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The Battle of the B-36

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The "Revolt of the Admirals" focused on the big bomber, but the real issues ran much deeper. The Battle of the B-36 By Herman S. Wolk HE 1949 "Revolt of the Admi- T rals," which initially focused on the Air Force's B-36 interconti- nental bomber, was one of the most bitter public feuds in American mili- tary history. This controversy over strategy and weapons began with the 1945-47 struggle over unification, when the US Army Air Forces (AAF) Above, after the conflict with the Navy was resolved, USAF Chief of Staff was fighting to become an indepen- Gen. Nathan F. Twining (left) and Strategic Air Command Commander in Chief dent service. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay (right) show Italian President Giovanni Gronchi a model Following World War II, Gen. of of the B-36. Opposite, a B-36, with four jet engines and six propellers on its the Army Henry H. Arnold, Com- 230-foot wingspan, fills the sky all by itself. manding General of the US Army Air Forces; Gen. Carl A. Spaatz; and Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle empha- sized that the demonstrated effec- tiveness of all forms of airpower made the AAF the lead service in the American defense phalanx. Gen- Chief of Staff Gen. Dwight D. Eisen- eral Doolittle, testifying before the hower, among others. Senate Military Affairs Committee, After the war, the Navy feared it pointed out that the Navy was no might lose its air element to an inde- longer the first line of defense for pendent Air Force and that even the the United States. The US required Marine Corps might be lost. More- an independent Air Force featuring over, the naval leadership, convinced an in-being strategic atomic force that the Navy required everything to that could deter any aggressor from make it self-supporting in pursuit of initiating conflict. This would be the its mission, opposed Truman' s and country's strategic concept in the Eisenhower' s concept of mutually postwar era, and it was supported by supporting services under unified President Harry S. Truman and Army command. In the Congressional hear- 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 1996 ings on unification, General Eisen- mission and other functions ques- In 1948 and 1949, the Air Force hower emphasized that economy tions. made several decisions that led to would be a driving force in postwar The Air Force relied on the B-36 Strategic Air Command's reliance defense matters and that the nation intercontinental-range bomber to on the B-36 for the SAC atomic de- simply could not afford the Navy's accomplish the strategic mission terrent mission until the B-52 long- concept of self-sustaining forces in supporting the Truman Administra- range bomber could enter the opera- the World War II mold. tion's policy of deterrence. In Au- tional inventory. In 1948, following The centerpiece of the Navy's vi- gust 1941, Robert A. Lovett, assis- the Soviet-inspired Communist coup sion was the carrier task force that, tant secretary of war for Air, and in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet during the war, became central to its Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, chief of Union's blockade of Berlin, the pos- Pacific strategy. In the postwar pe- the Army Air Corps, determined that sibility of war increased. The Air riod, Navy Secretary James V. For- the potential loss of bases in the Force emphasized that the B-36 was restal took the lead in promoting the United Kingdom called for develop- the only aircraft capable of deliver- maritime strategy of depending on ment of a long-range bomber that ing the atomic bomb from bases in larger and faster carriers and oppos- could fly a round trip from the US to the US. ing the creation of an independent Europe. Until that time, no aircraft In early 1949, SAC Commander Air Force. had even approached this proposed in Chief Gen. Curtis E. LeMay rec- range of 10,000 miles. ommended to Gen. Hoyt S. Vanden- Compromise and Conflict Immediately after the creation of berg, USAF Chief of Staff, that the The National Security Act of 1947, USAF in September 1947, criticism Board of Senior Officers review the which established the United States of the B-36 began appearing in news- B-54 program because B-36 tests Air Force, clearly was a compro- papers and journals. Some of this with jet pods had been outstanding. mise. The Act, as well as the so- criticism came from Hugh L. Hanson, Compared to the B-54, the B-36 with called "functions paper" (actually, a Navy employee with the Bureau of jet pods was faster, operated at higher Truman's Executive Order), failed Aeronautics, who had also contacted altitude, and had greater range and to resolve roles-and-missions dis- Forrestal, now Defense Secretary, bomb-carrying capacity. Subsequent- putes among the services. The new and several Congressmen. The Sec- ly, the B-54 was canceled. Symington Air Force and the Navy—at confer- retary of the Air Force, Stuart Sy- informed Secretary Forrestal that the ences at Key West, Fla., and New- mington, complained about this to B-36 could fly from the US and could, port, R. I., in the spring and summer the Secretary of the Navy, John L. "because of its speed and altitude, of 1948—could not work out their Sullivan. Nevertheless, the attacks ... penetrate enemy country without differences over the strategic atomic continued. fighter escort, destroy the strategic AIR FORCE Magazine / July 1996 61 The stage was now set. This bitter confrontation, precipitated by the Navy and its advocates, had been foreseen by General Eisenhower. "Someday we're going to have a blowup," he predicted in January 1949. "God help us if ever we go before a Congressional committee to argue our professional fights as each service struggles to get the lion's share. Public airing of griev- ances . someday . will go far beyond the bounds of decency and reason, and someone will say, 'Who's the boss? The civilians or the mili- tary?' " High-ranking naval officers, de- termined to make the case for the supercarrier and against the B-36, took action. The Navy's Op-23 "re- Adm. Arthur Radford was one of the leaders of the Navy's charge against the search and policy" office had been B-36. He called the huge bomber - a billion-dollar blunder" and claimed that US formed in December 1948. Capt. reliance on strategic bombing was excessive. Arleigh A. Burke, a World War II destroyer commander and future Chief of Naval Operations, took target, and return nonstop to its base flush-deck supercarrier United States charge of this office in early 1949. on this continent." on which construction was to start in He placed Op-23 under tight secu- April 1949. The Navy estimated the rity (causing the press to speculate Stress and Suicide cost of the carrier at $190 million, that it was involved in shady busi- Ironically, given the nature of the but this figure failed to include the ness) and directed his people to col- struggle then brewing between the thirty-nine additional ships required lect detrimental data on the B-36 Air Force and Navy over the B-36 to complete the task force. Total while amassing positive information and the atomic mission, Truman had construction cost was $1.265 bil- on the supercarrier. named Forrestal as Secretary of De- lion, a staggering sum in 1949. John- Going public, naval officers criti- fense after Secretary of War Robert son immediately asked the Joint cized the B-36 as being too slow and P. Patterson had turned down the Chiefs of Staff as well as retired vulnerable to enemy defenses. This, post, pleading that his finances forced General Eisenhower for their opin- however, was only the beginning of him to return to the private sector. ions. what turned out to be a vicious cam- Forrestal had led the campaign against Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of paign to discredit not only the B-36 a strong National Security Act and Naval Operations, defended the su- but also the top leadership of the an independent Air Force. When he percarrier, calling it necessary "in fledgling Air Force. In April and May became the Defense Secretary, he the interest of national security." Gen. 1949, an "anonymous document" showed himself to be a weak coordi- Omar N. Bradley, Army Chief of made its way around Washington, nator, unable under the new law to Staff, and General Vandenberg, Air D. C., charging that Symington, John- step in and resolve the many differ- Force Chief of Staff, strongly op- son, and Floyd B. Odium, chairman ences among the services. posed construction, arguing that the of the board of Convair, had put the Having failed to provide strong supercarrier would duplicate the heat on the Air Force to buy B-36s, in support to Truman' s 1948 political function of the Air Force's landbased spite of the bomber's deficiencies. campaign, Forrestal' s influence waned bombers. Eisenhower also opposed Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, di- significantly. At the same time, his building the carrier. rector of Air Force Special Investi- health began to fail. He resigned in In late April 1949, after informing gations, traced the anonymous docu- March 1949, in deep mental distress, President Truman, Johnson abrupt- ment to Cedric R. Worth, a former and in May jumped to his death from ly directed that construction of the Hollywood scriptwriter, who had a window on the sixteenth floor of carrier stop immediately. Navy offi- served with the Navy during the war the National Naval Medical Center cials were outraged at not being in- and was now an assistant to Dan A.
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