The "Revolt of the " focused on the big bomber, but the real issues ran much deeper. The Battle of the B-36

By Herman S. Wolk

HE 1949 "Revolt of the Admi- T rals," which initially focused on the Air Force's B-36 interconti- nental bomber, was one of the most bitter public feuds in American mili- tary history. This controversy over strategy and weapons began with the 1945-47 struggle over unification, when the US Army Air Forces (AAF) Above, after the conflict with the Navy was resolved, USAF Chief of Staff was fighting to become an indepen- Gen. Nathan F. Twining (left) and Commander in Chief dent service. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay (right) show Italian President Giovanni Gronchi a model Following World War II, Gen. of of the B-36. Opposite, a B-36, with four jet engines and six propellers on its the Army Henry H. Arnold, Com- 230-foot wingspan, fills the sky all by itself. manding of the US Army Air Forces; Gen. Carl A. Spaatz; and Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle empha- sized that the demonstrated effec- tiveness of all forms of airpower made the AAF the lead service in the American defense phalanx. Gen- Chief of Staff Gen. Dwight D. Eisen- eral Doolittle, testifying before the hower, among others. Senate Military Affairs Committee, After the war, the Navy feared it pointed out that the Navy was no might lose its air element to an inde- longer the first line of defense for pendent Air Force and that even the the United States. The US required Marine Corps might be lost. More- an independent Air Force featuring over, the naval leadership, convinced an in-being strategic atomic force that the Navy required everything to that could deter any aggressor from make it self-supporting in pursuit of initiating conflict. This would be the its mission, opposed ' s and country's strategic concept in the Eisenhower' s concept of mutually postwar era, and it was supported by supporting services under unified President Harry S. Truman and Army command. In the Congressional hear-

60 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 1996 ings on unification, General Eisen- mission and other functions ques- In 1948 and 1949, the Air Force hower emphasized that economy tions. made several decisions that led to would be a driving force in postwar The Air Force relied on the B-36 Strategic Air Command's reliance defense matters and that the nation intercontinental-range bomber to on the B-36 for the SAC atomic de- simply could not afford the Navy's accomplish the strategic mission terrent mission until the B-52 long- concept of self-sustaining forces in supporting the Truman Administra- range bomber could enter the opera- the World War II mold. tion's policy of deterrence. In Au- tional inventory. In 1948, following The centerpiece of the Navy's vi- gust 1941, Robert A. Lovett, assis- the Soviet-inspired Communist coup sion was the carrier task force that, tant secretary of war for Air, and in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet during the war, became central to its Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, chief of Union's of Berlin, the pos- Pacific strategy. In the postwar pe- the Army Air Corps, determined that sibility of war increased. The Air riod, Navy Secretary James V. For- the potential loss of bases in the Force emphasized that the B-36 was restal took the lead in promoting the called for develop- the only aircraft capable of deliver- maritime strategy of depending on ment of a long-range bomber that ing the atomic bomb from bases in larger and faster carriers and oppos- could fly a round trip from the US to the US. ing the creation of an independent Europe. Until that time, no aircraft In early 1949, SAC Commander Air Force. had even approached this proposed in Chief Gen. Curtis E. LeMay rec- range of 10,000 miles. ommended to Gen. Hoyt S. Vanden- Compromise and Conflict Immediately after the creation of berg, USAF Chief of Staff, that the The National Security Act of 1947, USAF in September 1947, criticism Board of Senior Officers review the which established the United States of the B-36 began appearing in news- B-54 program because B-36 tests Air Force, clearly was a compro- papers and journals. Some of this with jet pods had been outstanding. mise. The Act, as well as the so- criticism came from Hugh L. Hanson, Compared to the B-54, the B-36 with called "functions paper" (actually, a Navy employee with the Bureau of jet pods was faster, operated at higher Truman's Executive Order), failed Aeronautics, who had also contacted altitude, and had greater range and to resolve roles-and-missions dis- Forrestal, now Defense Secretary, bomb-carrying capacity. Subsequent- putes among the services. The new and several Congressmen. The Sec- ly, the B-54 was canceled. Symington Air Force and the Navy—at confer- retary of the Air Force, Stuart Sy- informed Secretary Forrestal that the ences at , Fla., and New- mington, complained about this to B-36 could fly from the US and could, port, R. I., in the spring and summer the Secretary of the Navy, John L. "because of its speed and altitude, of 1948—could not work out their Sullivan. Nevertheless, the attacks ... penetrate enemy country without differences over the strategic atomic continued. fighter escort, destroy the strategic

AIR FORCE Magazine / July 1996 61 The stage was now set. This bitter confrontation, precipitated by the Navy and its advocates, had been foreseen by General Eisenhower. "Someday we're going to have a blowup," he predicted in January 1949. "God help us if ever we go before a Congressional committee to argue our professional fights as each service struggles to get the lion's share. . . . Public airing of griev- ances . . . someday . . . will go far beyond the bounds of decency and reason, and someone will say, 'Who's the boss? The civilians or the mili- tary?' " High-ranking naval officers, de- termined to make the case for the supercarrier and against the B-36, took action. The Navy's Op-23 "re- Adm. Arthur Radford was one of the leaders of the Navy's charge against the search and policy" office had been B-36. He called the huge bomber - a billion-dollar blunder" and claimed that US formed in December 1948. Capt. reliance on was excessive. Arleigh A. Burke, a World War II commander and future Chief of Naval Operations, took target, and return nonstop to its base flush-deck supercarrier United States charge of this office in early 1949. on this continent." on which construction was to start in He placed Op-23 under tight secu- April 1949. The Navy estimated the rity (causing the press to speculate Stress and Suicide cost of the carrier at $190 million, that it was involved in shady busi- Ironically, given the nature of the but this figure failed to include the ness) and directed his people to col- struggle then brewing between the thirty-nine additional ships required lect detrimental data on the B-36 Air Force and Navy over the B-36 to complete the task force. Total while amassing positive information and the atomic mission, Truman had construction cost was $1.265 bil- on the supercarrier. named Forrestal as Secretary of De- lion, a staggering sum in 1949. John- Going public, naval officers criti- fense after Secretary of War Robert son immediately asked the Joint cized the B-36 as being too slow and P. Patterson had turned down the Chiefs of Staff as well as retired vulnerable to enemy defenses. This, post, pleading that his finances forced General Eisenhower for their opin- however, was only the beginning of him to return to the private sector. ions. what turned out to be a vicious cam- Forrestal had led the campaign against Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of paign to discredit not only the B-36 a strong National Security Act and Naval Operations, defended the su- but also the top leadership of the an independent Air Force. When he percarrier, calling it necessary "in fledgling Air Force. In April and May became the Defense Secretary, he the interest of national security." Gen. 1949, an "anonymous document" showed himself to be a weak coordi- Omar N. Bradley, Army Chief of made its way around Washington, nator, unable under the new law to Staff, and General Vandenberg, Air D. C., charging that Symington, John- step in and resolve the many differ- Force Chief of Staff, strongly op- son, and Floyd B. Odium, chairman ences among the services. posed construction, arguing that the of the board of Convair, had put the Having failed to provide strong supercarrier would duplicate the heat on the Air Force to buy B-36s, in support to Truman' s 1948 political function of the Air Force's landbased spite of the bomber's deficiencies. campaign, Forrestal' s influence waned bombers. Eisenhower also opposed Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, di- significantly. At the same time, his building the carrier. rector of Air Force Special Investi- health began to fail. He resigned in In late April 1949, after informing gations, traced the anonymous docu- March 1949, in deep mental distress, President Truman, Johnson abrupt- ment to Cedric R. Worth, a former and in May jumped to his death from ly directed that construction of the Hollywood scriptwriter, who had a window on the sixteenth floor of carrier stop immediately. Navy offi- served with the Navy during the war the National Naval Medical Center cials were outraged at not being in- and was now an assistant to Dan A. in Bethesda, Md. formed of the decision. Navy Secre- Kimball, under secretary of the Navy. To replace Forrestal, Truman named tary Sullivan resigned in protest, Glenn L. Martin, an aircraft manu- Louis A. Johnson, a former assistant emphasizing that the decision could facturer whose bombers had lost out secretary of War (1937-40) who had have "far-reaching and tragic conse- to the B-36, had provided Worth with served as the President's chief fund- quences." Rumors immediately sur- considerable data. A Navy court of raiser during the 1948 campaign. faced within the Navy's high com- inquiry subsequently determined that Secretary Johnson began by review- mand that Johnson was pro-USAF Cmdr. Thomas D. Davies, Op-23 ing military procurement programs and was determined to cut the Navy deputy to Burke, had also and quickly focused on the Navy's down to size. fed material to Worth.

62 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 1996 The charges in the Worth docu- on B-36 procurement in August and returned nonstop to Carswell AFB, ment became public and reached the on strategy and unification in Octo- Tex. floor of the House of Representatives ber 1949. In June, Symington ap- In regard to B-36 procurement, when Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R- pointed W. Barton Leach, an Air Symington informed the committee Pa.), a Navy advocate with wartime Force Reserve and Harvard that "at no time since I have been naval service, called for an investiga- Law School professor, to coordinate Secretary has any higher authority tion of the allegations. Secretary and direct the Air Force case for the attempted to recommend in any way Symington denied the charges and B-36. Leach had served with Army the purchase of any airplane. . . . also requested an immediate investi- Air Forces and had earned a reputa- Every aircraft that was purchased by gation. Rep. (D-Ga.), tion for incisive analysis of AAF the Air Force during my tenure was chairman of the House Armed Ser- operations in Europe. recommended to me by the Chief of vices Committee, agreed to hold hear- He proceeded to organize the Air Staff of the Air Force and his staff." ings. In June, the full committee con- Force case by analyzing the charges, Modifications in the B-36 program sented to hear the B-36 procurement preparing replies to the allegations, were approved by Symington only case and to hold an inquiry into strat- making a study of the aircraft indus- after recommendations had been egy and unification issues. Thus be- try, preparing a memo on Syming- made by General Vandenberg, Lt. gan one of the most fractious public ton' s policies relative to the aircraft Gen. , and Gen. Jo- confrontations in US military history. industry, collecting all Air Force seph T. McNarney. Symington also The Navy's supporters in the press statements on the heavy bomber pro- strongly denied that he had ever dis- held back nothing. Hanson Baldwin, gram chronologically, analyzing all cussed formation of a large aircraft military editor of Inspector General reports on the B- combine with Floyd Odlum or any and a graduate of the Naval Acad- 36, and preparing an explanation of aircraft manufacturer. emy, described Symington as one of Air Force action on the B-36. Gen. George C. Kenney, a former the "nastiest" politicians in Wash- The result of Leach's massive ef- SAC commander in chief, testified ington, someone who had "ganged fort was "A History of B-36 Procure- to the committee that, although he up on Forrestal." Baldwin charged ment," which Vinson had requested initially opposed production of the that Symington had played "dirty and which formed the foundation of B-36, the bomber had been modified pool and dirty politics, . . . [was] a the Air Force's presentation to the to be "the fastest, longest-range, best two-faced goad who was not re- committee. In early July 1949, the altitude-performing, and heaviest spected by most of the people in the Air Force Association's third annual load-carrying bomber in the world." Air Force." Baldwin even went so National Convention, held in Chi- Had he changed his view under po- far as to claim that Symington was cago, also helped counter the Navy's litical pressure? No, replied Kenney. the only service secretary not asked charges by disseminating material on "If the bomber had the performance to be a pallbearer at Forrestal' s fu- the B-36 Peacemaker's mission and and would do the job that I was neral because the family actually operational characteristics. At 45,000 charged with carrying out, I would believed that he had contributed to feet, this intercontinental bomber was buy it." Forrestal' s death. anything but vulnerable. Each day General LeMay also took the stand, during the AFA meeting, seven B- saying "I expect that, if I am called The Air Force Case 36s flew up from Fort Worth, Tex., upon to fight, I will order my crews Vinson s committee held hearings circled the fair area at low level, and out in those airplanes, and I expect to be in the first one myself." Van Zandt questioned LeMay closely, but the SAC commander in chief insisted that the B-36 was the only bomber that could accomplish the intercon- tinental mission. An extensive case study of the B- 36 hearings by Professor Paul Y. Hammond of Johns Hopkins Univer- sity, published in 1963, concluded that, "because of the careful prepara- tion of the Air Force, no inconsisten- cies or contradictions capable of ex- ploitation appeared in the testimony. The result was an impressive show- ing for the Air Force." In contrast, according to Hammond, the Navy's Op-23 office failed to provide much help to the Navy's witnesses. More- over, noted Hammond, "most of the hostility that developed towards Op- With its 160-foot length and forty-six-foot height, the B-36 was too large for 23 was of the Navy's own making.. .. most hangars, so USAF was forced to devise other solutions to allow mechan- Op-23 was treated by the Navy from ics to work on the bomber and yet be sheltered from the elements. the beginning like dirty business; and

AIR FORCE Magazine / July 1996 63 Force and the nation had placed ex- cessive reliance on this concept.

Strange Tales Other Navy witnesses made simi- lar arguments. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations (who was relieved of his post at completion of the hearings), stressed the way in which the flush-deck carrier was canceled. Navy Cmdr. Eugene Ta- torn, head of research and develop- ment for aviation ordnance, made the stunning claim that "you could stand in the open at one end of the north-south runway at the Washing- ton National Airport, with no more protection than the clothes you have on, and have an atom bomb explode at the other end of the runway with- From 1951 to 1959—when the was at its frostiest—the B-36 stood out serious injury to you." Tatom' s alert twenty-four hours a day, serving as one of the main deterrents to statement was labeled absurd by Sec- aggression by the . retary of Defense Johnson, Sen. Brien McMahon (D-Conn.) and Rep. Chet Holifield (D-Calif.) of the Joint Com- the press had soon drawn the same The Navy's witnesses before the mittee on Atomic Energy, and other conclusion. Upon its establishment, House Armed Services Committee members of Congress. it was located next to the Office of took their cue from Adm. Arthur W. The strongest counterattack on the Naval Intelligence, and its activities Radford, who stated that he did not Navy's position was launched by from the beginning were subject to an believe the threat of an "atomic blitz" Secretary Symington and General unusual degree of secrecy." provided a deterrent to war. He fo- Vandenberg. Replying to the charge The Vinson committee subsequent- cused his guns on the B-36, calling it that the Air Force placed too much ly exonerated Symington and John- "a billion-dollar blunder" and claim- reliance on the B-36, Symington son and stated that it found "not one ing that, in his view, its poor perfor- showed that, in Fiscal Years 1949 scintilla of evidence [to] support mance made it a "bad gamble." He through 1951, the B-36 accounted charges that collusion, fraud, corrup- went along with the Joint Chiefs to for only 2.9 percent of the number of tion, influence, or favoritism played the extent that he agreed that stra- aircraft and 16.3 percent of the cost any part whatsoever in the procure- tegic bombing should be the primary of all airplanes purchased by the Air ment of the B-36 bomber." Accord- role of the Air Force. However, Force. ing to the committee, Symington, Radford emphasized that the Air This was telling testimony, but the Air Force leadership, and Secre- tary of Defense Johnson made it through the hearings with "unblem- ished, impeccable reputations." After the procurement hearings, the Navy immediately convened a board of inquiry to investigate the origin and release of the anonymous document supposedly written by Worth. Worth had, under oath, "re- canted and repudiated" the allega- tions contained in the documents and was dismissed. The Navy' s court of inquiry, however—although it found "distorted propaganda" against the Air Force—found no cause for dis- ciplinary action against any of the Op-23 personnel, including Captain Burke and Commander Davies. The twelve days of unification and strategy hearings, convened in Oc- tober 1949, revealed a somewhat less The first Air Force Secretary, (center), seen here with Gen. Carl definitive outcome than the procure- Spaatz (left) and Gen. , was attacked viciously during the battle ment sessions had. for the B-36. Some went so far as to implicate him in Secretary Forrestal's suicide.

64 AIR FORCE Magazine/July 1996 ▪ ▪

Radford, aware of these figures, chose to ignore them. Symington then ...... „, -4.4-1-- . ' - zeroed in on the effectiveness of stra- --.,..,...,.. ----..-„L_ .,, ,,,..-_-_---;., ..,■__ _ , --__:„.., , ---..1•-■ tegic bombing. He reminded the com- .,...... .....".". mittee that strategic bombing had .„---;-;_.... ,....,_ __ ...,...„....._ _. -...6•■••- ___---""-, _....,.4".....„-•- "..-4--. been approved and assigned to the -7---'.'"".-.1-1..7".' ...... _...... _.4,..-L-.4 ' - ___,.._ -4-i"--- -"--r--'4:* '----- --___;...... _, ' -::"------4.'- ...... 4.;c4,...... :■ -"'-'f-r;::"'r'-'f-j- Air Force by the . - - - 4 • ..i. 4...... --,-' -- 1. =;.., , ,,C, ...„_-.....4..4„..- 7 -...1.11,-....¢..," ., - "The most disturbing feature of the ---.....„, •••••••g.,c44. . _ _ ...... k, 79' ... +-• k.....,_,,,, - .... , 4;. 4 ...... ,7-• -_-_, --,* "4-4- 4" attacks against the Air Force," Sy------... ., . ----L t. .., -----4,4 mington said, "is what they have • ;„,,,_ .t_...... -. -.14 4.4.,,,,.. ...4..._4"."-...e, _ ..-- done and are doing to imperil the ------.4 t.-:: security of the US. It was bad enough '' - :-..--%--- --N---...." to have given a possible aggressor 1... ...... : technical and operating details of 1: ■,,,,... our newest and latest equipment. . . . , k .. It is far worse to have opened up to ,,,, . _____.• : him in such detail the military doc- '116 ;e• trines of how this country would be defended." • Vandenberg reiterated Syming- • ton' s points, reinforcing them with Careers were ruined and reputations impugned in the "Revolt of the Admi- technical details and adding that, so rals," but the B-36 vindicated its proponents before eventually finding its way far as the flush-deck carrier was to its final resting place in the desert at Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. concerned, "my opposition to build- ing it comes from the fact that I can see no necessity for a ship with those desired because it could not proceed The Air Force, with the B-36, was capabilities in any strategic plan in a logical manner; to be complete front and center in the nation's against the one possible enemy." and comprehensive, the hearings defense establishment—hence, the Following Vandenberg, General would have to start with a consider- Navy's unbridled attack on the B-36 Bradley, now Chairman of the Joint ation of the nation's classified war bomber. Chiefs of Staff, unleashed heavy fire plans. This would have torpedoed Years later, Stephen F. Leo, Syming- against the Navy. He said that the the Navy's arguments. The maga- ton' s director of Public Relations, Navy's "careless detractions of the zine emphasized, however, that "the described the Navy in this era as power of this [atomic] weapon have Admirals found, as a by-product of being "out of control." The Navy had done national security no good and the hearing, that civilians still run been dragged, kicking and scream- may have done our collective secu- the defense establishment as the pro- ing, into the National Security Act rity, in these precarious times, un- visions of the Constitution intended, of 1947, and its opposition to a strong told harm." He wished that the Navy's and their reeducation in this particu- Secretary of Defense reflected a testimony had never been delivered, lar was most timely." reluctance to join the unification he added. "This is no time," empha- team. General Bradley emphasized sized the usually mild-mannered Unreconstructed Admirals that the Navy had refused to ac- Bradley, "for 'fancy dans' who won't This struggle, ignited by unrecon- cept unification "in spirit as well as hit the line with all they have on structed, high-ranking naval officers, deed." every play unless they can call the had deep roots in the 1945-47 pe- Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower signals." The gut problem, accord- riod, when the Army Air Forces won showed his frustration with the Navy ing to General Bradley, was that the the battle to establish an indepen- when he stressed to the Congress Navy had opposed unification from dent Air Force. The Navy all along that the postwar national security the start and had never completely had been reluctant to cede the atomic establishment had to be structured accepted it. mission to the AAF in a period of like a three-legged stool, each mili- This was a point Air Force Maga- stringent budgetary cutbacks. This tary service mutually supportive of zine made in a December 1949 ret- became especially critical when the the whole. This was the great lesson rospective on the strategy and uni- Truman Administration made stra- of World War II—mutually support- fication hearings. It noted that the tegic deterrence the centerpiece of ing services under unified theater investigation left a great deal to be its postwar national security policy. command. It was a lesson that the Navy took some time to learn. The extraordinarily able first Sec- retary of the Air Force, Stuart Sy- Herman S. Wolk is senior historian, Air Force History Support Office, Hq. mington, many years later described USAF, where he has served since 1966. He was a historian at Hq. Strategic with enthusiasm to this author the B- Air Command, 1958-66. He is author of Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-47; Strategic Bombing: the American Experience; and a 36 confrontation and the Revolt of commemorative booklet, "Independence and Responsibility: The Air Force in the Admirals as "a great battle." He the Postwar World." Mr. Wolk is also the author of "General Arnold, the might have added (because he surely Atomic Bomb, and the Surrender of Japan," to be published by the LSU knew) that it was a fight the fledg- Press in The Pacific War Revisited (1996). ling US Air Force won. •

AIR FORCE Magazine/July 1996 65