TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH The September 30th Movement and Aftermath in Indonesian Collective Memory and Revolution: A Lesson for the Nation

ABSTRACT: The G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) in 1965 was a largest national tragedy since the Republic of had gained its independence on August 17th, 1945. It was a darkness episode in Indonesian collective memory and revolution towards a democratic state. It also still remains a lot of problems, both before and aftermath. This study is a historical analysis to the movement focused on the rivalry between the three pillars of Indonesian political power; anatomy of the movement and massacre’s aftermath; and the national socio-political change’s aftermath under the regime rule. The study showed that, socio-politically, the G-30-S of 1965 was a rivalry of Indonesian political powers between the TNI-AD (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat or Indonesian National Military-Army), the PKI (Partai Komunis Indoensia or Indonesian Communist Party), and President Soekarno. The success of the Indonesian Military, under General Soeharto, in winning the rivalry had brought further consequences to changes in political systems, structures, and processes and Indonesian government for a period of 30 years. How the movement lives in collective memories of the nation, and how Hannah Arendt (1970 and 1998)’s perspectives on the meaning of “forgiveness” as the state’s ethical policy to find a humanitarian solution for the G-30-S of 1965’s victims and perpetrators were also discussed. Hopefully, the paper can give an important meaning of the events to the citizenship education for next generations, so they are more thoughtful in addressing the nation’s history. KEY WORDS: September 30th Movement of 1965; Memory; Indonesian Revolution; Forgiveness and Reconciliation.

INTRODUCTION on 17th of the succession were characterized by a democraticSince Indonesia state isgaining not over, independence, especially a “loud succession” or “revolution”, either in relation August with 1945, the national revolutions leadership to realize (throughGerakan a September bloody movement, 30) or people’sGerakan 30power, September or an impeachment. Theth GESTAPUMovement) G-30-S ( succession. The fact, three of six periods or September 30 About the Authors: Prof. Dr. Mohammad Imam Farisi is a Lecturer at the Department of Citizenship Education FKIP UT (Faculty

Dr. Ary Purwantiningsih of Education and Teacher Training, Indonesia Open University), UT’s Regional Office of Jember, Jalan Kaliurang No.2A, Sumbersari, contactedJember 68121, via e-mails East Java, adress Indonesia. at: and is a Lecturer at the Department of Citizenship Education FKIP UT, Jalan CabeSuggested Raya Pondok Citation: Cabe, FarisiPamulang, Tangerang Selatan 15418, Banten, Indonesia. For academic interests,th Movement the Authors and are Aftermath able to bein [email protected] [email protected]” in TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April, , Mohammad Imam & Ary Purwantiningsih. (2020). “The September 30 IndonesianArticle CollectiveTimeline: Memory and Revolution: A Lesson for the Nation pp.103-128. Bandung, Indonesia: Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI, with ISSN 2085-0980 (print) and ISSN 2685-2284 (online). Accepted (February 21, 2020); Revised (March 24, 2020); and Published (April 30, 2020).

© 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 103 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

which had a major impact to Indonesian in 1965 was one of the national tragedies, Adam, 2008; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sucipto, RESEARCH2013; and Sanita METHOD & Rianto, 2018). people in the next periods. Even, Indonesian The study uses a historical analysis eventshistorians in the committed, history of besides modern the Indonesia G-30-S method involve the collection and a critical of 1965 movement, there are no important are still debatable (Mulder, 2000; Suwirta, analysis of all secondary sources of text, such 2000; Kahin, 2013; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & as: memoir, testimony, textbooks, academic Rianto, 2018). journals, (auto)biographies, daily newspaper, In Indonesian history, the G-30-S of Thisnews/reports, study is, especially, etc. to establish focused relationships on the rivalry 1965 movement was related to twentieth- between cause and effect of the movement. century darkness of Indonesia, a labyrinth ofthe heartbreaking unsolved riddles memories of Indonesian that breed history in between the three pillars of Indonesian theunanswerable twentieth century questions. It was one of the socio-politicalpolitical power; change’s anatomy aftermath of the movement under It“ was the most mysterious event, an and massacre’s aftermath; and the national ” (Boden, 2007:507). historians, whose solution had profound the New Regime rule (Notosusanto, 1978; unsolvable and impenetrable murder for Sjamsuddin,How the movement 2007; Zed, and 2008; aftermath Buckley, live 2016; in and Wasino & Hartatik, 2018). variousimplications interests for Indonesia’s and political national propaganda history. of analyzed and interpreted using the conception theThe parties, G-30-S ofthe 1965 political movement scene intricates,involves and the collective memories of the nation, it will be the suspect nature of much of the evidence (ofGerakan P. Bourdieu 30 September (1989) on or “symbolic struggle”,th to find a humanitarian solution for the G-30-S (Notosusanto & Saleh, 1989; Suwirta, 2000; September 30 Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sucipto, 2013; and Movement) of 1965’s victims; and perpetrators alsoAdam, asserted 2018). that the movement was an will be analyzed and interpreted using Hannah intricateM.C. Ricklefs of the political (1981), sceneand other and thescholars, policyArendt ( cf(1970 and 1998)’s perspective on the suspect nature of much of the evidence, meaning of “forgiveness” as the state’s ethical Arendt, 1970 and 1998; Bourdieu, FINDINGS1989; and Sanita AND DISCUSSION& Rianto, 2018). make firm conclusions about the movement Road to the Movement: The Triangular nearly impossible. Because it was actions Rivalry. Without ignoring the factors of historian’sclandestinely usual plotted sources by military of information officers, — foreign conspiracies and period newspapers,intelligence operatives, magazines, and government double agents, records, a

(1945-1991), which had proposed by experts and pamphlets — were of little help (Ricklefs, (Scott, 1985; Keys & Cottle,Gerakan 2017; 30 Adam, September 2018; 1981; Adam, 2007 and 2008; Roosa, 2006 orLeksana, 2018; andth Robinson, 2018), the paper and 2008; and Sucipto, 2013). In this context, regards that the G-30-S ( A. Sumarwan[…] 1965 massacres (2007) were stated an event also that as never follows: clearly theSeptember three pillars 30 of Movement)Indonesian ofpolitical 1965’s powers explained why [...] it be a puzzle to me, for many movement was a climax of the rivalry between people, not just my generation, but also for the generation of my parents (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat/ Angkatan— Indonesian Bersenjata Military Indonesia or TNI-AD/ABRI (Sumarwan, 2007:19). Party or PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia); President) — So that, anything interpretation or question Soekarno; and the Indonesian Communist of the event will never find a definitive answer, it is still in a mystery. If further evidence is to attain political power after the General not found, the final truth never will be known Election in 1955 (Crouch, 1986; Feith, 1995 for ever (Suwirta, 2000; Sundhaussen, 2006; and 1999; and Munsi, 2016). © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 104 TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

At that time, position and role of President parties’ power, after Prime Minister Ali been successful to dissolve of political Soekarno were so powerful after 13 years of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1959) Sastroamidjojo’s Cabinet (1956-1957) in excluded by parties’ power. President conceiveda crisis; and of also the Guidedafter President Democracy Soekarno Soekarno had become a balancing power decreed back to the PresidentialNasionalisme, system and between the PKI and TNI-AD, and he had Agama, Komunisme based on enabled to intervene on theMadiun PKI and Affair TNI- in the politics of and NASAKOM ( AD internal affairs. The PKI, that had or Nationalism, Religion, “marginalized” since the and Communism) in 1959. Although 1948, returned to the national politics after right-wingPresident Soekarno’s Islamic groups, conception however, on the PKI they were success to become the winner (NASAKOMPartai Komunis was opposed Indonesia by or the Indonesian TNI-AD and in the General Election of 1955, and one of the four largest parties in Indonesia. mainEven, party,President which Soekarno dominated had Parliament also been Communist Party) supported it. For PKI, given to them a great chance to become the NASAKOM provided more opportunities to build a closer relationship with President and military (Magenda, 1985; Feith, 1999; Soekarno for influencing the national Anderson, 2003; Sundhaussen,Tentara 2006; Nasional Poeze, policies;Dewan gaining Perwakilan leadership Rakyat-Gotong positions in Indonesia-Angkatan2011; Sugiyama, 2011; Darat and or Adams, Indonesian 2014). Royongthe Ministry or House Cabinet, of Representatives-Mutual Parliament or DPR- Meanwhile, the TNI-AD ( GR (

National Military-Army), which had dissolvingCooperation), all anti-Communist the Executive Board organizations/ of the marginalized by the political parties during National Front, and Local Officials; and the era of Parliamentary Democracy (1950- hand,1959) it cannot had made more the participated military as actively a group parties (Sastroamidjojo, 1974; Feith, 1995; and directly in politics processes. On the one Sundhaussen, 2006; Cenne, 2016; and importantWinata, 2017). political party and powerful in aexcluded powerful from internal political cohesion roles; andand, integration on the These factors had become PKI as a very other hand, the military had allowed to build Indonesia; and President Soekarno’sStaat van policies Oorlog (Magenda, 1985; Crouch, 1986; Feith, 1995; enwere Beleg more left leaning. After President and Munsi, 2016). Soekarno revoked the SOB ( IndonesianA.H. (Abdul military Haris) role Nasution in politics, was sincethe main NASAKOMISASI, or State or in a War process and Emergency)of NASAKOMISM in , architect forcf building and strengthening the 1962, the PKI began to launch a campaign on the 1950s ( Nasution, 1985; Penders & into the Indonesian military body, including Sundhaussen, 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006; to the TNI-AD, by putting political advisers suggestedand Anwar, as 2018). follows: In his analysis on the on every command; and mobilize and recruit General Election of 1955, D. Dhakidae (1985) intellectuals,et alstudents, workers, and peasants […] the whole analyses to view the distribution of as new members (Feith, 1995; Sundhaussen, parliamentary parties were not meaningful, when 2006;The Arif PKI also., supported2010; Cenne, to President 2016; and the President and military factors simultaneously Winata, 2017). waging to war against the party [...] and since then, every aspect of national politics cannot be separated from the triangular rivalry between Soekarno in confrontation against Malaysia -PKI-Military to create a radical atmosphere in society; strengthen their position in national politics; (Dhakidae, 1985:214). Tentara and weaken the Indonesian militaryAngkatan power. Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat or KelimaEven, they were supported by President President Soekarno and TNI-AD ( Soekarno proposed to establish the (Fifth Force), besides the Indonesian Indonesian National Military-Army) had Army, Air Force, Navy, and Police. This force © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 105 MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath consisted of PKI cadres, and sympathizers (Dewan Nasional

successfully incorporated), an extra-parliament Indonesian were armed. However,Gerakan it was never 30 September approved or council built in 1957, A.H. Nasution also by the Indonesianth Movement) military, particularly was happened TNI- in AD, until the G-30-S ( Military-Army and Police officers, and September 30 himself as ex-officio members of the National 1965 (Crouch, 1986; Sundhaussen, 2006; and (Council.Staat van In Oorlog1958, A.H. en Beleg Nasution proposed to Irshanto, 2019). President Soekarno to implement the SOB The TNI-AD under A.H. (Abdul Haris) President and the Indonesian or State Military-Army, in War Nasution’s role had also been able to build and Emergency) to ease tensions between the and expand their political roles more focused. (TheIkatan first Pendukung moment was Kemerdekaan when A.H. NasutionIndonesia and he also suggestedJalan a “participatoryTengah policy” had been successful in establishing the IPKI Front”for Indonesian (Front Lebar Military-Army well-known as the “Middle Way” ( ) or “Broad or Indonesian Independence SupportersKepala Staf ), particularly for the TNI- AngkatanAssociation) Darat after or he Chief was of dismissed Indonesian by Army AD (Nasution, 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, President Soekarno as a KSAD ( 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006; Cenne, 2016; and 17th cameSetyahadi, from 2018).the Indonesian Military-Army Staff) caused by his failure to prevent the claimedIdeologically, that it was the their concept historical of “Middle rights Way” October 1952’s Affair. In 1955, when A.H. Nasution reappointed as a KSAD, he had holder of revolution”, so that the Indonesian fought back to realize a greater role for the to participate in politics. It was the “share Indonesian military in politics (Nasution, 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; and Military-Army cannot just be placed as a Maulana & Santosa, 2019). “civil apparatus” orUndang-Undang a “military regime”. Dasar And or appointedTo prevent him A.H. as a Nasution—military Deputy Minister of when President Soekarno declared about became too powerful, President Soekarno “back to theth UUD ( divide Constitution) 1945”, through the President etDefense impera in (divided 1960s, so and A.H. ruled) Nasution strategy can be Decree on 5 July 1959, was also based on controlled easily; and carried out a suggestedA.H. Nasution—Indonesian that Indonesian Military-Army Military-Army proposed and supported. Then, A.H. Nasution between the with the strengthenedAir Force. To control the autonomy the authority of the ofAir the Force should be neutral in General Elections and Ministry of Defense, President Soekarno also political parties to avoid politicization; and their membership in parliament as by incorporating the Air Force and Police a “functional group” conducted by the as part of the Indonesian Armed Forces. President Soekarno appointment (Nasution, President Soekarno also strengthened the 1985; Notosusanto, 1985:23; Penders & Ministerposition ofEx-Officio Chief of Air Force Staff and Police Sundhaussen, 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006:299; toby theincorporating President as them Commander into the Ministry in Chief as Indonesianand Hamid, Military-Army2012). had successfully that responsible directly placedUp to their this representative point, A.H. Nasution— in government/ ministry, legislative, and in almost every state (Nasution, 1985; Notosusanto, 1985:25; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006:254-255; and Cenne, 2016). agency. According to U. Sundhaussen (2006), Facing the President Soekarno’sPartai Nasional strategy, Military-Armyand other scholars, as the this most success important had enabled part IndonesiaA.H. Nasution and Indonesian Military-Army for A.H. Nasution to establish the Indonesian supported by IPKI, PNI ( and had outlined a pattern for cooperation or Indonesian National Party) of the national administration in Indonesia; and PKI persuaded President Soekarno to build the National Front. When President among President Soekarno – Indonesian Soekarno established a National Council Military-Army to bury the parliamentary © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 106 TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

system on next time (Nasution, 1985; Penders Military power (Penders & Sundhaussen, & Sundhaussen, 1985; Muhaimin, 2005; 1985; Muhaimin, 2005; Sundhaussen, 2006; Sundhaussen, 2006:225-226; and Cenne, Disjarahad, 2013; and Setyahadi, 2018). 2016). However, President Soekarno’s tactics Since the time, President Soekarno – PKI to weaken the Indonesian Armed Forces, it – TNI-AD position were stronger, but the seemed not entirely successful. Ahmad Yani, rivalry among of them became more heated. who replaced A.H. Nasution, had a smart Each of them sought to organize and fight strategy to re-attack the weakening tactic of influence, strategy, or power and/or to weak President Soekarno. Ahmad Yani replaced and compete, but they also needed each a number of top officers in the Indonesian other to support their own political interests. Army body and promoted officers, who Special to PKI, the Indonesian Military- opposed and hostile to President Soekarno Army still regarded it as a “domestic enemy and anti-Communist or PKI. AmongKomando them was and external enemy agents” (Feith, 1995; CadanganBrigadier GeneralStrategis Soeharto, Angkatan who Darat assigned or Muhaimin, 2005; Sundhaussen, 2006:247; as Commander of KOSTRAD ( Hamid, 2012; and Munsi, 2016). strategic position in the Indonesian Army, U. Sundhaussen (2006), and other Army Strategic Reserves Command), a very scholars, stated again, in fact, since 1957 up to the beginning of the 1960s, the difference which was can take over the Indonesian in the opinion between President Soekarno Army command if a KSAD was in absent and A.H. Nasution—Indonesian Military- (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Elson, partialArmy was adjustment vitriolic. ofEven, the ifinterests there was of political,a 2001; Sundhaussen, 2006; Disjarahad, 2013; coalition of them, it was only based on the Adams, 2014; and Setyahadi, 2018). Ahmad Yani also replaced the pro- ideological, personal, and material. However, Communist officers to the unimportant both were agreed to abolish parliamentary strengthenedpositions; reorganized Army positions the Regional in Local democracy in Indonesia. In the line with Army Commando up to the village level; Force,growing he of can President intervene Soekarno’s into the Indonesian power implemented the Operasi Karya supported by the PKI and the Indonesian Air Governments (Provincial and District); (WorkPertahanan Military body further. Gradually, President SipilOperation) from the central to local level; and Soekarno reduced A.H. Nasution’s power over established a system of HANSIP ( politicalthe Indonesian role of military;the Indonesian and regarded military” A.H. (cf stemed or CivilPKI effortsDefense) for in strengthening Indonesia. All their the Nasution as the “architect who has forged the policies he had taken to compensate and

Muhaimin, 2005; Sundhaussen, 2006:284; position in the regions (Sundhaussen, 2006; Lev, 2009; and Ladang, 2016). leastDisjarahad, there were 2013; four and interrelated Anwar, 2018). opinions Finally,Kepala in 1962, Staf Angkatan A.H. Nasution Darat was or Chief In the contextGerakan of the 30historical September above, or at replaced by Major General Ahmad Yani as a th KSAD ( in the G-30-S ( of Army Staff); and,Kepala then, Staf A.H. Angkatan Nasution was leftSeptember wing 30 Movenemt) of 1965. Firstly, Bersenjataappointed as Chief of Staff of the Armed the G-30-S of 1965 was a revolt of fanatic Forces or KSAB ( officers in the Indonesian Army ) under President Soekarno’s Body under Colonel Untung command dissolvedauthority asof allthe his Supreme rules and Commander authorities of over have(under indoctrinated President Soekarno Nasakomism support/ the militaryArmed Forces. and very On harmsthe one to hand, the military it had command?) and Air Force officers who by PKI. They used issues on the news about the andinterests. the PKI On to the control other ofhand, the Indonesianit had been asefforts Dewan of IndonesianJenderal Military-Army officers given an advantage to President Soekarno group of “capitalist-bureaucrats” known (General Council) of © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 107 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath the Indonesian Armed Forces that will do Muslimin Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Partai Sosialis Indonesia “counter-revolution” to overthrow and kill League Council) and PSI ( the PresidentMahkamah Soekarno. ThisMiliter opinion Luar Biasawas or or Indonesia Socialist Party) reinforced by the “evidences” exposed in the supported by the Western and Islamic groups MAHMILUB ( (Feith, 1964 and 1995; Sutter, 1966; Crouch, Extraordinary Military Court) and Gilchrist 1973 and 1986; Fic, 2005; Boden, 2007; letter document (Crouch, 1973; Notosusanto and Sucipto, 2013). In these context, Taufik & Saleh, 1989; Beise, 2004; Sundhaussen, wereAbdullah a natural (1985), defense and other mechanism scholars, in stated any 2006; and Keys & Cottle, 2017). that the polarization and rivalry like this Secondly, the G-30-S of 1965 was not so much “movement” against the government, Indonesian Military organization (Abdullah, but an attempt to force President Soekarno’s 1985; Sucipto, 2013; and Setyahadi, 2018). hand within the existing governmental Fourthly, the G-30-S of 1965 was a structure. The basic aim of the movement movement organized by Soeharto and anti- was to arrest the Indonesian Army’s Generals, Communist Generals group through double who were believed to be plotting against agents, e.g. Sjam Kamaruzaman, in order to the President Soekarno; in the hope that he provide a pretext for attacking the PKI and thewould, PKI then, to movement be able to of take the topaction command against of overthrowing President Soekarno (Wertheim, thethem. Indonesian The G-30-S Army of 1965 to eliminate was organized its major by 1970; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; and Adam, competitor for power, and replaced President presence2018). The of strong the senior positions Indonesian of the ArmyPresident Soekarno were supported by PKI, and the suddenSoekarno death by a orPKI’s permanent candidate paralysis using issues Generals did not allow Soeharto to seize on the plausibility of President Soekarno’s nationalpower directly. emergency Soeharto and overthrowhad made thePresident G-30-S of 1965’s movement as a “pretext” to create a (Notosusanto, 1985; Fic, 2005; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Purdey, 2011; and Sucipto, 2013). SoekarnoRecently, (Dake, this opinion2005; Roosa, associated 2006 withand Thirdly, the G-30-S of 1965 was an internal the2008; theory and Adam,of Creeping 2018). Movement, which conflict within the Indonesian Military-Army was revealed in the memoir’s testimony that caused by a dissatisfaction expression of “progressive” middle-officers of Indonesian cf Military-Army in Central Java (Diponegoro of , a former Foreign Minister of andDivision) their tomismanagement their officers in policies headquarter, for those Guided Democracy in 1960s ( Subandrio, who called as the “cosmopolitan-elitist”, 2000; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sundhaussen, 2006; Adam, 2010, 2012 and 2018; Widodo, outsidewho had forces, struggled which to werethe liberation considered of West to have following2012; and here: Setyahadi, 2018). Even, in his hinderedIrian. The the conflicts development more compounded and integration by of memoirs, Subandrio (2000) wrote as the Indonesian Military (Anderson, McVey & […] July 3, 1946’s coup was a movement that failed; the G-30-S of 1965 movement was the beginning of a successful creeping movement […] and the beginning of a series ’s victories Bunnel, 1971; Crouch, 1973; Sundhaussen, in a creeping movement. Letter of Authorization 2006; Pour, 2010; and Purdey, 2011). () that received by Suharto was According to this opinion, it was looked also the first. Why it should in the four stages? at the increasing influence of the President The answer is that before the G-30-S of 1965, Suharto was not an unimportant officer [...] also a andSoekarno increasing and PKI an internalin restructuring polarization of the and disability officer [...]. rivalryIndonesian within Military-Army the Indonesian leadership Military-Army elites; Actually, creeping movement was not a left-wing Suharto’s choice [...], this was a forced choice. Suharto cannot perform simply to get the top of right-wing the national leadership. He must pass the senior between affiliatedMajelis to PKI Syuroand close Generals and dealing with President Sukarno, to the President Soekarno and affiliated to the MASJUMI ( © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 108 TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

who was so strong [...]. The Creeping Horse is a bloody man. First, the Generals’ blood murdered on October 1, 1965. Second, Gains and Supardjo’s in theThe G-30-S of 1965’s (Crocodile troops wereHole) divided area, blood manipulated. Third, Sjam Kamaruzzaman’s Lubang Buaya blood betrayed. Fourth, blood of millions of into two groups. The first wasMerdeka centralized Communists, sympathizers, their families, workers, and farmers murdered about seven miles in south of Square in Central . Their main duty was to (Subandrio, Dewan Jenderal kidnap the six Indonesian Army Generals Anatomy2000:35-36, of 56 the and G-30-S72). of 1965 as the members of the Movement. Gerakan 30 and entered into an old well in the Lubang (General Council). The Generals murdered September or th Movement) Buaya The G-30-S ( th in the Merdeka September 30 Their main area. duty The secondwas to neutralizewas centralized and was occurred on September 30 , 1965, in Square in Central Jakarta. aJakarta, Cakrabirawa Central Java, and Yogyakarta. In LieutenantJakarta, the Colonel Indonesian Untung, Military two consistedplatoons of block the centers of state power, such as the Presidential Palace, Military Headquarters, (theKomando President Daerah Guard) Militer under Ministry of Defense, and the USA (United Jakarta Raya Regionalof KODAM Command)’s JAYA ( garrison under Colonel States of America) Embassy. It was also to or Great Jakarta Military theretake over was thea troops Radio group Station centralized and the Center in of residentialTelecommunications’ areas around building. the Halim In addition, Air Force Abdul Latif, and the Indonesian Air Force battalion of the Halim Air Base under Major SoejonoIn addition, (Pour, 2010;there wereSucipto, ten 2013;companies and Base, a location of the Central Command of Adam, 2018). G-30-S of 1965 (Collinson, 2009; Pour, 2010; Sucipto, 2013; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & of the Battalion 454 of Central Java and successfullyRianto, 2018). carried out their missions and TheseBattalion troops 530 were of East the Java, main units group of thefor Para- The G-30-S of 1965’s movement occupyingCommando Merdeka troops, and the Police Forces. Ante Meridiem control to Jakarta only seven hours, from 04:00 to 11:00 AM ( ). In (Independent) SquarePartai Semarang, Solo, and Salatiga in Central Java, Komunisin Central Indonesia Jakarta. Besides or Indonesian that, there Communist were Party)two thousand and its massmembers organizations, of the PKI such( as they have occupied a local radio station, but there was no kidnapping or murdering of the PR (Pemuda Rakyat the Indonesian Army Territorial Officers. Gerakan Wanita Indonesia or Indonesian Women’s Movement) or People’s coordinated Youth) However, in Yogyakarta, they have kidnapped and GERWANI ( and murderedKepatihan two Army (ViceTerritorial Regent Officers. Place), They have also surrounded the Yogyakarta Aiditby Sjam (Aidit) Kamaruzzaman as a Chairman (Sjam), of the Supono PKI from Sultanate and Marsudidjojo (Pono), and Dipa Nusantara and a radio station in Yogyakarta (Anderson, McVeyAfter & the Bunnel, humanitarian 1971; Roosa, tragedy 2006 at and the the Special Bureau (Fic, 2005; Collinson, Lubang2008; Sucipto, Buaya area2013; in and an earlyAdam, month 2018). 2009; and Munsi, 2016). 2,130In Jakarta, Armed personnelthe G-30-S and of 1965’s 2,000 troopsCivilians, totally estimated 4,130 people, consisted of of October 1965,Komando a very Cadangan large tragedy Strategis Angkatanbroken. Brigadier Darat General Soeharto, a who had received a brief training on Command)’sKOSTRAD ( Commander, and Indonesian military in Halim. In Central Java, Semarang, Armed Forces occupied or Army to Strategic Merdeka Reserves variousYogyakarta, youths Solo, organizations and Salatiga, supporting they consisted PKI of local troops backed by Armed Civilian and Square in Central Jakarta; re-takenLubang the Buaya Radio Station, (Notosusanto & Saleh, 1989; Cribb ed., 1991; Telecommunications’ building, Halim Air Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Arta, Purnawati & Force Base, and the area. Pageh, 2017; and Adam, 2018). Then, Brigadier General Soeharto announced © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 109 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

30th through the Radio Station on September Bali, spread to Aceh in Northern Sumatra, Movement of 1965’s event (Elson, 2001; Sulawesi, and Kalimantan (AI, 1977; Cribb Collinson, 2009; Pour, 2010; Sucipto, 2013; ed.,The 1991; Time MLM-RSG, magazine, 2007; on 17 Beech,th 2017; and and Adam, 2018). Adam, 2018). The facts, according to John Roosa (2006 December and 2008), and other scholars, that since the 1965, illustrated that the massive killings sound of Soeharto’s voice on the air marked have caused serious sanitation problems in the symbolic end of the G-30-S of 1965’s North Sumatra, where the humid air bears movement (Wertheim, 1970; Roosa, 2006:58 the reek of decayed flesh, small rivers, and wasand 2008;the pursuit Pour, and2010; cleansing Sucipto, anyone 2013; and who streams that have been literally clogged with Adam, 2018). The next, Soeharto’s operation bodies; river transportation had at places been seriously impeded (cited in Ransom, involved in the G-30-S of 1965’s event, and 1975; AI, 1977; Cribb ed., 1991; Roosa, destruction of the PKI bases in Central Java, 2006:58 and 2008; MLM-RSG, 2007; and massEast Java, from Bali, the politicaland North opponents Sumatra. ofThe PKI, and Adam, 2018). anti-Communistoperation supported youth by groups vigilantes, with civilian weapons In the context of this massacre, there were withouttwo profound any one conclusions particular about person it. or Firstly, the mass killings just seemed to have happened supplied by Indonesian Military-Army (Cribb ed., 1991; Farid, 2005; MLM-RSG, 2007; Munsi, ofinstitution accidental being mass responsible. death” (cf The Indonesian 2016; and Arta, Purnawati & Pageh, 2017). killings can be categorized as “an anomalous It was not known exactly how many Cribb ed., people were killed. The earliest version as 1991:16; Cribb, 2001; Sulistyo, 2003; Roosa, announced by President Soekarno in January 2006:24 and 2008; and Adam, 2018). The 1966, the number of murders was 87,000 mass killings had been attributed by frenzied people (Cribb ed., 1991; Roosa, 2006 and mobs rampaging through villages and urban 2008; and Adam, 2018). In 1966, the USA neighborhoods (Cribb, 2001; Sulistyo, 2003; Indonesian(United States data of released America) in State the mid-1970s Department Roosa,It was 2006 a horizontal, and 2008; spontaneousRoosa & Nevins, violence, 2016; estimate placed the figure at 300,000. Official orand a Adam,volatile, 2018). primitive people prone to placed the number of deaths between 450,000 and 500,000 victims. In 1976, violence (Sulistyo, 2003; Farid, 2005; Roosa, Admiral Sudomo, the Head of the Indonesian 2006 and 2008; Roosa & Nevins, 2016; and State Security System, said larger than HannahAdam, 2018). Arendt If (1970)’stheir analysis violence was model, correct, and 500,000 had been murdered. The Amnesty otherthe killing scholars, act confirmed was properly the existencecalled Niemand of an International had quoted one sourcecf placing Herschaft the number killed at 700,000 and another at “many more than one million” ( AI, 1977; (Nobody Dominion), the rule by CribbThe ed., people 1991; of Beech, the world 2017; will Adam, never 2018; nobody, violence politics by many hands, so forgetand Sanita and forgive& Rianto, this 2018). horrendous crime who should be responsible was uncertain. For the rule by nobody was not no-rule, and tens of thousands of people were tortured where all were equally powerless, we have andagainst imprisoned the people. in concentrationThis did not include camps the couldhad a tyrannyargued, towithout whom a one tyrant. could That presented the and isolation found in almost all parts grievances,state there wason whom nobody the left pressures with whom of power one cf of Indonesia. Even, Indonesian activists could be exerted ( Arendt, 1970; Budiardjo, estimated the number at from one to three 1996; Bartov ed., 2000; Budiawan, 2000; and million people, and about 10,000 of PKI cadre Robinson, 2018). and supporters. The massacres, which were Secondly, unlike the provious views, most intense in Central Java, East Java, and G. Leksana (2018); G.B. Robinson (2018); 110 © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

and other scholars, stated that the killing 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018). encouraged,was rather than facilitated, inevitable directed, or spontaneous, and shaped After SoehartoSurat successfully Perintah quelled 11 Maret the the mass killings and detentions were orG-30-S March of 111965’sth movement, then, he received It was a repertoire of violence, rather a SUPERSEMAR ( by the Indonesian Army’s leadership. deemed necessary Warrant) to guarantee of 1966 fromsecurity, the President Soekarno: to take any action it than psychological explanations of mass thoseviolence. associated The repertoire with military refered institutions to routines peace, and stability of the government and of violence learned and employed by all of the revolution; to ensure Soekarno’s safety (andMajelis authority Permusyawaratan as the President/Supreme Rakyat Sementara (Marching, 2017; Leksana, 2018; McGregor, orCommander/Leader Provisional People’s of Consultativethe Revolution/MPRS Melvin & Pohlman eds., 2018; Melvin, 2018; and Robinson, 2018). AlthoughThe mass the killingsArmy’s couldrole differed not have cross- happened Assembly)’s Mandatory; to sake the National regionally,without the due Indonesian to the capacities Army’s interference.of their PemimpinIntegrity and Besar the Revolusi Republic of Indonesia; regional leaders, the violence eventually and to execute all Sukarno’s teachings as or the Great Leader of the Revolution (LAI, 1998; Adam, 2006; propagandaescalated due and to themedia mobilization campaigns, of including civilian and Wardaya, 2007). groups by the Army and the usage of (PartaiBased Komunis on the SUPERSEMARIndonesia or Indonesian of 1966, Soeharto had taken important actions to PKI alsoreligiously suggested inspired that thetactics. Indonesian In this context, Army was A. The PKI and its mass organizations, for Keys & D. Cottle (2017), and other scholars, Communist Party) and President Soekarno. at the centre of the mass killings, through the example, dissolved and declared as a banned toArmy’s note thatrole thisin both was the not instigation simply a case and of the party/organization in allPresiden parts of SeumurIndonesia. theorganisation Indonesian of Military-Armythe killings, but carrying it is important out HidupWhile in(President 1967, the for MPRS Life) was and revoked declared that a slaughter of alleged Communists (Keys Soekarno’s authority as

implementPresident Soekarno the outlines was of unable state policyto meet and & Cottle,Political 2017:341; Changes Melvin, in the 2018;New Regime, and his responsibilities constitutionally and to 1968-1998.Robinson, 2018). Gerakan 30 September or th Movement) the MPRS’s decisions. MPRS also prohibited The G-30-S ( President Soekarno to be active participate in the history of Septemberthe Indonesian 30 revolution, politics until General Election (LAI, 1998; Isak of 1965, and aftermath, had been part of ed., 2007; and Wardaya, 2007). Pemegang Indonesia people as one of the most dramatic SuparsemarOne year (Holderslater, in 1968, of the MPRS March was 11 th which always will be remembered by all appointed General Soeharto as changed the entire of political constellation events of the nation of Indonesia. It has also Warrant) of 1966 to become Acting President focused on the most political changes in the until a President elected by the new MPR domesticin Indonesia. affairs The consisted following of description the system was of otherwill be scholars, formed inrevocation the next Generalof President Election in 1971. According to Sunarno (2011), and DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House juridical normative, even was the overthrow ofparty; Representatives) General Elections; and MPR Parliament, (Majelis i.e. Soekarno’s authority was more political than Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s (Orde Lama or Old Order) regime under of Presidential power. Since then, the ORLA

Consultative Assembly); Governance; and President Soekarno, 1945-1967, and the Security and Order Policy (Suwirta, 2000; political hegemony of the PKI was over; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Pour, 2010; Adam, political authority, then, replaced by the ORBA © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 111 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

(Orde Baru every Indonesian Military person, who will enter the political activity, she/he should or New Order) regime under repudiate his/her status and occupation in President Soeharto, 1968-1998 (Sunarno, Presidential2011; Wood, system 2013; and and Abdulsalam, focused on the 2018). The new regime was based on a theSystem Indonesian and MilitaryStructure (Crouch, of Political 2010; Parties, Rikan, paradigm of the government was dominated General2014; and Elections, Anwar, 2018). and Parliament. “political and economic stabilities”. A typical Order regime policy on the political parties The New by the Indonesian Military (Abdullah, 1985:38; McGregor, 2008; and Anwar, and General Election was “fusion or simplify 2018). This paradigm was an anti-thesis ofthe the political political parties”. parties It in newly Indonesia, implemented the of the President Soekarno’s regime that in the General Election of 1977. In the history was characterized by inter-political party Toconflicts maintain in the and Parliament, strengthen which of his hadregime, led policy had never really existed. Apparently, it to a “civilian political bankruptcy” in 1958. based on the experience of the Parliamentary system previously ending with a “civilian doctrinePresident so-called Soeharto Dwi maximized Fungsi ABRI engagement (Angkatan political bankruptcy” in 1958. Learning to Bersenjataof the Indonesian Republik Military Indonesia) based on the this, the New Order regime deemed necessary Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces”, a to facilitatereduce the government number of controlpolitical over parties political to doctrine of Indonesian Military or participation “Dual avoid inter-political party conflicts, as well as in politics and government activities, which parties (Feith, 1962; Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, Jalan 2017; and Ardanareswari, 2019). Tengahwas developed from General A.H. (Abdul Above all was to maintain political stability Haris) Nasution’s concept of the as a mainstream paradigm of the New Order or “Middle Way” for the Indonesian regime. The number of political parties in Army in 1950s (Nasution, 1985; Penders the General Election of 1955 was 55 parties; & Sundhaussen,In the doctrine 1985; mentioned Muhaimin, two 2005;functions remainedthe General two Election political of parties,1971 was namely 10 parties, the Sundhaussen, 2006; and Anwar, 2018). the PPPand the(Partai General Persatuan Elections Pembangunan of 1977 to 1997 or defense function: maintain security and order Development United Party) and the PDI of the Indonesian Military-Army:social firstly, and (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian political function: participate in the power in the country; and, secondly, Golongan Karya or Functional the role and function of the Indonesian Democratic Party). Besides that, there was Military-Armyand rule the country. not only Based provide on the channels doctrine, a ( for themselves as an organization—not Group), a non-party group formedAngkatan by the individuals—to participate actively and BersenjataNew Order Republikregime whose Indonesia membership or Indonesian Armedconsisted Forces), of ABG, Birokrasi namely: ABRI ( spacedirectly widely in the and social openly and politicalfor the Indonesian field on a government to the Villages (Bureaucracy), administrative limited basis. It had also provided a political and GOLKAR’s paths, from the Central determining the state policy at a highest level,Military-Army from the tocenter be active to the participate local authority in level in Indonesia (Suryadinata, 1992; Puspoyo, 2012; and Reeve, 2013). In fact, the New Order regime efforted (Harisanto, 1993; Sundhaussen, 2006; Rikan, to reduce the number of political parties 2014; and Anwar, 2018). tenthat political had also parties been carried approved out toby participate President in After the New Order regime collapsed in ElectionSoekarno of in Parliament, 1960s. At that other time, political there partieswere May 1998, the Indonesian Military function dissolved to avoid a crisis of Konstituante was gradually abolished, starting after the General Election of 2004 and completing in the General Election of 2009. Since that time, or Constituent Assembly for Forming the 112 © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

Constitution in 1959 (Dhakidae, 1985; Lev, supportingshould also tobe one neutral of the in parties,the General namely 2009; Hamid, 2012; and Indrajat, 2017). Elections; although in practice, they were The differences of both were in the (Pegawai Negeri Sipil or Civil Apparatuses President Soekarno era (1959-1966), political GOLKAR. They also “required” all the PNS parties were not diffusion but selected from existing parties according to the President violatedof the Government) the principles to voteand provisionsGOLKAR. In of this the Soekarno’s Guided Democracy concept. case, the New Order regime had actually Meanwhile, in the President Soeharto era Bebas (Free), in which every on(1966-1998), a platform politicalof the political parties parties, were diffused namely personGeneral chose Elections freely that according had been to defined, his/her to maintain the “national stability” and based namely: firstly,

“Nationalist-Socialist-Democratic” and secondly,conscience Rahasia without influence, pressure, or (“Islam”.Nahdlatul The Ulama PPP, for example, was a fusion coercion from anyone or with anyway; and, of the Islamic politicalPartai parties, Muslimin such Indonesia as NU (Secret), in which what or Awakening of IslamicPartai political parties were chosen not will be SyarikatCleric), PARMUSI Islam Indonesia ( or Indonesia Islamic known by anyone and in any way, including Leagueor Indonesian Party), Muslimand PERTI Party), (Pesatuan PSII ( Tarbiyah those who selected. The Indonesianet al Military Islamiyah did also not have the right to elect and to be electedThe purpose(Liddle, 1992;of the Widagdopolicy was to maintain., 1995; or United of Islamic Education). and Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, 2017). (WhilePartai the Nasional PDI was Indonesia a fusion orof Indonesianthe “Nationalist- Socialist-Democratic” parties,Partai such asKristen PNI a “Neutrality in General Elections and Protestan Indonesia or Indonesian Protestant IndonesianPolitical Parties” Military and was to avoid the instrument a “Military of ChristianNational Party), Party), PARKINDO Partai Katolik ( Indonesia thePoliticizing“ state and by socio-political political parties. power The that must (Indonesian Catholic Party), Partai Murba maintain the corps unity, and guarding and (Ordinary People Party), and IPKI (Ikatan securing of and the Constitution Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Dwi Fungsi (Dual Functions) for Indonesian of 1945. To accommodate the doctrine of asIndonesian political partyIndependence in the time Supporters of Indonesia Association). GOLKAR ownself claimed not Military, the NewDewan Order Perwakilan regime stipulated Rakyat/ Majelisof their Permusyawaratanmembership in the Rakyat Parliament, or House New Order (Reeve, 2013; Fuad, 2015; and ofi.e. Representatives/People’s DPR/MPR ( Consultative Abdulsalam, 2019). Since the PKI and its mass organizations were dissolved and banned, political rights ofAssembly) the recommendation as “a functional of the group” Commander through of their members to participate in the party, the President’s appointment and on the based to elect and/or be elected in the General Elections, and to become of the member of in Chief of ABRI or Indonesian Armed Forces Parliaments were prohibited. In the New (Sundhaussen, 2006; Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, Order regime’s view, the General Elections amount2017; and in DPR/MPRYanuarti, 2018). came from the A democratic”,and Parliament they were were a pillarpeople/groups of democracy. which According to the Law No.2/1985, their Meanwhile, they were considered “anti- (ABRI) path of the GOLKAR was 100 people, democracywant to destroy and thedemocracy enemies itself. of Pancasila They also or or 20% of all DPR memberships and 10% had not been recognizing to the principles of of all MPR memberships. They were in the (“ABRIFraksi Fraction”. Utusan Daerah The New or RegionalOrder regime Delegation also Five Principles of the Republic of Indonesia appointed the PNS as members of the FUD (Liddle, 1992; Puspoyo, 2012; and Nisa, Na’im et al & Umamah, 2017). Faction) in the DPR/MPR in Indonesia (Bivitri The State Officials, such as the Ministers, ., 2002; Purnama, 2014; and Anwar, 2018). © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 113 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

of the state lives, politics, social, culture,

Besides that, the membership of strategic considerations and concerns of the Parliament of the GOLKAR Fraction – a economics, government, etc. based on pro-government fraction – was constantly increasing for every General Election period. military (Nasution, 1977, 1980 and 1985; In General Election of 1971, for example, Sundhaussen, 2006:248; and Rikan, 2014). GOLKAR placed 236 representatives all IndonesianThus, the New Military Order potencies regime can in theintegrate (62.82%); in General Election of 1977 was and control effectively and efficiently 232 representatives (62.11%); in General under one command, namely President Election of 1982 was 242 representatives executive, judicial, and legislative institutions (62.11%); in General Election of 1987 was 299 representatives (68.34%); in General Soeharto. Nevertheless, it was difficult to Election of 1992 was 282 representatives alone,conclude although that Suharto’s dominant, era and was what “a military was (73.16%); and in General Election of 1997, regime”. The Indonesian Military did not rule a final General Election during the New cf Order regime era – GOLKAR placed 325 called the “military regime” in Indonesian is a representatives (68.10%) in the Indonesian “civil-militaryThe civil-military fusion” relation ( Abdullah, in the 1985:37;era of Parliament. Accordingly, the alliance of the Jenkins, 2010; and Abdulsalam, 2018). three fractions of the New Order regime trulysupporters effective – Military, to manage Regional and control Delegations, the entire New Order regime (1966-1998) was very processesand GOLKAR in the – were Indonesan greatly Parliamentpowerful, and (Liddle, Armygood, notdomination as extreme in politics as in the and previous national periods. In addition, the Indonesian Military- the Parliament and the civilian government 1992;System Puspoyo, and Structure2012; KPU, of 2014; the Government. Nisa, Na’im government can be seen as a victory over & Umamah, 2017; and Yanuarti, 2018). a parallel system and structure of the divideduring et 1945-1958 impera periods, which has been The New Order regime had developed The“co-opted” control by of ParliamentaryParliament over alienation the Indonesian and (divided and ruled) policy. Ministersgovernment largely with werea “command consisted system of President and control through the military civilization structure” of the Indonesian Military. The Military-Army was a subjective civilian (Staf Pribadi Presiden Soeharto’s personal military staffs as SPRI (Feith, 1962; Notosusanto, 1985:13-14; or Personal Staff of Kahin, 2013; and Anwar, 2018). the President). To maintain national order In this context, the Indonesian Military- Regents/Mayors,and stability, all the Districts, strategic and positions Villages of came Army had been positioned as a neutral the local governments, such as Governors, roleinstitution of the Indonesianof ideology, Military-Armyand as a fighting had arena for ideological warriors. Position and from the Indonesian Military. This strategy the political parties’ power, and it had led offsethad been the appliedPKI (Partai effectively Komunis since Indonesia the 1950s or been “marginalized” and “intervention” by Indonesianin West Java, Communist i.e. Siliwangi Party) Army power Division, and to Military-Army, and the Indoensian Military- its mass organizations to the Village level, Armyto internal against conflicts to the withinParliament-Ministry the Indonesian and to establish good relationsat alwith local political system, suchcf as the “July 3, 1946 communities (Mas’oed, 1989 and 1996; Affair”; “October 17, 1952 Affair”; and “June Sundhaussen, 2006; Zulkifli . eds., 2014; 22, 1955 Affair” ( Feith, 1962; Dhakidae, theand Doktrin Yanuarti, Perang 2018). Teritorial (Doctrine of 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Conceptually, it can be traced back to Anderson,Security 1988; and OrderSundhaussen, Policy. 2006; and the widespread involvement of the Anwar, 2018). IndonesianTerritorial War), Military-Army a strategy into that all justified aspects regime in the security and socio-politicalThe stability paradigm also conducted by the New Order

© 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 114 TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020 order policies, particularly with respect to student’s activities and organizations (in freezed all in-campus student’s organizations, namelySince DEMA that time, (Dewan the NewMahasiswa Order regimeor Majelis and out of campus); and to the mass media, Presidium Mahasiswa particularlyIn the history the press of Indonesian (Raillon, 1985;revolution, Hill, Students Council) and MPM ( student/youth’s2011; and Suwirta, activities 2018b). and organizations Normalisasi or Students Kehidupan Presidium KampusAssembly), and promoted a new students had appeared the historical generations, Allpolicy, student’s namely political NKK ( activism was over suchhad the as themost Generasi important Kebangkitan role. Among Nasional them or Normalization of Campus Life).

Generasi Sumpah Pemuda focusedand “institutionalized” solely on academic in the and intra-campus not on or National Awakening Generation,Generasi Revolusiin student organizations. So, students’ activism Kemerdekaan1908; Indonesia or Indonesianor Youth Oath Generation, in 1928; politics (Usman, 1999; Firdausi, 2018; and Generasi TRITURA (Tiga Tuntutan onlyRizkiah, allowed Suwirta the &students’ Supriatna, organization, 2018). Rakyat)Independence / AMPERA Revolution (Amanat Generation, Penderitaan in Period 1978-1989,Senat Mahasiswa the New Order regime Rakyat)1945; or Three People Demands’ namely SEMA ( or Student Senate) at the Faculty level only; and at the Generation / the Mandate of People’s onUniversity the Rector level and was Vice newly Rector allowed III policy in 1990s. Suffering, in 1966; and so on (Martha, andTheir power activities as Leaders are also of determined Campus or basedHigher Wibisono & Anwar, 1985; Raillon, 1985; wereAnderson, more 1988; autonomous and Patty, and 2018). were derivedIn the fromearly theyears cadres of the of New out-campus Order regime, organizations, they Education Institution (Raillon, 1985; Firdausi, independent activists of various study 2018; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018). OrderA political regime andlaunched bureaucratic a policy atmosphere on the also engaged in political activity (Martha, slightly reduced in 1980s, when the New groups, and other activist groups. They were “intra-campus” organizations by establishing Wibisono & Anwar, 1985; Raillon, 1985; Gie, orthe independent students’ study of the groups; political and parties, the “extra- so least,2005; there Maxwell, were 2005; two important Patty, 2018). events had campus” organization that affiliated and/ During the New Order regime ruling, at political activities, and to avoid the repressive repressive actions against the political they were able to participate in out-campus become a precedent to the new regime’s (Malapetaka 15 Januari th Havoc) actions of the government (Magenda, 1985; rights of students. Firstly was the “MALARI Firdausi, 2018; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & against the political issues of Januaryon corruption, 15 Supriatna, 2018). dominationof 1974 Affair”, of the when Chinese they demonstratedcapitalist, and (OrganisasiHowever, Massa when orthe Mass New Organization), Order regime theregulated students’ the organizationsLaw No.8/1985 cannot on ORMAS actively involve to politics freely without government Japanese investors (Raillon, 1985; Jazimah, controls strictly through determination the2013; government Suwirta, 2018a; irregularities and Wirajati, in the 2018).electoral of Pancasila politicsSecondly, and when in the they nature demonstrated and strategy to protest of (Five Basic Principles of the Republic of Indonesia)Azas Tunggal as the only one of the activities,development considered in 1977. to Their jeopardize leaders the were Thisfoundations policy caused for any all mass mass organization organizations, – well- and positionarrested ofand the jailed regime on accuseand threaten of subversive the known as the (Single Principle).

also the political parties, became apathetic stability of the nation and the state (Suharsih to participate into politics activities; even, and & Mahendra, 2007; Rizkiah, Suwirta & some organizations became a political tool of Supriatna, 2018; and Sitompul, 2018). the regime (Noer, 1984; Humaidi, 2010; © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 115 MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

This situation, which had caused turmoil inMatanasi, the community, 2017). then led to the emergence 2011; Suwirta, 2015 and 2017; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018). The press, sometimes, not cover both sides of a number of national tragedies, such as in the news. Intervention of various external “Tanjung Priok Tragedy of 1984” in North alsointerests, often e.g.and politics, unwittingly economics, caused religion,them to notJakarta enforce and the“Petition Pancasila of 50”. principles The tragedy to all had etc., to the independence of the press were been demanded the New Order regime did be a subjective when reporting the crucial politicalThe mass parties media, and particularlyorganizations press, (Jenkins, was issues in society, such as race, religion, tribe, 2010; Humaidi, 2010; and Suwirta, 2017). ethnicity, and class. However, the press was not value-free. They had a “media policy”, a 30also national/local not free from pressesthe New and Order 9 campus/ regime’s phenomenon that cannot be denied in the students’control. During presses period were 1970-1990,warned, suppressed, more than media,press activity, which didincluding not play in politicsIndonesia. in its It maynews be said that there were none of the press/ even their licenses revoked. Some press and views (Raillon, 1985; Said, 2009; Hill, figures were also imprisoned. The repressive 2011;Indonesian Suwirta, press2015 wasand one2017; of andthe pillarsRizkiah, actions of the New Order regime more ofSuwirta democracy, & Supriatna, which had2018). a legal, ethical, and theincreased Press” duringregulated the in 1980s, Indonesia since (Raillon, the Law No.21/1982 on the “Principal Provisions of moral responsibility to uphold the basic 1985; Said, 2009; Hill, 2011; Suwirta, 2017; values ​​of democracy. They had been also a and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018). rightssocial andcritically moral and responsible corrective to through promote the the theAlthough press was a consistentlymassive banning done, to especially the press if presentationestablishment of of news the rulein a free,of law open, and accurate, human no longer like in 1970s, repressive action to true, and fair accordance with the code of the press considered tended to be unilateral, if the press criticizing and correcting the causedbe negative only or130 opposed presses to were the officialsregistered or thein regime,journalistic then ethics considered and independence. as anti-Pancasila However,, government. The control of the regime had anti-development under the name of national

1966, decreased to 95 presses in 1982, and since the New Order regime was the collapse actionstability, was or againstthey considered the values as ​​and the principles right ad/ in 1998, only 71 presses were registered, but or left-extreme, and so on, of course, such that capable of publish were only 51 presses (Said, 2009; Hill, 2011; and Suwirta, 2018a of democracy (Said, 2009; Hill, 2011; Suwirta, and 2018b). 2015 and 2017; and Oktavianti, 2016). In many cases, the press banning and/ Moreover, in the Law No.11/1962 on corruption,or their figures cronyism, arresting and was nepotism related in to the “Basic Principles of the Press”, article governmenttheir news on circles, pornography; involving gambling the President code; 4 stated that to the national press was not subject to censorship and banning. In other awords, perspective from a of “political democratic stability” values perspective, ​​within nationalSoeharto’s leadership family and succession the Indonesian or openness Military; thesuch military, as action it wasmay certainlybe understood, not paralleled but from students protest movement; and issues on the to the commitment that the Indonesian was when the press reported the issues on Military should encouraged to the growth in the opinion. The most prominent case

“spreading hatred” among the people. So that, and maturation of democratic life. What the control of the press was not fully caused by regime did to maintain political stability fullyrepressive independent regime inattitudes, its news but and also views caused (Hill, seemed an “taming act“ of the press by the press attitudes which had not been (Abdullah, 1985:44; Simatupang, 1985:49; Luwarso, 2003; Suwirta, 2008; and Hill, 2011). © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 116 TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

Institution that had a strategic role to The Massacre was an unhealed Cold War maintain the security and socio-political trauma within Indonesian society (Keys &

Komando Operasi TheCottle, killings 2017:343). represented a vast popular Pemulihanorder during Keamanan the New danOrder Ketertiban regime era or irruption, spontaneously, and involved a was the ( violence that was face to face and strangely and Order), which was under the direct intimate Command of Operation to Restore Security Genocide (Friend, of 1965 in2003). Indonesia recorded in world history as a major crime against Command of the President Soeharto. During humanity in the 20th century, which can only the 23 years of the New Order regime ruling, be compared to the savagery of Hitler Fascism assets,they had personnel, become a and “military authority, government even of the in Germany Indonesiantask force” that Armed can Forces used all for the implementing civilian It saved a lot (Arif, of grief 2005). and wounds, both for the security and intelligence activities (Elson, those who win, especially for the losing party. A human dimension was lost, although appears, sense to rancor and to vengeance 2001; Jenkins, 2010; and Farihi, 2018). were the most important It can be said that they were “the (Sumarwan, 2007). heart of power of the regime” that able to coordinate the number of intelligence Regardless of the debate about who had agencies (military and non-military). In Partai Komunis Badan Koordinasi dan move and orresponsible Indonesian for Communist the tragic incident Party) or 1988, they were dissolved and replaced by Indonesia Strategis Pertahanan Nasional – President Soekarno, PKI ( the BAKORSTRANAS ( Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan or National Darat TNI-AD ( Defense Coordinating and Strategic Agency) ways that or Indonesian done to them, National of course, Military- was not with the tasks and functions were not much Army) – a large number of victims and cruel differentThe Movement than the KOPKAMTIB in Collective (Elson, Memories 2001; Farihi, 2018; and Matanasi, 2018). of the Nation. For historians and Indonesian sufficient to justify a violence. Revolution Gerakan by the name of anything, cannot justified a th 30 September or Movement) massive violence (Feith, 1995; Anwar, 2007; generations, the event of G-30-S ( followingLev, 2009; here: Hamid, 2012; and Ilmar, 2018). September 30 a phase of political regime changed or In this context, John Roosa (2006) stated as of 1965, and aftermath, not only indicated dramatically changed in the social, politics, Violence as it reflects a humanitarian catastrophe […]. Whatever connection the PKI had was had caused a prolonged trauma for the insufficient by itself to justify violence against economics, and culture. Furthermore, it everyone associated with it (Roosa, 2006:xviii intrigue,Indonesian intimidation, people. Knowingly, atrocity, orpogrom, not, it andstill and 33). perceived and remembered by them as an suggested also that violence never got Hannah Arendt (1998), and other scholars, genocide periods (Sulistyo, 2003; Roosa, the social and moral support from society 2006 and 2008; Sumarwan, 2007; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018). Another its implications, as following here: completely. Violence was merely justified scholars also said on the G-30-S of 1965 and and other scholars, the violence came from never legitimate. For Hannah Arendt (1998), […] it was a single most important and ignominious event in the history of the country since gaining its independence in the attitude of totalitarianism. It was just 1945 an instrument, a part of the force. However, it had never been a system of values, ​​which (Fic, 2005:1). th […] one of the greatest crimes of the 20 was the basis of collective power. It required century was committed in Indonesia (MLM- cf a collective justification, rationalization, and normative confirmation ( Arendt, 1998; RSG, 2013:1). Molan, 2009; and Kautzer, 2019). © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 117 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

stated as following here: As Elie Wiesel (1985), cited also in ideology. In this context also, S. Frunză (2008) MNs (Museum News) in 2007, and other The event speaks of the necessity of cultivating in scholars, stated that to kill or any violence each person a consciousness of responsibility in acts, absolutely, first of all, to undermine the the face of terror, violence, and the attempt to use religion or ideology against other individuals or healthy zones of the human being and the communities morale of the person. That was its goal, that the person should be so demoralized that (Frunză, 2008:109). he or she would lose hope (Wiesel, 1985; Nicholls, 2004; MNs, 2007:36; Molan, 2009; Lastly, in GerakanP. Bourdieu 30 September (1989) and or other and Kautzer, 2019). scholars’ conceptionth on “symbolic struggle”, alsoElie that Wiesel this was (1985), a product as cited of hatred,also in A.and the the G-30-S ( Sumarwan (2007) and other scholars, stated September 30 Movement) of 1965, and aftermath, can be viewed as an individually or hatred, whatever in the name placed – racial, collectively struggle to maintain the stability intribal, fact, religious, in itself displayed ancestral, a national,most crushing social, of and durability of social order within a space ethical, political, economic, or ideological – of relative autonomy with a flexibility and opening of freedom for political and social action. The human defeat, an absolute defeat to human power,aim was which redefining can manipulate the world hopes and being, to humanity (Wiesel, 1985; Nicholls, up new possibilities based on new symbolic 2004; Sumarwan, 2007:269; Molan, 2009; less inspired and uplifting pre-formative scholars’and Kautzer, study, 2019). had revealed that the expectations, especially through a more or massacreHermawan carried Sulistyo out on (2003), young andpeople, other so it impressed as a rite of passage for evocation of the future (Bourdieu, 1989; Roosa,Within 2008; this Siregar, situation, 2016; anyone/anyMelvin, 2018; group and Sanita & Rianto, 2018). those who will enter adulthood. Even, A. Sumarwan (2007), and other scholars’ study, againstcan take another violence person actions or and, group, then, which see andhad on a story of 1965 political detainees and re-imagine themselves as a human being thereconciliation massacre ( effortscf in Bali, explored that of disruption, resistance, and disorder the use of cultural symbols-religious behind denigrated and commodified as the creator Cribb ed., 1991; Cribb, 2001; Sulistyo, 2003; Sumarwan, 2007; Roosa, (Bourdieu,Hannah 1989; Arendt’s Melvin, Forgiveness: 2018; and A Sanita & 2008; Marching, 2017; and McGregor, Melvin HumanitarianRianto, 2018). Perspective for the Ex G-30-S here:& Pohlman eds., 2018). In this context, A. of 1965. Another important aspect of the Sumarwan (2007), then, sated as following Gerakan 30 September or […] against the PKI wass a holy war, for the 30th sake of fulfilling a religious obligation to purify the island [...]. The enemies of our revolution were G-30-S ( September also the most ferocious enemy of religion, and it Movement) of 1965, and aftermath, was should be killed and destroyed down to the roots. Knowingly,associated withor not, the the New event Order had regime provided policy Extermination the root of GESTAPU/PKI and for ex G-30-S of 1965’s prisoners/detainees. NEOKOLIM (Neo-Colonialism) was an obligatory godly duty [...] the killing of Communists was “the will of God” a heavy burden for the nation and future generations in Indonesia (Roosa, 2008; Munsi, (Sumarwan, 2007:360 and 372). 2016;To overcomeMarching, was2017; a collectiveMcGregor, duty Melvin that & religious consciousness to murder, in fact, Pohlman ed., 2018; and Robinson, 2018). Knowingly, or not, beyond of their eradicate their ideological enemies and, at the must be borne by the entire nation, if we there was New Order regime interests to violationswant to be of a civilizedhuman rights nation of in the the political world the ruling power over the evil of the opponent community. We all must resolve alleged same time, attempting to build a prestige of prisoners/detainees of the ex G-30-S of 1965 © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 118 TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020 and/or their families, to uncover the truth, to give forgiveness, and to respect for human rights, democracy, social justice, communal Organizations,opposed by various Mass parties, Organizations, such as andthe of environmental safety for them, as well as to course,Parliament, the Indonesian Government Military, Officials, particularly Political reconcile them as citizens, and for peace and

Army. On one hand, these oppositions national unity. Onwere the understandable, other hand, a discrimination because the PKI and was Nevertheless, it seemed, had become a considered to have betrayed the country. law of history, when a New Order regime (1966-1998) replaced the Old Order regime “heritage punishment” for those was also (1959-1966), especially if it happened in cannot be justified. It was “a crime against socialcomplicated and political and complex structure political according events, to humanity” (Sherlock, 2000; Barton, 2010; and they were necessarily going to build a fresh Sanita & Rianto, 2018).Pedagogy of the Oppressed,In the context said as of following education, here: P. Freire their own paradigm (McGregor, 2008; Lev, (2005), in his work on 2009; Rikan, 2014; Indrajat, 2017; and They can run the risk of losing oneself in Winata, 2017). the disconnectedness of practice and of the During the New Order regime ruling, it responsible to active participate in the social construction seemed could not be done, although, actually was possible according to the Constitution (Friere, 2005:20). the President authorized to give the The of 1945, article 14, in which stated that Mahkamah Human Condition, also stated as following here: Agung Hannah Arendt (1998), in her work on rehabilitation based on the MA ( Discrimination or alienation actions would DPR (Dewan or Supreme Perwakilan Court)’s Rakyat judgments, or House and of eliminate their existence from public space and Representatives)’to give amnesty and considerations abolition based in Indonesia on the narrow their opportunities to establish a stable (Munir identity and to act spontaneously together with et al others for creating a shared interaction space in a free public discourse ., 2005; Soemantri, 2007; and (Arendt, 1998). newlyYani, 2018). implemented after the President However, in 2003, the MK (Mahkamah However, this article of 1945 Constitution Konstitusi or Constitutional Court) had

Soeharto’s regime collapsed in a bloody that the Parliament candidates were not revolution and the people power, well-known revoked thePartai Law No.12/2003,Komunis Indonesia article or 60g, as “MayKyai 1998 Haji Affair” by the next Presidents of Indonesian Communist Party), including B.J. (Bacharuddin Jusuf) Habibie, 1998-1999; massan ex-PKI organizations, ( or persons involved K.H. ( ) Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Gerakan 30 Dur, 1999-2001; and Megawati Soekarno September or th Movement)/ Putri, 2002-2004. President B.J. Habibie directly or indirectly in G-30-S ( and President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, September 30 for example, had been given forgiveness andPKI inhas 1965. regained MK has their decided political that rights, it violated so they PKI(amnesty (Gerakan and 30abolition) September/Partai to 1,400 – Komunis1,800 the human rights in the Constitution of 1945, Indonesiapolitical prisoners/detainees or th Movement/ of ex G-30-S/ miteinanderhave rights to activity vote and (reciprocity be elected dialogues) since 2004. September 30 The decision should also be interpreted as a Indonesian Communist Party) of 1965 in of all citizens in social and politics without Indonesia (Budiawan, 2000 and 2004; Munsi, of the state to build a collective participation 2016; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018). MPRIn (2000,Majelis President Permusyawaratan K.H. Abdurrahman Rakyat or exception. Everyone, even the state, needs to Wahid also been sought to revoke the free and forgive her/himself from the burden of the past based on sense of understanding People’s Consultative Assembly)’s Decree (Sutiyoso, 2008; Mietzner, 2010; and Sanita & on the dissolution of the PKI, but he was Rianto, 2018). © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 119 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

scholars, stated that forgiveness was an Mahkamah Again, Hannah Arendt (1998), and other Konstitusiand amnesty or Constitutionalor forgiveness Court)of the President. had Unfortunately,a quo in 2006, as a whole the MK is against( the continueability to livingfacilitate and reconciliation acting together, between to remain Constitution of 1945, and it does not have a engagedforgiver andin a forgiven.collective It project, has allowed despite us theto bindingdeclared legal it “ force

though it was canceled“ (MK, nor 2006:7). implied that inevitable trespasses of communal life. It was effortsIn the to MKsolve (2006)’s human considerations,rights violations even in enable forgiver and forgiven to begin again, to rebuild the common world in a shape unbridled by the transgressions of history the past have been closed. Many ways can be following(Arendt, 1998; here: Molan, 2009; and Kautzer, internationaldone by shaping human legal rights policies instruments, (laws) were or 2019). Hannah Arendt (1998), then, stated as aaccordance reconciliation with through the Constitution political wisdomof 1945 onand Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity that efforts and way-out to reconcile them to act would, as it were, be confined to a single rehabilitation and general amnesty. It means deed from, which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer’s apprentice, are still open (MK, 2006; Sutiyoso, 2008; who lacked the magic formula to break the spell Mietzner,With all 2010; due respect,Adam, 2018; for victims and Sanita of the & Rianto, 2018). (Arendt, 1998:237). violence of human rights as ordered in the Without forgiveness every wrong would G-30-S/PKI of 1965 and they had seriously creating still more vengeance and only Constitution of 1945, the MK’s considerations quickly snowball, with every reaction were suitable to be attempted. If it can be realized, behind an event, however, it was adding fuel to increasing fires of political dark, undoubtedly there was a meaning inside resentment. Humanity must, above all, the national vigilance, and not to repeat the for the future generations to keep always without bloodshed, without hate and revenge by the name of country goodness. perspectives on educational philosophy, events that can be fatal to community, nation, Within P. Freire (2005), and other scholars’ and the state (Notosusanto & Saleh, 1989; Setneg RI, 1994; MK, 2006; Mietzner, 2010; forgiveness can be seen as an instrument for and Sanita & Rianto, 2018). liberation, a mutual process, world-mediated conscious of their imperfection and who This was the significance of Hannah for a person as uncompleted beings, who cf Arendt, Arendt (1998), and other scholars’ thought, on the remembrance as an ethical struggle attempt to be more fully person ( correlated with the efforts and awareness against the erosion of past events. It was 1998; Freire, 2005; Molan, 2009; Johnson, to construct the future, and to transmit 2016; and Kautzer, 2019). meanings of the events of the past to the The crucial problem which was still unresolved up to know related to forgivenessth (Gerakan 30 September or younger generation (Arendt, 1998; Molan, for the prisoners/detainees of ex G-30-S Partai Komunis 2009; and Kautzer, 2019). September 30 have also provided an ethical perspective of Indonesia or Indonesian Communist The scholars’ ideas about forgiveness Movement) of 1965/PKI ( democratic egalitarian for a revolutionary foundation of the modern nation-state Commission”Party) was a “reconciliation”. had attempted toThe give Law a judicial No.27/2004 on the “Truth and Reconciliation Forgiveness does not change the past, space for those to reveal the truth, uphold constitution and international law. human rights, and to achieve reconciliation but it does enlarge the future, hopefully justice, to establish a culture of respect for (Zurbuchen, 2002; Budiawan, 2004; Brunkhorst, 2008; Siahaan, 2014; and Sanita and national unity, through rehabilitation & Rianto, 2018). 120 © 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh TAWARIKH: Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 11(2), April 2020

CONCLUSION Gerakan 30 September or References th The G-30-S ( ofSeptember Indonesia 30 had Movement) gained its independenceof 1965 was a Abdullah,Analisa Taufik. Kekuatan (1985). Politik “Sipil-Militer di Indonesia di Dunia Ketiga: onlargest August national 17th tragedy since the Republic Sebuah Taksonomi Pengantar” in F. Bulchin [ed]. . Jakarta: episode in Indonesian collective memory Penerbit LP3ES, pp.36-48. Tirto. , 1945. It was a darkness Abdulsalam,Id, Husein. (2018). “Bagaimana Soehartohttps:// Mengambil Alih Kekuasaan dari Sukarno?” in and revolution towards a democratic state. It on February 22. Available online also at: was also still remains a lot of problems, both tirto.id/bagaimana-soeharto-mengambil-alih- The study shown, socio-politically, the kekuasaan-dari-sukarno [accessed in Jember City, before and aftermath. East Java, Indonesia: October 17, 2019]. Tirto. Abdulsalam,Id, Husein. 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© 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia 127 p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh MOHAMMAD IMAM FARISI & ARY PURWANTININGSIH, The September 30th Movement and Aftermath

The G-30-S of 1965 and Tragedy in Modern Indonesian History

Gerakan 30(Source: September https://www.kompasiana.com/th , 15/1/2020)

After all, the G-30-S ( or September 30 Movement) of 1965 and aftermath had provided a prolonged trauma for the Indonesian people, and it became a collective memory of the Indonesian people. This trauma needed to be ended and resolved properly and wisely, because, consciously or not, this will become a heavy burden for families,the nation to anduncover future the Indonesia truth, to givegenerations. forgiveness, If we and want to respect to be a forcivilized human nation rights, in democracy, the world socialcommunity, justice, we communal all must resolve alleged violations of human rights of the political prisoners/detainees of the Ex G-30-S of 1965 and/or their environmental safety for them, as well as to reconcile them as citizens, and for peace and national unity.

© 2020 Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia p-ISSN 2085-0980, e-ISSN 2685-2284, and www.journals.mindamas.com/index.php/tawarikh 128