The Escalating Conflict with Hezbollah in Syria

Home , Ali Musa Daqduq, Baqir Brigade, Battle of Arsal (2014), Karrar (tank), Toophan

JULY 2017 CSIS BRIEFS

By Seth G. Jones and Maxwell B. Markusen JUNE 2018 THE ISSUE Hezbollah and Iran have accumulated a substantial amount of weapons and fighters in Syria that pose a threat to the United States and its allies in the region. In response, Israel has conducted a growing number of strikes against Iranian, Hezbollah and other targets in Syria. An escalating war has the potential to cause significant economic damage, lead to high numbers of civilian casualties and internally displaced persons, and involve more countries in the region than did the 2006 Lebanon War. The stakes are high, making it critical for Washington to help prevent such an escalation.

ver the past several years, Hezbollah has Hezbollah, Iranian, and Syrian targets in Syria. What is new, amassed significant capabilities in Syria however, is Israel’s decision to step up attacks to deter Iran with the help of its close ally, Iran, and and Hezbollah from future expansion in Syria—and perhaps to today poses a growing asymmetric threat deter Syria from allowing Iran and Hezbollah to undertake this to the United States, Israel, Jordan, and expansion. “I know one thing for certain,” said Israeli Defense other countries in the region. Hezbollah Minister Avigdor Lieberman recently. “We will not allow the forces in Syria have improved their Iranians to base themselves in Syria and there will be a price Ooperational and tactical combat skills, trained and equipped for that. We have no other choice. To agree to an Iranian thousands of militants as part of its growing network of Shi’a presence in Syria, it’s agreeing to the fact that the Iranians militias, and stockpiled an impressive arsenal of standoff will put a noose around your neck.”1 Israel has conducted weapons like Fateh-110/M-600 guided missiles, Karrar over 100 strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian targets in Syria unmanned armed drones, Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 short-range since the beginning of the Syrian war.2 Of the Israeli airstrikes ballistic missiles, Toophan anti-tank missiles, and possibly analyzed by CSIS, over two-thirds were against missile-related chemical weapons. In addition, much of Hezbollah’s arms targets.3 Hezbollah’s deepening involvement in Lebanese and are shipped through, or potentially manufactured in, Syria— regional politics, including the expansion of seats in Lebanon’s making the country a critical transit hub. Hezbollah is perhaps Parliament by Hezbollah and its political allies in the May the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable terrorist 2018 elections, suggest that a future war involving Israel, organization in the world, and these developments have Hezbollah, and even Iranian forces could be more violent and raised the prospects of a wider conflict in the Middle East. expansive than the 2006 Lebanon War. Israeli leaders are already on a war footing because of the These recent developments raise several questions. What are actions of Hezbollah and its ally, Iran. For the past several Hezbollah and Iranian long-term goals in Syria? What are years, Israel has regularly conducted attacks against Hezbollah’s capabilities, how have these capabilities been

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east INTERNATIONAL STUDIES program CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1 transformed, and what threat does Hezbollah pose? Finally, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah what are the implications for the United States and its allies? To answer these questions, this CSIS Brief compiles a range remarked, “I will tell you that if the of data—including new information—about the location whole world comes together to force of Hezbollah, Iranian, and allied militias in Syria; Israeli airstrikes in Syria; and satellite imagery of military bases us to leave Syria, they will not be able and other targets. The brief is organized into four sections. to evict us.” The first analyzes Hezbollah and Iran’s political and military objectives in Syria. The second section assesses Hezbollah’s the IRGC responsible for extraterritorial operations, has been capabilities and actions. The third examines the broader critical in organizing these militias. strategic threat from Hezbollah. And the fourth section outlines potential challenges and opportunities for the Hezbollah retains a close relationship with Iran, though it United States and its allies. In addition, an appendix provides operates as its own political-military organization. Hezbollah’s examples of Hezbollah weapons and systems in Syria. objectives in Syria can be divided into two broad categories: political and military. HEZBOLLAH AND IRANIAN GOALS IN SYRIA Political goals: Hezbollah’s political objectives in Syria Hezbollah’s objectives in Syria are closely tied to Tehran’s include ensuring the survival of the Assad regime; broader national security goals. Since Hezbollah’s creation, protecting—and expanding—Hezbollah’s political power Iran has played a significant role in training, supplying, and influence; balancing against Israel and the United and funding the group. Iranian leaders seek to expand their States; stemming the spread of Sunni Salafi-jihadist and security, economic, cultural, and religious interests regionally, other “takfiri” groups; and defending Shi’a communities.8 4 and to ensure the survival of the regime domestically. The As Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned, “Should 1979 revolution—and the global reaction to the revolution— Syria fall into the hands of the Americans, the Israelis, significantly impacted the views and politics of Supreme the takfiri groups and America’s representatives in Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini. Iranian leaders seek to expand the region which call themselves regional states, the Iran’s network of influence through regional allies and buffer resistance will be besieged and Israel would reenter 5 zones, including through Hezbollah. Lebanon, impose its conditions on Lebanon, and renew its greed and projects in it.”9 The overthrow of Israel has conducted over 100 the Assad regime by Sunni rebels or countries like the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel would pose a strikes against Hezbollah and severe threat to Hezbollah and could lead to Hezbollah’s Iranian targets in Syria since the encirclement in Lebanon. Consequently, Hezbollah leaders remain committed to operations in Syria as long beginning of the Syrian war. as Bashar al-Assad wants them there. In June 2018, Hassan Nasrallah remarked, “I will tell you that if the Since the Syrian war began in 2011, Iran has provided an whole world comes together to force us to leave Syria, unprecedented level of political, financial, cyber, and military they will not be able to evict us,” and continued on support to the Syrian government to prevent the overthrow to state that Hezbollah would only leave Syria “when of the Assad regime and to balance against Iran’s main the Syrian authorities demand it.”10 Hezbollah’s broad adversaries, including the United States, Israel, and Saudi political goals have long been to protect Shi’a Islam and Arabia. Tehran has deployed as many as 2,500 soldiers on spread Shi’a activism, particularly in Lebanon, and to the ground—from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) balance against—and eventually to destroy—Israel.11 operatives to regular Iranian forces—and utilizes locations Hezbollah has orchestrated a sophisticated information like Tiyas air field (or T-4) in Homs, Al-Shayrat airfield in campaign in Syria to support its political and military 6 Homs, and Al-Kiswah base south of Damascus. Iran has also objectives, using television, radio, print media, the supported Hezbollah and other militias in Syria, including Internet, and social media to bolster its narrative. Its perhaps 8,000 to 12,000 Shi’a foreign fighters from countries media outlets collaborate with Iranian state media on 7 like Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq. The external operations broader messaging, while simultaneously addressing department of the IRGC-Quds Force, a special forces unit of local grievances. Hezbollah has used an intensive

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 2 The Syria conflict has improved territory. Consequently, an important military objective includes preserving—and potentially expanding—the use Hezbollah’s urban warfare of Syrian territory as a logistical route for transporting capabilities, provided real-world Iranian missile parts and other material. Hezbollah also seeks to strengthen its own military capabilities in case of battlefield coordination with Iran a possible war with Israel. Hezbollah leaders have used the and Russia, and augmented its conflict in Syria to expand their footprint in the country to increase their influence and surround Israel. The next collaboration with less-sophisticated section provides more details about Hezbollah’s military Iranian battlefield proxies from power and operations. Afghanistan and other countries. HEZBOLLAH’S CAPABILITIES AND ACTIONS IN SYRIA propaganda and media campaign to portray itself as the To achieve its political and military goals, Hezbollah self-proclaimed protector of Shi’a communities that has redirected significant personnel, capabilities, and straddle the Lebanese-Syrian border. From the outset resources from Lebanon to Syria.15 The Syria conflict of the Syrian war, Hezbollah has helped protect Shi’a has improved Hezbollah’s urban warfare capabilities, populations near the western Syrian city of al-Qusayr provided real-world battlefield coordination with Iran and other areas in Syria near Hezbollah’s stronghold in and Russia, and augmented its collaboration with less- Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.12 Hezbollah has also vowed to sophisticated Iranian battlefield proxies from Afghanistan protect Shi’a holy sites around Damascus, even producing and other countries. In the early stages of the Syrian war, video games that allow players to fight as Hezbollah Hezbollah’s support for the Assad regime was limited militants. One of the most recent video games, titled “The to small numbers of trainers and advisers. Hezbollah Holy Defense: Protecting the Homeland and the Holy leaders didn’t confirm their activities in Syria until 2013, Sites,” was released in February 2018. It allows players when Hassan Nasrallah defiantly announced that he was to defend Shi’a holy sites, such as the Sayeda Zeinab in sending fighters to aid the Syrian government, adding: “I southern Damascus, against Islamic State attackers.13 have always promised you victory, and I promise victory again.”16 Today, Hezbollah has between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters in Syria, its largest deployment anywhere in the world outside of Lebanon.17 Hezbollah forces have amassed a range of weapons and systems in Syria, such as the Fateh-110/M-600 short-range ballistic missile, Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 short-range ballistic missiles, Toophan anti-tank guided missiles, Kornet man-portable anti-tank guided missiles, M113 armored personnel carriers, T-72 main battle tanks, Karrar unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and Katyusha rockets.18 The appendix provides more details about these weapons and Figure 1: An Image for the Hezbollah Video Game “Holy Defense”14 systems. Hezbollah’s armed drone capabilities are among the most advanced of any terrorist group in the world, and it has destroyed Islamic State Military goals: While increasingly unlikely, the fall of 19 the Assad regime in Syria would represent a significant targets in Syria using Karrar armed drones. In addition, setback for Hezbollah, since it receives most of its arms Hezbollah may have stockpiled chemical weapons in 20 through Syria. Other neighbors, such as Turkey, have Syria, including chlorine. We found no evidence in Syria cracked down on Hezbollah shipments through their that Hezbollah has stockpiled or used explosively formed

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 3 Today, Hezbollah has between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters in Syria. penetrators (EFPs), which are shaped charges designed to penetrate armor. But this could change. Iran, Hezbollah, and other proxies have used EFPs in other countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.21 Still, Hezbollah’s capabilities—particularly its standoff missiles— present a threat to the region. Hezbollah has used these capabilities in support of operations in Syria and Lebanon. It has defended or retaken Druze, Shi’a, Alawite, Sunni, and Christian villages around the Syrian city al-Qusayr, as well as several Shi’a- majority suburbs of Damascus like Sayyida Zeinab.22 In August 2014, in a rare instance of cooperation, Islamic State and Jabhat al- Nusrah militants launched a joint offensive and briefly held the Lebanese town of Arsal. They eventually retreated to positions in the mountains along the Lebanese-Syrian border following military operations by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). In May Figure 2: Hezbollah and Syrian Government Offensive along Lebanese-Syrian 2015, Hezbollah militants were involved in Border, January 2014-September 201726 heavy fighting in the Qalamoun region of Syria, near the Lebanese border. In July 2017, Hezbollah • Quwat al Ridha (or Ridha Forces), which have operated launched an offensive against al-Nusrah positions around in such Syrian governorates as Homs; Baalbek, Lebanon, near the Syrian border, as highlighted in • Al-Ghaliboun: Saraya al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi 23 Figure 2. Hezbollah used the operation to rally domestic Suria (or The Victors: The Companies of the Islamic Lebanese support around its campaign in Syria, trying to Resistance in Syria), which have been active in bolster its image as the protector of Shi’a communities governorates like Daraa and Quneitra; against Sunni militancy.24 As Hezbollah leader Hassan • Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir (or Baqir Brigade), which has Nasrallah remarked in response to those who questioned deployed to such governorates as Aleppo.27 Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, “Ask the people of Hermel. Continue on to the villages around Hermel, to In addition, there are roughly 8,000 to 12,000 other Shi’a the Bekaa . . . and to Baalbek . . . then answer your own foreign fighters in Syria from countries like Afghanistan, question.”25 Nasrallah was apparently referring to towns Yemen, and Iraq.28 The IRGC-QF’s external operations cleared of al-Nusrah control or influence. department, Department 400, has been critical in organizing these militias. Hezbollah has also trained, advised, and assisted Shi’a and other proxies in Syria. Collectively known as Al- The bulk of Hezbollah’s forces and proxy militias have been Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi Suria, or “the Islamic Resistance deployed along the Lebanese-Syrian border, where there are in Syria,” the militias are similar to those trained by large pockets of Shi’a communities and shrines—and near Hezbollah Commander Ali Musa Daqduq in Iraq, known as Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has the Asaib Ahl al-Haq units. Examples of Hezbollah-trained also deployed fighters deeper into Syria, including around militias in Syria include: the cities of Damascus and Homs. There have been reports of Hezbollah fighters as far away as Deir al-Zour governorate

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 4 Over two-thirds of the strikes to strategic locations like the Golan Heights along the Israel-Syrian-Lebanese border, threatening Israel. Second, analyzed by CSIS hit missile- Hezbollah and Iran’s decision to train and equip Shi’a related targets, such as storage and other militias in Syria gives them a larger network of proxies to extend their power and influence in the warehouses, transportation Middle East, South Asia, and other regions. Hezbollah convoys, and missile batteries. and Iran also have access to a larger multinational pool of personnel for other conflicts or terrorist operations. These developments threaten U.S. interests in Iraq, in the Middle Euphrates River Valley.29 More recently, Afghanistan, Yemen, and other countries. Third, Hezbollah forces have deployed to Syrian military positions Hezbollah and Iran have expanded and transformed their near the Israeli-Syrian border. Figure 3 shows the presence influence in Syria by deploying their forces, building of Hezbollah, Iranian, and other militias in Syria, according proxies, and establishing a relationship with the Assad to CSIS estimates. An interactive version of this map is regime and non-state actors. available on the CSIS website. In response to these developments, Israel has carried out over 100 strikes in Syria since the beginning of the war— with a rise in activity in recent months. These strikes have ranged from artillery barrages along the Israeli-Syrian border to airstrikes that have reached deeper into Syria. Over two-thirds of the strikes analyzed by CSIS hit missile-related targets, such as storage warehouses, transportation convoys, and missile batteries. On May 24, 2018, for example, Israeli Air Force fighters struck munitions depots and other targets at al-Qusayr (or Daba’a) airbase in the western sector of Homs governorate, allegedly killing a senior Hezbollah commander.31 On May 9 and 10, shortly after the United States pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, Israeli F-35 stealth fighters, F-15Is, F-16Is, and other aircraft attacked over 20 Iranian targets Figure 3: Hezbollah, Iranian, and Other Allied Militias in Syria, June 201830 in Syria—including Iranian logistical bases and outposts—with over 70 cruise THE STRATEGIC THREAT missiles and precision-guided bombs.32 On April 29, Israeli There are several concerns about Hezbollah’s trajectory. aircraft hit 13 buildings at the 47th Brigade military base First, Hezbollah continues to develop its military near the city of Hama, targeting as many as 200 surface-to- proficiency and increase its standoff capabilities, air missiles. On April 9, Israeli aircraft attacked Syria’s T-4 making it a more dangerous adversary in the event of a air field in Homs governorate, killing seven Iranian military future Hezbollah or broader Iranian conflict with Israel, personnel.33 As a senior Israeli Air Force officer remarked, the United States, or other countries. Hezbollah has “We are continuing with our operational mission against stockpiled and deployed larger quantities and types of the arming of Hezbollah and Iranian moves to establish weapons—particularly rockets and missiles—that can themselves in Syria. As far as we are concerned, anywhere reach targets in countries like Israel, Jordan, and Turkey. we identify consolidation [of Iranian or Hezbollah forces] or Hezbollah and Iran have deployed their forces close the introduction of weapons, we act.”34

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 5 Figure 4 plots Israeli strikes against Hezbollah, Iranian, and Battles in areas like Damascus, Syrian targets collected by the CSIS Transnational Threats Project through original open-source research. Most of Homs, and Aleppo have resulted Israel’s attacks were in southwestern Syria, near the Israeli in high numbers of Hezbollah border. But a few operations were against major bases used by Hezbollah, Iran, and other proxy militias in other areas, such casualties. as T-4 air field in Homs, the airbase north of al-Qusayr, and Damascus International Airport. In June 2018, Israeli aircraft strikes against Syrian targets, and 14 strikes against Iranian apparently struck Shi’a militia targets near the southeastern targets. CSIS counted 12 strikes in 2013; 8 strikes in 2014; town of al-Bukamal, near the Syria-Iraq border. 21 strikes in 2015; 10 strikes in 2016; and 22 strikes in 2017. As of June 1, 2018, we recorded an unprecedented The rise in the number of strikes in 2017 and 2018 shows number of strikes—28—only five months into the year.36 that Israel has been increasingly concerned about the encroachment of Hezbollah and Iran. The Israeli military has We also used satellite imagery to analyze specific targets. conducted strikes to retaliate against Iranian actions, such The Israelis struck a Syrian military facility at Al-Kiswah as rocket launches; push Hezbollah and Iranian positions in southern Damascus four times in 2017 and 2018. further from its border; and degrade Hezbollah and Iranian Figure 5 is a satellite image showing the overview of capabilities, especially missile capabilities. An interactive the military site at Al-Kiswah, where Israel conducted version of this map is available on the CSIS website. airstrikes in December 2017 and May 2018 on alleged Iranian targets. Figures 6 through 9 depict the satellite imagery of the specific targets before and after Israeli strikes. Figures 6 and 7 show the destruction of some missile-related storage facilities at Al-Kiswah military base, following a December 2017 Israeli attack. The photos on the left show the location before the Israeli strikes, and the photos on the right show the same location after the strikes. Figures 8 and 9 include satellite imagery of another missile-related location at Al-Kiswah after a May 2018 Israeli attack. Again, the photos on the left feature the location before the Israeli strikes, and the photos on the right feature the same location after the strikes. The satellite imagery suggests several issues. First, Israeli strikes were Figure 4: Israeli Airstrikes in Syria, 2013–201835 precise. Israeli aircraft destroyed all Of the 101 Israeli strikes analyzed by the CSIS Transnational or parts of specific buildings or trucks—but left undamaged Threats Project through open-source research, more than infrastructure or trucks only a few feet away. Second, the two-thirds were against missile-related targets. CSIS found imagery suggests that Iran and Hezbollah have utilized both that at least 42 of the 101 strikes were on missile-related fixed and mobile sites to store or transport missiles and missile facilities, while 15 of the 101 strikes were on convoys parts. Figures 6, 7, and 9 are infrastructure targets, such as allegedly carrying missile parts or technology. In addition, buildings. But Figure 8 indicates that the targets were trucks, 34 of the 101 Israeli strikes were retaliatory. CSIS counted presumably because they were transporting material such as a total of 47 Israeli strikes against Hezbollah targets, 40 missile parts.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 6 Figure 5: Overview of Alleged Missile-Related Storage Facilities at Al-Kiswah

Figure 6: Before and After Satellite Imagery of the December 2017 Israeli Airstrikes on Alleged Missile-Related Storage Facilities at Al-Kiswah

Figure 7: Before and After Satellite Imagery of the December 2017 Israeli Airstrikes on Alleged Missile-Related Storage Facilities at Al-Kiswah CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 7 Figure 8: Before and After Satellite Imagery of May 2018, Israeli Airstrikes on Alleged Missile-Related Transportation Targets at Al-Kiswah

Figure 9: Before and After Satellite Imagery of May 2018, Israeli Airstrikes on Alleged Missile-Related Storage Facilities at Al-Kiswah

Moving forward, U.S. and Israeli officials should remain U.S. military presence in or around Syria to balance against concerned that Iran, Hezbollah, and their proxies will Iran and Hezbollah, and leverage U.S. diplomacy to prevent continue—and even increase—their presence and stockpile military escalation. standoff weapons in Syria. In June 2017, Hassan Nasrallah First, there are opportunities to exploit Hezbollah and exacerbated these and other fears when he promised that Iranian vulnerabilities in Syria. Battles in areas like “thousands, even hundreds of thousands of fighters from Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo have resulted in high Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan” would fight numbers of Hezbollah casualties. Estimates range from against Israel. Following this statement, Yemen’s Abdul- several hundred to several thousand Hezbollah fighters Malek al-Houthi, a leader of the Houthi movement, pledged killed, with the most likely estimates between 1,000 and his fighters. So did Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi, whose Iraqi 2,000 dead.38 Thousands of Hezbollah fighters have also Shi’a Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba militia formed a “Golan been wounded. Among Hezbollah’s high-profile deaths 37 Liberation Brigade.” were a senior Hezbollah commander in May 2018; Mustafa Badreddine in May 2016, a senior Hezbollah commander U.S. AND ALLIED CONSIDERATIONS in charge of Syrian military operations; Abdel Hamid In crafting policy options, the United States and its allies Mahmoud Shri in June 2017, a field commander nicknamed should consider several issues: exploit dissent, encourage “Abu Mahdi”; and Ali Al-Hadi Al-Ashiq in October 2017, Russia to pressure Iran and Hezbollah, preserve a limited

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 8 another senior Hezbollah military commander. Hezbollah’s Third, the United States should continue to keep a military presence in Syria has been controversial among some of its and intelligence presence in Syria—as well as in neighboring own members and supporters because of the high costs in countries such as Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon—to balance blood and money, as well as concerns that the war in Syria against Iran and Hezbollah. The United States, Jordan, has taken away its focus from priorities in Lebanon.39 “We and Russia established a temporary de-escalation zone in are a resistance [movement], and you don’t do resistance southwestern Syria in 2017 as a buffer to stem the flow of by going to war in Syria,” said one former Hezbollah fighter. terrorists and additional refugees into Jordan, aid refugees “I will gladly go to fight Israel. But I won’t send my sons in countries like Lebanon and internally displaced persons to die in Syria.”40 Moving forward, the continuing death of in Syria, and prevent Hezbollah and other Shi’a militias from 43 Hezbollah fighters in Syria would likely increase pressure on moving closer to the Syrian-Israeli border. U.S. diplomacy the group to pull back its forces. will be critical to help negotiate future arrangements in southern Syria that protect Israel’s security. The United States will need to continue collecting and analyzing There are reports that the Syrian intelligence on Hezbollah and Iranian positions and regime helped disguise Iranian- activities in Syria. For instance, Hezbollah and Iran could agree to move units and material out of southwest Syria, allied militia as its own fighters to but instead shift to new clandestine locations or attempt avoid further Israeli airstrikes. to better conceal their positions. There are reports, for instance, that the Syrian regime helped disguise Iranian- allied militia as its own fighters to avoid further Israeli Second, the United States should encourage Russia to airstrikes.44 The United States should also keep a military play a more assertive role in decreasing the Hezbollah— presence at bases like Al-Tanf in Syria’s Homs governorate. and even Iranian—footprint in Syria. Russian leaders Withdrawing U.S. forces from Al-Tanf would likely open a have expressed concern about several issues, such as the southern corridor for Iran to move people and material from proliferation of Shi’a militias in Syria; the presence of Iraq through Syria and into Lebanon. It would also allow Iranian and Hezbollah forces, including near the Golan Iran an additional route to transport advanced weapons Heights; and the possible escalation of an Israeli-Iranian technology, supplementing other ground and air shipments. war. While this is unlikely to result in the complete removal of all Hezbollah and other Iranian-friendly forces from Syria, Russia could be helpful in mediating A war with Israel would likely an escalating crisis between Israel and Iran, as well as be more destructive and span restraining both sides. Moscow could also be useful in pushing for a reduction in the number and location a wider geographic area than of Hezbollah and Iranian forces and material in Syria, in 2006, which led to nearly particularly as the Assad regime takes back territory during counterinsurgency operations. As Russian President 1,400 dead, over 6,000 wounded, Vladimir Putin acknowledged in May 2018, “We presume nearly 1.5 million displaced that, in connection with the significant victories and success of the Syrian army in the fight against terrorism, persons, and billions of dollars in with the onset of a more active part, with the onset of war damage and lost economic the political process in its more active phase, foreign armed forces will be withdrawn from the territory of the output and income. Syrian Arab Republic.”41 Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov also remarked in May 2018 that all non-Syrian Fourth, U.S. diplomacy will be critical to preventing an forces—which includes Hezbollah—should withdraw from escalation in the conflict between Israel and Iran—including Syria’s southern border with Israel “as soon as possible.”42 with Hezbollah. The political and military landscape in The United States and Russia should continue to push the region is much different today than during the Israeli- for the removal of Iranian and Hezbollah forces from Hezbollah war in June and July 2006. Hezbollah has more southwestern Syria and allow the Syrian army to deploy to advanced standoff weapons, improved cyber capabilities, the border along the Golan Heights. more recruits, and more expansive forces in Syria—not

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 9 just Lebanon—capable of striking Israeli targets. The 2006 nearly 1,400 dead, over 6,000 wounded, nearly 1.5 million conflict demonstrated the difficulty of rooting out Hezbollah displaced persons, and billions of dollars in war damage sites in Lebanon’s heavily urbanized environment. Time and lost economic output and income.45 An escalating war has only expanded the nature of this problem set for Israel’s has the potential to engulf at least Israel, Syria, Lebanon, military. With Hezbollah’s success in Lebanon’s May 2018 and Iran in a region where there are already multiple wars. parliamentary elections, Hezbollah is also a more significant It could cause significant economic damage to countries political player in Lebanon. Israel could expand its military like Lebanon and Israel, lead to high numbers of civilian target set in a future war to include Lebanese government casualties and internally displaced persons, and involve sites—threatening a wider conflict. Russia more deeply than in the past. The stakes are high A war with Israel would likely be more destructive and today, making it even more important for Washington to span a wider geographic area than in 2006, which led to deter such escalation.

APPENDIX: EXAMPLE OF HEZBOLLAH WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS IN SYRIA

System: Fateh-110 Description: The Fateh-110 is a short-range, road-mobile, surface-to-surface ballistic missile. Hezbollah apparently has the M-600 variant of the Fateh-110, which has a range of approximately 180 miles and can deliver a payload of up to 1,100 pounds.

Photo: CSIS

System: Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 Description: The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 are single- stage, liquid-propelled, short-range ballistic missiles. The Shahab-1 has a maximum range of nearly 200 miles, while the Shahab-2 has a maximum range of over 300 miles. The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles are the Iranian variants of the Russian SS-1C ‘Scud B’ and SS-1D ‘Scud C,’ respectively.

Photo: CSIS

System: Toophan Anti-Tank Guided Missile Description: The Toophan is an Iranian man-portable, semiautomatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) anti- tank guided missile. It is reverse-engineered from the American BGM-71 tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) missile. The Toophan can be deployed by small teams against tanks, armored vehicles, buildings, and other targets. It has a maximum firing range of over 2 miles, a warhead of roughly 8 pounds, and can pierce armor 22 inches thick.

Photo: Wikipedia CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 10 System: 9M133 Kornet Description: The 9M133 Kornet is a modern Russian man- portable, anti-tank guided missile intended for use against main battle tanks. The Kornet has a range of over 3 miles, a warhead of 15 pounds, and can pierce armor nearly 40 inches thick.

Photo: Wikipedia

System: M113 Armored Personnel Carrier Description: The M113 is a lightly armored personnel carrier first fielded by the U.S. army in 1962. It is versatile and capable of acting as a front-line vehicle and can also be used in support roles. The M113 is most commonly armed with a machine gun.

Photo: Wikipedia

System: T-72 Main Battle Tank Description: The T-72 tank is a Soviet second-generation main battle tank that entered production in 1971. The T-72 is lightweight, has a comprehensive nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) system, can reach speeds up to 50 miles per hour, and is usually equipped with the 125-millimeter 2A46 series main gun.

Photo: Wikipedia

System: Karrar Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Description: The Karrar is an unmanned combat aerial vehicle and the first long-endurance, combat-capable Iranian drone. It has an operational range of over 600 miles, with a maximum speed of 560 miles per hour. The Karrar can be outfitted with conventional bombs or guided missiles, including precision ordinance.

Photo: Wikipedia

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 11 System: Katyusha Multiple Rocket Launcher Description: The Katyusha was originally a truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher first fielded by the Soviet Union in 1939. Today, there are numerous variants of the Katyusha, with maximum ranges between 2 and 7 miles. While the Soviet variant used 82 mm and 132 mm rockets, the Hezbollah variants are typically 107 mm and 122 mm. The shorter- range rockets can carry up to 64-pound warheads, while the longer-range rockets can carry up to 11-pound warheads. In comparison with the Soviet truck-mounted Katyusha, Hezbollah does not have many Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs), so the Katyusha is often fired one at a time. Photo: Marwan Naamani/AFP/Getty Images

Seth G. Jones holds the Harold Brown Chair, is director of the Transnational Threats Project, and is a senior adviser to the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Maxwell B. Markusen is an associate fellow and associate director of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

CSIS BRIEFS is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Cover Photo: LOUAI BESHARA/AFP/Getty Images

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 12 ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Oren Liebermann, “Iran and Israel Draw Closer to War Than bollah-is-preparing-syria-as-second-battlefield-against-israel.php; Reuters Ever,” CNN, May 1, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/30/middleeast/ Staff, “Hezbollah Uses Drones against Islamic State in Syria: Hezbollah-run iran-israel-analysis/index.html. Media,” Reuters, August 21, 2017, https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 2. David Wainer and Henry Meyer, “Russian Missiles Alarm Israel, Stoking idCAKCN1B11H4-OCATP; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Hezbollah Has U.S. Risk of Next Syria Crisis,” Bloomberg, April 19, 2018, https://www.bloomberg. Armored Personnel Carriers,” Washington Post, November 16, 2016, https:// com/news/articles/2018-04-19/new-russian-weapons-alarm-israel-may-trig- www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/11/16/hezbollah- ger-next-syrian-crisis; CSIS Transnational Threats Project estimates. has-u-s-armored-personnel-carriers-but-how-did-they-get-them/?noredi- rect=on&utm_term=.32c1d4f2924b. 3. CSIS Transnational Threats Project estimates. We only counted cases where we found open-source evidence of missiles or missile parts at the 19. See the alleged video footage of a Hezbollah drone strike in Reuters Staff, target location. However, we suspect the number of Israeli airstrikes against “Hezbollah Uses Drones against Islamic State in Syria.” missile-related targets may be higher than two-thirds. 20. See, for example, Gideon Kouts, “Former Syrian General: Hezbollah Is 4. Mehdi Haghighatkha, “Omgh-e Raahbordi-ye Iran: Baghdad ta Karakas in Possession of Chemical Weapons,” Jerusalem Post, March 8, 2018, https:// [Iran’s Strategic Depth: From Baghdad to Caracas],” Borhan News, August 5, www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Former-Syrian-official-to-Maariv-Hezbol- 2013, http://borhan.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=5630. lah-has-chemical-weapons-544567. 5. See, for example, Misagh Parsa, Democracy in Iran: Why It Failed and How 21. On the use of EFPs by Iran, Hezbollah, or other proxies see, for exam- It Might Succeed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Abbas ple, Andrew deGrandpre and Andrew Tilghman, “Iran Linked to Deaths Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). of 500 U.S. Troops in Iraq, Afghanistan,” Military Times, July 14, 2015, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2015/07/14/ 6. Ben Hubbard, Isabel Kershner, and Anne Barnard, “Iran, Deeply in Syria, iran-linked-to-deaths-of-500-u-s-troops-in-iraq-afghanistan/; Kimberly Expands ‘Axis of Resistance,’” New York Times, February 19, 2018, https:// Kagan, Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/world/middleeast/iran-syria-israel.html. (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 2007), http:// 7. CSIS Transnational Threats Project estimates; Phillip Smyth, “Iran Is www.understandingwar.org/report/irans-proxy-war-against-united- Outpacing Assad for Control of Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” Washington Insti- states-and-iraq; Kareem Fahim and Liz Sly, “Lethal Roadside Bomb That tute for Near East Policy, April 12, 2018, http://www.washingtoninstitute. Killed Scores of U.S. Troops Reappears in Iraq,” Washington Post, Octo- org/policy-analysis/view/iran-is-outpacing-assad-for-control-of-syrias- ber 12, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ shia-militias. Our estimates of Shi’a foreign fighters are slightly lower lethal-roadside-bomb-that-killed-scores-of-us-troops-reappears-in- than Smyth’s estimates. iraq/2017/10/11/87c5a57c-aeb7-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.htm- 8. The term “takfiri” refers to a Muslim who accuses another Muslim of l?utm_term=.a804a8804d69. Also see, Adam Entous, “US Sees Hand of apostasy, or nonbelief. We define Salafi-jihadist based on two criteria. First, Elite Iranian Unit in Afghanistan,” Reuters, September 21, 2009, https:// the individual or group emphasizes the importance of returning to a “pure www.reuters.com/article/idUSN21522027; and Michael Knights, “Defeat- Islam,” that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors. Second, the group believes that ing Iran’s Roadside Bombs in Yemen,” Washington Institute for Near East violent jihad is a fard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty). Policy, March 26, 2018, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-anal- 9. Speech by Hassan Nasrallah, May 25, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/ ysis/view/defeating-irans-roadside-bombs-in-yemen. watch?v=3gw60_F28zY. 22. See, for example, James Harkin, “A Hundred Tiny Hezbollahs,” Foreign 10. Speech by Hassan Nasrallah, June 8, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/ Policy, May 15, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/15/a-hundred-ti- watch?v=9lSkqfQdHJ8. ny-hezbollahs-syria-iran-shiite-guerrilla-warfare/; Agence France-Presse, “Shi’a Shrine Near Damascus Hit by Double Bomb Attack,” Guardian, June 11. On Hezbollah more broadly see, for example, Joseph Daher, Hezbollah: 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/11/shia-shrine- The Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (New York: Pluto Press, 2016); near-damascus-hit-by-double-bomb-attack; IHS Markit, “Jane’s World In- Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, rev. surgency & Terrorism,” https://ihsmarkit.com/products/janes-world-ter- ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015). rorism-insurgency.html. 12. David Hirst, “Hezbollah Uses Its Military Power in a Contradictory 23. Tom Perry and Angus McDowall, “Lebanese Army, Hezbollah An- Manner,” Daily Star (Beirut), October 23, 2012, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ nounce Offensive against Islamic State on Syrian Border,” Reuters, August Opinion/Commentary/2012/Oct-23/192380-hezbollah-uses-its-military- 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-leba- power-in-a-contradictory-manner.ashx. non-syria/lebanese-army-hezbollah-announce-offensives-against-islam- 13. Sunniva Rose, “‘Holy Defence’: Hezbollah Issues Call of Duty to Video ic-state-on-syrian-border-idUSKCN1AZ03G. Gamers,” Middle East Eye, February 28, 2018, http://www.middleeasteye. 24. See, for example, Lina Khatib, “The Political and Security Fallout of the net/news/holy-defense-hezbollah-launches-new-video-game-675819933. Battle of Arsal,” Carnegie Middle East Center, August 16, 2014, http://car- 14. For an example of the game, see http://holydefence.com. negie-mec.org/2014/08/16/political-and-security-fallout-of-battle-in-ar- 15. Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli Military Chief Outlines Hizbullah’s Syria Com- sal-pub-56408. mitment,” HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 4, 2018, http://www.janes.com/ 25. “Statement of Hassan Nasrallah on Television about the Course of the article/76795/israeli-military-chief-outlines-hizbullah-s-syria-commitment. Joroud Arsal Battle,” Al-Manar TV, July 27, 2017. 16. Speech by Hassan Nasrallah, May 25, 2013. 26. MrPenguin20, “Battle of Qalamoun”, https://commons.wikimedia.org/ 17. CSIS Transnational Threats Project estimates. wiki/File:Battle_of_Qalamoun.svg, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ 18. CSIS Transnational Threats Project estimates; David Daoud, “Hezbollah File:Battle_of_Qalamoun.svg. Is Preparing Syria as Second Battlefield against Israel,”Long War Journal, 27. See, for example, Phillip Smyth, “Lebanese Hezbollah’s Islamic Resis- March 16, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/hez- tance in Syria,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 26, 2018,

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 13 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/lebanese-hez- 40. Rasmussen and Osseiran, “Hezbollah Faces Rising Ill Will in Lebanon.” bollahs-islamic-resistance-in-syria. 41. Quoted in Tamara Qiblawi, “All ‘Foreign Forces’ to Leave Syria, Putin Tells 28. CSIS Transnational Threats Project estimates; and Smyth, “Iran Is Out- Assad,” CNN, May 18, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/18/middleeast/ pacing Assad for Control of Syria’s Shi’a Militias.” assad-putin-intl/index.html. Emphasis added. 29. Lappin, “Israeli Military Chief Outlines Hizbullah’s Syria Commitment.” 42. “Lavrov: Pullback of Non-Syrian Forces from Border with Israel Must Be 30. IHS Janes and open-source data collected by the CSIS Transnational Fast,” TASS, May 30, 2018, http://tass.com/politics/1007169. Threats Project. 43. “Jordan Does Not Want Terrorists or Sectarian Militias at Border,” 31. TOI Staff, “Hezbollah Men, Including Commander, Said Killed in Syria Jordan Times, April 21, 2018, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jor- Strike Blamed on Israel,” Times of Israel, May 29, 2018, https://www.time- dan-does-not-want-terrorists-or-sectarian-militias-border%E2%80%99. sofisrael.com/hezbollah-men-including-commander-said-killed-in-syria- 44. See, for example, Raja Abdulrahim, “Iran-Backed Fighters Switch to Syr- strike-blamed-on-israel/; Charles Bybelezer, “Israel and Iran Revert Back ian Uniforms to Avoid Israeli Strikes, Rebels Say,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, to Familiar Patterns in Syria,” Jerusalem Post, May 28, 2018, https://www. 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backed-fighters-switch-to-syrian- jpost.com/Middle-East/Israel-and-Iran-revert-back-to-familiar-patterns- uniforms-to-avoid-israeli-strikes-rebels-say-1528478351. in-Syria-558530; Tamar Ben-Ozer and Yasser Okbi, “21, Including Iranians, 45. Reuters Staff, “Factbox: Costs of War and Recovery in Lebanon and Reported Killed in IAF Strike in Syria,” Jerusalem Post, May 27, 2018, https:// Israel,” Reuters, July 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-leba- www.jpost.com/Israel-News/21-including-Iranians-reported-killed-in-IAF- non-war-cost/factbox-costs-of-war-and-recovery-in-lebanon-and-israel- strike-in-Syria-558454. idUSL0822571220070709. 32. Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel Launched World’s First Air Strike Using F-35 Stealth Fighters, Air Force Chief Says,” Haaretz, May 24, 2018, https:// www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/with-iran-in-syria-israel- launched-world-s-first-air-strike-using-f-35-stealth-fighters-1.6110706; Amos Harel et al., “Israel Launches Most Extensive Strike in Syria in Decades after Iranian Rocket Barrage,” Haaretz, May 11, 2018, https://www.haaretz. com/israel-news/israel-launches-extensive-syria-strike-after-iranian-rocket-barrage-1.6073938. 33. Judah Ari Gross, “Satellite Captures Destruction on Syrian Base after Alleged Israeli Strike,” Times of Israel, May 1, 2018, https://www.timesofis- rael.com/satellite-captures-destruction-on-syrian-base-after-alleged-israeli-strike/. 34. Kubovich, “Israel Launched World’s First Air Strike Using F-35 Stealth Fighters.” 35. These data are from CSIS original open-source research. We identified more than 65 of the alleged 150 Israeli strikes and plotted them. 36. Estimates are from the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. As noted in a previous footnote, we only counted cases where we found open-source evidence of missiles or missile parts at the target location. However, we suspect the number of Israeli airstrikes against missile-related targets may be higher than two-thirds. 37. David Daoud, “How Hezbollah Will Use Foreign Fighters to Conquer Lebanon,” Haaretz, April 27, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.pre- mium-hezbollah-s-plan-to-conquer-lebanon-1.6032874. 38. CSIS Transnational Threats Project estimates; Colin P. Clarke, “A Glass Half Empty? Taking Stock of Hezbollah’s Losses in Syria,” Jerusalem Post, October 15, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/A-glass-half-empty-Tak- ing-stock-of-Hezbollahs-losses-in-Syria-507497; Ali Alfoneh, “Hezbollah’s Balancing Act Between Syria and Lebanon,” Atlantic Council, April 12, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/hezbollah-s-balancing-act-between-syria-and-lebanon. 39. See, for example, Sune Engel Rasmussen and Nazih Osseiran, “Hez- bollah Faces Rising Ill Will in Lebanon,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/hezbollah-faces-rising-discontent-in-heart- land-ahead-of-election-1525348801; Majid Rafizadeh, “Iran’s Fighters Are Dying in Syria—Will It Change Anything?” Huffington Post, December 6, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/irans-fighters-dying-in-s_b_8735658.html; Jesse Rosenfeld, “Hezbollah Fighters Are Fed Up with Fighting Syria’s War,” Daily Beast, December 30, 2015, https://www. thedailybeast.com/bill-clinton-on-monica-lewinsky-how-about-all-the- women-i-promoted?ref=scroll.

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