PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

2006 ANNUAL REPORT

State of New York Department of Transportation

David A. Paterson, Governor Astrid C. Glynn, Commissioner Page ii Contents

List of Tables ...... v List of Figures ...... vii 2008 Safety Board Members ...... ix Past Safety Board Staff ...... x 2008 Safety Board Staff ...... xi Letter from the Chairman ...... xiii The Board’s Year in Review ...... 1 Highlights of 2006 ...... 2 Signifi cant Accident Cases Presented to the Board in 2006 ...... 6 PTSB Outreach Program ...... 10 Annual Accident Report ...... 13 Bus Accident Analysis ...... 14 Rail Accident Analysis ...... 17 Probable Causes of Bus and Rail Accidents ...... 20 Accident Rate Analysis ...... 24 Bus & Rail Systems Under PTSB Jurisdiction ...... 28 Defi nitions ...... 29 PTSB Safety Awards ...... 33 PTSB 2006 Award Recipients ...... 33

Page iii Page iv List of Tables

Table 1: Bus Accidents by Reporting Criteria ...... 14 Table 2: Bus Accident Rates by Type ...... 16 Table 3: Rail Accidents by Reporting Criteria ...... 17 Table 4: Rail Accident Rates by Type ...... 19 Table 5: Rail Accidents by System ...... 19 Table 6: Bus Probable Accident Causes by Type ...... 20 Table 7: Bus Driver Probable Accident Causes ...... 21 Table 8: Bus Equipment/Maintenance Probable Accident Causes ...... 21 Table 9: Rail Probable Accident Causes ...... 22 Table 10: Rail Car Equipment Probable Accident Causes ...... 22 Table 11: Rail Crew Probable Accident Causes ...... 23 Table 12: Rail Operations Probable Accident Causes ...... 23 Table 13: Rail Track and Signal Probable Accident Causes ...... 23 Table 14: Bus Accident Rates Grouped by Operator Size ...... 25 Table 15: Rail Accident Rates ...... 26 Table 16: Rail Accident Rates ...... 26 Table 17: Rail Accident Rates Excluding Grade Crossing Accidents ...... 27

Page v Page vi List of Figures

Figure 1: Bus Accidents Investigated ...... 15 Figure 2: Bus Accident Fatalities ...... 15 Figure 3: Bus Injuries ...... 15 Figure 4: Rail Accidents Investigated ...... 18 Figure 5: Rail Accident Fatalities ...... 18 Figure 6: Rail Injuries ...... 18 Figure 7: PTSB Accident Trends ...... 24

Page vii Page viii 2008 SAFETY BOARD MEMBERS

Astrid C. Glynn Commissioner and PTSB Chair

John S. Delaney Karen Rae David Berke, PE Appointed 2002 Deputy Commissioner Appointed 2004 and PTSB Chair Designee

Deborah A. Green Barry Kluger Daniel J. Texeira Appointed 2002 MTA Inspector General Appointed 2005

Page ix Page x 2007 PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

PTSB Chairman Astrid C. Glynn, Commissioner and Chair Karen Rae, Deputy Commissioner and PTSB Chair Designee

Board Members Deborah A. Green 2002 John S. Delaney 2002 David Berke 2004 Daniel J. Texeira 2005 Barry Kluger, MTA Inspector General MTA, 2007

Board Staff Gary R. McVoy, Ph.D., Director, Operations Division, and Executive Director of PTSB Donald Baker, Director, Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security Services Roger Schiera, PTSB General Counsel Trish Estella, Secretary

Rail Accident Investigations Albany Offi ce C. Ike Scott, Director, Rail Safety Bureau Jerry P. Shook, Chief, Rail Safety Bureau O.J. Guzman, Sr. Investigator

New York Metro Offi ce Robert Maraldo, Supervising Investigator John Compitello, Investigator Joseph Stiga, Investigator Jean-Paul Paraskevas, Investigator

Bus Accident Investigations - Albany Offi ce G. Mike Smith, Director, Passenger Carrier Safety Bureau John S. Fabian, Chief Investigator Michael Gluskin, Investigator Phyllis LaCross, Secretary

New York Metro Offi ce Harry Gerham, Investigator Mikhail Planker, Investigator

Page xi Page xii STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ALBANY, N.Y. 12232 http://www.dot.state.ny.us

Astrid C. Glynn David A. Paterson Commissioner Governor

April 1, 2008

The Honorable David A. Paterson, Governor Members of the Legislature And Citizens of New York

Since 1984, the Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) has been charged by the New York State Legislature to improve the safety of New York State’s public transportation system, which has an annual ridership of more than 2-1/2 billion. As public transportation ridership has increased, it has been our challenge to insure that the number of accidents continues to decrease. This has been achieved through our active involvement in investigating bus and rail accidents, performing safety site reviews, providing accident investigation training to the bus industry, and participating in rail safety emergency preparedness exercises.

The purpose of this annual report is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the bus and rail accidents throughout the year. In accordance with Section 217 of the New York State Transportation Law, it is my pleasure to submit the 2006 PTSB Annual Report.

Sincerely,

Astrid C. Glynn PTSB Chair and Commissioner New York State Department of Transportation

Page xiii Page xiv In Memoriam

Walter G. Rich PTSB Board Member 1993 - 2007

Walter G. Rich, as a member of the Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) from July 1993-2007, is acknowledged for his dedicated service to the State of New York.

Mr. Rich’s vision, passion and extensive knowledge of the railroad industry greatly strengthened the Board’s activities to improve public transportation safety for the citizens of the State. The PTSB recognizes Mr. Rich for his signifi cant contributions and support.

Page xv Page xvi The Board’s Year In Review Public Transportation Safety Board

The Public Transportation  Recommending the establish- Safety Board (PTSB) has broad, ment of new safety legisla- Staff legislatively mandated powers tion, rules and regulations, Gary R. McVoy, Ph.D. has and duties that enable it to effec- and transportation system the responsibility for directing tively improve public transportation procedures, based on fi nd- staff activities, including: con- safety for transportation systems ings from accident investiga- ducting accident investigations; that receive funds under the State tions, special studies and reviewing system safety program Transit Operating Assistance Pro- comprehensive audits. plans; preparing commuter rail, gram (STOA). Membership on the Safety subway and bus accident reports; The PTSB is statutorily Board is determined by Section monitoring transpor tation opera- responsible for investigating and 216 of the Transportation Law. tors’ compliance with fi nal Safety analyzing serious bus, subway The Board may consist of seven Board actions; maintaining Safety and commuter rail accidents, and members and a Chairman. Mem- Board records; preparing special recommending actions to be taken bers of the Board in 2007 were: analytical and research studies; to reduce the possibility of similar Astrid C. Glynn, Commissioner and performing other tasks that accidents from occurring. The New York State Department of are deemed appropriate. The Board’s powers and duties include: Transportation (NYSDOT) and Safety Board’s primary resources Chair of the Safety Board; David are housed within the NYSDOT’s  Establishing accident report- Berke, Licensed Professional Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security, ing, investigation and analysis Engineer; John S. Delaney, Vice Passenger Carrier Safety and Rail procedures; President LeRoy Dedicated Lo- Safety Bureaus.  Conducting comprehen- gistics; Deborah A. Green; Barry Kluger, Inspector General, Met- Karen Rae is Deputy Commis- sive accident investigations sioner of the Policy and Planning involving public transportation ropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA); and Daniel J. Texeira, Sr. Division and serves as the PTSB’s systems, whether publicly or Chair Designee. privately owned; Vice President, Lincoln Brokerage Corporation.  Taking a proactive role in public safety, by reviewing, The Safety Board meets approving and monitoring in public session, on the third system safety program plans Wednesday of every other month. submitted by each transporta- During 2006, the Board formally tion system eligible for STOA; met six times.  Conducting system safety program plan fi eld audits to ensure that the transportation systems are in compliance with their approved system safety program plans;  Analyzing critical safety is- sues and concerns;

Page 1 Highlights 2006

Board Meetings and Recommendations

January 2006 that people be more diligent in General Council acknowledged throwing out their trash in the that the NYSDOT staff supports In January, the Board met in New proper place; to make sure the bin the petition. General Council also York City and approved 14 rail and is cleaned up; and usable trash stated that accountability of staff bus accident investigation reports bins are made available at all and the operations of the property and recertifi ed fi ve bus system times. It was noted that the Met- will be preserved. General Coun- safety program plans. ropolitan Transportation Authority cil is coordinating with the staff of (MTA) was running four additional the Attorney General’s Offi ce to During the meeting, the Board trash pickup trains to accomplish this. properly fulfi ll the State’s proce- expressed concern that seven dural obligations for the successful of the 11 bus cases presented to March 2006 completion of the process. the Board involved fi res. Various suggestions were considered to re- In March, the Board met in Albany May 2006 solve the problem, including a heat and approved 15 rail and bus ac- In May, the Board met in New York shield around the turbo and other cident investigation reports and City and approved 19 rail and bus high-temperature components, or recertifi ed fi ve bus system safety accident investigation reports and the use of nonfl ammable hydraulic program plans. recertifi ed three bus system safety fl uids. The Board asked to have a At the meeting, staff furnished the program plans. report created regarding bus fi re bus fi re report that was requested trends and include information on Staff reported a lowered out-of- by the Board. The probable cause latest technology to address the service rate for Tompkins County for the 126 bus fi res for the last problem. Area Transit (TCAT) since the last 10 years are as follows: electrical report. The Board requested site Board staff updated the Board on 58, equipment 32, undetermined audits and continued monitoring the New York City Transit Ventila- cause 25, hydraulic systems 11. their progress. The NYSDOT motor tion Plant status. Staff pointed The fl eet age for the vehicles in vehicle inspectors will actively work out the signifi cance of the overall which the fi res occurred is as with TCAT management to ensure downward trend in fi res across the follows: 1 to 2 years: 24, 3 to 5 continued positive trends. system. Short-term recommenda- years: 27, 6 to 10 years: 50. tions are all completed and long- July 2006 During the review of rail accidents, term recommendations are being In July, the Board met in Bingham- the Board questioned the elapsed progressed. It was further reported ton and approved 10 rail and bus time element surrounding post- that 63 percent of the tracks are accident investigation reports and accident alcohol and drug testing. now being cleaned weekly with recertifi ed one bus system safety Staff reported that protocol was the remaining 37 percent be- program plan. to only enter times when prob- ing cleaned biweekly. Additional lems existed, but to relieve any manpower was hired to clean the Staff reported attendance at the suspicion of delays in testing, it wide areas between stations, with Federal Transit Administration’s was agreed to present the actual 71 wide areas cleaned during the (FTA) Compliance Workshop in elapsed time in all future cases. previous two months. Eleven fewer St. Louis, MO. Each state’s over- sight program was reviewed for Ventilation Plants were reported The Board’s General Council compliance of more than 250 out of service this month, com- reported the Utica Transit Authority items required by the revised rule pared to last month. had petitioned the Oneida County on state oversight. Additionally, Supreme Court for dissolution and The Board stated that along with as part of the Compliance Work- the transfer of most assets and the more concentrated efforts to shop, staff was asked to complete operations to Centro of Oneida, pick up debris along the tracks, it a Fatigue Management Survey. Inc. pursuant to Section 67 of the was equally imperative to remove Staff reported the survey was Transportation Law. the trash from the pickup bins on needed to obtain additional infor- the platforms. The Board asked

Page 2 mation on the work scheduling and September 2006 the noncompliant brakes were not fatigue management practices at detected during regular preventive In September, the Board met in rail transit agencies and to sup- maintenance inspection (PM). Staff New York City and approved eight port FTA’s ability to respond to the responded that when the brake rail and bus accident investigation National Transportation Safety linings were checked during the reports and recertifi ed four bus sys- Board (NTSB). This recommen- regular PM cycle they were correct, tem safety program plans. dation requires transit agencies, it wasn’t until the brake system was through the system safety program The Board was briefed on the disassembled, during post-accident and hazard management process, unfortunate death of a young lady inspection, that the brake drums to ensure that the time off between that occurred on August 5, 2006, at were found to be worn beyond daily tours of duty, including regular the LIRR’s Woodside Station. The service limits.The post-accident and overtime assignments, allows fatality occurred after the young type of inspection is not performed train operators to obtain at least lady fell between the car door under the general PM inspection. eight hours of uninterrupted sleep. and the platform edge in the area commonly referred to as the “Gap.” Staff reported that the bus/pedes- Following up on the Board’s recom- Subsequently, the Commissioner trian committee was researching mendation, meetings were held was petitioned by New York State up-to-date data to provide a draft with members of the Long Island Senator Dean Skelos to have the report on recent bus/pedestrian Rail Road (LIRR) Signal Depart- PTSB look into the gap issue on all accidents to refl ect a change in the ment and NYSDOT Grade Cross- MTA commuter lines in New York. types of bus/pedestrian accidents, ing Safety Bureau to discuss the In mid August, staff commenced a from right side rear wheel to left establishment of a quiet zone in the special study, (PTSB Special Study side front wheel. Since the last Port of Washington Branch and to #11), that reviewed the Gap issue Board meeting in September, there improve safety at the Stewart Av- on both the LIRR and MNR rail have been additional pedestrian enue grade crossing in Beth Page, lines. Staff stated that while the Au- fatalities that involved the right rear NY, where there have been several gust 5 accident investigation would and left front wheels. During the pedestrian accidents. be completed by the next meeting, Fall Conference (Oct 4-6, 2006) the Special Study was likely not to of the NYSDOT Passenger Carrier Staff reported that the Offi ce of the be completed until early 2007. Staff Conference, participants requested State Comptroller (OSC) recently also reported that once the data an industry committee be selected conducted an audit on safety is analyzed, compiled and fi nal- to review the high incidence of bus/ issues at LIRR and Metro-North ized, recommendations, if any, will pedestrian accidents in an attempt Railroad (MNR) grade crossings be made. If recommendations are to provide recommendations to pre- and it’s report. Initial review indi- made, they will be drafted, shared vent reoccurrences of these types cates that problems outlined in the with the property involved for re- of accidents. report are primarily those associ- sponse and then presented for the ated with enforcement of current Board’s approval. It was also noted BUS AND RAIL TRANSIT motor vehicle laws and that the that the study is being carried out railroads are doing a respectable SYSTEM SAFETY SITE in conjunction with a parallel effort job in promoting grade crossing REVIEWS by the NTSB and with the full coop- safety. The railroads have agreed eration of the LIRR and MNR. The periodic review of bus and rail to implement some of the OSC transit systems’ safety programs is recommendations and to study the November 2006 an essential element of the Board’s others for further action. In November, the Board met in Al- safety oversight program. The Board Staff reported that discus- bany and approved 18 rail and bus reviews consist of the staff visiting sions were beginning on the Bus accident investigation reports and selected transit property offi ces, Accident Investigation Training For recertifi ed fi ve bus system safety depots, terminals and/or shops to Identifying Safety Hazards (BAIT- program plans. review operating procedures to FISH) recertifi cation program that ensure adherence to system safety will be used for advanced accident During the meeting, the Board program plans and to identify investigation techniques. This reviewed a bus accident report in safety defi ciencies. The reviews al- program is for those carriers who which a Sport Utility Vehicle and low the Board to work cooperatively have already obtained introduction an MTA New York City bus col- with the transit providers to en- and basic level certifi cation. It was lided at an intersection in Brooklyn hance passenger safety, to identify also reported that the school bus NY. The report indicated the bus safety issues and to develop ac- industry has inquired about this brakes were not in compliance tions to correct safety defi ciencies. outreach program. and the Board questioned why

Page 3 Bus staff conducted reviews at the relative to each property’s safety obstructions and black box and Tompkins County Area Transit Sys- program plan. camera technology. Three sub- tem and Broome County Transpor- committees analyzed the areas tation System. State Safety Oversight of human factors, bus design and In addition to attending two confer- product design. In 2004, the task SUPPORT OF STATE AND NA- ences on State oversight issues, force modifi ed the overall scope of TIONAL SAFETY INITIATIVES Board staff conducted three over- the committee to look at accident AND ORGANIZATIONS sight safety reviews of the MTA causes relative to crushing injuries NYCT during the year. from any wheel of the bus (instead Emergency Response Drills of right rear specifi cally). Bus Operator Safe Driving On Thursday, January 26, 2006, Competitions NYSDOT Bus Safety the staff attended a terrorism semi- Conference nar hosted by U.S. Department of Board staff participated as judges Homeland Security in Queens, N.Y. at Bus Operator Safe Driving In October, staff served as panel The seminar addressed the in- Competitions at MTA Long Island moderators at the NYSDOT crease in terrorist activity worldwide Bus, Westchester County and the Annual Passenger Carrier Safety and the planning and expertise that Statewide New York Public Transit Conference held in Saratoga the terrorist organizations possess Association’s Compe tition held at Springs. At the conference, staff in carrying out their criminal acts. the New York State Fairgrounds provided presentations on top- On Tuesday, February 7, 2006, in Syracuse. As judges, the staff ics such as wheelchair equipped the PTSB staff attended a table rated bus operators’ safety tech- vehicles, inspection procedures, top domestic preparedness exer- niques, including defensive driving preventive maintenance and safe- cise `hosted by the Metropolitan skills, steering control and mirror driving philosophies. usage. Transportation Authority Police The Rural Transportation As- Interagency Counter-terrorism Task Rural Transportation Assis- sistance Program Bus Safety Force. The exercise involved a tance Conference terrorist attack against the transpor- Committee tation infrastructure in the County of Board staff attended the Rural Nassau and presented the opportu- Transportation Assistance Preven- In 2006, staff attended the Ameri- nity to evaluate multi-jurisdictional tion conference held in Syracuse can Public Transportation Associa- emergency responses to a terror- and provided a presentation on tion Bus Safety Conference, held ist attack launched against public the use of accident investigation in Nashville, TN, to discuss the transportation. techniques. Areas covered in detail current safety issues affecting tran- included accident response, driver sit systems throughout the US and In addition to attending emer- training, retraining and prevent- Canada. Issues included determi- gency response drills, the staff ability rating. The PTSB BAITFISH nation of pedestrian/bus accident also participated in 11 emergency program was also highlighted. causation, safety awards, emer- response committee meetings and gency preparedness and response The Board continued to play a role post-incident analysis meetings to and bus standards development. discuss the results of the Emer- in the development of national Professional Development gency Response Drills. guidelines regarding the develop- ment of bus system safety pro- The Board staff is continually en- Rail Site Safety Inspections gram plans for all states to con- sider adopting. hancing its professional skills and Board staff conducted fi ve site safety personal development by attending inspections at various Metro politan Bus/Pedestrian Right Side safety conferences and training and upstate rail transit systems. Accident Task Force courses. During 2006, the rail staff attended seven training courses The inspections included visits to Board staff initiated the Task relating to track safety, fi re preven- rail properties’ construction sites, Force in 2003 to share knowledge tion, security training, accident rights-of-way, railroad bridges and with industry peers by develop- investigation and State oversight. maintenance facilities. The rail in- ing counter-measures to reduce spections were a proactive means bus pedestrian accidents. The The Bus staff attended accident for staff to address incidents such task force is comprised of indi- reconstruction and 19-A Recertifi - as debris collisions and reports of viduals from the bus industry, bus cation training. motor vehicles hitting railroad bridges manufacturers and government along with identifying defi ciencies safety oversight agencies. The task force discussed training, view

Page 4 NYSDOT/PTSB: Emergency Preparedness Drills

As safety and security of the traveling public is paramount, the PTSB is constantly attending or participating in Emer- gency Preparedness meetings, drills and/or simulation exercises. These activities may involve multiple emergency response organizations and departments such as EMT organizations and local Fire Departments, police agencies and their SWAT teams, the FBI, TSI, Homeland Security and the State’s transit and commuter lines.

Drills are held in various locations with an emphasis in the metropolitan area where the potential for terrorist at- tacks are considered greatest. After each drill, a follow-up debriefi ng meeting is held to analyze the effectiveness of the planning phases and the drill/exercise. These meetings are conducted on a monthly basis and simulations are performed at various times of the year.

Page 5 Signifi cant Accident Cases Presented to the Board in 2006

Jerry Shook and John Fabian

On July 9, 2005, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Hampton Jitney bus #81 was traveling west on Montauk Highway and approaching the intersection with Steven Hands Path. The driver of a minivan failed to stop at the stop sign on Steven Hands Path and attempted to turn left onto eastbound Montauk Highway, entering into the path of the bus. The bus driver braked and steered right in an attempt to avoid a collision, but the left front of the bus col- lided with the left side of the minivan. The driver of the minivan was killed instantly. There were no other reported injuries to the 16 bus passengers. The bus sustained extensive damage from the collision and the minivan was destroyed. The bus driver was issued two traffi c tickets for underinfl ated right tag axle tire and log book not cur- rent.

In the vicinity of the accident site, Montauk highway is a 22-foot- wide two-way east/west roadway divided by a double yellow barrier marking into one travel lane in each direction. At the intersection with Steven Hands Path, the travel lanes are sepa- rated by a painted channelizing median (see photo, view of in- tersection facing east) that is 11 feet wide at its’ broadest point. There is also a dedicated left turn lane onto Steven Hands Path for eastbound traffi c. Steven Hands Path is a 24-foot-wide two- way north/south roadway that forms a “T” type intersection with Montauk Highway. The intersection is controlled by a stop sign for traffi c traveling south on Steven Hands Path. The posted speed limit for traffi c on Montauk Highway is 40 miles per hour. There are no sight restrictions for any vehicles at the intersec- tion.

There were no safety or recurring defects noted in the 45 days prior to the accident. The bus passed decelerom- eter tests performed on the bus’ braking systems at the accident scene by the Suffolk County Police Department Highway Patrol Bureau, Motor Carrier Safety Section. When the Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) staff inspected the bus on July 11, 2005, the bus was deemed unsafe to drive at that time due to damage incurred in the accident. Therefore, no decelerometer tests were performed at that time. However, physical inspection of the braking systems showed no defects.

The bus driver was hired by Hampton Jitney on June 2, 2003, and successfully completed it’s Bus Operator Training Program. A review of the driver=s Department of Motor Vehicles records for the past three years showed no violations, convictions or suspensions. New York State Vehicle & Traffi c Law, Article 19-A records were reviewed and found to be com- plete, in order and up-to-date. A review of the driver=s Hampton Jitney accident record for the past three years showed two non- preventable collision accidents (08/11/03, 10/25/03). Post-acci- dent drug and alcohol tests performed on the bus driver upon his release from the accident scene, approximately 4 hours and 15 minutes from the time of the accident, were negative.

In an interview, that bus driver indicated that he had reported for duty at about 8:30 a.m., made relief of another driver and

Page 6 left the garage at 9:00 a.m. After a short trip, the driver said that he had a layover of about an hour and departed for New York City at about 10:50 a.m. The bus driver said that he was traveling east in heavy traffi c on Montauk Highway and approaching the intersection with Steven Hands Path when a minivan entered the path of his bus. He indicated that he braked and steered to the right but could not avoid colliding with the minivan. The driver said that he was traveling at or below the posted speed limit and was about 2 to 2 ½ bus lengths behind the vehicle in front of his bus when the minivan entered his path.

The only witness statement obtained by the police indicated that the minivan had slowed, not stopped, at the stop sign on southbound Steven Hands Path and had then turned left onto eastbound Montauk Highway, enter- ing the path of the bus where the collision occurred.

The bus driver received tickets for an underinfl ated right rear tag axle tire and for log book violations [failure to have the log book current for duty status on the day of the accident and violations of the 80/70 hour rule (total hours of service), the 10-hour rule (driving) and the 15-hour rule (daily total hours of service)]. The PTSB staff re- view of the bus driver’s log book for the period 06/27/05 to 07/08/05 showed four 80/70 hour rule violations, one 15-hour rule violation and three 10-hour rule violations.

The PTSB staff found that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the minivan driver to stop at the stop sign on Steven Hands path.

An August 2006 accident at the Long Island Rail Road’s Woodside Station raised a broader public concern with the hazards presented by station platform gaps. The accident was investigated by staff of the PTSB and a report on its fi ndings was issued on November 20, 2006.

The PTSB investigation revealed that on the afternoon of the accident, the young woman was part of a group of approximately 18 to 20 acquaintances who were all traveling to New York City to attend a concert and that the young woman and about 12 friends drank alcohol for approximately 45 minutes prior to boarding the 3:09 p.m. train at Merrick Station. The group transferred at Jamaica to train #6113 which consisted of 10 M-7 coach cars and arrived at Woodside Station at approximately 3:52 p.m., (about three minutes behind schedule).

Upon arrival at Woodside Station, the doors opened and the group began to exit car #7548. However, before the young woman exited, the doors started to close. As one of the group stepped off the train, she turned around to speak with another girl and saw the door begin to close and the young woman grab the door with both hands in an attempt to prevent it from closing. Two additional acquaintances also saw the young woman grab the doors to prevent them from closing and, when the doors reopened, saw the young woman apparently lose her balance and fall forward. The conductor of train #6113 was operating the door control panel from the third car in the train and initiated the closing of the doors. As the doors were closing, the conductor saw a young woman banging on the outside of car #7548, so she reopened the doors. When the doors reopened, the conductor saw a young woman exit out of car #7548 and fall between the train and the platform to the roadbed. The conductor called the Movement Bureau and requested third rail power off on Main Line track #3 in Woodside and that police and EMS respond. A passenger aboard car #7548 saw the young woman fall and pulled the passenger emergency brake at approximately 3:53 p.m. The young woman’s acquaintances and railroad personnel immediately gathered about her telling her not to move and that they would get her out. An acquaintance reached down and held the young woman’s hand.

At approximately 3:54 p.m., eastbound Port Washington train #6464 was arriving at the Woodside Station on Port Washington Branch track #2 for a scheduled station stop. At approximately the same time, the young woman pulled away from the acquaintance’s hand and crawled under the platform toward the Port Washington Branch #2 track side of the platform. Train #6464 was decelerating in preparation for a normal stop when the engineer saw the young woman emerge from under the platform onto the track directly in front of his train. The engineer applied the train’s brakes in emergency but was unable to stop before striking the young woman. Train #6464 was traveling at a recorded speed of 30 miles per hour when its brakes were applied. Train #6464 stopped with the fi rst four cars along the eastbound Port Washington platform with the young woman under the second car.

Page 7 After being informed that the train had just struck someone, the conductor of train #6464 called the Movement Bureau and requested that third rail power be removed from Port Washington Branch track #2. Meanwhile, the Collector from train #6464 climbed down to the roadbed to aid and to comfort the young woman. FDNY and EMS arrived on the scene at approximately 4:05 p.m. and began treating the young woman. The young woman was removed from the roadbed by EMS personnel at 4:15 p.m. and transported to the Bellevue Hospital Trauma Center where she expired at 6:51 p.m.

The PTSB staff found that the most probable cause of this accident was the young woman’s actions that posi- tioned her in the path of an oncoming train. Contributing to the cause of this accident was the young woman’s alcohol-impaired condition. Based on the specifi cs of this accident, the PTSB made no recommendations; however, it reserved the right to possibly make recommendations upon the completion of a systemwide study of the gap issue.

In conjunction with the investigation of the August accident, the PTSB initiated a Special Study of the hazards presented by station platform gaps on both the LIRR and MNR. Staff issued interim recommendations followed by additional recommendations intended to address several objectives, including:

 Provide an understanding of railroad engineering and operating factors that result in the need for sta- tion platform gaps, based on current national and local standards and practice in the commuter railroad industry;  Gather data on the size and nature of platform gaps along stations of the LIRR and Metro North and re- late that information to accident / incident data; through a review of recent (fi ve-year) station platform gap accidents and incidents provide a better understanding of their nature and possible contributing factors, with a particular focus on those incidents resulting in the most serious injuries;  Look beyond the borders of New York State at other commuter railroad operations in North America and elsewhere to identify strategies employed by the industry to mitigate or to reduce the number of station platform gap-related accidents and incidents;  Review current LIRR and Metro North operating practices, including signage, customer service an- nouncements and passenger assistance offered; and fi nally,  Where appropriate, make recommendations to both railroads regarding strategies they can pursue to reduce or to eliminate the hazards created by station platform gaps.

The PTSB believes that gaps present a potential hazard and can occasionally lead to serious injury. However gaps are necessary to avoid collisions between a train and the platform. It is every passenger railroad’s respon- sibility to manage safety risks to its riders. While the LIRR and Metro North both have active risk management and system safety programs, PTSB Staff believe there is an opportunity to revisit and to improve those pro- grams.

Signifi cantly changing the possible risk presented to customers may take years to achieve. It is important that railroads prioritize efforts to focus on those strategies and locations that will have the quickest and greatest impact. Focus should be placed on locations with the highest volume of incidents and those that present the largest gaps – platforms on curves. Priority should be also given to evaluating those strategies that might have the greatest systemwide impact.

The PTSB staff recommends an incremental approach to managing and to reducing this risk associated with gaps. It is predicated on, but not limited to, establishing a goal over time to present customers with a more uniform environment with regard to gaps. The end goal would be to have a system whose gaps are nominally smaller and more uniform. The areas of emphasis and the content of the incremental effort is outlined below and should include, but not be limited to:

Development of a general public and passenger awareness protocol, including:

 Signs – Adopt a uniform pictographic message to warn passengers of the danger presented by gaps that deploy both inside and outside cars in the immediate vicinity of car doors.

Page 8  Visual cues – Highlight gaps visually to remind and call passengers attention to specifi c gaps (e.g., LED lights, stenciled markings on cars and/or platforms, etc.)

 Pamphlets – Explain the danger in greater detail and highlight the need for parents with small children to pay particular attention. Recognize the ethnic diversity of the population served in the area and consider multilingual approaches.

 Announcements – Reinforce other awareness strategies with periodic announcements and reminders from conductors and other railroad personnel.

 Customer participation – Solicit input form customers on how best to craft the message and otherwise deal with gap issues.

Strengthening of inspection and accident investigation protocols to en- sure continued focus on the potential hazards and delivery of promised strategies.

 Inspections and Measurements - Periodically inspect and measure platform clearances and equipment features that affect the gaps passengers’ experience.

 Data collection - Improve data collection on gap and other passenger incidents to continue learning about what causes them.

 Program evaluation – Periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the railroad’s risk management program for gaps.

Development of an engineering and operational plan that minimizes gaps and their variability.

 Engineering – Review present standards for track, platforms and equipment.

Short-term mitigation strategies (e.g., track realignment, equipment modifi cation or platform adjust ments such as edging).

Test the use of special technologies (e.g., platform extenders, platform rubbing board, and retract able steps/platforms) that can become part of a future design strategy.

Long-term investment strategies – Reduce gaps and their variability as part of equipment, station and track rehabilitation and replacement cycles.

 Operational – Review present operating practices to better manage passenger risk in negotiating gaps.

Train Operations – Control access to train doors where gaps are widest (e.g., ends of fl ared plat forms)

Crowd control – Review crowd control practices at high-volume stations and transfer points as well as at stations serving special events. It is anticipated that a response to this mitigation program will be developed and implemented in 2007.

Page 9 NYSDOT/PTSB OUTREACH PROGRAM: Update John Fabian

BAITFISH: Bus Accident Investigation Training For Identifying Safety Hazards

The NYSDOT/PTSB staff outreach training effort known as “BAITFISH” has been presented across New York State to several hundred participants in a modular format of three classes as described below:

CLASS ONE: Accident Management and Investigation:

In phase one, this class will prepare the participants on what to expect when a call comes over the radio from a bus operator who says “I’ve had an accident, what do I do?” The students learn how to be prepared ahead of an incident with proper in-house procedures and a well-trained support staff. The class also addresses how to respond to the scene of an accident and gather the necessary “evidential facts.” A fi eld exercise leaves participants with the practical knowledge on how to develop a useful scene diagram. Phase two (Bus Accident Investigation) builds upon the fi rst class. Students learn two sides of an investigation: 1. The technical aspects requiring the use of proven accident investigation formulas to arrive at speed es- timates; and 2. The “incident management” process, which demands control of the accident scene to reduce injuries and unnecessary claims. Once again, students are exposed to outside practical exercises to verify the formulas taught in the morning session are valid. In addition, they gain personal experience in proper measuring techniques in determining grade, super-elevation, radius of curve, lengths of tire marks and other typical accident scene dimensions. Skid tests and drag-test techniques are also discussed.

CLASS TWO: The Determination of Accident Preventability

Over time, the bus industry has changed in many ways, but the process used to determine the preventability of an accident has been around for many years. Students are instructed on the theories behind a solid preventabil- ity program, and later challenged to put those theories to the test. There is heavy emphasis on the information- gathering efforts necessary to prepare for the rating of an incident. Finally, when a “preventable” determination has been reached, the process must include accurate countermeasures to reduce the reoccurrence of similar incidents in the future.

CLASS THREE: Hazard Assessment and Mitigation (Trend Analysis)

The last class in the series, the Hazard Assessment and Mitigation class will educate students on developing a sound, reasonable and effective system safety program. The importance of a technical accident investigation pro- gram, trend analysis, sound hiring practices, use of observation rides and a reasonable disciplinary program are discussed. Classmates are encouraged to share both proven techniques and “war stories” to benefi t the learning curve of all participants.

Page 10 2006 BAITFISH Program Highlights

Every PTSB jurisdictional bus property shall be required by January 1, 2008, to be certifi cated in the BAITFISH program (or equivalent).

Base program (anticipated):

Certifi cation will extend for a 4-year term; Certifi cation represents a person successfully completing all courses (including acceptable substitu- tions) every four years; Testing out of Class 1 is allowed if an approved accident investigation course is successfully com- pleted within the previous 48 months (proof of completion required); Certifi cated comprehensive accident investigation course/class (TSI, IPTM, NATMI, etc) attended within one year (proof of grade required) will be an acceptable substitution for Class 1 requirements; Classes 2 and 3 must be taken by all PTSB jurisdictional properties unless equivalent outside course is approved as substitute (currently none exist); List of acceptable courses for substitution/equivalency updated semiannually; Passing grades for testing purposes will be 70 percent; If a certifi ed trainer leaves a company’s employment, immediate notice shall be provided by the com- pany, and a “good faith” plan must be provided to obtain recertifi cation by the company in a reason- able time frame; No consortiums will be allowed to meet requirements; Consideration will be given for exemption to companies operating fi ve or less vehicles for Class 1 only, which can substantiate a partnership with a neighboring certifi ed company. Classes 2 and 3 must be attended by all systems; and Courses will be offered throughout the year and will be taught by selected bus industry trainers throughout the State.

Page 11 Train-the-trainer program The NYSDOT/PTSB is grateful for those individuals who have voluntarily joined “Team BAITFISH” as class in- structors and are providing a high level of experience and expertise from the transit community to the classroom. The program has been successful due to the efforts of the transit systems and industry representatives.

TEAM BAITFISH Industry Trainers:

Mike Armstrong Joe Aversano Diane Bergquist MTA Bus Company Ulster County Area Transit Ulster County Area Transit Kingston Kingston

Pete Cassells Jim DelaPena Dawn Campbell Liberty Lines, Inc MTA-New York City Transit MTA-New York City Transit Yonkers

Tony Laino Felicia Jones Dave Mix Jitney Transportation Program MTA-New York City Transit Centro Brookhaven Syracuse

Bruce Rubin Dick Stout MV Transportation Chautauqua Area Rural Transit New York City Jamestown

Page 12 Annual Accident Report

Accident Investigation Procedures

The Safety Board is responsi- Notifi cation of Rail Investigation Process ble for commuter rail, subway and transit bus accident investigations. Accidents The accident investigation All accidents that meet the acci- Each public transportation process begins with the system no- dent criteria stated below must be system operating a commuter rail, tifying the PTSB of an accident that immediately reported by the trans- light rail or subway system must meets the reporting criteria. This portation systems to the Board. give the Safety Board notice of the results in dispatching investigators Accidents meeting the PTSB crite- following accidents: to the accident scene for a compre- ria represent just a small portion, hensive and detailed examination perhaps as low as one percent of  all collisions and derailments of the environmental and human all accidents and safety related (except those minor incidents factors. Analysis of the factors incidents encountered by the resulting from shifting cars and develops fi ndings, conclusions and properties annually. The purpose making up trains in yards); recommendations that are issued of the PTSB investigations is to  all accidents at grade cross- to the affected transportation sys- assess the most serious accidents ings; tems to reduce the probability of to ensure transit system have ap- future accidents. propriate procedures and policies  all accidents that result in a The recommendations specifi - to avoid similar accidents from fatality; cally address actions to occurring in the future. be implemented by the transit systems to correct Notifi cation of Bus safety defi ciencies and Accidents to improve safety. The transit systems’ respons- Every public transpor- es to the recommenda- tation bus system subject tions are reviewed and to the Safety Board must closely monitored by give the Safety Board the PTSB to ensure notice of the following oc- that they are properly currences: executed.  all accidents that re- Accident fi gures sult in a fatality; and rates in this annual  all accidents that report may vary from result in fi ve or more previous reports. The injuries that require variances are due to medical attention; and  all accidents that result in two the changes in the reportability of or more injuries that require certain accidents types.  all accidents caused by medical attention; and mechanical failure, including, Bus accident investigation but not limited to, all fi res that  all emergency passenger reports that have been processed occur in revenue service that evacuations. by the Safety Board during formal require passenger evacuation meetings are analyzed to identify and/or response by the police trends and special problems. In or fi re departments. 2006, the Safety Board investigat- ed 76 bus accidents that met the Board’s reporting criteria.

Page 13 Bus Accident Analysis

Table 1 depicts the number of accidents meeting the fatal, multiple injury, and mechanical failure reporting criteria accident types for 2006.

Table 1 2006 BUS ACCIDENTS BY REPORTING CRITERIA FATAL MULTIPLE INJURY MECHANICAL FAILURE Number Number Number of of of Accident Type Accidents Accident Type Accidents Accident Type Accidents Pedestrian at 1 Angled Collisions 14 Fire 20 Intersection Angled Collisions 1 Hit Other in Rear 4 Hit Other in Rear 6 Head On 1 Sideswipe 1 Wheel Off 3 Other Vehicle Hit Bus in Pedestrian 9 2 Passenger 2 Rear Motorcycle 2 Head On 3 Angled Collisions 0 Hit Other in Rear 1 Hit Stationary Object 1 Hit Stationary Object 1 Miscellaneous 0 Sideswipe 0 Enter/Leave Bus 2 Door Interlock 1 Miscellaneous 1 Total 15 Total 27 Total 34

Page 14 Figures 1 through 3 depict the average number of bus accidents, fatalities and injuries for the years 2000 through 2006. Data is calculated by using fi ve-year moving averages. Five-year moving averages simply measure the average accident rate over a fi ve-year time frame. Bus accidents, fatalities and injuries have shown a general decline over the last fi ve years.

Figure 1

Bus Accidents Investigated

85 84 84 83 82 81 81 80 80 80 80 79 79 78 78 77 76 75 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Figure 2

Bus Fatalities

18

16 16 14 17 15 16 15 12 13 12 10

8

6

4

2

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Figure 3

Bus Injuries

600

500 481 400 465 463 404 379 300 345 323

200

100

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Page 15 Table 2 is the distribution of bus accidents investigated by accident type for the years 2000 through 2006. Calcu- lations are based on fi ve-year moving averages.

Table 2 2006 BUS ACCIDENTS BY REPORTING CRITERIA Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Accident Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Collisions Angled Collisions 22.20 24.00 24.60 21.20 20.00 19.00 17.20 Other Vehicle Hit Bus in 8.60 8.40 8.40 8.80 8.60 7.60 6.40 Rear Hit Other in Rear 7.80 7.40 9.40 9.00 8.00 8.60 9.40 Pedestrian 4.60 4.40 4.40 4.60 4.00 3.80 4.80 Head On 4.40 3.80 4.20 3.80 4.00 3.80 3.80 Sideswipe 3.40 3.00 3.00 2.40 2.00 2.40 2.00 Hit Stationary Object 2.80 3.40 2.40 2.40 2.00 1.80 1.40 Bicycle 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.80 1.60 1.60 1.20 Enter/Leave Bus Stop 1.40 1.40 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 .80 Motorcycle 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.40 .80 Subtotal 56.6 56.80 58.80 55.00 51.20 49.40 47.80 Fire 7.60 9.00 11.40 13.20 18.20 22.60 24.60 Passenger 3.80 3.60 3.40 3..00 2.40 2.00 1.80 Miscellaneous 4.60 4.80 4.60 3.60 2.80 1.80 .80 Out Of Control 4.00 3.80 3.60 2.80 2.40 1.80 1.20 Door Interlock 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.40 Roll Away 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Wheel Off 0.40 0.40 1.00 1.40 1.80 2.20 2.60

Page 16 Rail Accident Analysis

Rail accident investigation reports that have been processed by the Safety Board during formal meetings are analyzed to identify trends and special problems. In 2006, the Safety Board investi- gated 27 rail accidents that met the Board’s criteria. Table 3 depicts the number of accidents meeting the collision, derailment, evacuation, highway grade crossing, multiple injury and passenger fatality accident types.

Table 3 2006 RAIL ACCIDENTS BY REPORTING CRITERIA

COLLISION DERAILMENT EVACUATION

Number Number Number Accident Type of Accident Type of Accident Type of Accidents Accidents Accidents Improper Operation of Equipment Mainte- 2 2 Unsafe Actions 1 Equipment nance Defi ciency Track Component Improper Procedure Used 1 1 Fire/Smoke 1 Defi ciency Track Component Hit Material on Track 1 1 Defi ciency Non Passenger Fatality 2

TOTALS 6 3 3 HIGHWAY GRADE MULTIPLE INJURY PASSENGER FATALITY CROSSING Number Number Number Accident Type of Accident Type of Accident Type of Accidents Accidents Accidents Improper Operation of Passenger Fell From Unsafe Actions 7 1 2 Equipment Train Ignored Warning Devices 1 Suicide 2 Other 2 TOTALS 12 1 2

Page 17 Figures 4 through 6 depict the fi ve-year moving average for rail accidents, fatalities and injuries for the years 2000 through 2006. Although rail accidents investigated have been trending down, fatalities and injuries have remained relatively constant. Figure 4

Rail Accidents Investigated

45

40

35 39

30 33 32 31 25 29 29 29

20

15

10

5

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Figure 5

Rail Fatalities

9

8 8 7 8 7 6 6 5 6 5 5 4

3

2

1

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Figure 6

Rail Injuries

120

100 109

93 94 80 90 80 60 70 63

40

20

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Page 18 Table 4 is the distribution of rail accidents investigated by accident type for the years 2000 through 2006. Calculations are based on fi ve-year moving averages. Table 4 2006 Rail Accident Rates by Type Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Accident Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Unsafe Actions 8.80 8.20 7.40 6.80 7.20 7.40 7.60 Ignored Warning Devices 5.60 4.60 4.20 3.60 3.60 4.00 3.40 Human Factor Improper Operation 4.00 2.80 3.80 3.60 4.20 4.20 4.20 of Equipment Hit Material on Track 3.60 3.00 3.20 3.20 3.20 2.60 2.00 Track Component Defi ciency 4.60 4.60 2.40 2.20 2.20 1.00 1.00 Fire/Smoke 2.20 1.40 1.40 1.20 0.80 1.00 1.00 Passenger Fell From Train 2.00 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.60 0.80 1.20 Human Factor Improper 1.20 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.60 1.60 1.40 Procedures Used Track Maintenance Defi ciency 1.20 0.60 1.20 1.00 1.20 1.20 1.20 Equipment Component Defi ciency 0.60 1.60 1.40 1.40 1.80 1.60 0.60 Non-Passenger Fatality 1.40 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.80 0.80 1.20 Loss of Power 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.60 0.60 Equipment Maintenance Defi ciency 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 Suicide 0.60 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.20 Mechanical Failure of Other Vehicle 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20 Other 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.60 1.00

Passenger Drag-Related Injury/Fatality 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Table 5 depicts the average number of rail accidents investigated by system for the years 2000 through 2006. Calculations are based on fi ve-year moving averages. Table 5 Rail Accidents by System Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average Number of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Rail Accidents MTA Long Island Railroad 16.60 14.40 12.20 12.20 14.20 14.60 14.40 MTA Metro-North Commuter Railroad 5.20 4.00 3.80 3.00 3.80 3.20 3.40

MTA New York City Transit 11.00 10.20 9.40 8.60 8.40 7.60 7.00

MTA Staten Island Railway 1.20 .80 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.00 1.00 New Jersey Transit 1.80 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 3.00 2.60 3.20 3.00 2.80 2.00 2.00

Page 19 Probable Causes of Bus and Rail Accidents

The primary probable cause of The primary probable cause cause, the probable cause was an accident is the action or factor of an accident is either associated categorized as transit system. that directly facilitates the initial with the transit systems or factors Defi nitions of bus and rail transit event of an accident. For example, not directly related to the transit system and other causes can be if a maintenance department failed systems (termed “other”). found on pages 29 through 32. to properly repair the steering Approximately 99 percent of ac- housing unit of a bus and the unit cident cases approved or adopted Table 6 depicts the average failed and the bus had a collision, by the Board identifi ed the primary rate of probable accident causes the maintenance department’s probable cause. If the Board identi- for the period 2000 through 2006 actions would constitute the initial fi ed both the transit system and using a fi ve-year moving average. event. factors external to a transit system (other) as the primary probable

Table 6 Bus Probable Accident Causes Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-year Transit System 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 period Bus Driver 18.00 17.20 17.60 17.00 14.60 16.00 16.80 16.74 Bus Equipment/Maintenance 11.80 13.40 15.20 17.60 22.00 26.40 27.80 19.17 Other 1.40 2.40 3.20 3.00 3.20 3.00 2.60 2.69

Average for the 7-year Transit System 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 period Other Vehicle 41.00 40.40 41.40 36.20 34.40 29.60 27.80 35.83 Passenger 2.60 4.20 4.20 3.60 1.80 1.60 0.00 2.57 Pedestrian, Bicyclist 2.60 1.40 1.00 1.60 2.00 2.00 2.60 1.89 Miscellaneous 0.40 0.20 0.60 0.40 1.40 1.60 1.60 0.89

Page 20 Table 7 is a breakdown of bus driver causes.

Table 7 2006 Bus Driver Probable Accident Causes Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-Year Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period Failure to Drive Defensively 12.40 12.40 13.20 12.60 10.60 11.20 11.40 11.91 Improper Use of Equipment 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.31 Inattentiveness 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.20 1.20 2.00 2.80 1.14 Use of Drugs/Alcohol 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.17 Failure to Perform Pre-trip 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Inspection Fatigue 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.14 Other 4.60 4.20 2.80 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.00 3.03

Table 8 is a breakdown of equipment and maintenance causes.

Table 8 Bus Equipment/Maintenance Probable Accident Causes Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-Year Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period Electrical Systems 3.40 4.20 5.00 7.00 8.60 11.80 13.80 7.69 Other 4.40 4.40 5.40 5.40 7.80 8.80 8.20 6.34 Wheels 1.00 1.20 1.60 1.80 2.40 2.40 2.20 1.80 Steering 0.80 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.60 2.00 1.40 1.40 Brakes 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.40 1.40 1.60 1.60 1.23 Rear Door Interlocking Systems 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.46 Wheelchair 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.80 0.43

Page 21 Table 9 is the average rate of rail accidents caused by the transit systems or others.

Table 9 Rail Probable Accident Causes Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-Year Transit Systems: 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period Track/Signals 7.80 6.80 5.20 4.80 4.60 3.40 3.40 5.14 Crew 4.60 3.20 3.20 3.40 4.20 4.20 4.20 3.86 Car Equipment 2.40 2.40 2.60 2.60 3.00 2.60 2.00 2.51 Operations 1.20 1.80 2.00 2.00 2.20 2.20 1.60 1.86

Other Vehicle 11.40 9.60 10.20 9.00 9.20 8.20 8.80 9.49 Miscellaneous 5.20 6.20 4.20 3.60 2.20 1.20 1.00 3.23 Pedestrian 3.20 2.40 2.60 2.60 4.40 6.00 6.00 3.89 Passenger 3.00 2.00 1.60 1.20 1.60 1.40 1.80 1.80

Table 10 is the average rate of rail car equipment causes.

Table 10 Rail Car Equipment Probable Accident Causes by Component Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-Year Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period Trucks 0.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.60 1.40 0.80 1.26 Other 0.60 0.60 1.20 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.86 Propulsion Unit 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.40

Total 2.51

Page 22 Table 11 is the average rate of crew (motorman, conductor, others) causes.

Table 11 Rail Crew Probable Accident Causes Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-Year Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period Human Failure - Operating 3.00 2.60 3.00 3.00 3.20 2.80 2.40 2.86 Procedures Human Failure - Inattentiveness 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.60 0.46 Human Failure - Operating Rules 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.80 1.20 0.49 Human Failure - Other 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06

Table 12 is the average rate of operation causes.

Table 12 Rail Operations Probable Accident Causes Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-Year Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period Improper Procedures 1.00 1.60 2.00 1.80 2.00 2.00 1.40 1.69 Other 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 Crowd Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Table 13 is the average rate of track and signal causes.

Table 13 Rail Track and Signal Probable Accident Causes Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Average for the 7-Year Cause Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period Track Component Defi ciency 2.80 2.00 1.20 2.00 2.20 1.60 1.80 1.94 Track Component Failure 2.40 3.00 3.00 1.60 1.40 0.80 0.40 1.80 Signal Component Defi ciency 0.80 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.00 0.77 Track or Signal Other 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.40 Signal Component Failure 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20

Page 23 Accident Rate Analysis

Figure 7 depicts the bus and rail accident trend since 2000 based on fi ve-year moving average.

Figure 7 PTSB Accident Trends 140 117 115 120 113 109 110 109 108

100 84 78 80 80 79 80 79 80 60 39 39 40 33 32 30 29 29 20 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 2 2

Bus & Rail Bus Rail

Page 24 Tables 14 through 17 depict bus and rail accident rates for the years 2000 through 2006. The rates are fi ve-year moving averages based on the ratio of the number of criteria accidents reported to 100 million Revenue Vehicle miles, 100 million Passengers and 100 million Train Miles. A very large property has 1,000 or more buses, large property 200-999, medium property 25-199 and small property 1-24 buses. A list of properties under the jurisdiction of PTSB can be found on page 27.

Table 14 Bus Accident Rates Based on Five-Year Moving Average

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Very Large Very Large Property Average Accident Rate 47.20 51.00 53.00 48.800 47.40 48.80 47.80 1,000+ buses Very Large Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 8.05 7.82 7.66 6.83 6.55 3.51 5.33 Very Large Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 51.68 55.67 57.57 52.33 50.17 25.01 37.84 Large Large Property Average Accident Rate 19.80 18.00 18.20 17.60 19.00 17.60 18.00 200-999 Buses Large Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 14.33 12.82 12.50 11.91 11.86 7.86 9.50 Large Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 31.71 27.85 27.64 26.05 26.98 15.75 16.77 Medium Medium Property Average Accident Rate 10.00 9.40 11.20 11.60 10.40 10.60 10.20 25-199 Buses Medium Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 20.76 19.17 21.09 20.79 17.29 9.02 15.11 Medium Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 25.60 23.36 26.25 25.85 21.95 10.66 19.06 Small Small Property Average Accident Rate 1.20 1.40 1.40 1.80 2.80 3.40 3.20 1-24 Buses Small Rate Per 100 Million Passengers 10.98 13.55 15.05 19.46 33.62 28.78 34.56 Small Rate Per 100 Million RV Miles 6.09 6.53 6.34 7.98 12.32 9.91 11.76

Page 25 Table 15 Rail Accidents Rates Based on Five-Year Moving Average

System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Per 100 Million Revenue Vehicle Miles New Jersey Transit 129.53 101.06 72.61 73.47 73.85 59.58 74.28 MTA New York City Transit 3.48 3.21 2.92 2.65 2.57 2.27 2.08

MTA Staten Island Railroad 58.71 36.73 64.68 64.63 55.32 46.61 46.51

Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 339.69 297.85 368.72 353.53 333.31 242.40 251.34 Per 100 Million Passengers System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 New Jersey Transit 135.42 104.66 63.67 44.49 42.29 27.64 32.70 MTA New York City Transit 0.93 0.82 0.71 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.49 MTA Staten Island Railroad 27.73 20.54 37.24 37.56 32.51 27.64 25.43 Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 75.47 67.61 84.89 80.40 74.89 55.07 55.03

Table 16 Rail Accidents Rates Based on Five-Year Moving Average

Per 100 Million Revenue Vehicle Miles System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 MTA Long Island Rail Road 28.62 24.61 21.86 20.86 24.22 25.08 24.44 MTA Metro-North Railroad 15.33 11.49 10.30 7.73 9.82 8.26 8.66 Per 100 Million Passengers System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 MTA Long Island Rail Road 21.11 17.61 15.14 14.24 16.88 17.84 17.77 MTA Metro-North Railroad 11.36 8.52 7.73 5.89 7.50 6.32 6.66 Per 100 Million Train Miles System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 MTA Long Island Rail Road 201.39 174.54 154.56 147.21 171.75 178.86 176.17 MTA Metro-North Railroad 138.59 103.90 98.70 77.92 98.70 80.70 81.06

Page 26 Table 17 Rail Accidents Rates Excluding Grade Crossing Accidents Based on Five-Year Moving Average

System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Per 100 Million Revenue Vehicle Miles MTA Long Island Rail Road 16.40 13.86 10.07 9.39 12.44 11.36 10.22 MTA Metro-North Railroad 9.33 6.84 6.46 4.61 5.62 4.57 5.48 Per 100 Million Passengers System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 MTA Long Island Rail Road 12.24 10.07 7.01 6.42 8.71 8.04 7.40 MTA Metro-North Railroad 6.93 5.09 4.86 3.53 4.30 3.51 4.24 Per 100 Million Train Miles System Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 MTA Long Island Rail Road 115.50 98.41 71.14 66.24 88.33 80.94 73.49 MTA Metro-North Railroad 85.13 62.34 62.34 46.75 57.14 44.34 49.89

Page 27 Systems Under PTSB Jurisdiction

Bus Small 1 - 24 buses Amsterdam Transit System Ontario Transit Lines Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. Arrow Bus Line, Inc. Orange County Paratransit Jamaica Buses, Inc. Blue Line, The ORDA Leisure Lines - Hudson Transit, Inc. Bluebird/Olean/BOA Bus Orleans Transit Service Liberty Lines Express, Inc. Bluebird Coach Passenger Bus Liberty Lines Transit, Inc. Bornscheuer Bus Service Pat Zanchelli, Inc. Monsey-New Square Bus Trails Buffalo Motor Coach Patchoque, Village Of New York Bus Tours, Inc. Capitol Bus Pine Hill-Kingston Bus Oswego County Opportunities Chautauqua Area Rural-CARTS Port Chester-Rye Transit Rockland Transit Coaches Inc Chenango Valley Port Jervis Dial-A-Bus Suffolk Bus Corporation City of Corning Progressive Transportation T-CAT Clarkstown Mini-Trans Service Transport of Rockland/TOR Upstate Clinton Area Rural Transit PTLA Enterprises, Inc. Transit Educational Bus -E.B.T. Putnam County Transit Utica Transit Authority (Bornscheuer Bus Co Inc) Roethel Coach Lines Yankee Trails Ellicottville Transportation Rome VIP Transportation Franklin County Association Schoharie County Large 200 – 999 buses Gadabout Seneca Transit Service Atlantic ParaTransit, Inc Glen Cove Bus Division Spring Valley, Village Of Broome County Transit Gloversville Transit System Steuben County Transit Capital District Transportation Auth. Goshen-Chester Dial-A-Bus Suffolk County Paratransit CENTRO Greater Glens Falls Transit Sullivan County Transportation Green Bus Lines, Inc. Highlands Dial-A-Bus Sunrise Coach Lines, Inc. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. Hornell Area Transit SUNY at Fredonia Student Assoc Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth. Hudson Minibus, City Of Thousand Island Bus Lines Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth. Huntington Area Rapid Transit (Laforty) Queens Surface Corporation Inter-County Motor Coach Tioga County Transit Rochester-Genesee Regional International Bus Service, Inc. Town of Hunter Trolley Trans Auth. Kaser Bus Service Town of Keene Triboro Coach Corporation Kingston Citibus Trans-Hudson Service Kiryas Joel, Village Of TRIPS Very Large 1,000 + buses Laidlaw Transit T-Tran BusSystem/PTS Lake Placid Sightseeing Ulster County Rural Transit Greyhound Lines, Inc. Lake Placid Village Wallkill Dial-A-Bus, Town Of MTA New York City Transit Lester Lines Inc Warwick Dial-A-Bus, Town Of New Jersey Transit Bus Long Beach Bus Division Watertown, City Bus System Operations, Inc Madison Transit Westchester Paratransit Mechanicville, City Of Rail Middletown Transit Corp Medium 25 – 199 buses Monroe Bus Corporation MTA Long Island Rail Road Adirondack Transit Lines, Inc. Monroe Dial-A-Bus, Town Of MTA Metro-North Railroad Birnie Bus Service Montgomery-Crawford D-A-B MTA New York City Transit Auth. Brown Coach, Inc. Netzach Transportation, Inc. MTA Staten Island Railway CBS Lines, Inc. New Windsor-Cornwall D-A-B New Jersey Transit Chemung County Transit System Newburgh Dial-A-Bus, Town Of Niagara Frontier Transportation Command Bus Company, Inc. Newburgh-Beacon Bus Corp Authority Dutchess County Mass Transit Niagara Falls Coach Lines Fullington Trailways Oneonta Public Transit

Page 28 Bus Probable Cause Defi nitions

Bus Driver including the rim, bearings, seals, Bus Other Causes lugs and other anchor assemblies, Failure to Perform Pretrip and tires. Other Vehicle: The improper Inspection: Failure of a bus driver action(s) of a vehicle other than the to inspect the safety condition of a Steering: The failure or bus. bus before using the bus in pas- defi ciency of any steering compo- senger service. nents, including, but not limited to, Pedestrian Bicyclist: Im- steering box, steering wheel and proper actions of a pedestrian Improper Use of Equipment: column, idler arm, pitman arm, or bicyclist that lead to accident Failure of a bus driver to properly radius rods, ball joints, pinions and involvement. utilize bus equipment, such as rear knuckles, power steering pumps Passenger: The improper door interlocks and wheelchair lifts. and belts, etc. action(s) of a person who travels Use of Drugs/Alcohol: Use Brakes: The failure or defi - on a bus or is attempting to board of illegal drugs or use of alcoholic ciency of a bus component(s) that or exit a bus. beverages while operating a bus mechanically slows or stops a bus Miscellaneous: Refers to or the improper use of prescription (includes air system, drums, disc, events such as weather or acts of drugs that have an adverse affect and brake pedal). on driver’s ability to operate a bus. God. Electrical System: The Bus Driver Inattentiveness: failure or defi ciency of a bus Driving while distracted, either component(s) that is associated visually (improper scanning) or with electrical systems or units, mentally (use of cell phone, radio, except for those electrical com- conversation, etc) and being ponents relating to the rear door diverted from performing required interlocks. duties. Rear Door Interlocking Bus Driver Other: Failure of System: The failure or defi ciency a bus driver other than failure to of a bus component(s) that com- drive defensivley (speeding, fol- prises the system that will apply the lowing too closely, improper mirror brakes of a bus when the rear door use, etc), such as medical, incapa- of a bus is opened. ciatation, etc. Wheelchair: The failure or de- Bus Driver Fatigue: Driving fi ciency of the bus system that lifts with improper rest resulting in loss or raises wheelchair passengers of driving skills and performance. from curb level to bus fl oor level. Bus Driver Improper use of Other (tires, suspension,...): Equipment: Failure of a bus driver The failure or defi ciency of any to properly utilize bus equipment bus component(s) except for such as drivers seat belt, rear door those components associated with interlock, wheelchair lifts, etc. brakes, electrical systems, rear door interlocking, steering, wheels, Bus Equipment and wheelchair lifts. Wheels: The failure or defi - ciency of any wheel component

Page 29 Rail Probable Cause Defi nitions

Car Equipment Body: Failure of a compo- nent of a rail car, except for those relating to the propulsion units or trucks. Body components would include lighting, doors, frame and draft gear. Propulsion unit: Failure of the power unit of a car. Trucks: Failure of the wheel and braking unit of a car. Crew Human Failure – Operating Rules: A train crews’ failure to ad- Track and Signal tion of a vehicle (includes bicycles) here to established or posted rules, that causes an accident, in most such as the train operator failing Signal Component Defi - instances “other vehicle” refers to to stop a train short of a restricted ciency: The inadequacy of a signal motor vehicles crossing highway signal. component to function to its intend- grade crossings. ed specifi cations; for example, a Human Failure – Operat- cable being worn or a sticky relay. Passenger: The improper action of ing Procedures: A train crews’ a person who travels by rail or who failure to adhere to established Signal Component Fail- is attempting to board or exit a rail procedures, such as crews’ failure ure: The complete failure of a car. to properly observe or react to a signal component, such as a short fl agperson’s instructions. circuit. Pedestrian: The improper action of a person who travels by foot. Human Failure–Inattentive- Track Component Defi ciency: ness: A train crews’ failure to be as The inadequacy of a track com- alert as expected, such as failure to ponent to function to its intended notice the position of a switch. specifi cations, for example, a rail being worn. Operations Track Component Fail- Crowd Control: Failure of man- ure: The complete failure of a track agement to have established safety component, such as a broken rail. procedures to effectively handle or control large numbers of passen- Rail Other Causes gers at one site or location. Miscellaneous: The improper ac- Improper Procedures: Failure tion of a vandal or trespasser or of management to have estab- other factors lished procedures (excludes crowd control procedures). Other Vehicle: The improper ac-

Page 30 Bus Accident Type Defi nitions

Angled Collisions Hit Other In Rear Pedestrian Intersection Defi nition: Collisions between two Defi nition: Accidents where a tran- Defi nition: Accidents involving the vehicles approaching on sepa- sit bus collides with the rear injury or fatality of a pedestrian as rate roadways or other paths that of another moving or standing a result of the pedestrian coming intersect. vehicle (including another into contact with the exterior of a transit bus). transit bus. Bicycle Hit Stationary Object Roll Away Unattended Defi nition Accidents involving a bicyclist and a transit bus. Defi nition: Accidents where a Defi nition: Accidents where an transit bus collides with any fi xed unattended transit bus rolls or Door Interlock object. travels from a stopped position. Defi nition: Accidents resulting in Miscellaneous Sideswipe the movement of a transit bus while a passenger door is open or an ac- Defi nition: Accidents that did not Defi nition: Accidents where vehicle cident caused by the failure of the meet the characteristics of another side contact is made between a door interlock system. accident type. transit bus and another vehicle. Enter/Leave Bus Stop Motorcycle Wheel Off Defi nition: Accidents involving a Defi nition: Accidents involving a Defi nition: Accidents where a bus transit bus entering or leaving a motorcycle and a transit bus. wheel separates from the bus as passenger loading-discharging a result of a mechanical failure. zone. Other Vehicle Hit Bus Fire in Rear Defi nition: Accidents where a Defi nition: Any fi re that occurs on moving or standing transit bus is a transit bus while it is in revenue impacted in the rear by another service. vehicle (excluding a transit bus). Head On Out of Control Defi nition: Collision accidents Defi nition: Accidents where a between a transit bus and a vehicle transit bus driver fails to control traveling in the opposite direction the operation of a bus while it is in on the same roadway (including motion. contra-fl ow lanes). If the accident occurs at an intersection and the Passenger vehicles approach each other from 180 degrees in the opposite direc- Defi nition: Accidents involving tion, it is termed Head On. the injury or fatality of passengers within the interior of a transit bus.

Page 31 Rail Accident Type Defi nitions

Equipment Component Loss of Power such as falling between cars or from vestibule areas. Defi ciency Defi nition: Accidents caused by Defi nition: Accidents caused as a a loss of or the inability of a train Suicide to take traction power, which in result of component failures, Defi nition: Self-induced death most circumstances results in an such as brake riggings dropping, caused by a non passenger. wheels shattering, and wheels evacuation of passengers. overheating. Material on Track Track Component Defi ciency Equipment Mainte- Defi nition: Accidents caused as nance Defi ciency a result of striking materials or Defi nition: Accidents caused by a objects on or near the tracks. track component failure, such as Defi nition: Accidents caused by broken rails, deteriorated crossties improperly maintained equipment, Mechanical Failure of and missing track bolts or spikes. such as allowing for worn wheels to be in service. Other Vehicle Track Maintenance Defi nition: Accidents caused by Defi ciency Fire/Smoke another vehicle experiencing Defi nition: Accidents caused by fi re mechanical problems, such as Defi nition: Accidents caused and/or smoke. an automobile stalling on a grade by improperly maintained track crossing. components such as switches, rail Ignored Warning crossties and ballast. Non-Passenger Device(s) Fatality Undetermined Defi nition: Accidents caused by the Defi nition: Accidents for which no Defi nition: Accidents caused public’s failure to obey and com- cause can be determined. ply with warning devices, such as by a non-passenger, includes grade crossing gates and fl ashing trespassers. Unsafe Practice(s) grade crossing warning lights. Passenger Drag Defi nition: Accidents that are Improper Operation of Related Injury or caused by unsafe practices or Equipment actions by the public, such as Fatality standing too close to the tracks or Defi nition: Accidents caused as a Defi nition: Accidents caused by jogging on right-of-ways. result of human error in the opera- a passenger and/or the passen- tion of a train. ger’s possessions being caught or Other trapped in a closed door or door- Improper Procedures Defi nition: Cause does not meet way of a train. one of the types list, would include Used Passenger Fell from contractor error. Defi nition: Accidents caused by hu- man error in following established Train procedures. Defi nition: Accidents caused by passengers falling from trains,

Page 32 PTSB Safety Awards

The Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) Awards were initiated in l996 to recognize public transit systems and individuals in New York State who have dem- onstrated excellence in safety.

The PTSB award categories are:

Transit Safety - Systems efforts have lead to a reduction in accidents

Transit System Safety - System has a proactive safety program that includes exemplary practices.

Leadership - An individual, entity or transit system’s efforts have im- proved the safety of a transit system and/or improved safety in the public transportation industry.

The awards are open to all bus and rail systems that receive State Transit Operat- ing Assistance or to individuals involved in public transit safety in New York State. The awards are sponsored in conjunction with the Bus Association of New York and the New York State Public Transit Association.

Award selections are approved by the PTSB based on recommendations from the PTSB Awards Selection Committee. The committee is responsible for reviewing and evaluating all award applications. The committee consists of representatives from the industry and the New York State Department of Transportation. Current industry committee members represent Liberty Lines Transit and Niagara Frontier Transpor- tation Authority.

The PTSB commends the 2006 award recipient for their efforts to improve safety for the riding public and for implementing safety initiatives to make New York State a leader in public transportation safety.

Page 33 Public Transportation Safety Board 2006 Safety Award Recipient Senator Norman J. Levy Safety Award

Presented to

MTA Long Island Railroad

Grade Crossing Education Program for Excellence in Transit System Safety

Page 34 Contributing Staff

Bus Safety Annual Highlights, Photographs, Accident Data and Analysis: John Fabian of the Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security Passenger Carrier Safety Bureau.

Rail Safety Annual Highlights, Photographs, Accident Data and Analysis: Jerry Shook and O. J. Guzman of the Offi ce of Modal Safety & Security Rail Safety Bureau

Page 35 Notifi cation of Unsafe Conditions

If you would like additional information about the PTSB or wish to report an unsafe public transportation condition involving buses, subways, commuter railroads or light rail sys- tems, please write to:

Executive Director Public Transportation Safety Board 50 Wolf Road, POD 53 Albany, New York 12232

Or you can phone the PTSB directly:

Upstate New York (518) 457-6512 New York City Metropolitan Area (718) 482-4570

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