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REGIME CHANGE in IRAN: a REASSESSMENT by Barry Rubin*

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REGIME CHANGE in IRAN: a REASSESSMENT by Barry Rubin* REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN: A REASSESSMENT By Barry Rubin* A quarter-century ago, Iran underwent a regime change, which became one of the main factors shaping the Middle East's subsequent history. What does this case study show us about regime changes in general and the nature of Iran's revolution itself? TWO REVOLUTIONS THAT MADE defeats in the last half-century, while not THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST attaining any of their major goals, should The politics and ideologies dominating be very persuasive arguments. That this has the region can best be seen as the product not happened is due to many factors, of two great regime-changing revolutions: though it can be most simply explained by Egypt in 1952 and Iran in 1979, the regimes' determination and clever respectively. Explicitly or implicitly, these strategy in maintaining the beliefs that major innovations were taken as exemplars justify their existence.(1) of the proper ideology and methodology What is undeniable, though, is that even for seizing and holding power. They were today, the overwhelming majority of not merely political revolutions but also Arabs--though, ironically, not necessarily represented comprehensive worldviews and most Iranians--still see the two frameworks paradigm shifts. represented by these past revolutions as the Now advocates of a third revolution very foundation of their political views and have appeared, though they are still far even of their personal self-image.(2) more prevalent in the United States than in Although the product of these two the Middle East. This third revolution revolutions--Arab nationalism and would be one which advocated as its main Islamism--can be seen as rival features: democracy, moderation, human interpretations, they also have a great deal rights and civil liberties, a more free in common. They seek to answer the same enterprise economy, friendship with the question, solve the same problem, and West, and peace with Israel, among other share the same goals. Their sense of right features. It is the model that has basically and wrong, friends and enemies, methods triumphed in most of the world, but and prescriptions, overlap far more than certainly not in the Middle East. The idea is they conflict. that Iraq would be a starting point and Both movements spawned by these two would then become a model whose success different revolutions attempted to answer would encourage others to follow in its the same basic question and provide the path. answer to it: Why were the Arabs, Iranians, One could argue that the failure of the and Muslims in general behind the West? two old revolutions in their own countries How could they catch up and surpass the would encourage--indeed, make inevitable- West? While the prescriptions were not -their abandonment as a model for other entirely the same, both rested on revolt, places. The fact that the Arab world and mobilization, and conflict with the West. Iran have suffered so many failures and 68 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) Regime Change in Iran: A Reassessment While both could be said to embrace governments was to produce an even more value-neutral technology, and Arab militant regime of precisely the same type. nationalism took the ideology of But a quarter-century later, while still nationalism from the West (as well as other enjoying support from the majority of techniques from the Communist states), Arabs, this system could be judged a both also rejected the basic path taken by failure. It had not gained political Western Europe and North America. A hegemony in the Arab world, united the path which includes embracing such Arabs, brought rapid economic concepts as democracy combined with free development, banished social problems, enterprise, an emphasis on moderation and expelled Western influence, or destroyed gradual reform, and a defense of the Israel. But what was the alternative? individual's rights against the state. Traditionalism and liberalism were In this process of surpassing the West, discredited, and Communism never really democratic rule and moderation in general caught on. were largely discredited as useful tools for During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Arabs or Muslims in pursuit of their Islamic movements were seen as socially dreams. Cooperation with the West and conservative, as pillars of the traditional with the existing political order was seen as order, which was largely true. Saudi Arabia illegitimate, though in practice often promoted Islam as a counter to leftist pursued. The proper goals of Arab politics movements; Egyptian President Anwar al- were seen as being the expulsion of Sadat backed it for a while in the 1970s for Western influence, the unity of all Arabs the same reason. (and of all Muslims for the later Islamists), Thus, Arab nationalism continued to be the destruction of Israel, mobilization of the dominant model--and still is today--but the masses from above, a statist and there was ample room for an alternative, socialist-style approach to economic which also expressed radical discontent, development, all under the aegis of a the demand for quick fixes, the possibility charismatic leader. of wide unity, a vision of utopian solutions, Of course, there were also important and the promise of total victory. But where differences between these two revolutions would that alternative arise? and their successors. What happened in Egypt in 1952 was a military coup in origin IRAN, THE MIDDLE EAST'S and it brought to the fore ideas such as: the SECOND FORMATIVE armed forces would be the vanguard in REVOLUTION transforming society, Pan-Arab Given the near-monopoly of Arab nationalism, the belief in a charismatic nationalist forces in the Arab world--along leader who would unite the Arabs and with the distaste for liberal democratic or bring them to victory, and a statist Marxist thought and the discrediting of economic system. This model took power Islamic orientations--the new political idea in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, while, at times, and its successful seizure of power had to threatening to do so in many other come from outside. Just as Russia was the countries. birthplace of both Marxist-Leninist For intellectuals, activists, and others, doctrine and the first Communist state, regime change meant to transform a coming from beyond a more industrialized traditional system into an Arab nationalist Western Europe where other types of one. And the goal of the oppositions in revolutions had already taken place, so too countries already ruled by such Iran became the source of the new revolutionary ethos by being outside the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 69 Barry Rubin mainstream ethnicity and the more countries and peoples should follow, "advanced" polities of its own region. Khomeini was extolling its unique mission In Iran, the regime to be displaced was and justifying anything that would further the "original" traditional one. The only its national interests. His Islamism also previous serious challenge had come from rejected foreign political or cultural a nationalist movement, that of Muhammad influences. Mossadegh, a quarter-century earlier. At the same time, Khomeini subsumed a While the Shah's victory over Mossadegh great deal of leftism's appeal by in 1953 is usually attributed to covert U.S. championing social justice and promising assistance, it should be noted, though, that to mobilize people against imperialism. the monarch also had the support of Islamic Moreover, he was in many ways a clerics, who saw the independent-minded traditionalist, championing the Persian prime minister as an enemy of the tradition language and the old way of life, rejecting they supported and especially distrusted his new or imported ways. And yet, the Communist allies. But militant nationalism revolution also offered its own path to had never really been a potent force in the modernization, using what were Iranian empire. And while a variety of supposedly "proper" Islamic routes to the underground leftist movements arose by goals of higher living standards and the 1970s, they were not capable of industrialization. overthrowing the regime either. In short, then, Khomeini succeeded in At the same time, though, it should not large part because, despite his stern be taken for granted that the radical insistence that his way was the only Islamists would inevitably have gained acceptable one and everything else was victory in Iran. In that country, as in Russia anti-Islamic heresy and treason, the in 1917, there was a wide spectrum of worldview and policies he proposed let different groups and ideologies active Iranians have their cake while eating it too. during the 1978 upheaval. These included While condemning the left, modernism, Marxists, Marxist-Islamists, Islamists of tradition, and nationalism, Iran's Islamic different orientations, Iranian nationalists, revolution claimed to give a blueprint to Kurdish nationalists, Azeri nationalists, and achieve equivalent ends. Of course, and liberal democrats. The triumph of this is a critical point, Khomeini was also Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (similar to ready to sacrifice any other consideration the triumph of Lenin) was in no small part for his rigid vision of an Islamic state. This due to his individual commitment, clear approach, along with serious repression ideology, ruthlessness, determination to and the unifying power of a manufactured seize state power, and refusal to confrontation with the United States and a compromise. life-and-death struggle with Iraq, sustained In a sense, it could also be said that the regime for many years. Khomeini's revolution encompassed nationalism even while rejecting it THE REGIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF explicitly. Radical Islamism was more IRAN'S REVOLUTION likely to unite the country's various ethnic For Khomeini and his followers, what communities than would an Iranian they were doing in Iran was not merely a nationalism, which could easily have revolution in one country but provided the turned into an ethnic Persian doctrine.
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