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Stewart Shapiro's Complete Publication List

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PUBLICATIONS Books: Vagueness in context, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; reissued in paperback, March, 2008. Thinking about mathematics: The philosophy of mathematics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. Philosophy of mathematics: Structure and ontology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997; reissued in paperback, Autumn 2000. Foundations without foundationalism: A case for second-order logic, Oxford Logic Guides 17, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, reissued in paperback, Summer 2000. Editorships: Oxford handbook of the philosophy of logic and mathematics, Oxford University Press, 2005. Special issue of History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (2000), a Festschrift for John Corcoran (edited with Michael Scanlan). Special issue of Philosophia Mathematica (3) 8 (2000), devoted to abstraction and neo-logicism. Two special issues of Philosophia Mathematica (3) 7 (1999), 9 (2001), devoted to the proceedings of a conference in memory of George Boolos, held at Notre Dame, during the April of 1998. The limits of logic: Second-order logic and the Skolem paradox, The international research library of philosophy, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996. Special issue of Philosophia Mathematica (3) 4 (1996), devoted to structuralism. Contributors: P. Benacerraf, G. Hellman, B. Hale, C. Parsons, M. Resnik, S. Shapiro. Intensional Mathematics, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics 113, Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1985, Contributors: S. Shapiro, J. Myhill, N. D. Goodman, A. Scedrov, V. Lifschitz, R. Flagg, R. Smullyan. Articles: “Towards a point-free account of the continuous” (with Geoffrey Hellman), Iyyun 61, 2012, 263- 287. “Revising logic in light of paradox”, in Insolubles and consequences: essays in honor of Stephen Read, Tributes 18, edited by Catarina Dutilh and Ole Hjortland, College Publications, 2012, 213-237. “An ‘i’ for an i: singular terms, uniqueness, and reference, Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2012), 380-415. “On Richard’s When truth gives out” (with Kevin Scharp), Philosophical Studies 160 (2012), 455-463. “Higher-order logic and set theory: a false dilemma”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 20 (2012), 305-323. “Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall”, in Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Annalisa Coliva, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 211-237. “The company kept by cut abstraction (and its relatives)”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 19, (2011), 107-138. “Mathematics and objectivity”, in Meaning in mathematics, edited by John Polkinghorne, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 97-108. “Reply to Gideon Rosen”, in Meaning in mathematics, edited by John Polkinghorne, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 112. “Addendum on Peter Lipton’s ‘Mathematical understanding’”, in Meaning in mathematics, edited by John Polkinghorne, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 55-59. “Theology and the actual infinite: Burley and Cantor”, Theology and Science 9 (2011), 101-108. “Foundations: structures, sets, and categories”, in Foundational theories of classical and constructive mathematics”, Western Ontario Series in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Giovanni Soimmaruga, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, 97-110. “Vagueness and logic”, in Vagueness, a guide, edited by Giuseppina Ronzitti, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, 55-81. “Varieties of pluralism and relativism for logic”, in A companion to relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 526-555. “Epistemology of mathematics: What are the questions? What count as answers?”, Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011), 130-150 “Vagueness, metaphysics, and objectivity”, Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 149-162. “So truth is safe from paradox: now what?”, Philosophical Studies 147 (2010), 445-455. “Life on the ship of Neurath: mathematics in the philosophy of mathematics”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2009), 149-166; reprinted in Between logic and reality, edited by Majda Trobok, Nenad Mišcevic and Berislav Žarnic, Dodrecht, Springer, 2012, 11-27. “The good, the bad, and the ugly” (with Philip Ebert), Synthese 170 (2009), 415-441. “Reference to indiscernible objects”, The Logica yearbook 2008, edited by Michal Peliš, London, College Publications, 2008, 223-235. “We hold these truths to be self evident: But what do we mean by that?”, Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2009), 175-207. “The measure of Scottish neo-logicism”, Logicism, intuitionism, and formalism, edited by Sten Lindström et al., Synthese Library 341, Springer, 2009, 69-90. “Reasoning with slippery predicates”, Studia Logica 90 (2008), 313-336. “Identity, indiscernibility, and ante rem structuralism: the tale of i and -i”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 16 (2008), 285-309. “Frege meets Zermelo: a perspective on ineffability and reflection” (with Gabriel Uzquiano), Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2008), 241-266. “Mathematical objects”, in Proof and other dilemmas: mathematics and philosophy, edited by Bonnie Gold and Roger A. Simons, Washington, D.C., The Mathematical Association of America, 2008, 131-156. “The objectivity of mathematics”, Synthese 156 (2007), 337-381. “Where in the (world wide) web of belief is the law of non-contradiction?” (with Jack Arnold), Nous 41 (2007) , 276–297. “Burali-Forti’s revenge, Revenge of the liar, edited by J. C. Beall, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 320-344. “Corcoran the mathematician”, Current topics in logic and analytic philosophy, edited by Concha Martinez, José L. Falguera, and José M. Sagüillo, Santiago de Compostela, Universidade de Santiago de Compastela, 2007, 271-288. “Philosophy of mathematics: 5 questions”, in Philosophy of mathematics: 5 questions, edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Hannes Leitgeb, Automatic Press, 2008, 219-232. “Faith and reason: the perpetual war”, in Philosophers without gods, 2007, edited by Louise Antony, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3-16. “All things indefinitely extensible” (with Crispin Wright), in Absolute generality, edited by Agustín Rayo, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 255-304. “Structure and identity” in Modality and identity, edited by Fraser MacBride, Oxford University Press, 2006, 109-145. “The governance of identity”, in Modality and identity, edited by Fraser MacBride, Oxford University Press, 2006, 164-173. “Computability, proof, and open-texture”, in Church’s thesis after 70 years, edited by Adam Olszewski, Jan Woleñski, and Robert Janusz, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006, 420-455. “Effectiveness”, The age of alternative logics: assessing philosophy of logic and mathematics today, edited by Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzmann, Manuel Rebuschi, and Henk Visser, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer, 2006, 37-49. “Externalism, anti-realism, and the KK-thesis”, in A logical approach to philosophy: essays in honour of Graham Solomon, edited by David DeVidi and Tim Kenyon, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer, 2005, 22-35. “Context, conversation, and so-called ‘higher-order vagueness’”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 79 (2005), 147-165. “Sets and abstracts”, Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 315-332. “Gurus, logical consequence, and truth-bearers: What is it that is true?”, in Deflationary truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J.C. Beall, Open Court Publishers, 2005, 153-170. “Categories, structures, and the Frege-Hilbert controversy: the status of meta-metamathematics”, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 13 (2005), 61-77; reprinted in Logicism, intuitionism, and formalism, edited by Sten Lindström et al., Synthese Library 341, Springer, 2009, 435- 448. “Logical consequence, proof theory, and model theory”, Oxford handbook for the philosophy of mathematics and logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 651-670. “Higher-order logic”, Oxford handbook for the philosophy of mathematics and logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 751-780. “Philosophy of mathematic and its logic”, Oxford handbook for the philosophy of mathematics and logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 3-27. “Simple truth, contradiction, and consistency”, The law of non-contradiction, edited by Graham Priest and J. C. Beall, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, 336-354. “The nature and limits of abstraction”, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 166-174. “Foundations of mathematics: metaphysics, epistemology, structure”, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 16-37. “All sets great and small: and I do mean ALL”, Philosophical Perspectives 17 (2003), 467-490. “Vagueness and Conversation”, in Liars and Heaps, edited by J. C. Beall and Michael Glanzberg, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 39-72. “Philosophy of mathematics”, in Philosophy of science today, edited by Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 181-200. “Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2003), 19- 42. “Prolegomenon to any future neo-logicist set theory: extensionality and indefinite extensibility”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003), 59-91 , 160-189; reprinted in The Arché papers on the mathematics of abstraction, edited by Roy T. Cook, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer, 353-382. “The guru, the logician, and the deflationist”, Noûs 37 (2003), 113-132. “Incompleteness and inconsistency”, Mind 111 (2002), 817-832. “Deflation and conservation”, Principles of truth, edited by Volker
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