state support for value of philosophy, our love for Silverman was invited to teach at the The department is currently education and increasing demands Ohio State’s philosophy department, University of California, Berkeley, undergoing its first program for excellence in research and and our vision of what it can be. In for the fall semester of 2005, and review in 20 years. This review teaching, the department needs to this spirit, let me close with a sincere Sigrún Svavarsdóttir received involves a thorough evaluation find sources of support other than request that you go to page 11 and a fellowship from the National of our strengths and weaknesses, those on which it has traditionally consider making a contribution to Humanities Center in 2002–03 what we’re doing right and not- relied. Development (in this sense) one of the department’s funds. And, and is teaching at Harvard this so-right, and how we can improve. does not come naturally to most please, take a few minutes to tell us, academic year. Our new colleague The review brought to campus of us academics. We would all on the other side of this form or by Declan Smithies has been awarded a three distinguished visitors: Don rather just do what we love: teach e-mail ([email protected]), what’s postdoctoral research fellowship at Garrett (New York University), our students, pursue our research, new in your life. n the Australian National University. Louis Loeb (Michigan), and Geoff engage our colleagues in stimulating Both Stewart Shapiro and Neil Sayre McCord (University of and profitable exchanges. But our Don Hubin Chair In memoriam Justin D’Arcy Isom by Neil Tennant humor, always showing more concern for others than Justin had lived in diverse exotic and On April 23, 2007, Justin Isom, a past member of for himself. He was a wonderful person—kind, caring, anthropologically interesting places, of which our graduate program, lost his months-long battle puckish. He also bore his blindness lightly. Those Columbus was just the last one. He was a wonderful against leiomyosarcoma, a particularly intractable who knew him well hardly noticed it. Justin had his raconteur. His friends will miss the impish laugh and form of cancer. Justin passed away peacefully, at own inner light. His high intelligence and sensitivity ready humor. He could do accents—Cockney and home, nursed with love and devotion by his wife enabled him to see in ways that the sighted could New South Wales Matey—and he always got them to Megan. The cruel and unrelenting disease to which well envy. a T.
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