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The ocS iety for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
12-1977 Form and Content in Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes: Rhetoric, Philosophy, Inconsistency and Invalid Argument in some Greek Thinkers Arthur Adkinis University of Chicago
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Recommended Citation Adkinis, Arthur, "Form and Content in Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes: Rhetoric, Philosophy, Inconsistency and Invalid Argument in some Greek Thinkers" (1977). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 73. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/73
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Form and Content in Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes: Rhetoric, Philosophy, Inconsistency and Invalid Argument in some Greek Thinkers
Gorgias' Helen (B 11) and Palamedes (B 11a)1 are among the l ongest pieces of continuous prose included in Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. We have here a �are opportunity of considering h ow a writer who merits inclusion in Diels-Kranz develops an argument over a number of pages. Gorgias, it is true·, is a rhetorician; and though he has some claim to be regarded as a soph ist or-Presocratic :philosopher also (see especially BJ), rhetoric2 has evident ly much to contribute to the Helen and Palamedes. The extent of the contri bution is indeed the primary subject of the first part of my paper. I shall inquire whether Gorgias in the Helen indulges in rhetorical flourishes in which form takes precedence over content; whether on" the other hand Gorgias' general philosophical position supplies the content of this work and furnishes premisses from which conclusions axe drawn for Helen's benefit, the rhetoric furnishing no more than a pleasing mode of presentation; or whether a case is being argued, and language manipulated, ad hoc, the rhetoric substituting for logic a.�d valid argument. Gorgias himself terms the Helen a Eaignion (21): I shall briefly con sider the meaning of the word in the light of my discussion. I shall discuss the Palamedes in less detail, and consider whether the presuppositions of the .Helen and Palamec.es are inconsistent with one another. Subsequently, I shall raise the q.uestionwhether inconsistency is per � a mark of a rhetorician at this period, or whether similar inconsistencies may be found in other writers 'who are philosophically more respectable. I shall also consider to· what extent Gorgias' presuppositions, and inconsistencies, are shared with non--philosophical
Greeks in early Greece; and very bri�fl.y indicate some long-standing worries · of my own about the study o:f Presocratic philosophers. There is much of interest in the introduction to the Helen; but I have no space to discuss it here, and shall begin at (6), where Gorgias sets out four possible reasons or causes for Helen's going to Troy with Paris: she did what she did either (a) as a result of the wishes of Chance or the plans of the gods or the decrees of Necessity or (b) because she was carried off by force or (c) because she was persuaded by words (logoi) o·r ( d) because she was smitten with love. We might perhaps provisionally grant that Gorgias had furnished a full list of possible reasons or causes (but see below),J and e.. 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Now. l o does not stand as the sub ct of a rans when s je t itive verb; and it doe so again in (12) Gorgias n e e s 'compelled.' The feels himself able to i t rpr t 'per uaded ' as r o de wo d- r r and syntax of the sentence translated above are a step on the way. Logoi are persu posi i the agency of asion; but they appear merely in a pre t o nal ph se perceive the is esse ; but is o ra . To logoi nt ial there n word for perception. 'Other people's p s c osely pa al el e with 'its own ragmata and bodies' i l r l d pathema', if he as t pragmata and bo dies directly caused the pathema.7 The causality of o s is the h e rg ca u , l go t em of Go ias' paragraph; but he is moving ut io sly step by step, the point he feels and i to where able to assert it; init ally that a pragma should a e relev i di c s cause pathema, in th ant sense of pathema ( wh ch I shall s us in a mo e t) seems o e kel forth m n prima facie m r li y -- without argument; and none is co ing -- than that a sh (I shall gue ere is a similar device m logos ould. · ar that th in (12).) eto c Rh ri al sleight of hand is most apparent here; but is philosophy also pres s, c g, h e ent? Is Gorgia by using pas hein in (7) of physical sufferin er of 8 the psuche, giving 'to this subjective emotion an objective, physical reality?' hav I e no doubt that Gorgias did not clearly distinguish the material from the suspect o so, non-material: I Pl at to have been the first to do so. That being the objective physical reality is likely to have been assumed unchallenged. What is more m t rg s ' to re r s t · i p ortan for G o ia case is p e en the events as a causal. sequenc·e. For h s purpose he o ri t i employs the range f usage of aschein, pathema. Paschein may s y e us d of h 20; and mean impl 'happ n to, ' as when e t e Nile in Hdt. 2. at least in i y c n sl ghtl later Greek nathema may mean 'emotion, affe tio ' when used with psuche 3 r ( Xen. Cyr. .1.17) or even of the experience of the nsuche in exe cising 12hronesis ( a 79d), which an not p s e th and Xenop o Pl to Phd. is not emotion and as iv . In e Plato h n cited, pathema makes no philosophical point; but of course Gorgias chooses paschein v and pathema for the passi ity implied. But the argument seems to me to be based o c r not n a coherent philosophi al position but on a rheto ical transference of paschein from s my by one context to another. I hall argue in favor of view pointing out that such e . transferences are characteristic of the design of the H len c Gorgias then ( 10) turns to another type of logos. Inspired ( entheoi) in an ta tions through the medium of· logoi induce pleasure, banish pain; for the power ( dunamis, cf. dunastes and dunatai ) of the incantation consorting with the opinion the (p c ) ( ) of mind s u he charms thelgein it, persuades ( 'Peithein) it and changes r . (methistanai) it by witchc aft Once again the presence of deity is alluded to ( e , in them': cf. gum ntheoi 'with gods Ar ent 1), and power is set in the foreground. But is the 'for' clause a philosophical explanation of what precedes? S urely not, in th e sense of an explanation drawing on a coherent theory: 'the dunamis of the incan consorting•• • • really tation can be read only as a metaphor. It explains nothing; but it does make 'power' the subject of the three transitive verbs. This a ro r than· uathema ••. 'P t ( 9). h is st nge expression e a hm in W at Gorgias really offers a p a d by an is verbal 'slide, ' in which one word is re l ce alleged synonym which in ac has f t different implications. Thelgein, 'charm,' is the appropriate term . with d c incantations an other magi acts. It has associations of binding with spells against the will: Circe in Odyssey 10 ( 291, 318, J26) could have thelge_i,g Odysseus with her magic arts and turned him into an animal had he not had a protective herb. or a g G gi s then writes peithein, implyin -- without proof -- that thelgein, when r used to instil pleasure and banish pain, is pe suasion. He evidently hopes that ' ' , persuasion will be endowed with all the associations of thelgein though the g a examples of thelgein iven are solely of imparting pleasure and removing p in. .;.. Gorgias needs to show that persuasion not merely can impart emotions will y nilly, . but that the emotions will issue in action willy-nilly; .and he has really demon l i i . strated neither, even for the gein and certainly not for pe the n Gorgias then ' ' uses methistanai, 'change.' In a weak sense of change the move is harmless, since presumably all data, if they are to be perceived by the mind, must produce some -4- changes therein; but Gorgias needs a strong sense of 'change' -- 'producing nec essary changes in the psuche which necessarily issue in act�on.' He has offered no proof that such a sense of 'change' is appropriate; he has merely contrived by skilful use of language to suggest that it is. Once again we have a trico+on, •• • s : thelgein •••neithein methi tanai a rhetorical device frequently resorted to for emphasis, rhetorical fullness or other stylistic reasons. Its stylistic function might well help to conceal that it is here used also for sleight of hand in the content of the argument. In (11) Gorgias makes the p oint that if everyone had knowledge of past, pre sent and future, the effect of logos would not be the same. But as it is, most people in most circumstances have to resort to opinion as counsellor. 'And opin ion, which is hazardous and unreliable, involves those who employ it in successes which are hazardous and unreliable.' Is there here allusion to a d octrine, like the Socratic, that no-one goes against knowled.ge? It seems not. Gorgias is making the common-sense point that if all the facts, including the future, were known, people would act differently: presumably Helen would have acted differently had she known the outcome of the Trojan War. The argument is a digression, and it does not help Gorgias' case. Not all opinions result from persuasion; to 'make a mistake' which is a moral error is not normally regarded as excusable in Greek; and Gorgias offers no reasons for a different evaluation. Furthermore, (11) im plies that there are actions which are not the effects of external causes; which reveals other flaws in the alleged comprehensiveness of his defense. I shall return to this point later.9 The opening words of (12), which are hopelessly corrupt, might have contain ed some attempt to show the relevance of (11); but none of the proposed emenda tions has this effect, or even uses the term 'opinion.' Gorgias returns to the argument of (10), according to the emendations, at the beginning of (12); and visibly does so in the transmitted text at the end of (12): 'for logos which -per suaded her -osuche cr)m:pelled (anankazein) the -psuche whfoh it persuaded to agree with (peithesthai ) what was said and to acquiesce in what was done. The one who persuaded committed an injustice in using compulsion, whereas the one who was persuaded, inasmuch as she was compelled by logos, is wrongly blamed.' Gorgias now finds himself able to say that logos persuaded the psuche and to slide immedi ately to 'compelled.' The form of words is more explicit than in (9): Gorgias advances one step at a time. Gorgias' hearers may find it easier to accept that logos compelled Helen's psuche than that logos compelled Helen, since both logos and psuche are 'psychic'; though he has of course justified neither. He now uses the fact that logos is masculine, psuche feminine. He writes ho � � neisas, 'the one who persuaded,' which might refer either to Paris or to the logos, while he peistheisa, 'the one who was persuaded,' might refer either to Helen or to her psuche. Since it is not Helen's psuche, but Helen, that is being blamed, the hearer is likely to interpret the seco nd participle as referring to Helen, the first to Paris, with the result that it is suggested that Helen was compelled by Paris using logos as an instrument: a proposition nrima facie even less easy to accept than that her psuche was compelled by logos. There is verbal dexterity also in peithesthai. Since it is the passive of neithein, if A peithei B, B peithetai; but the range of usage of peithesthai with the dative spans 'be persuaded, obey, trust in': the word may suggest that logos compelled Helen not merely to be persuaded but to trust in and obey what was said. Once again, I see skilful rhetoric here, but little philosophical theory. In (13) Gorgias speaks of persuasion added to logos 'moulding (tunousthai) the mind as it wishes': the strongest statement yet, and one totally unproved as yet. He adduces as evidence here the arguments of the cosmologists which can take away one opinion and implant (energazesthai) another; forensic arguments,10 in which one argument delights and persuades a crowd not because its statements are true but because it is composed with skill; and philosophical debates, in which quickness of wit can be seen readily making (poiein) opinion easily changed !� -5- ( eumetabolon}. I. see no philosophical theory here; and the evidence falls far short of proving Gorgias' point. He adduces examples of persuasion: he needs to argue that all instances of persuasion are instances of necessary, compulsory persuasion, that 'you were persuaded by that argument, but you need not have been/ the argument is not persuasive' is nonsense. (cf. Aristotle's remarks in EN 1110 a 29, which are relevant to Arguments 3 and 4 of the Helen.) There is less rhetori cal skill here: energazesthai (also in (8)) and noiein do not compare with some earlier rhetorical effects. Possibly, however, the statement that the cosmologists ' cause (12oiein) what is incredible and obscure to a:ppear before the eyes of doxa' points forward to the fourth argument. 'The eyes of doxa' is a much more unusual expression in Greek than is ' the mind's eye' in English, and presumably was chosen with some purpose. In the light of the fourth argument Gorgias could have elabor ated the phrase into an assertion that speech presents to the mind images over which we have no more control than over the manner in which what we see presents itself to us. There is no more than a hint here, but it may prepare for {15 ff.). As we have seen, Gorgias is advancing step by step. In (14) an analogy is drawn between the effects of logos and those of pharmaka, 'drugs.'· Different pharmaka drive out different humors from the body: some cure, some kill. Similarly, some logoi cause grief, some joy, some fear, some boldness, while others ' through some harmful persuasion "drug" ( l)h_armakeuein) and bewit ,�h (goeteuein) the mind.' Once again, Gorgias is trying to equate peithein with a causal sequence, for the effect of a drug does not depend on the patient's choice: cure or death follows irrespective of the patient's wish. Is there a philosophical theory here? I see none. Gorgias draws an analogy between the effects of logoi on the 'PSUche and drugs on the body, and in justification simply says 'for drugs have effects .a, b1 c etc ., while logoi have effects k, 1, m, etc.' . No proof is offered that the effects are produced in any analogous way: this is a mere petitio ')Jrincipii. Any conviction must be produced by rhetoric, by skilled choice of words. Gorgias' word-order in discussing the effects of logo s may be intended to help his case . The first two examples, grief and joy, do not suggest specific types of action; the second pair, however, fear and boldness, dispose the mind towards types of action: retreat and advance. (Gorgias has not attempted to prove that the· emotions cause the relevant actions. He might have used the arguments of 15 ff.: once again he may be advancing step by step.) He concludes with the exarrrple of persuasion ( aft er using pleasure and pain as earlier examples, as in 10), and reintroduces a word from (10), 'bewitched,' where he h(),s already argued for a causal sequence. The use of pharmakeuein together with 'bewitched' is rhetorically skilful. The word takes up ;pharmaka earlier in (1.4). Now :E_harmaka may denote both what we should distinguish as medicinal drugs and magical means of affecting others.11 (Being unaware how either worked, the Greeks did not distinguish clearly at this period between natural and supernatural causation.) Pharmaka in (14), closely associated with 'humors' (chumos), a scientific terrn,12 predominantly suggests scientific medicine; but pharmakeuein, which has the same range as J2!!armaka, when brought into association with both go et euein and the earlier use of J2harmaka, readily calls to mind the full range of usage, and binds together the argument of ( 14) with that of ( 10) , where, Gorgias hopes, a causal sequence has already been conceded. The rhetoric is skil ful; of philosophical theory, or of valid philosophical argument, there is none. We may note once again the use of a term (goeteuein) to cross-refer to an earlier part of the speech in order to suggest the existence of an argument: it seems to be a Gorgianic device. Gorgias sums up his third argument by claiming to have proved that if Helen was persuaded by logos, she did not do wrong but was tmfortun- ate (atuchein). She was not the agent but the patient. . . Argument 4. The fourth argument, designed to exonerate Helen if it was love that 'did' all this, takes a similar line. (Note the immediate ascription of agency, prattein, to love: Gorgias' confidence is increasing.) What we see does not have. the nature we wish it to have, but whatever it chances to ha�e ; and through sight q;* 4Ș B ` Ș ; áŕ3&Ș 2 $,; 3Ș Ș ô/"QƑ³Ș Ç vȘ 9zf &Ș I1 'ư RȘ Ș ƿ H(*AȘ <&Ș SÁ SÁ J ºnÁ _nvÁ (vn@`xnÁ u Ș X6Ș ǘ" Ɛ; Ș vÁ 7 Ș v>5nÁ BnÁ ĦȘ Ș _ǁȘ IO!Ș "Ș >ĭȘ : #Ș Á ,#Á Ò Ș '5 ĪȘ ? 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What is said about sight is evidently comnatible with the view ascribed to Gorgias by Plato (Meno 76 A ff.) that color is an effluence from objects, fitting the passages(:)f"the eyes, since it assert s a flow from obj ects . into the perceiver; but the argument of (1.5)ff. rests on observable h'l.Illlan behavior, would be compatible with many theories of perception, and woulcl be rendered no more valid by any theory that stopped short, as Gorgias' does, of claiming more than that certain results 'of'ten' follow. There is curious Greek· here: it seems strange to say that ' sight is throvm into confusion and confuses,' that it 'engraves images in the mind' and that Helen's eye was pleased and then caused effects in her psuche. There may be a philosophical theory; but it is worth observing that similar phrases occur in tragedy . Opsis, here translated ' sight , ' is a word whose range spans ' sight , appearance, face, eyes. ' The connota tion of the word perhaps renders it easier to write that opsis is thrown into con fusion, disturbed, by terror. Similarly , Ele:ctra says to Orestes that his �· ('eye, face , etc.' ) is thrown into confusion ( tarattein ) , when Orestes' experiences have driven him mad (Eur. Orest. 253). Hades in Aesch. Eum. 27.5 is said to watch over everything �c.\.r'-'lf"q'"'i' 4·(-'i:i.1{:J 'with.a mind that records on tablets.• A;;::nn, the Guard in Soph. Ant. 317 asks 'Are you pained in your ears or in your �uche?' The idea is used somewhat differently; but the distinction drawn between effects . in ears and psuche is comprehensible in the absence of any philosophi cal theory,13 (The date of Antigone makes it impossible to suppose the line affected by Gorgias' famous visit to Athens. ) There might be a philosophical theory here nonetheless; after all, metaphor is sometimes a source for philsophical theory, and I shall argui below that there are precedents for some of Gorgias' causal expressions in earlier Greek . It remains true, however, that the the ory does not materially assist the argument , which rests sha!dly on empirical observation -- extrapolated -- and rhetorical sleight of hand. It is worth noting that Gorgias ' four arguments do not exclude all possibility of condemning Helen. In 11 the possibillty of. moral error arising out of mistake about one's best i.nterests was mentioned, though not ·very clearly; and now in 19 we have mention of 'the plans of intellect' and 'the devices of art' as possible sources of action which are not relevant to Helen's case. ( Gorgias does not ex plain why they are not relevant ; and this is of course a serious flaw in his argu ment. ) If my analysis is correct, Gorgias is throughout manipulating language with great rhetorical skill to prove a case ad hoc. He is not setting out a philosophi cal theory held on other grounds, and drawing from it conclusions which serve to acquit Helen . (Nor is he indulging in rhetorical flourishes for the:i.r own sake: language is manipulated in a very purposeful manner . ) Gorgias' concern is to acquit Helen, and he draws on all his resources of ingenuity to construct a case for so doing. In (8) ff. and (15) ff. he begins from empirical observation , drawing from it conclusions which go far beyond what is j ustified, but demand no coherent theory, and invoke none. The motive power of the arguments is verbal dexterity sustained over the whole work: I have noted the manner in which Go rgias uses words and phrases to allude and cross-refer from one argument to another in order to support one point -- not by argument, but by verbal association -- with a point he claims to have proved, or is going to 'prove' later. ( Note how he carefully sets the two less controversial defences f irst, and reverses the order (20) when all are 'proved,' so that the more difficult proofs may be thrust into the foreground. ) The argu- . ments of the Helen can be understood without reference to a philosophical theory. That they would be valid only if a particular type of ph ilosophical theory were held does not prove that Gorgia� held such a theory. 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On the basis of the arguments of the Helen one could draw from the fact that the army did not run away qn a particular occasion the conclusion that the visual (or in different ci rc umsta nces, verbal or aural gener ally) stimulu s was insufficient to cause fl igh t, and one might add ' to an army of persons so discipl ined and with such a characte r; ' but one could only argue thus after the event, for one could not forecast the effects of a visual/aural presenta tion which in all its indiv id ual details could never have occurred before. Accord ingly, the arguments of Hele n (16) would rende r it impossible for Palamedes to arg ue , as he does, 'because I have such and s uch a character, I did not behave in such and ' such a manner. If the arguments of the Hel en are pressed as Gorgias needs to press them to a chieve the goal of his reasoning in that s pee ch, the position of the Helen is seen to be in compatible with that of the Palamedes. We may be tempted to conclude that s uch d is crepancies are a mark of the paignion, interpreted as a work la ckin g in seriousness : Gorgias, we may s uppose, simpl y makes whatev�r assu mpt ion s he needs for the argument in hand. The meani ng of paignion has been much discussed: it has been comp ared with lu sus in Catullus and pa ignia in Philetas, to indicate that works so termed may have been serio usly and carefully composed. 1 5 There is of course a difference between poetry and phi losophical argu ment: one m ight work long and seriously at a poem on a frivolous topi c and produce an excellent poem; but se ri ous work on the prod uct io n of clever but invalid argu ments will be differ�iltly evaluated. Gorgias' seriousness about his skill as a rhetoricia n cannot be doubted ; but, as indeed contin uing schola rl y debate on the subject would sugges t, I doubt wheth er it can be conclusively demonstrated whe ther or not Gorgias believed his arguments in the Helen to be valid. He may have done so, for these are the early days of logic and philosophy ; or if he knew that there was something wrong with the arguments, he ma y not have known what it was. He is ce rt ain 1 ly not the onl y Presocratic to arg ue for ext reme conclusions. 6 What can be demon s trated , however, is that similar discrepanc ies occur, in different kinds of work in which there is no quas tion of deliberate rhetorical trickery; and to this I now turn my attent ion . For even if the Helen and Palamedes are rhetorical and contain di s crepancies, it does not necessarily foll ow that their bei ng rhetorical is a sufficient explana tion for the discrepancies. A rh etori ci an cannot take any presuppositions he choose s : they m ust ap pear plausible to those whom he is trying to convince. Now though his arguments about logos and visual data may be novel, Gorgias was not the first Greek to tra ce action back to causes outside the agent. Action is frequently so character ized in Homer; and similar l ang uage appears in fifth- centu ry writers. In a famous and much - di scuss ed passage, Iliad 1 9.85 ff.,17 Ag amemnon, having discovered the disastrous effects of offending Achilles, says: 'Often indeed did the Greeks tell me this, and abused me. But I am not aitios of this. No; Ze us and moira and the Fury who walks in garkne ss are the cause; for t hey put fierce blindness, ate, i nto my min d in the assembly when I mysei f dep rived Achilles o f h is p ri ze. But what could I do? The god brings all th ing s to pass.' Again , one may yi eld to one's thumos; in _!_liad 9.109 Agamemnon ' s behavior in slighting Achilles is thus ex plained. l{ere -- and numero us examples could be cited -- we have ascri ptio ns of cause very similar to those of Gorg ias ' Helen; and Agamemnon ev�n says that he is not aiti os. If Go rgias ' Helen can be so cha rac te rized, she is f ree d from blame (6). Occasionally, similar moves are ma de in Homer. In Iliad 3.164 f., Priam ex cuses Helen from responsibility for the war, saying 'You are not aitie; in my eyes the god s are aitioi, who have stirred up against me the woeful wa r with the Greek s . ' But this attitude to divine causa tion is unusual, in Homer and later. Indeed , Ze us' com plaint, Od ys sey 1.32 ff. (which is not really required by the situation in the poem at this p oint) , that the accusations me n bring against the gods are unjustified since ma nkind b ring woes upon themselves hu er m oro n, seems �es� gned as a r�� ec� ion of the �ind of vie':' . t expressed by Pri&�; 8 and set where it is at the beg inning of the first book, it i s given great prominence and see ms progra mmatic . In Ilia d 19, Agamemnon does not expect to be excused for what he has done: he offers re compense to Achille s, and -10- 'I indeed follows his statement that three deiti�s were aitioi with myself (autos) ' deprived Achilles .•• Autos is very emphatic, and expresses Agamemnon's agency very strongly. In the fifth century it remains unusual to excuse behavior on the grounds that it was .caused by deity. There are two recorded instances of Delphi excusing human agents for actions which, the oracle reveals, the gods have caused themselves (the priestess Timo and Evenius, Hdt. 6.135 and 9.93); but the conclusion that, if a god caused the action, the human being is not responsible for it, is not usually drawn. Aeschylus in Agam. 1468 ff. displays a sensitivity· to problems of divine causation and human responsibility which is not apparent in his earlier plays.19 In the Agamemnon the chorus speaks of the daimon that has fallen on the accursed house. The form of expression is common enough; but Clytemnestra unusually tries to employ it to disclaim responsibility. Later the chorus speaks of Agamemnon as 'srnitten • ..by a two-edged weapon wielded by the hand of a wife.' Clytemnestra realises that such language ascribes responsibility to her as agent. She denies responsibility, claiming that the Alaster, the avenging spirit of the accursed house, took her shape and killed Agamemnon. The chorus rejects the defence: 'Who will bear witness that you are anaitios of this murder? Yet the avenging spirit sprung from a father's crime might be a sharer in the deed.' Even in the extreme case of the accursed house of Greek tragedy, th� accursed may not appeal to the language of divine causation in order to plead that they are not to be held responsible for their actions. The Alastor may be a contributory cause; but, to quote what I have written elsewhere, 'while some may be predisposed to do evil by supernatural agency, none are so predestined.' Clytemnestra had a choice. The gods caused Agamemnon to slight Achilles by sending ate upon him (Iliad 9.115 f., 19.136 f., etc.); and ate is frequently cited in later Greek as influenc ing action for the worse. Usually, the ascription to ate furnishes no excuse; and Dodds seems to be correct in·supposing that it serves primarily to distance the agent psychologically from the act.20 Agamemnon feels that had not 'something' prevented it, he would have acted sensibly, with a proper calculation of advantages. Clytemnestra, in a psychological revulsion from what she has done for the scene is psychologically sound; it is not merely a philosophical debate -- feels that she would not 'herself' have done what has been done. In earlier Greek, accordingly, it was not uncommon to ascribe the source of actions, particularly -- but not solely -- actions whose consequences had been, or might be, disastrous, to causes outside the agent, or external to the agent's ego, usually identified with the practical intelligence. That the agent would other wise have behaved 'sensibly' is a tacit assumption of this belief: there is no implied general determinism of action. Now Gorgias' Palamedes is denying that he has done anything wrong; he claims to have acted with the prudence and common sense that would ensure that he would not commit. treachery in the circumstances. Helen has pe�formed, or been involved in, an important action with disastrous consequences; and Gorgias has furnished her with a choice .of chains of causation beginning outside the agent. In this respect the difference between the analysis of Helen's situation and that of Palamedes is traditional. I have noted that even in the Helen it is conceded -- or seems to be conceded; but see below -- that not all actions are externally caused, that there is no asser tion of a universal determinism of action; and this too i.s traditional. Gorgias departs from the mainstream of Greek tradition partly by the rhetorical ingenuity with which he argues for and elaborates his causal chains , but more importantly by his insistence that the causal chains furnish grounds for exonerating Helen from blame. It is at this point that the contradictions between the Helen and the Palamedes become apparent. So long as the causal explanation furnished psychologi- . cal relief, but not an excuse, it was not important to determine criteria for the class of actions to which the causal explanation was relev·ant: as we have seen, ... -11- Agamemnon in the Iliad can cite three deities-as external causes, and say emphati cally that he himself did the deed, all within the space of a few lines. In these circumstances it is comparatively unimportant whether or not the causal explana tion is invoked in any particular case. Gorgias, however, in the Helen has furnish ed causal explanations which are intended to excuse , and which could be applied, so far as I can see, to any misdeed whatever. Gorgias may allude to miscalculations of interest, to the plans of intellect and the devices of art; but one can always say of any action 'I did this because ... '; and if the agent wished to obtain or avoid something (as presumably he did) then at least Argument 4 will be available to excuse him. Furthermore, good actions have motives too: Argument 4 could furnish a causal explanation for all actions which do not fall under Arguments 1, 2 or 3. A universal determinism of action could easily be 'generated from what is said in the Helen; and such a determinism is not consistent with the Palamedes. Gorgias may have failed to realise all the implications of his arguments in the Helen: he is arguing a case for one important action of one important person, and does not overtly generalise his findings. He does not say explicitly -- and it would have been shocking to Greek sentiment -- that armies which run away are not to be held responsible for their, actions. Further, since Paris was presumably under the influence of eros in his behavior towards Helen he should, under the terms of Argument 4, be absolved from blame; but Gorgias does not wish to draw this con clusion (7, 12). I conclude that Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes owe much more to rhetoric than to philosophy , but also that each draws on certain assumptions about behavior and causation which date back at least as far as Homer. Gorgias was not taking up different.positions in different speeches with conscious sophistry, but in each case elaborating positions which would have been familiar to the Greeks of his day. Nor is it impossible for an acknowledged philosopher to hold that wrongdoing is involuntary, right-doing voluntary. Aristotle _1.rgues against the position (EN 1110b9 ff.), defining action done under compulsion as action whose first cause-. ( ct lies outside the agent 4 J.:ri.1 ��""fYc."1 ) . The definition seems unexception able; but Aristotle is aware that it might be argued that actions performed to ob tain what is pleasant or kalon are involuntary, since these objects are outside the agent and exert force to compel him (anankazein, cf. Helen _(17) with cross reference to (12)). Aristotle replies that such a theory renders all action in voluntary, since the desire for what is pleasant or kalon actuatesall men in all their actions; and no-one, ·Aristotle is confident, would accept any theory which had such consequences. (Gorgias, as I said above, seems not to have realised all the possible consequences of his arguments in .the Helen; and I see no reason to suppose that he would have welcomed them.) Aristotle adds a further point: actions done in pursuit of the pleasant or kalon are pleasant, and so cannot be done under compulsion; and be observes that it would be absurd to take the credit for noble actions performed in pursuit of the kalon or pleasant while disclaiming responsibi lity for bad actions performed for the same motives. Aristotle's own view is that actions done under compulsion are not simply those whose first cause lies outside the agent; the person compelled must have contributed nothing at all; and he holds that being persuaded, or moved to action by desire for the kalon or pleasant, are elements of action over which the agent exercises some control. Argument 2 of the Helen (force majeure) remains valid, as possibly does Argument 1 in some circumstances;21 but the practical wisdom of the Palamedes is restored to Arguments 3 and 4 of the Helen, thereby breaking the chain of causation. A little later (EN 1111 a 24 ff.) Aristotle considers the internal, non-rational springs of action: thumos and epithumia. If actions performed under their constraint are involuntary, then no child or animal will ever act voluntarily. Once again, Aristotle is confident that no one would accept a theory with such consequences. He · then points out that both good and bad actions may be prompted by thumos or epithumia; and it would be absurd to claim credit for good actions, .but excuse oneself for bad . ' -12- He ones, when the ascribed cause of each group of actions is the same. concludes (EN 1111 b 1 ff.): 'It seems that the irrational passions are not less human than reason is. Accordingly, actions which result from thumos or epithumia are the man's actions too.... It is absurd, then, to suppose that these are involuntary.' 1110 9 The arguments, particu�arly those of b ff., could have Gorgias for their 4. target: they are especially relevant to Argument However, Gorgias cannot be the sole target. More prominent thinkers than he had held that no-one is voluntarily kakos without.also maintaining that no-one is voluntarily agathos, notably Socrates and Plato.22 The Socratic position could be regarded as a m ore enlightened version of Helen (11): if we were not ignorant of our best interests in the full sense of the phrase, we should act differently. My concern here is not to discuss the Socratic 11 position as such, merely to show that discrepancies of the kind found in Gorgias and lla are not confined to rhetors and sophists; and for that purpose a brief dis cussion of the rather different account of 'no-one is voluntarily kakos' which appears in the Timaeus will be suitable. Timaeus treats the basic stuff of the cosmos as being triangles, a shape from which may be constructed every plane figure and thence every solid. Earth, air, fire and water differ because they are constituted of dif ferent geometric shapes. God made h�man marrow from primary triangles of the high est quality, and bound human psuche into it. He divided the marrow between the head and the spinal column, the head receiving the divine seed of reason, the other parts of the psuche being bound into the spinal column. A psuche so bound to its body may be affected by it, and some of Timaeus' words (e.g. 86 B) would suggest that psuche ., ; is under the control of body. There exist diseases of the psuche which result.from the condition of the body. Madness in the familiar sense of the term is included; and this is uncontroversially involuntary. But the greatest diseases of the psuche are pleasures and pains in excess. The abundant flow of one substance', resulting from the open texture of the bones, is the cause of sexual excess; while bad temper, rashness, cowardice, forgetfulness and stupidity -- all1diseases1 of the psuche -- are ascribed to the presence of acid and salty phlegms and bitter and bilious humors, which wander through the body (86 E) and 'find no exit but are pent within the body and blend their vapor with the movement of the psuche and cause all manner of diseases to the psuche.' It is wrong, says Timaeus, to reproach anyone in any of these con ditions as if he were voluntarily bad: no-one is voluntarily kakos (86 D-E). The kakos is so as a result of the unskilled nurtureof his body, and the condition is universally detested by its possessors, and occurs against their will. Nowhere else in Plato do we find an explanation of human behavior in such mechan istic terms. One might expect to find an explanation of arete in similar terms, for the p�uche seems entangled in a nexus of causes over which it has no control. But consider the following (87 B): 'Furthermore, when men are in such an evil condition (kakos), and the political constitutions are kakai and speech in the cities, both in private and in public, is kakos, and when lessons which would cure these conditions are nowhere learnt from childhood, as a result of this those of us who are kakoi become kakoi on account of two altogether involuntary causes. We must always regard the parents as responsible for the situation rather than the children and the nurses rather than those in their care; yet each of us must endeavor, so far as in him lies, to flee kakia and pursue the opposite by means of his motive, practices and studies. 1· The Timaeus is a work of philosophy, not composed by a sophist or a rhetor. The speech of Timaeus is presumably to be. taken seriously, even if the account is only 'probable' (440, etc.). Yet the speaker does not consider the possibility -- indeed, the necessity, in terms of the account of kakia given above -- that the bad parents and nurses are involuntarily bad, but is prepared to find fault with them; just as Gorgias does not consider that his causal explanations for Helen's behavior, partic ularly in Argument 4, could be used to excuse Paris too. Again, despite the far reaching explanation of temperaments and behavior in mechanistic terms, Plato adjures adults to flee kakia by their own endeavors. 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