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Materialism and of Empirio-Criticism W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S , U N I T E! L E N I N COLLECTED WORKS 14 A THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE U.S.S.R. ИНCTИTУT МАРÇCИзМА — ЛЕНИНИзМА пpи ЦK KНCC B. n. l d H n H С О Ч И Н E Н И Я И з д a н u е ч е m в е p m o e ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ M О С К В А V. I. L E N I N cOLLEcTED WORKS VOLUME 14 190] PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN BY THE LATE A B R A H A M F I N E B E R G EDITED BY C L E M E N S D U T T From Marx to Mao M L © Digital Reprints 2010 www.marx2mao.com First printing 1962 Second printing 1968 Third printing 1972 Fourth printing 1977 Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 10102–983 l 61–77 014(01)–77 7 C O N T E N T S Preface ........................ 11 1908 TEN QUESTIONS TO A LECTURER .............. 13 MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy .............. 17 Preface to the First Edition ............... 19 Preface to the Second Edition .............. 21 In Lieu of an Introduction. How Certain “Marxists” in 1908 and Certain Idealists in 1710 Refuted Materialism .... 22 Chapter One. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-criticism and of Dialectical Materialism. I ............ 40 1. Sensations and Complexes of Sensations ...... 40 2. “The Discovery of the World-Elements”....... 53 3. The Principal Co-ordination and “Naïve Realism”... 67 4. Did Nature Exist Prior to Man? ......... 75 5. Does Man Think with the Help of the Brain? .... 86 6. The Solipsism of Mach and Avenarius ....... 94 Chapter Two. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-criticism and of Dialectical Materialism. II ............ 98 1. The “Thing-in-Itself”, or V. Chernov Refutes Frederick Engels .................... 98 2. “Transcendence”, or V. Bazarov “Revises” Engels .... 107 8 CONTENTS 3. L. Feuerbach and J. Dietzgen on the Thing-in-Itself . 117 4. Does Objective Truth Exist?........... 122 5. Absolute and Relative Truth, or the Eclecticism of Engels as Discovered by A. Bogdanov........ 131 6. The Criterion of Practice in the Theory of Knowledge 138 Chapter Three. The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism and of Empirio-criticism. III ....... 144 1. What Is Matter? What Is Experience? ....... 144 2. Plekhanov’s Error Concerning the Concept “Experience” 151 3. Causality and Necessity in Nature ......... 153 4. The “Principle of Economy of Thought” and the Prob- lem of the “Unity of the World” ......... 169 5. Space and Time ................ 175 6. Freedom and Necessity .............. 187 Chapter Four. The Philosophical Idealists as Comrades-in-Arms and Successors of Empirio-criticism ......... 194 1. The Criticism of Kantianism from the Left and from the Right ................... 194 2. How the “Empirio-Symbolist” Yushkevich Ridiculed the “Empirio-Criticist” Chernov............ 205 3. The Immanentists as Comrades-in-Arms of Mach and Avenarius ................... 209 4. In What Direction Is Empirio-criticism Developing? .. 217 5. A. Bogdanov’s “Empirio-monism” ......... 226 6. The “Theory of Symbols” (or Hieroglyphs) and the Crit- icism of Helmholtz ............... 232 7. Two Kinds of Criticism of Dühring ........ 238 8. How Could J. Dietzgen Have Found Favour with the Reactionary Philosophers? ............ 243 Chapter Five. The Recent Revolution in Natural Science, and Philosophical Idealism ............... 250 1. The Crisis in Modern Physics .......... 252 2. “Matter Has Disappeared” ............ 258 3. Is Motion Without Matter Conceivable? ...... 266 4. The Two Trends in Modern Physics, and English Spirit- ualism .................... 274 5. The Two Trends in Modern Physics, and German Ideal- ism...................... 282 CONTENTS 9 6. The Two Trends in Modern Physics, and French Fideism 290 7. A Russian “Idealist Physicist” .......... 299 8. The Essence and Significance of “Physical” Idealism . 302 Chapter Six. Empirio-criticism and Historical Materialism ... 314 1. The Excursions of the German Empirio-criticists Into the Field of the Social Sciences.......... 314 2. How Bogdanov Corrects and “Develops” Marx .... 322 3. Suvorov’s “Foundations of Social Philosophy” .... 330 4. Parties in Philosophy and Philosophical Blockheads . 335 5. Ernst Haeckel and Ernst Mach .......... 346 Conclusion .......................FROM MARX 357 Supplement to Chapter Four, Section 1. From What Angle Did N. G. ChernyshevskyTO Criticise MAO Kantianism? ...... 359 Notes ......................... 363 The Life and Work of V. I. Lenin (Chronology) ........ 389 Name Index ...................... 399 NOT FOR COMMERCIALILLUSTRATION Cover of the first edition of V. I. Lenin’s Materialism and Em- pirio-criticism, 1909DISTRIBUTION...................16-17 11 P R E F A C E Volume 14 contains V. I. Lenin’s extremely important philosophical work Materialism and Empirio-criticism, written in 1908 and published in 1909, which was the theo- retical preparation for the Bolshevik Party. In this work Lenin gave an all-round criticism of the anti-Marxist views of the Russian Machists and their foreign philosophical teachers. At the same time Lenin’s work was a defence of the theoretical basis of Marxism—dialectical and historical materialism—and a materialist generalisa- tion of all that was valuable and essential in the achieve- ments of science, and especially natural science, during the period from the death of Engels to the appearance of Lenin’s book Materialism and Empirio-criticism. This work has become a model of irreconcilable, party struggle against the enemies of dialectical and historical materialism. The volume includes also Lenin’s “Ten Questions to a Lecturer”, written in the spring of 1908, which furnished the basis for the public dissociation of the Bolshevik group from the philosophical views of the Machist Bogdanov and his supporters, who had joined the Bolsheviks in 1905. Lenin’s work Materialism and Empirio-criticism is printed in the present volume in accordance with the first edition of the book (1909) collated with the second edition (1920). In preparing the text account has been taken of the instructions given by Lenin in letters to relatives dur- ing the preparation of the book for the press in 1908-09 and in correcting the proofs of the first edition. TEN QUESTIONS TO A LECTURER1 Written in May, before 15 (28), 1908 Published according to First published in 1925 in the manuscript Lenin Miscellany III 15 1. Does the lecturer acknowledge that the philosophy of Marxism is dialectical materialism? If he does not, why has he not ever analysed Engels’ countless statements on this subject? If he does, why do the Machists call their “revision” of dialectical materialism “the philosophy of Marxism”? 2. Does the lecturer acknowledge Engels’ fundamental division of philosophical systems into idealism and mate- rialism,2 Engels regarding those intermediate between these two, wavering between them, as the line of Hume in modern philosophy, calling this line “agnosticism” and declaring Kantianism to be a variety of agnosticism? 3. Does the lecturer acknowledge that recognition of the external world and the reflection of it in the human mind form the basis of the theory of knowledge of dialecti- cal materialism? 4. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels’ argument concerning the conversion of “things-in-them- selves” into “things-for-us”?3 5. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels’ assertion that the “real unity of the world consists in its materiality”? (Anti-Dühring, 2nd ed., 1886, p. 28, section 1, par. IV on world schematism.)4 6. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels’ as- sertion that “matter without motion is as inconceivable as motion without matter”? (Anti-Dühring, 1886, 2nd ed., p. 45, in par. 6 on natural philosophy, cosmogony, physics and chemistry.)5 7. Does the lecturer acknowledge that the ideas of cau- sality, necessity, law, etc., are a reflection in the human mind of laws of nature, of the real world? Or was Engels wrong in saying so? (Anti-Dühring, S. 20-21, in par. III on 16 V. I. LENIN apriorism, and S. 103-04, in par. XI on freedom and neces- sity.)6 8. Does the lecturer know that Mach expressed his agree- ment with the head of the immanentist school, Schuppe, and even dedicated his last and chief philosophical work7 to him? How does the lecturer explain this adherence of Mach to the obviously idealist philosophy of Schuppe, a defender of clericalism and in general a downright reactionary in philosophy? 9. Why did the lecturer keep silent about “adventure” with his comrade of yesterday (according to the Studies), the Menshevik Yushkevich, who has today declared Bogdanov (following in the wake of Rakhmetov) an idealist?8 Is the lecturer aware that Petzoldt in his latest book has classed a number of Mach’s disciples among the idealists?9 10. Does the lecturer confirm the fact that Machism has nothing in common with Bolshevism? And that Lenin has repeatedly protested against Machism?10 And that the Mensheviks Yushkevich and Valentinov are “pure” empirio- criticists? MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM CRITICAL COMMENTS ON A REACTIONARY PHILOSOPHY11 Written in February-October 1908; Supplement to Chapter IV, Section I—in March 1909 Published according to the text Published in May 1909 in Moscow of the 1909 edition checked as a separate book by Zveno Publishers with the 1920 edition 19 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION A number of writers, would-be Marxists, have this year undertaken a veritable campaign against the philosophy of Marxism. In the course of less than half a year four books devoted mainly and almost exclusively to attacks on dia- lectical materialism have made their appearance. These include first and foremost Studies in (?—it should have said “against”) the Philosophy of Marxism (St.
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