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CHAPTER FOUR THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISTS AS COMRADES-IN-ARMS AND SUCCESSORS OF EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

So far we have examined empirio- philosophical trends. First comes the criticism taken by itself. We must now question of the relation of Mach and examine it in its historical development and Avenarius to Kant. in its connection and relation with other

1. THE CRITICISM OF KANTIANISM FROM THE LEFT AND FROM THE RIGHT

Both Mach and Avenarius began their experience" that Avenarius deals in his philosophical careers in the 'seventies, Prolegomena (§§ 56, 72 and many other when the fashionable cry in German places). Of what does Avenarius "purify" professorial circles was "Back to Kant" [84] the Kantian doctrine of experience? In the And, indeed, both founders of empirio- first place, of apriorism. In § 56 he says: criticism in their philosophical development "The question as to whether the started from Kant. "His [Kant's] critical superfluous 'a priori conceptions of reason' idealism," says Mach, "was, as I should and could be eliminated from the acknowledge with the deepest gratitude, content of experience and thereby pure the starting point of all my critical thought. experience par excellence established is, But I found as far as I know, raised here, as such, for the first time." We have already seen that page 228 Avenarius in this way "purified" Kantianism it impossible to remain faithful to it. Very of the recognition of necessity and soon I began to return to the views of causality. Berkeley ... [and then] arrived at views akin Secondly, he purifies Kantianism of the to those of Hume.... And even today I assumption of substance (§ 95), i.e., the cannot help regarding Berkeley and Hume thing-in-itself, which, in Avenarius' opinion as far more consistent thinkers than Kant" "is not given in the stuff of actual (Analysis of Sensations, p. 292). experience but is imported into it by Thus Mach quite definitely admits that thought." having begun with Kant he soon followed We shall presently see that Avenarius' the line of Berkeley and Hume. Let us turn definition of his philosophical line entirely to Avenarius. coincides with that of Mach, dif- In his Prolegomena to a "Critique of Pure Experience" (1876), Avenarius page 229 already in the foreword states that the fering only in pompousness of formulation. words Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (Critique But we must first note that Avenarius is of Pure Experience ) are indicative of his telling a plain untruth when he asserts that attitude towards Kant's "Critique of Pure it was he who in 1876 for the first time Reason," and "of course, of an antagonistic raised the question of "purifying attitude" towards Kant (1876 ed., p. iv). In experience," i.e., of purifying the Kantian what does Avenarius' antagonism to Kant doctrine of apriorism and the assumption of consist? In the fact that Kant, in Avenarius' the thing-in-itself. As a matter of fact, the opinion, had not sufficiently "purified development of German classical experience." It is with this "purification of philosophy immediately after Kant gave rise to a criticism of Kantianism exactly It is evident from this that the Humean along the very line followed by Avenarius. Schulze rejects Kant's doctrine of the This line is represented in German thing-in-itself as an inconsistent classical philosophy by Schulze- concession to materialism, i.e., to the Aenesidemus, an adherent of Humean "dogmatic" assertion that in our sensations agnosticism, and by J. G. Fichte, an we are given objective reality, or, in other adherent of Berkeleianism, i.e., of words, that our ideas are caused by the subjective idealism. In 1792 Schulze- action of objective things (independent of Aenesidemus criticised Kant for this very our mind) on our sense-organs. The recognition of apriorism (op. cit., pp. agnostic Schulze reproaches the agnostic 56,141, etc.) and of the thing-in-itself. We Kant on the grounds that the latter's sceptics, or followers of Hume, says assumption of the thing-in-itself contradicts Schulze, reject the thing-in-itself as being agnosticism and leads to materialism. In "beyond the bounds of all experience" (p. the same way, but even more vigorously, 57). We reject objective knowledge (p. 25); Kant is criticised by the subjective idealist we deny that space and time really exist Fichte, who maintains that Kant's outside us (p. 100); we reject the presence assumption of the thing-in-itself in our experience of necessity (p. 112), independent of the self is "realism " causality, force, etc. (p. 113). One cannot (Werke, I, S. 483), and that Kant makes attribute to them any "reality outside our "no clear" distinction between "realism" conceptions" (p. 114). Kant proves apriority and "idealism." Fichte sees a crying "dogmatically," saying that since we cannot inconsistency in the assumption of Kant think otherwise there is therefore an a and the Kantians that the thing-in-itself is priori law of thought. "This argument," the "basis of objective reality" (p. 480), for Schulze replies to Kant, "has long been this is in contradiction to critical idealism. utilised in philosophy to prove the objective "With you," exclaims Fichte, addressing the nature of what lies outside our ideas" (p. realist expositors of Kant, "the earth rests 141), Arguing thus, we may attribute on the great elephant, and the great causality to things in-themselves (p. 142). elephant rests on the earth. Your thing-in- "Experience never tells us (wir erfahren itself, which is only thought, acts on the niemals) that the action on us of objective self!" ( p. 483). things produces ideas," and Kant by no Thus Avenarius was profoundly means proved that "this something (which mistaken in imagining that he "for the first lies outside our reason) must be regarded time" undertook a "purification of the as a thing in-itself, distinct from our experience" of Kant from apriorism and sensation (Gemut). But sensation also may from the thing-in-itself and that he was be thought of as the sole basis of all our thereby giving rise to a "new" trend in knowledge" philosophy. In reality he was continuing the old line of Hume and page 230 (p. 265). The Kantian critique of pure page 231 reason "bases its argument on the Berkeley, Schulze-Aenesidemus and J. G. proposition that every act of cognition Fichte. Avenarius imagined that he was begins with the action of objective things "purifying experience" in general. In reality on our organs of sensation (Gemut), but it he was only purifying agnosticism of then disputes the truth and reality of this Kantianism. He fought not against the proposition" (p. 266). Kant in no way agnosticism of Kant (agnosticism is a refuted the idealist Berkeley (pp. 268-72). denial of objective reality given in sensation), but for a purer agnosticism, for the elimination of Kant's assumption, which itself to be unknowable, transcendental, is contradictory to agnosticism, that there is other-sided, he is an idealist. Recognising a thing-in itself, albeit unknowable, experience, sensations, as the only source noumenal and other-sided, that there is of our knowledge, Kant is directing his necessity and causality, albeit a priori, philosophy towards sensationalism, and given in our understanding, and not in via sensationalism, under certain objective reality. He fought Kant not from conditions, towards materialism. the Left, as the materialists fought Kant, Recognising the apriority of space, time, but from the Right, as the sceptics and causality, etc., Kant is directing his idealists fought Kant. He imagined that he philosophy towards idealism. Both was advancing, when in reality he was consistent materialists and consistent retreating to the programme of criticising idealists (as well as the "pure" agnostics, Kant which Kuno Fischer, speaking of the Humeans) have mercilessly criticised Schulze-Aenesidemus, aptly characterised Kant for this inconsistency. The in the following words: "The critique of pure materialists blamed Kant for his idealism, reason with pure reason [i.e., apriorism] left rejected the idealist features of his system, out is scepticism. The critique of pure demonstrated the knowability, the this- reason with the thing-in-itself left out is sidedness of the thing-in-itself, the Berkeleian idealism" (History of Modern absence of a fundamental difference Philosophy, German ed., 1869, Vol. V, p. between the thing-in-itself and the 115). phenomenon, the need of deducing This brings us to one of the most curious causality, etc., not from a priori laws of episodes in our whole "Machiad," in the thought, but from objective reality. The whole campaign of the Russian Machians agnostics and idealists blamed Kant for his against Engels and Marx. The latest assumption of the thing-in-itself as a discovery by Bogdanov and Bazarov, concession to materialism, "realism" or Yushkevich and Valentinov, trumpeted by "naive realism." Thc agnostics, moreover, them in a thousand different keys, is that rejected not only the thing-in-itself, but Plekhanov is making a "luckless attempt to apriorism as well; while the idealists reconcile Engels with Kant by the aid of a demanded the consistent deduction from compromise -- a thing-in-itself which is just pure thought not only of the a priori forms a wee bit knowable" (Studies,[85] etc., p. of the under standing, but of the world as a 67 and many other places). This discovery whole (by magnifying human thought to an of our Machians discloses a veritable abstract Self or to an "Absolute Idea," or to bottomless pit of utter confusion and a "Universal Will," etc., etc.). And here our monstrous misunderstanding both of Kant Machians, "without noticing" that they had and of the whole course of development of taken as their teachers men who had German classical philosophy. criticised Kant from the standpoint or scepticism and idealism, began to rend page 232 their clothes and to cover their The principal feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of page 233 materialism with idealism, a compromise heads with ashes at the sight of monstrous between the two, the combination within people who criticised Kant from a one system of heterogeneous and contrary diametrically opposite point of view, who philosophical trends. When Kant assumes rejected the slightest element of that something outside us, a thing-in-itself, agnosticism (scepticism) and idealism in corresponds to our ideas, he is a his system, who argued that the thing-in- materialist. When he declares this thing-in- itself is objectively real, fully knowable and this-sided, that it does not differ existence; not because he refused to fundamentally from appearances that it deduce causality and necessity in nature becomes transformed into appearance at from objective reality, but because he every step in the development of the assumed causality and necessity at all individual consciousness of man and the (except perhaps purely "logical" necessity). collective consciousness of mankind. Help, The immanentists were at one with the they cried, this is an illegitimate mixture of empirio-critics, also criticising Kant from materialism and Kantianism! the Humean and Berkeleian standpoint. When I read the assurances of our For instance, Leclair in 1879, in the work in Machians that they criticise Kant far more which he praised Mach as a remarkable consistently and thoroughly than any of the philosopher, reproached Kant for his antiquated materialists, it always seems to "inconsistency and connivance at realism" me as though Purishkevich [86] had joined as expressed in the concept of the "thing- our company and was shouting: I criticised in-itself " -- that "nominal residuum of the Constitutional-Democrats far more vulgar realism" (Der Realismus der consistently and thoroughly than you modernen Naturwissenschaft, usw., S. 9). Marxist gentlemen! There is no question Leclair calls materialism "vulgar realism" -- about it, Mr. Purishkevich, politically in order "to make it stronger." "In our consistent people can and always will opinion," writes Leclair, "all those parts of criticise the Constitutional-Democrats from the Kantian theory which gravitate towards diametrically opposite points of view, but realismus vulgaris should be vanquished after all it must not be forgotten that you and eliminated as being inconsistencies criticised the Constitutional-Democrats for and bastard (zwitterhaft) products from the being excessively democratic, while we idealist point of view" (p. 41). "The criticised them for being insufficiently inconsistencies and contradictions in the democratic! The Machians criticise Kant for Kantian theory of knowledge [arise from] being too much of a materialist, while we the amalgamation (Verquickung) of idealist criticise him for not being enough of a criticism with still unvanquished remnants materialist. The Machians criticise Kant of realistic dogmatism" (p. 170). By realistic frorn the Right, we from the Left. dogmatism Leclair means materialism. The Humean Schulze and the subjective Another immanentist, Johannes idealist Fichte may be taken as examples Rehmke, reproached Kant because he of the former category of critics in the realistically walled himself off from history of classical German philosophy. As Berkeley with the thing-in-itself (Johannes we have already seen, they try to obliterate Rehmke, Die Welt als Wahrnehmung und the "realistic" elements of Kantianism. Just Begriff, Berlin, 1880, S. 9). "The as Schulze and Fichte criticised Kant philosophical activity of Kant bore an himself, so the Humean empirio-critics and essentially polemical character: with the the subjective idealist-immanentists thing-in-itself he turned against German criticised the German Neo-Kantians of the rationalism [i.e., page 234 page 235 second half of the nineteenth century. The the old fideism of the eighteenth century], line of Hume and Berkeley reappeared in a and with pure contemplation against slightly renovated verbal garb. Mach and English empiricism" (p. 25). "I would Avenarius reproached Kant not because compare the Kantian thing-in-itself with a his treatment of the thing-in-itself was not movable lid placed over a pit: the thing sufficiently realistic, not sufficiently looks so innocent and safe; one steps on it materialistic, but because he assumed its and suddenly falls into ... the 'world-in- itself’" (p. 27). That is why Kant is not liked entities, the noumena; they are thought of, by the associates of Mach and Avenarius, but they lack existence -- at least for us -- the immanentists; they do not like him and objectivity; they are the things-in- because in some respects he approaches themselves, the true things, but they are the "pit" of materialism! not real things.... But what a contradiction, And here are some examples of the to sever truth from reality, reality from criticism of Kant from the Left. Feuerbach truth!" (Werke, II, S. 302-03). Feuerbach reproaches Kant not for his "realism," but reproaches Kant not because he assumes for his idealism, and describes his system things-in-themselves, but because he does as "idealism based on empiricism" (Werke, not grant them reality, i.e., objective reality, II, 296). because he regards them as mere thought, Here is a particularly important remark "thought entities," and not as "entities on Kant by Feuerbach. "Kant says: If we possessing existence," i.e., real and regard -- as we should -- the objects of our actually existing. Feuerbach rebukes Kant perceptions as mere appearances, we for deviating from materialism. thereby admit that at the bottom of "The Kantian philosophy is a appearances is a thing-in-itself, although contradiction," Feuerbach wrote to Bolin on we do not know how it is actually March 26, 1858, "it inevitably leads either constructed, but only know its appearance, to Fichtean idealism or to sensationalism." i.e., the manner in which our senses are The former conclusion "belongs to the affected (affiziert) by this unknown past," the latter "to the present and the something. Hence, our reason, by the very future" (Grun, op. cit., II, 49). We have fact that it accepts appearances, also already seen that Feuerbach advocates admits the existence of things-in- objective sensationalism, i.e., materialism. themselves; and to that extent we can say The new turn from Kant to agnosticism and that to entertain an idea of such entities idealism, to Hume and Berkeley, is which lie at the bottom of appearances, undoubtedly reactionary, even from and consequently are but thought entities, Feuerbach's standpoint. And his ardent is not only permissible, but unavoidable...." follower, Albrecht Rau, who together with Having selected a passage from Kant the merits of Feuerbach also adopted his where the thing-in-itself is regarded merely faults, which were eliminated by Marx and as a mental thing, a thought entity, and not Engels, criticised Kant wholly in the spirit of a real thing, Feuerbach directs his whole his teacher: "The Kantian philosophy is an criticism against it. "... Therefore," he says, amphibole [ambiguity]; it is both "the objects of the senses [the objects of materialism and idealism, and the key to its experience] are for the mind only essence lies in its dual nature. As a appearances, and not truth.... Yet the materialist or an empiricist, Kant cannot thought entities are not actual objects for help conceding things an existence the mind! The Kantian philosophy is a (Wesenheit) outside us. But as an idealist contradiction between subject and object, he could not rid himself of the between entity and existence, thinking and page 237 page 236 prejudice that the soul is an entity totally being. Entity is left to the mind, existence different from sensible things. Hence there to the senses. Existence without entity [i.e., are real things and a human mind which the existence of appearances without apprehends those things. But how can the objective reality] is mere appearance -- the mind approach things totally different from sensible things -- while entity without itself? The way out adopted by Kant is as existence is mere thought -- the thought follows: the mind possesses certain a priori knowledge, in virtue of which things must "... At the beginning of the nineteenth appear to it as they do. Hence, the fact that century our bourgeoisie, having completed we understand things as we do is a fact of its task of revolutionary destruction, began our creation. For the mind which lives to repudiate its Voltairean and free-thinking within us is nothing but the divine mind, philosophy. Catholicism, which the master and just as God created the world out of decorator Chateaubriand painted in nothing, so the human mind creates out of romantic colours (peinturlurait), was things something which they are not in restored to fashion, and Sebastian Mercier themselves. Thus Kant guarantees real imported the idealism of Kant in order to things their existence as 'things-in- give the coup de grace to the materialism themselves.' Kant, however, needed the of the Encyclopaedists, whose protagonists soul, because immortality was for him a had been guillotined by Robespierre. moral postulate. The 'thing-in-itself,' gentle "At the end of the nineteenth century, men [says Rau, addressing the Neo- which will go down in history as the Kantians in general and the muddleheaded 'bourgeois century,' the intellectuals A. Lange in particular, who falsified the attempted to crush the materialism of Marx History of Materialism], is what separates and Engels beneath the philosophy of the idealism of Kant from the idealism of Kant. The reactionary movement started in Berkeley; it spans the gap between Germany -- without offence to the socialist materialism and idealism. Such is my integralistes [87] who would like to ascribe criticism of the Kantian philosophy, and let the honour to their chief, Malon. But Malon those who can refute it...." "For the himself had been to the school of materialist a distinction between a priori Hochberg, Bernstein and the other knowledge and the 'thing-in-itself' is disciples of Duhring, who were reforming absolutely superfluous, for since he Marxism in Zurich. [Lafargue is referring to nowhere breaks the continuity of nature, the ideological movement in German since he does not regard matter and mind socialism in the later 'seventies.] It is to be as two fundamentally different things, but expected that Jaures, Fourniere and our as two aspects of one and the same thing, other intellectuals will also treat us to Kant he need not resort to artifice in order to as soon as they have mastered his bring the mind and the thing into terminology.... Rappoport is mistaken when conjunction."1 he assures us that for Marx the 'ideal and the real are identical.' In the first place we page 238 never employ such metaphysical Further, Engels as we have seen, phraseology. An idea is as real as the rebuked Kant for being an agnostic, but not object of which it is the reflection in the for his deviation from consistent brain.... To provide a little agnosticism. Lafargue, Engels' disciple, argued in 1900 against the Kantians page 239 (amongst whom at that time was Charles recreation for the comrades who have to Rappoport) as follows: acquaint themselves with bourgeois philosophy, I shall explain the substance of this famous problem which has so much

1 exercised spiritualist minds. Albrecht Rau, Ludwig Feuerbachs Philosophie, "The workingman who eats sausage and die Naturforschung und die philosophische Kritik receives a hundred sous a day knows very der Gegenwart [Ludwig Feuerbach's Philosophy, Natural Science and the Modern Philosophical well that he is robbed by the employer and Critique ], Leipzig, 1882, S. 87-89. is nourished by pork meat, that the employer is a robber and that the sausage is pleasant to the taste and nourishing to from red testifies to something that lies the body. Not at all, say the bourgeois outside of me, to real differences between sophists, whether they are called Pyrrho, the things.... The relations and differences Hume or Kant. His opinion is personal, an between the things themselves revealed to entirely subjective opinion; he might with me by the individual space and time equal reason maintain that the employer is concepts ... are real relations and his benefactor and that the sausage differences of the external world, not consists of chopped leather, for he cannot conditioned by the nature of my perceptive know things-in-themselves. faculty.... If this were really so [if Kant's "The question is not properly put, that is doctrine of the ideality of time and space the whole trouble.... In order to know an were true], we could know nothing about object, man must first verify whether his the world outside us, not even that it senses deceive him or not.... The chemists exists." (Russ. trans., pp. 33-34.) have gone still further -- they have Thus the entire school of Feuerbach, penetrated into bodies, they have analysed Marx and Engels turned from Kant to the them, decomposed them into their Left, to a complete rejection of all idealism elements, and then performed the reverse and of all agnosticism. But our Machians procedure, they have recomposed them followed the reactionary trend in from their elements. And from the moment philosophy, Mach and Avenarius, who that man is able to produce things for his criticised Kant from the standpoint of Hume own use from these elements, he may, as and Berkeley. Of course, it is the sacred Engels says, assert that he knows the right of every citizen, and particularly of things-in-themselves. The God of the every intellectual, to follow any ideological Christians, if he existed and if he created reactionary he likes. But when people who the world, could do no more."2 have radically severed relations with the We have taken the liberty of making this very foundations of Marxism in philosophy long quotation in order to show how begin to dodge, confuse matters, hedge Lafargue understood Engels and how he and assure us that they "too" are Marxists criticised Kant from the Left, not for those in philosophy, that they are "almost" in aspects of agreement with Marx, and have only slightly "supplemented" him -- the page 240 spectacle is a far from pleasant one. Kantianism which distinguish it from Humism, but for those which are common page 241 to both Kant and Hume; not for his assumption of the thing-in-itself, but for his inadequately materialist view of it. And lastly, Karl Kautsky in his Ethics also criticises Kant from a standpoint diametrically opposed to that of Hume and Berkeley. "That I see green, red and white," he writes, arguing against Kant's epistemology, "is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different

2 Paul Lafargue, "Le materialisme de Marx et l'idealisme de Kant" [Marx's Materialism and Kant's Idealism ], Le Socialiste, [88] February 25, 1900.

2. HOW THE "EMPIRIO-SYMBOLIST" YUSHKEVICH RIDICULED THE "EMPIRIO-CRITIC" CHERNOV

"It is, of course, amusing," writes Mr. P. radical difference between materialism and Yushkevich, "to see how Mr. Chernov tries the broad current of positivism, which to make the agnostic positivist Comtean includes Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Spencerian, Mikhailovsky, a Mikhailovsky, a number of Neo-Kantians, forerunner of Mach and Avenarius" (op. and Mach and Avenarius. The essence of cit., p. 73). the matter has been very accurately First of all, what is amusing here is Mr. expressed by Engels in his Ludwig Yushkevich's astonishing ignorance. Like Feuerbach, where he places all the all Voroshilovs, he conceals this ignorance Kantians and Humeans of that period (i.e., under a display of erudite words and the 'eighties of the last century) in the names. The passage quoted is from a camp of wretched eclectics, pettifoggers paragraph devoted to the relation between (Flohknacker: literally, flea-crackers), and Machism and Marxism. And although he so on. [89] To whom this characterisation undertakes to treat of this subject, Mr. can and must apply is a question on which Yushkevich does not know that for Engels our Voroshilovs did not wish to reflect. And (as for every materialist) the adherents of since they are incapable of reflecting, we the Humean line and the adherents of the shall cite one illuminating comparison. Kantian line are equally agnostics. Engels, speaking both in 1888 and 1892 of Therefore, to contrast agnosticism the Kantians and Humeans in general, generally with Machism, when even Mach mentions no names. [90] The only himself confesses to being a follower of reference Engels makes to a book is his Hume, is simply to prove oneself an reference to the work of Starcke on ignoramus in philosophy. The phrase Feuerbach, which Engels analysed. "agnostic positivism" is also absurd, for the "Starcke," says Engels, "takes great pains adherents of Hume in fact call themselves to defend Feuerbach against the attacks positivists. Mr. Yushkevich, who has taken and doctrines of the vociferous lecturers Petzoldt as his teacher, should have who today go by the name of philosophers known that Petzoldt definitely regards in Germany. For people who are interested empirio-criticism as positivism. And finally, in this afterbirth of German classical to drag in the names of Auguste Comte philosophy this is a matter of importance; and Herbert Spencer is again absurd, for for Starcke himself it may have appeared Marxism rejects not what distinguishes one necessary. We, however, will spare the positivist from another, but what is reader this" (Ludwig Feuerbach, S. 25).[91] common to both and what makes a Engels wanted to "spare the reader," philosopher a positivist instead of a that is, to save the Social-Democrats from materialist. a pleasant acquaintance with the Our Voroshilov needed this display of degenerate chatterboxes who call words so as to "mesmerise" his reader, to themselves philosophers. And who are stun him with a cacophony of words, to implied by this "afterbirth"? distract his attention away from the We open Starcke's book (C. N. Starcke, essence of the matter to empty trifles. And Ludwig Feuerbach, Stuttgart, 1885), and the essence of the matter is the find constant references to the adherents of Hume and Kant. Starcke dissociates page 242 Feuerbach from these two trends. Starcke quotes in this connection page 244 page 243 croix3 and others. We shall cite one A. Riehl, Windelband and A. Lange (pp. 3, example -- an especially emincllt scientist 18-19, 127, etc., in Starcke). who in philosophy also combined Hume We open Avenarius' The Human with Berkeley, but who emphasised the Concept of the World, which appeared in materialist elements of this mixture. He is 1891, and on page 120 of the first German Thomas Huxley, the famous English edition we read: "The final result of our scientist, who gave currency to the term analysis concurs -- although not absolutely "agnostic" and whom Engels undoubtedly (durchgehend) in the measure of the had chiefly and primarily in mind when he various points of view -- with that reached spoke of English agnosticism. Engels in by other investigators, for example, E. 1892 called this type of agnostics Laas, E. Mach, A. Riehl, W. Wundt. See "shamefaced materialists." [92] James also Schopenhauer." Ward, the English spiritualist, in his book Whom was our Voroshilov-Yushkevich Naturalism and Agnosticism, wherein he jeering at? chiefly attacks the "scientific champion of Avenarius has not the slightest doubt as agnosticism," Huxley (Vol. II, p. 229), bears to his kinship in principle -- not regarding out Engels' opinion when he says: "In any particular question, but regard ing the Huxley's case indeed the leaning towards "final result" of empirio-criticism -- to the the primacy of the physical side ["series of Kantians Riehl and Laas and to the idealist elements" Mach calls it] is often so Wundt. He mentions Mach between the pronounced that it can hardly be called two Kantians. And, indeed, are they not all parallelism at all. In spite of his vehement one company, since Riehl and Laas repudiation of the title of materialist as an purified Kant à la Hume, and Mach and affront to his untarnished agnosticism, I Avenarius purified Hume à la Berkeley? know of few recent writers who on Is it surprising that Engels wished to occasion better deserve the title" (Vol. II, "spare" the German workers, to save them pp. 30-3l). And James Ward quotes the from a close acquaintance with this whole following statements by Huxley in company of "flea-cracking" university confirmation of his opinion: "'Anyone who lecturers? is acquainted with the history of science Engels could spare the German will admit, that its progress has, in all ages, workers, but the Voroshilovs do not spare meant, and now more than ever means, the Russian reader. the extension of the province of what we It should be noted that an essentially call matter and causation, and the eclectic combination of Kant and Hume, or concomitant gradual banishment from all Hume and Berkeley, is possible, so to regions of human thought of what we call speak, in varying proportions, by laying spirit and spontaneity.'" Or: "'It is in itself of principal stress now on one, now on little moment whether we express the another element of the mixture. We saw phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or above, for instance, that only one Machian, the phenomena of spirit in terms of H. Kleinpeter, openly admits that he and Mach are solipsists (i.e., consistent Berkeleians). On the other hand, the 3 Bibliotheque du congres international de Humean trend in the views of Mach and philosophie, Vol. IV, Henri Delacroix, David Hume Avenarius is emphasised by many of their et la philosophie critique [David Hume and Critical disciples and followers: Petzoldt, Willy, Philosophy]. Among the followers of Hume the author includes Avenarius and the immanentists in Pearson, the Russian empirio-critic Germany, Ch. Renouvier and his school (the neo- Lessevich, the Frenchman Henri Dela- critics) in France. page 245 regarding it as "metaphysics" that matter -- each statement has a certain illegitimately goes beyond "groups of relative truth ["relatively stable complexes sensations." And this same Huxley wrote: of elements," according to Mach]. But with "'If I were obliged to choose between a view to the progress of science, the absolute materialism and absolute idealism materialistic terminology is in every way to I should feel compelled to accept the latter be preferred. For it connects thought with alternative.... Our one certainty is the the other phenomena of the universe... existence of the mental world'" (J. Ward, whereas the alternative, or spiritualistic, Vol. II, p. 216). terminology is utterly barren, and leads to Huxley's philosophy is as much a nothing but obscurity and confusion of mixture of Hume and Berkeley as is ideas.... Thus there can be little doubt, that Mach's philosophy. But in Huxley's case the further science advances, the more the Berkeleian streaks are incidental, and extensively and consistently will all the agnosticism serves as a fig-leaf for phenomena of Nature be represented by materialism. With Mach the "colouring" of materialistic formulae and symbols'" (Vol. I, the mixture is a different one, and Ward, p. 17-19). the spiritualist, while bitterly combating So argued the "shamefaced materialist" Huxley, pats Avenarius and Mach Huxley, who refused to accept materialism, affectionately on the back.

3. THE IMMANENTISTS AS COMRADES-IN-ARMS OF MACH AND AVENARIUS

In speaking of empirio-criticism we could philosophy is a broad current in which the not avoid repeatedly mentioning the immanentists are on the same footing as philosophers of the so-called im- the empirio-critics and the positivists. "Thus" -- repeats Mach in the introduction page 246 to the Russian translation of the Analysis of manentist school, the principal Sensations (1906) -- "there is a common representatives of which are Schuppe, movement..." (p. 4). "My position [Mach Leclair, Rehmke, and Schubert-Soldern. It says in another place], moreover, borders is now necessary to examine the relation of closely on that of the representatives of the empirio-criticism to the immanentists and immanentist philosophy.... I found hardly the nature of the philosophy preached by anything in this book [i.e., W. Schuppe, the latter. Outline of the Theory of Knowledge and In 1902 Mach wrote: "... Today I see that Logic] with which, with perhaps a very a host of philosophers -- positivists, slight change, I would not gladly agree" (p. empirio-critics, adherents of the 46). Mach considers that Schubert-Soldern immanentist philosophy -- as well as a very is also "following close paths" (p. 4), and few scientists, have all, without knowing as to Wilhelm Schuppe, Mach even anything of each other, entered on new dedicates to him his latest work, the paths which, in spite of their individual summary so to speak of his philosophical differences, converge almost towards one labours, Knowledge and Error. point" (Analysis of Sensations, p. 9). Here Avenarius, the other founder of empirio- we must first note Mach's unusually frank criticism, wrote in 1894 that he was admission that very few scientists are "gladdened" and "encouraged" by followers of the supposedly "new," but in truth very old, Humean-Berkeleian page 247 philosophy. Secondly, extremely important Schuppe's sympathy for empirio-criticism, is Mach's opinion that this "new" and that the "differences" between him and Schuppe "exist, perhaps, only temporarily" "natural-historical metaphysics"5 -- the term (vielleicht nur einstweilen noch given to natural-historical materialism by all bestehend).4 And, finally, J. Petzoldt, the reactionary university lecturers and whose teachings Lessevich regards as the professors in Germany. In 1893, after the last word in empirio-criticism, openly appearance of Avenarius' The Human acclaims the trio -- Schuppe, Mach and Concept of the World, W. Schuppe hailed Avenarius -- as the leaders of the "new" this work in An Open Letter to Prof. trend. (Einfuhrung in die Philosophie der Avenarius as a "confirmation of the reinen Erfahrung, Bd. II, 1904, S. 295; Das naïve realism" which he (Schuppe) Weltproblem, 1906, S. v. und 146). On this himself advocated. "My conception of point Petzoldt is definitely opposed to Willy thought," Schuppe wrote, "excellently (Einf., II, 321), probably the only harmonises with your [Avenarius'] pure outstanding Machian who felt ashamed of experience."6 Then, in 1896, Schubert- such a kinship as Schuppe's and who tried Soldern, summarising the "methodological to dissociate himself from him trend in philosophy" on which he "bases fundamentally, for which this disciple was himself," traces his genealogy from reprimanded by his beloved teacher Berkeley and Hume down through F. A. Avenarius. Avenarius wrote the words Lange ("the real beginning of our about Schuppe above quoted in a movement in Germany dates from Lange"), comment on Willy's article against and then through Laas, Schuppe and Co., Schuppe, adding that Willy's criticism Avennrius and Mach, Riehl (among the perhaps "was put more strongly than was Neo-Kantians), Ch. Renouvier (among the really necessary" (Vierteljahrsschrift fur Frenchmen), etc.7 Finally, in their wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 18. Jahrg., programmatic "Introduction" printed in the 1894, S. 29; which also contains Willy's first issue of the philosophical organ of the article against Schuppe). immanentists, alongside a declaration of Having acquainted ourselves with the war on materialism and an expression of empirio-critics' opinion of the immanentists, sympathy with Charles Renouvier, we let us examine the immanentists' opinion of read: "Even in the camp of the scientists the empirio-critics. We have already themselves voices of individual thinkers mentioned the opinion uttered by Leclair in are being raised sermonising against the 1879. Schubert-Soldern in 1882 explicitly growing arrogance expressed his "agreement" "in part with the elder Fichte" (i.e., the distinguished page 249 representative of subjective idealism, of their colleagues, against the Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose son was as unphilosophical spirit which has taken inept in philosophy as was the son of possession of the natural sciences. Thus Joseph Dietzgen), and "with Schuppe, the physicist Mach.... On all hands fresh Leclair, Avenarius and partly with Rehmke," while Mach (Die Geschichte und 5 Dr. Richard von Schubert-Soldern, Ueber die Wurzel des Transcendenz des Objekts und Subjekts [On the Transcendence of the Object and Subject], 1882, S. page 248 37 and 5. Cf. also his Grundlagen einer Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit ) is Erkenntnistheorie [Principles of a Theory of cited with particular gusto in opposition to Knowledge], 1884, S. 3. 6 Vierteijahrsschlift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 17. Jahrg., 1893, S. 384. 7 Dr. Richard von Schubert-Soldern, Das 4 Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche menschliche Gluck und die soziale Frage [Human Philosophie, 1894, 18. Jahrg., Heft I, S. 29. Happiness and the Social Question ], 1896, S. v, vi. forces are stirring and are working to representatives of the immanentist school" destroy the blind faith in the infallibility of as "realists."9 Bogdanov briefly (and in fact the natural sciences, and once again falsely ) declares that "the immanentist people are beginning to seek for other school is only an intermediate form paths into the profundities of the between Kantianism and empirio-criticism" mysterious, a better entrance to the house (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, p. xxii). V. of truth."8 Chernov writes: "Generally speaking, the A word or two about Ch. Renouvier. He immanentists approach positivism in only is the head of the influential and one aspect of their theory, in other aspects widespread school in France known as the they go far beyond it" (Philosophical and neo-critics. His theoretical philosophy is a Sociological Studies, p. 37). Valentinov combination of the phenomenalism of says that "the immanentist school clothed Hume and the apriorism of Kant. The thing- these [Machian] ideas in an unsuitable in-itself is absolutely rejected. The form and found themselves in the blind connection of phenomena, order and law is alley of solipsism" (op. cit., p. 149). As you declared to be a priori; law is written with a see, you pay your money and take your capital letter and is converted into the basis choice: constitution and salmon of religion. The Catholic priests go into mayonnaise, realism and solipsism. Our raptures over this philosophy. The Machian Machians are afraid to tell the plain and Willy scornfully refers to Renouvier as a clear truth about the immanentists. "second apostle Paul," as "an obscurantist The fact is that the immanentists are of the first water" and as a "casuistic rank reactionaries, I open advocates of preacher of free will" (Gegen die fideism, unadulterated in their Schulweisheit, S. 129). And it is such co- obscurantism. There is not one of them thinkers of the immanentists who warmly who has not frankly made his more greet Mach's philosophy. When his theoretical works on epistemology a Mechanics appeared in a French defence of religion and a justification of translation, [94] the organ of the neo-critics medievalism of one kind or another. -- L'Annee philosophique [95] -- edited by Leclair, in 1879, advocated his philosophy Pillon, a collaborator and disciple of as one that satisfies "all the needs of a Renouvier, wrote: "It is unnecessary to religiously inclined mind" (Der Realismus, speak of the extent to which, in this etc., S. 73). J. Rehmke, in 1880, dedicated criticism of substance, the thing, the thing- his "theory of knowledge" to the Protestant in-itself, Mach's positive science agrees pastor Biedermann and closed his book by with neo-critical idealism" (Vol. XV, 1904, preaching not a supersensible God, but p. 179). God as a "real concept" (it was for this As for the Russian Machians, they are reason all ashamed of their kinship with the immanentists, and one of course could not page 251 expect anything else of people who did not presumably, that Bazarov ranked "certain" deliberately immanentists among the "realists"?), and moreover the "objectivisation of this real page 250 adopt the path of Struve, Menshikov, and 9 "Realists in modern philosophy -- certain the like. Bazarov alone refers to "certain representatives of the immanentist school who have emerged from Kantianism, the school of Mach- 8 Avenarius, and many other kindred movements -- Zeitschrift fur immanente Philosophie, [93] Bd. I, find that there are absolutely no grounds for Berlin, 1896, S. 6, 9. rejecting the basis of naive realism" (Studies, etc., p. 26). concept is relegated to practical life," while in philosophical literature. In order to show Biedermann's "Christian dogmatism" is clearly what epistemological premises declared to be a model of "scientific these comrades-in-arms of Mach and theology" (J. Rehmke, Die Welt als Avenarius proceed from, we shall quote Wahrnehmung und Begriff, Berlin, 1880, S. some fundamental theoretical propositions 312). Schuppe in the Zeitschrift fü rr from the works of im manentists. immanente Philosophie assures us that Leclair in 1879 had not yet invented the though the immanentists deny the term "immanent," which really signifies transcendental, God and the future life do "experiential," "given in experience," and not come under this concept (Zeitschrift which is just as spurious a label for fü rr immanente Philosophie, II. Band, S. concealing corruption as the labels of the 52). In his Ethik he insists on the European bourgeois parties. In his first "connection of the moral law ... with the work, Leclair frankly and explicitly calls metaphysical world conception" and himself a "critical idealist " (Der Realismus, condemns the separation of the church etc., S. 11, 21, 206, etc.). In this work he from the state as a "senseless phrase" (Dr. criticises Kant, as we have already seen, Wilhelm Schuppe, Grundzuge der Ethik for his concessions to materialism, and und Rechtsphilosophie [Principles of Ethics clearly indicates his wn path away from and the Philosophy of Law ], Breslau, Kant to Fichte and Berkeley. Leclair fights 1881, S. 181, 325). Schubert-Soldern in his materialism in general and the tendency Grundlage einer Erkenntnistheorie towards materialism displayed by the deduces both the pre-existence of the self majority of scientists in particular as before the body and the after-existence of mercilessly as Schuppe, Schubert-Soldern the self after the body, i.e., the immortality and Rehmke. of the soul (op. cit., p. 82), etc. In The "If we return," Leclair says, "to the Social Question,[96] arguing against Bebel, standpoint of critical idealism, if we do not he defends, together with "social reforms," attribute a transcendental existence [i.e., suffrage based on class distinction, and an existence outside of human says that the "Social-Democrats ignore the consciousness] to nature or the processes fact that without the divine gift of of nature, then for the subject the unhappiness there could be no happiness" aggregate of bodies and his own body, in (p. 330), and thereupon laments the fact so far as he can see and feel it, together that materialism "prevails" (p. 242): "he with all its changes, will be a directly given who in our time believes in a life beyond, or phenomenon of spatially connected co- even in its possibility, is considered a fool" existences and successions in time, and (ibid.). the whole explanation of nature will reduce And German Menshikovs like these, no itself to stating the laws of these co- less obscurantists of the first water than existences and successions" (p. 21). Renouvier, live in lasting concubinage with Back to Kant! -- said the reactionary the empirio-critics. Their theoretical kinship Neo-Kantians. Back to Fichte and is in contestable. There is no more Berkeley! -- is essentially what the Kantianism in the immanentists than in reactionary immanentists are saying. For Petzoldt or Pearson. We saw above that Leclair, all that exists consists they page 253 page 252 of "complexes of sensations " (p. 38), while themselves regard themselves as disciples certain classes of properties (Eigen- of Hume and Berkeley, an opinion of the schaften), which act upon our sense- immanentists that is generally recognised organs, he designates, for example, by the letter M, and other classes, which act upon One must be extremely naive not to other objects of nature, by the letter N (p. discern unadulterated subjective idealism 150, etc.). Moreover, Leclair speaks of in such "realism"! Just think: the external nature as the "phenomena of the world "belongs to consciousness" and is in consciousness" (Bewusstseinsphanomen) absolute connection with it! The poor not of a single person, but of "mankind" professor was indeed slandered by the (pp. 55-56). If we remember that Leclair "established" practice of ranking him with published his book in Prague, where Mach the subjective idealists! Such a philosophy was professor of physics, and that Leclair completely coincides with Avenarius' cites with rapture only Mach's Erhaltung "principal co-ordination"; no reservations der Arbeit, [97] which appeared in 1872, and protests on the part of Chernov and the question involuntarily arises: ought we Valentinov can sunder them; both not to regard the advocate of fideism and philosophies will be consigned together to frank idealist Leclair as the true progenitor the museum of reactionary fabrications of of the "original" philosophy of Mach? German professordom. As a curiosity once As for Schuppe, who, according to more testifying to Valentinov's lack of Leclair,10 arrived at the "same results," he, judgment, let us note that he calls Schuppe as we have seen, really claims to defend a solipsist (it goes without saying that "naïve realism," and in his Open Schuppe vowed and swore that he was not Letter to Prof. Avenarius bitterly complains a solipsist -- and wrote special articles to of the "established perversion of my this effect -- just as vehemently as did [Schuppe's] theory of knowledge to Mach, Petzoldt, and Co.), yet is highly subjective idealism." The true nature of the delighted with Bazarov's article in the crude forgery which the immanentist Studies! I should like to translate into Schuppe calls a defence of realism is quite German Bazarov's dictum that "sense- clear from his rejoinder to Wundt, who did perception is the reality existing outside us" not hesitate to class the immanentists with and forward it to some more or less the Fichteans, the subjective idealists intelligent immanentist. He would embrace (Philosophische Studien, loc. cit., S. 386, and kiss Bazarov as heartily as the 397, 407). Schuppes, Leclairs and Schubert-Solderns "In my case," Schuppe retorts to Wundt, embraced Mach and Avenarius. For "the proposition 'being is consciousness' Bazarov's dictum is the alpha and omega means that consciousness without the of the doctrines of the immanentist school. external world is inconceivable, that the And here, lastly, is Schubert-Soldern. latter belongs to the former, i.e., the "The materialism of natural science," the absolute connection (Zusammen- "metaphysics" of recognising the objective gehorigkeit) of the one with the other, reality of the external world, is the chief which I have so often asserted enemy of

page 254 page 255 and explained and in which the two this philosopher (Grundlagen einer constitute the primary whole of being."11 Erkenntnistheorie, 1884, p. 31 and the whole of Chapter II: "The Metaphysics of Natural Science"). "Natural science

abstracts from all relations of 10 Beitrage zu einer monistischen Erkenntnistheorie consciousness" (p. 52) -- that is the chief [Essays in a Monistic Theory of Knowledge ], Breslau, 1882, S. 10. 11 Wilhelm Schuppe, "Die immanente Philosophie and Wilhelm Wundt "] Zeitschrift fur immanente und Wilhelm Wundt " ["The Immanent Philosophy Philosophie, Band II, S. 195. evil (and that is just what constitutes rest of the world. With the destruction of materialism!). For the individual cannot the individual self the world is also anni- escape from "sensations and, hence, from a state of consciousness" (pp. 33-34). Of page 256 course, Schubert-Soldern admitted in hilated, which appears impossible -- and 1896, my standpoint is epistemological with the destruction of the rest of the world, solipsism (Die soziale Frage, S. x), but not nothing remains for my individual self, for "metaphysical," not "practical" solipsism. the latter can be separated from the world "What is given us immediately is only logically, but not in time and space. sensations, complexes of constantly Therefore my individual self must continue changing sensations" (Ueber to exist after my death also, if the entire Transcendenz des Objekts und Subjekts, world is not to be annihilated with it..." S. 73). (ibid., p. xxiii). "Marx took the material process of The "principal co-ordination," production," says Schubert-Soldern, "as "complexes of sensations" and the rest of the cause of inner processes and motives, the Machian banalities render faithful in the same way (and just as falsely) as service to the proper people! natural science regards the common [to "... What is the hereafter (das Jenseits) humanity] external world as the cause of from the solipsist point of view? It is only a the individual inner worlds" (Die soziale possible future experience for me..." (ibid.). Frage, S. xviii). That Marx's historical "Spiritualism ... would be obliged to prove materialism is connected with natural- the existence of the Jenseits. But at any historical materialism and philosophical rate the materialism of natural science materialism in general, it does not even cannot be brought into the field against occur to this comrade in-arms of Mach to spiritualism, for this materialism, as we doubt. have seen, is only one aspect of the world "Many, perhaps the majority, will be of process within the all-embracing spiritual the opinion that from the standpoint of connection" (= the "principal co-ordination") epistemological solipsism no metaphysics (p. xxiv). is possible, i.e., that metaphysics is always All this is said in that philosophical transcendental. Upon more mature introduction to Die soziale Frage (1896) reflection I cannot concur with this opinion. wherein Schubert-Soldern all the time Here are my reasons.... The immediate appears arm in arm with Mach and foundation of all that is given is the spiritual Avenarius. Only for the handful of Russian (solipsist) connection, the central point of Machians does Machism serve exclusively which is the individual self (the individual for purposes of intellectual prattle. In its realm of thought) with its body. The rest of native country its role as a flunkey to the world is inconceivable without this self, fideism is openly proclaimed! just as this self is inconceivable without the

4. WHITHER IS EMPIRIO-CRITICISM TENDING?

Let us now cast a glance at the examine how and whither, i.e., in what development of Machism after Mach and direction, this philosophy is Avenarius. We have seen that their philosophy is a hash, a pot-pourri of page 257 contradictory and disconnected developing, for this will help us to settle epistemological propositions. We must now certain "disputable" questions by referring to indisputable historical facts. And indeed, in view of the eclecticism and incoherence with pleasure the works" of Cornelius and of the initial philosophical premises of the others, "who have disclosed the kernel of trend we are examining, varying Avenarius' ideas and have developed them interpretations of it and sterile disputes further" (p. 48). Let us take Cornelius' over particulars and trifles are absolutely Einleitung in die Philosophie [Introduction inevitable. But empirio-criticism, like every to Philosophy ] (Germ. ed., 1903) and we ideological current, is a living thing, which find that its author also speaks of his grows and develops, and the fact that it is endeavour to follow in the footsteps of growing in one direction or another will Mach and Avenarius (pp. viii, 32). We have help us more than long arguments to settle before us then a disciple acknowledged by the basic question as to what the real the teacher. This disciple also begins with essence of this philosophy is. We judge a sensations-elements (pp. 17, 24), person not by what he says or thinks of categorically declares that he confines himself but by his actions. And we must himself to experience (p. vi), calls his views judge philosophers not by the labels they "consistent or epistemological empiricism" give themselves ("positivism," the (p. 335), emphatically condemns the "one philosophy of "pure experience," "monism" sidedness" of idealism and the or "empirio-monism," the "philosophy of "dogmatism" of both the idealists and the natural science," etc.) but by the manner in materialists (p. 129), vehemently denies which they actually settle fundamental the possible "misconception" (p. 123) that theoretical questions, by their associates, his philosophy implies the recognition of by what they are teaching and by what the world as existing in the mind of man, they have taught their disciples and flirts with naive realism no less skilfully followers. than Avenarius, Schuppe or Bazarov ("a It is this last question which interests us visual, as well as every other sense now. Everything essential was said by perception, is located where we find it, and Mach and Avenarius more than twenty only where we find it, that is to say, where years ago. It was bound to become clear in the naïvenaïve mind, untouched the interval how these "leaders" were by a false philosophy, localises it" -- p. 125) understood by those who wanted to -- and this disciple, acknowledged as such understand them, and whom they by his teacher, arrives at immortality and themselves (at least Mach, who has God. Materialism -- thunders this police outlived his colleague) regard as their sergeant in a professorial chair, I beg your successors. To be specific, let us take pardon, this disciple of the "recent those who themselves claim to be disciples positivists" -- converts man into an of Mach and Avenarius (or their adherents) automaton. "It need hardly be said that and whom Mach himself ranks as such. together with the belief in the freedom of We shall thus obtain a picture of empirio- our decisions it destroys all considerations criticism as a philosophical current, and not of the moral value of our actions and our as a collection of literary oddities. responsibility for them. Just as little room is In Mach's Introduction to the Russian left for the idea of the continuation of our translation of the Analysis of Sensations, life after death" (p. 116). The final note of Hans Cornelius is recommended as the book is: page 258 page 259 a "young investigator" who is following "if Education (or the youth stultified by this not quite the same, at least very close man of science presumably) is necessary paths" (p. 4). In the text of the Analysis of not only for action but "above all ... to Sensations Mach once again "mentions inculcate veneration (Ehrfurcht) not for the transitory values of a fortuitous tradition, repudiations are not worth much. Friedrich but for the imperishable values of duty and Adler evidently has not been "warned," and beauty, for the divine (dem Gottlichen) therefore recommends this Cornelius in a within us and without" (p. 357). socialist journal (Der Kampf, 1908, 5, S. Compare this with Bogdanov's assertion 235: "a work that is easy to read and highly that "there is absolutely no room " to be commended"). Through the medium (Bogdanov's italics) and "there cannot be of Machism, downright philosophical any room" for the idea of God, freedom of reactionaries and preachers of fideism are the will and immortality of the soul in palmed off on the workers as teachers! Mach's philosophy in view of his denial of Petzoldt, without having been warned, every "thing-in-itself" (p. xii). While Mach in detected the falsity in Cornelius: but his this same book (p. 293) declares that method of combating this falsity is a gem. "there is no Machian philosophy," and Listen to this: "To assert that the world is recommends not only the immanentists, idea [as is asserted by the idealists -- but also Cornelius who had disclosed the whom we are combating, no joke!] has kernel of Avenarius' ideas! Thus, in the first sense only when it implies that it is the idea place, Bogdanov absolutely does not know of the predicator, or, if you like, of all the "Machian philosophy" as a current predicators, i.e., that its existence depends which not only nestles under the wing of exclusively upon the thought of that fideism, but which itself goes to the length individual or of those individuals; it exists of fideism. In the second place, Bogdanov only inasmuch as he thinks about it, and absolutely does not know the history of what he does not think of does not exist. philosophy; for to associate a denial of the We, on the contrary, make the world ideas mentioned above with a denial of the dependent not upon the thought of an thing-in-itself is to insult the history of individual or individuals, or, to put it better philosophy. Will Bogdanov take it into his and clearer, not upon the act of thinking, or head to deny that all consistent followers of upon any actual thought, but -- and Hume, by rejecting every kind of thing-in- exclusively in the logical sense -- upon itself, do leave room for these ideas? Has thought in general. The idealist confuses Bogdanov never heard of the subjective one with the other, and the result is idealists, who reject every kind of thing in- agnostic semi-solipsism, as we observe it itself and thereby make room for these in Cornelius" (Einfü rhrung, II, 317). ideas? "There can be no room" for these Stolypin denied the existence of the ideas solely in a philosophy that teaches cabinets noirs! [98] Petzoldt annihilates the that nothing exists but perceptual being, idealists! It is truly astonishing how much that the world is matter in motion, that the this annihilation of idealism resembles a external world, the physical world familiar recommendation to the idealists to to all, is the sole objective reality -- i.e., in exercise more skill in concealing their the philosophy of materialism. And it is for idealism. To say that the world depends this, precisely for this, that materialism is upon man's combated by the immanentists page 261 page 260 thought is perverted idealism. To say that recommended by Mach, by Mach's disciple the world depends upon thought in general Cornelius, and by modern professorial is recent positivism, critical realism -- in a philosophy in general. word, thoroughgoing bourgeois Our Machians began to repudiate charlatanism! If Cornelius is an agnostic Cornelius only after this indecency had semi-solipsist, Petzoldt is a solipsist semi- been pointed out to them. Such agnostic. You are cracking a flea, person can dissever himself from his states gentlemen! of consciousness, he can manipulate them, Let us proceed. In the second edition of can make them stand out more clearly or his Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Mach says: "A force them into the background, can systematic exposition [of Mach's views], analyse them, compare various parts, etc. one to which in all its essentials I can All this is a fact of (immediate) experience. subscribe, is given by Professor Dr. Hans Our self is therefore essentially different Kleinpeter" (Die Erkenntnistheorie der from the sum-total of the states of Naturforschung der Gegenwart, Leipzig, consciousness and cannot be put as an 1905: The Theory of Knowledge of Modern equivalent of it. Sugar consists of carbon, Natural Science). Let us take Hans hydrogen and oxygen; were we to attribute Number Two. This professor is an a soul to it, then by analogy it would have accredited disseminator of Machism: a pile to possess the faculty of directing the of articles on Mach's views in philosophical movement of the hydrogen, oxygen and journals, both in German and in English, carbon at will" (pp. 29-30). § 4 of the translations of works recommended by following chapter is headed: "The Act of Mach with introductions by Mach -- in a Cognition -- an Act of Will word, the right hand of the "teacher." Here (Willenshandlung)." "It must be regarded are his views: "... All my (outer and inner) as definitely established that all my experience, all my thoughts and psychical experiences are divisible into two aspirations are given me as a psychical large main groups: compulsory acts and process, as a part of my consciousness" deliberate acts. To the former belong all (op. cit. p. 18). "That which we call physical impressions of the external world" (p. 47). is a construction of psychical elements" (p. "That it is possible to advance several 144). "Subjective conviction, not objective theories regarding one and the same realm certainty (Gewissheit) is the only attainable of facts ... is as well known to physicists as goal of any science " (p. 9). (The italics are it is incompatible with the premises of an Kleinpeter's, who adds the following absolute theory of knowledge. And this fact remark: "Something similar was already is also linked with the volitional character of said by Kant in the Critique of Practical our thought; it also implies that our volition Reason.") "The assumption that there are is not bound by external circumstances" (p. other minds is one which can never be 50). confirmed by experience" (p. 42). "I do not Now judge how bold Bogdanov was in know... whether, in general, there exist asserting that in Mach's philosophy "there other selves outside of myself" (p. 43). In § is absolutely no room for free will," when 5, entitled "Activity (Spontaneity) in Mach himself recommends such a Consciousness," we read that in the case specimen as Kleinpeter! We have already of the animal-automaton the succession of seen that the latter does not attempt to ideas is purely mechanical. The same is conceal either his own idealism or Mach's. true of us when we dream. "The quality of In our consciousness page 263 page 262 1898-99 Kleinpeter wrote: "Hertz proclaims in its normal state essentially differs from the same subjectivist view [i.e., as Mach] of this. It possesses a property which these the nature of our concepts.... If Mach and [the automata] entirely lack, and which it Hertz [with what justice Kleinpeter here would be very difficult, to say the least, to implicates the famous physicist we shall explain mechanically or automatically: the soon see] deserve credit from the so-called self-activity of the self. Every standpoint of idealism for having emphasised the subjective origin of all our sensations" (p. 104. This "new" concept -- concepts and of the connections between "reduced sensations" -- contains them -- and not only of certain individual everything that is original in Ziehen's ones -- from the standpoint of empiricism Berkeleianismt). they deserve no less credit for having Petzoldt repudiated Ziehen as an idealist acknowledged that experience alone, as a as far back as 1904 in the second volume court entirely independent of thought, can of his Introduction (S. 298-301). By 1906 solve the question of their correctness" he had already included Cornelius, (Archiv fur systematische Philosophie, Bd. Kleinpeter, Ziehen and Verworn (Das V, 1898-99, S. 169-70). In 1900 he wrote Weltproblem, etc., S. 137 Fussnote) in the that in spite of all the points on which Mach list of idealists or psychomonists. In the differs from Kant and Berkeley, "they at case of all these worthy professors, you any rate are more akin to him than the see, there is a "misconception" in their metaphysical empiricism prevailing in interpretations "of the views of Mach and natural science [i.e., materialism! The Avenarius" (ibid.). professor does not like to call the devil by Poor Mach and Avenarius! Not only name] which is indeed the main target of were they slandered by their enemies for Mach's attacks" (op. cit., Bd. VI, S. 87). In idealism and "even" (as Bogdanov 1903 he wrote: "The starting point of expresses it) solipsism, but their very Berkeley and Mach is irrefutable.... Mach friends, disciples and followers, expert completed what Kant began" (Kant professors, also understood their teachers Studien, Bd. VIII, 1903, S. 314, 274). pervertedly, in an idealist sense. If empirio- In the preface to the Russian edition of criticism is developing into idealism, that by the Analysis of Sensations Mach also no means demonstrates the radical falsity mentions T. Ziehen, "who is following, if not of its muddled Berkeleian basic premises. the same, at least very close paths." We God forbid! It is only a slight take Professor Theodor Ziehen's book The "misconception," in the Nozdriev-Petzoldt Psychophysiological Theory of Knowledge [99] sense of the term. (Psychophysiologische Erkenntnistheorie, The funniest thing of all perhaps is that Jena, 1898) and and that the author refers Petzoldt himself, the guardian of purity and to Mach, Avenarius, Schuppe, and so forth innocence, firstly, "supplemented" Mach in the very introduction. Here therefore we and Avenarius with his "logical a priori " again have a case of a disciple and, secondly, coupled them with Wilhelm acknowledged by the teacher. Ziehen's Schuppe, the vehicle of fideism. "recent" theory is that only the "mob" is capable of believing that "real objects page 265 evoke our sensations" (p. 3), and that "over Had Petzoldt been acquainted with the portals of the theory Mach's English adherents he would have had very considerably to extend the list of page 264 Machians who had lapsed (because of a of knowledge there can be no other "misconception") into idealism. We have inscription than the words of Berkeley: 'The already referred to Karl Pearson, whom external objects subsist not by themselves, Mach praised, as an unadulterated idealist. but exist in our minds!'" (p. 5). "What is Here are the opinions of two other given us is sensations and ideas. Both are "slanderers" who say the same thing of embraced by the word psychical. Non- Pearson: "Professor Pearson is merely psychical is a word devoid of meaning" (p. echoing a doctrine first given clear 100). The laws of nature are relations not utterance by the truly great Berkeley" of material bodies but of "reduced (Howard V. Knox, Mind, Vol. VI, 1897, p. 205). "There can be no doubt that Mr. differences between Mach's views and Pearson is an idealist in the strictest sense mine," although "I at once recognised in of the word" (Georges Rodier, Revue him a kindred spirit."13 "Our Monism," says philosophique, 1888, II, Vol. 26, p. 200). Carus, "is not materialistic, not spiritualistic, The English idealist, William Clifford, whom not agnostic; it merely means consistency Mach regards as "coming very close" to his ... it takes experience as its basis and philosophy (Analysis of Sensations, p. 8), employs as method the systematic forms must be considered a teacher rather than a of the relations of experience" (evidently a disciple of Mach, for Clifford's philosophical plagiarism from Bogdanov's Empirio- works appeared in the 'seventies. Here the Monism!). Carus' motto is: "Not "misconception" is due to Mach himself, agnosticism, but positive science, not who in 1901 "failed to notice" the idealism mysticism, but clear thinking, not in Clifford's doctrine that the world is "mind- supernaturalism, not materialism, but a stuff," a "social object," a "highly organised monistic view of the world, not a dogma, experience," and so forth.12 For a but religion, not creed, but faith." And in characterisation of the charlatanism of the conformity with this motto Carus preaches German Machians, it is sufficient to note a "new theology," a "scientific theology," or that Kleinpeter in 1905 elevated this theonomy, which denies the literalness of idealist to the rank of founder of the the bible but insists that "all truth is divine "epistemology of modern science"! and God reveals himself in science as he On page 284 of the Analysis of does in history."14 It should be remarked Sensations, Mach mentions the "kindred" that Kleinpeter, in his book on the theory of (to Buddhism and Machism) American knowledge of modern science already philosopher, Paul Carus. Carus, who calls referred to, recommends Carus, together himself an "admirer and personal friend" of with Ostwald, Avenarius and Mach, edits in Chicago page 267 page 266 the immanentists (pp. 151-52). When The Monist, a journal devoted to Haeckel issued his theses for a Monistic philosophy, and The Open Court, a journal Alliance, Carus vigorously opposed him on devoted to the propagation of religion. the ground that, first, Haeckel vainly "Science is divine revelation," say the attempts to refute apriorism, which is "quite editors of this popular little journal, and in keeping with scientific philosophy"; they express the opinion that science can second, that Haeckel's doctrine of bring about a reform of the church that will determinism "excludes the possibility of retain "all that is true and good in religion." free will"; third, that Haeckel is mistaken "in Mach is a regular contributor to The Monist emphasising the one-sided view of the and publishes in it individual chapters from naturalist against the traditional his latest works. Carus corrects Mach "ever conservatism of the churches. Thus he so little" à la Kant, and declares that Mach appears as an enemy to the existing "is an idealist or, as we would say, a churches instead of rejoicing at their higher subjectivist." "There are, no doubt, development into a new and truer

13 12 William Kingdon Clifford, Lectues and Essays, The Monist, [100] Vol. XVI, 1906, July; P. Carus, 3rd ed., London, 1901, Vol. II, pp. 55, 65, 69: "On "Professor Mach's Philosophy," pp. 320, 345, 333. this point I agree entirely with Berkeley and not with The article is a reply to an article by Kleinpeter Mr. Spencer" (p. 58); "The object, then, is a set of which appeared in the same journal. 14 changes in my consciousness, and not anything out Ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 24 et seq., "Theology as a of it" (p. 52). Science," an article by Carus. interpretation of their dogmas ..." (ibid., Vol. It is quite evident that we have here a XVI, 1906, p. 122). Carus himself admits leader of a gang of American literary fakers that "I appear reactionary to many who are engaged in doping the people with freethinkers who blame me for not joining religious opium. Mach and Kleinpeter their chorus in denouncing all religion as joined this gang evidently as the result of a superstition" (p. 355). slight "misconception."

5. A. BOGDANOV'S "EMPIRIO-MONISM"

"I personally," writes Bogdanov of too, psychical experience (under the title of himself, "know so far of only one empirio- the Absolute Idea) comes first, then follow, monist in literature -- a certain A. "higher up," the physical world, nature, Bogdanov. But I know him very well and and, lastly, human knowledge, which can answer for it that his views fully accord through nature apprehends the Absolute with the sacramental formula of the Idea. Not a single idealist will deny the primacy of nature over mind. To wit, he primacy of nature taken in this sense for it regards all that exists as a continuous is not a genuine primacy, since in fact chain of development, the lower links of nature is not taken as the immediately which are lost in the chaos of elements, given, as the starting point of while the higher links, known to us, epistemology. Nature is in fact reached as represent the experience of men the result of a long process through [Bogdanov's italics] -- psychical and, still abstraction of the "psychical." It is higher, physical experience. This immaterial what these abstractions are experience, and the knowledge called: whether Absolute Idea, Universal Self, World Will, and so on and so forth. page 268 These terms distinguish the different resulting therefrom, correspond to what is varieties of idealism, and such varieties usually called mind" (Empirio-Monism, III, exist in countless numbers. The essence of xii). idealism is that the psychical is taken as The "sacramental" formula here ridiculed the starting point; from it external nature is by Bogdanov is the well-known proposition deduced, and only then is the ordinary of Engels, whom Bogdanov, however, human consciousness deduced from diplomatically avoids mentioning! We do nature. Hence, this primary not differ from Engels, oh, no! But let us examine more carefully page 269 Bogdanov's own summary of his famous "psychical" always turns out to be a lifeless "empirio-monism" and "substitution." The abstraction concealing a diluted theology. physical world is called the experience of For instance, everybody knows what a men and it is declared that physical human idea is; but an idea independent of experience is "higher " in the chain of man and prior to man, an idea in the development than psychical. But this is abstract, an Absolute Idea, is a theological utter nonsense! And it is precisely the kind invention of the idealist Hegel. Everybody of nonsense that is characteristic of all knows what human sensation is; but idealist philosophies. It is simply farcical for sensation independent of man, sensation Bogdanov to class this "system" as prior to man, is nonsense, a lifeless materialism. With me, too, he says, nature abstraction, an idealist artifice. And it is is primary and mind secondary. If Engels' precisely to such an idealistic artifice that definition is to be thus construed, then Bogdanov resorts when he erects the Hegel is also a materialist, for with him, following ladder. 1) The chaos of "elements" (we know sensation, etc., is taken as the immediate that no other human concept lies back of and the physical is deduced from it, the term "element" save sensation). substituted for it. The world is the non-ego 2) The psychical experience of men. created by the ego, said Fichte. The world 3) The physical experience of men. is absolute idea, said Hegel. The world is 4) "The knowledge emerging therefrom." will, said Schopenhauer. The world is There are no sensations (human) conception and idea, says the immanentist without man. Hence, the first rung of this Rehmke. Being is consciousness, says the ladder is a lifeless idealist abstraction. As a immanentist Schuppe. The physical is a matter of fact, what we have here is not the substitution for the psychical, says usual and familiar human sensations, but Bogdanov. One must be blind not to fictitious sensations, nobody's sensations, perceive the identical idealist essence sensations in general, divine sensations -- under these various verbal cloaks. just as the ordinary human idea became "Let us ask ourselves the following divine with Hegel when it was divorced question," writes Bogdanov in Book I of from man and man's brain. Empirio-Monism (pp. 128-29): "What is a So away with the first rung! 'living being,' for instance, 'man'?" And he Away also with the second rung, for the answers: "'Man' is primarily a definite psychical before the physical (and complex of 'immediate experiences.' [Mark, Bogdanov places the second rung before "primarily "!] Then, in the further the third) is something unknown to man or development of experience, 'man' science. The physical realm existed before becomes both for himself and for others a the psychical could have appeared, for the physical body amidst other physical latter is the highest product of the highest bodies." forms of organic matter. Bogdanov's Why, this is a sheer "complex" of second rung is also a lifeless abstraction, it absurdities, fit only for deducing the is thought without brain, human reason immortality of the soul, or the idea of God, divorced from man. and so forth. Man is primarily a complex of immediate expe- page 270 Only when we throw out the hrst two page 271 rungs, and only then, can we obtain a riences and in the course of further picture of the world that truly corresponds development becomes a physical body! to science and materialism. To wit: 1) the That means that there are "immediate physical world exists independently of the experiences" without a physical body, prior mind of man and existed long prior to man, to a physical body! What a pity that this prior to any "human experience"; 2) the magnificent philosophy has not yet found psychical, the mind, etc., is the highest acceptance in our theological seminaries! product of matter (i.e., the physical), it is a There its merits would have been fully function of that particularly complex appreciated. fragment of matter called the human brain. "... We have admitted that physical "The realm of substitution," writes nature itself is a product [Bogdanov's Bogdanov, "coincides with the realm of italics] of complexes of an immediate physical phenomena; for the psychical character (to which psychical co- phenomena we need substitute nothing, ordinations also belong), that it is the because they are immediate complexes" reflection of such complexes in others, (p. xxxix). analogous to them, but of the most And this precisely is idealism; for the complex type (in the socially organised psychical, i.e., consciousness, idea, experience of living beings)" (p. 146). A philosophy which teaches that Materialism says that the "socially- physical nature itself is a product, is a organised experience of living beings" is a philosophy of the priests pure and simple. product of physical nature, a result of a And its character is in no wise altered by long development of the latter, a the fact that personally Bogdanov development from a state of physical emphatically repudiates all religion. nature when no society, organisation, Duhring was also an atheist; he even experience, or living beings existed or proposed to prohibit religion in his could have existed. Idealism says that "socialitarian" order. Nevertheless, Engels physical nature is a product of this was absolutely right in pointing out that experience of living beings, and in saying Duhring's "system" could not make ends this, idealism is equating (if not meet without religion. The same is true of subordinating) nature to God. For God is Bogdanov, with the essential difference undoubtedly a product of the socially- that the quoted passage is not a chance organised experience of living beings. No inconsistency but the very essence of his matter from what angle you look at it, "empirio-monism" and of all his Bogdanov's philosophy contains nothing "substitution." If nature is a product, it is but a reactionary muddle. obvious that it can be a product only of Bogdanov thinks that to speak of the some thing that is greater, richer, broader, social organisation of experience is mightier than nature, of something that "cognitive socialism" (Bk. III, p. xxxiv). This exists; for in order to "produce" nature, it is insane twaddle. If socialism is thus must exist independently of nature. That regarded, the Jesuits are ardent adherents means that something exists outside of "cognitive socialism," for the basis of nature, something which moreover their epistemology is divinity as "socially- produces nature. In plain language this is organised experience." And there can be called God. The idealist philosophers have no doubt that Catholicism is a socially- always sought to change this latter name, organised experience; only, it reflects not to make it more abstract, more vague and objective truth (which Bogdanov denies, at the same time (for the sake of but which science reflects), but the plausibility) to bring it nearer to the exploitation of the ignorance of the masses by definite social classes. page 272 "psychical," as an "immediate complex," as page 273 the immediately given which requires no But why speak of the Jesuits! We find proof. Absolute Idea, Universal Spirit, Bogdanov's "cognitive socialism" in its World Will, "general substitution " of the entirety among the immanentists, so psychical for the physical, are different beloved of Mach. Leclair regards nature as formulations of one and the same idea. the consciousness of "mankind" (Der Every man knows, and science Realismus, etc., S. 55), and not of the investigates, idea, mind, will, the psychical, individual. The bourgeois philosophers will as a function of the normally operating serve you up any amount of such Fichtean human brain. To divorce this function from cognitive socialism. Schuppe also substance organised in a definite way, to emphasises das generische, das convert this function into a universal, gattungsmassige Moment des general abstraction, to "substitute" this Bewusstseins (Vierteljahrsschrift fürr abstraction for the whole of physical wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Bd. XVII, S. nature, this is the raving of philosophical 379-80), i.e., the general, the generic factor idealism and a mockery of science. of consciousness. To think that philosophical idealism vanishes when the consciousness of mankind is substituted these outright comrades-in-arms and, at for the consciousness of the individual, or times, direct followers of Mach to the the socially-organised experience for the "substitution" would be much more experience of one person, is like thinking eloquent than their arguments. that capitalism vanishes when one However, it would scarcely be correct to capitalist is replaced by a joint-stock regard Bogdanov's philosophy as a company. finished and static system. In the nine Our Russian Machians, Yushkevich and years from 1899 to 1908, Bogdanov has Valentinov, echo the materialist gone through four stages in his Rakhmetov in asserting that Bogdanov is philosophical peregrinations. At the an idealist (at the same time foully abusing beginning he was a "natural-historical" Rakhmetov himself). But they could not materialist (i.e., semi-consciously and stop to think where this idealism came instinctively faithful to the spirit of science). from. They make out that Bogdanov is an His Fundamental Elements of the Historical individual and chance phenomenon, an Outlook on Nature bears obvious traces of isolated case. This is not true. Bogdanov that stage. The second stage was the personally may think that he has invented "energetics" of Ostwald, which was so an "original" system, but one has only to fashionable in the latter 'nineties, a compare him with the afore mentioned muddled agnosticism which at times disciples of Mach to realise the falsity of stumbled into idealism. From Ostwald (the such an opinion. The difference between title page of Ostwald's Lectures on Natural Bogdanov and Cornelius is far less than Philosophy bears the inscription: the difference between Cornelius and "Dedicated to E. Mach") Bogdanov went Carus. The difference between Bogdanov over to Mach, that is, he borrowed the and Carus is less (as far as their fundamental premises of a subjective philosophical systems are concerned, of idealism that is as inconsistent and course, and not the deliberateness of their muddled as Mach's entire philosophy. The reactionary implications) than the fourth stage is an attempt to eliminate difference between Carus and Ziehen, and some of the contradictions of Machism, so on. Bogdanov is only one of the and to create a semblance of objective manifestations of that "socially-organised idealism. "The theory of general experience" which testifies to the growth of substitution" shows that Bogdanov has Machism into described a curve of almost 180° from his starting position. Is this stage of page 274 Bogdanov's idealism. Bogdanov (we are here, of course, speaking exclusively of Bogdanov page 275 as a philosopher) could not have come into philosophy more remote or less remote God's world had the doctrines of his from dialectical materialism than the teacher Mach contained no "elements"... of previous stages? If Bogdanov remains in Berkeleianism. And I cannot imagine a one place, then he is, of course, more more "terrible vengeance" on Bogdanov remote. If he keeps moving along the same than to have his Empirio-Monism curve in which he has been moving for the translated, say, into German and last nine years, he is less remote. He now presented for review to Leclair and has only one serious step to make in order Schubert-Soldern, Cornelius and to return once more to materialism, Kleinpeter, Carus and Pillon (the French namely, universally to discard his whole collaborator and disciple of Renouvier). universal substitution. For this universal The compliments that would be paid by substitution gathers into one Chinese pigtail all the transgressions of half-hearted materialism, namely, universally to discard, idealism and all the weaknesses of absolutely to eliminate, the Absolute Idea, consistent subjective idealism, just as (si that Hegelian "substitution of the psychical" licet parva componere magnis! -- if it is for physical nature. Feuerbach cut off the permissible to compare the great with the Chinese pigtail of philosophical idealism, in small) Hegel's "Absolute Idea" gathered other words, he took nature as the basis together all the contradictions of Kantian without any "substitution" whatever. idealism and all the weaknesses of We must wait and see whether the Fichteanism. Feuerbach had to make only Chinese pigtail of Machian idealism will go one serious step in order to return to on growing for much longer.

6. THE "THEORY OF SYMBOLS" (OR HIEROGLYPHS) AND THE CRITICISM OF HELMHOLTZ

As a supplement to what has been said symbols" (calling a symbol a hieroglyph above of the idealists as the comrades-in- changes nothing), Helmholtz, and shall see arms and successors of empirio-criticism, it how he was criticised by the materialists will be appropriate to dwell on the and by the idealists in conjunction with the character of the Machian criticism of Machians. certain philosophical propositions touched Helmholtz, a scientist of the first upon in our literature. For instance, our magnitude, was as inconsistent in Machian would-be philosophy as are the great majority of scientists. He tended towards Kantianism, page 276 but in his epistemology he did not adhere Marxists fastened with glee on Plekhanov's even to these views consistently. Here for "hieroglyphs," that is, on the theory that instance are some passages on the man's sensations and ideas are not copies subject of the correspondance of ideas and of real things and processes of nature, not objects from his Handbook of Physiological their images, but conventional signs, Optics: "I have ... designated sensations as symbols, hieroglyphs, and so on. Bazarov merely symbols for the relations of the ridicules this hieroglyphic materialism; and, external world and I have denied that they it should be stated, he would be right in have any similarity or equivalence to what doing so if he rejected hieroglyphic they represent" (French translation, p. 579; materialism in favour of non-hieroglyphic German original, p. 442). This is materialism. But Bazarov here again agnosticism, but on the same page further resorts to a sleight-of-hand and palms off on we read: "Our concepts and ideas are his renunciation of materialism as a effects wrought on criticism of "hieroglyphism." Engels speaks neither of symbols nor of hieroglyphs, but page 277 of copies, photographs, images, mirror- our nervous system and our reflections of things. Instead of pointing out consciousness by the objects that are the erroneousness of Plekhanov's perceived and apprehended." This is deviation from Engels' formulation of materialism. But Helmholtz is not clear as materialism, Bazarov uses Plekhanov's to the relation between absolute and error in order to conceal Engels' truth from relative truth, as is evident from his the reader. subsequent remarks. For instance, a little To make clear both Plekhanov's error further on he says: "I therefore think that and Bazarov's confusion we shall refer to there can be no possible meaning in an important advocate of the "theory of speaking of the truth of our ideas save as a practical truth. Our ideas of things cannot external causes in our organs, and the be anything but symbols, natural signs for manner in which such effects manifest things, which we learn to use in order to themselves, of course, depends very regulate our movements and actions. essentially on the nature of the apparatus When we have learned to read these on which these effects are wrought. symbols rightly we are in a position with Inasmuch as the quality of our sensation their aid to direct our actions so as to informs us of the properties of the external achieve the desired result...." This is not action by which this sensation is produced, correct. Helmholtz here lapses into the latter can be regarded as its sign subjectivism, into a denial of objective (Zeichen), but not as its image. For a reality and objective truth. And he arrives certain resemblance to the object imaged at a flagrant untruth when he concludes the is demanded of an image.... But a sign paragraph with the words: "An idea and the need not resemble that of which it is a object it represents obviously belong to two sign..." (Vortrage und Reden [Lectures and entirely different worlds...." Only the Speeches], 1884, Bd. II, S. 226). If Kantians thus divorce idea from reality, sensations are not images of things, but consciousness from nature. However, a only signs or symbols which do "not little further on we read: "As to the resemble" them, then Helmholtz's initial properties of the objects of the external materialist premise is undermined; the world, a little reflection will show that all the existence of external objects becomes properties we may attribute to them merely subject to doubt; for signs or symbols may signify the effects wrought by them either quite possibly indicate imaginary objects, on our senses or on other natural objects" and everybody is familiar with instances of (French ed., p. 581; German original, p. such signs or symbols. Helmholtz, 445; I translate from the French). Here following Kant, attempts to draw something again Helmholtz reverts to the materialist like an absolute boundary between the position. Helmholtz was an inconsistent "phenomenon" and the "thing-in itself." Kantian, now recognising a priori laws of Helmholtz harbours an insuperable thought, now tending towards the prejudice against straightforward, clear, "transcendental reality" of time and space and open materialism. But a little further on (i.e., to a materialist conception of them); he says: "I do not see how one could refute now deriving human sensations from a system even of the most extreme external objects, which act upon our sense subjective idealism that chose to regard life organs, and now declaring sensations to as a dream. One might declare it to be be only symbols, i.e., certain arbitrary signs highly improbable and unsatisfactory -- I divorced from the "entirely different" world myself would in this case subscribe to the of the things signified (cf. Viktor Heyfelder, severest expressions of dissent -- yet it Ueber could be constructed consistently.... The realistic hypo- page 278 den Begriff der Erfahrung bei Helmholtz page 279 [Helmholtz's Conception of Experience], thesis, on the contrary, trusts the evidence Berlin 1897). (Aussage) of ordinary self-observation, This is how Helmholtz expressed his according to which the changes of views in a speech delivered in 1878 on perception that follow a certain action have "Facts in Perception" ("a noteworthy no psychical connection with the preceding pronouncement from the realistic camp," impulse of volition. This hypothesis regards as Leclair characterised this speech): "Our everything that seems to be substantiated sensations are indeed effects wrought by by our everyday perception, viz., the material world outside of us, as existing and clearly: the sensations which are independently of our ideas." (pp. 242-43.) produced in us by things are reflections of "Undoubtedly, the realistic hypothesis is the nature of those things" (ibid., p. 320). the simplest we can construct; it has been That is the way a materialist criticises tested and verified in an extremely broad Helmholtz. He rejects Helmholtz's field of application; it is sharply defined in hieroglyphic or symbolic materialism or its several parts and, therefore, it is in the semi-materialism in favour of Feuerbach's highest degree useful and fruitful as a consistent materialism. basis of action" (p. 243). Helmholtz's The idealist Leclair (a representative of agnosticism also resembles "shamefaced the "immanentist school," so dear to materialism," with certain Kantian twists, in Mach's heart and mind) also accuses distinction to Huxley's Berkeleian twists. Helmholtz of inconsistency, of wavering Albrecht Rau, a follower of Feuerbach, between materialism and spiritualism. (Der therefore vigorously criticises Helmholtz's Realismus, etc., S. 154.) But for Leclair the theory of symbols as an inconsistent theory of symbols is not insufficiently deviation from "realism." Helmholtz's basic materialistic but too materialistic. Leclair view, says Rau, is a realistic hypothesis, says: "Helmholtz thinks that the according to which "we apprehend the perceptions of our consciousness offer objective properties of things with the help sufficient support for the cognition of of our senses."15 The theory of symbols sequence in time as well as of the identity cannot be reconciled with such a view or non-identity of transcendental causes. (which, as we have seen, is wholly This in Helmholtz's opinion is sufficient for materialist), for it implies a certain distrust the assumption and cognition of law in the of perception, a distrust of the evidence of realm of the transcendental" (i.e., in the our sense-organs. It is beyond doubt that realm of the objectively real) (p. 33). And an image cannot wholly resemble the Leclair thunders against this "dogmatic model, but an image is one thing, a prejudice of Helmholtz's": "Berkeley's symbol, a conventional sign, another. The God," he exclaims, "as the hypothetical image inevitably and of necessity implies cause of the conformity to natural law of the objective reality of that which it the ideas in our mind is at least just as "images." "Conventional sign," symbol, capable of satisfying our need of causality hieroglyph are concepts which introduce as a world of external objects" (p. 31). "A an entirely unnecessary element of consistent application of the theory of agnosticism. Albrecht Rau, therefore, symbols... can achieve nothing without a generous admixture of vulgar realism" (i.e., page 280 materialism) (p. 35). is perfectly right in saying that Helmholtz's theory of symbols pays tribute to page 281 Kantianism. "Had Helmholtz," says Rau, This is how a "critical idealist" criticised "remained true to his realistic conception, Helmholtz for his materialism in 1879. had he consistently adhered to the basic Twenty years later, in his article "The principle that the properties of bodies Fundamental Views of Ernst Mach and express the relations of bodies to each Heinrich Hertz on Physics,"16 Kleinpeter, other and also to us, he obviously would the disciple of Mach so highly praised by have had no need of the whole theory of his teacher, refuted in the following way the symbols; he could then have said, briefly "antiquated" Helmholtz with the aid of

15 Albrecht Rau, Empfinden und Denken [Sensation 16 Archiv fur Philosophie, II, Systematische and Thought ], Giessen, 1896, S. 304. Philosophie,[101] Bd. V., 1899, S. 163-64. Mach's "recent" philosophy. Let us for the realities existing outside of thought. We are moment leave aside Hertz (who, in fact, not even in a position to know such things. was as inconsistent as Helmholtz) and From the observation of our senses we are examine Kleinpeter's comparison of Mach in general unable, owing to their and Helmholtz. Having quoted a number of imperfection, to make even a single passages from the works of both writers, uniquely determined conclusion. We can and having particularly stressed Mach's never assert, for instance, that upon well-known statements to the effect that reading a certain scale (durch Ablesen bodies are mental symbols for complexes einer Skala ) we shall obtain a definite of sensations and so on, Kleinpeter says: figure: there are always, within certain "If we follow Helmholtz's line of thought, limits, an infinite number of possible figures we shall encounter the following all equally compatible with the facts of the fundamental premises: observation. And to have knowledge of "1) There exist objects of the external something real lying outside us -- that is for world. us impossible. Let us assume, however, "2) A change in these objects is that it were possible, and that we did get to inconceivable without the action of some know reality; in that case we would have cause (which is thought of as real). no right to apply the laws of logic to it, for "3) 'Cause, according to the original they are our laws, applicable only to our meaning of the word, is the unchangeable conceptions, to our mental products residue or being behind the changing [Kleinpeter's italics]. Between facts there is phenomena, namely, substance and the no logical connection, but only a simple law of its action, force.' [The quotation is succession; apodictic assertions are here taken by Kleinpeter from Helmholtz.] unthinkable. It is therefore incorrect to say "4) It is possible to deduce all that one fact is the cause of another and, phenomena from their causes in a logically consequently, the whole deduction built up strict and uniquely determined manner. by Helmholtz on this conception falls to the "5) The achievement of this end is ground. Finally, the attainment of objective equivalent to the possession of objective truth, i.e., truth existing independently of truth, the acquisition (Erlangung) of which any subject, is impossible, not only is thus regarded as conceivable" (p. 163). because of the nature of our senses, but Rendered indignant by these premises, also because as men (als Menschen) we by their contradictoriness and their creation can of insoluble problems, Klein- page 283 page 282 in general have no notion of what exists peter remarks that Helmholtz does not hold quite independently of us (p. 164). strictly to these views and sometimes As the reader sees, our disciple of employs "turns of speech which are Mach, repeating the favourite phrases of somewhat suggestive of Mach's purely his teacher and of Bogdanov, who does logical understanding of such words" as not own himself a Machian, rejects matter, force, causality, etc. Helmholtz's whole philosophy, rejects it "It is not difficult to find the source of our from the idealist standpoint. The theory of dissatisfaction with Helmholtz, if we recall symbols is not even especially singled out Mach's fine, clear words. The false by the idealist, who regards it as an understanding of the words mass, force, unimportant and perhaps accidental etc., is the basic weakness of Helmholtz's deviation from materialism. And Helmholtz whole argument. These are only concepts, is chosen by Kleinpeter as a representative products of our imagination and not of the "traditional views in physics," "views shared to this day by the majority of phys and advanced in opposition to the "theory icists (p. 160). of symbols," or "hieroglyphic materialism," The result we have arrived at is that the idealist nonsense that "sense- Plekhanov was guilty of an obvious perception is the reality existing out side mistake in his exposition of materialism, us." From the Kantian Helmholtz, just as but that Bazarov completely muddled the from Kant himself, the materialists went to matter, mixed up materialism with idealism the Left, the Machians to the Right.

7. TWO KINDS OF CRITICISM OF DUHRING

Let us note another characteristic Holbach and Co., Bü rchner and Co., etc., feature in the Machians' incredible are absolutely nothing but an attempt to perversion of materialism. Valentinov throw dust in the eyes of the public, a endeavours to beat the Marxists by cover for the departure of Machism as a comparing them to Buchner, who whole from the very foundations of supposedly has much in common with materialism in general, and a fear to take Plekhanov, although Engels sharply up a straightforward and clear position with dissociated himself from Buchner. regard to Engels. Bogdanov, approaching the same question And it would be hard to express oneself from another angle, defends, as it were, more clearly on the French materialism of the "materialism of the natural scientists," the eighteenth century and on Buchner, which, Vogt and Moleschott, than Engels does at the end of Chapter II of his Ludwig page 284 Feuerbach. It is impossible not to he says, "is usually spoken of with a understand Engels, unless one deliberately certain contempt" (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, wishes to distort him. Marx and I are p. x). Both Valentinov and Bogdanov are materialists -- says Engels in this chapter, wretchedly muddled on this question. Marx explaining what fundamentally and Engels always "spoke distinguishes all schools of materialism contemptuously" of bad socialists; but from from the whole camp of the idealists, from this it follows that they demanded the all the Kantians and Humeans in general. teaching of correct socialism, scientific And Engels reproaches Feuerbach for a socialism, and not a flight from socialism to certain pusillanimity, a certain bourgeois views. Marx and Engels always condemned bad (and, particularly, anti- page 285 dialectical) materialism; but they frivolity of thought, as expressed in his condemned it from the standpoint of a rejection at times of materialism in general higher, more advanced dialectical because of the mistakes of one or another materialism, and not from the standpoint of school of materialists. Feuerbach "should Humism or Berkeleianism. Marx, Engels not have confounded the doctrines of these and Dietzgen would discuss the bad hedge-preachers [Bü rchner and Co.] with materialists, reason with them and seek to materialism in general," says Engels (p. correct their errors. But they would not 21). [102] Only minds that are spoilt by even discuss the Humeans and reading and credulously accepting the Berkeleians, Mach and Avenarius, doctrines of the German reactionary confining themselves to a single still more professors could have misunderstood the contemptuous remark about their trend as nature of such reproaches levelled by a whole. Therefore, the endless faces and Engels at Feuerbach. grimaces made by our Machians over Engels says very clearly that Buchner Having enumerated these three and Co. "by no means overcame the "limitations" and explained them with limitations of their teachers," i.e., the exhaustive clarity (pp. 19-21), Engels then materialists of the eighteenth century, that and there adds that they (Buchner and they had not made a single step forward. Co.) did not emerge "from these limits " And it is for this, and this alone, that Engels (uber diese Schranken). took Buchner and Co. to task; not for their Exclusively for these three things and materialism, as the ignoramuses think, but exclusively within these limits, does Engels because they did not advance materialism, refute both the materialism of the because "it was quite outside their scope to eighteenth century and the doctrines of develop the theory [of materialism] any Buchner and Co.! On all other, more further." It was for this alone that Engels elementary, questions of materialism took Buchner and Co. to task. And (questions distorted by the Machians) there thereupon point by point Engels is and can be no difference between Marx enumerates three fundamental "limitations" and Engels on the one hand and all these (Beschranktheit) of the French materialists old materialists on the other. It was only of the eighteenth century, from which Marx the Russian Machians who brought and Engels had emancipated themselves, confusion into this perfectly clear question, but from which Buchner and Co. were since for their West-European teachers unable to emancipate themselves. The first and co-thinkers the radical difference limitation was that the views of the old between the line of Mach and his friends materialists were "mechanical," in the and the line of the materialists generally is sense that they believed in "the exclusive perfectly obvious. Our Machians found it application of the standards of mechanics necessary to confuse the issue in order to to processes of a chemical and organic represent their break with Marxism and nature" (p. 19). We shall see in the next their desertion to the camp of bourgeois chapter that failure to understand these philosophy as "minor corrections" of words of Engels' caused certain people to Marxism! succumb to idealism through the new Take Duhring. It is hard to imagine physics. Engels does not reject mechanical anything more contemptuous than the materialism for the faults attributed to it by opinion of him expressed by Engels. But at physicists of the "recent" idealist (alias the same time that Duhring was criticised Machian) trend. The second limitation was by Engels, just see how he was criticised the meta- by Leclair, who praises Mach's "revolutionising philosophy." Leclair page 286 regards Duhring as the physical character of the views of the old materialists, meaning the "anti-dialectical page 287 character of their philosophy." This "extreme Left " of materialism, which limitation is fully shared with Buchner and "without any evasion declares sensation, Co. by our Machians, who, as we have as well as every activity of consciousness seen, entirely failed to understand Engels' and intelligence in general, to be the application of dialectics to epistemology secretion, function, supreme flower, (for example, absolute and relative truth). aggregate effect, etc., of the animal The third limitation was the preservation of organism" (Der Realismus, etc., 1879, S. idealism "up above," in the realm of the 23-24). social sciences, a non-understanding of Is it for this that Engels criticised historical materialism. Duhring? No. In this he was in full agreement with Duhring, as he was with every other materialist. He criticised incarnation of pernicious realism and Duhring from the diametrically opposite materialism (cf. also Beitrage zu einer standpoint, namely, for the inconsistency of monistischen Erkenntnistheorie, 1882, S. his materialism, for his idealist fancies, 45). In 1878, W. Schuppe, teacher and which left a loophole for fideism. comrade-in-arms of Mach, accused "Nature itself works both within ideating Duhring of "visionary realism" beings and from without, in order to create (Traumrealismus)17 in revenge for the the required knowledge of the course of epithet "visionary idealism" which Duhring things by systematically producing had hurled against all idealists. For Engels, coherent views." Leclair quotes these on the contrary, Duhring was not a words of Duhring's and savagely attacks sufficiently steadfast, clear and consistent the materialism of such a point of view, the materialist. "crude metaphysics" of this materialism, Marx and Engels, as well as J. Dietzgen, the "self-deception," etc., etc. (pp. 160 and entered the philosophical arena at a time 161-63). when materialism reigned among the Is it for this that Engels criticised advanced intellectuals in general, and in Duhring? No. He ridiculed all florid working-class circles in particular. It is language, but as regards the cognition of therefore quite natural that they should objective law in nature, reflected by the have devoted their attention not to a consciousness, Engels was fully in repetition of old ideas but to a serious agreement with Durhring, as he was with theoretical development of materialism, its every other materialist. application to history, in other words, to the "Thought is a form of reality higher than completion of the edifice of materialist the rest.... A fundamental premise is the philosophy up to its summit. It is quite independence and distinction of the natural that in the sphere of epistemology materially real world from the groups of they confined themselves to correcting manifestations of the consciousness." Feuerbach's errors, to ridiculing the Leclair quotes these words of Duhring's banalities of the materialist Duhring, to together with a number of Duhring's criticising the errors of Buchner (see J. attacks on Kant, etc., and for this accuses Dietzgen), to emphasising what these most Duhring of "metaphysics" (pp. 218-22), of widely known and popular writers among subscribing to "a metaphysical dogma," the workers particularly lacked, namely, etc. dialectics. Marx, Engels and J. Dietz- Is it for this that Engels criticised Duhring? No. That the world exists page 289 independently of the mind and that every gen did not worry about the elementary truths of materialism, which had been cried page 288 by the hucksters in dozens of books, but deviation from this truth on the part of the devoted all their attention to ensuring that Kantians, Humeans, Berkeleians, and so these elementary truths should not be forth, is false, on this point Engels was fully vulgarised, should not be over-simplified, in agreement with Duhring, as he was with should not lead to stagnation of thought every other materialist. Had Engels seen ("materialism below, idealism above"), to from what angle Leclair, in the spirit of forgetfulness of the valuable fruit of the Mach, criticised Duhring, he would have idealist systems, Hegelian dialectics -- that called both these philosophical pearl which those farmyard cocks, the reactionaries names a hundred times more contemptuous than those he called 17 Dr. Wilhelm Schuppe, Erkenntnistheoretische Duhring. To Leclair Duhring was the Logik [Epistemological Logic ], Bonn, 1878, S. 56. Buchners, the Duhrings and Co. (as well themselves. Marx and Engels were as Leclair, Mach, Avenarius and so forth), similarly more concerned to dissociate could not pick out from the dung heap of themselves from the vulgarisation of the absolute idealism. fundamental demands of political If one envisages at all concretely the democracy than to defend these demands. historical conditions in which the Only disciples of the philosophical philosophical works of Engels and J. reactionaries could have "failed to notice" Dietzgen were written, it will be perfectly this circumstance, and could have clear why they were more concerned to presented the case to their readers in such dissociate themselves from the a way as to make it appear that Marx and vulgarisation of the elementary truths of Engels did not know what being a materialism than to defend the truths materialist means.

8. HOW COULD J. DIETZGEN HAVE FOUND FAVOUR WITH THE REACTIONARY PHILOSOPHERS?

The previously cited example of Helfond inexact expression of Dietzgen's, who already contains the answer to this elsewhere correctly says: "Mind and matter question, and we shall not examine the at least have this in common, that they innumerable instances in which J. Dietzgen exist" (p. 80). "Thinking," says Dietzgen, "is receives Helfond- a work of the body.... In order to think I require a substance that can be thought of. page 290 This substance is provided in the like treatment at the hands of our phenomena of nature and life.... Matter is Machians. It is more expedient to quote a the boundary of the mind, beyond which number of passages from J. Dietzgen the latter cannot pass.... Mind is a product himself in order to bring out his weak of matter, but matter is more than a points. product of mind..." (p. 64). The Machians "Thought is a function of the brain," says refrain from analysing materialist Dietzgen (Das Wesen der menschlichen arguments of the materialist Dietzgen such Kopfarbeit, 1903, S. 52; there is a Russian as these! They prefer to fasten on translation). "Thought is a product of the passages where he is inexact and brain.... My desk, as the content of my muddled. For example, he says that thought, is identical with that thought, does scientists can be "idealists only outside not differ from it. But my desk outside of their field" (p. 108). Whether this is so, and my head is a separate object quite distinct why it is so, on this the Machians are from it" (p. 53). These perfectly clear silent. But a page or so earlier Dietzgen materialistic propositions are, however, recognises the "positive side supplemented by Dietzgen thus: "Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is page 291 also sensible, material, i.e., real.... The of modern idealism" (p. 106) and the mind differs no more from the table, light, "inadequacy of the materialist principle," or sound than these things differ from each which should rejoice the Machians. The other" (p. 54). This is obviously false. That incorrectly expressed thought of Dietzgen's both thought and matter are "real," i.e., consists in the fact that the difference exist, is true. But to say that thought is between matter and mind is also relative material is to make a false step, a step and not excessive (p. 107). This is true, but towards confusing materialism and what follows from this is not that idealism. As a matter of fact this is only an materialism as such is inadequate, but that metaphysical, anti-dialectical materialism is dissociating himself from vulgar inadequate. materialism. "Simple, scientific truth is not based on a But then follows a little further on a person. It has its foundation outside [i.e., of passage that is quite incorrect: "The the person], in its material; it is objective concept matter must be broadened. It truth.... We call ourselves materialists.... embraces all the phenomena of reality, as Philosophical materialists are distinguished well as our faculty of knowing or by the fact that they put the corporeal world explaining" (p. 141). This is a muddle at the beginning, at the head, and put the which can only lead to confusing idea, or spirit, as the sequel, whereas their materialism and idealism under the guise opponents, after the manner of religion, of "broadening" the former. To seize upon derive things from the word... the material this "broadening" would be to forget the world from the idea" (Kleinere basis of Dietzgen's philosophy, the philosophische Schriften, 1903, S. 59, 62). recognition of matter as the primary, "the The Machians avoid this recognition of boundary of the mind." But, as a matter of objective truth and repetition of Engels' fact, a few lines further down Dietzgen definition of materialism. But Dietzgen corrects himself: "The whole governs the goes on to say: "We would be equally right part, matter the mind.... In this sense we in calling ourselves idealists, for our may love and honour the material world ... system is based on the total result of as the first cause, as the creator of heaven philosophy, on the scientific investigation of and earth" (p. 142). That the conception of the idea, on a clear insight into the nature "matter" must also include thoughts, as of mind" (p. 63). It is not difficult to seize Dietzgen repeats in the Excursions [103] upon this obviously incorrect phrase in (op. cit., p. 214), is a muddle, for if such an order to deny materialism. Actually, inclusion is made, the epistemological Dietzgen's formulation is more inexact than contrast between mind and matter, his basic thought, which amounts to this, idealism and materialism, a contrast upon that the old materialism was unable to which Dietzgen himself insists, loses all investigate ideas scientifically (with the aid meaning. That this contrast must not be of historical materialism). made "excessive," exaggerated, Here are Dietzgen's ideas on the old metaphysical, is beyond dispute (and it is materialism. "Like our understanding of to the great credit of the dialectical political economy, our materialism is a materialist Dietzgen that he emphasised scientific, historical conquest. Just as this). The limits of the absolute necessity definitely as we distinguish ourselves from and absolute truth of this relative contrast the socialists of the past, so we distinguish are precisely those limits which define the ourselves from the old materialists. With trend of epistemological investigations. To the operate beyond these limits with the distinction between matter and mind, page 292 latter we have only this in common, that we page 293 acknowledge matter to be the premise, or physical and mental, as though they were prime base of the idea" (p. 140). This word absolute opposites, would be a great "only" is significant! It contains the whole mistake. epistemological foundation of materialism, Dietzgen, unlike Engels, expresses his as distinguished from agnosticism, thoughts in a vague, unclear, mushy way. Machism, idealism. But Dietzgen's But apart from his defects of exposition attention is here concentrated on and his individual mistakes, he not unsuccessfully champions the "materialist theory of knowledge " (pp. 222 and 271), deviation from a consistent application of "dialectical materialism " (p. 224). "The dialectics, from consistent materialism, in materialist theory of knowledge then," says particular from Anti-Dü rhring. Dietzgen, "amounts to the recognition that Does it now dawn upon Mr. Valentinov the human organ of perception radiates no and his brethren that what Marx could call metaphysical light, but is a piece of nature Dietzgen's confusion is only what brings which reflects other pieces of nature" (pp. Dietzgen close to Mach, who went from 222-23). "Our perceptive faculty is not a Kant not towards materialism, but towards supernatural source of truth, but a mirror- Berkeley and Hume? Or was it that the like instrument, which reflects the things of materialist Marx called Dietzgen's the world, or nature" (p. 243). Our profound materialist theory of knowledge confused, Machians avoid an analysis of each yet approved his deviations from individual proposition of Dietzgen's materialism, that is, approved what differs materialist theory of knowledge, but seize from Anti-Duhring, which was written with upon his deviations from that theory, upon his (Marx's) participation? his vagueness and confusion. J. Dietzgen Whom are they trying to fool, our could find favour with the reactionary Machians, who desire to be regarded as philosophers only because he occasionally Marxists and at the same time inform the gets muddled. And, it goes without saying, world that "their " Mach approved of where there is a muddle there you will find Dietzgen? Have our heroes failed to guess Machians. that Mach could approve in Dietzgen only Marx wrote to Kugelmann on December that which Marx called confusion? 5, 1868: "A fairly long time ago he But taken as a whole, J. Dietzgen does [Dietzgen] sent me a fragment of a not deserve so severe a censure. He is manuscript on the 'faculty of thought' which nine-tenths a materialist and never made in spite of a certain confusion and of too any claims either to originality or to frequent repetition, contains much that is possessing a special philosophy distinct excellent and -- as the independent from materialism. He spoke of Marx product of a working man -- admirable" frequently, and invariably as the head of (Russ. trans., p. 53). [104] Mr. Valentinov the trend (Kleinere philosophische quotes this opinion, but it never dawned on Schriften, S. 4 -- an opinion uttered in him to ask what Marx regarded as 1873; on page 95 -- 1876 -- he emphasises Dietzgen's confusion, whether it was that that Marx and Engels "possessed the which brings Dietzgen close to Mach, or necessary philosophical training"; on page that which distinguishes Dietzgen from 181 -- 1886 -- he speaks of Marx and Mach. Mr. Valentinov does not ask this Engels as the "acknowledged founders" of question because he read both Dietzgen the trend). Dietzgen was a Marxist, and and Marx's letters after the manner of Eugene Dietzgen, [105] and -- alasl -- Gogol's Petrushka. Yet it is not Comrade P. page 294 page 295 difficult to find the answer to this question. Dauge are rendering him left-handed Marx frequently called his world outlook service by their invention of dialectical materialism, and Engels' Anti- "Naturmonismus," "Dietzgenism," etc. Duhring, the whole of which Marx read "Dietzgenism" as distinct from dialectical through in manuscript, expounds precisely materialism is confusion, a step towards this world outlook. Hence, it should have reactionary philosophy, an attempt to been clear even to the Valentinovs that create a trend not from what is great in Dietzgen's confusion could lie only in his Joseph Dietzgen (and in that worker- philosopher, who discovered dialectical Dietzgen.... With Dietzgen, the absolute materialism in his own way, there is much becomes the universal, and this becomes that is great!) but from his weak points. the thing-in-itself, the absolute subject, I shall confine myself to two examples in whose appearances are its predicates. order to illustrate how Comrade P. Dauge That he [Dietzgen] is thus converting a and Eugene Dietzgen are sliding into pure abstraction into the basis of the reactionary philosophy. concrete process, he does not, of course, In the second edition of the Akquisit realise any more than Hegel himself did.... [106] (p. 273), Dauge writes: "Even He frequently chaotically lumps together bourgeois criticism points out the Hegel, Darwin, Haeckel, and natural- connection between Dietzgen's philosophy scientific materialism" (Die soziale Frage, and empirio-criticism and also the S. xxxiii). Schubert-Soldern is a keener immanentist school," and, further on, judge of philosophical shades than Mach, "especially Leclair" (a quotation from a who praises everybody indiscriminately, "bourgeois criticism"). including the Kantian Jerusalem. That P. Dauge values and esteems J. Eugene Dietzgen was so simple-minded Dietzgen cannot be doubted. But it also as to complain to the German public that in cannot be doubted that he is defaming him Russia the narrow materialists had by citing without protest the opinion of a "insulted" Joseph Dietzgen, and he bourgeois scribbler who classes the sworn translated Plekhanov's and Dauge's enemy of fideism and of the professors -- articles on Joseph Dietzgen into German. the "graduated flunkeys" of the bourgeoisie (See Joseph Dietzgen, Erkenntnis und -- with the outspoken preacher of fideism Wahrheit [Knowledge and Truth], Stuttgart, and avowed reactionary, Leclair. It is 1908, Appendix). The poor "Natur- possible that Dauge repeated another's monist's" complaint rebounded on his own opinion of the immanentists and of Leclair head. Franz Mehring, who may be without himself being familiar with the regarded as knowing something of writings of these reactionaries. But let this philosophy and Marxism, wrote in his serve him as a warning: the road away review that Plekhanov was essentially right from Marx to the peculiarities of Dietzgen -- as against Dauge (Die Neue Zeit, 1908, to Mach -- to the immanentists -- is a road No. 38, 19. Juni, Feuilleton, S. 432). That leading into a morass. To class him not J. Dietzgen got into difficulties when he only with Leclair but even with Mach is to deviated from Marx and Engels (p. 431) is lay stress on Dietzgen the muddlehead as for Mehring beyond question. Eugene distinct from Dietzgen the materialist. Dietzgen replied to page 296 page 297 I shall defend Dietzgen against Dauge. I Mehring in a long, snivelling note, in which assert that Dietzgen did not deserve the he went so far as to say that J. Dietzgen shame of being classed with Leclair. And I might be of service "in reconciling" the can cite a witness, a most authoritative one "warring brothers, the orthodox and the on such a question, one who is as much a revisionists" (Die Neue Zeit, 1908, No. 44, reactionary, as much a fideist and 31. Juli, S. 652). "immanentist" philosopher as Leclair Another warning, Comrade Dauge: the himself, namely, Schubert-Soldern. In 1896 road away from Marx to "Dietzgenism" and he wrote: "The Social-Democrats willingly "Machism" is a road into the morass, not lean for support on Hegel with more or less for individuals, not for Tom, Dick and (usually less) justification, but they Harry, but for the trend. materialise the Hegelian philosophy; cf. J. And do not complain, Messrs. Machians, that I quote the "authorities"; your objections to the authorities are but a screen for the fact that for the socialist authorities (Marx, Engels, Lafargue, Mehring, Kautsky) you are substituting bourgeois authorities (Mach, Petzoldt, Avenarius and the immanentists). You would do better not to raise the question of "authorities" and "authoritarianism"!