sign in sign up
<<
Home , Admiral Dewey (tugboat), Air raids on Hong Kong, Clint Lorance, Croatian military ranks, David Fickling, Donn Hill

Quarter 2020 th

Issue 99, 4 99, Issue

Competition Winners Competition 2020 Essay Insurrection Act A Brief History of the of the History A Brief Weaponization Social Media

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-NINE, 4TH QUARTER 2020 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 99, 4th Quarter 2020 https://ndupress.ndu.edu

GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, , NDU

Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.

Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.

Senior Editor and Director of Art John J. Church, D.M.A.

Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich

Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell

Associate Editors Jack Godwin, Ph.D. Brian R. Shaw, Ph.D.

Book Review Editor Brett Swaney

Creative Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Advisory Committee BrigGen Jay M. Bargeron, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RDML Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN/U.S. ; BG Joy L. Curriera, USA/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for and Resource Strategy; Col Lee G. Gentile, Jr., USAF/ Air Command and ; Col Thomas J. Gordon, USMC/ Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Ambassador John Hoover/College of International Security Affairs; Cassandra C. Lewis, Ph.D./College of Information and Cyberspace; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and Staff College; MG Stephen J. Maranian, USA/U.S. Army War College; VADM Stuart B. Munsch, USN/The Joint Staff; LTG Andrew P. Poppas, USA/The Joint Staff; RDML Cedric E. Pringle, USN/ ; Brig Gen Michael T. Rawls, USAF/; MajGen W.H. Seely III/Joint Forces Staff College

Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; COL James E. Hayes, USA/National War College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College

Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Lance Corporal Joshua Anderson, rifleman with 3rd Battalion, , 1st Marine , relays commands to his fire team while conducting offensive operations during Supersquad 2020 Competition at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, , August 20, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kyle C. Talbot); Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2nd Class Travis Lamson and his team, assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 2, conduct gear check while on standby in SH-60F Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to Nightdippers of Helicopter Anti- Submarine Squadron 5, September 8, 2012 (U.S. Navy/Ryan D. McLearnon); Sailor in firefight ensemble after combating fire aboard amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard, moored pier side at Naval Base San Diego, July 15, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Julio Rivera) About the Cover In This Issue Private First Class Courtney Gibson, assigned to 554th Military Police Company, provides security from Forum Humvee gunner’s turret during 2 Executive Summary training exercise in Boeblingen, , February 10, 2015 (U.S. 4 Social Media Weaponization: Army/Martin Greeson) The Biohazard of Russian Disinformation Campaigns By Sarah Jacobs Gamberini 14 Recruiting Cyber Specialists: Why the Services Must Modernize Qualification Standards By Jesse P. Samluk, Mark A. Boeke, and Marcus A. Neal Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Features Defense University Press for the Chairman of the 22 Space Operations: Lines, Zones, 95 The Importance of Joint . JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to Options, and Dilemmas Concepts for the Planner inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and By Jerry V. Drew By James L. Cook other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat st terrorism; homeland security; and developments in 31 The Strategic Potential of 101 Mobilization in the 21 Century: training and joint professional military education to Collected Exploitable Material Asking the Right Question transform America’s military and security apparatus By Matthew C. Gaetke to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting By Michael R. Fenzel with Leslie freedom today. All published articles have been vetted Slootmaker and R. Kim Cragin through a peer-review process and cleared by the 111 A Globally Integrated U.S. Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. Coast Guard on a World Stage NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Essay Competitions By Michael N. St. Jeanos cross-component, professional military and academic 40 Competition Is What publishing house. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations States Make of It: A U.S. 116 Differentiating Kinetic and expressed or implied within are those of the Strategy Toward China Cyber Weapons to Improve contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views Integrated Combat of the Department of Defense or any other agency of By Kaleb J. Redden the Federal Government. By Josiah Dykstra, Chris Inglis, Copyright Notice 57 the Paradox: Making and Thomas S. Walcott This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition Sense of President Trump’s of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions Interventions in Military Justice of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Recall without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ By Jeremy McKissack should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted 124 Calling Forth the Military: A Brief from or based on its content. 71 Artificial Intelligence: A History of the Insurrection Act Submissions and Communications By Michael R. Rouland and JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Decisionmaking Technology research from members of the Armed Forces, By Mark M. Zais Christian E. Fearer security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United 135 More Afraid of Your Friends Than States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. Commentary the Enemy: Coalition Dynamics manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: 74 Decision Superiority in the , 1950–1951 Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Through Joint All Domain By Fideleon O. Damian NDU Press 300 Fifth Avenue (Building 62, Suite 212) Command and Control Fort Lesley J. McNair By Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy Book Reviews Washington, DC 20319 Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 81 Rightsizing Our 144 Shadows on the Wall Email: [email protected] Understanding of Religion Reviewed by John Mark Mattox JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq th By Wayne A. Macrae 4 Quarter, October 2020 145 Divided Armies ISSN 1070-0692 88 Success on Purpose: A Reviewed by Larry D. Miller Message for Leaders of 146 Command Military Organizations Reviewed by Allan R. Millett By Russell Steven Williford and Wendi Peck President Lyndon B. Johnson hands pen to Senator Robert F. Kennedy during signing ceremony for Voting Rights Act, U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC, August 6, 1965 ( Photo Office/LBJ Library/Robert Knudsen)

Executive Summary

n an address in Cape Town, South the individual Services would likely find campaigns (yes, they do exist) through the , on June 6, 1966, Senator themselves in even more interesting times. medium of social media and their impact I Robert F. Kennedy stated, “There is a The early battles over aerial bombing of on public health. Still much a concern Chinese curse which says, ‘May he live naval ships, the “Revolt of the ,” related to our battles in cyberspace, Jesse in interesting times.’ Like it or not, we dividing up airpower in Vietnam, the Samluk, Mark Boeke, and Marcus Neal live in interesting times. They are times Mayaguez incident, Operation Desert provide a solid set of criteria for updating of danger and uncertainty; but they are One, Grenada, and more all point to how the Services might recruit future cyber also the most creative of any time in the the need for more jointness, not less. warriors. While no one would question history of mankind.” As it turns out, We have learned that we can accomplish the strategic importance of space, Jerry we ourselves are living in interesting more when we work together to secure Drew helps us explore the operational and times: from the worldwide COVID-19 the Nation, especially when readiness tactical issues all of us need to understand pandemic to racial strife, wildfires to is low and resources are overstretched. as we consider space operations and the record numbers of hurricanes, contested “Teamwork makes the dream work,” my potential for warfighting in space. Back politics to economic crises, and more. wife often says. How could it be otherwise? here on Earth, Michael Fenzel, assisted by But when we take a hard look and do Sometimes we need to be reminded of Leslie Slootmaker and Kim Cragin, discuss some digging, we find that while we as how much we rely on each other. Often lessons learned on how to develop strategic individuals may not have been in such cir- it is as simple as rereading our nation’s insights from exploitable material collected cumstances, others have and found ways foundational documents and trying to from the battlefield. to “soldier on.” Otherwise, the human understand what they mean and how we Successful virtual Secretary of Defense race would have long ago ceased to exist. should best defend what they stand for. and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs essay This indomitable spirit is exactly what Our Forum presents four important competitions were held earlier this year, jointness does for the American military: it articles that take us from the battlefield and NDU Press proudly presents the provides the ways and means to continue in a traditional sense to the far reaches winners of some very close contests. to survive and provide, collectively, for the of the newest domain of cyber. First, So close, in fact, that we declared a tie defense of our nation. Left to figure out Sarah Gamberini helps us explore the in the Secretary of Defense Strategic how to defend the alone, potential effects of Russian disinformation Research Paper category. From the

2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 U.S. Army War College, Roderick Butz offers his research on the use of remotely piloted airstrikes as a tool of statecraft. Answering the call for ideas about Great Power competition with China, Kaleb Redden, from the National War College, offers his suggested U.S. strategy toward the People’s Republic of China. Jeremy McKissack, from the Air War College, won the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s Strategy Paper category with his analysis of President ’s interventions in military justice cases. In the Chairman’s Strategy Article category, Mark Zais, of the U.S. Army War College, gives us his take on artificial intelligence and military decisionmaking. Due to circumstances beyond our con- trol, we are unable to provide Roderick Butz’s winning essay in this issue but will do so as soon as possible. In Commentary, we get an ex- pert practitioner’s view as Terrence O’Shaughnessy helps us understand how we can leverage the emerging Joint All Domain Command and Control to achieve decision superiority. From the chaplain to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Wayne Macrae discusses how to understand religion in relation to the joint force. Part of his work is in assisting the development of new Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy speaks to crowd about racial equality, outside Justice joint doctrine in this area. As leaders at Department, June 14, 1963 (Library of Congress) all levels grapple with the added load of working during a global pandemic, how to integrate physical and cyber weap- assassination—included some words that Russell Williford and Wendi Peck offer ons in combat. may help all of us see our road ahead a their suggestions on how to achieve suc- In Recall, we are pleased to offer bit more clearly. He stated, “It is from cess in military organizations. two fine articles that tie us to our past in numberless diverse acts of courage such Leading off Features, James Cook order to understand what we could and as these that the belief that human history offers an excellent article on the value of should do in the future. From the Joint is thus shaped. Each time a man stands joint concepts to a joint planner. After Staff History Office, Michael Rouland up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot several calls from my colleagues here at the and Christian Fearer help us learn about of others, or strikes out against injustice, Eisenhower School for more articles on the long and nuanced history of the he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and mobilization, and having a second place Insurrection Act. The first lesson is that crossing each other from a million dif- winner in the 2019 Chairman of the Joint there is no such act. Most military history ferent centers of energy and daring those Chiefs of Staff Strategy Paper competition students look to World War II for lessons ripples build a current which can sweep at hand on the topic, we offer Matthew of fighting with allies, but Fideleon down the mightiest walls of oppression Gaetke’s views on the right questions to Damian offers an excellent account of and resistance.” To me that is what ask as we consider what mobilizing for coalition operations in the opening year Americans, especially those in uniform, war today should resemble. Next, Michael of the Korean War. In addition, we bring aspire to do. Let us know what you think. St. Jeanos offers an up-to-date primer on you three excellent book reviews and our Be safe. JFQ the U.S. Coast Guard. And to help us joint doctrine update. understand the connections between the Robert Kennedy’s speech that day William T. Eliason “boom” and the “zaps,” Josiah Dykstra, in 1966—on a then unprecedented Editor in Chief Chris Inglis, and Thomas Walcott describe trip and exactly 2 years before his

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Eliason 3 Senior Airman Marcel Williams, 27th Special Operations public affairs broadcaster, speaks at “Gathering for Unity” event at Cannon Air Force Base, New , June 5, 2020, and shares experiencing racism in his own community (U.S. Air Force/Lane T. Plummer)

Social Media Weaponization The Biohazard of Russian Disinformation Campaigns

By Sarah Jacobs Gamberini

n a renewed era of Great Power com- competitors are regularly operating allowed for nearly ubiquitous access to petition, the United States is faced below the threshold that would warrant its targets and a prolific capability for I with adversaries engaging across mul- a military response, including on the controlling a narrative and manipu- tiple domains without the traditional information battlefield. The blurred red lating the hearts and minds of a pop- distinctions of war and peace. America’s lines that from covert informa- ulation on a range of sensitive societal tion operations waged by foreign actors issues, including public health. on the Internet will force a change in Russia has a long history of seeking how the United States operates and to project power and influence while Sarah Jacobs Gamberini is a Policy Fellow in how its society consumes information. playing with a technological and geopo- the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute for National Strategic Russia used tactics of influence and litical handicap. Given its history and a Studies, at the National Defense University. coercion long before social media geographic location with many bordering

4 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 nations, it sees itself as constantly be- encroachment from the United States region.9 Since the end of the , sieged from all sides, but particularly by and the Orga- Russia has had to be calculating and the West. Since the nadir of Soviet dis- nization (NATO). It views the United creative to balance its economic, military, solution, Russia has fought to rebalance States, NATO, and the European Union and technological disadvantages to com- power and contemporaneously reduce as committed to weakening Russia, pete with the United States, maximizing American influence. But without equiva- eliminating its sphere of influence, less conventional tools of war, including lent conventional military might, Russia and ensuring sustained U.S.-Western covert operations within the information has turned to other asymmetric advan- unipolar dominance.4 This assessment domain. tages to compensate in its competition derives from a strong Russian belief that During the Cold War, the Soviet with the United States. Social media has the United States broke its word that Union used active measures to influence provided a unique tool kit to manipulate NATO would move “not one inch east- nations in coercive ways distinct from narratives and amplify societal divisions ward,” as stated by then–U.S. Secretary espionage and counterintelligence. Active in an effort to weaken the United States of State James Baker in the aftermath measures included disinformation, polit- in ways previously unimaginable. While of the Soviet dissolution.5 Russia touts ical influence operations, and controlling Russian weaponization of information the West’s “interference” during the media and messaging with the goal of is not new the intersection of Russian Ukrainian revolution as further evidence discrediting or influencing the West, disinformation, public health crises, and that the United States and NATO which are echoed in Russia’s modern-day vulnerability to bioevents presents new are meddling too much in its area of tactics.10 This type of warfare and other and troubling homeland and national influence.6 It views this infringement on measures below the threshold of actual security threats for the United States. what it perceives as its near abroad as an use of force have been variously referred The United States is diverse, pluralis- unacceptable affront.7 to in the West as Russia’s asymmetric, tic, and democratic. These characteristics, Russia sees Western dominance gray zone, hybrid, or next-generation its founding principles, are also its manifested socially and culturally (for warfare. However, the term cross-do- strengths as a nation. But to U.S. adver- example, Western entertainment seeking main warfare better reflects the current saries, including Russia, they are potential to replace Russian culture, values, and Russian method of shaping the security weaknesses to exploit. One strategic goal language), politically (the West foment- environment using an integrated ap- of Russia’s influence operations is to ing “color revolutions” in Russia and the proach of all military and nonmilitary weaken the United States and its allies, former ), and militarily (the devices to achieve its strategic goals.11 which Russia views as operating too close United States geographically encircling In a response to the to its sphere of influence, what it refers Russia with NATO expansion and tech- uprisings, which Russia believed to be to as its “near abroad.”1 Time and again, nologically ringing Russia with missile incited by the West, General Valery Russia has used familiar influence tactics defenses and bases). Moreover, Russia Gerasimov (now chief of the General to spread disinformation in an attempt to has long feared it is behind the West in Staff) publicly discussed how to prevent weaken U.S. democratic society and de- science and technology. Russia has, at similar uprisings in Russia. In his speech, fame America’s reputation on the world times, achieved parity in certain defense Gerasimov cited control of information stage.2 From Russia’s interference in the platforms but generally struggles to keep as central to victory.12 This speech, which 2016 Presidential election to spreading pace, thus relying heavily on traditional has been overstated as a Russian military hoaxes during the 2020 global pandemic, weapons of mass destruction, such as its doctrine, did describe how Russia should Russia is exploiting America’s divisions substantial nuclear arsenal, to offset U.S. operate simultaneously across multiple with disinformation to amplify discord conventional might. Russia similarly lags domains—military, political, cyber, and in the United States and undermine its in technologies for civilian applications. information warfare—to achieve strategic institutions. As Russia targets issues of Underlying all this are vast and troubling goals. In March 2019, Gerasimov spoke public health in this way, there will be demographic and health challenges (a on the shift of warfare to the information tremendous implications for American declining birth rate and high death rate sphere and labeled information technolo- citizens and the U.S. health system. The from unnatural causes, including wide- gies as “one of the most promising types world is grappling with an “infodemic” spread alcoholism).8 These factors have of weapons” to be used covertly “not as well as a pandemic, and both require a led to Russia viewing itself in a constant only against critically important informa- whole-of-society approach to be success- state of besiegement and deficiency. tional infrastructures, but also against the fully addressed.3 Much of what shapes and propels population of a country, directly influ- Russia’s worldview today is based on for- encing the condition of a state’s national Russia Under Siege mer Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s security.”13 Over centuries, Russia has experienced doctrine that rejects the United States as Information is but one aspect of attacks from the Teutonic Knights, a hegemon and seeks a multipolar world cross-domain warfare. Another important Napoleon, and , and the reestablishment of Russia as the facet of this Russian thinking is the belief and, since the end of the Cold War, main regional power in the former Soviet that the customary distinction between

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 5 Control room operators with Edgewood Chemical Biological Center aboard U.S. Government–owned container ship MV Cape Ray, modified and deployed to eastern Mediterranean Sea to dispose of Syrian chemical agents, confirm and record data on current operation at Naval Station Rota, , June 16, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Desmond Parks) wartime and peacetime no longer ex- undermine Russian social, cultural, Russia has responded to this threat of ists. These blurred red lines have been and political institutions as part of its the information age in a number of ways. demonstrated beyond speeches or doc- broader campaign to ensure Western It is working to create a “Russia only” trine, for instance in Russia’s employment geopolitical dominance.14 The Kremlin Internet with aspirations of creating a of this malign activity below the U.S. sees information as a new type of Russian equivalent of China’s “Great threshold of armed conflict—little green weapon and views all forms of informa- Firewall.”15 Russian and propa- men in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, tion, across all platforms, as potential ganda (for example, the state-controlled “unaffiliated” private military groups in sources of power to be weaponized. television network RT and online “news” , use of Novichok (a Cold War–era Russia believes that the West is using aggregators such as Sputnik) are beamed chemical weapon first developed by the all forms of information technology in to counter Western cable news.16 Soviet Union) in the , against them—from persistent satellite Additionally, until Russia has its own and numerous cyber attacks—and by the television and the Internet bombarding information operations military systems, nature of cloaked activities, likely many Russian citizens with what it views as it holds Western systems at risk both more. Yet Russia has protected itself from overtly anti-Russian messages to social physically (for example, antispace capa- military response because attribution and media as tools for coordinating activists bilities) and with cyber attacks.17 Finally, proportionality are thrown into question and provocateurs in uprisings in former the Russian government’s active Internet by their deniability and obfuscation. Soviet republics. Finally, Russia sees presence pervades the social media land- U.S. space, intelligence, surveillance, scape using large numbers of Russian Old Influence Operations and reconnaissance, as well as other Web brigades, troll farms, and automated Playbook, New Media Tools information technology systems, as net- bots to disseminate propaganda and flood Russia’s present leaders fear that U.S. worked military capabilities designed to hashtags.18 advantages in information technology summarily dismantle any opponent slow Coinciding with its view that all infor- allow Washington and its allies to to adapt. mation can be leveraged, Russia’s social

6 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 media machine is employed to great that makes online influence operations communication during protests.25 It is effect to influence its adversaries and so successful is that once information is important to note that Russia’s goal is their populations. Russian trolls utilize disseminated and consumed, it is hard rarely to promote one side of any issue, the power of narratives online, focusing to retract it from people’s minds. The but to stir the pot and enflame ten- on simple messages targeting a cohesive tools that make social media so useful for sions—U.S. self-destruction would be so that its message will then be connecting, sharing, and organizing are Russia’s ideal victory. shared and further amplified by foreign the same tools that allow malign actors Russia’s information warfare tactics targets.19 They have a keen understanding to take advantage and manipulate. This are a moving target, making them diffi- that strong emotions spread quickly on- fact—paired with a need for fast news cult to understand and counter. In June line and that, given the right prompting, without waiting for validating research or 2020, a large-scale, persistent 6-year-long people love nothing more than arguing fact-checking, the ease of sharing on so- disinformation campaign out of Russia and solidifying entrenched viewpoints.20 cial media platforms, and the fact that the was exposed. The campaign used new As with Soviet active measures, Russia’s most divisive topics are deeply emotional methods for targeting the West and goals in weaponizing social media are (for example, public health and race Ukraine on issues ranging from denying to foment chaos, create distrust in U.S. relations)—makes the United States the Russian doping in international sporting institutions, and target the preexisting perfect target of this type of social media events to the broader praising of Russia divisions in the country. All this makes weapon. and its government and highlighting U.S. it harder for the United States to form Russia’s modus operandi for social and NATO aggression and interference a unified response to counter Russia in media exploitation is predictable: Identify in other countries.26 The campaign was more traditional domains. a contentious issue, employ bots and labeled “Secondary Infektion”27 as an trolls on various social media platforms to homage to Operation Infektion, a Cold Misinformation and spread divisive rhetoric, amplify debates, War callback to the 1980s disinforma- Disinformation Campaigns and promote discord.22 One of the most tion campaign when the Soviet Union Americans are regularly confronted with publicized influence operations by Russia employed malicious messaging to sell the fake news in many forms from both was its interference in the U.S. elections conspiracy theory that the U.S. military domestic and foreign sources. There in 2016. But Moscow’s efforts are created the AIDS virus as a tool of war.28 is a spectrum of false content online, broader than elections and exist as part of Of particular interest in Russia’s methods from well-meaning friends on Facebook an ongoing deliberate campaign against during Secondary Infektion was the large thoughtlessly sharing misinformation the U.S. public. As a diverse, pluralist so- number of “burner” accounts used for a they assume to be true to more malev- ciety, the existence of societal fissures for single misleading tweet and then aban- olent and targeted propaganda-like target are numerous. doned. As opposed to previous efforts content designed to intentionally In 2019, leaked documents revealed to build social media accounts with a fol- confuse and deceive. Therefore, it is that Russia considered targeting one of lowing, credibility, and trust, this shows important to understand the difference America’s deepest and oldest fault lines as Russia’s recognition of Americans’ media between the terms disinformation and a nation: race. Documents showed Russia illiteracy, inability to recognize fake news, misinformation. Disinformation is the considered training African-Americans in and unwillingness to research deeper than malicious and intentional development combat and sabotage before returning a single tweet. Few people take the time and propagation of false information, these individuals to the United States to to seek the source of information, and so while misinformation is the inadvertent create a Pan-African state in the southern far Russia has been proved correct in its spreading of erroneous content. Russia United States, physically breaking apart hypothesis.29 As much as can be under- relies on both. A misinformation cam- the country. The proposal, which was stood about Russia’s goals and methods, paign, for example, could be employed never enacted, intended to “destabilize the inexpensive and ubiquitous nature of maliciously by relying on unwitting the internal situation of the [United social media empowers disinformation users to spread false information. States].” 23 Russia recognizes that slav- efforts to shift and flex to changes in Bill Gates, when asked in 1995 about ery and the resulting centuries-long the social media algorithms as needed. false information spreading on the then- inequality is the original American sin It could also release prolific amounts of new “Net,” stated that fake news would and the ultimate fissure to be exploited. false and harmful information, which, if be easy to debunk because there would Russian influence operations were used only marginally successful, could have an be more people checking the facts and in- against African-Americans in advance of outsized impact. formation would be spread from friend to the 2016 election,24 and more recently friend, a more trustworthy transaction.21 Russia has exploited the Black Lives Amplifying Public But as we now know, it is this very aspect Matter movement by flooding Health Debates of social media that allows for misinfor- hashtags—a technique used to dilute Russia clearly recognizes how to iden- mation campaigns to succeed and for fake legitimate related content, thus inhibiting tify, exploit, and amplify U.S. political news to flourish. Another core challenge the social media platform as a means of tensions and the Nation’s racial wounds

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 7 Transportation systems technicians from 452nd Logistic Readiness Squadron prepare 50 pallets of ventilators provided by U.S. Agency for International Development for delivery to Moscow, Russia, at March Air Reserve Base, California, May 19, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Keith James) as well as other seams and fissures. vaccinations are at best unnecessary and example, children, pregnant women, Public health is another area of acute at worst cause physical harm, including and other vulnerable populations). debate in the United States, and one autism and seizures. The movement is For a disease as contagious as measles, that is ideal for Russian targeting. fueled by a deep mistrust of authority herd immunity occurs only if approx- Public health issues are both personal and the existence of echo chambers imately 94 percent of a population is and societal, and therefore any discus- online that encourage the spread of vaccinated; even a small change in vac- sion of related topics is often full of misinformation quickly and among cination numbers could bring back this emotion and an eagerness to quickly friends. All the fake news about vaccines disease, declared eliminated in the United obtain information. Often, people are is actually harder to counter due to States in 2000.32 The result of erroneous more trusting of health advice from their amazing success. Diseases such as fear-mongering about vaccines is a society friends, family, or influencers they trust measles are seen as relics of the past that that is physically degraded by previously than impersonal institutions. A National have long been eradicated and do not eliminated diseases.33 And now that the Institutes of Health study found that touch modern U.S. society. However, world grapples with the novel corona- “in the [United States], eight in ten the United States is experiencing the virus causing COVID-19, large pockets Internet users search for health infor- greatest number of measles cases since of society are loathe to be told how to mation online, and 74 percent of these 1992 in parts of the country where a protect themselves and their communi- people use social media.”30 This makes significant percentage of the population ties. If Americans are rebelling against public health issues such as COVID-19 has opted out of vaccines.31 Vaccines the science that underlies why masks and or measles an ideal target for Russian are successful with herd immunity physical distancing are good preventative social media weaponization. It is divisive when, depending on how contagious measures, it is foreseeable that there will and emotional, and could realistically the disease, a certain percentage of the be skepticism over a vaccine once it is physically weaken the United States. society is vaccinated in order to protect a available. The United States has been The anti-vaccination (anti-vaxx- small number of the society who cannot lulled into a false sense of security due to ers) movement espouses a belief that get vaccines for various reasons (for the very success of vaccines.

8 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 These public health crises would be was brought to Wuhan by the U.S. Army also relied on the military to help with atrocious enough without attempts by during Olympics-style military games expanded hospital bed capacity at home, foreign adversaries to exacerbate them. in 2019.36 This adds to concerns that all of which stretches resources and in The Journal of Public Health uncovered Russia’s influence operations are attrac- theory means fewer forces deployed.38 that the same Russian Internet Research tive to other U.S. adversaries and will If anti-vaxxers grow in number and/ Agency—led by Yevgeny Prigozhin (a continue to be a prime method of attack or influence, this could weaken the U.S. close friend of Russian President Vladimir from multiple actors. ability to respond to any type of biolog- Putin) and indicted in Robert Mueller’s These attacks on public health pres- ical threat—natural or human-made. investigation report on Russian election ent a threat to homeland and national Bioweapons of the future are less likely to interference—was also behind deploying security. The anti-vaxxer movement risks be those agents historically weaponized bots and trolls to spread disinformation increasing U.S. vulnerability to infec- and will likely target civilian populations. on vaccinations.34 In its analysis, the tious diseases. Looking forward to how Biological agents have always been diffi- journal article notes that Russian bots these same tactics may be used against a cult to weaponize because of the quantity and trolls tweeted an equal number of COVID-19 vaccine once it is available, and dissemination needed to have wide- pro- and anti-vaccine tweets. The goal, we must consider the implications of spread, mass impact. As the large-scale it seems, was to stir the debate and bring malignant messaging about vaccines programs of the Cold War gave way to people into their corners, further en- from both domestic and foreign sources. the terrorist threat, the biothreat scenario trenching their own viewpoints. Russia’s Beyond propagating doubt in U.S. insti- of a biological agent–filled test tube goal is to amplify and normalize the tutions (for example, hospitals/testing dropped in a subway has been overtaken debate and firmly cement divisions. The and government organizations such as by disturbing real-world pandemic health repercussions that result from the Centers for Disease Control and scenarios. a normalized vaccination debate were Prevention), these campaigns result in Russia and other U.S. adversaries are unlikely Russia’s primary goal—merely doubt of basic science (for example, peo- certainly noting U.S. vulnerabilities in a byproduct—but the fact that Russia ple not wearing masks and possibly not its response to the coronavirus. All this could so callously degrade the health trusting a future vaccine). By amplifying presents renewed concerns of a future of U.S. citizens as a secondary effect public health debates and not advocating biological weapon, the effects of which of its influence operations is egregious. for one side, Russia has helped normalize could be further enabled by information Given the ties to the Russian president, it a previously fringe discussion rejecting warfare. These indiscriminate information presents further concerns about how this basic science underlying vaccines and dis- attacks on public health reveal how Russia campaign may be endorsed by the state ease prevention. U.S. health institutions will exploit any divisions within the and what that means for how the United are faced with a crisis of trust as scientific United States, even to the point of wreak- States responds. Deniability, however, is facts about these contagious diseases are ing public health havoc. These attacks the crux of Putin’s success in this area. degraded by both intentional and inad- on public health highlight the type of Russia has similarly used its predict- vertent lies. ruthless adversary the United States faces. able tactics against the United States to There are longer term effects of At a certain point, the United States must stoke fear and chaos and to undercut amplifying the anti-vaxxer movement. contemplate whether this interference in the U.S. response during the COVID- Beyond the health and institutional its public health is a biothreat caused by a 19 pandemic. False narratives spread concerns, there are also costs to the U.S. foreign adversary. by Russian state media, trolls, and bots health system, as well as costs associated range from conspiracy theories that the with quarantining. The movement is a Countering the Influence virus was variously created by migrants, distraction for healthcare professionals of Influence Operations as a U.S. bioweapon, or to benefit the who are overburdened in this crisis as Asymmetric warfare is being waged U.S. pharmaceutical companies, or that it is, and for local, state, and Federal against the United States and its citizens the virus itself is a hoax.35 Furthermore, governments that must devote time daily across multiple platforms and with China’s disinformation use—which has and resources to countering this false expanded notions of what constitutes historically been focused on domestic information. Furthermore, natural or acceptable warfare. Though the effects propaganda and creating the narrative intentional biothreats (including nat- of Russia’s information operations on that China and its authoritarian govern- ural biothreats exacerbated by foreign health matters are grave, we have not ment are benevolent and powerful—has adversary messaging) could potentially yet codified these societal attacks as borrowed from Russia’s influence oper- inhibit the military’s ability to project warfare, and therefore they do not rise ations playbook during the pandemic, power abroad. The pandemic has shown to the level of military response. The moving from its initial propaganda-type how vulnerable forces are to contracting United States requires a comprehen- response downplaying and denying the diseases such as COVID-19, and there sive, whole-of-government solution disease to all-out conspiracy theories and is renewed awareness of this threat by to counter these actions as well as a disinformation, including that the virus our adversaries.37 The United States has whole-of-society awareness to be part

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 9 Berkut (Ukrainian riot police) man checkpoint at entrance to Crimean Peninsula, March 10, 2014 (Courtesy Sasha Maksymenko) of the solution. Governments and as authorized.39 In the past, there has citizens and the Nation’s adversaries, it companies could raise barriers to make been work to counter Russian messaging cannot be fully successful.41 the efforts harder, and people could be in pockets of the U.S. Government, but One of the most effective things better informed on how to identify mis- it has often been limited to addressing that the U.S. Government could do information and disinformation, thereby overt propaganda rather than the low- to counter disinformation is practice making it less effective. The combined level guerrilla exploitation of social media consistent messaging and, in the case of effects could lead to reducing Russia’s we face today. During the Cold War, the disinformation and public health, deliver influence, if not deterring it altogether. U.S. Active Measures Working Group a consistent, science-based message. The solution will be complex, at all was established not only to counter During the aftermath of the attempted levels of society, and it begins and ends Soviet disinformation but also to sensitize assassination of Sergei Skripal in the with an informed public with high societies to be able to recognize Russian United Kingdom using Novichok, Russia media literacy. interference for themselves.40 It would put out hundreds of conflicting narratives Government can help but cannot seem this type of whole-of-government to confuse, deflect, and deny its involve- alone solve the problem of disinformation commitment to countering disinforma- ment. The United Kingdom, rather than any more than it can solely solve public tion would be timely to revive, perhaps in play whack-a-mole by attempting to health challenges. The 2020 National the form of the Malign Foreign Influence disprove each falsehood, put out a consis- Defense Authorization Act called for the Response Center. Even so, it would not tent, science-based message that helped Director of National Intelligence to cre- be enough on its own and certainly not reveal the lies and inconsistencies within ate a Malign Foreign Influence Response with intelligence-only participation. the Russian messaging.42 Center to coordinate and integrate across The Department of State’s Global Furthermore, the United States the Intelligence Community on issues Engagement Center is doing its part to must call out Russia for its cross-domain of foreign influence; as of this writing, identify, expose, and counter disinforma- misdeeds, including in the area of infor- this center has not yet been established tion, but without higher visibility by U.S. mation operations. The United States

10 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 must respond directly to these threats As social media continues to evolve Russia’s theory of the United States through targeted sanctions, international into more visual platforms including is that its diversity is its weakness. To condemnation in multilateral forums, TikTok, it will be important to flag counter this narrative, the United States and other asymmetric responses. Despite manipulated media such as artificial must show strength in its pluralism and Russia’s attempts at deniability of its role intelligence–enabled deepfakes. Though work as a country to heal the divisions in these campaigns, the United States it presents a great challenge, as the tech- that make it the ideal target for this meth- and its allies should present evidence nology to create believable deepfakes odology. Russia is drilling deeper into in a forum such as the improves, so does the technology to the preexisting fault lines of American Security Council to show the links be- counter it. Tech companies are investing society—distracting, dividing, and tween these bad actors and the Russian in methods that reveal clues for when weakening. Particularly in the face of the government. Because of Russia’s veto an image has been altered, such as water Presidential election and a modern pan- on the Security Council, no resolutions droplets on an image, a tell-tale sign of demic, all Americans must be vigilant in would be passed, but this high-visibility media manipulation.44 There are also questioning where information originates action would highlight to the world algorithms to assess when the title of and hyperaware of the seams and fissures Russia’s malign activities and perhaps rally an article does not match the content, in American society that are primed for support of other nations around stop- which could then alert users and dis- this type of attack. Healing the wounds ping this bad actor. The United States courage them from sharing misleading and divisions of an increasingly polarized needs to assess Russia’s actions not only information based on the title alone.45 nation will go a long way toward protect- by its methods but also by its effects. If Incorporating these technologies into ing the United States from Russia’s social Russia’s social media meddling results in social media platforms to flag manipu- media weaponization. JFQ a physically weakened society, even inad- lated media before it is shared further vertently, the United States must consider would both slow the spread of false treating these actions as more akin to a information and help create a society Notes bioattack than to a cyber attack. with a healthy level of skepticism and 1 Industry partners would play an improved media literacy. To maintain Roy Godson, Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Cam- important role in the solution. Silicon freedom to access all information, we paigns, Hearing Before the Select Committee Valley, the home of the platforms on must ensure users have the tools they on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, 115th Cong., which this misinformation and disinfor- need to help recognize and counter 1st sess., 2017, available at . 2 Adam Taylor, “Did Russia Interfere of speech and shareholder pressure and must happen to effectively counter in Brexit? An Unpublished Report Roils therefore has not done nearly enough to Russian disinformation is an educated UK Politics Before Election,” Washington combat the information warfare waged and empowered U.S. population ca- Post, November 5, 2019, available at ; Filippa this threat but rather must accept that will not work to stop or slow Russia’s Lentzos, “The Russian Disinformation Attack this false content exists and focus on em- disinformation efforts; the United States That Poses a Biological Danger,” Bulletin of the powering companies and users to identify should therefore focus on inoculating Atomic Scientists, November 19, 2018, available and expose this content. In the midst of the population against Russia’s attempts at ; Robert S. Mueller III, Report system to identify and draw attention to A challenge of countering disinfor- on the Investigation into Russian Interference articles and posts that may be consid- mation during a public health crisis is in the 2016 Presidential Election, vols. I and ered dangerous or spreading disproven balancing the need for a media-literate II (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, information. In June 2020, Twitter society that is highly attuned to detect March 2019), available at . 3 Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, speech of Foreign Affairs official Lijian Zhou’s trusting institutions in equal measure. delivered to the Munich Security Conference, tweet advertising a bioweapon conspiracy The United States must invest in media Munich, Germany, February 15, 2020, avail- theory. While this social media policing is literacy and instill an awareness of the able at . 4 concerns and a “whack-a-troll” approach campaigns. In addition to making the Godson, Disinformation. 5 Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blan- is inefficient, it is a good first step to public aware of Russia’s role in these ton, NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev draw users’ attention to the reality that targeted information attacks, Americans Heard (Washington, DC: National Security all tweets, even from verified accounts, must assess other fissures in U.S. society Archive, 2017), available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 11 Marines fire 81mm mortar during training in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Hajin, Syria, August 4, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Corey Hook) bachev-heard-western-leaders-early>. library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP- 14 Carolina Vendil Pallin, “Internet Control 6 Ukraine: Background, Conflict with 84B00049R001303150031-0.pdf>. Through Ownership: The Case of Russia,” Post Russia, and U.S. Policy, R45008 (Washington, 11 Dmitry Adamsky, “Strategic Stability Soviet Affairs 33, no. 1 (2017). DC: Congressional Research Service, April 29, and Cross-Domain Coercion: The Russian 15 Jane Wakefield, “Russia ‘Successfully 2020), available at . The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons ber 24, 2019, available at . West, and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg (Wash- 16 Steven Erlanger, “Russia’s RT Network: Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, Is It More BBC or KGB,” New York Times, 2017). 2018). March 8, 2017, available at

12 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Narratives for National Security: Proceedings Best Practices,” Pharmaceutical and Thera- com/2020/04/08/magazine/hospi- of a Workshop (Washington, DC: The National peutics Journal 39, no. 7 (July 2014), available tal-ship-comfort-new-york-coronavirus.html>; Academies Press, 2018), available at . PMC4103576/>. formation.” 20 Matthew Shaer, “What Emotion Goes 31 Centers for Disease Control and Preven- 39 National Defense Authorization Act for Viral the Fastest?” Smithsonian Magazine, April tion (CDC), “Measles Cases and Outbreaks,” Fiscal Year 2020, 116th Cong., § 1790, January 2014, available at . gov/legislation/damon-paul-nelson-and-mat- est-180950182/>. 32 Sebastian Funk, Critical Immunity thew-young-pollard-intelligence-authori- 21 Tom Huddleston, Jr., “In 1995, Bill Thresholds for Measles Elimination (London: zation-act-fiscal-1>; Amy Klobuchar et al., Gates Made These Predictions About Stream- Centre for the Mathematical Modelling of In- “Letter to Secretary Esper, Director Ratcliffe, ing Movies and Fake News on the Internet,” fectious Diseases, October 19, 2017), available Director Wray, General Nakasone, and Acting CNBC, May 31, 2019, available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 13 Grace M. Hopper, USN (covered), popularized idea of machine-independent programming languages that led to development of COBOL, January 20, 1984 (U.S. Navy/James S. Davis)

Recruiting Cyber Specialists Why the Services Must Modernize Qualification Standards

By Jesse P. Samluk, Mark A. Boeke, and Marcus A. Neal

ardly a day goes by without best cyber security efforts, criminal Officer Corps) are also doing their another data breach concerning hackers seem to be one step ahead. version of playing catchup by forming H peoples’ sensitive information— Playing catchup to hackers is an infinite their own siloed cyber elements.1 Cyber such as Social Security numbers, dates game of wits, brains, luck, and patience. issues are by definition not geographically of birth, and payroll information— The uniformed services (to include bound, and they do not have a certain as- making the news. Billions of dollars are here the Coast Guard, U.S. Public pect to them that begs for assistance from lost each year to data breaches and theft Health Service Commissioned Corps, any particular service component. This of intellectual property. Unfortunately, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric effort is compounded with the services there is no end in sight. Despite our Administration [NOAA] Commissioned recruiting and retaining cyber specialists in a decades-old personnel environment with even older medical, age, and prior service standards. Dr. Jesse P. Samluk is a Reserve Organization of America Member and an RF Engineer with the Department of Defense (DOD). Mark A. Boeke is a Lessons Learned Program Manager with DOD. Marcus The uniformed services realize that A. Neal is a Lead Cyber Security Engineer with DOD. cyber is its own distinct warfighting

14 Forum / Recruiting Cyber Specialists JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 domain, just like the land, sea, or air, promotion policies, frequent moves, long cyber specialists, the time is at hand to where either nation-states or terrorist ac- deployments, and less-than-competitive make these necessary changes, so the tors can target our country. It is a unique pay present retention challenges for cyber uniformed services will be well prepared battlefield where no one receives direct security experts in uniform—even more to defend our Nation in cyberspace. The fire, but the potential havoc created by so for those who must support families. clarion call is more revolutionary than a cyber attack could be more damaging To address this problem, the uni- evolutionary. than other forms of engagement. Cyber formed services are starting to adapt in warfare does differ in that it knows no innovative ways. The Army already offers Medical Standard Barriers boundaries; even if the United States direct commissioning into the cyber In addition to meeting technical qual- withdrew all its forces from foreign coun- field and is considering expanding direct ifications, cyber specialists also face tries, it would still be vulnerable to cyber commission ranks through (O6), other entrance standards that apply to lines of operation from capable actors— while also paying accession and retention all candidates: medical, age, and prior both external and internal. Additionally, bonuses between $40,000 and $100,000.4 service reentry standards. No one is our assets in space are prime targets for General Paul Nakasone, USA, while in calling for the elimination of all criteria. hacking. Protecting the data of the re- his previous role as commander of U.S. The question is, what standards are cently established U.S. Space Force will Army Cyber Command, agreed that the appropriate for our modern and future place an additional demand on critically current level of direct commission ranking cyber warriors? overburdened cyber professionals.2 (O2) is hampering recruiting and reten- The majority of current age-eligible Cyber security is among the fastest tion efforts. He stated, “We are limited prospects cannot meet the entrance stan- growing job markets, and such expansion to bringing [cyber specialists] in as a first dards; overall, this problem is catastrophic. is expected to continue rapidly over the lieutenant, and so we would like greater According to a 2017 Pentagon report, 71 next few years. Nearly every facet of flexibility on that.”5 Considering that the percent of those considered young enlist- society is under attack from state-spon- Public Health Service Commissioned ment age—that is, between the ages of 17 sored hackers, including Russian attacks Corps already direct commissions the and 24—are ineligible to serve.10 Of that on classified government networks and Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary number, close to 60 percent are ineligible North Korean ransomware attacks on av- for Health at the ranks of due to either medical standards or physical erage Americans. In this vein, the services vice (O9) and admiral (O10), fitness levels.11 This problem is quickly are looking for the best and brightest respectively, this problem, while somewhat becoming the next “looming national and are actively recruiting to protect our controversial for the Public Health Service security crisis.”12 And of those deemed government’s critical systems. In return, Commissioned Corps, should be a nonis- qualified to serve, only 15 percent exhibit the services offer the honor and privilege sue for the rest of the services.6 any interest in service whatsoever.13 of wearing the uniform and assisting the Even marching band members in While the numbers are concerning, Nation. However, the services are also the Air Force, as an incentive to join the given the medical standards in their pres- competing for people against private in- band, are rapidly promoted to E6 after ent state, it is also safe to say that most dustry, with familiar company names such initial training.7 The Army is considering of the standards do not reflect the pace as Google, Facebook, and Apple, as well letting cyber personnel leave the mili- of advances in medicine. What was once as less familiar ones such as CrowdStrike tary, learn new skills in private industry, considered a serious medical condition and FireEye, to secure sensitive informa- and reenter service.8 This concept is years ago can be treated successfully tion of all stripes. Although private-sector not unlike training with industry pro- today. For example, consider a severe my- employers can pay top dollar to attract grams—an existing option for selected opia condition from a detached retina as new talent, government agencies servicemembers. Lori a result of an injury resulting from sports, (Federal, state, and local) cannot. That Reynolds, former commander of Marine a car accident, or even being a victim is not to say that cyber security experts Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, has of an assault or other crime. Within the are averse to government service; highly stated, “We need to start thinking outside current medical standards, this particular skilled cyber security professionals serve the box on some of this stuff, because, eye condition is disqualifying and has a in the Nation’s military and clandestine monetarily, it’s really difficult to keep up slim chance of receiving a medical waiver. services and are perhaps the world’s most with what industry offers.”9 While some Specifically, Department of Defense potent offensive and defensive hackers. of the ideas presented here are outside (DOD) Instruction 6130.03 disqualifies, U.S. Code Titles 10 (Armed Forces), 18 the box, the uniformed services have “d. Retina. Any history of any abnormal- (Crime and Criminal Procedure), and not changed their extremely restrictive ity of the retina, choroid, or vitreous.”14 50 (War and National Defense) work medical, age, and prior service stan- But eye surgery has improved over in concert to allow government cyber dards, even though the need is so great. the years to treat such conditions so that security professionals to operate under Therefore, the purpose of this article is a detached retina can be repaired, regard- authorities that private industry can- to argue and demonstrate that, given the less of how it occurred. So, then, why not—a major point of appeal.3 That said, urgent need for recruiting and retaining are the uniformed services still regarding

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Samluk, Boeke, and Neal 15 some of these conditions as limiting for is deployed. That may be a valid case in nonprior military service applicants the military service? Keep in mind that a some specialties, but servicemembers in highest maximum age cutoff: age 44.20 detached retina is just one of many condi- cyber operations are generally in com- The uniformed services have shown tions that modern medicine has improved puting centers far away from any danger an ability to adapt to adjusting outdated with consistent results, but the DOD zone and could launch successful attacks age standards when faced with filling a instruction for medical standards has with little more physical exertion than critical specialty. In 2018, Tyrone Krause, not evolved. That said, DOD has been the touch of a keyboard and click of a a 63-year-old cardiothoracic surgeon, was known to evolve on the area of medical mouse. Obviously, those cyber operators commissioned into the Navy at the rank standards when there is a definite need: embedded in tactical units would need to of commander (O5).21 If this surgeon can Due to a fighter shortage, the Air meet more rigorous physical standards. commission later in life, at a higher rank, Force no longer restricts applicants for Regardless, those members in cyberspace then are age standards really necessary in being too short.15 are dedicated to protecting systems and an era where people live longer and are The medical standards are written will go where they are needed. For this more vigorous well into their seventies to treat everyone the same and to hold reason, obsolete medical standards cannot and beyond? everyone to an equal standard regardless be a barrier to recruiting cyber specialists if For another example, consider Grace of military specialty. Not everyone can be the uniformed services want to best achieve Hopper, who was born in 1906, earned a or desires to be a fighter pilot, infantry, or the offense—a principle of war. PhD in mathematics from Yale in 1934, even a special forces operator, which are The solution is for the services to and joined the Navy Reserve in 1943. specialties that require a stricter physical readily waive standards—as they often She became a pioneer with the new and specialized standard. Many who seek do for other critical specialties, such as compiled computer language COBOL in to join want to do something besides physicians, lawyers, and chaplains—as the 1950s.22 Commander Hopper retired combat-related work. There are scores of long as these individuals can still perform from the Navy Reserve in 1966 but was other specialties in the services that peo- the mission.17 If waivers are required, recalled to Active duty to continue her ple could join without being held to such then the process must be lean for shorter work with COBOL. Her second retire- stringent physical standards. In today’s processing time. One possible way to ment was as a , lower half, in era, retired Army Major Scott Smiley speed up the process is to include retired 1986, when she was nearing age 80.23 continued to serve even after losing military and civilian doctors’ recom- The key point here is a familiar adage: 100 percent of his vision after a suicide mendations. Another proposed idea is “With age comes wisdom and experi- bomber attack in .16 to have an assisted accessions process in ence.” Even Commander Krause, at the The cyber domain is one of the spe- which applicants are evaluated holistically time of his commissioning, stated, “A lot cialties that does not require strict physical instead of just looking at a disqualifying of people in the private sector have a lot standards to do the job, and the uni- condition on face value.18 As an even of skills they can bring to the Navy and formed services desperately need people better alternative, the services could adapt military in general. You can be 40 years to fill critical roles. Thus, the key question separate medical standards suited to the old, 50 years old, and your profession is whether the services will continue to duties that would be performed as part of may be something that’s necessary. . . . perpetuate self-destructive and overreac- a particular specialty. Effectively, separate You can certainly give back.” 24 tive policies by maintaining questionably medical standards are already adopted Commander Krause’s statement relevant standards. To further advance this today, in that troops in units such as the resounds within the cyber community. point, conditions such as a detached retina 75th Ranger Regiment meet higher stan- Would the services scoff at someone (that has been corrected), previous back dards than those of the Army in general. who has 25 years in the cyber arena just injuries (for example, herniated discs), Case in point, rest assured that, regardless because he or she did not meet an age asthma, or even eczema do not preclude of medical issues, these cyber professionals standard? Did the Navy deride former a network operator from conducting a can still do the job. White House Chief of Staff Reince computer network attack on an adver- Priebus for an age waiver at age 46 to sary. Are the services willing to risk the Age Standard Barriers become a human resource officer in exclusion of cyber experts because they The same argument for outdated the Naval Reserve?25 If the age limit has have suffered injuries or have other minor entrance standards could be made with to do with ensuring 20 years of service medical conditions? Furthermore, do our age. Current guidelines for age vary by just to earn a full pension, then that adversaries reject technically gifted people service but are mainly in place to ensure argument is now a moot point. The because they have a medical condition that 20 years of service can be com- uniformed services implemented an agile that the uniformed services would con- pleted when someone hits his or her forward-looking pension plan, known as sider a disqualifier? sixties. To date, only the NOAA Com- the Blended Retirement System, which A counterargument could be that the missioned Officer Corps has no age allows members to have their Thrift guidelines are strict to avoid any medical limit for applicants.19 The Public Health Savings Plan retirement account if they issues flaring up while the servicemember Service Commissioned Corps allows leave before 20 years of service.26

16 Forum / Recruiting Cyber Specialists JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Scott M. Smiley, first blind officer and second Wounded Warrior to hold position of command, passes guidon back to 1st Sergeant Deon E. Dabrio during U.S. Army Warrior Transition Unit at West Point change of command ceremony, February 1, 2010 (U.S. Army/Tommy Gilligan)

Trying to change age standards is that older personnel are more likely to the Army wants to remove the retire- nothing new. In 2012, Representative become injured and take longer to heal.29 ment-age requirement, which could, in Paul Broun, Jr. (R-GA), tried to enact We must reject this age bias. The services turn, render irrelevant the age restric- legislation that would allow people at any seem perfectly happy and content to relax tion.32 Additionally, in 2018 a relatively age to join the uniformed services as long standards for medical personnel, as pre- unnoticed request for comments in as the candidates could meet minimum viously mentioned, so why not cyber? It the Federal Register indicated that the health and fitness requirements. The is understood that medical professionals services may be modifying the selective House at that time voted down the mea- are always in demand, as they possess service process for those with “cyber sure. Congressman Broun, a retired Navy unique skills. So are cyber professionals. skills, and science, technology, engineer- medical officer, even stated that the age For instance, as medical devices become ing, and mathematics skills for which cap is “an arbitrary policy.”27 This age cap increasingly “connected,” who is going the Nation has a critical need, without is also extended to Federal law enforce- to ensure that those devices are secure, regard to age or sex.”33 While it appears ment agencies. These agencies, such as the especially in remote environments where that there may be a shift in thinking Federal Bureau of Investigation, control lives are on the line? Is age really going about age, the solution here is that key components of America’s coordinated to affect those sitting at a workstation the uniformed services need to reflect cyber efforts. Such agencies are also ham- performing information security? NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps pered by these restrictions, as a candidate There is some hope: Private industry policy on having no age limit in place. must be younger than age 37, thus also is starting to see the value of older work- There is no reason to have an arbitrary eliminating that avenue for patriots of a ers.30 Even physically demanding and age limit in place, especially with what certain age who still want to contribute.28 dangerous occupations akin to military we are up against in cyberspace. Counter to the proposed legislation service, such as career fire departments eliminating an age limit is the argument in major cities like Philadelphia, do not Prior Service Barriers made by Representative Susan Davis (D- have age limits for new recruits.31 For Prior service barriers are also lasting CA) that “risks outnumber gains” and recruiting older cyber professionals, administrative obstacles. There are

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Samluk, Boeke, and Neal 17 “The President’s Own” U.S. Marine Band performs during retirement ceremony for General Thomas D. Waldhauser at Marine Barracks Washington, DC, September 27, 2019 (DOD/James K. McCann) potential recruits with prior service who members seeking a second chance often particular—gives second chances to those were discharged honorably, but some- serve in other ways, perhaps in the police who have committed serious crimes, there thing may have affected their reentry— force, as emergency medical technicians, is no reason for not giving a second chance to perhaps a particular narrative statement or in career/volunteer fire departments; former members, discharged under adverse or a reentry code on their discharge some have even deployed to dangerous conditions, who have proved themselves. certificate. Some may even have been areas alongside the uniformed services, To address the current need, as the discharged under less-than-honorable albeit in a civilian role. These individuals saying goes, “Desperate times call for conditions (such as a general discharge). have demonstrated themselves through desperate measures.” And, indeed, we Whatever the circumstances at the first selfless service in their communities and are in desperate times, especially on the discharge, those contexts may now be have put their lives on the line. There are cyber front. Although some may vig- a moot point. It is not unheard of for even prior service cyber professionals who orously argue that the concern is solely some of these prior servicemembers feel the calling to serve in the military yet a retention issue and not a recruitment to have turned their lives around and again; however, it seems as though the issue—even though retention is in the matured from when they were younger; services turn a blind eye to these individ- forefront too—there is resounding evi- today, they could be looking for a uals who want to return—and who have dence to the contrary that has even been second chance to serve. a clean record—because their narratives acknowledged by Pentagon officials.35 Unfortunately, the services would and/or reentry codes appear to be worse Even if the problem were solely a reten- rather grant waivers to those who have than felonious crimes or drug use. To say tion issue, recruiting is an inherent part of more serious background problems, like that the uniformed services place objective the process, and adjustments need to be felonies and drug use, than to take back guilt on former members for matters that made for the future.36 Moreover, because those members who may have had minor happened years ago and have since been there is a problem no matter what, DOD issues similar to those aforementioned at corrected is an understatement. Because and other services are simply too selective the time of discharge.34 Some of those society in general—and the services in when it comes to former uniformed

18 Forum / Recruiting Cyber Specialists JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Sergeant Brittany Deturo, 401st Army Field Support Brigade, positions herself to practice deadlift element of new during familiarization training at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, August 17, 2020 (U.S. Army/Kevin Fleming)

servicemembers trying to help in this To their credit, the services recognize risk in this area just to maintain anti- field. The solution is clear: Let those that there is a big problem in this area. quated standards in the face of adversaries who have prior experience have a second Some of the concern is based on compen- who seem to have the upper hand in the chance. The need is too great in the cyber sation, but what the services fail to realize cyber domain. Our adversaries would domain to be so fastidious. is that there are some cyber professionals gladly accept into their ranks a cyber op- out there who are not interested only in erator who can wreak havoc but who also Conclusion: Modernizing money. These professionals would sac- has a condition that the services would Standards rifice a higher salary in private industry, find disqualifying. Relating back to the The future is ours to create the oppor- endure the prolonged application and principles of war, more and better talent tunity for talented, skilled, and driven boarding process, and get the necessary allows us to gain and maintain the initia- people. In light of the current cyber clearances and polygraphs just to have tive in this battlespace, which we arguably situation, agencies of the U.S. Govern- the honor of wearing the cloth of this have ceded. ment are taking the challenge head-on, Nation. These are the type of people Changing standards for the uni- each and every day. In particular, the that the uniformed services need—those formed services is not unheard of; they uniformed services have made serious who are loyal and will never give up. have had a long history of adjusting or headway to counter cyber adversaries. If the services could only seek out and even ignoring standards to allow for But significant obstacles remain, and recognize these individuals and give them talented recruits in specialized fields, and, the most important issue is attracting, a chance—or a second chance, in some given the nature of cyber warfare, it may recruiting, training, and retaining a instances—they could prove themselves even be possible to accept individuals world-class force of people to serve in and, without a doubt, make a real contri- with physical disabilities.38 The services this field in uniform. We need them if bution to closing U.S. cyber deficiencies. used to grant field commissions in times we are to gain and maintain the initia- Unfortunately, common sense does not of need as well. Another possibility is that tive—an offensive principle of war.37 necessarily prevail, and we are increasing the services could also retrain those who

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Samluk, Boeke, and Neal 19 Notes

1 U.S. Cyber Command components include U.S. Army Cyber Command (head- quarters in Fort Gordon, ), Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (head- quarters in Fort Meade, ), U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland), and Air Forces Cyber (headquarters in Joint Base San Antonio, Texas). 2 Space Policy Directive–4, Establishment of the United States Space Force (Washington, DC: The White House, 2019). 3 U.S. Code, available at . 4 Kathleen Curthoys, “How the Army Is Competing with Google for These Ninjas,” Army Times, August 6, 2018; Jeffrey E. Phil- lips, “‘Lateral Entry’: Direct Commissioning of Civilians, a Pro and Con,” ROA, August 3, 2016, available at ; Crispin J. Burke, “ Should Annette, after being showered with champagne upon exiting cockpit of his McDonnell Douglas F-4 Adjust Standards for Cyber Soldiers—as It Has Phantom II for last time following ceremonial final military flight of storied aircraft at Holloman AFB, Always Done,” War on the Rocks, January 24, , December 21, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/J.M. Eddins, Jr.) 2018, available at ; Armed Forces serve in a fuller capacity. Instead of medi- hence cannot be transferred.44 Perhaps Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), “U.S. Army Introduces Cyber cally discharging these wounded warriors, our cyber model reflects the “President’s Fast Track for Civilians,” AFCEA, February the services should allow them to serve Own” to a degree, but significantly 13, 2017, available at . 5 Some critics may argue that adapting To this end, it does take talented Lauren C. Williams, “Military Looks for Ways to Bring in Cyber Talent at Better Sala- standards for cyber personnel could people to address the cyber problem. ries,” Federal Computer Week, March 14, 2018. affect overall readiness and that there The services should consider themselves 6 U.S. Department of Health and Human are always civilian positions instead.39 fortunate that people want to join them Services, “Leadership,” available at ; problem surrounding the culture of the embrace these professionals with open Richard Carmona, “Instant Admirals and the Plague of Politics in the United States Public services—specifically the cultural biases arms, adjusting the standards to allow Health Service: Back to the Future,” Military 40 of what a warrior looks like. The coun- their entry. It would be a grave mistake to Medicine 182, no. 5–6 (May 2017), 1582– terargument is that future warriors will turn them away if the goal of the services 1583, available at . 7 and mathematics skills in order to adapt will be difficult to defend against our ad- Air Force Bands, “Auditions and USAF 41 Band Career Information,” available at to high-tech threats in real time. There versaries in the cyber domain if the military . 8 ians.42 Furthermore, not everyone who The authors acknowledge the following Kathleen Curthoys, “Army Cyber Should ‘Let Nerds Be Nerds,’ Experts Say,” Army joins the uniformed services, explicitly individuals for their assistance in shaping Times, October 11, 2017. the Armed Forces, need be a “trigger this article: Lieutenant Colonel Susan 9 Sean Gallagher, “DOD Needs Cyber- puller.” The Marine Corps’ “President’s Lukas, USAF (Ret.); Major Crispin warriors So Badly It May Let Skilled Recruits Own” marching band musicians do not Burke, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Skip Boot Camp,” Ars Technica, May 9, 2017, “attend recruit training or basic combat Chris Lusk, USA (Ret.); Cryptologic available at . and the [of the Marine Zoppi Rodriguez. 10 Thomas Spoehr and Bridget Handy, Corps].”43 These highly skilled musicians The Looming National Security Crisis: Young

20 Forum / Recruiting Cyber Specialists JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Americans Unable to Serve in the Military 46-Year-Old Ensign Who Once Ran the White 2018, available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Samluk, Boeke, and Neal 21 Atlas V rocket launches Navy’s Mobile User Objective System 2 satellite from Space Launch Complex–41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, July 19, 2013 (U.S. Navy/NASA/Patrick H. Corkery)

Space Operations Lines, Zones, Options, and Dilemmas

By Jerry V. Drew

hile there is considerable lit- works have largely focused on the stra- this explanation—for instance, Joint erature available on both the tegic and political aspects of the space Publication 3-14, Space Operations W strategic and tactical aspects domain.1 Much of the professional (2018), and U.S. Army Field Manual of space operations, there is surprisingly literature produced by military practi- 3-14, Army Space Operations (2019)— little that discusses the linkage of tacti- tioners, on the other hand, has focused tend to develop domain-unique language cal space operations to the achievement on the tactical exploitation of space rather than language rooted in theoretical of strategic objectives through opera- systems.2 While this collection of works principles that is translatable across other tional art. In addition to government sometimes hints at the possibility of warfighting domains.3 As a result, the documents such as the National Secu- synchronizing tactical action to achieve connective tissue of a common opera- rity Space Strategy, influential academic strategic ends, none provides a practical tional language between space operations explanation of how commanders and and the rest of the joint force is largely staffs might achieve such a feat. missing. With the recent establishment of Major Jerry V. Drew II, USA, is a Planner in the U.S. Furthermore, the doctrinal publica- U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Space Army Space and Missile Defense Command. tions that bear some responsibility for Force, the joint force stands poised to

22 Forum / Space Operations JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 expand its incorporation of the space do- Lines of Communication Additionally, because of the specificity main into existing and future operations. In The Art of War, Jomini simply required to describe them, the terms To effectively accomplish this expansion, defines LOCs as “the practicable routes themselves are somewhat cumbersome. however, operational art as it applies to between the different portions of the If one considers the function of the lines the space domain requires a deeper con- army occupying different positions rather than their physical location, how- ceptual consideration—one that leverages throughout the zone of operations.”6 ever, one may arrive at terms that more and expands on existing warfighting con- Clausewitz provided more detail. In On easily translate to other components of cepts to enable multidomain integration. War, he writes that LOCs “lead from an the joint force. These functions, which The literature of operational art army’s main position back to the main Clausewitz defined and which Klein itself has a long history and provides sources of food and replacements.”7 addresses, are the transfer of personnel much of the language necessary for They allow for the conduct of various and materiel (in the manner of the joint such a consideration. In 1838, the functions, including resupply, troop doctrinal definition of the concept) Swiss general and theoretician Baron movement, delivery of mail, transit of and data transfer. Klein’s concept of Antoine-Henri Jomini published The couriers, and the conduct of admin- physical CLOCs provides justification Art of War, a work that permeated the istrative action. The joint doctrinal for the inclusion of space domain LOCs U.S. military of the and definition of LOCs follows the vein of into the joint doctrinal definition of forms the basis for the modern doctrinal the Clausewitzian theory but falls short LOCs; like LOCs in other domains, the lexicon. Like his contemporary, the on two accounts. First, it acknowl- physical CLOCs perform the function Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, edges only the troop movement and of transferring personnel and materiel Jomini concerned himself primarily with resupply functions of an LOC. Second, from one location to another. For this land warfare, but his concepts remain it concedes the domain-specific or reason, one may simply consider Klein’s relevant to applications of space systems multidomain nature of LOCs insofar as physical celestial LOCs as LOCs per in modern warfare. Indeed, they have they apply to the land, maritime, and air the doctrinal definition, retaining the served the theoreticians of warfare quite domains, but offers no consideration of modifier “celestial” when useful. Also, well over the past two centuries. Within the concept as it applies in the space (to Klein’s nonphysical CLOCs transfer data. the realm of military space literature, say nothing of the cyber) domain.8 As such, the term data line of commu- Everett Dolman’s Astropolitik makes In an effort to expand these concepts nication (DLOC) seems more useful reference to the sea power theory of into the space domain, Klein defines because it describes the function of the , himself a disciple celestial lines of communication (CLOCs) concept while remaining general enough of Jominian thought.4 Furthermore, “in and through space used for the to apply to other domains, including John Klein’s Space Warfare leverages movement of trade, materiel, supplies, cyber. Thus, “nonphysical celestial lines the writings of Sir Julian Corbett, whose personnel, spacecraft, electromagnetic of communication” simplify to “data lines Some Principles of Maritime Strategy transmissions, and some military effects.”9 of communication.” was a reaction to Mahanian thought.5 Thus, Klein’s CLOCs maintain similar The concept of LOCs when applied When taken as a whole, the existing functions to those of Clausewitz and to the space domain—both in its re- body of theory provides rich source include “physical CLOCs” that launch lation to theoretical notions and in its material from which to discuss the satellites or replenish constellations and uniqueness from current doctrinal defini- ways one might employ military space the “nonphysical LOCs” of radio com- tions—carries tremendous significance for systems within the larger context of munications links.10 While traditional the operational artist. First, space-specific operational art. The operational artist LOCs can perform all the Clausewitzian LOCs are a concern to the military may then apply these concepts to work functions, Klein’s nonphysical CLOCs planner if constellation replenishment is toward an understanding of how space are a special type of nondoctrinal line in a concern. Historically, constellations re- systems, along with systems centered in that they perform only the information ceive new satellites as older models fail—a other domains, contribute to an overall transmission function. These communi- very deliberate process that requires strategic goal. From the perspective cations links fulfill the courier functions significant lead time. In a protracted of space systems, the most important mentioned by Clausewitz, but unlike the conflict that witnesses the destruction among these concepts are lines of com- LOCs of 19th-century wars, nonphysical or degradation of vital space systems, munication (LOCs), lines of operation CLOCs are not tethered to supply routes. however, a belligerent may endeavor to (LOOs), zones of operation (ZOOs), In his effort to map warfighting launch replacement capabilities. Massive and zones of communication (ZOCs). concepts to the space domain through satellites require large rockets to lift them While these concepts have theoretical, the creation of new terminology, Klein into orbit, which in turn necessitates historical, and doctrinal precedent in the provides the joint force a great service. significant infrastructure. In the case of land, maritime, and air domains, they The downside of his approach, however, the United States, large rocket launches take on a new form in the context of the is that the language he creates is domain occur either over the eastern coast of employment of space systems. specific, rather than domain inclusive. Florida or the western coast of California.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Drew 23 Crewman from (Air Assault) stands beside AH-64A Apache helicopter armed with M-230A1 30mm automatic cannon and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles as it prepares for takeoff during Operation Desert Shield, January 23, 1991 (DOD)

In terms of LOCs, these launch sites rep- operating in the same zone (in the more path that the force intends to follow resent a base, and the typical rocket flight Jominian sense of LOCs). In contempo- to reach its objectives. In the words of and orbital path form the remainder of rary U.S. military operations, the force Jomini, LOOs connect “the decisive the LOC. As the trend toward smaller, largely takes for granted the ability to points of the theater of operations.”11 more capable satellites continues, future talk to rearward and adjacent units via As in Jomini, the doctrinal definition of constellation replenishment may not be satellite, but an enemy with jammers or LOO hinges on decisive points. In joint dependent on traditional launch facilities antisatellite missiles could threaten such doctrine, a LOO connects actions “on but may employ ad hoc launch sites or access. DLOCs, then, provide a concept nodes and/or decisive points related in launch-capable air and sea platforms. If for the operational artist to use in the time and [physical] space to an objec- ever realized, such launch options would deliberate planning and employment of tive.”12 Whereas Jomini designates only give the operational artist greater flexibil- space systems and of communications physical locations as decisive points, ity in opening LOCs. systems in other domains. the joint definition expands to include As for DLOCs, those provide tre- not only places but also events, critical mendous flexibility to the operational Lines of Operation factors, or functions.13 artist. In a space domain context, such In theory and doctrine, the LOC and Whether adapting the concept of DLOCs allow for the control and use the LOO are related concepts that LOO from theory or doctrine, the of the spacecraft. In support of multi- center on the friendly military force. employment of space systems through domain operations, the DLOCs allow for Generally, LOCs lead from the massed operational art requires consideration communication not only with a military force rearward and connect terrain of LOOs and LOCs in and across mul- force’s rear area (in the Clausewitzian already traversed with rearward bases. tiple domains. Most obviously, space sense of LOCs) but also with other units LOOs, on the other hand, lay out the operations can occur in space. Just as

24 Forum / Space Operations JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 often—and sometimes simultaneously— units are less mobile, their potential set of space operations occur to or from space. LOOs contains fewer options; they may Figure 1 DLOC Between DLOCs provide the electromagnetic plan only to move from point to point Single Satellite and Single connection between the ground station and then possibly back again. Regardless Ground Station controlling the in-space action, between of their relative complexity, operations Satellite the satellite and the air or sea force ex- would likely require execution of mul- ecuting along its LOO, or between the tiple LOOs to maintain the viability of electronic warfare system and its satellite multiple DLOCs. It is therefore useful target. The penultimate operational artist to define a concept that groups multiple DLOC would be capable of synchronizing the LOOs and LOCs into sets. activity of LOCs and LOOs of all do- mains through integrated planning. For Zones of Operation and much of the joint force, however, space Zones of Communication operations are not a familiar topic and Since LOOs are possible both in space require further explanation. and in the employment of space systems As in the other domains, an objective from Earth, ZOOs are also possible in space may be terrain based (attainment in both locales. A ZOO consists of of a specific orbit or orbital slot) or enemy multiple LOOs, and like a LOO, a Ground Station based (in the case of an antisatellite system ZOO could exist in any single domain that seeks to destroy another satellite). or across multiple domains. Indeed, a In the context of space systems, the One terrain-based LOO might follow ZOO may be multidomain in nature, simplest DLOC consists of the uplink or the mission’s critical events: launch, attain including the orbital and surface-based downlink signal between the ground and orbit, transfer orbit, reach final orbit, space operations LOOs along with the satellite—in doctrinal terms, the link begin proximity operations. With current land, maritime, or air LOOs. The segment of the space system (figure 1). technology, this LOO might take weeks or previous example of multiple satellites In modern military systems, however, the months to complete and significantly de- converging simultaneously with air and reality can be much more complicated. plete the spacecraft’s onboard fuel reserve. ground forces provides such a case. A A typical beam from a transmitting Any effort to synchronize the tactical ZOO is not a defined doctrinal term satellite (for example, a communica- actions of such a satellite, then, requires but a Jominian concept, “a fraction of tions satellite) covers a large area on the an understanding of these time-distance the whole theater of war which may be ground. One need to think only of how calculations and how those relate to opera- traversed by an army in the attainment many backyard satellite dishes a single tions in other domains. In the near future, of its objective.”14 communications satellite may service. one might imagine multiple satellites (or Just as multiple LOOs may coalesce Similarly, in military operations, one sat- groups of satellites) executing independent to form a ZOO, multiple LOCs may ellite may service many ground receivers LOOs. These formations may converge coalesce to form a ZOC, and multiple within a single theater or even within at their decisive point in space just as the DLOCs may coalesce to form a data zone multiple theaters. One may imagine radio air and land forces mass at their decisive of communication (DZOC). Within linking the satellite transponder to points on Earth. the context of contemporary space op- each of the ground-based receivers within While the orbital aspect of space erations, it is difficult to define a ZOC the footprint of the transmitted beam. operations remains the most obvious, because the personnel and materiel trans- This group of links forms a DZOC. ground-based space operations forces port functions are isolated—that is, major Figure 2 shows a DZOC consisting of may also execute along LOOs. The launch facilities are widely separated and one satellite communicating with multi- LOO of a satellite communications not employed as complementary assets in ple receivers. unit, for example, may begin with an a warfighting sense. With the expansion While one satellite may transmit to intertheater deployment. Establishing of responsive launch capability, however, multiple receivers with a single transmit- an initial operating location follows. As such ZOCs may be possible. Additionally, ter, it is also possible for a satellite to have the conflict escalates, the unit relocates in the near future, orbital refueling or multiple transponders, each capable of to a more suitable position—either rear- repair satellites may traverse groups of servicing multiple receivers. In this situ- ward, forward, or perhaps to an entirely well-defined LOCs in a manner similar ation, each transponder creates multiple different continent in order to maintain to how fuelers and maintenance vehicles links by transmitting to multiple receiv- the DLOCs that are essential for the traverse well-worn road networks on the ers, each of which may be considered as joint force to operate. Nondeployable ground. For the present, however, the separate DZOCs. space operations units (the so-called DLOC is the operative principle of space The visualization of DZOCs changes deployed-in-place units) may execute operations, and the DZOC therefore re- slightly depending on the orbital altitude similar relocations, but because these quires a more expansive consideration. of the satellite in question. For satellites in

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Drew 25 Figure 2 DZOC of One Satellite and Multiple Receivers below the horizon and out of view of the receiver, another will likely have risen Satellite above the horizon to offer its own link, thus providing a continuous solution to the receiver. Unlike the typical receivers depicted in the first two DZOC illustrations, GPS receivers accept simultaneous input from DOC multiple satellites. Thus, the DZOC in- volves multiple transmitters, not multiple receivers. Figure 3 shows the changing DZOCs as GPS satellites move relative to the ground observer. As with missile warning, weather, in- telligence, and communications satellites, Ground Station GPS satellites enable tactical operations and have historically operated with little enemy interference. As long as these Figure 3 DZOC Changes as Satellites Move enabling means are working normally and the space domain remains relatively Satellite uncontested, the operational artist may Satellite Satellite Satellite be tempted to devote less consideration to the vulnerabilities of such space sys- tems. However, when a system becomes DOC Satellite DOC degraded, the synchronization of opera- tions with windows of system capabilities Satellite becomes a significant concern.

Options and Dilemmas The line of communication and the line of operation serve as foundational concepts for joint force operations. Satellite In this sense, space operations are not Ground Station Ground Station different from operations in the other domains, but the application of familiar geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), the Between GEO and LEO resides concepts to a different domain requires satellite remains in view of the same loca- a wide expanse of space called me- clarifying and expanding their applica- tions on Earth. Its orbital speed matches dium-Earth orbit (MEO). The GPS tion. With the building blocks of LOCs, the rotational speed of Earth, giving an constellation resides in MEO (approx- DLOCs, LOOs, ZOCs, DZOCs, and observer on the ground the perception imately 12,000 miles from the Earth) ZOOs in place, one must consider how that the satellite is stationary over that and is designed to provide multiple to employ them in a larger operational point. For satellites at this orbital altitude, links to handheld and vehicle-mounted context. While one may apply these the ZOC is continuously operational. As receivers. As one might deduce from concepts within any number of opera- altitudes become lower, the speed of the the in-between altitude, the windows tional frameworks, a historical example satellite relative to the ground increases. during which to access GPS satellites are of large-scale combat—the Persian Gulf For low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, neither constant (as with GEO satellites) War—provides an illustration of how a few hundred miles from the Earth, a nor very brief (as with LEO satellites). such concepts can apply, particularly in ground receiver will be able to access the Although access times vary depending creating options for the friendly force satellite only for a short period, perhaps on the location of the receiver relative to and dilemmas for the enemy. only several minutes. In this situation, the the constellation’s configuration, a single Jomini states as the first point of his DZOC is short lived; it comes into exis- GPS satellite typically remains in view for fundamental principle that the aim of war tence when the links are established and is 3 to 6 hours. For an accurate solution, is to mass combat power at the decisive not reestablished until the next satellite in each receiver requires access to four point.15 To do this effectively, even with a the constellation comes along or until the satellites, but more than the minimum joint force operating in multiple domains, original satellite returns. are typically in view. As one satellite dips the complementary concepts of options

26 Forum / Space Operations JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Navy’s fourth Mobile User Objective System satellite, encapsulated in 5m payload fairing, stands mated to Atlas V booster inside Vertical Integration Facility at Cape Canaveral’s Space Launch Complex–41, August 19, 2015 (Courtesy United Launch Alliance)

and dilemmas apply. One may imagine offensive—as Robert E. Lee did success- operation.20 The ability of allied coali- Napoleon arriving at the preordained fully at the Second Battle of Bull Run in tion forces to open multiple ZOOs and time of battle with three corps converg- 1862.17 If employed with simultaneity, effectively sequence operations within ing on the enemy army. With three corps however, Napoleon’s three corps could those ZOOs imposed on the Iraqi armed at his disposal, Napoleon had options. theoretically present more dilemmas than forces a state of operational shock. In For example, he could have attacked with the enemy’s two corps could absorb. essence, the allied coalition presented the two while keeping the third in reserve. When one force presents an enemy force Iraqis more dilemmas than they could Alternatively, he could have used two for with multiple, synchronized dilemmas effectively counter, and the advantages a turning movement while employing the along the depth of the enemy force, the of space-based intelligence, communi- third as a guard force. He also could have enemy’s entire ability to wage war effec- cations, missile warning, and navigation used two as an enveloping force while tively becomes overwhelmed; the friendly directly contributed to the ability of sending the third against a weaker enemy force has achieved operational shock.18 the allied coalition to maintain an over- detachment. One way for the joint force to create whelming operational tempo. An enemy commander with five corps dilemmas is to open multiple ZOOs that As far as the space domain is con- could have parried every dilemma pre- the enemy must address. As previously cerned, little unclassified information is sented by Napoleon with forces to spare. mentioned, these zones may or may not available on how the United States did In other words, he or she would have correspond to domains. In the case of or did not open space zones during the retained options in the face of multiple the , for example, U.S. Central Gulf War.21 It is important to consider, dilemmas. Retaining options in the face Command opened land and air ZOOs however, that multiple LOOs had placed of dilemmas is the essence of flexibility.16 from and a maritime ZOO all the space systems into operation over a All other things equal, an enemy with in the Persian Gulf.19 Arguably, the air period of decades preceding the conflict, only two corps would have had fewer assault of the 101st Airborne Division and it is possible that the U.S. Air Force options: conduct a deliberate defense, on the allied coalition’s northern flank adjusted satellites during the conflict to withdraw, or split the force to risk a bold represented a cross-domain zone of maximize their usefulness. While LOOs

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Drew 27 Sodium Guidestar at Air Force Research Laboratory Directed Energy Directorate’s Starfire Optical Range provides real-time, high-fidelity tracking and imaging of satellites too faint for conventional adaptive optical imaging systems, November 17, 2005 (DOD) and ZOOs may not have been the op- of strategy, but the destruction of such consideration of their potential is useful. erative concept for the planned use of assets poses immediate problems for both Based on the desired target, the distance space systems during the Gulf War, space the operational artist and the tactician.23 they are required to travel, and their systems did provide DLOCs for weather, While the tactician must adjust proce- design specifications, there is a tradeoff intelligence, and missile warning, and dures to the capability of the remaining between how far an orbital asset could DZOCs for communications and a not resources, the operational artist must travel and how fast it could get there. fully operational GPS constellation.22 understand the strategy and work to As with the infantry Soldier, a satellite Imagine now a similar scenario in readjust the means to enable the most may travel a long distance slowly without which a near-peer belligerent is able to effective strategy. Operational planners expending all its fuel, or it may travel a counter U.S. forces in the land, sea, and (particularly military space professionals), short distance very rapidly with a greater air domains and perhaps overmatch U.S. then, must understand the vulnerabilities expenditure. Satellite refueling, however, forces in the cyber domain. In such a of space systems and develop contingency is not currently practicable, and any fu- scenario, how does the operational artist plans to address their loss. Furthermore, ture LOO that involves offensive orbital employ space systems? As in the Gulf with the limitations of satellite replenish- means must bear the limitations in mind. War, the operational artist must consider ment in mind, one may plan to counter Nonetheless, in theory, a belligerent may possible and existing lines and zones the enemy’s satellite replenishment capa- use multiple spacecraft-based robotic and make provisions for opening and bility by cross-domain attacks on launch manipulators to open multiple LOOs, maintaining them through the deliberate facilities or by cyber action against the thus forming a zone of operation and placement of assets within the specific enemy’s industrial base. presenting the enemy with an additional strategic context. While the employment Unlike the operational employment dilemma set.25 A less complicated—and of existing assets may be more or less of enabling means (satellites for commu- perhaps a more operationally useful—way straightforward, employing new satellites nications, intelligence, among others), of establishing a ZOO is from Earth presents a difficult problem. the operational employment of offensive through the employment of defensive While it may be possible to acceler- orbital systems requires a different cal- space control (DSC) or offensive space ate or reprioritize launch and on-orbit culus. First, orbital antisatellite systems, control assets. testing timelines, military satellites inspector satellites, or manipulator If an in-space ZOO is one type of typically require long lead times for op- satellites are niche capabilities that have space operation ZOO, a second type is erational employment. For this reason, existed since the Cold War—albeit in low a defensive space control ZOO. Given the planning and employment of such numbers and largely in an experimental the fundamental importance of informa- constellations falls more within the realm rather than operational capacity.24 Still, a tion transmission to the joint force, the

28 Forum / Space Operations JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 employment of DSC assets should be an Figure 4 Multiple DLOCs Coalesce to Form DZOC early consideration for the operational artist. As mentioned, DSC assets may be placed outside or inside the theater of war to protect the most necessary data lines Notional Decisive Point or zones. The effort to deploy, emplace, Line of Operations and operate these assets constitutes a Data Line contributing LOO, the ultimate goal of of Communications which is to establish a DLOC with the Data one intent of monitoring an already existing of Communications link segment. The employment of multi- Satellite ple assets into multiple theaters represents Space Unit additional LOOs and additional DLOCs that may, if mutually supporting, coalesce into data zones (figure 4).26 A third type of ZOO, a combination of offensive space control LOOs, involves the employment of satellite jammers. As with DSC assets, a force may develop multiple LOOs (or ZOOs) with the ultimate goal of establishing offensive LOCs in the theater of war, from an ex- ternal theater or in multiple and mutually supporting theaters. The combination of multiple offensive DLOCs constitutes an offensive DZOC, and depending on the orbital motion of the target satellites, the operational artist must determine the appropriate sequencing of the tactical of- fensive actions to contribute to the overall To begin addressing the practical it is unlikely—and perhaps even foolish— strategic effect. Alternatively, if an enemy questions of how operational artists for any modern nation to operate in that force is establishing offensive DLOCs, may employ space systems, theory and way. Indeed, all domains are essential in the operational artist must anticipate doctrine provide a starting point from modern warfighting, and the operational which friendly assets are vulnerable and which to consider specific new concepts. artist must approach the goal of victory take action to mitigate operational risk. Historical examples provide context and, through the establishment of ZOOs in as in the case of ZOCs, suggests a useful many domains as possible, the maximal Conclusion concept neither in traditional theory nor use of ZOCs, and the synchronization An understanding of space operations in U.S. doctrine. That the ideas of Jomini of activity across all domains. ZOCs and across the joint force is now more essen- come to the fore indicates his importance ZOOs provide the friendly force options tial than ever, and achieving this under- in creating the language of modern while forcing the enemy to confront mul- standing depends on a language that military operations as evidenced in the tiple dilemmas, and the creative process translates concepts across all domains. theoretical writings of Mahan, Corbett, of integrating multidomain ZOCs and Necessarily, this effort must not focus on and Klein. However, while each of these ZOOs is fundamental to operational art. the creation of domain-unique language writers focused on a particular domain, Indeed, the creative process that links (as has the space doctrine of the past) but in contemporary warfare, domains are the tactical actions to the strategic ends on making similar concepts relatable so inseparable, and domain-specific theories is ongoing and requires continuously that domain-specific practitioners across of warfare may be misleading. Theory, revisiting one’s understanding of oper- the joint force can communicate effec- history, and doctrine all posit that it be- ations in all domains.27 For this reason, tively with one another. The language of hooves a belligerent to present as many concepts—whether they come from his- operational art—with some expansion of dilemmas as possible to an enemy across tory, theory, or doctrine—may be more existing concepts like lines of operation all domains (simultaneity) while main- important tools for an operational artist and communication—provides the con- taining as many options as possible for in the conduct of warfighting than any nective tissue to link the operations of all one’s own force (flexibility). While it is domain-specific means. JFQ domains through theoretical ideas that possible that the forces of a single domain enable practical application. may be able to achieve the desired ends,

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Drew 29 18 Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Notes Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory New from NDU (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 1 See, for example, Everett C. Dolman, As- 18. Press tropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age 19 Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The for the Center for Strategic Research (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002); U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth: Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset Strategic Forum 307 U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); lege, 1994), 84, 390–391, figure 5-3. I also Baltics Left of Bang: Comprehensive James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: must acknowledge Dr. Bruce Stanley, associate Defense in the Baltic States Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National professor at the School of Advanced Military By Dalia Bankauskaite, Janis Berzins, Interests, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Studies, for first explaining to me the concept Tony Lawrence, Deividas Šlekys, Press, 2011). of lines, zones, and dilemmas, which he did Brett Swaney, and T.X. Hammes 2 Of note, the Air University’s Space Primer, in the context of the Gulf War. The additional a decade’s worth of Army Space Journals pub- consideration of lines and zones in the space Since lished during the height of the years, domain is my expansion of the concept. regaining and multiple master’s theses and monographs 20 Ibid., 221. independence from both the Naval Postgraduate School and 21 Except for three pages of overview on the in 1991, the the Command and General Staff College en- general conclusions of the study, the portion Baltic states’ deavored to expound on the tactical usefulness of the Gulf War Air Power Survey regarding of space. space operations remains classified. Eliot A. (, 3 Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations Cohen et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. Latvia, and (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 10, 4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Lithuania) 2018); U.S. Army Field Manual 3-14, Army Office, 1993), v–vii. foreign and Space Operations (Washington, DC: Headquar- 22 James Walker, Lewis Bernstein, and diplomatic main objective has been ters Department of the Army, October 2019) Sharon Lang, Seize the High Ground: The Army 4 Dolman, Astropolitik, 33. in Space and Missile Defense (Washington, DC: full integration with the West. 5 John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Com- Each state has adopted compre- Principles, and Policy (New York: Routledge, mand, 2003), 151–157. hensive defense to coordinate 2006), 3. 23 Dolman, Astropolitik, 61. Much of the actions of its military, civilian 6 J.D. Hittle, ed., Jomini’s Art of War (Har- Dolman’s discussion in Astropolitik engages this government, private sector, and risburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1965), 78–79. aspect of “astrostrategy.” 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and 24 See, for example, Jim Sciutto and the general populations to deter trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Prince- Jennifer Rizzo, “War in Space: Kamikazes, and defeat Russian aggression. In ton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 345. Kidnapper Satellites and Lasers,” CNN, applying comprehensive defense, 8 According to joint doctrine, a line of November 29, 2016, available at ; Andrew Ogilvie force with a base of operations and along which et al., “Autonomous Satellite Servicing Using to counter Russian information supplies and military forces move.” See Joint the Orbital Express Demonstration Manipu- warfare, coordinated security mea- Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense lator System,” fact sheet, Defense Advanced sures with its neighbors, deepened Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Research Projects Agency, 2008, 25–29. its integration with European and (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 25 A celestial zone of operation (CZOO) is international organizations, and 8, 2010, as amended through February 15, voiced as “kazoo” not as “sea zoo.” 2016), 141. 26 Although the tendency in the joint force worked to reduce its economic and 9 Klein, Space Warfare, 51. is to view the deployment of forces to a combat energy dependence on Russia. 10 Ibid., 52–53. A celestial line of communi- theater as administrative—indeed, Service cation (CLOC) should be voiced as “clock” to component commands perform this function avoid confusion with a sea line of communica- through their administrative control author- tion (SLOC). ities—planners should treat such moves as 11 Hittle, Jomini’s Art of War, 78. operational so as not to downplay the need for 12 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictio- synchronization with the overarching scheme of nary of Military and Associated Terms, 141. maneuver or to negate the possibility of enemy 13 Ibid., 60. interference. As the Marines state, a force must 14 Hittle, Jomini’s Art of War, 78. be able to “fight to the fight.” 15 Ibid., 67. 27 Huba Wass de Czege, “Thinking and 16 In Army doctrine, the tenets of unified Acting Like an Early Explorer: Operational Art land operations are flexibility, depth, synchro- is Not a Level of War,” Small Wars Journal, nization, and simultaneity. Neither joint nor March 14, 2011; Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Army doctrine formally defines these terms. Excellence, 13. See Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2017), 5-5. 17 Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and Visit the NDU Press Web site for William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A more information on publications Military History of the United States from 1607 at ndupress.ndu.edu to 2012 (New York: , 2012), 174.

30 Forum / Space Operations JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Members of USS Normandy visit, board, search, and seizure team brief Navy Secretary Kenneth Braithwaite on seizure of illicit shipment of advanced weapons and weapon components intended for Houthis in Yemen, February 9, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Alexander C. Kubitza)

The Strategic Potential of Collected Exploitable Material

By Michael R. Fenzel with Leslie Slootmaker and R. Kim Cragin

n November of 2007, I was com- mander (Captain David Boris, USA, prevent a recurrence? This is the timeless manding an infantry battalion in the age 30) and his dependable and tough dilemma of every commander in combat. Eastern Paktika Province of Afghan- driver (Sergeant Adrian Hike, USA, age It is personal. It does not matter that the I 1 istan. One of our convoys was hit by an 26) were killed in the explosion. attack occurred in a time of war. It is of improvised explosive device (IED) on A few questions came to mind as I no consolation to understand “the enemy a routine mission in the border district struggled with the loss. Who had built has a vote.” Thirteen years later, as I of Bermel, just a few short miles from and placed the IED? How could I exact reflect back, it was this searing event and . A brilliant young troop com- justice? What actions could I take to my talented staff’s response that taught me the value of collected exploitable ma- terial (CEM).2 After the Bermel attack, an explosive Michael R. Fenzel, USA, is Vice Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5). Commander ordnance disposal (EOD) team con- Leslie Slootmaker, USN, is assigned to the Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5), Global Integration, at the Pentagon. Dr. R. Kim Cragin is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic ducted a postblast analysis of the site and Research, Institute for National , at National Defense University. found what would prove to be critical

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Fenzel, Slootmaker, and Cragin 31 soldiers, combined with assets from 45th Infantry Brigade, conduct cordon and search in village thought to be home to IED makers and fighters, August 21, 2011, in Alingar District, Laghman Province (DOD/Ryan Crane)

CEM. Specifically, the EOD team col- in , and, based on evidence derived have been inefficient and cumbersome.5 lected a pressure plate with metal soup from the CEM, convicted of terrorism The Armed Forces also have struggled can lids and wire taped together at one charges under Afghan law. We subse- to get these materials to our allies and end. The team also recovered fragments quently saw an immediate and dramatic partners in a usable format and timely of a battery pack wrapped in goat hair. reduction of IED activity in Bermel. manner.6 Biometrics (fingerprints) were lifted This story is not uncommon. The To address these challenges, Secretary from the tape. In addition to the EOD Armed Forces often acquire large quan- of Defense in January team, I had a retired Federal Bureau of tities of CEM in the midst of operations. released new guidance on CEM in a Investigation (FBI) agent serving on my Even now, we hold over 300 terabytes of memorandum titled “Classification staff. He informed me that the same fin- CEM gathered from across the globe.3 It of Materials Captured, Collected, or gerprints had been discovered at the site has become common practice for ground Handled by the Department of Defense.” of four other IED attacks. He explained force commanders to use CEM as they The memo directs that all new CEM how the distinctive configuration of these “find, fix, finish” violent extremist orga- be unclassified unless sensitive sources, IEDs was the “signature” of a single nizations (VEOs) on the battlefield.4 Less methods, or activities were used to ac- bombmaker. If we could locate him, then frequently, and outside of conflict zones, quire it.7 The document articulated the we would have the person responsible for law enforcement authorities have used following logic: killing Captain Boris and Sergeant Hike. CEM in criminal proceedings against a Five months later, a local goat herder wide variety of illicit actors. CEM has Sharing of CEM with foreign partners told us that bombs were being made in proved useful in securing longer prison is often necessary to effectively prosecute a qalat (a fortified place) in Bermel. A sentences for convicted terrorists and per- persons who pose a clear and present danger combined Afghan army and coalition suading countries to extradite terrorists to the safety and security of the United team searched the dwelling and found to the United States. Yet CEM has its States and our foreign partners in civilian the same distinctive bombmaking ma- challenges. Transfers or “warm handoffs” courts of law. . . . Unclassified CEM is terials. The bombmaker and his fellow between the U.S. military, law enforce- releasable to the public and partner na- insurgents were detained, taken to prison ment, and other government agencies tions to support the U.S. mission objectives

32 Forum / Collected Exploitable Material JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 and partner nation security and law But that is not the end of the story. based on the CEM found in Omar’s enforcement purposes, to include criminal One of the Abbottabad documents Cache and an International Criminal prosecutions.8 linked Saleh al-Somali, al Qaeda’s Police Organization (INTERPOL) Red then–head of external operations, to an Notice.15 By the time Al-Ahmad was This new guidance lays the foundation individual named Abid Naseer. Naseer extradited, he had shifted his allegiance for CEM to be used well beyond the was already in a British prison at the from the 1920 Revolution Brigade to the battlefield. It allows for easier transfer time of the raid.11 He was arrested in Islamic State.16 of CEM from the military to other April 2009, along with three other ter- Beyond prosecutions, the Armed U.S. Government agencies, as well as rorists for plotting attacks on behalf of Forces have provided CEM to allies and our allies and partner nations. Yet sub- al Qaeda in , Manchester, partner nations to assist with efforts stantially more work needs to be done. and Copenhagen.12 British authorities to identify and arrest terrorist plotters This article argues that, to realize its full extradited Naseer to the United States, before they can execute attacks in the potential, CEM also should be lever- and U.S. prosecutors were able to use West. As an example, in October 2015, aged as part of strategic competition.9 documents from the Abbottabad raid the Armed Forces captured a cache of To do this, the article first examines to secure a 40-year prison sentence for documents from IS and shared them recent efforts by the Armed Forces to him.13 This example illustrates how CEM with Danish authorities.17 The cache acquire CEM during operations against can assist prosecutors in their efforts to contained registration forms from foreign VEOs and transfer it to law enforcement connect individual terrorists to foreign terrorist fighters who had left their homes authorities in the United States, our VEOs and their global terrorist networks. in Western Europe and traveled to the allies, and partner nations. The article It also underscores the critical need for to join IS.18 As it happens, explores three different types of CEM: the Armed Forces to appropriately classify IS is a highly bureaucratic VEO that uses al Qaeda’s internal memos and corre- (certainly not misclassify) these types payrolls, guest house registries, weapons spondence gathered in conjunction with of materials at the point of collection in inventories, leave requests, and registra- the Abbottabad raid, IED components order to preserve the ability of prose- tion forms. On the captured forms, IS collected as part of “Omar’s Cache” in cutors to use CEM in civilian criminal required applicants to provide recruiters , and, more recently, so-called courts. with their name, nationality, residence, Islamic State (IS) registration forms cap- This same logic—that is, making skill set, and education.19 The forms also tured during Operation Inherent Resolve. CEM available for criminal proceed- outlined the duties performed by IS Second, the article discusses how the ings—recently enabled the extradition members.20 In April 2016, using informa- lessons learned from these counter-VEO of a bombmaker from to the tion from these forms, Danish authorities operations apply to strategic competition. United States, as well as his successful identified and arrested five individuals In doing so, the article provides some prosecution in . Syrian terrorist who had fought for IS in Syria and re- concrete, albeit limited, examples of how Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Ahmad built IEDs for turned home to plot attacks in Europe.21 the Armed Forces have used CEM to Iraqi insurgent groups to use against the The actions of Danish authorities in this counter Iran’s malign activities and how Armed Forces deployed to Iraq during case demonstrate potential for CEM a similar approach could be taken with Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of his to prevent terrorist attacks in the West. Russia and China. The article concludes devices were discovered during an August To do so, however, the Department of with an appeal to the joint force to think 2006 raid on an IED factory on 50 Defense (DOD) must take measures to more creatively about the application of Omar Street in Baghdad.14 We gathered ensure CEM is not only properly classi- CEM, in combination with other instru- these devices, colloquially referred to as fied and catalogued but also made quickly ments of National power, to confront “Omar’s Cache,” and, in partnership and readily available to allies and partners. rogue states and revisionist powers. with the FBI, collected biometrics in At this time, the joint force, our allies, anticipation of using this CEM in the and partners have all learned the value of Lessons Learned from future. This effort eventually proved collecting, storing, and cataloguing CEM the VEO Fight its value. Unbeknownst to the United with the expectation of eventually em- In May 2011, Army aviators and Navy States, Al-Ahmad left Iraq in July 2010 ploying them against VEOs.22 The idea of SEALs executed a raid against then–al and relocated to China. He continued using CEM in criminal proceedings is not Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s com- to build and ship IED components to new. The International Criminal Tribunal pound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The Iraqi insurgents while living there. But for the Former Yugoslavia heard evidence SEALs killed bin Laden and captured in May 2011, Al-Ahmad attempted to gathered by military police in coordi- over 470,000 electronic files from his return to Iraq by way of Istanbul, and nation with the Office of Prosecutor in compound.10 These documents repre- Turkish authorities arrested him. Three Srebrenica (1995) and Kosovo (1999). sent the most well-known recovery of years later (2014), the U.S. Government In fact, the evidence accounted for an CEM by the Armed Forces in modern persuaded Turkey to extradite Al-Ahmad estimated 65 percent of the total evidence history. to the United States for prosecution used by the Office of the Prosecutor.23

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Fenzel, Slootmaker, and Cragin 33 Yet some allies and partner nations learned from the use of CEM to con- as a means to foil any country’s use of continue to struggle in their efforts to in- front VEOs and apply them to strategic private military companies (PMCs), troduce CEM into civilian criminal court competition. paramilitaries, and proxy forces. Some of proceedings. Most of the concern centers this is already being done. For example, on the admissibility of materials captured, Applications for Strategic looking at the U.S. Central Command collected, or stored by the military from Competition area of responsibility, the United States the battlefield.24 While the joint force’s use of CEM in recently used CEM recovered by the To alleviate these concerns, the the fight against VEOs is well docu- Armed Forces to highlight Iran’s illegal United Nations (UN) in January of mented, CEM also holds unlimited support to Houthi insurgents in Yemen. this year issued guidelines for the use of potential for strategic competition. It On November 25, 2019, the USS Forrest battlefield evidence in the criminal prose- simply requires creativity in the appli- Sherman legally boarded an unregistered cution of foreign terrorist fighters.25 The cation. This viewpoint aligns with the dhow (small sailing vessel) in international purpose of these guidelines is to assist 2018 National Defense Strategy, which waters and seized CEM containing UN members in updating and modifying describes both the central challenge to unmanned aerial system components, legal frameworks to allow for use of CEM U.S. national security and the required antitank-guided missiles, “near-fully in criminal proceedings. Just as Secretary response as follows: assembled” Iranian surface-to-air mis- Esper’s memo urges, UN guidelines siles, 13,000 blasting caps, and other emphasize the importance for all coun- The central challenge to U.S. prosperity missile components.32 A few months later tries to declassify battlefield evidence and security is the reemergence of long- (February 9, 2020), the USS Normandy and make it readily available for criminal term, strategic competition by what the seized a similar cache.33 In both interdic- proceedings. The guidelines state: National Security Strategy classifies as tions, close coordination occurred among revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear DOD, law enforcement, partner nations, To ensure the most effective possible use that China and Russia want to shape a and UN weapons inspectors. Indeed, al- of information in criminal proceedings, world consistent with their authoritarian lowing UN inspectors access to this CEM States are encouraged to refrain from model—gaining veto authority over other in a timely manner proved critical; the in- over-classifying such information. They nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security spectors confirmed and announced to the are also encouraged to develop simplified decisions. international community that the weap- procedures for the declassification of such ons were produced by Iran.34 Secretary of materials where they are likely to be used in A long-term strategic competition re- State , in turn, has used this such proceedings.26 quires the seamless integration of multiple CEM in his diplomatic engagements to elements of national power—diplomacy, urge the UN Security Council to extend The joint force is at the forefront of information, economics, finance, intelli- the arms embargo against Iran.35 global efforts to collect, properly classify, gence, law enforcement, and military.30 If CEM can be used effectively in declassify, and catalogue CEM so that it this way against rogue states, such as can be used as evidence in criminal pro- When the National Defense Strategy Iran, it also has applications for strategic ceedings against VEOs.27 Due to these calls on the joint force to be more com- competition with revisionist powers. efforts, the FBI has used CEM to identify petitive by looking at its own capabilities Russia, and its use of PMCs, represents and arrest terrorists who pose a threat relative to these revisionist powers over an obvious example. It is well known that to the U.S. homeland. It is also working the long term, it is best understood as the Wagner Group is a Russian PMC led to share CEM with its counterparts part of a wider effort to push back or re- by former Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye globally.28 U.S. attorneys have prosecuted sist this encroaching authoritarian model Upravlenie officer Dmitry Utkin.36 In individuals successfully with CEM in the that is inimical to U.S. interests. This June 2017, the Department of Treasury United States, and the Department of wider effort includes not only military sanctioned Utkin and the Wagner Group Justice has shared this experience with capabilities and strength but also diplo- for their involvement in Russia’s illegal prosecutors worldwide.29 Yet more work macy, information, economics, finance, annexation of Crimea.37 Its fighters di- remains to be done. The joint force needs intelligence, and law enforcement. Both rectly confronted Special Forces deployed to continue to apply the aforementioned the National Defense Strategy and the to Syria in February 2018.38 The Wagner lessons learned from the successful ap- National Military Strategy emphasize Group also sent weapons along with plication of CEM to the ongoing fight competition below the level of armed 1,200 fighters to Libyan General Khalifa against violent extremism. This means conflict. They also describe strategic Haftar’s forces in violation of UN sanc- investing the resources, time, and effort competition as a collective effort with tions.39 In fact, UN sanction monitors to break down barriers to collection, the United States, its allies, and partner recently released details on 122 individu- classification, and sharing of CEM, both nations.31 als linked to the Wagner Group who were domestically and internationally. But it Given this understanding of strategic in Libya to either transfer weapons, pro- is also the right time to take the lessons competition, CEM seems well positioned vide training to Haftar’s forces, or fight.40

34 Forum / Collected Exploitable Material JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 F/A-18E Super Hornet, assigned to Gunslingers of Strike Fighter Squadron 105, launches from of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, Arabian Gulf, August 8, 2016, in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Navy/J. Alexander Delgado)

If the United States, its allies, or CBM-Future New Material Science and Through reciprocal sharing, DOD partner nations obtained CEM on these Technology Co., Ltd. (CBMF), and by could use such CEM-derived informa- individuals, they could substantiate extension the Chinese government.41 tion to better protect and secure our INTERPOL notices and warrants for China does not have the indigenous capa- vital assets and intellectual equities. This the paramilitaries’ arrests or requests for bility to produce syntactic foam, which is a information is also an ideal tool for diplo- extradition. Alternatively, CEM used in dual-use technology with applications for matic engagements, such as highlighting diplomatic engagements could encourage deep water oil exploration, as well as Navy China’s efforts to expand its capabilities our allies and partners to enact travel re- submarines and . Shan Shi created through the illegal use of front companies strictions on the Wagner Group or other a front company in Houston and part- or persuading allies and partner nations relevant Russian PMCs. If successful, nered with CBMF to steal this intellectual to enact measures to halt illegal behavior. these efforts would undermine Russia’s property.42 CBMF paid Shan Shi $3.1 These examples illustrate the utility ability to send PMCs abroad to bolster million between 2014 and 2017.43 Using of CEM as an instrument of national authoritarian regimes or otherwise use this money, Shan Shi hired employees power.45 It has diplomatic, informational, them as an instrument of foreign policy. away from a Houston-based subsidiary of economic, intelligence, law enforcement, China, and its use of front companies, the Swedish company that manufactures and military applications—all of which provides another opportunity to use syntactic foam, Trelleborg. Shan Shi’s are named in the National Defense CEM as part of strategic competition. new employees obtained spreadsheets Strategy as elements integral to strategic CEM could be used to defend against from their former colleagues at Trelleborg competition. In order to reach its full Chinese front companies attempting to with details on how to produce syntactic potential, however, the declassification steal U.S. intellectual property, including foam and passed this information along to and distribution of CEM should be a military technology. In May 2017, the Shan Shi, who then emailed it to CBMF collective endeavor, including the U.S. FBI arrested Shan Shi, a U.S. citizen, in China.44 These spreadsheets, emails, Government, allies, and partner nations. and charged him with attempting to and other communications represent just Other militaries and law enforcement steal trade secrets for a Chinese company, another type of CEM. organizations would need to collect,

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Fenzel, Slootmaker, and Cragin 35 4 properly classify, and share these materials See, for example, Charles Faint and Mi- gust 20, 2019), available at . with the United States in a transparent SOF Targeting Process,” Small Wars Journal, 14 Office of Public Affairs, Department of manner, allowing for fulsome exploita- January 31, 2012, available at . pr/syrian-man-sentenced-terrorism-relat- 5 Non-Binding Guiding Principles on the ed-crimes>. See also Morgan Loew, “Finger- Use of Battlefield Evidence in Civilian Criminal prints Led FBI to Notorious IED Maker,” Final Thoughts Proceedings. CBS News, November 9, 2018, available at Collected exploitable material provides 6 Ibid. . community, allies, and partner nations 8 Ibid. 15 Ibid. See also U.S. Attorney’s Office, in the fight against violent extremism. 9 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Phoenix, Arizona, “Defendant Extradited to Equally important, the joint force now Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- the United States to Face Terrorism Charges,” has a growing body of lessons on the ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge press release, August 28, 2014, available at effective utilization of CEM that it can (Washington, DC: DOD, 2018), available at . revisionist powers and rogue states. gy-Summary.pdf>. 16 “Turkey Extradites ISIS-Linked Syrian to Strategic competition requires us to 10 Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Re- U.S. on Terror Charges,” Daily Sabah (Istan- think innovatively, work collaboratively, leases Nearly 470,000 Additional Files Recov- bul), September 2, 2014, available at . Other examples also exist. In 2011 think critically through the application cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-state- in United States v. Alwan, the FBI’s Terrorist of CEM across multidomain opera- ments/2017-press-releases-statements/cia-re- Explosive Device Analytic Center (TEDAC) tions—domains less developed or yet leases-additional-files-recovered-in-ubl-com- matched the fingerprints from an improvised to be discovered—we must understand pound-raid.html>. See also Combating explosive device produced in Iraq (around Terrorism Center at West Point, “Harmony 2005) to a man living in Kentucky. TEDAC has that CEM, if applied in this context, Program,” available at ; Office of the Director of over 50 countries. See Non-Binding Guiding Let’s not miss them. JFQ National Intelligence, “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf,” Principles on the Use of Battlefield Evidence in available at ; Central 17 Amandine Scherrer, ed., The Re- Notes Intelligence Agency, “November 2017 Release turn of Foreign Fighters to EU Soil, Ex-Post of Abbottabad Compound Material,” available Evaluation (: European Parliament at . at . terrorist attacks that take place outside a violent STU(2018)621811>; Arthur Martin, Ian 2 Collected exploitable material is all extremist organization’s safe haven or primary Drury, and Martin Robinson, “ISIS Staff List material and/or materiel in the possession areas of operation. It is distinct from the more Is Leaked: Names and Family Details of 22,000 of the Department of Defense, regardless traditional term international terrorism. For ex- Jihadis Revealed in Cache of Application of its classification or how it was obtained, ample, al Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyyah ex- Forms Complete with References (and Next of that could be exploited in support of DOD ecuted an attack against the Australian embassy Kin),” Daily Mail, March 10, 2016, available and National interests. Examples range from in Jakarta, , in September 2004. This at . Esper, “Classification of Materials Captured, external operation because Islamiyyah is based 18 Ibid. Collected, or Handled by the Department of in Indonesia. Al Qaeda leaders focused their 19 Martin, Drury, and Robinson, “ISIS Staff Defense,” memorandum, DOD, January 9, external operations on the so-called far enemy List Is Leaked.” 2020; and Non-Binding Guiding Principles or Western countries. 20 Europol, European Union Terrorism on the Use of Battlefield Evidence in Civilian 12 Office of Public Affairs, Department of Situation and Trend Report 2017 (Brussels: Eu- Criminal Proceedings (Washington, DC: Inter- Justice, “Al Qaeda Operative Convicted for ropean Agency for Law Enforcement Coopera- national Institute for Justice and the Rule of Role in International Terrorism Plot Targeting tion, June 15, 2017), 19, available at . Evidence-EN.pdf>. victed-role-international-terrorism-plot-target- 21 Vickiie Oliphant, “Terror Warning: ISIS 3 Non-Binding Guiding Principles on the ing-united-states-and>. Files Reveal Danish Recruiters Who ‘Plotted Use of Battlefield Evidence in Civilian Criminal 13 United States v. Naseer, 16-373-cr (U.S. Attack’ Links to UK,” Express Online, April Proceedings. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Au- 18, 2016, available at

36 Forum / Collected Exploitable Material JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 co.uk/news/world/662217/ISIS-files-Danish- remarks by the Coordinator for Counterterror- 42 Office of Public Affairs, Department recruiters-linked-to-UK>. ism at the Brookings Institution, Washington of Justice, “Texas Man Convicted of Con- 22 Sajid Javid, “UK Nationals Return- DC, April 30, 2019, available at . Affairs, Department of Justice, “Two Busi- available at . ation and Trend Report 2017; Scherrer, The Re- Economic Espionage for Benefit of Chinese 23 Bibi van Ginkel and Christophe Paulus- turn of Foreign Fighters to EU Soil, 49; Europol, Manufacturing Company,” press release, April sen, The Role of the Military in Securing Suspects European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend 27, 2018, available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Fenzel, Slootmaker, and Cragin 37 NDU Press Congratulates the Winners of the 2020 Essay Competitions

DU Press virtually hosted the final round of judging in May 2020, during Strategic Research Paper which 26 faculty judges from 14 participating professional military educa- N tion (PME) institutions selected the best entries in each category. There First Place were 72 submissions in this year’s three categories. First Place winners in each of Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy McKissack, the three categories appear in the following pages. USAFR Air War College Secretary of Defense National Second Place “Pardon the Paradox: Making Sense Security Essay Competition Kyle Richardson, Department of State of President Trump’s Interventions in National War College Military Justice” “Indonesia: Lessons for the U.S.-China Geo-Economic Competition” Second Place Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Kendrick Third Place Mulvey, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Eric V.M. Kreitz, U.S. Naval War College (Senior) The 14th annual competition was USA “Helping Hanoi Keep the Dragon at Bay intended to stimulate new approaches U.S. Army War College in the South China Sea” to coordinated civilian and military “Re-Emerging Russian Influence in action from a broad spectrum of civilian Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy Third Place and military students. Essays address Response” Amy C.F. Carlon, Department of State U.S. Government structure, policies, Eisenhower School for National Security capabilities, resources, and/or practices Chairman of the Joint and Resource Strategy and to provide creative, feasible ideas Chiefs of Staff Strategic “Diplomatic Engagement on Missile on how best to orchestrate the core Essay Competition Defense Amidst Great Power competencies of our national security Competition” institution. Strategy Article First Place (tie) Lieutenant Colonel Roderick K. Butz, First Place USAF Colonel Mark M. Zais, USA U.S. Army War College This annual competition, in its 39th U.S. Army War College “Beneath the Crosshairs: Remotely year in 2020, challenges students at the “Artificial Intelligence: A Decisionmaking Piloted Airstrikes as a Foreign Policy Tool” Nation’s joint PME institutions to write Technology” research papers or articles about signifi- First Place (tie) cant aspects of national security strategy Second Place Kaleb J. Redden, Office of the to stimulate strategic thinking, promote Lieutenant Colonel Kukunaokala Secretary of Defense well-written research, and contribute () Mendonca, ARNG National War College to a broader security debate among U.S. Army War College “Competition Is What States Make of It: professionals. “Cybersecurity Initiatives in the National A U.S. Strategy Toward China” Guard: Opportunities and Challenges”

38 Essay Competitions / Introduction JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Third Place Distinguished Judges Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy McKissack, Twenty-six senior faculty members from New from NDU USAFR the 14 participating PME institutions Air War College took time out of their busy schedules Press “First Among Equals: Diplomacy as (and online teaching duties) to serve for the Center for the Study of America’s Primary Instrument of Power” as judges for this year’s competitions. Chinese Military Affairs Their personal dedication and profes- Strategic Forum 306 Joint Force Quarterly sional excellence ensured strong and Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Maerz Awards credible competitions. Control of Overseas Operations In its 5th year, the JFQ Maerz Awards, The judges were Joseph L. By Phillip C. Saunders chosen by the staff of NDU Press, Billingsley, College of Information and Expanded recognize the most influential articles Cyberspace; Brandy Lyn Brown, Marine Chinese from the previous year’s four issues. Six Corps University; Mark A. Bucknam, interests outstanding articles were chosen for the National War College; Dr. Charles are driving Maerz Awards, named in honor of Mr. Chadbourne, U.S. Naval War College; People’s George C. Maerz, former writer-editor Dr. James Chen, College of Information Liberation of NDU Press. and Cyberspace; Dr. Benjamin Army efforts “Frank” Cooling, Eisenhower School to develop Forum for National Security and Resource power projec- Glenda Jakubowski Strategy; Dr. Armando DeLeon, Air tion capabilities. The reorganization “What’s Not to Like? Social Media University eSchool of Graduate PME; of the Chinese military in late 2015 as Information Operations Force Dr. Richard L. DiNardo, Marine Corps explicitly sought to give the Central Multiplier,” JFQ 94 (3rd Quarter 2019) Staff College; Dr. Peter Eltsov, College Military Commission and the of International Security Affairs; Dr. Jack theater commands responsibility for JPME Today Godwin, NDU Press; Dr. Todd Holm, conducting operations and to rele- Dale C. Eikmeier Marine Corps University; Dr. C.J. Horn, gate the services to force-building. “Simplicity: A Tool for Working with Air Force Cyber College; Dr. James However, the services are trying Complexity and Chaos,” JFQ 92 (1st D. Kiras, School of Advanced Air and to maintain operational respon- Quarter 2019) Space Studies; Captain Bill Marlowe, sibilities, including for overseas USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; operations. The precise division of Commentary Dr. Brian McNeil, Air War College; responsibilities and coordination Jeffery Zust and Stephen Krauss Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War mechanisms between the CMC “Force Protection from Moral Injury: College; Dr. Kristin Mulready-Stone, and the theater commands remains Three Objectives for Military Leaders,” U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Jaimie Orr, unclear, especially for large, high-in- JFQ 92 (1st Quarter 2019) National War College; Dr. Nicholas tensity combat operations. Existing M. Sambaluk, Air University eSchool command and control mechanisms Features of Graduate PME; Dr. Jesse P. Samluk, are workable for now, but are likely Sara Dudley, Travis Pond, Ryan National Intelligence University; Dr. to prove inadequate if PLA overseas Roseberry, and Shawn Carden Nicholas E. Sarantakes, U.S. Naval operations become larger, require “Evasive Maneuvers: How Malign Actors War College; Dr. Naunihal Singh, U.S. joint forces, last for extended periods Leverage Cryptocurrency,” JFQ 92 (1st Naval War College; Dr. Paul Springer, of time, or occur in nonpermissive Quarter 2019) Air Command and Staff College; Dr. environments where deployed forces Jeff Turner, Joint Forces Staff College; face significant threats from hostile Recall Dr. David A. Wigmore, College of state or nonstate actors. John K. DiEugenio and Aubry J. International Security Affairs; and Eaton Dr. Elizabeth D. Woodward, Air War “Flanking the Crater,” JFQ 94 (3rd College. Quarter 2019)

Joint Doctrine J. Mark Berwanger “Fire for Effect: The Evolution of Joint Fires,” JFQ 93 (2nd Quarter 2019) Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 2020 Winners 39 Sailors signal to MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter attached to Golden Falcons of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 12 as it hovers over flight deck of USS McCampbell during visit, board, search, and seizure training exercise, South China Sea, July 22, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Elesia K. Patten)

Competition Is What States Make of It: A U.S. Strategy Toward China

By Kaleb J. Redden

They have transformed a poor society by an economic miracle to become now the second-largest economy in the world. . . . They have followed the American lead in putting people in space and shooting down satellites with missiles. Theirs is a culture 4,000 years old with 1.3 billion people, many of great talent. . . . How could they not aspire to be number 1 in Asia, and in time the world? . . . It is China’s intention to be the greatest power in the world.

—Lee Quan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore1

hina today represents the “most power—to challenge its economic consequential long-term challenge influence and technological lead in C we face as a nation.”2 While many key sectors, to challenge its military actors and trends present challenges in scenarios in which it has long held Kaleb J. Redden wrote this essay while a student to U.S. interests, only China has the dominance or assumed sanctuary, or at the National War College. It tied for first place in the 2020 Secretary of Defense National potential to challenge the United States to present an alternative governance Security Essay Competition. across so many aspects of national model that undermines the norms and

40 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 values that the United States has sought capabilities and bide your time,” creating this erosion.17 Donald Trump’s National to preserve at home and promote space for its rise while allowing the world Security Strategy may have given official abroad.3 To be clear, China faces many to believe it might become a “responsible voice to a more competitive U.S.-China headwinds that may inhibit its rise.4 stakeholder” in the international system.11 relationship, but there is a growing bi- Yet China has signaled ambitions to The arrival of President Xi Jinping partisan consensus on the gravity of this be a dominant global power; its eco- in 2012, however, ushered in a new era issue, which is rare in Washington today. nomic trajectory, if it continues, would of Chinese confidence and assertiveness. Despite this sense that its dominance provide significant means to pursue its China is hiding its capabilities no longer; is eroding, the United States today still aims.5 As a result, today China alone it portrays itself as a world leader and enjoys a number of enduring strengths can contend with the United States for casts the United States as retreating from that China lacks. These include an un- hegemony within a region and has the the global stage. Under Xi’s leadership, paralleled alliance network,18 unrivaled potential to mount a serious challenge China has sought to reorient global military power projection capabilities, to the U.S. ability to shape the charac- economic corridors through its Belt and a highly efficient and innovative econ- ter of the international system.6 Road Initiative (BRI), militarized extra- omy,19 systemic fiscal and economic This article provides a U.S. strategy territorial claims in the South China Sea, advantages,20 abundant natural resources for this challenge.7 It begins from a view undertaken a massive military moderniza- and energy reserves,21 a comparatively that the United States benefits from its tion campaign, and set goals to dominate uncontested near abroad,22 and an open leading position in the international order key technology sectors by 2025. Perhaps society and comparatively transparent of the past 75 years.8 It embraces the di- most significant, Xi’s articulation of a new government with greater legitimacy, elite agnosis of our current national strategies “Chinese Dream” set ambitious national educational institutions,23 more favorable that U.S.-China relations have become objectives that, according to some inter- demographics,24 and a historic position more competitive, but diverges on some pretations, aim to supplant the United as de facto leader of the international of the approaches it recommends to suc- States economically, militarily, and cultur- order.25 And China faces significant chal- ceed in that competition. It posits that, ally by 2049.12 Ultimately, China seeks lenges often overlooked in narratives of while the primacy the United States once to achieve dominant influence in its near its inevitable rise, including widespread enjoyed may no longer be attainable, the abroad and to displace the United States corruption, poor health care, an aging United States still maintains the where- from its historical role as the de facto population, and many others.26 In short, withal to prevent Chinese hegemony leader of the international order so that it China is not preordained to supplant the in Asia and to sustain its leading role in can reshape that order to its preferences.13 United States globally.27 shaping the character and direction of China’s strategy to achieve these aims Yet the United States has frittered global affairs—and that the U.S. political has increasingly come into focus. It seeks away many of its advantages. At home, aim should be to do so.9 It argues that to increase its leverage through trade it has underfunded education and in- the United States can achieve this aim by and economic tradecraft so that nations, frastructure, insufficiently prioritized reinforcing deterrence in Asia, building corporations, and organizations are ret- research and development, abandoned a balancing coalition to check China’s icent to contest or even criticize China’s immigration policies that have under- rise, and bolstering domestic strengths activities; increase its military capabilities written U.S. economic competitiveness, to extend U.S. influence and sustain the to deter U.S. military intervention in and allowed other domestic strengths to international order until China either Asia; weaken the U.S. alliance system, wither.28 It is experiencing new levels of moderates its ambitions or suffers set- particularly in Asia; erode confidence in political polarization and national debt backs. In other words, the United States U.S. credibility and staying power; cast that leave it less able to stem this atrophy should not panic, but it must focus. doubt on the U.S. economic and political or respond to other crises. And abroad, model; and increasingly present itself an “America First” foreign policy has The Strategic Context: as a leader in global institutions and in put strains on U.S. alliances,29 undercut International and Domestic the eyes of the world.14 It seeks to do so U.S. attractiveness,30 created a vacuum China’s Trajectory, Ambitions, while avoiding a conflict with the United in international institutions that China and Strategy. Over the past 40 years, States, but it is increasingly confident has moved to fill,31 and, most important, China has witnessed an unprecedented of its prospects should one emerge.15 A left the world less confident of U.S. economic transformation, rising from a successful U.S. theory of victory must be leadership.32 poor, isolated state to become the world’s designed to defeat this Chinese theory of Moreover, while Washington has second largest economy, largest merchan- victory.16 become seized with this problem, it is un- dise exporter, second largest destination U.S. Domestic Context: Advantages clear that the American public has done of foreign direct investment, and largest and Atrophy. As these dynamics have so. Some polling suggests that the public manufacturer.10 Throughout most of become more evident, a consensus has is less focused on China than political that time, China’s leaders were mindful emerged in Washington that the United elites.33 The public already expects a level of Deng Xiaoping’s dictate to “hide your States must move aggressively to stop of services incommensurate with taxation;

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 41 F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 (Reinforced), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepares to take off from flight deck of amphibious assault ship USS America, South China Sea, April 18, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Isaac Cantrell) the United States was running nearly Protecting U.S. Security. The United decades focused on counterterrorism trillion-dollar deficits even before the States remains the world’s preeminent and counterinsurgency—investing in coronavirus pandemic. To put it simply, military, with unrivaled global power. legacy systems and consuming readiness the public does not appear prepared for But regional balances of power are what as quickly as possible. As a result, China the commitment that a long-term U.S.- matter vis-à-vis China—because the today rivals the United States in key China competition might entail. Whether potential flashpoints today are proximate technologies such as artificial intelligence, the United States will sustain its advan- to China, and Beijing has been investing quantum computing, and hypersonics.37 tages is therefore unclear; this strategy in capabilities specifically designed to It appears capable of using cyber capabil- must demonstrate why the public should challenge Washington in such scenarios.35 ities to hold at-risk critical infrastructure, be willing to support doing so. Unless the United States is postured to penetrating military networks critical to blunt Chinese aggression initially, it faces our power projection, and engaging in U.S. National Interests and the unwelcome choice of either seeking social manipulation to cripple the public’s How China Threatens Them to roll back Beijing’s advances or backing will.38 It is eroding U.S. advantages one The United States must weigh Chinese down. With the former come risks of es- by one, often by stealing technology that actions by the degree to which they calation against a nuclear power; with the required billions of dollars and years to threaten its national interests. While latter comes weakened U.S. credibility develop.39 Put simply, the character of formulations for national interests have and norms against nonaggression.36 Put warfare is changing, and China has done varied, they are typically variants of simply, U.S. military deterrence in Asia, more to prepare for it. security, prosperity, and the values we which numerous allies trust for their own Promoting U.S. Prosperity. China seek to preserve at home and promote security, is eroding, and the risk of con- has eclipsed the United States as the abroad.34 China poses significant chal- flict is rising as a result. primary trading partner for nearly all the lenges to each. Long-term trends are also bleak. The world’s nations, reversing a dominant United States has spent the past two U.S. position of only 20 years ago.40 The

42 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 International Monetary Fund estimates states to drop diplomatic recognition of behavior. It is always possible that that if China achieves its 2049 goals, its of .48 In Europe, U.S. efforts to China’s aims are less ambitious. U.S. economy would be three times that of convince nations not to allow Huawei strategy, however, must account for the the United States.41 While scholars rightly to build 5G networks have fallen flat.49 possibility that they are not. point out that China must also provide Nations increasingly want U.S. security As a result, the U.S. political aim for more than four times the U.S. pop- but still want Chinese economic benefits, should be to deny China regional hege- ulation, this sheer economic heft would and they try to avoid being forced to mony and to sustain the leading role of give China enormous benefits of scale as choose.50 the United States in shaping the charac- well as significant leverage in almost any Advancing U.S. Values and ter and direction of global affairs. The bilateral relationship. Influence. China’s governance model United States still maintains the where- To grow and sustain these advantages, presents the most credible alternative withal to do so today, even if it is unlikely the goals of “Made in China 2025” make model to Western democracy since the to regain the primacy it enjoyed following clear China’s intent to dominate key fall of the Soviet Union. Chinese citizens the collapse of the Soviet Union. To do technology areas it believes are essential cede political freedom in exchange for so, this strategy offers a theory of victory to future growth—a goal that implies dis- economic gain,51 allowing the Chinese designed to counter China’s strategy: the placing U.S. leadership in many cases.42 Communist Party to create an unparal- United States must reinforce deterrence To do so, it restricts foreign companies’ leled surveillance state.52 Xi has arrested in Asia to mitigate vulnerabilities today, access to Chinese markets, supports thousands of activists, expelled foreign build a balancing coalition to check state-owned enterprises, forces companies journalists, and worked to suppress pro- China’s rise, and bolster U.S. domestic to share intellectual property (IP), and tests in . Most egregiously, strengths to extend American influence steals IP it cannot otherwise obtain. The China has detained more than 1 million and sustain the international order until Commission on Intellectual Property Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim China either moderates its ambitions or Theft estimates that cyber theft costs the minorities in “reeducation camps,” with suffers setbacks. United States between $180 billion and torture and forced labor being reported.53 Given’s China’s breathtaking rise, $540 billion annually—the equivalent U.S. experts have comforted themselves we should be clear about the plausible of 1 to 3 percent of U.S. gross domestic with the thought that China’s model mechanisms for this theory of victory to product.43 Intangible assets such as IP lacks foreign appeal.54 Yet recent behavior work. Even as some trends appear signifi- represent 80 percent of the value of suggests China increasingly sees its model cantly in China’s favor, this theory could the Standard and Poor’s 500 by some as something it should export.55 If it work by buying time and signaling U.S. estimates, so vulnerability to such attacks spreads, not only will millions of people commitment that allows states to form a is consequential for both economic pros- be less free, but current norms that guide balancing coalition against China,58 buy- perity and national security.44 nation-state behavior will be at risk as ing time for China’s domestic constraints Moreover, China reinforces this well. Such a future presents a challenge to work against it, either through eco- leverage with tools of economic state- to our values and portends a darker nomic stagnation or more far-reaching craft, most notably its Belt and Road world where unrest and conflict are more domestic upheaval,59 or by simply sus- Initiative. Most estimates suggest China common—potentially undercutting long- taining U.S. advantages that prove more plans to spend more than $1 trillion term global stability as well.56 pronounced than declinists predict.60 globally under BRI, which will reorient Competing with rather than accommo- global trade corridors toward China.45 Desired Ends, Theory of dating China is also advisable even if none As part of this effort, China engages in Victory, and Assumptions of these futures transpires, because even predatory lending—simultaneously link- The United States must decide if it if its current position in the international ing these nations to China’s economic wishes to confront this challenge or order is not viable indefinitely, the United system, generating coercive leverage, and seek some form of accommodation with States benefits from sustaining it for as undercutting international norms.46 The China. This strategy argues that the long as possible. United States has no compelling alterna- United States is unlikely to reach any This approach, however, relies on a tive to these offerings. accommodation that would be sufficient number of assumptions. If any of these As a result, even as states become to protect its own interests yet satisfy proved invalid, it would require revisiting more wary of China’s motives, its eco- Beijing over the long term.57 China’s the strategy. Key assumptions include the nomic leverage provides a powerful ambitions are at odds with core tenets following: tool to promote its preferences and of U.S. foreign policy: preventing a The current international order undermine U.S. influence. At least one foreign hegemon in Asia, supporting • remains attractive to most nations.61 analysis of Asian power trends now rates allies and partners who feel threatened The United States can convince China as the most diplomatically influ- by China’s rise, and reluctantly con- • nations to balance against China.62 ential nation in Asia.47 In Latin America, ceding regional spheres of influence in China is using this leverage to pressure which China would dictate the norms

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 43 • China’s leaders can adjust policy • Pursue “principled engagement.” reconnaissance), increase U.S. regional without imperiling regime stability.63 Even as we take the steps above, we force posture and improve its combat • U.S. actions designed to deter should look to cooperate with China credibility (more dispersed and resilient Chinese behavior will in fact improve where our interests align to provide basing),67 develop new operational con- deterrence, not drive an escalatory ballast for the relationship as com- cepts for defeating Chinese aggression response.64 petition intensifies, improve crisis without the all-domain dominance to • Other threats (for example, Russia) stability, and make progress where which U.S. forces have become accus- will not alter Chinese behavior sig- possible on global issues. tomed since the Gulf War,68 and identify nificantly or align with one another critical infrastructure for U.S. power These objectives are designed to be in ways that significantly increase the projection and develop cyber protection mutually reinforcing and to produce cu- threat they pose to U.S. interests. campaigns given the importance of U.S.- mulative effects. They could be pursued The U.S. public will support based surge forces for most Indo-Pacific • in parallel, though some of them may increased investments necessary to contingencies.69 necessarily allow for faster action than execute this strategy. Deterrence is not simply about capa- others. Access to Asia’s economy is necessary bilities; it is also about resolve. While the • What follows is a series of “objec- for U.S. prosperity. decision to use force will always be made tive instrument packages” that tie the U.S. economic fundamentals (for by the President at the time, the United • objectives above to specific ways and instance, the dollar as a safe-haven States must be prepared to fight in those means. An overarching strategy for China currency) will not shift significantly. situations where we seek to deter.70 To could not possibly account for every Relative Chinese and U.S. economic that end, as the United States updates • specific action the United States should and military trends are such that we its posture and deploys more advanced take given the breadth and complex- may see a “period of acute danger” capabilities, it should undertake a cali- ity of U.S.-China competition today. rather than China’s inexorable rise.65 brated messaging campaign to Beijing These objectives, however, provide key that signals both our defensive intentions elements that should guide the U.S. and our unequivocal preparedness to act Strategic Objectives approach and could also inform more in the event of significant Chinese aggres- This strategy articulates four key objec- detailed Department of Defense (DOD) sion against U.S. forces or allies. tives that, taken together, are designed strategies. The second element of this objective to pursue this theory of victory and Objective 1: Bolster Conventional is longer term efforts to sustain our mili- achieve the strategy’s political aim: Deterrence in Asia. The United States tary edge. The National Defense Strategy must begin by launching a campaign to Bolster conventional deterrence in emphasizes creating a more lethal force • bolster conventional deterrence in Asia. Asia. This step includes both near- but gives little guidance on the relative The National Defense Strategy provides term measures to deter Chinese emphasis on known capabilities versus useful direction on this issue. More needs aggression and longer term efforts to long-term disruptive technology. As a to be done to implement it, however, and sustain the U.S. military edge. result, the military departments’ procliv- some of its prescriptions are incomplete. Build a balancing coalition to check ity toward familiar platforms means that • Ensuring there is no opportunity for China’s rise. To do so, the United DOD has focused more on near-term Chinese aggression is important because States must reinvest in its alliances, lethality. DOD has made notable steps in it shores up an acute vulnerability. It is restore perceptions of U.S. lead- increasing its research and development also a useful first step because other na- ership and support for the inter- (R&D) spending,71 but much of this tions expect it, and because it is a bedrock national order, level the economic funding has focused on evolutionary requirement for stability on which other playing field with China by pursuing rather than revolutionary gains.72 To ad- initiatives can ride: with it as a bulwark, reciprocal trade rules and by building dress this issue, DOD should first sustain we can work to rebuild other nations’ alternatives to BRI, and undertake a its R&D funding increases—even at the confidence in the United States and over messaging campaign to expose the expense of force structure or additional time enable them to stand with us on gap between China’s narratives and readiness—and significantly increase economic and diplomatic matters. its behavior. investment in long-term R&D on key This effort must begin with urgently Restore the sources of long-term technology areas such as artificial intel- • needed investments and changes to U.S. domestic strength. This step ligence, hypersonics, space systems, and capabilities and force posture.66 To do includes investments at home to quantum computing. Second, because so, DOD must prioritize acquisition of revitalize our economy and society R&D spending is increasingly driven by more lethal and survivable platforms as well as discipline to prioritize the private sector, DOD must not only (advanced munitions; more resilient resources to meet the challenge that increase spending but also undertake ac- command, control, communications, China poses. quisition reforms to speed up commercial computers, intelligence, surveillance, and technology integration, experimentation,

44 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 From left, USS Germantown, USNS John Ericsson, USS Antietam, USS Ronald Reagan, USS America, USS Shiloh, USS New Orleans, and USS Comstock break away from formation in support of Valiant Shield 2020, Philippine Sea, September 25, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Oswald Felix, Jr.)

and fielding.73 And third, DOD, work- Strengthening U.S. Alliances and many nations as their de facto security ing with the Departments of State and Partnerships. The U.S. alliance network guarantor, and is still trusted more than Commerce, should continue to drive is a substantial advantage that China China—advantages we can leverage but export control reforms—improving our lacks but seeks to undermine. Yet the must shore up.75 ability to protect technological crown United States risks taking this advantage First, the United States must simply jewels while making it easier to share for granted. It is no secret that many act in word and deed as if its alliance and noncontroversial technology with allies. allies have chafed at President Trump’s partner relationships matter. Washington Objective 2: Build a Balancing “America First” rhetoric and demands should begin by turning down the rhet- Coalition to Check China’s Rise. If for increased burden-sharing at a time oric on burden-sharing in both Europe China’s trajectory continues, building a when many allies face economic chal- and Asia and moderating its aims in balancing coalition of states to sustain a lenges and have just spent the past two particular negotiations such as the Special favorable balance of power is the most decades supporting the United States in Measures Agreement with the Republic plausible mechanism to counter China’s Iraq and . In some quarters, of Korea. It should consult with partners rise. Credible deterrence is crucial, but these relationships already appear to before making significant foreign policy convincing nations to take this step be fraying. One need look no further decisions (for example, closing U.S. would also require the United States to than the ’ termination of the borders without consulting allies was a strengthen frayed bonds among its allies Visiting Forces Agreement, the British self-inflicted wound in the initial corona- and partners, reestablish perceptions of decision on Huawei, or European na- virus response). And it should simply be U.S. leadership and commitment to the tions seeking to create an alternative to more present and dependable diplomat- international order, develop alternatives the Society for Worldwide Interbank ically (for example, President Trump has to Chinese economic statecraft, and ex- Financial Telecommunication.74 Yet attended only two of eight summits in pose China’s malign behavior. on balance, the United States still has Asia during his tenure). substantial leverage today, is seen by

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 45 F/A-18E Super Hornet, attached to Eagles of Strike Fighter Squadron 115, launches from flight deck of Navy’s only forward-deployed USS Ronald Reagan, Philippine Sea, August 31, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Erica Bechard)

The United States should couple this the perception among nations that it not forgotten the years of demands for shift in diplomatic posture with increased remains committed to and prepared to zero real growth that Washington placed assistance and collaboration. For instance, play a leading role in the international on these organizations. Many will view it could increase and reprioritize its order. For 70 years, the United States has President Trump’s recent decision to security assistance programs—providing widely been seen as the creator, defender, withhold funding for the World Health more assistance to states vulnerable to and de facto leader of the order. Yet as Organization as a politically motivated Chinese coercion while also being more the Trump administration has criticized attempt to shift blame for the coronavirus direct about specific capabilities—with U.S. involvement in aspects of the order, pandemic. And the United States must the goal of incentivizing vulnerable states China has sought to step into this vac- reconsider its posture in certain situa- to become “porcupines” that are difficult uum, portraying itself as a global leader as tions to avoid appearing obstructionist. to invade and more able to withstand the United States retreats.76 For example, the United States recently Chinese harassment. DOD should also To shift this trend, the United States blocked the appointment of judges to develop analytic processes to optimize must begin by demonstrating a renewed the World Trade Organization’s dispute defense capability mixes among sophisti- commitment to international institutions. resolution court until the court could cated allied militaries (for example, It must increase U.S. participation in finally no longer reach a quorum,78 and ) to improve complemen- international standard-setting bodies, ending 27 years of enforcement.79 Some tary capabilities given new operational many of which draw few headlines but 67 nations petitioned the United States concepts. And it should seek to persuade do critical work. China has been increas- to shift its position. When Washington Quadrilateral Security Dialogue nations ingly staffing these agencies, then using refused, the European Union worked (Japan, Australia, India, and the United its positions to insert official references with other nations—including China—to States) and key European allies to increas- to BRI or Xi Jinping’s “Community create a workaround.80 China looks like ingly join such activities as Freedom of with a Shared Future for Mankind” and a constructive actor here, but the United Navigation exercises, which signal joint shaping norms like the “Responsibility States does not. resolve and bind these nations to us. to Protect” to accommodate China’s Second, the United States must Reestablishing Perceptions of U.S. sovereignty concerns.77 The United reclaim its role as a leader on global Leadership and Commitment to the States must also make its contributions challenges. COVID-19 provides a near- International Order. Additionally, the for United Nations funding on time and term opportunity where the world will be United States should seek to reestablish without coercive demands. Nations have watching: the United States could play

46 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 a leading role coordinating vaccine re- publicly through aggressive unilateral 203088) that traditional finance vehicles search, information-sharing, cooperating tariffs—a battleground where China has were not meeting. U.S. rhetoric warning on industrial mobilization, and providing significant countervailing leverage and will nations of predatory loans may make assistance to impacted nations.81 Looking also feel pressure to show toughness—the China look bad, but it is unlikely to suc- beyond the present moment, Washington United States should create multilateral ceed without a credible alternative. should signal its recommitment by re- pressure by rejoining the successor agree- This strategy argues that creating an joining the Paris Climate Accords. The ment to the Trans-Pacific Partnership alternative to BRI is economically viable, U.S. withdrawal allowed China to present (TPP). Doing so would require accepting especially if the United States does so itself as the more responsible actor on some concessions because negotiations with other nations and leverages multi- . Given that 175 parties advanced in our absence, but it would be lateral institutions. The United States has signed the accords and Washington nego- a huge signal to allies skittish about U.S. made some progress with its recent Better tiated specifically with Beijing to ensure commitments to regional and multilateral Utilization of Investments Leading to both nations joined, the U.S. withdrawal institutions. And ultimately, the combined Development (BUILD) Act, which over- makes it appear the obstreperous party.82 pressure of TPP members makes it more hauls the Overseas Private Investment The list of other global problems is too likely that China will feel compelled to Corporation (OPIC) and provides $60 long to enumerate here,83 but the basic accommodate these demands over time. billion for loans as well as political risk dynamic for many of them is similar. The This step should, however, be cou- insurance for U.S. commercial entities. United States must reverse this trend by pled with targeted pressure through Yet $60 billion will not compete favor- playing a leading role in developing the the dispassionate application of U.S. ably with $1 trillion or more in potential multilateral responses so that the world law. The United States should, for ex- Chinese loans. sees it as willing to lead and committed to ample, increase the scrutiny placed on The United States could address this the international order it helped create. Committee on Foreign Investment in gap through three steps. First, it should Developing Alternatives to Chinese the United States cases and broaden its expand the BUILD Act to grow the Statecraft. While the deterrence posture mandate to other business dealings like funds available to the U.S. International above provides stability, and a return to venture capital investments.84 The ad- Development Finance Corporation multilateralism will improve the U.S. ministration should work with Congress (DFC) considerably. Many U.S. com- image, we must also set the economic to expand sanctions authorities to cut mentators have called for an alternative conditions to sustain U.S. influence over off Chinese firms that illicitly obtain to BRI yet argue that the United States the long term. Two key elements com- U.S. technology.85 And the United cannot afford to compete symmetrically. pose this approach: setting conditions States should delist Chinese companies It is well within U.S. capacity, however, for more reciprocal economic relations that do not meet audit and disclosure to grow DFC by several times its current and building tools to challenge Chinese requirements for U.S. exchanges.86 Last, size. This cost appears substantial at economic statecraft. given the significant impacts of cyber-en- first, until one realizes that DFC will be First, the United States should abled IP theft, the United States should issuing loans, not grants. In fact, DFC’s continue to privately press for fair and re- revisit the recommendations of the predecessor, OPIC, returned a $3.7 bil- ciprocal trade terms in negotiations with Commission on the Theft of American lion profit to the Treasury from 2012 to China. Today, U.S. firms do not enjoy Intellectual Property. Those recommen- 2017, and its loans have created 275,000 fair access to Chinese markets, China’s dations are sufficiently numerous that jobs and $75 billion in U.S. exports state-owned enterprises receive subsidies a full treatment is not possible here. since 1974.89 There would be costs to that make competing difficult for U.S. Suffice it to say that a 2017 update to capitalize the fund, but at the time of this companies, and China demands access to the commission’s report suggested that writing, reactions to the coronavirus have foreign firms’ intellectual property and while the United States has made some left the United States able to borrow at data before it allows them to do business. progress, many of the commission’s record low rates—so low, in fact, that The Trump administration has pushed recommendations had not been imple- in -adjusted terms, it is actually back against these imbalances. Having al- mented at that time.87 being paid to borrow.90 ready pressed these concerns, the United Second, the United States should Second, the United States should ex- States should continue to pursue them in build tools to compete with China’s pand the alternatives to BRI by working ongoing negotiations while being clear- development finance model, in particular with key allies, the World Bank, and the eyed about the limits of what China may BRI. The logic here is also straightfor- Asian Development Bank to expand the concede and doing so privately to avoid ward; it is difficult to “beat something types of loans available. Several nations threatening Beijing’s prestige. with nothing.” The reality is that for have begun to build similar development This approach, however, has not all the handwringing in Washington, finance vehicles and to pursue bilateral produced significant results to date—the Chinese financing responds to significant or multilateral partnerships to deconflict Phase I trade deal avoided many of these infrastructure gaps (for example, an resources. The United States should issues. Instead of continuing to press estimated $26 trillion in Asia through demonstrate renewed leadership by

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 47 Sailor aboard ship HMCS Regina relays orders to helm on bridge during replenishment-at-sea with Royal Australian Navy ship HMS Sirius during RIMPAC, August 20, 2020 (Courtesy Royal Canadian Navy/Dan Bard) taking this concept further, creating an the percentage of the budget that goes to United States should hold regular press Infrastructure Development Coalition foreign aid.92 briefings on these activities, declassify that creates an integrated structure with Exposing China’s Malign Behavior. U.S. assessments when possible, and other leading nations in development China is adroit at messaging campaigns amplify nongovernmental leaks that finance.91 that portray it as a peaceful power and its have begun to emerge in Xinjiang.93 The And last, it should couple these in- governance model as superior. China’s United States should supplement cover- creased development finance offerings actual behavior, however, tells a different age of this topic with evidence of other with a modest increase in direct devel- story. To reinforce the objectives above human rights abuses and authoritarian opment assistance. The U.S. Agency for and help nations balance with us, the behavior, including the detention of International Development currently United States should launch a coordi- regime critics and human rights activists, funds assistance to help nations evaluate nated information campaign that seeks to the expansion of China’s surveillance loan offerings, the technical feasibility expose the differences between China’s state, and efforts to suppress protests in of projects, and a variety of supporting propagated narratives and its actual Hong Kong. The United States should programs (for example, legal assistance conduct. The principal objective should then encourage other nations to amplify to strengthen contract enforcement, be to expose China’s malign practices to this messaging. It should in particular streamline regulations, and meet labor foreign audiences to shape their views. seek to persuade other Muslim nations standards). The agency’s fiscal year 2020 At the same time, such messaging might that have been reluctant to speak out. budget request included $449 million for have the collateral benefit of convincing This campaign should combine the Indo-Pacific region (covering other China to corral some behaviors. with a second information campaign issues as well). An increase of $3 billion The centerpiece of this campaign documenting China’s lending practices to $5 billion would have substantial should be China’s treatment of ethnic under BRI, economic coercion of states impact alongside loan offerings while not minorities, in particular the gross mis- and corporations, and attempts to export radically altering the U.S. debt picture or treatment of Uighurs and other Muslim its development model. The United minorities in Xinjiang Province. The States should showcase BRI’s lack of

48 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 transparency, cases of poor results, and • Technology. The United States that could be done anywhere, and— ways in which BRI acts as a tool for geo- should seek to maintain its tech- most critically—to invent.98 strategic leverage, not simply assistance. nological edge by increasing R&D • Immigration. The United States The messaging should be coordinated to funding in key emerging technol- must expand immigration, which has highlight aforementioned efforts to build ogies such as artificial intelligence, long been a source of strength and alternatives to BRI and a multilateral where it has been less aggressive than innovation, and reform its approach consortium to provide such loans. Here China in recent years.96 Government toward it, including raising the again, Washington should press partners incentives should be designed to overall cap on visas for advanced to amplify this message among their ensure the United States is poised degree holders to ensure that the publics. to lead in the technologies and brightest foreign students can stay Finally, the United States should economic sectors most likely to and contribute their skills to our launch a media outreach effort focused drive future growth (for example, economy.99 on Chinese business perfidy. It should electric vehicle infrastructure, battery • Public health. America’s health is a highlight China’s endemic corruption, technology, solar power, and many significant comparative advantage use of state-owned enterprises to un- others), rather than clinging to to China. But the United States dercut other nations’ competitiveness legacy manufacturing. It also means spends more on health care than in global trade, Internet censorship, IP promoting a business and regulatory any nation in the world yet still has theft, and use of market access to coerce climate designed to support Ameri- the lowest life expectancy among companies to bow to Chinese demands.94 can business and help it to compete wealthy nations. The rising costs The United States should look for firms against Chinese firms.97 Moreover, of Medicare and Medicaid are the that experienced negative long-term such steps must be coupled with largest driver of the Federal deficit. effects and use those firms to amplify this a technology protection regime And we were no better prepared for message and display concrete evidence to defend U.S. innovations from the coronavirus than nations that of the impacts Chinese activities have on Chinese theft, coercive acquisition, spend much less. There are multiple companies. or cooption, while enabling coop- health care models the United States Collectively, the elements of this erative development with allies and could pursue with track records in media campaign would reinforce the partners. other countries; almost all, however, other objectives above; this effort would • Education and human capital. The have two key elements: some form of not only cast doubt on China’s messaging United States should couple those universal coverage and measures for about its responsible behavior but also efforts with investments to ensure cost control.100 Here again, the crisis implicitly juxtapose this behavior to more that it has the best human capital. caused by the pandemic offers an benign U.S. partnership. This means reinvesting in the U.S. opportunity to adjust the system for Objective 3: Restore Sources of education system, including not only the better. Long-Term U.S. Domestic Strength. building on our first-rate universi- • Energy. The U.S. energy windfall The previous objectives set the initial ties but also investing in universal over the past decade transformed a conditions to sustain U.S. influence in pre-kindergarten and greater kinder- strategic vulnerability into a source a competition with China. This com- garten through 12th grade science, of strength. Yet the United States petition, however, could last decades. technology, engineering, and math- does not behave like an energy Sustaining our efforts over the long term ematics education. It also requires superpower. The United States thus requires the United States to be developing new training models to should transform its energy grid strong domestically, building on many support working-class citizens as the (which Thomas Edison would still of its aforementioned advantages. The Nation moves toward artificial intelli- recognize from the one he designed United States has the resources to do so, gence–enabled automation to handle in the 1890s) to improve its resil- but these resources must be revitalized many basic jobs. iency, develop “swing capacity” to avoid atrophy. The present access to • Infrastructure. The United States by having some state-owned oil cheap capital and likely future financial should revitalize the Nation’s infra- wells ready to pump as leverage injections to provide economic stability structure, not only updating aging internationally (most other major provide a propitious window for such infrastructure but also investing in energy-producing nations do this; action.95 new elements that would unleash the United States does not), develop The United States should begin by American productivity, such as regulatory regimes around significant taking steps to ensure the long-term vi- installing high-speed fiber and liquid natural gas deals that provide brancy of its economy. A full accounting broadband nationally, which allows preference for U.S. allies, and launch of the steps required is not possible here, people to access virtual high-quality a national-level initiative through the but key elements include the following: training, to pursue high-paying jobs National Laboratories on renewable energy technology.101

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 49 Demonstration for rights of Uighurs, Berlin, January 19, 2020 (Courtesy Leonhard Lenz)

These steps are necessarily illustra- about these issues in terms of national se- These efforts are essential to sustain tive, but all would build on advantages curity, not simply domestic debates about a multidecade competition. Given scarce the United States has vis-à-vis China, taxation.102 resources, to pursue them also requires posture the United States to lead in the Next, just as the initiatives seek U.S. leaders to exercise stark priority-set- industries of the future, and sustain do- to shore up our economic strengths, ting, discipline, and risk acceptance. This mestic vibrancy that will be required in a the administration—working with is more of a mindset than a list of specific long-term competition. To support this Congress—should launch a parallel edu- activities. strategy, the next President should work cation effort to shore up the integrity of First, the United States should look with Congress to appoint a bipartisan our democratic institutions. Rebuilding to reduce tensions with Russia while still commission with a mandate to bolster confidence in our institutions serves three defending U.S. alliance commitments. U.S. domestic strengths for long-term purposes: to lessen the partisanship that Critically, this is not a “reset”; we should competition, which should develop a has paralyzed the country, limiting its not chase Russian engagement. Nor body of proposals, a timeline, and antici- ability to act decisively; to limit China’s should we ignore the risk of Russian pated costs for presentation to Congress ability to portray the U.S. model as threats in Eastern Europe or its under- or pursued where possible via administra- dysfunctional and its own model as mining of U.S. democracy. But since tion policy. superior; and to help build buy-in for Russia’s economic and demographic Additionally, engaging the American the commitment of resources needed trends do not suggest a long-term, multi- people is key to building support for to sustain a long-term competition dimensional challenge as China’s do, we the initiatives outlined here. Given the with China. A civic education campaign should seek to dial down animosity in this public’s continued desire for services should be the centerpiece of this renewal. relationship to allow us to focus on the that outstrip tax revenues and common Domestic civic knowledge is appallingly Indo-Pacific region. This should include expectations that U.S. actions abroad bad today.103 Robust education produces quiet diplomacy to see where mutual should impose no hardships on citi- positive effects on voter turnout, school concessions might be possible (while zens, the administration must initiate a dropout rates, and community activism. being clear-eyed that none may be) but domestic education campaign to frame This campaign should emphasize the minimally seeking to lower antagonist the challenge China poses and a parallel Nation’s free press, fair elections, and rule rhetoric on both sides. At a minimum, campaign on our fiscal health. Both of law—all of which China lacks.104 the United States should accept Vladimir campaigns need to help Americans think Putin’s offer for a simple extension of

50 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 the New Strategic Arms Reduction dialogue could take any number of forms. strengths could still be pursued for some Treaty, providing considered stability and But the motivations above point to some time. The borrowing in response to the removing the potential for a costly com- key elements. First, the United States coronavirus clearly shows that borrow- petition. Reducing tensions might also should suggest a dialogue on global ing funds in the near term is feasible,112 decrease incentives for Russia and China’s issues, starting with climate change. and the current access to cheap capital increasing collaboration. And in the long This focus on climate change could be presents a unique window.113 Moreover, term, it might even play on traditional supplemented with dialogue on global these proposals are ones many experts balancing dynamics. Over time, Russia health infrastructure, nonproliferation, believe are key to long-term competitive- might come to see China, which it shares and humanitarian relief. Second, the ness. This logic suggests these near-term a border with and has fought previously, defense establishments should build on costs might be recouped by long-term as a bigger threat.105 conversations to date to develop crisis gains of a more vibrant economy with Second, the United States should communication channels designed to technological advantages and premiere reduce its military presence in the Middle mitigate tensions and avoid unintended human capital in the sectors that matter East and rejoin the Joint Comprehensive escalation.109 Third, bilateral engagement for growth. Plan of Action.106 To do so would signal should include a dialogue focused on As with any strategy, this approach goodwill to European allies but more norms on the use of emerging technol- entails risks. While a full list is impossible importantly would lower the risk, at least ogy such as artificial intelligence, where to catalog, several are worth considering: for a time, of a principal threat driving China and the United States both have The American public does not U.S. force posture in the Middle East interests but rules of the road remain • support this approach to China.114 today. This is not to suggest the Iran nu- nascent.110 The American public does not clear deal is perfect, but to acknowledge • support expending the resources to the enormous opportunity costs to any Costs and Risks support this strategy military action there. Simply put, any The costs of this strategy are nontrivial Other threats emerge that divert administration focused on China should but well within the Nation’s means, • U.S. resources. do everything possible to diplomatically provided we can political will Even absent other threats, U.S. defuse tensions and avoid conflict with to do so. The costs of restoring con- • leaders lack the discipline to take risk Iran.107 ventional deterrence are in keeping in other regions. Objective 4: Pursue “Principled with levels envisioned in the National U.S. actions would cause China to Engagement” with China. Even as Defense Strategy. New investment, such • increase aggressive behavior rather the United States undertakes the steps as increased R&D or security assistance, than back down. above, it should be prepared to cooperate could largely be sourced by reprioritiza- U.S. actions would sideline moderate with China where doing so serves U.S. tion within DOD’s planned topline.111 • voices within the Chinese regime. interests. Such cooperation might be Many of the actions associated with the China might perceive its relative frustrating and produce little at times, second objective involve diplomacy or • position worsening as the United but it is still worth pursuing for several messaging; these costs are nominal from States begins to focus more reasons. First, it provides a vehicle for an overall budget perspective. The two resources; it might then choose to pursuing progress on transnational issues. elements with significant costs are the act aggressively while it perceives a Second, it signals to China and the rest strategy’s proposal to create an alterna- window of opportunity before the of the world that even as U.S.-China tive to BRI and the strategy’s objective United States is fully poised to focus competition intensifies, the United to renew U.S. domestic strengths. on it.115 States is not inherently aggressive or Expanding the U.S. International The set of actions here, even if bent on dominance. Third, it provides Development Finance Corporation • implemented, would be insufficient a venue to establish mechanisms for would also require a significant initial to succeed, in which case we have crisis stability—mechanisms that we had outlay. However, once capitalized, this angered China but are unable to during the U.S.-Soviet era but that are fund may actually generate revenue, not deny its objectives. less robust with China today. And last, it consume it. provides ballast for the relationship as it The costs associated with revitalizing Some considerations might mitigate becomes more competitive in other areas. U.S. domestic strengths are impossible to some of these risks, however. Most sig- Contrary to arguments that a competitive estimate with precision but likely would nificant, the robust political consensus posture is incompatible with such coop- be substantial in the near term. Ideally, on this issue may guide public sentiment eration, it could in fact make competitive such proposals would be offset by action over time. That same consensus also gives policies more effective by giving China a to restore U.S. fiscal solvency—an issue some cause for cautious optimism that stake in the relationship.108 beyond the scope of this article. Absent U.S. leaders would be able to exercise Given the complex nature of the such proposals, however, the steps more discipline in other applications of U.S.-China relationship, the agenda for above to secure our long-term domestic American power. For those risks involving

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 51 AAV-P7/A1 assault amphibious vehicles assigned to Combat Assault Company, , unload Servicemembers during amphibious landing demonstration as part of RIMPAC, at Pyramid Rock Beach on Marine Corps Base , July 29, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Aaron S. Patterson) unexpected Chinese behavior, one can issuing the National Defense Strategy, ty-Two U.S. Policy Prescriptions, Council Special only say that it is impossible to know with “America can afford survival.”118 Report No. 85 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020), available at . more assertive posture over the past sev- rupt: “Gradually, and then suddenly” 2 Michèle Flournoy, Department of eral years is a result of U.S. inaction. The is the reply. U.S. strategists examining Defense (DOD) Role in Competing with risks of prompting aggressive Chinese China’s rise and U.S. performance over China, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, January 15, 2020, reaction are real, but so too are the risks the past few years could be forgiven for available at . 3 For example, see Thomas L. Friedman, alternative is a world in which U.S. com- describes ways to extend enduring U.S. “How Trump and Xi Can Make America panies are less competitive and experience strengths and sustain its position in the and China Poor Again,” New York Times, more restricted market access, the United international system. To borrow and August 6, 2019, available at ; Elbridge Colby, “How to Win America’s Next War,” Foreign Policy, May 5, curtailed, and we potentially encounter tages, if we can keep them. JFQ 2019, available at ; Elizabeth C. Economy, “Yes, , greater over the long term. As Secretary China Is Exporting Its Model,” Council on For- 1 eign Relations, December 11, 2019, available at of Defense James Mattis stated when Quoted in Robert D. Blackwill, Imple- menting Grand Strategy Toward China: Twen-

52 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 na-exporting-its-model>. 10 Morrison, China’s Economic Rise, 1. the world can match.” Mattis went on to note, 4 For a detailed treatment of many of these Whether China is currently the world’s largest for example, that the North Atlantic Treaty issues, see Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why or second largest economy depends on how Organization represents half of world economic America Will Remain the World’s Sole Super- one measures. If measured based on purchasing and military might. power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, power parity, China surpassed the United States 19 The World Economic Forum’s Global 2018). in 2015. See, for example, International Mon- Competitiveness Index ranks the United States 5 See, for example, Graham Allison, “What etary Fund (IMF), “GDP Based on PPP, Share 1st and China 28th. See “How Competitive Xi Jinping Wants,” The Atlantic, May 31, of World,” in World Economic Outlook: Growth Is China’s Economy on the Global Stage?” Chi- 2017, available at . On China’s economic rise 11 See, for example, Hal Brands and Zach tiveness/>. and challenges, see Wayne Morrison, China’s Cooper, “After Responsible Stakeholder, 20 For example, the continued use of the Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and What? Debating America’s China Strate- dollar as a global reserve currency. Implications for the United States, RL33534 gy,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 2 21 For example, the United States became (Washington, DC: Congressional Research (February 2019), available at . U.S. Energy Information Agency, “The United 6 For example, see Lowy Institute, Asia 12 Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants”; Katsuji States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil Power Index 2019, available at . This report concludes gered U.S.-China Trade War,” Nikkei Asian . nation in Asia, but China is quickly catching asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up- 22 While some will rightly note that the up. See also Blackwill, Implementing Grand close/Xi-s-overly-ambitious-goals-triggered- advent of cyber capabilities decreases the sanc- Strategy Toward China. US-China-trade-war>. tuary the homeland affords, the United States 7 A brief caveat on the coronavirus is 13 Odd Arne Westad, “The Sources of Chi- nonetheless remains surrounded by friendly required here. What happens in the next few nese Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (September/ nations or large oceans. China, by contrast, months could have profound implications for October 2019), available at ; Fei-Ling Wang, 23 For details, see Beckley, Unrivaled, chap- the world. Yet the pandemic’s lasting impacts “From Tianxia to Westphalia: The Evolving ter 3. For example, the United States is home will not be clear for some time, and there are Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World to 50 of the top 100 universities worldwide, many structural continuities that will remain Order,” in America, China, and the Struggle for compared with China’s 2. Three-quarters of features of the international system. This strate- World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Lega- Chinese citizens have not completed high gy will thus be mindful of, but not dictated by, cies, and Global Visions, ed. G. John Ikenberry, school, and roughly one-third of children en- the current crisis. But it should be reassessed Zhu Feng, and Wang Jisi (New York: Palgrave tering the workforce are barely literate. to ensure its continued coherence as this crisis Macmillan, 2015), 43–62. 24 For details, see Beckley, Unrivaled, unfolds. 14 Adapted from several sources, the chapter 3. For example, by 2050, the number 8 On the value of the international order, primary being Blackwill, Implementing Grand of Chinese over the age of 65 will triple to 33 see G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: Strategy Toward China. percent of its population (versus 20 percent for The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the 15 “Roundtable Discussion on U.S.-China the United States)—a huge economic drag. American World Order (Princeton: Princeton Relations,” National War College video-tele- 25 Michael J. Mazarr et al., Understanding University Press, 2011); Michael J. Mazarr conference with Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for the Emerging Era of International Competition: and Ashley L. Rhoades, Testing the Value of the Global Policy, April 2, 2019. Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Santa Postwar International Order (Santa Monica, 16 Octavian Manea, “The National Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 17, available at CA: RAND, 2018), available at . The authors note that, html>. Small Wars Journal, January 19, 2019, although the international order is under 9 Note that U.S. rhetoric has also shifted to available at . 26 A detailed treatment of these advantages vision which recognizes that no one nation can 17 Richard Fontaine, “Great-Power Compe- is available in Beckley, Unrivaled. or should dominate the Indo-Pacific.” Cited in tition Is Washington’s Top Priority—but Not 27 It is worth noting that, although China’s Ely Ratner et al., Rising to the China Challenge: the Public’s,” Foreign Affairs, September 9, economy eclipsing the United States seems in- Renewing American Competitiveness in the In- 2019, available at . in the 1960s and 1970s. Cited from James available at . National Defense Strategy,” Reagan National Great Power Competition,” unpublished paper Robert Blackwill articulates a similar phrase Defense Forum, Simi Valley, CA, December prepared for Defense Science Board. Also see as his preferred political aim. See Blackwill, 1, 2018, available at . Mattis ion/articles/2019-03-08/will-china-overtake- aim, not just an aim to prevent an outcome. argued that “history is clear: Nations with u-s-gdp-depends-how-you-count>. I believe these objectives are compatible and allies thrive. America’s alliances are a durable, 28 For more on this point, see David reinforcing. asymmetric advantage that no competitor in Leonhardt, “What Americans Don’t Under-

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 53 stand About China’s Power,” New York Times, in a Quantum Arms Race that Will Transform 47 Lowy Institute, Asia Power Index 2019. January 16, 2020, available at . view.com/2019/01/03/137969/us-china- tionships?” The Diplomat, May 30, 2019, avail- 29 Michael Fuchs, “How to Lose Friends quantum-arms-race/>; David Lague, “China able at . com/articles/china/2020-03-12/how-lose- uters.com/article/us-china-army-hypersonic/ 49 David Sanger and David McCabe, friends-and-strain-alliances>. china-leads-u-s-on-potent-super-fast-missiles- “Huawei Is Winning the Argument in Europe, 30 Joshua Ball, “Secretary Mattis: ‘We’ve idUSKCN1S11E6>. as the U.S. Fumbles to Develop Alternatives,” Lost the Power of Inspiration; We’ve Got 38 See David Sanger, The Perfect Weapon New York Times, February 17, 2020, available the Power of Intimidation,’” Global Security (New York: Penguin , 2018); at . globalsecurityreview.com/secretary-mat- Deterrence (Washington, DC: DOD, Feb- 50 Jonathan Stromseth, “Don’t Make tis-weve-lost-powerinspiration-weve-got-pow- ruary 2017). See also James N. Miller et al., Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of er-intimidation/>. “The Growing Threat from Cyber Weapons U.S.-China Rivalry,” Brookings Institution, 31 Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, “Map- and What the United States Needs to do to October 2019, available at . able at ; Michael J. Mazarr et al., Hostile der (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2018), 9. tions/>. Social Manipulation: Present Realities and 52 Louise Lucas, “Inside China’s Sur- 32 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Emerging Trends (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, veillance State,” Financial Times, Septem- Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2019), available at . content/2182eebe-8a17-11e8-bf9e- articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-ameri- 39 See, for example, “Hacked: How China 8771d5404543>; Nicole Kobie, “The Com- ca-must-lead-again>. Stole U.S. Technology for Its J-20 Stealth plicated Truth About China’s Social Credit 33 Fontaine, “Great-Power Competition Fighter,” The National Interest, July 10, 2019, System,” Wired, June 7, 2019, available at Is Washington’s Top Priority—but Not the available at . 34 The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy nology-its-j-20-stealth-fighter-66231>. 53 Austin Ramsey and Chris Buckley, articulates four national interests. However, 40 Steve Johnson, “The Great Haul of “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose because “peace through strength” does not China, Illustrated,” Financial Times, November How China Organized Mass Detentions of appear to be an “interest,” it is not treated 19, 2019. Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, separately in this article. It is also worth noting 41 Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants.” 2019, available at ; Rob Schmitz, “Ex-De- however, both because it is a part of the clas- April 20, 2018, available at

54 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 articles/china/2018-11-27/there-no-grand- September 10, 1997, available at . mit.edu/17.423/www/Archive98/handouts/ cial-empire>. 58 Stephen Walt provides a classical formu- spiral.html>. 75 Presentation by Dr. Zachary Abuza, lation that “states will join alliances in order to 65 Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in professor of National Security Strategy at the avoid domination by strong powers.” Stephen Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” National War College. M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (August 76 Luiza Savage, “The U.S. Left a Hole in of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 2010), 492, calls this a “moment of maximum Leadership on Climate. China Is Filling It,” 4 (1985), 5. Of note, while other states might danger.” Politico, August 15, 2019, available at . nomic and military power is far behind China’s the National Defense Strategy. For more detail 77 Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Evolving Role today, demographics—a factor often proffered on these force requirements, see Christopher in the United Nations: A Conversation with to demonstrate China’s inexorable heft—skew M. Dougherty, Why America Needs a New Way Courtney Fung,” ChinaPower podcast, June heavily in India’s favor over time. China is of War (Washington, DC: CNAS, June 2019), 18, 2019, available at . united-nations/>. history. The United Nations predicts India will 67 Elbridge A. Colby, Hearing on Imple- 78 See, for example, Dan Pearson, “Fix surpass China’s population by 2027; by 2050, mentation of the National Defense Strategy, the WTO Appellate Body While We Can,” India will stand at 1.5 billion, compared with Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services The Hill, February 13, 2020, available at China’s 1.1 billion. How India will rise, and Committee, January 29, 2019, available at ; Eric while-we-can>. might produce the counterweight to compli- Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim, “Deterring 79 Some commentators called this “the cate the Chinese calculus over time, enabling Without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese beginning of the end of the WTO as we know this theory of victory. Adventurism Under Austerity,” The Washington it.” “WTO Judge Blockage Could Prove ‘the 59 For example, see Minxin Pei, “China’s Quarterly 38, no. 1 (Spring 2015), 185–199. Beginning of the End,’” Deutsche Welle, Coming Upheaval,” Foreign Affairs (May/ 68 Dougherty, Why America Needs a New October 12, 2019, available at ; Tom Miles, nas-coming-upheaval>. Cyber Deterrence. See also O’Hanlon, “Cyber “U.S. Blocks WTO Judge Reappointment as 60 Beckley, Unrivaled; Ruchir Sharma, “The Threats and How the U.S. Should Prepare.” Dispute Settlement Crisis Looms,” Reuters, Comeback Nation,” Foreign Affairs (May/June The Defense Science Board argues that to August 27, 2018, available at . command and control, long-range conventional sis-looms-idUSKCN1LC19O>. 61 Michael Mazarr conducted an extensive strike, and offensive cyber capabilities. 80 “Brussels Builds Alliance to Bypass U.S. study of the order in 2015 and found it to 70 See Hal Brands, Eric S. Edelman, and Block on WTO Judges,” Financial Times, be surprisingly resilient, which supports this Thomas G. Mahnken, Credibility Matters: January 24, 2020, available at . been hostile to key elements of the order. See for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 81 Kurt M. Campbell and Russ Doshi, Michael J. Mazarr, Summary of the Building 2018), available at . available at . lion over the past 5 years and is proposing an- shape-global-order>. 62 See, for example, Jeff M. Smith. “China’s other 10 percent in the fiscal year 2020 budget 82 The United States should of course Rise and (Under) Balancing in the Indo-Pacific: request. This increase was a priority for former support efforts to meet its own climate Putting Realist Theory to the Test,” War on the Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan change goals if China does so. However, it is Rocks, January 8, 2019, available at . 73 For more on this issue, see Flournoy, goals—it is hard to imagine a context in which 63 See Richard B. Andres, “National Securi- Testimony Before the House Armed Services the United States bore fewer costs for staying ty and U.S. Constitutional Rights: The Road to Committee. It is worth noting that the Nation- in the agreement and bore higher reputational Snowden,” in Cybersecurity and Human Rights al Defense Strategy has a theory of techno- costs for leaving it. in the Age of Cybersurveillance, ed. Joanna logical advancement that argues commercial 83 To give one example, migration may not Kulesza and Roy Balleste (Lanham, MD: Row- technology adaptation and integration are in be a direct element of U.S.-China competition, man & Littlefield, 2015). Andres at one point some respects more critical than actual R&D, but it is another place where the United States argues that China’s leaders may not be able to yet DOD lacks both the personnel and the could reassume historic leadership that it has make concessions because they believe those risk-taking incentives to conduct more aggres- relinquished, which would have significant concessions would fundamentally undermine sive experimentation and prototyping. benefits for America’s image abroad as well as regime stability. 74 Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, long-term economic benefits for the Nation. 64 For a useful primer on this question, see “The Twilight of America’s Financial Em- See Ariana A. Berengaut and Antony J. Blinken, Steven Van Evera, “The ‘Spiral Model’ v. the pire,” Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2020, “Trump’s Huge Mistake on Refugees,” New ‘Deterrence Model,’” unpublished handout, available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Redden 55 ; “Debt Is Biggest Threat to National Security, html>. Jamie Davies, “So Much for ‘Don’t Be Evil’ Chairman Says,” DOD News, September 22, 84 Ratner et al., Rising to the China Chal- as Google Bows to China Censorship—Sourc- 2011, available at . Toward China. ; “Major U.S. Airlines Bow 104 Only 26 percent of Americans can name 86 Ibid. to China’s ‘Orwellian’ Demands on Taiwan the three branches of government. This point, 87 Dennis C. Blair and Jon M. Huntsman, Recognition,” CBS News, July 25, 2018, and the broader recommendation, are taken Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft available at ; Bari Weiss, “The 105 Westad, “The Sources of Chinese Policy (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian World’s Wokest Sports League Bows to China,” Conduct.” Also Blackwill, Implementing Grand Research, 2017), 1–19. New York Times, October 8, 2019, available at Strategy Toward China, 36 (though I would 88 Michael Peel and Tom Mitchell, . offers). Growth, ADB Warns,” Financial Times, 95 Several of the following ideas draw on 106 This has been a goal of U.S. defense February 27, 2017, available at . tory essay, titled “A Nation Tested,” is available likened the way DOD continued to send the 89 Daniel Runde, “We Shouldn’t Be at . 108 Jeffrey A. Bader, U.S.-China Relations: roids/#6204e3343156>. 96 There are many other specifics that could Is It Time to End the Engagement? Policy Brief 90 Weissman, “The Federal Govern- sit within this recommendation. For more, see (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, ment Can Borrow Money for Less than Ever. Ratner et al., Rising to the China Challenge. September 2018), available at . Flournoy slate.com/business/2020/03/govern- government data for artificial intelligence and makes a similar point in her testimony before ment-borrow-bond-yield-infrastructure-corona- machine learning and efforts to secure semi- the House Armed Services Committee. virus.html>. conductor supply chains.” Length restrictions 109 Flournoy, Testimony Before the House 91 William C. Pacatte, Competing to Win: preclude recommendations of that detail here. Armed Services Committee. A Coalition Approach to Countering BRI 97 As one example, Dougherty, Why 110 Ratner et al., Rising to the China Chal- (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and In- America Needs a New Way of War, argues for lenge. ternational Studies, December 2019), available regulatory frameworks to accelerate finan- 111 While some commentators have called at . jurisdictions and to encourage research into argue that this approach could be done with 92 I learned of this consideration from Pat- blockchain technology. little to no increases. For example, see Kathleen rick Ventrell, director of the Bureau of Interna- 98 See Thomas L. Friedman, “Post-Pan- Hicks, “Getting to Less,” Foreign Affairs tional Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ demic, Here’s How America Rises Again,” New (March/April 2020), available at . aid, though he recommended a slightly higher lus-infrastructure-covid.html>. 112 William D. Lastrapes, “The U.S. Owes amount. A more detailed estimate of the proper 99 For more on this topic, see Vikram J. $23.5 Trillion—but Can Still Afford a Big funding requirement would require U.S. Agen- Singh, “The Great American Brain Drain Is Coronavirus Stimulus Package,” The Conver- cy for International Development expertise. Coming,” CBS News, May 23, 2019, available sation, March 18, 2020, available at . an Zenz, “Leaked Documents Offer a the-great-american-brain-drain-is-coming/>. 113 See Friedman, “Post-Pandemic, Here’s Peek Inside China’s Detention of Ui- Additional information is available in Ratner et How America Rises Again.” ghurs,” National Public Radio, November al., Rising to the China Challenge. 114 Fontaine, “Great-Power Competition 25, 2019, available at . April 14, 2020, available at . Strategy Toward China, 8. of the best-known examples include Marriott, 101 Several ideas here come from email 117 Adapted from Ratner, “There Is No Google, the airline industry, and the National exchanges with a professor at the National War Grand Bargain with China.” Basketball Association. See, for example, “Mar- College who specializes in these issues. 118 “Remarks by Secretary Mattis on Na- riott’s Pitiful Apology to China,” Washington 102 For example, former Chairman of the tional Defense Strategy.” Post, January 24, 2018, available at

56 Essay Competitions / Competition Is What States Make of It JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Judge advocate from Naval Special Warfare Command, assigned as Legal Special Projects Officer for special operations command under Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, conducts special Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement training for first graduating company of unique, multitribe Iraqi force, the A’ali Al Furat Brigade, at training ground in Western Iraq, January 4, 2017 (U.S. Navy/John Fischer)

Pardon the Paradox Making Sense of President Trump’s Interventions in Military Justice

By Jeremy McKissack

rmy captain and attorney Aubrey had convinced a military jury at Fort “damaged the military judicial system Daniel III wrote a blistering Benning, Georgia, to convict Lieu- and lessened any respect it may have letter to President Richard tenant Calley for the murder of at least gained as a result of the proceedings.”4 A 1 Nixon in April 1971. The lead prose- 22 Vietnamese civilians in the village Nearly 50 years later, echoes of cutor in the court-martial of First Lieu- of My Lai on March 16, 1968.2 A day Captain Daniel’s criticism of President tenant William Calley, Captain Daniel after Calley began serving his sentence Nixon could be heard when another of life imprisonment, President Nixon President, Donald J. Trump, intervened reacted to the public outcry against the in military justice proceedings. In just Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy McKissack, USAFR, verdict and ordered the Army to release his first term, President Trump has in- wrote this paper while attending the Air War Calley and return him to his apartment tervened several times in cases College. It won the Strategy Paper category of 3 the 2020 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on post. In his letter, Daniel wrote brought under the Uniform Code of Strategic Essay Competition. that the President’s intervention had Military Justice (UCMJ).5 He has used

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 McKissack 57 Rear Admiral Collin Green, commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (right), and Force Master Chief William King speak to junior officers and senior enlisted leaders during troop leadership class at Center for SEAL and SWCC, Coronado, California, February 13, 2020 (U.S. Navy/David Schwartz) his pardon power to terminate one mil- argument against the military , Congress should review the cases to itary prosecution, ordered the release of which is that President Trump meddled ensure that military law and policy clearly an accused Servicemember from pretrial in the military justice process and thereby demarcate the role of the commander confinement, and directed the outcome eroded trust between himself and military in chief in the military justice process of a military administrative board, all leaders. The essay then addresses norma- and that Servicemembers who report against the recommendations of his se- tive arguments against the pardons that war crimes receive full protection from nior military advisors.6 In total, President claim they will diminish the military’s retaliation. Trump has granted executive clemency, moral standing and authority and open or pardons, to four Servicemembers the floodgates for Servicemembers to The Military Pardon Cases: A accused or convicted of committing commit war crimes with impunity. In the Factual and Legal Overview war crimes while deployed to Iraq or end, the essay attempts to make sense of The military pardon cases involved Afghanistan.7 His decisions in these cases President Trump’s decisions, through the four Servicemembers, three from the have elicited widespread criticism from Jacksonian tradition in American politics Army and one from the Navy: Army academics, journalists, and retired mili- and foreign policy. , tary leaders.8 The essay concludes with two rec- Army First Lieutenant , The criticism of President Trump’s ommendations. First, in response to the Army Major Mathew Golsteyn, and war crime pardons has been partially right military pardons, the Department of Navy Chief Petty Officer and SEAL and partially overstated. The purpose of Defense (DOD) should review its law Edward Gallagher. Lieutenant Behenna this essay is to analyze two broad critiques of war policies, address any deficiencies received his pardon for murder in a war that have emerged from the military in them, and implement regular training zone in May 2019.10 Several months pardon cases. It begins with a brief factual that highlights the “fundamental impor- later and on the same day, President and legal overview of the four cases. tance” of the law of war to the Armed Trump granted executive clemency to Next, the essay tackles the first main Forces of the United States.9 Second, Lieutenant Lorance, Major Golsteyn,

58 Essay Competitions / Pardon the Paradox JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 and Chief Petty Officer Gallagher for to self-defense was anything but “open the time he ordered his Soldiers to fire. war crimes.11 All four cases share simi- and shut.”20 Furthermore, 37 generals The Army appellate court reviewed the larities. First, the four Servicemembers and admirals, along with a former DOD facts and legal arguments and upheld were either convicted or accused of inspector general, had signed a legal Lorance’s conviction and sentence. murdering civilians who were out of brief supporting Behenna’s self-defense Major Mathew Golsteyn. Major combat. Second, the cases reportedly argument.21 Golsteyn traveled a circuitous path made their way to the President’s desk In announcing Behenna’s pardon, to his pardon from President Trump. through right-wing media coverage the White House press release did not While deployed to Afghanistan in 2010, and direct from individuals mention the facts of the case.22 Instead, Golsteyn, by his own admission, shot or organizations outside government.12 the announcement highlighted the unset- an Afghan civilian and buried him in a And third, support for the military tled debate about Behenna’s self- defense shallow grave.26 Golsteyn suspected the pardons split along partisan lines, with argument.23 The White House also noted civilian of being a Taliban bombmaker.27 one poll revealing that 79 percent of that Behenna had the support of some The next day, Golsteyn and two other Republicans and only 12 percent of elected officials and had been a model Soldiers exhumed the body, brought Democrats agreed with Trump’s pardon prisoner.24 the remains back to base, and burned of Lieutenant Lorance.13 First Lieutenant Clint Lorance. them.28 Golsteyn stated that he took The four cases are also factually and During his deployment to Afghanistan matters into his own hands because there legally distinct. The parameters of this in 2012, Lieutenant Lorance ordered his was not enough evidence to detain the essay do not allow for a complete treat- troops to fire on three Afghan civilians. suspected bombmaker for more than ment of the cases. What follows instead is At Lorance’s court-martial, a platoon 24 hours.29 Golsteyn told investigators a summary of the important and distin- member testified to being the first to see that he would not have been able to live guishing factual and legal circumstances three Afghan men riding on a motorcycle with himself had the civilian killed more in each case. enter in “his field of view.”25 The platoon Servicemembers after being released from First Lieutenant Michael Behenna. member did not perceive a “definitive U.S. custody.30 Lieutenant Behenna’s actions that led hostile intent and hostile act” from the Golsteyn’s actions came to light to his conviction for unpremeditated three men. Still, Lorance ordered him during a preemployment polygraph for murder occurred not within the fog of to fire without asking whether the three the Central Intelligence Agency.31 The war but inside the haze of a fast-moving, men had shown hostile actions, but the Army launched a criminal investigation dynamic situation largely of his own shots missed. Aware of the shots, the men in 2011 but decided not to prosecute creation while he was deployed to Iraq got off the motorcycle. “As they returned Golsteyn for lack of evidence.32 Then, in 2008. After being directed to return to the motorcycle, [Lorance], over his in October 2016, ran a fea- Iraqi detainee Ali Mansur to his village, portable radio, ordered the platoon’s gun ture about rules of engagement and Behenna instead ordered his platoon to truck to engage the men,” killing two interviewed Golsteyn for the program.33 drive Mansur to a remote section of the of them and injuring a third. Afterward, Golsteyn admitted to the interviewer that Iraqi desert near the area of Albu-Toma.14 Lorance’s actions seemed designed to he had killed the civilian.34 Two months Behenna ordered Mansur to strip naked cover up and disguise the circumstances later, the Army began investigating and sit inside a culvert.15 Behenna surrounding the shooting. Golsteyn once again.35 The investigation then aimed his firearm at Mansur and A jury convicted Lorance of murder ended with Golsteyn being charged with attempted to interrogate him.16 When and attempted murder, among other murder, and he was nearing the start of Behenna averted his attention momentar- things, and sentenced him to confine- his court-martial when President Trump ily, he claimed that Mansur lunged for the ment for 20 years. After Lorance’s trial, intervened and pardoned him.36 firearm, forcing him to shoot Mansur in the government discovered information Chief Petty Officer Edward Gallagher. the head and chest in self-defense.17 about the motorcycle passengers that A Navy SEAL and decorated combat At trial, the jury rejected Behenna’s perhaps could have been helpful to veteran, Edward Gallagher was accused self-defense argument, and he was con- Lorance’s defense. One of the victims of murdering a wounded captive who victed and sentenced to confinement.18 “knew someone who was linked to belonged to the so-called Islamic State On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the hostile action against U.S. forces.” The (IS) while deployed to Iraq in 2017.37 Armed Forces, the military’s highest other slain passenger “was biometrically After a firefight, Gallagher learned that appellate court, ruled against Behenna linked to an [improvised explosive de- an IS fighter had been captured, and he in a three-to-two decision, holding vice] incident” that had occurred prior directed his unit to drive to the scene that Behenna had forfeited the right to to the shooting. Finally, the government where the captive lay injured and barely self-defense because of his actions vis-à- somehow learned that sometime after conscious.38 After the SEALs arrived, vis Mansur.19 One commentator observed the shooting, the wounded passenger someone got video footage of Gallagher that the court’s narrow ruling meant that took hostile action against U.S. forces. kneeling next to the detainee and starting the legal debate about Behenna’s right Lieutenant Lorance knew none of this at medical treatment. A hand is then seen

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 McKissack 59 covering the camera. While appearing remain a SEAL and retain the privilege achieved through professionalization not to treat the wounded fighter, Gallagher of wearing the gold Trident pin on his only minimizes military power but also allegedly stabbed him in the neck with uniform.50 President Trump, nonetheless, produces a political neutrality or sterility a hunting knife. Afterward, Gallagher swooped in once more to aid Gallagher. among military officers.62 Because mil- and other SEALs took a photograph On November 21, 2019, the President itary officers have been entrusted with with the IS fighter’s corpse. Gallagher’s took to Twitter to announce, “The Navy overseeing military affairs with little to no actions came to light when members of will NOT be taking away Warfighter and oversight from their civilian leaders, their the SEAL team, after returning to the Navy Seal Eddie Gallagher’s Trident Pin. independence to perform their duties United States, reported them to the This case was handled very badly from as professionals reduces their political chain of command and Navy criminal the beginning. Get back to business!”51 power and increases civilian control of the investigators.39 At the end of the investi- Then–Secretary of the Navy Richard Armed Forces.63 gation, the Navy charged Gallagher for Spencer was not enthusiastic about Professor Eliot Cohen calls murdering the IS captive and posing with President Trump’s interference in an Huntington’s objective control the the corpse.40 administrative process involving the “normal theory” of civil- military rela- After Gallagher was charged, evidence SEALs.52 Spencer wanted the board to tions.64 For his part, Cohen offered a came to light that he may have been go forward.53 He attempted to salvage competing theory to objective control intimidating or threatening witnesses.41 the process by brokering a deal with the that he labeled “unequal dialogue.” In Consequently, Gallagher was ordered White House without first coordinating an unequal dialogue, civilian and military into pretrial confinement in September his proposal with Secretary of Defense leaders engage in frank exchanges and 2018.42 Gallagher’s family and legal Mark Esper.54 On learning of Spencer’s discussions, yet the final authority always defense team went public with the case behind-the-scenes negotiations, Secretary rests with the President.65 Where Cohen on Fox News, which helped them garner Esper requested Spencer’s resignation, pushes beyond the normal theory is in his support from some elected officials and which Spencer promptly tendered.55 As argument that civilian leaders also have President Trump.43 On March 30, 2019, for Gallagher, he retired from the Navy the authority, even the responsibility, to the President intervened and ordered with his full rank and his SEAL Trident.56 immerse themselves in military affairs and Gallagher released from jail and into less to constantly interact with and ask ques- restrictive confinement on the military Critiquing the Criticism of tions of military leaders.66 installation.44 the Military Pardons Cases The Huntington-Cohen frames are The government’s prosecution of One overarching criticism of President by no means the alpha and omega of Gallagher gradually derailed. First, the Trump’s pardons of Behenna, Lorance, the civil-military relations literature on judge removed the lead military prosecu- Golsteyn, and Gallagher is that he civilian control. But these two influential tor from the case because of “accusations meddled in predominantly military theories serve as purposeful bookends for of prosecutorial misconduct.”45 Second, matters over the recommendations of evaluating whether President Trump’s a key witness changed his story on the his civilian and uniformed advisors.57 pardons evidenced civilian meddling. witness stand, testifying that he, not In civil-military relations, the phrase The military pardons cases often Gallagher, killed the IS captive.46 The civilian meddling denotes unwarranted get lumped together and painted with jury acquitted Gallagher of murder but or unnecessary civilian interference or a broad brush. A more evenhanded as- convicted him of taking a picture with intrusion in military affairs.58 By inter- sessment of President Trump’s decisions the body. Gallagher was sentenced to a fering or intruding in military affairs, requires an understanding of each case’s reduction in rank from E7 (chief petty civilians risk undermining military procedural posture at the time of the officer) to E6 (petty officer 1st class) and professionalism, which chips away at pardons. The distinctions matter to the four months’ confinement.47 the Huntingtonian model of “objective overall conclusion that President Trump’s When President Trump pardoned control”—a theory of civil-military rela- interventions demonstrate obvious Lorance and Golsteyn, he also directed tions that the military tends to favor.59 civilian meddling in the Golsteyn and that the Navy restore Gallagher’s rank to The notion of civilian meddling en- Gallagher cases but no meddling at all in chief petty officer—reversing the sentence tered the civil-military lexicon by way of those of Behenna and Lorance. of the trial court.48 The President, how- Samuel Huntington’s book The Soldier To begin with, few constitutional ever, did not pardon Gallagher, meaning and the State. Published in the 1950s, powers are as absolute as the power of Gallagher’s conviction for posing with the The Soldier and the State posited that the President to issue pardons and grant captive’s corpse remains undisturbed.49 true civilian control of the American executive clemency. Article II, Section Meanwhile, the SEAL command moved military occurred through “profession- 2, of the U.S. Constitution gives the full steam ahead to hold an administrative alizing the military.”60 According to President the “Power to Grant Reprieves hearing, called a Trident Review Board, Huntington, civilian control increases and Pardons for Offences against to determine whether Gallagher, who in- with “the recognition of autonomous the United States, except in Cases of tended to retire from the military, would military professionalism.”61 Autonomy Impeachment.”67 Presidential authority

60 Essay Competitions / Pardon the Paradox JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Former Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer delivers remarks during joint regional discussion on sexual assault and sexual harassment at State University of New York, in New York City, September 5, 2019 (U.S. Navy/Sarah Villegas)

to grant executive clemency extends to fact that President Trump may have par- actual trial, unlike Lorance, Behenna, and Servicemembers punished under the doned Behenna and Lorance against the Gallagher. UCMJ.68 With this in mind, we first con- recommendations of his military advisors The Golsteyn outcome is a bit of a sider the Behenna and Lorance pardons. should not be too alarming, especially mixed bag when it comes to civilian med- Behenna and Lorance had been when viewed in light of Cohen’s unequal dling. An argument in favor of President tried, convicted, and sentenced before dialogue. Trump’s intervention prior to trial rests President Trump pardoned them.69 In contrast, President Trump’s inter- on his authority as commander in chief. Their cases had received appellate review. ventions in the Golsteyn and Gallagher Under the UCMJ, for example, the President Trump did not intervene in cases are good examples of civilian med- President can convene or send charges the cases or direct military authorities to dling. As for Golsteyn, he was pending to a court-martial, just like a military take any particular action with respect to trial when the President pardoned him. commander.73 By the same token, them. The cases, therefore, were ripe for Granted, the President can pardon any- the President probably could order pardon consideration. When viewed as one charged or convicted of a Federal charges withdrawn and dismissed from a acts of Presidential mercy, the Behenna offense at any stage of a criminal pro- court-martial. and Lorance pardons do not evidence ceeding.70 Yet Presidents generally wait But President Trump did not exercise civilian meddling. This, of course, does until trials have concluded, appeals have court-martial convening authority–like not mean that President Trump should been exhausted, and sentences have been powers in Golsteyn’s case. He used the have pardoned Behenna and Lorance; served before granting pardons.71 Months power of the pardon to put an end to that is a separate criticism. Nevertheless, before President Trump pardoned the Army’s prosecution before pros- these pardons evidence much less med- Golsteyn, he told reporters that “it was ecutors even had the opportunity to dling than do the Golsteyn and Gallagher very possible” that he would allow the present evidence to a jury. By doing so, cases. And it is difficult to see why or trials to proceed and make his decision af- the President tipped the scales of justice how the Behenna or Lorance pardons terward.72 As it turned out for Golsteyn, in favor of the accused and denied the would affect civil-military relations. The nevertheless, he never had to face an government the chance to present its case

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 McKissack 61 in a public trial. With his pretrial pardon, at the behest of political allies, put his top SEAL commander, Rear Admiral President Trump further signaled that thumb on the scales of justice to help a Collin Green.88 Rear Admiral Green had he did not trust the Army to reach a fair Servicemember accused of war crimes. made it a priority in his command to and just result “after nearly a decade-long Second, when the President ordered stop the SEAL community’s drift from inquiry and multiple investigations.”74 the Navy to reverse Gallagher’s demo- Navy core values of honor, courage, A fair criticism, then, is that President tion, he committed “a shocking and and commitment.89 By preventing the Trump meddled unnecessarily in the unprecedented intervention in a low-level SEALs from convening an administrative Golsteyn case. Although the President’s review,” according to Spencer.82 After board, the President’s actions reportedly intervention in the case was highly un- the trial, Gallagher requested to retire “angered many senior military officers usual, proponents could counter that from the military; his court-martial con- and Pentagon civilians” and undercut the he had to get involved given the Army’s viction and sentence required the Navy efforts of Rear Admiral Green to address handling of the case. Conversely, the to determine his rank at retirement and ethical and disciplinary issues within his Army’s delays in bringing Golsteyn to the characterization of his discharge from command.90 court-martial may have been the result the Service.83 These administrative issues The Gallagher case alone risked erod- of other factors, such as the availability of are usually left to the military to sort ing trust between senior military leaders witnesses and the discovery of additional out and do not warrant a commander and the President. With each intervention evidence. Even though President Trump in chief’s time or attention. Again, as in the case, President Trump seemed asserted civilian control when he over- President, Mr. Trump probably had the to vindicate Cohen’s theory of unequal rode his military advisors and pardoned authority to commute Gallagher’s sen- dialogue in that the President received Golsteyn, he should have allowed the trial tence—that is, to reduce the severity of the advice and recommendations of his to move forward. As it stands, Golsteyn, the punishment.84 military advisors and decided to go in a by his own admission, shot an unarmed The President’s third and final in- different direction. Here, though, the Afghan, hid the remains, and emerged tervention in the Gallagher case may cost of an unequal dialogue may prove to relatively unscathed.75 have been the most problematic from be too high and seems likely to degrade The multiple interventions in the a civil-military relations perspective. trust between the President and the Gallagher case, however, more clearly When President Trump learned about military.91 And, as political scientist Peter opened the President to charges of civil- the Navy’s plan to put Gallagher before Feaver has observed: “Trust is the essen- ian meddling. First, President Trump, a Trident Review Board, he tweeted tial ingredient for healthy civil-military reacting to Fox News reporting and lob- his disapproval. After Secretary Spencer relations.”92 bying from some public officials, ordered resigned, the President expressed his dis- Gallagher moved into less restrictive satisfaction with the military’s handling Normative Arguments Against confinement.76 When he was Secretary of of the Gallagher case: “I was not pleased the Military Pardon Cases the Navy, Richard Spencer claimed that with the way that Navy Seal Eddie The second and perhaps most damning the President twice asked him “to lift Gallagher’s trial was handled by the Navy. criticism of the military pardon cases, Gallagher’s confinement in a Navy brig,” He was treated very badly but, despite broadly speaking, accused President which Spencer resisted before ultimately this, was completely exonerated on all Trump of being a “war crimes Presi- being ordered to move Gallagher to the major charges.”85 dent.”93 This line of criticism factors in equivalent of enlisted barracks to await In a very public fashion, the President the President’s previous remarks about trial.77 Journalist David Ignatius reported excoriated an entire branch of the Armed the use of torture94 and warfighting.95 that President Trump even proposed a Forces and prevented the Navy from Critics have argued that the military pretrial pardon for Gallagher, but Spencer holding an otherwise routine admin- pardons furnish further evidence that talked him out of it.78 istrative board. To be sure, the Navy’s President Trump does not understand As commander in chief, President criminal prosecution of Gallagher was the law of war or the military he leads. Trump probably had the UCMJ au- not beyond reproach.86 In fact, the case Although President Trump has made thority to change the conditions of was part of the basis for then-Secretary controversial remarks about torture Gallagher’s pretrial confinement.79 But Spencer’s decision to order a comprehen- and the conduct of war, his comments not since President Nixon’s interven- sive review of the Navy Judge Advocate reveal something more fundamental than tion in the Calley court-martial had a General and Marine Corps Staff Judge just bluster and bloviation. Rather, the commander in chief inserted himself in Advocate organizations.87 But the Navy’s rhetoric sheds insight into his underlying a court-martial proceeding to the extent missteps in prosecuting the case did not worldview and the reasons he issued that President Trump did in Gallagher’s warrant such high-level interference in a pardons to Behenna, Lorance, Golsteyn, case.80 After resigning as Secretary of low-level administrative process. and Gallagher. To better understand the Navy, Spencer wrote that “military Even more concerning, President the President’s aggressive views about justice works best when senior leadership Trump’s intervention in the Navy’s warfighting, we must know something stays far away.”81 Here, the President, Trident Review Board undermined the about the Jacksonian tradition in

62 Essay Competitions / Pardon the Paradox JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 U.S. Air Force General Paul J. Selva, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, departs after speaking to students enrolled in Advanced Ethics Counselor course in Air Force Judge Advocate General’s School, at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 30, 2019 (DOD/James K. McCann)

American politics—a tradition that traces Space constraints forbid a full pan- are distrustful of international law and its heritage back to the sixth President orama of Jacksonianism. The picture institutions and hew to an honor code of the United States, Andrew Jackson.96 would be incomplete, though, without that extends favorable treatment to those The Jacksonian tradition helps explain juxtaposing the Jacksonians with their who live by the same.104 “But,” as Mead President Trump’s rationale for pardon- distant cousins, the Jeffersonians.99 notes, “those who violate the code—who ing Behenna, Lorance, Golsteyn, and Fortunately, Mead tidily distinguishes commit terrorist acts in peacetime, for ex- Gallagher, why his supporters endorsed the two schools of thought this way: ample—forfeit its protection and deserve his actions, and why some critics vehe- “Jeffersonians join the American Civil no consideration.”105 Honorable enemies mently opposed the pardons. Liberties Union; Jacksonians join the get treated honorably; dishonorable ene- The Jacksonian Tradition and the National Rifle Association.”100 On foreign mies, such as IS and al Qaeda fighters, get Trump Presidency. When Walter Russell policy, Mead asserts that Jeffersonians treated as they deserve.106 Mead first described the Jacksonian tra- are more dovish, while Jacksonians are Jacksonians “formed the core of dition in 1999, he posited that it would “the most consistently hawkish.”101 Trump’s passionately supportive base.”107 “continue to enjoy major influence During Vietnam, Mead loosely char- His brand of “populist nationalism” over both foreign and domestic policy acterizes Jeffersonians as being among tapped into what Mead characterizes in the United States for the foresee- those who dodged the draft and “sought as a “truly surging force in American able future.”97 With the ascendance of exemptions and substitutes,” whereas politics.”108 This surging force embraces Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency, Jacksonians, as they always have, “sol- “Jacksonian conceptions of ‘honor,’ as Mead’s prognostication could not have diered on, if sometimes bitterly and the Islamic State constitutes an inherently been more prescient. As a candidate and resentfully.”102 dishonorable adversary justifying the de- as President, Mr. Trump has spoken Jacksonian hawkishness extends to ployment of all and any means to destroy “directly to Jacksonian principles of views on the conduct of war. Jacksonians them.”109 populism, individualism, honor, and believe fundamentally “that wars must be A final and important point about courage.”98 fought with all available force.”103 They the Jacksonian tradition concerns its

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 McKissack 63 illuminates President Trump’s philosophy about warfighting generally and explains why he supported Behenna, Lorance, Golsteyn, and Gallagher. His Jacksonian orientation diverges from cosmopolitan beliefs about limited war, international institutions, and application of interna- tional law during jus in bello. “When our soldiers have to fight for our country,” President Trump has stated, “I want to give them the confidence to fight.”113 For critics of the war crime pardons, however, the confidence to fight does not neces- sitate or contemplate warfighting that deviates from the law of war. The war crime pardons serve as a notable flashpoint in the country’s continuing conversation about the way Americans fight and win wars, specifi- cally, and the conduct of foreign policy, generally. Where one comes down on the military pardons cases likely depends on his or her ideological proximity to or distance from Jacksonian principles. The debate between Jacksonians and everyone else will almost certainly continue even after the Trump Presidency ends, but the criticism of the military pardon cases may have more to do with the Jacksonian view of warfighting than with President Trump per se. President Trump is, after all, a blunt, charismatic, and forceful manifestation of a venerable American tradition, not its progenitor. The beef, then, for many critics of the military pardons is with the underlying beliefs that brought them to President Trump’s attention and compelled him to act. “Just Cause” as a Related Explanation for War Crime Pardons. A distinct, yet related, explanation for President Trump’s actions in the Behenna, Lorance, Golsteyn, and Gallagher cases concerns his views about the military’s mission to eliminate or reduce the ter- rorist threat against the United States. The question arises whether Jacksonian Andrew Jackson, Thomas Sully, 1825 (Library of Congress/Detroit Publishing Company) support for aggressive warfighting and unconditional surrender equates to public instinctive support of the military.110 explains, Jacksonians, such as President forbearance of war crimes committed by The degree of support for the military Trump, firmly believe that it is “unfair U.S. Servicemembers. Available research allows Jacksonians to recognize that and even immoral” for warriors to risk suggests an affirmative answer. Servicemembers “on the frontlines their lives only to have “their choices A recent study by researchers Scott protecting society sometimes make second-guessed by armchair critics.”112 Sagan and Benjamin Valentino found, mistakes.”111 As Mead succinctly The Jacksonian tradition, therefore, among other things, that “Americans

64 Essay Competitions / Pardon the Paradox JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 were . . . much more willing to describe coupled with Jacksonian fealty to the mil- When the general counsel completes soldiers who participate in unambiguous itary could explain in part why President the review, Secretary Esper should share war crimes as behaving ethically when Trump and others were willing to see the the findings and recommendations with they were fighting for a just cause than actions of Behenna, Lorance, Golsteyn, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The review when they were fighting for an unjust and Gallagher in a more favorable light should serve as a launchpad for clearer cause.”114 Sagan and Valentino presented than did the journalists, academics, and and more robust uniform guidance about a group of subjects with a story about a retired military leaders who criticized the law of war. The Services should then country’s just counterattack, but with the the President’s decisions regarding these think anew about how they train on added detail of war crimes. Particularly, actions. the law of war. Law of Armed Conflict the “just” side reportedly massacred 48 Of course, the Jacksonian orienta- (LOAC) training must occur more women and children.115 Subjects exposed tion does not inoculate the President’s regularly and more intensively, similar to this scenario were twice as willing to interventions in military justice against to how the Services now conduct sexual describe soldiers’ war crimes as ethical criticism. The Jacksonian tradition merely assault and suicide prevention instruction. when committed as part of a just cause.116 offers an ideological, as opposed to a po- Servicemembers need more than just Sagan and Valentino’s research design litical, explanation for President Trump’s another judge advocate general briefing did not parse subjects by partisan political actions. Criticism of the military pardons about LOAC; rather, they must be affiliation or ideology. Additional research seemed to dwell on President Trump brought into the conversation about the could investigate whether Jacksonian- as a leader, when the greater cause for principles of military necessity, humanity, Trumpian adherents are more likely to concern may be the school of thought proportionality, distinction, and honor. excuse grave atrocities in service of a just that undergirds his views about warfight- The Services should draw on the factual cause.117 But, as Sagan and Valentino ing. The real and unsettled issue, then, scenarios from the military pardon cases concluded, many Americans “are willing is whether the United States wants to and other war crime cases in military to overlook acts of gratuitous killing by fight a war with a Jacksonian or someone history to invite Servicemembers to think soldiers whose cause they believe to be else—because the choice is consequential more deeply about ethics and morality in just.”118 Along with Mead’s argument for how Americans fight and how they the conduct of war. that Jacksonians are unwilling to extend treat their enemies. Lastly, the military does not and honor to dishonorable enemies, this should not train its members to be killing finding suggests that President Trump’s Recommendations machines. Machines are emotionless, worldview envisions Servicemembers Improve Law of War Guidance and unfeeling, impartial, and impervious fighting with much more leeway against Training. While discussing Richard to the psychological trauma that can a hated enemy—a position that presum- Spencer’s resignation with the press, occur from killing another human being, ably would find currency among the Secretary of Defense Esper remarked, even if that human being is an enemy. President’s most ardent supporters. “The case of Eddie Gallagher has dragged Servicemembers are not automatons; Finally, moral licensing may further on for months, and it’s distracting too they are thinking and feeling social explain why President Trump and many many. It must end.”121 When asked about creatures. Americans should not want or Americans give soldiers the benefit of the Gallagher, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs expect them to kill unflinchingly, reflex- doubt when they perceive the military of Staff General stated, “The ively, impulsively, or wantonly. Why this mission as just.119 Sagan and Valentino case is now, in my view, closed.”122 The should be so requires deeper thinking, define moral licensing as “the tendency of cases of Behenna, Lorance, Golsteyn, and from frontline warriors to strategic lead- individuals to allow past moral behavior Gallagher are indeed closed, legally, but ers, about discipline and self-control in to excuse subsequent immoral behav- the ramifications of these cases deserve a the crucible of combat. iors.”120 Recall an instinctive support for full accounting within DOD.123 Congressional Review and the military among Jacksonians, and it After Spencer’s abrupt resignation, Whistleblower Protections. Strategic becomes more evident why they would Secretary Esper directed DOD general leaders should welcome the ongoing tend to excuse, overlook, or explain away counsel to “review how the department congressional review of the military crimes committed by Servicemembers on educates and train [its] Servicemembers pardon cases.127 They should be prepared battlefields half a world away. about wartime ethics and laws of armed to explain to Congress the law of war re- Against the backdrop of the conflict.”124 The review will entail “how forms they intend to implement. Military Jacksonian tradition, President Trump’s the department monitors, investigates, leaders will have to repeatedly remind support for frontline troops and disgust reports, and adjudicates its adherence and assure Congress that these cases are for the Nation’s enemies further explain to the laws of armed conflict.”125 This in no way being interpreted as a license to why the commander in chief picked up review is a meaningful and needed first commit war crimes. on these particular cases and why, phil- step toward improving the way DOD Senior military leaders must be osophically and politically, he decided implements the law of war in light of the prepared to delineate the protections to intervene in them. Moral licensing military pardons cases.126 afforded to whistleblowers who come

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 McKissack 65 forward with allegations of war crimes.128 prosecutor not only expressed his dissat- Servicemembers with “standard criminal viola- tions” of the UCMJ. See Charlie Dunlap, “No, A serious and unintended consequence isfaction with the President’s intervention the ‘Laws of War’ Are Not ‘History,’” Lawfare, of the military pardon cases is that in the Calley case but also conveyed November 18, 2019, available at . Still, fear that their names will get dragged nation to condone the acts of Lieutenant “war crimes” aptly and concisely describe the offenses underlying the four cases. For ease of through the mud in the media.129 The Calley,” Captain Daniel wrote, “is to description, this article at times uses the term 132 mechanisms for reporting war crimes make us no better than our enemies.” war crime in a nontechnical, nonlegal sense must be clear and understandable to all Captain Daniel got it mostly right, but he as shorthand. For the most part, though, the Servicemembers, just as sexual assault re- missed a salient truth. For this nation to author refers to the four cases collectively as the porting avenues have been strengthened condemn the acts of Lieutenant Calley, or military pardon cases. 6 Dan Lamothe and Josh Dewey, “‘In- and clarified in recent years. Lieutenant Behenna, Lieutenant Lorance, surgents’ Lobbied Trump for War Crimes Finally, Congress may want to review Major Golsteyn, or Chief Petty Officer Pardons with Little Pentagon Involvement, Presidential authority in the military Gallagher, it must first learn to tame the Officials Say,”Washington Post, November justice process. Congress, of course, beast within that strains against its chains 21, 2019, available at

66 Essay Competitions / Pardon the Paradox JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01/andrew- entino, “Do Americans Approve of Trump’s inal Investigation Division (CID) Report of sullivan-donald-trump-is-the-war-crimes- Pardons for Court-Martialed Military Offi- Investigation (, NC: U.S. Army president.html>; , Twitter cers?” Washington Post, December 16, 2019, Criminal Investigation Command [redacted post, May 21, 2019, 8:15 a.m., available at available at ; Barry prove-trumps-pardons-court-martialed-mil- the Army’s War Crimes Case Against a Green McCaffrey, “Pardoning Convicted Troops itary-officers/>. In their YouGov survey, Beret Hero,” Washington Post, May 19, 2015, Would Tell the World America No Longer Has Sagan and Valentino used the Clint Lorance available at . Lamothe posted would-tell-the-world-america-no-longer-has-a- second-degree murder. Overall, Sagan and the redacted Mathew Golsteyn investigation disciplined-military/2019/05/24/f289fbf2- Valentino reported that 41 percent of survey report on May 15, 2015, at ; subjects approved of the pardon and 59 percent doc/265668561/Golsteyn-Army-CID-inves- James Stavridis, “We Trust the Navy SEALs did not. tigation?secret_password=PNNptwfNQ2XM- to Protect America. Trump Should Trust the 14 United States v. Behenna, 71 M.J., 228, sAsZqkBF>. Navy SEALs to Judge Themselves,” Time, 231 (United States Court of Appeals for the 27 CID Report. November 25, 2019, available at ; www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/opin- 29 Ibid. “Gen. Krulak Statement on Trump’s Military ions/2011SepTerm/12-0030.pdf>. 30 Ibid. Also, while held in detention by Pardons,” Human Rights First, November 15, 15 Ibid. U.S. forces, the murdered victim had seen the 2019, available at . 18 Ibid., 229. and his family if released from detention. 9 Stephen W. Preston, Department of De- 19 Ibid., 234–235. A second issue raised 31 Dan Lamothe, “Inside the Stunning fense [DOD] Law of War Manual (Washington, on appeal addressed whether the government Fall and War-Crimes Investigation of an Army DC: Office of the General Counsel, June 2015, failed to disclose exculpatory or favorable in- Green Beret War Hero,” Washington Post, May updated December 2016), ii. The manual de- formation to Behenna’s trial defense attorneys. 19, 2015, available at . and the protection of war victims in both inter- fied, the same government expert determined 32 Ibid. In 2015, an Army Board of Inquiry national and non-international armed conflict; he was telling the truth. Before leaving the trial, (not a court-martial or criminal tribunal) did belligerent occupation; and the relationships the expert told defense counsel that he would not substantiate the allegation that Golsteyn between belligerent, neutral, and non-bellig- have been a great witness for them. Neither the violated the Law of Armed Conflict, but erent States.” The manual also explains that trial court nor appellate courts granted relief to nonetheless recommended his discharge from the “law of war is often called the law of armed Behenna on this particular issue. the Army with a General (Under Honorable conflict.” This essay uses law of war and law 20 Charlie Dunlap, “The Behenna Pardon: Conditions) characterization for engaging in of armed conflict interchangeably, but both Some Answers (and Much More!),” Lawfare, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle- terms refer to jus in bello: “justice in war.” See May 19, 2019, available at . Army Hearing with His Benefits,”Washing - (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 21. 21 “Statement of the Press Secretary ton Post, June 29, 2015, available at . briefings-statements/statement-press-secre- Kali Borkoski, “The Story of Michael Behen- 33 Dan Lamothe, “Army Reopens Probe tary-regarding-executive-clemency-michael-be- na and Mad Dog 5: ‘Self Defense’ in War,” into Suspected Bombmaker’s Death After henna/>. SCOTUS, May 29, 2013, available at . point/wp/2016/12/08/army-reopens-investi- briefings-statements/statement-press-secre- 23 “Statement of the Press Secretary gation-of-special-forces-soldier-accused-of-kill- tary-97/>. Regarding Executive Clemency for Michael ing-unarmed-detainee/>. 12 Andrew Dyer, “All the SEAL’s Men: Behenna.” 34 Barnini Chakraborty and Jennifer Griffin, The Fox News Campaign That Made Eddie 24 Ibid. “Army Opens Probe into Green Beret, Detain- Gallagher Untouchable,” San Diego Tribune, 25 The following discussion of the Lorance ee’s Death After FNC Interview,” Fox News, November 29, 2019, available at . touchable>; Lamothe and Dewey, “‘Insurgents’ ACCAOpinions.nsf/MODD/331E0265D- 35 Lamothe, “Army Reopens Probe into Lobbied Trump for War Crimes Pardons with C59E54F8525814E006BA1DC/%24FILE/ Suspected Bombmaker’s Death After Special Little Pentagon Involvement, Officials Say.” mo-lorance,%20ca.pdf>. Forces Soldier’s Fox News Interview.” 13 Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A.Val- 26 U.S. Department of the Army, Crim- 36 “Statement from the Press Secretary.”

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 McKissack 67 37 Dave Philipps, “Who Is Eddie Gallagher, 50 Carl Prine, “Navy Secretary Backs Admi- 60 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the SEAL the Navy Wants to Expel?” New York rals in Tussle with Trump over SEAL Trident, the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Mil- Times, November 24, 2019, available at . tary-backs-admirals-in-tussle-with-trump-over- 62 Ibid. 38 The following discussion of the Ed- seal-trident/>. 63 Ibid. die Gallagher case is from “The Gallagher 51 Donald J. Trump, Twitter post, Novem- 64 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Effect,” The Weekly, season 1, episode 23, ber 21, 2019, 8:30 a.m., available at . 65 Ibid., 208–209. f33b6487a9c3?>. Subscription required to view. 52 Richard Spencer, “I Was Fired as Navy 66 Ibid., 209. 39 Philipps, “Who Is Eddie Gallagher, the Secretary. Here’s What I’ve Learned Because 67 U.S. Const., Art. 2, § 2, cl. 1. SEAL the Navy Wants to Expel?” of It,” Washington Post, November 27, 2019, 68 “Submission of Petition; Form to Be 40 George Petras, “Timeline: How Trump available at . 28, 2019, available at . convicted, and sentenced when he received his spencer-s-letter-to-president-trump/2bf70c2a- 53 Ibid. executive clemency. As we have seen, though, f811-43be-9e21-b02f1fe54a26/>. Gallagher 54 “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Press the President also intervened in the case before was also “accused of firing a sniper rifle at Gaggle,” Department of Defense, November trial, and intervened once more after restoring civilians, striking a girl wearing a flower-print 25, 2019, available at ; Richard V. Spencer, Letter to Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney includes lagher, the SEAL the Navy Wants to Expel?” President Trump, Washington Post, November a section for frequently asked questions. One 41 “The Gallagher Effect,” clip approx. at 24, 2019, available at . that “it would be highly unusual,” but notes manders can order Servicemembers accused 55 “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Press that President Gerald Ford, President Jimmy of military crimes into confinement while they Gaggle.” Carter, and President George H.W. Bush issued await trial only after certain criteria are met 56 Petras, “Timeline.” pardons outside of the customary sequence. See and a hearing is held. See Part II, Chapter II, 57 Understandably, civilian and uniformed Department of Justice, Office of the Pardon At- “Rule 305, Pretrial Confinement,” 305(a)-(m), military leaders have not revealed the partic- torney, available at . (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), to the President about the military pardon 71 Ibid. II-22–II-27. cases. But their public comments coupled with 72 John Wagner, “Trump Says Pardoning 43 Dyer, “All the SEAL’s Men.” concomitant reporting suggest they advised War Criminals ‘a Little Bit Controversial,’ Sug- 44 Donald J. Trump, Twitter post, the President against intervening. See Lamothe gests Delay in Deliberations,” Washington Post, March 30, 2019, 8:14 a.m., available at and Dewey, “‘Insurgents’ Lobbied Trump May 24, 2019. . President Involvement, Officials Say”; “Remarks by Sec- States is authorized to convene courts-martial Trump tweeted, “In honor of his past service to retary Esper in a Press Gaggle”; “ICYMI: Rep. under Article 22, UCMJ (10 USC § 22). our Country, Navy Seal #EddieGallagher will Moulton Grills Military’s Most Seniors Leaders 74 “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Press soon be moved to less restrictive confinement on Trump’s Pardons, Retreat from Iran Deal,” Gaggle.” while he awaits his day in court. Process should December 13, 2019, available at ; Lorance and Behenna. Golsteyn did endure SEAL the Navy Wants to Expel?” Meghann Myers, “Esper: ‘Robust’ Conver- a lengthy criminal investigation, a board of 46 Ibid. sation with Trump About Proposed Pardons inquiry, and other collateral consequences, 47 Petras, “Timeline.” The sentence also in- for SEAL, Two Soldiers,” Military Times, which continued after his pardon. Even after cluded four months’ confinement, but Gallagh- November 6, 2019, available at . Showdown,” New York Times, January 9, 2020, 49 Ibid. The relevant portion reads, “Today, 58 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military available at . directing the promotion of Special Warfare Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & 76 Dyer, “All the SEAL’s Men.” Operator First Class Edward R. Gallagher to Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), 160, available 77 Spencer, “I Was Fired as Navy Secretary.” the grade of E-7, the rank he held before he at . a SEAL Disciplinary Case Risks a Collision the charges against him.” 59 Ibid., 158. with the Navy,” Washington Post, November

68 Essay Competitions / Pardon the Paradox JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 21, 2019, available at . vy/2019/08/22/navsec-orders-comprehen- & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and 79 Rules for Court-Martial 304 and 305, in sive-review-of-navy-marine-corps-jags/>. those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT Manual for Courts-Martial, are touchstones for 87 Zachary D. Spillman, “SECNAV Orders VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA a President’s authority to change the condi- a Review of the Navy and Marine Corps Legal wants no more threats!” Donald J. Trump, tions of confinement for a military member. As Communities,” CAAFlog, August 23, 2019, Twitter post, January 4, 2020, 5:52 p.m., President Nixon weighed options in the Calley available at . House Counsel John Dean. Dean argued that corps-legal-communities/>. 95 Donald J. Trump, Twitter post, October the President “could not exercise piecemeal the 88 Ignatius, “Trump’s Meddling in a SEAL 12, 2019, 9:49 a.m., available at . The President tweeted, the President to take some action as a conven- 89 Ibid. Rear Admiral Collin P. Green, Naval “The case of Major Mathew Golsteyn is now ing authority because this would make him Special Warfare Command, to Major Com- under review at the White House. Mathew is the convening authority for all future aspects manders, Naval Special Warfare, memorandum, a highly decorated Green Beret who is being of the case.” See Michal R. Belknap, The Viet- subject: Guidance from the Commander, tried for killing a Taliban bombmaker. We train nam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and August 20, 2019, available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 McKissack 69 111 Ibid. avenues for reporting war crimes, especially the 112 Ibid. agencies outside the chain of command eligible New from NDU 113 “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Press to receive a report. Junior members may feel Gaggle.” reluctant to report a war crime through their Press 114 Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valen- chain of command, especially in circumstances for the Center for Chinese Military tino, “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American where someone in the chain allegedly commit- Affairs Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Com- ted the act. batants,” Ethics & International Affairs 33, 129 Dave Phillips, “Navy Reduces Punish- Strategic Forum 305 no. 4 (2019), 414, available at . In their York Times, October 29, 2019, available at Perspectives on the study, Sagan and Valentino constructed four . teria” and assigned about 150 participants “to 130 U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 14. Chinese each condition and each subject read only one 131 For example, the President issues the officials have story.” In each scenario, Sagan and Valentino Rules for Court-Martial and the Military responded to varied an aspect of the conflict “to isolate the Rules of Evidence that establish court-martial the U.S. “free effects of beliefs about the justice of the war’s procedure. 132 and open cause on the public’s ethical judgments about Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. the conduct of combatants and the moral Calley, 385. One poll “showed that nearly 80 Indo-Pacific” responsibility of leaders.” Sagan and Valentino, per cent of Americans bitterly opposed the find- strategy “Just War and Unjust Soldiers,” 420–421. ing.” Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley, through 115 Ibid., 444. 374; see “Poll Finds Majority Think Calley Was a regional 116 Ibid., 427. a Scapegoat,” New York Times, April 17, 1971, counternarrative that raises doubts 117 Ibid., 433. available at . Additionally, a separate 1971 ity of U.S. leadership. Chinese ana- 120 Ibid. Gallup/Newsweek poll found that 11 percent lysts perceive the strategy as a form 121 “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Press of Americans approved of the verdict. Sagan of containment. They assess that Gaggle.” and Valentino, “Do Americans Approve of the strategy will reduce China’s 122 Idrees Ali, “Navy SEAL Case Closed as Trump’s Pardons for Court-Martialed Military Far as Top U.S. General Concerned,” Reuters, Officers?” influence and increase regional November 25, 2019, available at . “Once an army is involved in war, there is in Asia and advocate responding by 123 According to some reporting, President a beast in every fighting man which begins Trump may be considering pardons for others tugging at its chains. And a good officer must improving China’s own relations convicted of war crimes. See Spencer Ackerman learn early on how to keep the beast under throughout the neighborhood. and Asawin Suebsaeng, “Justice Department control, both in his men and himself.” George U.S. messaging needs to offer Stonewalls Senate Democrats on Trump’s War- C. Marshall, quoted in Luke Mogelson, “A assurances of U.S. commitments Crimes Clemency,” , January Beast in the Heart of Every Fighting Man,” and evidence of regional contri- 16, 2020, available at . maintain key relationships in the cy>. region but need not respond in 124 “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Press kind to every Chinese overture. Gaggle.” The strategy may also create new 125 Ibid. 126 John C. Dehn, “Why a President Cannot opportunities to negotiate with Authorize the Military to Violate (Most of) the China on certain issues from a Law of War,” William & Mary Law Review 59, position of strength. no. 3 (2018), 816, available at . 127 Ackerman and Suebsaeng, “Justice Department Stonewalls Senate Democrats on Trump’s War-Crimes Clemency.” 128 DOD Directive (DODD) 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program, February 22, 2011, 8. DODD 2311.01E, para. 6.3, mandates that “all military . . . personnel shall report report- able incidents” of war crimes through their chain of command. Later in the paragraph, Visit the NDU Press Web site for the directive allows for reports to be made more information on publications through other channels outside the chain of at ndupress.ndu.edu command. Servicemembers need to know their

70 Essay Competitions / Pardon the Paradox JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Air National Guard intelligence analysts assigned to 181st Intelligence Wing, 137th Intelligence Squadron Unclassified Processing, Assessment, and Dissemination site test new domestic response artificial intelligence technology at Hulman Field Air National Guard Base, Indiana, November 2, 2019 (U.S. Air National Guard/L. Roland Sturm)

Artificial Intelligence A Decisionmaking Technology

By Mark M. Zais

ith the release of its first resource allocation decisions.”1 Unfor- be a substitute for it. Military leaders artificial intelligence (AI) tunately, most senior leaders currently must leverage AI to help them adapt W strategy in 2019, the Depart- have limited familiarity with AI, and be curious. As innovative technol- ment of Defense (DOD) formalized having developed their skills in tacti- ogies with AI applications increasingly the increased use of AI technology cal counterinsurgency environments, become integral to DOD moderniza- throughout the military, challenging which reward strength (physical and tion and near-peer competition, senior senior leaders to create “organizational mental), perseverance, and diligence. leaders’ knowledge of AI is critical for AI strategies” and “make related Some defense scholars have advocated shaping and applying our AI strat- a smarter military, emphasizing intel- egy and creating properly calibrated lectual human capital and arguing that expectations. Colonel Mark M. Zais, USA, wrote this essay while cognitive ability will determine success War is about decisionmaking, and AI attending the U.S. Army War College. It won the in strategy development, statesman- enables the technology that will trans- Strategy Article category of the 2020 Chairman 2 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay ship, and decisionmaking. AI might form how humans and machines make Competition. complement that ability but cannot those decisions.3 Successful use of this

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Zais 71 general-purpose technology will require encouraged rebranding of existing First, they would stop searching for senior leaders who truly understand computing methodologies (for example, AI solutions to every problem. Business its capabilities and can demystify the neural networks has become deep learn- leaders identify the core business deci- hyperbole.4 Within current AI strategy ing), which has been useful in attracting sions they are trying to solve; likewise, development and application, many prac- attention and funding.7 Elevating the military leaders should pinpoint critical titioners have a palpable sense of dread as discourse of machine learning and deep decisions that affect an objective and we crest the waves of a second AI hype learning to the senior leader level means assess the role that data play in those cycle, seemingly captained by novices of domain knowledge must be elevated as decisions. That analysis would show the AI seas.5 In-house technical experts well. This is critical when working with when the solution requires data-driven find it difficult to manage expectations the private sector. For instance, when approaches, such as rule-based systems, and influence priorities, clouded by buzz- engaging with vendors or discussing ma- advanced analytics, statistics, economet- words and stifled by ambitions for “quick chine learning applications, senior leaders rics, optimization, simulation, machine wins.” The importance of AI-related should know what kind of machine learn- learning, or deep learning—and when education increases with AI aspirations ing (linear regression, logistic regression, it does not. Knowledgeable leaders will and the illusion of progress. Without that decision trees, Naïve Bayes) is desired or accept that the best solution is not always education, we face a world where senior already in use. an AI solution. leaders use AI-enabled technologies to What does AI education look like Second, they would manage expec- make decisions related to national secu- for senior leaders? The definition of tations so as not to be trapped by a hype rity without a full grasp of the tools that AI is gradually evolving and becoming cycle that leads to disillusionment.8 AI they—and our adversaries—possess. This broader. Today, almost any computerized leaders need to understand that a return would be equivalent to a combat arms system that solves a problem or informs a on investment will be slow and, perhaps, officer making strategic military land- decision falls under the AI umbrella. The disappointing.9 That will be particularly power decisions without the foundations relationship between AI and data science true when new applications are launched of military education in maneuver warfare is underpinned by a complex interdepen- without needed supporting infrastructure and practical experience. dence of many multidisciplinary skills and and data architecture. That support may methods. As such, we cannot expect se- require multiple data sources, teams of Educating Senior Leaders in AI nior leaders to have a deep understanding people, and integration of data before Strategic decisionmaking in a transfor- of all the constituent AI disciplines and the the AI application can begin making pre- mative digital environment requires continuously evolving technology. These dictions and evaluations. Knowledgeable comparably transformative leadership. leaders should, however, have broad leaders will understand the differences Modernization of the military work- enough knowledge to understand the between expectations of deliverables for force should parallel modernization of relationships among data science, machine AI and those for information technology equipment and technology. In the short learning, and deep learning and to be fa- (IT). Whereas IT delivers known services, term, senior leaders require executive AI miliar with the methods that each uses. AI and data science engage in discovery, education that equips them with enough Senior leaders should also have similar which is inherently unpredictable, unless knowledge to distill problems that need understanding of the capabilities of re- a previously solved problem or previously AI solutions and that provides informed lated fields essential to AI solutions, such used data is involved in the science. Like guidance for customized solutions. With as data mining, data management, data any discovery process, they may not pro- the ability to trust internal expertise, the architecture, and cloud computing. duce desired solutions. military can avoid overreliance on con- Third, senior leaders must build a sultants and vendors, following Niccolò Applying Knowledge workforce that supports AI to a scale Machiavelli’s warning against depen- to AI Strategy needed to support the DOD enterprise. dence on auxiliary troops.6 In the long To realize the potential of AI, senior Military Services and subordinate organi- term, military education should give the leaders (both military and civilian) must zations must transform their workforces same attention to AI that is provided to make intellectual human capital central to be proficient digital-data practitioners, traditional subjects such as maneuver to DOD AI strategy. The level of AI able to leverage human-machine oppor- warfare and counterinsurgency oper- knowledge that those senior leaders tunities across all warfighting functions. ations. Each steppingstone of military possess will determine their success in An AI-ready workforce includes leaders education should incorporate subjects setting priorities in requirements and who know about not only the domain from the strategic domain, including applying AI strategies. That will require but also the limits of their knowledge. maneuver warfare, information warfare, a top-down AI strategy that is con- That self-awareness will allow them to and artificial intelligence. sistent with proven AI applications in assemble internal staffs that have a deeper As the military becomes more AI- industry. Three key indicators evince the understanding of mathematical modeling driven, it will become more quantitative progress of these leaders in achieving needed to lead data scientists and engi- and automated. The allure of AI has the mastery that their positions require. neers. These staff capabilities are critical

72 Essay Competitions / Artificial Intelligence JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 12 to building infrastructures and identifying adoption of AI technologies requires Johnna T. Wynne, Wired Fast and Think- ing Slow: Cyber Technology and the U.S. Army manageable projects that can be bench- leaders who can direct the strategy— (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advance marked against existing ones. Complex and not rely only on outside experts and Military Studies, 2016). organizations require four to five data DOD AI research centers. JFQ engineers for every data scientist in order to create the data pipelines essential to the applications.10 If senior leaders do not Notes understand these needs, then they need 1 senior advisors with that technical knowl- Summary of the 2018 Department of De- fense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing edge and training to converse with them. AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity How does the military scale its AI (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, workforce to support the enterprise? 2019), 14. Currently, large businesses struggle to 2 Everett S.P. Spain, J.D. Mohundro, and hire enough data scientists. DOD faces Bernard B. Banks, “Intellectual Capital: A Case for Cultural Change,” Parameters 45, no. 2 the same challenge, with organizations (Summer 2015), 77–91. as large and as geographically distributed 3 Tom Upchurch, “How China Could Beat as any global multinational corporation; the West in the Deadly Race for AI Weapons,” however, assuming there is the top-level Wired, August 8, 2018, available at . may seem more daunting than reality. 4 Wim Naudé, “AI’s Current Hype and Whatever the size of the organization, all Hysteria Could Set the Technology Back by projects start with a small team, which Decades,” The Conversation, July 24, 2019, can then grow with the number and available at . with AI. One industry expert has de- 5 Alok Aggarwal, “Resurgence of Artificial scribed the scaling issue like this: “A big Intelligence During 1983–2010,” Scry Ana- company is a bunch of little people all lytics, January 20, 2018, available at . 6 Niccoló Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and Conclusion trans. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett, In some ways, the current evolution 1995), chapter 13. of AI is similar to the rapid growth of 7 Samira Pouyanfar et al., “A Survey on the DOD cyber community over the Deep Learning: Algorithms, Techniques, and Applications,” ACM Computing Surveys 51, last decade. The mantra of “we need no. 5 (September 2018), available at . to ambitious cyber goals that outpaced 8 Jackie Fenn and Marcus Blosch, “Un- workforce growth and capabilities. In derstanding Gartner’s Hype Cycles,” Gartner, the case of cyber technology, military August 20, 2018, available at . had thrived under earlier, simpler rules 9 Sankar Narayanan, “How to Measure the and understanding for the world were ROI of AI,” interview by Daniel Fraggella, criticized for neglecting the professional Artificial Intelligence in Industry, December military education needed to achieve a 3, 2019, podcast audio, 3:20, available at 12 . Time will tell whether the current DOD 10 Jesse Anderson, “Data Engineers vs. AI modernization strategy will yield Data Scientists,” O’Reilly, April 11, 2018, similar results. There is no doubt that available at . 11 Charles Martin, “How to Get Started changing. AI, like information warfare with an Effective AI Strategy,” interview by and space, will require a commitment to Daniel Fraggella, Artificial Intelligence in the development of intellectual capital Industry, June 28, 2019, podcast audio, 6:35, to ensure that the workforce and lead- available at . fast-moving domains. The successful

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Zais 73 Captain Joseph O’Brien, mission commander of Task Force New York City, greets medical providers joining USNS Comfort, which is working with Javits New York Medical Station as integrated system to relieve city’s medical system, in support of U.S. Northern Command’s Defense Support of Civil Authorities as response to COVID-19 pandemic, April 15, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Scott Bigley)

Decision Superiority Through Joint All-Domain Command and Control

By Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy

have had the honor to lead both U.S. years. During that time, the commands and control (C2) of assigned forces, Northern Command (USNORTH- have undergone a critical transforma- and defeating adversary attacks. These I COM) and the binational North tion to ensure their collective ability to capabilities are not new but rather have American Aerospace Defense deter and defeat the very real threats existed since each command’s inception Command (NORAD) for the past 2 posed by peer adversaries. In order and have been key to providing a cred- to accomplish this no-fail homeland ible deterrent against our adversaries for defense mission during a time of crisis, many years. we must be able to perform a number While these critical capabilities for General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF of critical capabilities, which in their homeland defense may be enduring, (Ret.), most recently served as Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American most distilled form are maintaining the requirements needed to carry them Aerospace Defense Command. domain awareness, exercising command out change over time. When I assumed

74 Commentary / Decision Superiority JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 command of USNORTHCOM and shows at a basic level what this capabil- chains and help us identify threats that NORAD (NC&N), it was clear that we ity could look like (see figure 1). The current systems struggle to detect, and needed to rapidly improve our capabilities commercial demonstrates artificial intel- to the operational/strategic levels, where to fulfill the sacred mission of defend- ligence (AI) analyzing National Football machine-enabled insights could help us ing the homeland. Our adversaries had League (NFL) plays. It identifies what understand adversaries’ patterns of behav- adapted, operating across new domains AI-enabled insights could do for the ior to anticipate what they may do next with faster and more advanced weap- decisionmaker, in this case an NFL quar- and generate various response options. onry designed to circumvent our aging terback. Using AI, a coach could assess That all sounds promising. But how defenses. To counter these weapons and whether the risks are worth the reward do we make that concept a reality? Over operate at the speed of relevance today, when looking at the probability of a the course of the last year, we at NC&N we must have awareness across all-domain completion for a 7-yard first down versus have undertaken a campaign to dramati- C2 providing a fused threat picture across a lower probability but higher payoff for a cally improve our critical capabilities to subsurface, maritime, land, air, near- 53-yard touchdown. meet homeland defense requirements in space, space, and cyber activities, and Beyond this simple illustration is an increasingly threatening security envi- defeat mechanisms capable of neutral- an even more robust potential when ronment. This campaign has focused on izing adversary attacks against our critical we factor in machine learning (ML) speed and innovation, incorporating both infrastructure. The linchpin between based on previous patterns of behavior, internal efforts to experiment with com- these two capabilities is Joint All-Domain incorporating historical analysis with mercial industry as well as with the Air Command and Control (JADC2). the current situation to anticipate the Force as the operational lead for their first What is JADC2? Describing and future. A quarterback such as Tom Brady two JADC2 demonstrations. Through ultimately producing JADC2 has proved approaches the line of scrimmage with these initiatives, we have been putting the elusive for the Department of Defense a brain processing two decades of NFL “J” in JADC2, rapidly advancing from (DOD) because, in part, it is difficult to experiential learning. He knows the concept to reality. translate an aspirational concept into a defensive coordinator whom he is facing Our pursuit of this aim yielded a shared vision and then into programming and his own patterns for any number four-part concept that articulates the requirements. One approach has been to of circumstances, giving him a pre-snap essential subcomponents that, when com- describe JADC2 by its desired attributes. edge when he evaluates the scheme. bined, constitute our vision of JADC2. In that sense, we talk about a redundant What machine-enabled insights could do, This concept helps to move beyond the and resilient architecture to enable faster if the information could be transmitted descriptive elements of JADC2 to actu- and more reliable communications, or to the quarterback in real time, is repli- ally explicate a framework to produce the ability to link fused sensor and re- cate that same capability for a rookie in the capability. First, at its foundation, porting data to the best shooter in ways his first game. A machine could actually JADC2 is a data problem. It must draw that flatten unnecessary organizational process even more than the experienced on authoritative data sources, both his- hierarchies, gaining the leverage needed quarterback if it understands what to look torical and current, that are material to to deny an enemy the ability to hold us at for. For example, a defensive coordina- an understanding of the relevant security risk. While these descriptions are certainly tor may consistently show an overload environment conditions. Second, that useful, JADC2 may be best described by to one side on third and long but drops data must be cloud-based, accessible up, its ultimate purpose: decision superiority. out of the play post-snap, blitzing from down, and across command echelons at JADC2 is C2 for the digital age—the the alternate side in order to pressure a the appropriate classification levels. Third, architecture needed to produce faster hot throw toward an eagerly awaiting the data must be layered and ultimately and better decisions for our warfighters defensive back. Armed with that informa- fused across domains and reporting from the tactical edge to the strategic tion regarding what is likely to happen, streams to enable operationally useful leader. What makes JADC2 different the rookie quarterback could come to a visualizations in an all-domain common from previous C2 constructs is that it is better assessment and take an action with operating picture (COP). Fourth, and built on a data-rich foundation that em- a higher probability of success. most important, JADC2 must incorpo- ploys the power of machines to enhance We seek these same data-driven rate machine-enabled insights into that decisionmaking. This new capability advantages as military leaders. Current COP. These insights simultaneously moves beyond the limitations of human technology holds the potential not only leverage predictive analytics, machine capacities to produce machine-enabled to replicate the knowledge and wisdom and deep learning, and AI to better insights that can identify anomalous of a commander with three decades of understand the situation and generate events, anticipate what will happen next, experience but also to improve on this data-driven analyses that offer our leaders and generate options with associated knowledge by processing beyond the decision superiority. This concept is the repercussions and risks. limits of a single mind. This applies both framework we are using to make JADC2 To illustrate, a recent Web to the tactical edge, where machine a reality and overcome today’s most Service Next Gen Stats commercial processing of data could shorten our kill pressing C2 challenges.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 O’Shaughnessy 75 Figure 1. AI Analyzing Football Play in Real Time

C2 Today architecture are subject to the limitations Applying the JADC2 Concept The challenge that we have across the of human processing—idiosyncratic ex- We were able to overcome the C2 chal- joint and allied forces is to operate at perience, knowledge, and the peculiarities lenges we faced at the outset of the the speed of relevancy to deter and of momentary happenstance. COVID-19 response because of the defeat today’s threats. These threats We recently wrestled with the im- unique opportunity it presented. There have advanced to the point that they pact of these challenges when NC&N was a shared sense of urgency as part of stress our ability to react swiftly enough supported the Nation’s COVID-19 the whole-of-nation effort, especially to counter them. The challenges posed response. As the outbreak spread, we re- with commercial industry partners that by modern weaponry, in both speed and ceived direction to lead DOD operations were eager to assist. With them we stealth, place a premium on the time in the United States. Within 48 hours, we were able to accelerate the progress on it takes to go from sensing a threat to stood up both joint maritime and land JADC2 development by applying the directing an action by the best available component commands and established same four-part concept we had devel- shooter to defeat it. We may be able a flexible C2 architecture to support oped to address the homeland defense to identify a threat, and we may have the dynamic employment of capabilities challenges posed by peer threats. defeat mechanisms in place to intercept across the country, including the forward Solving the problem started with it, but if we cannot process the informa- deployment of medical personnel into the finding authoritative data, which meant tion in time to execute, we are at an heart of the outbreak in New York City. moving data entry in most cases to the extreme disadvantage. Using legacy C2 systems, we immediately edge and cutting out redundant layers. C2 today relies on myriad data found ourselves struggling to maintain For example, we accomplished this mis- sources that are collected and refined situational awareness in order to inform sion by working with two technology at each command level without a com- the Nation’s senior leaders as well as my companies to deploy smart devices to mon interface. That data is stored in own decisionmaking about what needed forward-deployed units at places such as stovepiped silos with either proprietary to be where and when to best accomplish the Javits Center in New York City, where or bureaucratic limitations that impose our mission. In these early stages of the medical units could provide real-time accessibility challenges. The result is dif- crisis, we used the traditional manual status updates through custom-built apps ferent operating pictures at each level of reporting through a hierarchical chain to and commercial online collaboration command and across the seams between aggregate data in Excel spreadsheets and tools. This ability enabled us to track dif- the commands, which hinders collabora- PowerPoint slides, taking hundreds of ferent statuses such as location, health, tion and reduces clarity. Beyond that, hours to ultimately produce reports that and personal protective equipment for the decisions produced from this legacy were too stale to be useful. these personnel. Moreover, the mobile

76 Commentary / Decision Superiority JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 devices allowed me to virtually interact had begun the previous year as part of processors can run algorithms to identify with the medical units to get the frontline our homeland defense transformation. tracks that legacy systems were unable pulse when I could not physically visit. We had been well aware of our capa- to collect. This capability improves not The second key step was to move that bility challenges at NC&N for quite only our sensing grid for identifying data to the cloud. We worked with the some time and had conducted a series traditional offensive platforms such Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to host of studies over the years to understand as aircraft but also the detection of our data and enable industry entities to our gaps and shortfalls as well as pos- launched weapons and unmanned aerial access it to produce operationally useful sible solutions to address advancing systems (UAS). visualizations in the form of COPs. To threats. In fact, there were so many Pathfinder was only the beginning. accomplish this undertaking, we worked different analytic efforts under way that We spearheaded additional experiments with two software companies to develop we conducted a study of the studies with commercial industry to improve displays for not only medical statuses just to understand how they all fit detection against cruise missiles and across the country but logistics and de- together. We learned that the myriad UAS. We worked with companies that ployment information as well, providing studies had reached a point of dimin- developed ML- and AI-enabled detect real-time situational awareness across ishing returns and that we needed capabilities positioned at the tactical edge subordinate commands. simply to start solving the problem. to identify a threat much earlier than The pivotal part of our JADC2 We acknowledged that we would not previously possible, eliminating layers of concept, incorporating machine-enabled get it exactly right out of the gate, but reporting. In addition, these companies insights into the COP, proved most the newly adopted agile development provided an advanced virtual user in- useful. We coordinated with an innova- approach allowed us to make iterative terface for the COP where the machine tion laboratory and other tech firms to and rapid progress. presented the operator with tasking leverage predictive analytics to inform Based on that predilection for action, options for various defeat mechanisms decisions. For example, we were able to our JADC2 concept development took to intercept the missiles—in that case, a bring in a number of data sources from the form of praxis: taking the theory or virtual engagement by an F-22 Raptor. across government and the private sector idea behind JADC2—namely produc- Based on the success of these early to develop a model that anticipated 2 ing decision superiority—and actively prototypes and experiments, the Air weeks out where COVID-19 spikes were attempting to build it out in the field. Force requested that we serve as the going to occur and where that outbreak Knowing that time was not on our side, operational lead for the Advanced Battle would coincide with medical capacity we employed an agile development Management System “onramp” number shortfalls. Based on that model, I received model with technologically innovative one. The Air Force and my team were a briefing on April 14 that identified a lo- commercial entities to break out of the focused on creating true JADC2 and had cation of concern just north of New York standard capability procurement process. similarly adopted a DevOps approach City. Based on an exodus of people from We thought big, started small, failed fast, in that pursuit.2 Knowing the standard to the Connecticut suburbs, and reinforced success. This approach model to develop the needed capabili- the model predicted an outbreak around included prototyping, experiments, and ties would take too long, we were not Stamford, and we dispatched a surge demonstrations over the last year aimed afraid to try a different course. We cast of expeditionary medical capabilities in at producing the critical requirements a wide net, explaining our homeland anticipation of the need for increased needed to modernize our defenses. defense needs to companies and agen- capacity. The model proved prescient. The campaign started with a focus cies that could potentially be part of the There were 412 new cases on April 19, on shoring up potential vulnerabilities in solution. Rather than ask for specific and by April 22 that number had bal- air domain awareness to improve detec- capabilities, we described our challenges. looned to 2,109.1 Fortunately, we were tion and responsiveness via a prototype When we found those with similar able to get capabilities in place in time called Pathfinder. Pathfinder harnessed mindsets, whether in industry or across by drawing on the power of big data and the power of competition among the Intelligence Community, we quickly predictive analytics to inform an opera- industry innovators to quickly gener- merged our efforts to work toward mutu- tional decision. This success was largely ate leap-ahead technology. Access to ally beneficial aims. due to a concerted and iterative effort to commercial industry was made possible Because our team served as the van- pursue JADC2 capabilities for homeland through collaboration with the Defense guard for the onramp development, we defense in the year leading up to the Innovation Unit (DIU), bringing Silicon were able to incorporate industry entities COVID-19 pandemic. Valley talent to bear on our problem set. and government partners in prototyping What DIU helped us create is a cloud- and testing to quickly produce the results Delivering JADC2 based data ecosystem that draws on needed to illustrate what was within Our COVID-19 response provided the disparate air domain feeds (for example, the realm of the possible. The first time opportunity for us to validate, leverage, Federal Aviation Administration radars), we were able to successfully apply the and accelerate JADC2 initiatives that pulling them into the cloud where data JADC2 model with a wide range of joint

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 O’Shaughnessy 77 Connecticut National Guard Soldiers and Airmen set up 200 beds at Stamford Hospital and construct Alaskan Small Shelter System tents for separate triage area in response to COVID-19 pandemic (U.S. Air National Guard/Steven Tucker) force participants happened at Eglin Air is the flattening of unnecessary layers compartmentalized silos that exist today Force Base, Florida, in December 2019. within the C2 construct, thus removing among organizations and partner nations The onramp scenario allowed us to col- potential for erroneous reporting and that inhibit a unified and coordinated lect authoritative data processed at the reducing hours of processing. Depending response. edge, pull those feeds into a data cloud, on the data in question, the authoritative All-Domain Common Operating apply machine-enabled insights to present source may be a sensor such as a radar Picture. Next, that data must be visually tactical-level employment options, and feed, a traditional C2 node at a headquar- represented in operationally useful ways in finally display that information in a multi- ters, or an open-source report coming the form of an all-domain COP. The feeds domain COP for the decisionmaker. through social media. When we think of that are integrated into the visualizations Through this pragmatic and it- our defenses for the homeland, we must must not only be layered but also fused erative approach using experiments look to identify and fuse feeds with all to correlate tracks and reports to reduce and demonstrations, we identified our pertinent reporting streams to create a uncertainty and increase assessment speed. process for building JADC2. A proven layered sensing grid from subsurface to Ideally, the COP would have multifunc- four-step concept emerged as a way on-orbit sensors that can support all- tionality, with the ability to toggle among to organize action and explain how domain awareness from incoming threats. a variety of customizable visualizations one process leads to the next with the Cloud Data Integration. That data within one framework rather than relying goal of achieving decision superiority: must then be integrated into a cloud- on multiple COPs that necessitate greater data—cloud—machines—COP. based architecture that is openly accessible manning and human-to-human process- both vertically and horizontally across ing. Instead of a static output, user-defined Building JADC2 the echelons of commands and organiza- visualization permits operators to select Authoritative Data. The first key tions that require its use. Importantly, the data sources that they are concerned to operating at the speed of relevancy is that architecture must also be able to with as well as to tailor the manner of finding the authoritative data sources, pri- accommodate multiple classification display to best enable understanding and oritizing them, and removing redundant levels, granting access based on the decisionmaking. In the digital age, data- input layers. The effect of this operation identity of the user to break down the rich machine-based analytics demand

78 Commentary / Decision Superiority JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 sophisticated user-friendly visualization Figure 2. USNORTHCOMJADC2 Concept to optimize decisionmaking. Our current prototype COP operates in just this way; Authoritative Data Cloud Data Integration Machine-Enabled Insights All-Domain COP it is data- rather than platform-based, ap- Decision plying technology to meet the emerging Data Cloud Machines COP Superiority needs of a commander. The production of a COP that provides a rich understanding Real-time end-user Cloud data Predictive/data Intuitive visual of the current situation and how it came reporting aggregation analytics faster awareness Sensors/joint force Accessible at all processing Layered about is the termination point of most units command echelons Machine learning cross-mission feeds C2-enhancement efforts before now. Open source/ Edge cloud capable pattern/anomaly Fused threat detection While those aims certainly advance beyond classified when disconnected awareness Deep learning Global integration where many commands are today, it does operational alerts COA analytics not enable decision superiority on par live mod/sim with what we need to contend with the Artificial intelligence threats of today as well as tomorrow. To decision options ensure superiority, we must employ tools that allow us to anticipate what will likely meaningful connections might be identi- enemy and friendly actions into the same happen in the future and assess our op- fied, freeing up analysts to focus on tasks interface, we could allow the machine tions. This is where machines are required. that only a person is able to tackle. to run multiple scenarios against various Advanced processing power, ML, and AI Next, we could look to ML to in- contingency force postures. Employing can take C2 to another level (see figure 2). corporate historical data and identify AI against these simulations affords the Machine-Enabled Insights. Machines significant patterns and anomalies that machine the opportunity to iteratively are the key component of JADC2. They might indicate an adversary’s intent. learn and develop options for decision. offer the potential to move beyond our For instance, we might learn over time The options generated through this human limitations and create a better that certain indicators are correlated data-rich process place the decision- understanding not only of the current with military maneuvers beyond those maker in an advantageous position by situation but also of the future—and how that we might typically associate. providing recommendations, implica- our potential actions are likely to play Commodity prices near a base could tions, and follow-on effects along with out. We have long had goals to produce fluctuate. Ordering for replacement parts concomitant risks. this type of technological foresight ca- for military equipment could precede This is made possible by increas- pability. The difference is the capabilities deployments in predictable patterns. All ing both the breadth and depth of the to produce this insight are no longer the these could serve as queues to help us data analysis. We are not just talking substance of science fiction. They are better anticipate when something anoma- about having a computer generate some readily employed across virtually every lous or consistent with a concerning prescripted responses based on a few aspect of our lives, from car navigation to activity is occurring. indicators. Increasing the breadth of the tailoring online shopping options. The Beyond that, machines could link data pool provides the opportunity to power of machines needs to be unleashed those ML-enabled detections together expose novel correlations that we could not only to enhance our way of life but to produce deep learning. Deep learn- link to adversary behavior. The depth also to protect our lives themselves. ing would help us establish a broader of the analysis afforded by advanced To accomplish this goal we must pattern of life for the adversary that analytics allows for a much richer un- call on machines to perform a variety could generate operational alerts when derstanding of a situation over time by of functions in support of JADC2. there is a confluence of concerning incorporating orders of magnitude more First, employing big data and predictive indicators. Those processes incorporate data than we currently use. For example, analytics could allow us to process large real-time and historical feeds to create an Monte Carlo analysis could provide amounts of information that would oth- understanding of what has happened, is much deeper insight into a wide range erwise take thousands of human hours. happening, and is likely to happen. By of possible future outcomes and the risks This ability speeds up processing and allowing machine and deep learning to associated with them.3 This data-driven creates a deeper appreciation of the situ- identify whole new subsets of observable approach provides highly granular under- ation at hand. Today it takes legions of behaviors or conditions, we potentially standing to move decisionmaking from analysts poring over reams of intelligence move our decision space to the left of reactive to anticipatory and proactive. data to establish connections between launch, giving us greater flexibility and Decisionmakers could have more sophis- their observations. If the subject of their more time to prepare a response. ticated insight into complex problems inquiry could be translated into a task for We could also leverage machines to and make decisions with much clearer a machine to process, exponentially more incorporate the hypothetical. By layer- understanding of the ramifications on data could be analyzed and many more ing modeling and simulations for both future operations.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 O’Shaughnessy 79 General Terrence O’Shaughnessy addresses National Defense University’s combined colleges as part of University’s President’s Lecture Series, at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, April 21, 2019 (NDU/Katie Persons Lewis)

To be clear, humans will still make with current information, but also with joint force needs to fight and win in the the decision, but they will do so from a operational insights that will enable better digital age. Because of the work we have much more informed perspective based and faster decisions. Keenly aware of this done with innovative teams in an agile on the input from machines. Today, immediate need, we at USNORTHCOM development model, we now have a better when a crisis situation arises, I rely on a and NORAD have led the charge working understanding of what we need JADC2 colonel with over 20 years of experience with both DOD and commercial industry to do and how to make it real. Decision and his or her team on the watch floor partners through an iterative approach superiority, enabled by JADC2, is the of our USNORTHCOM and NORAD to build that capability. Our efforts to competitive advantage we need against Command Center to help me make deci- jump from the PowerPoint slide to the peer adversaries. JFQ sions. This team rapidly processes the field yielded a four-part concept that information that is projected onto a bank disambiguates JADC2 and accomplishes of screens from a vast number of reporting two important things: first, it provides Notes feeds. These individuals, each responsible a framework that makes it easier to or- 1 for a different aspect of the complete chestrate efforts to create and enhance Patrick Tucker, “How the Pandemic Is Helping the Military Prep for World War III,” picture, correlate and make sense of that JADC2 for our formations; second, it Defense One, May 26, 2020, available at . 2 ity suites. However, the technology exists insights to identify anomalous events, DevOps refers to an approach that com- bines software development with operations to today for us to do much better. Only by predict what is likely to happen next, and increase the rate of innovation. fully harnessing the potential of machines generate options that overcome human 3 Monte Carlo analysis is a method that uses will we ultimately achieve JADC2’s goal of limitations. This is a significant progression statistical evaluation of randomized data sets producing decision superiority. from where we were on this effort just to better understand things such as probability a few years ago, but we cannot rest. We distribution. Today’s security environment requires must continue this unrelenting pursuit for military leaders to be armed not just JADC2, as it is the core capability that the

80 Commentary / Decision Superiority JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Chaplain (Captain) James Johnson, USN, presents gift to Supreme Patriarch of during exercise Cobra Gold, in Bangkok, Thailand, February 12, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Ian Kinkead)

remains a present factor that they work to account for or control both inter- Rightsizing Our nally and externally. Every government invests time and energy in controlling, influencing, or seeking to exist along- Understanding of side religion. In recent years, religious boundar- ies have begun to shift as immigration Religion has surged, creating more overlap, interaction, friction, conflict, and com- peting interests of diverse influences. By Wayne A. Macrae Understanding the interchange among intersecting religious dynamics, strategic theater goals, plans, and military opera- he world of religion consists of ways. Religion is global. It is powerfully tions is at the heart of global integration; various belief systems that influ- influential everywhere that the joint this is particularly true when considering T ence humanity in numerous force currently operates and extends the presence of religion throughout the to every corner of the globe. Religion “gray zone” between peace and war and is part of the fabric of every nation— the major role of religious dialogue in including those that take a position messaging to and influencing adherents. Chaplain (Captain) Wayne A. Macrae, USN, is Chaplain to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of against it. For governments that This article advocates for a strategic ap- Staff. identify as secular or atheist, religion proach to religion and the role of the

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Macrae 81 chaplain in representing it to the com- The Growing Impact of Religion exhibit efforts to oppose or control reli- mander. The article also considers the Research paints the picture of a steadily gion and religious expression.5 dynamics and growing impact of religion, increasing global majority holding Russia uses religion, as expressed how nations interact with it, U.S. military to a religious faith and identification. through the Russian Orthodox Church interaction with religion, and how the According to a Pew Research report, (ROC), as an instrument of national soft U.S. military could account for that role population trends indicate a continued power. Russian Federation President through the utilization of religious affairs increase in faith among the major reli- Vladimir Putin positions himself as the staff sections. gions, while nonreligious populations protector of Christian Orthodoxy cast The world’s main religions have continue to decline. Current estimates against a secular West that has lost all been present for thousands of years—a are that 84 percent of the global popu- moral sensitivity and direction. According feat no government present today can lation follows a religious faith; by 2050, to Jack Dulgarian: boast. Philosophies and ideologies 87 percent of the global population likewise come and go, though they may could adhere to religious faith.2 Accord- The Kremlin has given the ROC the spot- leave their mark on religion for a time. ing to the same report, much of this light in its state-sponsored media, stressing Religion has influenced cultures through- growth is projected to take place within the importance of Orthodox Christianity out history, and, frankly, it would be a the following regions: to contemporary Russian life. It is closely denial of history to expect the influence related to Putin’s effort to portray himself Asia-Pacific, with 21.8 percent of religion to cease in the future. History • as a vanguard of traditional, conservative projected growth in major religious attests to the great resilience of religion values. On major Christian feast days, groups and to the role it plays in regional trends Putin and prominent Russian politicians Latin America and the Caribbean, and geopolitics. • are regularly shown lighting candles inside with 26.9 percent projected growth Religion is a key influencer in the grandiose cathedrals, as well as in small Middle East and North Africa, with cultures and practices of many allies, uni- • village churches—serving to cement the 72.7 percent projected growth fied action partners, and enemies. While image of church-state unity.6 Sub-Saharan Africa, with 130.9 Western European and North American • percent projected growth.3 culture may regard religion as being per- It also is Russia’s practice to construct sonal and private, most regions of South These regions correspond to U.S. Orthodox churches among Russian America, Africa, the Middle East, and Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Southern minority populations as centers for Asia view religion and religious figures Command, U.S. Central Command, unity, identity, and influence—and as as key influencers within society, with and U.S. Africa Command, respectively. potentially destabilizing outposts in the topic of religion itself regarded as These four commands are geographic nations bordering Russia. corporal and public. For the vast majority combatant commands (CCMDs) that China is politically atheistic and seeks of people, religion and religious faith in- provide command and control of military to control or limit religion. Open-media forms not only how they view their world forces in peace and war. sources report significant crackdowns on but also how they live their daily lives and Strategic Approaches to Religion various religious groups, particularly the respond to the institutions around them. As noted in the 2017 National Muslim Uighur population in the west- The Western cultural bias toward the Security Strategy, the United States views ern province of Xinjiang. The Chinese place of religion creates a blind spot that the freedom of religion as a fundamental government strives to be in control of causes many in the West to minimize the individual liberty and remains committed religion. As Thomas Harvey notes: role and importance of religion in other to supporting and advancing religious societies. As Chaplain Paul Wrigley, Naval freedom.4 This is a foundational principle In the history of the People’s Republic of Academy graduate and former naval avia- of our Republic and acknowledges a key China, President Xi Jinping is the first tor, stated: reality of governmental dynamics. All paramount leader to give prominence to governments develop approaches for religion in word and deed. In a major An operational commander, however dealing with religion or religions. There speech in 2016, Xi called for the “siniciza- well trained in the military issues, who is may be one principle—such as the U.S. tion of religion.” ignorant of or discounts the importance stance on religious freedom—or there of religious belief, can strengthen his may be several approaches, depending on He noted that, given the rise of religion enemy, offend his allies, alienate his own which religion is the focus of attention. among the Chinese people, the Chinese forces, and antagonize public opinion. The relationship between governments Communist Party (CCP) must “guide Religious belief is a factor he must consider and religions are often dynamic and the adaptation of religions to socialist in evaluating the enemy’s intentions and changing. When we consider the chal- society.” In its academic sense, “sinicization capabilities, the state of his own forces, his lenges identified in our National Defense of religion” refers to the indigenization relationship with allies, and his courses of Strategy, we cannot help but note that of religious faith, practice, and ritual action.1 those groups who pose external threats in Chinese culture and society. For Xi,

82 Commentary / Rightsizing Our Understanding of Religion JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Lieutenant Colonel Lucilio Mizerani, USA, 18th Medical Command (Deployment Support) chaplain, administers religious support to fellow team members in Yona, Guam, April 18, 2020 (U.S. Army/Luisito Brooks)

however, “sinicization” is profoundly Iran is a theocratic state that uses reli- According to Haidar Kherzi, “Today, political. It requires religious leaders and gion to control its population. According Khamenei—like his well-known predeces- institutions demonstrably to embrace State to Greg Bruno: sor Ayatollah Khomeini, whose reign Socialism and the leadership of the CCP.7 ended when he died in 1989—wields Under Khomeini, the Iranian religious enormous control over Iran’s military, The Council on Foreign Relations and political landscapes were dramatically judiciary, treasury, media, foreign policy, reports the widespread growth of religion transformed, making Shia an in- presidential cabinet, and legislative among the Chinese population; by some separable element of the country’s political process.”10 estimates, China may have the largest structure. Khomeini ushered in a new form maintains a strong athe- Christian population in the world by of government anchored by the concept of ism, blocking or manipulating religious 2030.8 Religious attitudes and national velayat-e faqih, or rule of the Islamic ju- expression while simultaneously establish- policy will increasingly conflict, as the 6 rist. In his 1970 book, Hokumat-e Islami: ing a form of “emperor worship,” in the percent of the Chinese population who Velayat-e faqih, Khomeini argued that philosophy of juche, to control the popu- make up the CCP become more out of government should be run in accordance to lation. According to Grace Lee: step with the growing religious popula- sharia, or Islamic law. For that to happen, tion. Additionally, China’s Belt and Road an Islamic jurist—or faqih—must oversee When Kim Il Sung unilaterally declared Initiative puts the country in contact the country’s political structure.9 juche to be the governing principle of all with strongly religious populations across aspects of North Korean life, as well as the Eurasia. To advance its national agenda, Religion is a primary ideological ideological basis of all state policies, the China will need to adjust its approach factor in Iran’s foreign policy, which is philosophy gained the full authority of Kim to religious populations and gain a bet- overseen by the supreme leader—a cleric. Il Sung’s godlike status. Having established ter understanding of the untapped soft Iran’s constitution grants the supreme the infallibility of the juche philosophy and power of religion. leader’s office almost unlimited power. consolidated their own political power,

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Macrae 83 KFOR Regional Command–East Liaison Monitoring Team K18, comprising Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry Regiment, Oregon National Guard, RC-E Chaplain (Captain) Katie Declet, and Religious Support Specialist (Specialist) Darren Anderson from 2nd Battalion, 135th Aviation, Colorado National Guard, meet with Father Srdjan at historic Church of Sveti Nikola in Kamenica, Kosovo, on August 3, 2020 (U.S. /W. Chris Clyne)

Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il were able to Violent extremist organizations such State’s Annual Report to Congress on use juche principles of self-sustenance and as the so-called Islamic State (IS) and al International Religious Freedom, which political and military independence as Qaeda perversely claim to find justifica- describes the status of religious freedom justification for policies such as the routing tion in the Quran for their atrocities. across countries; government policies of a huge percentage of national income As reported in , IS violating religious belief and practices toward military expenditures, despite the “leadership has emphasized a narrow of various religious groups; and U.S. famine sweeping through the populace. Due and selective reading of the Quran and policies promoting religious freedom. to the power and influence of one man, the other religious rulings to not only justify The lesson from this information is that Great Leader, the juche philosophy became violence, but also to elevate and celebrate the impact of religion on governments inextricably embedded in the economic, each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, and policies is diverse. Because simple political, military and cultural aspects of even virtuous.”13 assumptions will often be inaccurate, the life in [North Korea].11 Beyond authoritarian regimes, all U.S. military must consider the multi- nations invest time and energy dealing tude of distinctions for how a nation’s There are also reports of growing with the realities of religion within their relationship with religion can and will clandestine religious organizations in borders. One way of gauging a na- influence our military interactions. When North Korea that can further challenge tion’s response to religion is to plot that the U.S. military acts in conjunction the regime’s efforts to oppress religious country’s stance on religious freedom with partner nations—either bilaterally expression.12 issues. An example is the Department of or in coalitions—the religious landscape

84 Commentary / Rightsizing Our Understanding of Religion JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 becomes even more dynamic. The mix receive germane subject matter advice on religious advisement as an enabler, and of thoughts, attitudes, and convictions the impact of religion on operations. All the benefits it brings for military opera- regarding religions becomes quite force- military commanders are responsible for tions, is not completely understood ful. Consequently, the joint force requires religious affairs in their command.”17 In or applied. Although commanders do a robust understanding of religion, addition, chaplains were brought into dia- embrace the religious support role of religious issues, internal and external fac- logue with religious leaders, both civilian chaplaincy to take care of the religious tors influencing religion, and, ultimately, and military, in pursuing the amelioration needs of U.S. military personnel, the regional stability. “of suffering, the promotion of peace, and recognition of religious advisement as the benevolent expression of religion.”18 an enabling function with utility to the The U.S. Military and Religion The net effect is that military chaplains commander is spotty at best—primarily The relationship between the U.S. have been providing religious advisement limited to ground commanders who military and religion goes back to the to commanders for over 70 years. have previously benefited from the prac- beginning of the Nation. According to It is important to make a significant tice of religious advisement. Couple this the Army History Center, the “Chap- distinction here: These examples are set situation with the Western bias against lain Corps dates back to 29 July 1775, against the backdrop of phases of war. religion, and we find ourselves needing when the Continental Congress autho- Today, the nature of operations is more to relearn the same lessons. The answer rized one chaplain for each regiment of fluid. As JP 3-0, Joint Operations, states, is to institutionalize—across the joint the Continental Army, with pay equal- the “complex nature of the strategic force—the understanding of religious ing that of a captain.”14 Not long after, environment may require U.S. forces to advisement as a necessary enabler. the Navy Chaplain Corps was formed. conduct different types of joint opera- It’s clear just from looking at policy According to Douglas Stutz, the tions and activities simultaneously across and staffing that the entire joint force the conflict continuum.”19 As the nature does not regard religious advisement as Chaplain Corps traces its beginnings to 28 of operations continues to change and a key enabler. The Army has extensive November 1775 when the second article of the continuum develops further into guidance on religious support and ex- Navy Regulations was adopted. It stated areas of competition, the ability to un- ternal advisement contained in Army that “the Commanders of the ships of the derstand and account for the impact of Techniques Publication 1-05.3, Religious thirteen United Colonies are to take care religion will grow in importance. Support and External Advisement, that divine services be performed twice a One of the major efforts from the which provides 60 pages of material and day on board and a sermon preached on National Defense Strategy is that of dates from January 2019.21 The Navy’s Sundays, unless bad weather or other ex- strengthening alliances and attracting guidance on Chaplain Advisement and traordinary accidents prevent.”15 new partners.20 In a world where religion Liaison, Secretary of the Navy Instruction plays a major role, and with religious 1730.10A, covers five pages on external For more than half of its history from freedom as a key principle within the religious advisement.22 Finally, Air Force 1775, the Chaplain Corps’ almost sole National Security Strategy, the ability to Instruction 52-101, Chaplain Planning focus has been the provision of religious demonstrate our appreciation for religion and Organizing, provides one page of support for the direct spiritual needs of and religious freedom through willful material covering religious advisement.23 our military personnel. engagement with religions and religious The amount of effort and attention that But that situation began to change actors will speak volumes about the sin- the three Services devote to religious with the Cold War. As noted in a Joint cerity of our claims and intentions. advisement policy and doctrine drives the Staff History Office information paper, Despite the religious plurality and level of understanding and interest within the changing character of that conflict diversity within the United States, each Service and has a corresponding saw chaplains “tasked to go beyond their there is an amazing degree of unity and impact on CCMDs. primary mission of pastoral care and cohesion. Our military embodies this Staffing levels for chaplain billets provide advice on the effect of religion on harmony within the Chaplain Corps. across CCMDs likewise communicate a military operations.”16 Our military’s engagement with religion great deal regarding the overall expecta- Subsequent conflicts in Vietnam, models for other nations how to build tions placed on those offices. CCMD the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan have cooperation— rather than friction— chaplain teams range from zero billets at increasingly drawn the chaplaincy into an when it comes to religion. one command to a high of four billets at advisory role, with chaplains, consistent another. If the goal is to provide religious with their noncombatant status, counsel- Religious Advisement support only for assigned staff, these ing on the impact of religion for military as Strategic Enabler numbers may be adequate. However, if operations. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine At this point, we could justifiably ask an appreciation truly existed for religious for the Armed Forces of the United States, what the problem is if the military has advisement as a staff function and force identifies religious advisement as address- taken advantage of religious advisement enabler at work across the staff and ing “the commander’s requirement to for over 70 years. The problem is that cross-functional teams, then it is hard to

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Macrae 85 conceive of two or three individuals ac- are 78 partnerships in effect involving all decades, many writers have called for an complishing the advisement and religious 54 States and Territories. As Chaplain increased role for religious engagement, support task within a command. (Lieutenant Colonel) Kurt Mueller noted the growing impact of religion points out, “the SPP is a low cost, high on military operations, and pointed What Should Religious payoff program that is ready for further to examples in which religious leader Advisement at the Strategic development in the area of religious engagement has had positive impacts.26 Level Look Like? diplomacy.”25 Such coordination would To ensure that the acceptance of reli- It is one thing to make a claim that minimize duplication of effort in support gious advisement as enabler for the chaplain support to a CCMD should be of partner-nation chaplaincies, identify commander gains traction, more needs organized into something more than a gaps in support to partner-nation chap- to be done than just raising aware- one- or two-person team; it is another laincies, and ensure that efforts among ness. This concept must be integrated thing to justify that expansion. So, what partner nations are synchronized with into existing strategic-level military would be the benefit for a CCMD if it the commander’s overall priorities within education. bought into the idea of creating a reli- the area of operations. This effort would Our leaders at the general and flag gious affairs staff section? also ensure that CCMD staffs remain officer ranks will benefit from understand- First, the combatant commanders aware of the religious engagement efforts ing that religion is something more than could expect to gain a deeper apprecia- already in place within the geographic just a resource used to support their tion for the religious dynamics within area and that the commander’s pri- personnel. Professional military education each country in their areas of operation. orities are reflected in component and should expose general and flag officers to A religious affairs section could work State Partnership Program engagement the multifaceted nature of all religions as with interagency offices that focus on strategies. well as the complex ways in which gov- religious issues and the extensive network Third, when Embassies need to ernments choose to interact with religions of religious affairs teams across Service engage with religious actors within an and religious expression. This will result components. It could build expertise assigned country, a sufficient religious af- in a deeper appreciation for the influential and understanding at the strategic level fairs staff would be able to assess requests role religion still plays in societal identity, of not only major religions but also the for religious leader support/engagement perception, and national will. primary issues, key personalities, and and work with the various components Furthermore, the Service chaplain- major influencers within each religious and National Guard units to offer the cies need to focus on preparing chaplains movement and geographic region. With best support the Embassy requests, in to serve in the joint environment and at central coordination at the CCMD level, conjunction with CCMD direction and CCMDs; this means preparing chaplains products generated at component levels, guidance. to understand the larger issues involved such as religious area analysis and port Finally, a sufficiently staffed and in external religious advisement, un- call reports, could be rolled up, collated, resourced religious affairs section could derstanding the dynamics of religious and shared for analysis and increased coordinate among various staff codes, developments, and gaining practice in understanding, rather than stovepiped working groups, cross-functional teams, the principles of religious leader engage- and isolated. Collating such information and so forth. This ability, in turn, would ment. The Service chaplaincies should would also identify which areas demand ensure that the role of religion is ad- strengthen their preparation of chaplains additional analysis and where dynamics equately represented in problem analysis to serve in the joint force and highlight are shifting over time. This in and of itself and courses of action development, plans joint policy through their intermediate and is no simple task: It requires dedicated development, command messaging, and advanced officer training courses. Services work hours to build and manage. But engagement strategies. A properly staffed should also ensure that chaplains who re- the potential benefit to military opera- religious affairs section could do all these ceive funded graduate education in world tions would be invaluable, and the effort things to further the command’s mission religions or religion and culture courses would strengthen our relations with allies within the geographic area—while still serve in assignments that allow them to and partners. being able to carry out the core function contribute to the knowledge pool required Second, a functional religious affairs of providing direct religious support to to support components and CCMDs. staff section would enable coordination and general care for the staff. Finally, the Department of Defense among the Service components and should consider the benefit of—and National Guard units participating in Recommendations invest billets and resources in—establish- the State Partnership Program (SPP). It is worth noting again that some of ing religious affairs sections with the This program links a state’s National the elements discussed here are already bandwidth to provide both religious Guard, as a unique component of the found within pockets of the military; advisement and religious support to Department of Defense, with the armed the challenge is that the role of religious senior-level staffs. Those commanders forces of a particular country in a coop- affairs is not universally understood who receive both counsel and support erative relationship.24 Currently there or experienced. Over the past few will be properly positioned to understand

86 Commentary / Rightsizing Our Understanding of Religion JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 and interact with the persistent and com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis- enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html>. prominent role of religion in the global 14 Army History Center, “U.S Army Chap- New from NDU arena. JFQ lain Corps,” n.d., available at . Press 15 Douglas H. Stutz, “Happy 239th—Chap- for the Center for Strategic Research Notes lains Corps Birthday Held at Naval Hospital Strategic Forum 304 Bremerton,” Navy.mil, November 27, 2014, Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total 1 available at . 16 Baltics Sea Region War College Review 49, no. 2 (Spring 1996), Christopher Holmes, “History of 84–101, available at . information paper, Joint History Office, April Sundelius, and Brett Swaney 2 4, 2019. Pew Research Center, The Future of The efforts 17 Joint Publication JP-1, Doctrine for the World Religions: Population Growth Projections, of Norway, 2010–2050 (Washington, DC: Pew-Templeton Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, Global Religious Futures Project, 2015). DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorpo- Sweden, 3 Ibid., chapter 3. rating Change 1, July 12, 2017), IV-22. and Finland 18 4 National Security Strategy of the United Joint Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in to enhance Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint States of America (Washington, DC: The White societal resil- House, 2017). Staff, February 1, 2018), III-6. 19 ience through 5 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Joint Publication JP 3-0, Joint Operations Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, unique “total ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge 2017, Incorporating Change 1, October 22, defense” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), V-4. and “comprehensive security” 20 Summary of the 2018 National Defense 2018). initiatives are unlikely to change 6 Jack Dulgarian, “The Most Important Strategy of the United States of America. 21 the near-term strategic calculus Thing to Understand About Putin’s Russia,” Army Techniques Publication 1-05.3, Merion West, October 14, 2019, available at Religious Support and External Advisement of Russia. Over time, however, . of the North Atlantic Treaty will 7 1730.10A, Chaplain Advisement and Liaison, Thomas Harvey, “The Sinicization of aid in the resilience to, and deter- Religion in China—Will Enforcing Conformity August 28, 2018. 23 Work? Evangelical Focus, September 30, 2019, Air Force Instruction 52-101, Chaplain rence of, Russian hostile measures available at . The Nordic states could “export” 8 Eleanor Albert, “Christianity in China,” Program,” n.d., available at . ship-Program/>. tion in European Union energy 25 9 Kurt Mueller, “Religious Diplomacy: Ex- Greg Bruno, “Backgrounder: Reli- and infrastructure projects with the porting Military Chaplain Professionalism,” The gion and Politics in Iran, New York Times, Baltic states, amplifying efforts to June 19, 2008, available at . pdf>. from adversaries. 26 10 Haidar Khezri, “Unrest in Iran Will William Sean Lee, Christopher J. Burke, Continue Until Religious Rule Ends,” The and Zonna M. Crayne, Military Chaplaincies as Conversation, January 23, 2018, available at Peace Builders: Embracing Indigenous Religions . (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University 11 Grace Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Press, February 1, 2005); Bradford E. Ableson, Juche,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs “A Time for Conversion: Chaplains and Uni- 3, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 105–112. fied Commanders,”Joint Force Quarterly 32 12 Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings, “True (Autumn 2002), 98–103; Eric Patterson, ed., Believers: Faith-Based NGO in North Korea,” Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and NK News, March 14, 2017, available at Beyond (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, . 13 Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Visit the NDU Press Web site for Theology of Rape,” New York Times, Au- more information on publications gust 13, 2015, available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Macrae 87 Paratroopers assigned to 173rd Airborne Brigade conduct inspections prior to airborne operations in Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, July 23, 2020 (U.S. Army/Ryan Lucas)

military operations than with standing Success on Purpose military organizations. But when it does occur, the result is a committed unit that is outcome-focused and agile, priori- A Message for Leaders of tizes smartly, and innovates or adapts as needed. Clear and meaningful purpose also begets collaboration; people with Military Organizations a common purpose tend to work well as a team, even if they have little else in By Russell Steven Williford and Wendi Peck common.1 These teams attract and retain top-tier talent. The ultimate outcome is success—success on purpose—whether in hy do leaders of successful organizations have that is missing for a relatively short operation or in a long- military operations often organizational leaders struggling with standing organization. W struggle to recreate that cultures mired in bureaucracy and Thus, the aim of this article is success when placed in charge of stand- box-checking? threefold. First, we intend to establish ing military organizations? What do We propose that highly successful mil- communication of clear and meaningful the leaders of highly effective military itary operations and organizations share a purpose as more than just a nice-to-have feature that is so obvious it is easy to miss: skill for military leaders. In fact, a wealth of Their teams have been given a clear and research has spelled out both the criticality meaningful purpose—an elevating “why” and the characteristics of team members’ Colonel Russell Steven Williford, USAF, is the behind their work—that they understand connections to their team’s particular pur- Vice Wing Commander of the 341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. Wendi Peck and embrace. This phenomenon ap- pose. Second, based on our own research is the CEO of Executive Leadership Group, Inc. pears to occur more naturally with active and experience within the Department

88 Commentary / Success on Purpose JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 of Defense, we argue that active military understanding of its objective.”2 All the Sometimes the meaningfulness of a operations and standing military orga- poorest performing teams were missing purpose stems from how that purpose is nizations have vastly different levels of this clarity. described. Consider the following two purpose-driven leadership. Leaders of Meaningfulness. Yet knowing a descriptions of one defense organization’s operations tend to guide their teams with team’s purpose, even if it is clear, does purpose: The Defense / clear and meaningful purpose; leaders of not suffice to drive team members toward Accounting Agency organizations tend to struggle to elucidate accomplishing that purpose. Something Web site states that its mission is to “[p] the organization’s purpose and connect it else is needed. Austrian psychiatrist rovide the fullest possible accounting for to every member. Finally, we review four Viktor Frankl is best known for his our missing personnel to their families ways by which effective leaders connect work advocating for the importance of and the nation.”7 That is a good and their teams to purpose. We attempt to meaning. A Holocaust survivor, Frankl noble purpose. But we recently heard offer that information with sufficient range theorized that those interned in the another description of that same purpose and specificity so leaders at all skill levels concentration camps who had a higher that might convey a more powerful will find actionable information to help purpose were more likely to survive, and meaning to the agency’s team. them achieve their unit’s purpose. in his writings he encouraged finding Dr. Kyle McCormick, a forensic meaning by embracing activities that con- anthropologist with the agency, stayed More Than a Nice-to-Have: nect the individual to something greater. late to show two strangers—one of the A Requisite for Success He often quoted Friedrich Nietzsche: authors and her 13-year-old granddaugh- When a team has a purpose that its “He who has a ‘why’ to live can bear ter—what the agency does. That evening, members find both clear and mean- almost any how.”3 among gurneys holding warfighters’ ingful, that purpose drives the team Today, many people want to find remains, he answered the question, “Why toward success. Both those aspects of meaning in the higher purpose they do you think this agency exists?” His an- purpose—clarity and meaningfulness— serve through work. Decades of research swer was immediate, and it reflected the have been studied exhaustively in mili- have shown that meaningfulness often meaningfulness of the mission: “We keep tary and nonmilitary settings. Here, we outweighs other occupational features, America’s promise to bring everyone emphasize the importance of both. including job security, income, and career home.” Clarity. Aristotle distinguished advancement opportunities.4 This is good Second, meaningfulness comes from between telos, the result or purpose of news at a time when the military is strug- a personal connection. Team members something, and technê, the means of gling to attract and retain talent. who understand both their unit’s higher achieving a purpose. It is a useful dis- In his book Drive: The Surprising purpose and their own contribution to it tinction. Purpose answers the question, Truth About What Motivates Us, Daniel are more likely to see their work as mean- “What are we trying to achieve?” That Pink devotes an entire chapter to pur- ingful. Recall the story of the National often is harder to answer than, “What are pose, where he writes, “The most deeply Aeronautics and Space Administration we doing?” For any military team—from motivated people—not to mention those (NASA) janitor who stated, “I’m not fully operational to fully supporting— who are most productive and satisfied— mopping the floors, I’m putting a man purpose must answer the question, “Why hitch their desires to a cause larger than on the moon.”8 That attitude did not does our unit exist?” or, at a minimum, themselves.”5 Research supports Pink’s happen by accident. A recent study “What outcome or accomplishment assertion, but with provisos: There are of NASA’s Manned Lunar Landing are we aiming for?” The answer must aspects of purpose, aside from clarity, that Program revealed a key component of be specific enough that members know make it meaningful. We cite four that all its success. People were not simply told when their unit’s purpose has—or has leaders should know. NASA’s larger purpose. Rather, they were not—been achieved. In other words, core First, and perhaps most obvious, a shown exactly how they and their work mission outcomes must be verifiable. unit’s purpose must be perceived by team fit into it. It was a deliberate, orchestrated When a team understands the unit’s members as meaningful. This requires organizational strategy for success. Later, purpose in terms of verifiable outcomes, a leader to help team members elevate we describe how individual leaders can do it has the unifying focus that is foun- their focus from the actions that must be the same. dational for successful performance, performed to the important and posi- Third, critical to meaningfulness including the informed decisionmaking tive outcomes that should result.6 For is that the unit’s purpose be seen as required for innovating or adapting to example, an Air Force maintenance group “difficult but achievable.”9 Challenge— achieve success. In their examination of commander explained his success by stat- especially one unique to the unit or unit 75 work teams, researchers Carl Larson ing, “It is about helping our maintainers type—increases the meaningfulness of and Frank LaFasto found that, “without see that it’s not just a collection of tasks the unit’s purpose. Of course, the goal exception, when an effectively function- that we do. It’s about the combat capa- must be more than just theoretically ing team was identified, it was described bility we produce on a daily basis that is achievable; team members must see it by [its members] as having a clear used to shape world events.” as achievable by them. Members’ belief

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Williford and Peck 89 Soldiers from 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment and Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Sid Taylor, USA, help conduct funeral honors with escort for U.S. Army Air Forces Captain Lawrence Dickson, MIA since December 1944 after plane crash in , in Section 60 of Arlington National Cemetery, March 22, 2019 (U.S. Army/Elizabeth Fraser) that their team has the skills, tools, and These are wildly different contexts, with communication of clear and meaningful resources to meet the challenges ahead is diverse risks, rewards, challenges, and organizational purpose. Without a clear strongly related to high performance. timeframes. purpose, the default view of “success” Fourth, meaningfulness requires a level Military operations often have im- risks becoming “staying out of trouble,” of autonomy. When unit members are mediate feedback, with high stakes and with little thought given to ultimate empowered with appropriate autonomy, tangible results. In such situations, it is operational or strategic impact. Such their ownership of the unit’s purpose incumbent on leaders to convey clear and commands come to exemplify compliance increases, and in turn, their belief that it is meaningful purpose. Accordingly, mili- command,14 wherein boxes checked be- meaningful grows.10 When a leader pro- tary doctrine states that the commander’s come the markers for success. Navy Chief vides clear purpose and goals, autonomy intent must include clear purpose: Information Officer Aaron Weiss stated, also increases productivity.11 This does not “We have a culture of compliance when mean organizational leaders should ignore A clear and concise expression of the it comes to [cyber] security. That culture subordinates and subordinate units or lose purpose of the operation and the desired leads people to say, ‘If I do the checklist touch with their work. In fact, numerous military end state that supports mission and I do all the right things . . . someone studies have shown that leaders of suc- command, provides focus to the staff, and will give me a stamp that says I have au- cessful groups keep tabs on performance helps subordinate and supporting com- thority to operate and I am secure.’ [They without micromanaging.12 manders act to achieve the commander’s miss the point that] security is a constant desired results without further orders, even state of readiness.”15 Operations vs. Organizations when the operation does not unfold as Compliance command stands in stark Defining purpose with clarity is difficult planned.13 contrast to mission command, which for all leaders, but military leaders face encourages intelligent initiative toward the additional challenge of having to Surprisingly, however, for military a purpose within the bounds of com- lead both active operations and stand- organizations there is no comparable mander’s intent. While mission command ing organizations during their careers. doctrine on the development and generally is considered in relation to the

90 Commentary / Success on Purpose JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 operational environment, its tenets are heard lofty descriptions of purpose that people outside the organization. That applicable—even critical—to all high-per- are too nondescript to be of much value, outward-facing benefit is always the or- forming organizations. While serving as such as “we’re here to defend our coun- ganization’s purpose. Army Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley try.” That is surely true, but it reveals But the deductive approach is not for explained, “We preach mission com- little understanding of a unit’s distinct everybody. Especially for people quite mand, but we don’t necessarily practice part in that noble aim. close to the work of an organization, it on a day-to-day basis in everything we Finally, some leaders conflated their it might be easier to use the inductive do. If we’re going to have to operate like responsibilities as a leader with the pur- approach—inferring purpose from activi- that in warfare, we have to train as we’re pose of the unit they led. They described ties. For them, the question to answer going to fight. We have to live and oper- their unit’s purpose as something like “to is, “Given the unit’s primary tasks, what ate like that on a day-to-day basis, even take care of our members by creating an must its purpose be?” Based on the on daily administrative tasks you have to atmosphere that supports them and their answer, leaders then can determine how do in a unit area.”16 families.” While this is a good thing to best to state that purpose clearly. With In other words, “in-garrison mis- do and helpful to the overall success of this clarity, they return to their unit’s sion command,” as Darrell Frawley has the team, it is not the purpose or critical tasks and determine what things it ought termed it, will deliver both organizational outcome of the unit. It is not why the to do and ought not to do, revising based and operational benefits because what unit exists. on a clearer view of purpose. happens upstream affects what happens Fortunately, quite a few leaders can Both approaches can work, and suc- downstream.17 When guided by a shared describe the purpose of their unit and ap- cess usually involves a combination of purpose, any organization becomes more preciate the importance of its clarity. One both: comparing forest to trees and back innovative, cohesive, and effective. Air Force security forces squadron com- again until both the forest and the trees Another way in which operations and mander explained, “Our purpose is about make sense and the purpose can be ex- organizations ought to be alike but often ‘no harm’: No harm to people, and then pressed in a clear and verifiable way. are not concerns who gets to declare no harm to our assets. If we’re talking Communicate Purpose Often and in purpose. In most operations, the purpose about nuclear assets, then that priority is Different Ways. Communicating organi- is not determined by the team members reversed,” that is, smart, succinct, easily zational purpose means not only ensuring or even their leader. Often expressed as understood—and verifiable. every team member knows the unit’s commander’s intent, purpose is assigned purpose but also inspiring them to care by someone further up the chain of What Leaders Can Do about that purpose and to want to play command. However, in many stand- The Air Force study cited earlier, in a role in fulfilling it. As anthropologist- ing organizations, incoming leaders are addition to the authors’ other work philosopher Gregory Bateson famously encouraged to put their own stamp on across the Services, has afforded an stated, “The meaning of your communi- the mission statement. This misses the opportunity to learn from leaders who cation is the response you get.”19 Team point. An organization’s mission does lead with clear and meaningful purpose. members must believe, act on, and be not change just because its leader does. Here are some lessons from observa- willing to sacrifice based on that message. New leaders must address how best to ac- tions of those effective leaders. To that end, two aspects of communica- complish their unit’s purpose—not how Know the Unit’s Purpose. Answering tion are worth considering: variety and to devise a different, more interesting, or the question, “Why do we exist?” is frequency. more self-expressive purpose. devilishly hard, even though the resulting Most new commanders determined Across a variety of organizational answer is usually simple. Organizational to convey their unit’s purpose would get improvement efforts in the military, leaders who are able to answer that ques- high marks for variety during their first few including a recent study the authors con- tion usually come to it in one of two weeks. They include the purpose in a short tributed to on Air Force squadron vitality, ways: deductively or inductively. speech during their first commander’s we asked organizational leaders at all The deductive approach starts call, they put it on signs in hallways, they levels to describe the purpose of the units broadly and works toward specifics. For include it in guiding documents such as they lead.18 Many had difficulty answer- example, a leader may deduce a unit’s project charters and mission statements, ing the question. Most commonly, these overarching purpose by considering and they put it under their email signature leaders recited only their unit’s activities what problem(s) its standup aims to blocks. But the effort must be ongoing. or duties, even when pressed for the solve for its superior organization. Clues People need to be reminded that larger, unspoken why of their work. Also can also be gathered by considering they are contributing to a meaningful common was dismissal of the question, what problems the unit ideally ought purpose and, because of that, that they with comments such as “it’s obvious” to solve for downstream supported and their contributions are meaningful, or “it’s self-evident,” with no further organizations. This approach works too. Creative redundancy—making the elaboration, or “we all know our mission, because organizations are stood up to same, important point repeatedly, but so there’s no need to discuss it.” We also solve problems or meet challenges for in a variety of ways and contexts—is an

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Williford and Peck 91 Buzz Aldrin’s photograph of Apollo 11 landing site captures mission commander Neil Armstrong on lunar surface, July 20, 1969 (NASA) essential tool of effective leaders. These The Air Force security forces com- One well-known technique is to have leaders never forgo an opportunity to mander mentioned earlier—the one support personnel spend time with the revisit a central theme, to use an occa- who understood his unit’s purpose— people they are supporting.20 Parachute sion, a success, or a failure to emphasize recounted this conversation with a riggers, for example, would benefit from the things they care about and want bored security forces Airman: “If you meeting the operators who will use the subordinates to care about, too. This is let someone through the gate without chutes. Administrative personnel, who not the same as merely using a slogan or proper ID, what might happen?” The often are behind the scenes, might feel story again and again. It is about creat- Airman shrugged and admitted a pos- stronger ownership of the mission if they ing a cycle between daily articulation sible bad result, but the commander are shown around the ship or across the of purpose and refining and amplifying kept digging. “And if that happened, base where their customers reside, or performance based on that purpose. It what might happen? And then what? if they are included in unit functions. is a big job that requires a leader’s atten- And then?” The Airman got the point, Even the smallest acknowledgment from tion from the first day on the job to the one domino at a time, and finally saw the people being supported can refuel a change of command. how her often-tedious task contributed sense of purpose. Support jobs are high- Make It Personal. Nonoperational to a weighty and worthy purpose. Her leverage positions, but like a physical organizations exist to support or en- job was not always interesting. That did lever, much leverage resides far from the able operations, and their effectiveness not change. What did change was her load—making it hard to see one’s rel- is critical, but they are removed in time personal connection to the good she evance and impact. It is a leader’s job to and place from military victory. That is does—making a powerful difference help subordinates bridge that gap. why effective organizational leaders work to the people and property she cares Reinforce with Actions. There is hard to help subordinates see the golden for. Many successful leaders have had much a leader can do beyond talk to thread between their sometimes-mundane some version of that conversation: a reinforce a unit’s clear and meaning- tasks and the contribution of those tasks time when they entered a subordinate’s ful purpose. Actions based on purpose to the greater good. This leadership task frame of reference to help him or her will elevate a unit’s stated purpose from demands framing or tailoring the message see how his or her work fit into some- rhetoric to reality. Following are four of to the audience or the individual. thing greater. the most powerful ways to do that.

92 Commentary / Success on Purpose JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Anchor Key Measures to Purpose. Figure. Achievement of Task Easier to Measure Than Purpose Measuring something is one way to convey that it is important, especially if any sort of consequence—positive or negative—is attached to the metric. A B That can be good news or bad, depend- ing on what gets measured. Our study of Air Force squadron vitality revealed performance

Outcome-Oriented Easy to measure and Hard to measure and that many units succumb to the tempta- important important to measure Important-to-measure tion to measure what is easy to measure (e.g., aircraft incidents) (e.g., uality of outcomes provided by a unit to instead of what is important to measure, supported commands) thereby sending the wrong message.

In other words, achievement of a unit’s Underemphasized tasks often is easier to measure than achievement of its purpose (see figure).21 Test scores, awards, or other proxies for

achievement can lure leaders to focus Strategic Importance Easy to measure and on easily verified tasks when they may noncritical (e.g., awards, training Hard to measure not be central to the unit’s purpose. noncritical effort is completion, nonperfect not usually tracked Measuring success based on compliance scores on low-level inspections) items such as ancillary training, fitness assessments, and the like is easy and may have to be done, but it cannot be C Overemphasized D allowed to overshadow success at deliv- Effort-Oriented Easy Hard ering the unit’s purpose. For example, imagine a training Difficulty to Measure command charged with providing a leadership course. A central purpose of Easy-to-measureperformance such a course might be for the course’s students to demonstrate certain new purpose is the point of reference for Leaders of military organizations leadership skills on the job. But mea- feedback, some additional benefits ac- must not become so distracted by the suring that outcome would require crue: Performance on the thing that flood of daily activity that they forget— surveying or interviewing students’ matters—that is, purpose—improves or allow their teams to forget—the point bosses, which is troublesome. That and understanding of the purpose of all that activity. Clear and meaningful measurement falls into the important-to- improves.22 If leadership guru Ken purpose helps teams pull together and measure but hard-to-measure category. Blanchard is right that “feedback is the in the right direction. Clarity speaks Easier would be to check off all the breakfast of champions,” then purpose- to the head, elevating decisionmak- material being covered and to survey based feedback is the breakfast of ing by providing the context to make students’ satisfaction with the class Olympians. smarter decisions based on common before they depart. That might yield Align One’s Own Behavior to aims. Meaningfulness speaks to the useful information, but it would not tell Purpose. Subordinates are highly attuned heart, elevating motivations and com- instructors whether they were having to “glimpses of truth”—those brief mitment. To provide both, leaders must the desired impact. In fact, it might tilt moments that reveal the congruence be- know, communicate, and reinforce their course design away from the course’s tween leaders’ public personae and who unit’s purpose. In every operation and intended impact. they really are. An exquisitely articulated every organization—large and small, Make Overt, Purpose-Based Decisions. purpose understood by everyone means temporary or ongoing—team members The leader reinforces purpose by referenc- nothing if, in a glimpse of truth, subor- benefit when they see the point of their ing it when deciding how to allocate the dinates see that the boss does not believe work, why it is important, and how they unit’s time, money, or energy. Purpose it or, worse, that the boss believes it does fit in to their organization’s clear and becomes the repeated and explicit touch- not apply to himself or herself. This usu- meaningful purpose. The Nation then stone for deciding, “What shall we do?” ally happens when doing the right thing benefits when military units, whether in and “What shall we not do?” is also doing the hard thing. Walk the the action or supporting it, predictably Give Purposed-Based Feedback. talk; it takes only a few missteps to hollow fulfill their purpose. JFQ Well-delivered feedback both teaches out a purpose that would uplift and direct and motivates. However, when the unit.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Williford and Peck 93 Notes

1 Stephen B. Knouse, Keeping “On Task”: Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision An Exploration of Task Cohesion in Diverse Mili- (to be signed within 6 months) tary Teams (Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense JP 1-0, Personnel Support Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Di- rectorate of Research, Summer 1998), available JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence at ; Stephen B. Knouse, “Task JP 3-0, Joint Operations Cohesion: A Mechanism for Bringing Together JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction Diverse Teams,” International Journal of Man- agement 23, no. 3 (September 2006), 588. JP 3-36, Joint Air Mobility and Sealift Operations 2 Carl E. Larson and Frank M.J. LaFasto, JP X-XX, Information Teamwork: What Must Go Right/What Can Go Wrong (Washington, DC: SAGE Publications, 1989), 27. JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) 3 Quoted in Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006). JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Vols. 1 and 2 4 W.F. Cascio, “Changes in Workers, Work, JP 3-05, Special Operations and Organizations,” in Handbook of Psychol- ogy, vol. 12, Industrial and Organizational JP 3-26, Combating Terrorism Psychology, ed. W.C. Borman, D.R. Ilgen, and R.J. Klimoski (New York: John Wiley & Sons, JP 3-72, Joint Nuclear Operations 2003), 401–422. JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations 5 Daniel H. Pink, Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us (New York: JP 5-0, Joint Planning , 2011). 6 Catherine Bailey and Adrian Madden, “What Makes Work Meaningful—Or Meaning- less,” MIT Sloan Management Review, June 1, 14 Stephen L. Davis and William W. Casey, the Performance Effects of Transformational 2016, 53–61. “A Model of Air Force Squadron Vitality,” Leadership,” Academy of Management Journal 7 “Vision, Mission, Values,” Defense POW/ Air & Space Power Journal 32, no. 4 (Winter 55, no. 2 (April 2012), 458–576. MIA Accounting Agency, available at . Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-32_Is- drons, 60. 8 Andrew M. Carton, “‘I’m Not Mop- sue-4/SLP-Davis_Casey.pdf>; Stephen L. Davis 22 Gonzalez-Mulé et al., “Channeled Au- ping the Floors, I’m Putting a Man on the et al., Improving Air Force Squadrons—Recom- tonomy.” Moon’: How NASA Leaders Enhanced mendations for Vitality: Report to the Chief of the Meaningfulness of Work by Chang- Staff of the (Washing- ing the Meaning of Work,” Administra- ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air tive Science Quarterly 63, no. 2 (June Force, 2018), 46. 2018), 323–369, available at . Mean Secure, Navy CIO Says,” Seapower 9 Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, Magazine, January 24, 2020, available at “New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory,” . no. 5 (2006), 265–268, available at . You to Know,” War on the Rocks, May 23, 10 Yizhak Fried and Gerald R. Ferris, “The 2017, available at . 40, no. 2 (June 1987), 287–322. 17 Darrell Frawley, “Mission Command 11 Erik Gonzalez-Mulé et al., “Channeled in Garrison,” in Mission Command: The Who, Autonomy: The Joint Effects of Autonomy What, Where, When and Why: An Anthology, and Feedback on Team Performance Through ed. Donald Vandergriff and Stephen Webber Organizational Goal Clarity,” Journal of (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, Management 42, no. 7 (November 2016), 2017), 121. 2018–2033, available at . drons. 12 Judith L. Komaki, Leadership from an 19 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Operant Perspective (London: Routledge, Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psy- 1998). chiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology (Chicago: 13 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations University of Chicago Press, 2000). (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 22, 20 Adam M. Grant, “Leading with Meaning: 2018), 7. Beneficiary Contact, Prosocial Impact, and

94 Commentary / Success on Purpose JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Croatian soldier assigned to Battle Group presses remote trigger to Vulcan M-92 rocket launcher, firing barrage of missiles in support of Operation Raider Thunder, at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, February 6, 2019 (U.S. Army/Sarah Kirby)

The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner

By James L. Cook

he 2018 National Defense Strat- could be used in new and more effec- David Fastabend argued that con- egy explains the importance tive ways in a future security environ- cepts provide innovative ideas intended, of developing new operational ment that is “always in flux” and in part, to facilitate a debate that is the T 2 concepts to “sharpen our competitive fraught with relentless change. Accord- analytical “crucible” to identify flaws and advantages and enhance our lethality” ing to the Joint Staff, the purpose of generate consensus while adding a sense across the entire spectrum of conflict.1 joint concepts is to offer “alternative of clarity about the way ahead.4 Simply The strategy forces us to think beyond operational methods and related capa- put, he saw value in the joint concept military modernization and order of bilities to maintain military advantage development process that offers a col- battle to consider how the joint force against current and emerging threats.”3 laborative framework to balance creative These concepts also propose necessary thinking with reality. Conversely, Antulio changes for the joint force to improve Echevarria contends that operational its ability to fight and win across all concepts are no panacea and have down- Lieutenant Colonel James L. Cook, USA (Ret.), is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. warfighting domains in these future sides. His criticisms include a “paradox,” Naval War College. conflicts. where the joint concept development

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Cook 95 Air Force fighter jet flies overhead as two Soldiers raise signal tower for Patriot missile system during training exercise at Kadena Air Base, Japan, November 22, 2017 (U.S. Army/Adan Cazarez) process itself is often impeded by Service A Brief History Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, biases and the absence of sustained com- The Armed Forces have a proven track Operations, published in 1976, intro- mitment from the relevant stakeholders, record of using strategy to inform the duced the concept of active defense, which, in turn, means opportunity costs development of joint concepts that which was designed to allow U.S. in the form of exploring other ideas.5 “address gaps, shortfalls, or inadequa- forces to fight outnumbered in Central These differing views raise questions cies in existing approaches and capa- Europe. Active defense emphasized the about the continued relevancy of joint bilities,” while presenting new ways to importance of winning the “first battle”8 concepts—and whether this approach accomplish a joint operation, function, to provide time for reconsolidation is the most effective way to integrate or activity.6 An often cited example is before the next echelon of Soviet forces advanced technology and other emergent the 1982 AirLand Battle concept that came within range.9 David Johnson capabilities into the joint force. This arti- was conceived in the post– describes the dissatisfaction within the cle argues that joint concept development era to fill what Douglas Skinner called Army over the FM’s emphasis on the is a critical, if underappreciated, compo- a “doctrinal vacuum.”7 It offered a defense at the expense of the offense. nent of military strategic and operational new way to think about implementing Moreover, he explains how Starry found planning that is not currently being maxi- the Cold War strategy of “contain- the doctrine inadequate to solve the mized to address emerging challenges ment” and defeating the Soviet Union. problems he faced as a corps commander and opportunities. To substantiate this The Army’s Training and Doctrine against the Warsaw Pact, especially premise, the article discusses the evolu- Command (TRADOC) Commander at the operational level of war.10 The tion of joint concepts and their influence General Donn Starry was the driving intra-Service doctrinal debates over the on military planning today; describes force behind AirLand Battle, which controversial active defense concept al- the Joint Staff process in which concepts applied some of the valuable lessons lowed for introspection and shaped the drive the development of required capa- learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War thinking of TRADOC and its schools. bilities; and recommends some specific and emphasized the importance of early The outcome of these intellectual ef- areas where joint concept development offensive action and combined arms forts was the development of the AirLand should be targeted going forward. operations to winning the fight. Battle concept. FM 100-5 (1982) states

96 Features / The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 that AirLand Battle is based on “secur- Military Strategy required the joint force capabilities-based approach “that focuses ing the initiative as early as possible to shape the international environment, more on how the United States can de- and exercising it aggressively” by using respond to the full spectrum of crises, and feat a broad array of capabilities that an synchronized air and ground operations, prepare now for an uncertain future.16 adversary may employ rather than who bold maneuver, and tempo to defeat a nu- To implement this strategic guidance, the adversaries are and where they may merically superior Soviet military threat.11 JV 2010 introduced four operational engage U.S. interests.”21 In both cases, The concept also encouraged the employ- concepts—dominant maneuver, precision the need for new concepts occurred in ment of combined arms task forces (for engagement, full-dimension protection, response to abrupt changes in the security example, armor and mechanized infantry and focused logistics—enabled by infor- environment following the collapse of the units within the same formation) intended mation superiority to mass effects and Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist to create synergy and “pose a dilemma for achieve “full spectrum dominance” across attacks against the United States in 2001. the enemy.”12 Moreover, AirLand Battle the entire range of military operations.17 was designed to bridge the gap between With the benefit of hindsight, JV How Are Concepts Used Today? military strategy and tactics by focusing 2010 was far from prescient in its assess- JV 2010 and JOPSC were replaced on the operational level of war using an ment of the future security environment, by the 2012 Capstone Concept for extended deep, close, and rear battlefield and its shortcomings include an over- Joint Operations (CCJO), which was framework; its requirement of a level of reliance on technology and insufficient intended to guide joint force develop- “jointness” in its implementation would attention paid to operations other than ment—after a decade of combat opera- later be expanded and codified in the war, such as counterterrorism and coun- tions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria— 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of terinsurgency operations. That said, the toward a more potentially dangerous Defense Reorganization Act. document was an effective medium to world that includes the reemergence of AirLand Battle also provided an emphasize the importance of becoming “long-term strategic competition” with intellectual foundation for Army mod- “fully joint: institutionally, intellectually, China and Russia and the proliferation ernization efforts during the so-called and technically.”18 Moreover, JV 2010 of advanced technologies.22 The CCJO Reagan defense buildup in the early influenced institutional changes for the describes the Chairman of the Joint 1980s that procured mobile, lethal Services and guided efforts to improve Chiefs of Staff’s vision for how the joint weapons systems including the M1 joint warfighting and the procure- force of 2020 will “defend the Nation Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley ment of advanced capabilities including against a wide range of security chal- infantry fighting vehicle, the Multiple intelligence, command and control, lenges” consistent with defense strategic Launch Rocket System, the PATRIOT precision-guided munitions, and air guidance provided in the 2012 Sustain- air and missile defense system, and the and missile defense, which are all criti- ing U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities Apache attack helicopter.13 The capabili- cal to the joint force today. On balance, for 21st Century Defense. The guidance ties provided by these advanced systems JV 2010 did a creditable job preparing required a “rebalance” from the post- were critical for successful execution of military strategists and operational plan- 9/11 “war on terror” waged against al the concept and validated by the U.S. ners to confront the challenges of a new Qaeda and other terror groups primarily military’s performance during Operation millennium, while deeply influencing and on land toward the Asia-Pacific with its Desert Storm in 1991. It is noteworthy shaping today’s joint force. different set of challenges, including a that all of these “legacy” weapons systems Finally, in 2003, the Department largely maritime environment.23 remain in service today. of Defense (DOD) published the In practice, the capstone concept Joint Vision (JV) 2010 offered a Joint Operations Concept (JOPSC) serves as a “bridge between strategic capstone “conceptual template” that as a “unifying framework” to guide guidance and joint operating concepts explained how the Armed Forces would Secretary of Defense ’s in support of joint force develop- “channel the vitality and innovation of transformation efforts for the Armed ment.”24 For example, the 2012 CCJO our people and leverage technological Forces in a post-9/11 world where introduced an approach called Globally opportunities” to improve joint warfight- “adapting to surprise—adapting quickly Integrated Operations (GIO), which calls ing effectiveness in the post–Cold War and decisively—must . . . be a condi- for elements of the joint force that are era.14 JV 2010 was written to support tion of planning.”19 He also articulated globally postured to “combine quickly President Bill Clinton’s 1996 National the requirement to “transform not with each other and mission partners Security Strategy that required the mili- only our Armed Forces but also the to integrate capabilities fluidly across tary to field forces “sufficient, in concert Defense Department that serves domains, echelons, geographic boundar- with regional allies, to defeat aggres- them—by encouraging a culture of ies, and organizational affiliations.”25 sion in two nearly simultaneous major creativity and intelligent risk-taking.”20 This approach aligns with the 2018 regional conflicts.”15 To advance the The JOPSC echoed JV 2010’s emphasis National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on National Security Strategy and promote on the importance of achieving full- “strategic flexibility” and “freedom of U.S. national interests, the 1997 National spectrum dominance, but it advocated a action” in its description of dynamic force

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Cook 97 Table. DOD Capability Framework While not authoritative, joint concepts should consider existing doctrine and propose clear alternatives to these “fundamental Doctrine principles” that guide the employment of U.S. military forces where appropriate. Joint concepts may require changes in the way the joint force organizes to accomplish assigned missions. This may include creating Organization new—or modifying extant—organizations and force structure. While joint doctrine is the basis for joint training, some joint concepts may require adopting new and innovative approaches to training Training exercises and other events across the full range of joint functions or missions. As described earlier, joint concepts propose capabilities to improve the ability of the joint force to address future security challenges. Materiel Once approved, the recommended materiel capabilities (for example, weapons systems) may result in validated military requirements through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Leadership Joint concepts may provide the basis for new courses of study across the professional military education enterprise. These classroom and Education discussions encourage critical thinking about the joint concept and support the further development of new ideas. The successful implementation of a joint concept may require members of the Armed Forces to acquire new individual and collective Personnel skills. These changes may affect recruitment, retention, and the professional development of the joint force. Joint concepts may affect the size, type, and number of facilities required in and outside of the continental United States, for Facilities deployment, reception, staging, movement, integration, and sustainment. Joint concepts and policy are closely related. Because policy can direct or assign tasks, prescribe desired capabilities, and provide Policy guidance, concept developers should consider and account for current policy when proposing new or alternative ways in which the joint force could operate.

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02E, Guidance for Developing and Implementing Joint Concepts (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 17, 2016), A-3–A-5. employment, which is intended to pro- Global Leadership requirement to “proj- maneuver in and across multiple domains vide more options for priority missions ect power despite antiaccess/area-denial to establish local superiority at multiple while introducing “unpredictability to (A2/AD) challenges.”30 One can envi- entry points to gain access and achieve adversary decisionmakers.”26 Finally, the sion the JOAC’s application in response military objectives.35 The document lists CCJO establishes priorities that imple- to a crisis in the South China Sea or other 21 required capabilities and affirms the ment the Chairman’s high-order vision global maritime hotspots. The concept’s need for the joint force to maintain its and guide the development of a family of central idea is to leverage cross-domain ability to enter foreign territory and ac- more specific and detailed subordinate synergy “to establish superiority in some complish all assigned missions ashore, joint operating and supporting concepts. combination of domains that will pro- both in the littoral regions and farther Joint operating concepts (JOCs) are vide the freedom of action required by inland.36 broadly defined as describing “how the the mission.”31 Additionally, the JOAC In sum, the Joint Staff provides a joint force may execute military opera- identifies 30 required capabilities and 11 logical, hierarchical process that translates tions within a specific military mission operational access precepts (that is, gen- strategic direction into proposed solu- area in accordance with defense strategic eral principles) intended as a “guide to tions for the joint force in the future guidance and the CCJO.”27 As an exam- judgment” based on an understanding of security environment. Developing joint ple, the Joint Operations Access Concept the unique factors of any situation.32 operating and supporting concepts—with (JOAC) is a “warfighting concept” that While critics argue that the JOAC GIO as a guide—gives intellectual focus explains—in conceptual terms—how the lacks necessary detail for such a complex and creativity to address specific mis- joint force would achieve and maintain military problem, it is important to un- sion areas and challenges. Moreover, the operational access “in the face of armed derstand that this document provides an aforementioned collaborative nature of opposition by a variety of enemies and “overarching concept” under which can concept development facilitates engaging under a variety of conditions, as part of “nest” multiple supporting concepts, such relevant stakeholders in the discussion— a broader national approach.”28 It al- as the Joint Concept for Entry Operations with a goal of enhancing the effectiveness lows Service planners to determine the (JCEO), that address specific aspects of and lethality of the joint force. contributions and limitations of their A2/AD challenges. Supporting concepts The Services formulate concepts that respective forces under specific scenarios. add depth and detail to JOCs by describ- align with the broader joint concepts, For instance, the concept recognizes that ing how the joint force may conduct a while focusing on their unique contri- air superiority and sea control—advan- particular subset of the mission.33 In this butions and Title 10 responsibilities to tages that U.S. forces have enjoyed for case, the JCEO focuses on integrating “organize, train, and equip” forces for decades—are no longer assured. force capabilities across domains “in order joint and combined operations. For The JOAC addresses operational to secure freedom of maneuver on foreign example, in 2014, the Army released access consistent with the guidance and territory within an operational area” that The Army Operating Concept: Win context provided by the CCJO,29 while is consistent with the GIO approach.34 in a Complex World, which describes directly addressing the Sustaining U.S. Specifically, JCEO seeks to employ its support for GIO by providing

98 Features / The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 “foundational capabilities required by way the world might turn out tomorrow examine novel ways to address 21st- the joint force.” The Army also plans for . . . that can help us recognize and adapt century security challenges that are and executes expeditionary operations to the changing aspects of our present increasingly transregional, multidomain, consistent with the JOAC and JCEO environment.”40 As an example, he of- and multifunctional (TMM). by “integrating with other Services fers a scenario that describes a potential For example, the 2030 CCJO states and mission partners to conduct joint Sino-U.S. conflict in the Taiwan Strait that the joint force “will globally pos- combined arms maneuver [and] the to facilitate the assessment of operating ture forces and prioritize readiness for synchronized application of capabilities concepts such as the JOAC and JCEO major combat against peer competitors critical to accomplish the mission.”37 In against a specific A2/AD challenge while while providing options for proactive response to the CCJO requirement for mitigating risk. This scenario could also and scalable employment of the joint the joint force to “integrate capabilities be used to address important joint and force anywhere in the world.”44 Given fluidly across domains,” then–Army Service capability issues such as the em- this guidance, what are future overseas Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley ployment of aircraft carriers and manned basing requirements in a TMM environ- testified before Congress that the Army’s versus unmanned systems in such a chal- ment, where response times to crises are Multi-Domain Operations concept is lenging environment. shortened and managing escalation and designed to “guide our modernization joint force resiliency would be tested in efforts . . . inform future force develop- From Concepts to Capabilities myriad ways?45 And how are combatant ment through numerous iterations of The 2030 Capstone Concept for Joint commands and the Services impacted? experimentation and analysis . . . [and] Operations describes a shift to a “joint Formulating answers to these difficult describe how we will synchronize our concept–driven, threat informed capa- questions should begin with operational- capabilities across all domains in support bility development process” intended to izing dynamic force employment through of the joint force.”38 drive the Pentagon’s resource allocation the development of joint concepts. Despite the importance of opera- decisions.41 Although some view the The 2018 National Military Strategy tional concepts to the planning process, term capabilities through the relatively directs the joint force to successfully Echevarria correctly argues that they are narrow lens of weapons systems, DOD “compete below the level of armed “usually poorly defined in military doc- and the Joint Staff take a more holistic conflict (with a military dimension).”46 trine or shrouded in jargon, which in turn view. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for With the exception of cyberspace, this leads to confusion.”39 For example, what the Armed Forces of the United States, is a rather ambiguous mission area that is the difference (if any) between a joint states that joint concepts lead to mili- requires some out-of-the-box thinking concept, an operating concept, and an op- tary capabilities, both nonmateriel and to address so-called gray zone or hybrid erational concept? The ambiguity is more materiel, that “significantly improve the warfare challenges that exist in the space than a mere semantics issue and should ability of the joint force to overcome between peace and war.47 How might the be clarified by the Joint Staff for military future challenges” and achieve strategic joint force respond to future attempts to strategists and operational planners. In and operational objectives.42 This robust employ “little green men,” armed mili- the interim, how does one select the right array of potential capability options to tias, disinformation campaigns, and other concepts? To be clear, these choices can fill identified gaps is captured by the efforts to disrupt national sovereignty and at times seem more art than science given DOD acronym DOTMLPF-P, which stability? Given the complexity and the the wide array of possible threats across serves as an intellectual framework for political implications of such operations, the spectrum of conflict. Nevertheless, institutional change (see table). how can the military’s efforts be inte- prudent concept development starts grated as part of a broader interagency with an assessment of the future security Conclusion and effort? environment to identify challenges and Recommendations Finally, how might the joint force opportunities, followed by a thorough Mark Guzinger argues that “legacy” integrate cutting-edge technology such as review of strategic direction to understand operational concepts based on favorable hypersonic weapons, quantum comput- the context and consider potential capabil- Operation Desert Storm–like scenarios ing, and artificial intelligence to support ity deficiencies or other obstacles. have hindered necessary changes in the GIO? The development of new joint Once written, concepts are an past.43 Fortunately, the 2018 National concepts must embrace these emerging important element of scenario-based Defense Strategy emphasizes the need capabilities and harness their potential planning to measure the joint force’s for fresh thinking and innovative advantages to present “insurmountable ability to succeed in realistic situations, approaches to increase the lethality dilemmas” for future adversaries.48 as they also identify capability gaps and overall effectiveness of the joint Perhaps some or all of these questions and other shortcomings. Evan Braden force. This is both encouraging and will be addressed in the forthcoming Montgomery argues that scenarios are necessary because an inclusive, trans- Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), which “not intended to be predictions of the parent exchange of ideas is critical to intends to provide “a threat-informed future” but are instead “stories about the look beyond the status quo and truly capability development roadmap for

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Cook 99 9 all-domain joint maneuver warfare.”49 Martin J. D’Amato, “Vigilant Warrior: mand (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. General Donn A. Starry’s AirLand Battle and Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff How It Changed the Army,” Armor 109, no. 3 World (Washington, DC: TRADOC, October General John Hyten describes JWC as (May–June 2000), 19. 7, 2014), 5. an “overarching concept” that will help 10 David Johnson, “An Army Trying to 38 Senate Armed Services Committee, guide the development of “capabilities Shake Itself from Intellectual Slumber, Part 1: Posture Statement by General Mark A. Milley, and attributes that we need to be able to Learning from the 1970s,” War on the Rocks, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 2, 2018, available at . Military Strength.” Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 11 FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: 40 Evan Braden Montgomery, Defense Plan- of Staff General believes Headquarters Department of the Army, August ning for the Long Haul: Scenarios, Operational that “the strategic landscape is changing 20, 1982), 7-2. Concepts, and the Future Security Environment 12 Ibid., 7-4. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and and our investment in future capabili- 13 Kari Hawkins, “AMC-Developed Budgetary Assessments, 2009), 14–15. ties, capacity, and readiness must keep Weapons Remain Vital to Army,” Army.mil, 41 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: pace to ensure our men and women in September 6, 2012, available at . Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the 14 Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: The Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, they provide a narrative framework that Joint Staff, July 1996), 1. DC: The Joint Staff, March 23, 2013, Incorpo- incorporates a comprehensive assessment 15 A National Security Strategy of Engage- rating Change 1, July 12, 2017), xxvi. of the security environment and strategic ment and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The 43 Mark Guzinger, Shaping America’s direction to identify and prioritize existing White House, February 1996), 14. Future Military Toward a New Force Planning shortfalls; at the same time, joint concepts 16 National Military Strategy: Shape, Construct (Washington, DC: Center for Strate- Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for gic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 23. propose innovative approaches and re- a New Era (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 44 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: quired capabilities to maximize the joint 1997), 1. Joint Force 2030, 4. force’s qualitative and quantitative advan- 17 Joint Vision 2010, 1. 45 Kathleen H. Hicks, “The Overseas Basing tages to solve complex problems. JFQ 18 Ibid., 9. Debate, Part 1,” Defense 2020 Podcast, tran- 19 Quadrennial Defense Review Report script, Center for Strategic and International (Washington, DC: DOD, September 30, Studies, February 10, 2020, available at . ing the Military,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 46 Description of the National Military 1 Summary of the 2018 National Defense 2002, available at . Staff, 2018), 3. ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge 21 Joint Operations Concept (Washington, 47 Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining (Washington, DC: Department of Defense DC: DOD, November 2003), 9. Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone [DOD], 2018), 7. 22 Summary of the 2018 National Defense and Hybrid Challenges,” PRISM 7, no. 2 Joint Operating Environment 2035 (Wash- Strategy, 1. 4 (2018), available at . Instruction (CJCSI) 3030.01, Implementing Staff, September 10, 2012), 1. 48 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force Development and Design (Washing- 24 CJCSI 3010.02E, A-10. Joint Force 2030, 7. ton, DC: The Joint Staff, December 3, 2019), 25 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: 49 Senate Arms Services Committee, C-2–C-3. Joint Force 2020, iii. Department of Defense Budget Hearing, 4 David A. Fastabend, “That Elusive Op- 26 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Statement of General Mark A. Milley, USA, erational Concept,” Army Magazine 51, no. 6 Strategy, 5, 7. 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 112th (June 2001), 42. 27 CJCSI 3010.02E, A-10. Cong., 2nd sess., March 4, 2020, 12. 5 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Operational 28 Joint Operations Access Concept (JOAC), 50 Theresa Hitchens, “New Joint Warf- Concepts and Military Strength,” The Heritage Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: DOD, January ighting Plan Will Help Define ‘Top Priority’ Foundation, October 7, 2016, available at 17, 2012), i. JADC2: Hyten,” Breaking Defense, January 29, . ties for 21st-Century Defense (Washington, DC: will-help-define-top-priority-jadc2-hyten/>. 6 CJCSI 3010.02E, Guidance for Develop- DOD, January 2012), 4. 51 Senate Appropriations Committee on ing and Implementing Joint Concepts (Washing- 31 JOAC, ii. Defense, Posture Statement of General Joseph ton, DC: The Joint Staff, August 17, 2016), 32 Ibid., 17. Dunford, Jr., USMC, 19th Chairman of the Joint A-1, A-3. 33 CJCSI 3010.02E, A-10. Chiefs of Staff, 115th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 7 Douglas W. Skinner, Airland Battle 34 Joint Concept for Entry Operations (Wash- 2017. Doctrine (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval ington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 7, 2014), v. Analyses, September 1988), 3. Emphasis in original. 8 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations 35 Ibid., 10. (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department 36 Ibid., iii. of the Army, 1976), 1-1. 37 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-

100 Features / The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Workers assemble B-25 bombers at North American Aviation, Kansas City, Kansas, October 1942 (Library of Congress/Alfred T. Palmer)

Mobilization in the 21st Century Asking the Right Question

By Matthew C. Gaetke

renewed focus on Great Power required wartime industrial mobiliza- ries during World War II. But does competition means major wars tion to produce all those resources. bringing these pictures to life reflect A are getting attention again, War mobilization conjures black and the realities of major war in the 21st and these kinds of wars consume a white images of tanks, planes, and century? Can we even make all those lot of resources. Historically, big wars ships pouring out of American facto- things? More important, is planning for this kind of industrial overhaul a high priority in preparing for a major war Colonel Matthew C. Gaetke, USAF, is Special Assistant to the Director and Air Force Operational Liaison with a peer competitor? Is this even the at the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency. right question?

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gaetke 101 This article analyzes the factors and China further scope the industrial Before , the economies behind mobilizing U.S. industry to sup- effort required. These loss rates, although of the major powers were of comparable port a large modern war. But what is sometimes exceeding current production size, especially when measured by the mobilization? U.S. joint doctrine broadly rates, do not dwarf them. Today, produc- alliance blocks that played a key role defines mobilization as “the process of tion rates for some items already exceed in the war. The figure shows the 1913 assembling . . . national resources . . . estimated wartime loss rates. GDPs of the major powers (at purchasing in time of war.”1 This means, at least, Given this context, the United power parity in 2011 dollars, showing massing people into uniform, leverag- States is well postured to sustain a major how far government spending could go ing industry to produce weapons and 21st-century war without the kind of within each economy). The economies of equipment, and sustaining public sup- mobilization experienced in the world most, such as the United Kingdom, were port for these measures.2 It also requires wars. Immense uncertainty, however, within a factor of two of the median. generating the financial resources to pay surrounds other aspects of such a war. The was significantly for it all. Among these elements of mobi- Since the United States has not fought less, and the United States significantly lization, this article focuses on industry, a peer war since Korea, characterizing more. Grouping the economies by alli- the economy, and producing military this kind of future combat is guesswork. ance block gives an even clearer picture equipment—and doing so when wartime Furthermore, the United States has never of the prewar balance. Considering the demands exceed military industrial capac- fought a modern war with the homeland initial combatants, the entente’s GDP ity. This is different from stockpiling in at risk, as it would be—at least through was 1.8 times larger than that of the case of war, peacetime decisions over cyberspace—during even minor 21st-cen- Central Powers. On a smaller scale, as the force size, rapid development of new tury wars. In the face of these unknowns, Austrians issued an ultimatum that would technologies, and surging existing indus- how to mobilize is the wrong question. start the war, they faced an adversary al- try. Mobilization happens when these How to develop the right options to liance with almost exactly the same GDP are not enough. Mobilization means prevail despite this uncertainty is far more ($503 billion for Germany vs. $495 bil- converting a significant portion of the important than fretting over re-creating lion for Russia and Serbia).3 civilian economy to military production the mobilization of World War II. The World War II powers’ GDPs to generate the materiel necessary to fight were also comparable at the start. In a sustained major war. A Peer War Requires a 1938, their economic output was again The following sections show, first, Peer Competitor within a factor of about two, with the that the contextual differences between A sustained major conflict that would United States again an outlier.4 Only World Wars I and II—wars that involved drive mobilization requires closely was less than half, and the Soviet mobilization—and a war in this century matched adversaries in terms of military Union was more than twice the median make such mobilization unlikely. The bel- capability, productive capacity, and eco- (again the United Kingdom).5 Separating ligerents of the world wars began them nomic power. This is logical; significant the powers into alliance blocks, with roughly similar economic potential, differences in productive capacity would and Britain faced continental adversaries which set the conditions for neither side allow one side to outproduce the other Germany and Italy with an almost identi- being able to overwhelm the other. Since without converting swaths of its civil- cal combined GDP. Including Japan and mobilization happens in relation to an ian economy. the United States would make the ratio adversary, among modern competitors (GDP) is a proxy for the productive 3.4 to 1 in favor of the Allies, but that is only China could play this role. Second, capacity of an economy and therefore misleading. By the time the United States unlike in the world wars, the United States gives a rough indication of its ability entered the war, France and portions of would enter a 21st-century conflict already to sustain a major war. Examining the the Soviet Union were already produc- fitted with high-end military equipment in GDPs of the major powers from World ing—at lower levels—for the Axis. One considerable quantity. There would be no Wars I and II shows what degree of dif- estimate of the impacts of the early Axis need for the U.S. military to expand just ference might exist between adversaries’ gains puts the adjusted Allied GDP at to catch up, a driver of previous mobiliza- economies and yet still see them engage about $1.44 trillion by 1942 to the Axis’s tions. Overcoming previous American in the kind of sustained major war that $1.55 trillion, assuming full production disarmament required a rapid expansion involves mobilization. Filtering today’s from conquered areas.6 That means a of military production into the civilian potential adversaries by that degree of GDP ratio of between 1.1 and 2 to 1, economy. While a 21st-century major difference—while having no political depending on how effectively the Axis war would certainly require increased or military predictive ability—indicates could convert the economic potential of military production, the increase would how well their economies might be able captured workers and territory. be considerably smaller and would not to sustain such a war against the United Together, the world wars suggest that require widespread conversion of the civil- States. Only a war with such a matched adversaries with GDPs within a factor ian economy. Finally, projected combat adversary might require the mobiliza- of about two are sufficiently compa- losses in a war between the United States tion of the American economy. rable to allow for a sustained major war

102 Features / Mobilization in the 21st Century JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 and mobilization. Other 20th-century Figure. GDPs of Major Powers wars—those without American mobiliza- 1913 GDP billion tions—saw a very different degree of economic disparity between adversaries. As the United States entered the Korean War, American GDP (conservatively United Kingdom 294 Germany excluding allies) was 5.5 times greater 374

than that of China and North Korea Russia United States combined. In 1965, U.S. GDP was 95 489 782 times larger than that of North Vietnam.7 In the Gulf War, the ratio was 71 to 1, again excluding the coalition.8 It rose to France Ottoman 206 Austria Empire 135 to 1 by 2002 for Operation Iraqi 129 42 Freedom.9 These cases where the GDP difference was greater than a factor of Central Powers Triple Entente Neutral two included other forms of marshaling 1938 GDP billion resources (activating Reserve personnel, leveraging Reserve lift, surging produc- tion, even creating specific acquisition programs like Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles), but not the wide- Soviet Union United States spread conversion of the civilian economy 985 1,278 that is mobilization.10 How do today’s potential adversar- ies stack up? American GDP is roughly $21 trillion as of late 2018, in current dollars.11 At purchasing power parity (internal buying power of government spending), China’s GDP is $23 trillion and Russia’s is $3.8 trillion.12 United Kingdom France Germany Japan Italy 402 236 478 234 131 Considering a future major war, though, requires estimating future GDPs. The U.S., Chinese, and Russian GDPs all grew in 2019, by 2.1 percent, 6.1 Axis Allies Neutral percent, and 1.3 percent, respectively, Sources Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War I An Overview, in according to each government.13 All The conomics of orld ar I, ed. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge Cambridge three real GDP growth rates, however, University Press, 2005), 710. Updated gross domestic products (GDPs) per capita are from Maddison Project Database 2018, last modified January 25, 2018, as described in Jutta Bolt et al., show faster growth than each economy’s Reasing addison e Income Comparisons and the Shape of ongRun conomic Development long-term, potential GDP growth Groningen Growth and Development Centre Research Memorandum 174 (Groningen, The Nether- rate. Based on Conference Board esti- lands Groningen Growth and Development Centre, January 2018). mates—comparable to Federal Reserve and Congressional Budget Office potential GDP growth rates—ignoring largest economies, with no similar eco- projections—U.S. potential GDP growth rates of change of the growth rates or nomic powerhouses likely to align with is just less than 2 percent, China’s is close the immediate impact of the COVID-19 either China or Russia. to 3 percent, and Russia’s is essentially crisis—should therefore give a conserva- In summary, only China has the zero.14 While actual GDP growth will tive estimate of U.S. advantage. If 2018 economic capacity to sustain a major war fluctuate—COVID-19 throws a wrench potential GDP growth rates were made with the United States. Unfortunately, in any projection—over the long term it actual to 2070, the U.S. economy would the seeds of such a war are all too easy to should converge to the potential GDP remain about the size of China’s, but imagine. After promising in 2015 not to growth rate. would be 34 times larger than Russia’s. militarize its outposts in the South China All three rates are also slowing, but Meanwhile the sluggishness of the Sea, China later installed antiship and an- the U.S. growth potential is slowing the Russian economy has already impacted tiaircraft missiles on several manufactured least quickly and shows the best pros- military purchases.16 None of this ac- islands, threatening any ship passing pects for stable growth.15 For simplicity, counts for allies—among which the between Vietnam and Brunei.17 Taiwan projecting future GDP based on current United States counts some of the world’s also presents a potential flashpoint. On

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gaetke 103 Table 1. U.S. and China Militaries submarines, and nonstealthy aircraft, Sixty the Chinese and the American militar- U.S. Percent, U.S. ies are of similar size (table 1). The United States China Advantage Advantage United States, however, has 11 aircraft Tactical Submarines 54 58 0.9 0.6 carriers in comparison to China’s 2 and Major Surface Combatants 87 23 3.8 2.3 a significant head start in stealthy, fifth- Aircraft Carriers 11 1 11 6.6 generation fighter aircraft. This article focuses on sea and air forces, anticipat- Fifth-Generation Fighters 303 6 50.5 30.3 ing a certain kind of Sino-American Fourth-Generation Fighters 1,568 1,542 1 0.6 war and also simplifying the analysis Fighters Total 1,871 1,548 1.2 0.7 to focus on big-ticket platforms. This Bombers 139 189 0.7 0.4 method would also apply to a large army Personnel (Active and Reserve) 2,206,000 2,545,000 0.9 0.5 engaged in a major land war with China, but the logic of such a war is less clear. Source: “Chapter Three: ,” The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018), 46–63; “Chapter Six: On the other hand, the United States Asia,” The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018), 249–259. has global responsibilities, in contrast to China’s regional focus, and must always January 2, 2019, Chinese President Xi one-fifth the size of Germany’s and one- balance the risk from other threats. The Jinping reiterated that Taiwan “must and quarter the size of France’s or the United RAND study projected that the United will” be united with mainland China.18 Kingdom’s.20 It grew almost 19 times States would commit 60 percent of its A conflict would be easy to start and by 1918.21 Even if the 1913 American global force to such a conflict.28 With could easily escalate. A 2016 RAND military had been equipped with plentiful this handicap, the American advantage study concludes that Sino-American ten- quantities of the best equipment—and it decreases. For submarines, in particular, sion has “a bias toward a long, severe, was not—this growth would have over- the Chinese would have a 1.8 to 1 advan- bitter war.”19 Such a war would demand whelmed the industrial base that initially tage, a 1.4 to 1 advantage in total tactical more from American industry, but just supplied it.22 The problem turned out fighter aircraft, a 2.3 to 1 advantage in because the economies will likely remain to be insurmountable. In fact, when the bombers, and a 1.9 to 1 advantage in comparable does not mean it will require Doughboys made it to the front, they total personnel. Thus, the United States mobilization. fought with weapons made in Europe.23 finds itself at a quantitative disadvantage In 1939, the U.S. military was to China, but not a historically large one. Mobilization to Catch Up again much smaller than those of the For the world wars, the U.S. military Despite their economies’ relative sizes, European powers, only one-eighth the needed to grow four to eight times just the similarity of the American and size of Germany’s and one-third the size to achieve parity with the other powers. Chinese militaries’ sizes actually makes of Japan’s.24 If the United States alone Furthermore, this tallying gives no credit war mobilization less likely. Previous had needed to fight the Axis powers, for qualitative differences in materiel or American mobilizations began as an its military would have needed to grow for China’s requirement to maintain a effort to catch up to other powers. by a factor of 13 just to be even.25 In lengthy land border. The situation is very different now. For the event, it grew 36 times by 1945.26 Like GDP, the trends are important; the world wars, the military industrial Once again, the industry supplying if China were to significantly outpace base that supplied the prewar Ameri- the American military in 1939 could the United States in military produc- can military could not support the not surge to equip one 36 times larger. tion, it could achieve world war–level multifold military expansion required Instead, the United States needed to con- numerical superiority in a few decades. just to draw even. That growth meant vert large portions of its civilian economy Like GDP, military production is possible converting large portions of the civilian to handle this growth. Mobilization was to obfuscate, but it gives a rough idea of economy to military production—that first an effort to catch up. projection capability. Based on inventory is, mobilization. The situation is different today. changes, China has produced roughly 3 In 1913, the U.S. military was Even three decades after the Cold War, submarines, up to 2 , and 30 to neither large enough nor well enough despite an overall decrease in military 40 combat aircraft each year over the past equipped to register as a peer com- spending relative to GDP, the United several years.29 It has focused on modern- petitor in Europe, using the number States still fields the world’s most pow- izing, however, rather than expanding its of military personnel as a proxy for erful military, and one of the largest.27 force, building its own fifth-generation quantity of military equipment and By many measures, the United States fighters, aircraft carriers, and cruisers for military production capacity. The has a numerically equivalent force to rather than expanding capacity.30 At the prewar U.S. military was several times China’s. In terms of total military per- same time, growth in Chinese military smaller than those of the other powers, sonnel (Active plus Reserve), tactical spending has slowed. After decades of

104 Features / Mobilization in the 21st Century JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Maginot Line fortification Ouvrage Michelsberg formed part of Fortified Sector of Boulay and fortified region of Metz, photographed June 10, 2006 (© Pascal Dihé)

double-digit increases, recent years’ Even assuming a one-for-one drawdown military industrial base would certainly growth has been 7 percent to 8 percent, in legacy aircraft, these purchases will need to expand, but starting conditions only slightly faster than China’s GDP keep pace with current Chinese produc- alone would not drive mobilization the growth.31 With wide skepticism over the tion rates. way they did in the world wars. Barring Chinese official budget figures, outside Additionally, annual military spend- major changes in the force balance, a war experts estimate its 2017 military spend- ing fails to account for accumulated should not require industrial catching up ing to be between $180 and $216 billion, advantage. Even if China spent more on at a scale to drive widespread conversion less than 2 percent of GDP.32 While a few its military annually than did the United of the civilian economy. years ago projections of Chinese military States, the incumbent would still benefit spending had it passing America’s by from its head start in research and devel- Sustaining a Major War 2030, now that seems unlikely.33 To opment. Copying technology to catch Even without playing catch-up, a do so, China would have to double its up is relatively easy, but taking the lead sustained major war could still stress military’s share of GDP, at a time when is much harder. Of course, China could military production to replace combat China has many other pressing needs. ramp up production of known technol- losses or as part of a strategy to over- Meanwhile, current U.S. trends ogy in the meantime, but probably not come the adversary with quantity. With are similar. The Navy seeks to increase in secret. With its initial advantage, the sufficiently high rates, this could require from 287 ships to 355 by mid-century.34 United States can afford to wait and see. mobilization. The expected loss rates in Lockheed Martin built 131 F-35s in Based on current military capacity and a war with China, however, should be 2019.35 The Air Force intends to buy current trends in production, the United more modest. Replacing losses might some 1,763 F-35s in total through 2044, States is not likely to have to mobilize to require a surge of existing capacity, but in addition to Navy and Marine Corps catch up to China for the foreseeable fu- again not a massive expansion into the purchases.36 The Air Force is also pursu- ture. This is not to say the United States civilian economy. ing the B-21 bomber, expecting to field is already postured to prevail in a major The RAND study estimates potential it in the 2020s and acquire at least 100.37 sustained war with China. The current losses in a Sino-American war based

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gaetke 105 Table 2. Losses and Production Worst- Factor Best-Case Case Loss Estimated Estimated Effective to Cover Factor to 2018 60% to Loss Rate Rate (15%/ Production Unit Cost Replacement Worst Cover Double Inventory PAC (5%/year) year) Rate (year) (2018$B) Rate (%) Case Worst Case Submarines 54 32 1.6 4.9 3 3.1 9 1.6 3.2 Aircraft Carriers 11 7 0.3 1 0.3 13 4 4 7.9 Large Surface 87 52 2.6 7.8 3.1 2.1 6 2.5 5 Combatants Bombers 139 83 4.2 12.5 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A Fighters (including Navy) 2,012 1,207 60.4 181.1 217 0.09 18 Exceeds 1.7

Sources: “Chapter Three: North America,” The Military Balance,” 118, no. 1 (2018), 46–63; An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office [CBO], October 2018), 22, available at ; Julia Bergman, “U.S. Navy Gearing Up for Boost in Submarine Production,” Navy Times, April 23, 2018, available at ; Aircraft carriers: An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan, 17–18; For large surface combatants, see An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan, 22–24. Unit cost numbers average the CBO estimates of the upgraded DDG-51 Flight III and a future large surface combatant. Production rates for bombers are too hypothetical to include, although the Air Force plans to buy at least 100 B-21s, fielding in the mid-2020s. See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2020), 1–18. For fighter production rates, see Mike Stone, “Lockheed Martin Reaches 2018 F-35 Delivery Target of 91 Jets,” Reuters, December 20, 2018, available at ; “F/A-18 Hornet Production,” Global Security, available at ; “Chapter Three: North America,” 63. Estimated F-35 cost of $100 million per aircraft (for Air Force and Navy variants) and fourth-generation aircraft at $75 million per aircraft are based on The Cost of Replacing Today’s Air Force Fleet (Washington, DC: CBO, December 2018), 7; Daniel Cebul, “New F-16s Are Headed to Bahrain,” Defense News, June 25, 2018, available at ; Valerie Insinna, “Lawmakers Stand Ready to Protect F-35 from F-15X Budget Threats,” Defense News, February 27, 2019, available at . on projected capabilities in 2025. After be conservative, since it ignores any percent of 2018 U.S. GDP. In that year, “significant” losses in the first days of the peacetime surge capacity. The Navy, the United States spent 3.1 percent of conflict (roughly 15 percent of commit- for instance, estimates it has 25 percent GDP on defense.42 Even with significant ted American forces), casualties become surge capacity across the board.41 ap- padding, the military share of GDP would “heavy” by the end of the first year of plies the RAND study’s projections to grow to only 4 percent (conservatively fighting, adding another 5 to 15 percent.38 the 2018 U.S. military inventory by assuming the extra spending produces no The study stops after a year, but this major platform with data from recent GDP growth). For comparison, during linear, steady-state loss rate would likely production or expected production for World War I, national security spending continue,39 and a linear rate is expected for emerging capabilities, per-unit cost, and rose to 20 percent of the economy, which sea and air combat.40 Notably, the study effective replacement rates. Finally, it itself expanded roughly 20 percent from projects heavier Chinese losses, based on shows the growth required to meet the 1914 to 1918.43 Defense spending peaked the relative quality of equipment, meaning double worst case loss rate target. The at 42 percent of the economy in World the United States would gain in relative required growth over current production War II, alongside 87 percent growth from quantity during the conflict. rates shows how much American military 1938 to 1944.44 Although the 4 percent Over a long war, military production production would need to expand for a estimate accounts for only some of the in- would, at a minimum, need to replace hypothetical war with China. While sig- creased costs of such a war, the world wars this sustained loss rate, which then gives nificant, it is not massive. dwarf the magnitude of economic conver- a low estimate of wartime production. Estimating the intrusion into the sion required. The United States spent Since there is no upper bound for the civilian economy requires estimating the 4 percent of GDP on defense as recently production rate assuming a desire to out- cost of increased production against GDP. as 1993, and a far larger portion through produce the enemy, this article arbitrarily This estimate depends on the expected the 1970s and 1980s.45 A war with China targets 30 percent of the committed price of additional equipment at higher would demand a surge by military indus- force per year, doubling RAND’s worst levels of demand. Assuming that demand try, but not widespread conversion of the case loss rate. This padding offsets add- for several times peacetime production civilian economy. ing training equipment, replacing initial would result in doubled prices, table 2 losses, and outproducing China to win shows the estimated costs of the increased The Right Question: with mass. production. Even producing at double the Bets vs. Options Comparing current production worst case loss rates and doubling the unit Stepping back from the numbers, it is rates to the target indicates required price based on surge demand, the total uncertain how a sustained major conflict wartime growth. This estimate should increase in cost would still be less than 1 with China would play out. Advanced

106 Features / Mobilization in the 21st Century JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft assigned to 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Medium Tiltrotor 265 (Reinforced), lands on flight deck of USS America, South China Sea, April 19, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Vance Hand)

technologies on both sides have never is highly leveraged, offering limited down- guns and barbed wire—neither of which actually faced off in armed conflict. side and large potential upside.46 Options were new technologies. Convinced of the How they might compete against each are different from “big bets,” which may durability of this defensive advantage, the other is speculation. Defense acquisi- provide an even larger upside, but at the interwar French constructed the Maginot tion choices occur in this uncertainty, risk of a symmetrically large potential Line. World War II, however, saw tanks pitting present capabilities against future downside.47 Firms pursue options to avoid and airplanes—both of which were used options. At the same time, while a the downside risk of a big bet, accepting in World War I—smash these defensive major war with China is the only likely a reduced but unbounded upside for a measures, a shocking transformation driver of mobilization, it is only one of known and limited downside. Not all in only 22 years. While the Germans many scenarios for which the U.S. mili- options pay off, but since the downside is simply drove around the Maginot Line, tary must prepare. limited and the upside is not, the ones that it remains emblematic of the uncertainty This high degree of uncertainty pay off could make up the losses. of war, and how quickly its nature can requires an analysis based on risk and op- National security is hard to value. So change. Three-quarters of a century tions. The key question facing the United are strategic options, but the concept later, and with a major war still beyond States is not how much it could mobilize, and language of options provide a dif- the horizon, it is hard to predict what but what it needs to face down the uncer- ferent way of thinking about choices, technologies might turn the tide. Any tainty. Each strategic choice either creates especially the value of delaying them in concept will be wrong until it clears Carl or eliminates options for future decisions, the face of uncertainty. A large part of the von Clausewitz’s market of combat.48 reducing some risks at the cost of increas- uncertainty comes from the interval since The “Maginot Line problem” haunts ing others. Business real options are an the last sustained major war. The use of every military investment, and the greater analogy: A real option creates competitive technology in combat changes quickly. In the commitment to one concept, the advantage; maintains flexibility by provid- World War I, tacticians were unprepared greater the potential consequences if it ing a right rather than an obligation; and for the defensive combination of machine turns out to be wrong.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gaetke 107 dry spell. If a war broke out, the option would entitle DOD to jump to the front of the line. Industry may actually value this demand insurance comparably to the value it assigns to DOD’s privilege to jump the line. Contractors may pay for this option, rather than the other way around. Admittedly, implementing such an ap- proach would require a significant culture shift. Failure of an acquisition program currently means cancelation before it is fielded. Congressional oversight kicks in based on costs and schedule, with pro- grams presumed terminated for certain breaches of cost thresholds.52 High costs and delays are easy to target as “waste.” It is much harder to legislate against a lack of technological ambition, when missing a technological leap becomes clear only in war. Audacious technological advances Sailor tracks contact bearings during Taiwan Strait transit aboard USS Shiloh, Taiwan Strait, January 16, 2019 (U.S. Navy/Chanel L. Turner) will run roughshod over budgets and timelines—how does one estimate these The way to combat this uncertainty decisions easier and therefore cheaper. things for something never done before? is by pursuing options in military Contractors could demonstrate that they By this way of thinking, waste is buying technology. To start, the United States had worked out the kinks at wartime large quantities of equipment that reach must ensure its portfolio of military production rates, but then slow down. obsolescence in the field, rather than technologies is diversified enough to That way, surging the equipment for war expiring as unexecuted options. Failure include whatever emerges as the machine would mean simply allocating capital to means being late with a technology. We gun of the next war. In this context, the production. For example, the wartime should celebrate options that the military prewar stockpile of a technology is far less production of large surface combatants lets go, since letting go means we saved a important than having developed that assessed earlier requires increasing pro- big bet that would have grown obsolete technology and considered how to use duction five times. If the Navy bought before it was needed in combat. Thinking it. In addition to the Maginot Line, for the 13 extra ships per year in peacetime of acquisitions as investing in technol- example, France also had the world’s best to guarantee the industrial capacity, it ogy and capability options rather than tank but had not sufficiently considered would also take on $1.9 billion in annual purchasing equipment means diversifying how to use it.49 Such diversification, operations and supply costs, plus the per- to mitigate surprise (not risk of fielding), assuming constant budgets, would sonnel costs of the 9,100 Sailors to crew containing downside potential while force smaller stockpiles of each type of the ships.50 In general, since 60 to 80 maximizing upside opportunities, and ac- equipment. Nevertheless, rather than percent of a system’s life cycle cost occurs cepting small losses in pursuit of big gains. committing to large buys of any single in sustainment, a production option looks technology, the United States should en- like a good deal even at the full produc- Conclusion and sure that it covers as many technological tion price.51 DOD could buy the option, Recommendations bases as possible. save the sustainment costs, and still keep Despite the small chance for a sustained More directly, when developing a new industry on the hook for the wartime major peer war, the existing size of the technology, the Department of Defense production rate. American military, and the existing (DOD) could negotiate a production In reality, the option should cost less, production capacity relative to potential option, buying the ability to increase given the low probability of exercising demands from such a war, several ques- production when required. Doing so it. Since a significant indicator of risk for tions remain for further research: would save the production costs, plus aircraft and shipbuilding contractors is To what extent does military produc- the personnel and sustainment costs, the depth of their order books, DOD • tion rely on Chinese components of actually acquiring large quantities of could purchase an option that would wait or supply systems, which would be any technology. Additionally, it would at the end of the line. If the commercial at risk during a war with China? increase stability for boom-and-bust con- orders dried up, DOD would buy a ship DOD is already working on this par- tractors, making their capacity investment or aircraft to float the contractor over a

108 Features / Mobilization in the 21st Century JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 ticular question.53 Again, an options more pressing matters, both within the 1820–1992 (Paris: OEC Development Centre, 1995). approach makes sense. Peacetime defense budget and within the halls of 7 Harrison, “The Economics of World War acquisition could leverage the cheap- strategic thought. Even thinking about II,” 7. This number is based on 1938 GDPs of est suppliers, but industry should mobilization generally should focus more 1942 Axis and Allied territories, in 1990 dol- maintain an option on inputs robust on other reasons to harness resources—as lars, with an older PPP conversion, and taken to wartime supply restrictions. COVID-19 has shown—rather than mar- from Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992. How vulnerable is the industrial base shaling them for war. • 8 Harrison, “The Economics of World War to attack? Adversaries were unable How to mobilize, then, is the wrong II,” 7. This number is based on 1938 GDPs of to contest previous U.S. mobiliza- question. The right question is how to 1942 Axis and Allied territories, in 1990 dol- tions, but modern wartime produc- equip future wartime leaders with the lars, with an older PPP conversion, and taken tion would be less benign. Industry broadest sheaf of technologies, since we from Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992. must produce under attack, at least cannot predict which will be the right 9 Harrison, “The Economics of World War through space and cyberspace. ones, and then train them to make flex- II,” 7. This number is based on 1938 GDPs of • Does the United States have more ible decisions over their use. The nature 1942 Axis and Allied territories, in 1990 dol- than one answer to every technologi- of the war they could fight might be lars, with an older PPP conversion, and taken cal challenge it might face in such a surprising. Preparing for that uncertainty from Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992. war? Developing options by master- means developing many options, not 10 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a ing the technology, production, placing a few large bets, regardless of how Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), and tactics should be the priority. promising a technology appears. This 119–126. Then, only when required and with preparation requires a shift in strategic 11 Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter the latest information (perhaps even mentality, reframing perspectives on cost, and Annual 2018 (Initial Estimate) (Hill- crest Heights, MD: U.S. Bureau of Economic from initial combat), DOD could risk, waste, and value. Big bets could turn Analysis [BEA], February 28, 2019), available execute options to tailor the fielded out far worse. In fact, they could leave at . becomes clear. Options rather than altogether. JFQ 12 The World Bank, “GDP, PPP (Current big bets mitigate the uncertainty International $)-China,” available at . Maginot Line. 13 Gross Domestic Product, First Quarter 1 Joint Publication 4-05, Joint Mobilization 2020 (Advance Estimate) (Hillcrest Heights, At the same time, none of these mo- Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, MD: BEA, April 29, 2020), available at ; Na- in the 21st Century: An American Perspec- a war with China are slim. Chances that tional Bureau of Statistics of China, “National tive” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown Univer- Economy Was Generally Stable in 2019 with such a war would demand widespread sity, March 21, 2012), 17–18, available at Main Projected Targets for Development conversion of the civilian economy to ; Russian Federation pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>. Federal State Statistics Service, “Main Economic less likely. Only China appears economi- 3 Stephen Broadberry and and Mark and Social Indicators,” December 2019, available cally capable of challenging the United Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I at . war that might require mobilization. 2005), 7. 14 Conference Board, “Total Economy 4 The U.S. military is already comparable Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World Database—Data,” November 2018, available at War II: An Overview,” in The Economics of in size—and superior in capability—to . that of China, even considering global Comparison, ed. Mark Harrison (Cambridge: 15 Ibid. American commitments. The productive Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3, 7; 16 “Editor’s Introduction: Western Technol- capacity of the U.S. military industrial updated gross domestic products (GDPs) per ogy Edge Erodes Further,” The Military Bal- capita from Maddison Project Database 2018. ance 118, no. 1 (2018), 6. base already comes close to replacing 5 Harrison, “The Economics of World War 17 losses in most scenarios for such a war, “China Has Put Missiles on Islands in II,” 3, 7; updated GDPs per capita from Mad- the South China Sea,” The Economist, May and expanding this industrial base to dison Project Database 2018. 10, 2018, available at ; Center for the mobilization efforts in the world of 1942 Axis and Allied territories, in 1990 Strategic and International Studies, “Chinese dollars, with an older purchasing power par- wars. Mobilization could easily become a Power Projection Capabilities in the South ity (PPP) conversion, and taken from Angus China Sea,” available at .

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gaetke 109 18 “China’s Might Is Forcing Taiwan to no. 1 (2017), 237–350; “Chapter Six: Asia,” 41 Report to Congress on the Annual Long- Rethink Its Military,” The Economist, January The Military Balance 116, no. 1 (2016), 211– Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for 26, 2019, available at . Asia,” The Military Balance 114, no. 1 (2014), 2019–2029, 63. 19 David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Ceval- 201–296; “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military 43 Hugh Rockoff, “Until It’s Over, Over los, and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Balance 113, no. 1 (2013), 245–352; “Chapter There: The U.S. Economy in World War I,” Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Santa Six: Asia,” The Military Balance 112, no. 1 in Broadberry and Harrison, The Economics of Monica: RAND, 2016), 28, available at . “Chapter Eight: East Asia and Australasia,” The 44 Hugh Rockoff, “The United States: 20 Correlates of War (COW) Project, Military Balance 110, no. 1 (2010), 377–440; From Ploughshares to Swords,” in The Eco- “National Material Capabilities (v5.0),” last “Chapter Eight: East Asia and Australasia,” The nomics of World War II, ed. Mark Harrison modified February 1, 2017, available at . COW article of record: J. Military Balance 108, no. 1 (2008), 359–416. 45 Ibid., 157. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, 30 “Chapter Six: Asia,” 2018, 232–233; 46 Hugh Courtney, 20/20 Foresight: Craft- “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and “Editor’s Introduction,” 5; Mike Yeo, ing Strategy in an Uncertain World (Boston: Major Power War, 1820–1965,” in Peace, War, “China’s Military Capabilities Are Booming, Harvard Business Review Press, 2001), 71. and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills, but Does Its Defense Industry Mirror That 47 Ibid., 73. CA: Sage, 1972), 1948. Trend?” Defense News, August 14, 2018, 48 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and 21 “National Material Capabilities (v5.0).” available at . That Could Have Crushed Hitler’s Best (But to 2012, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 2012), 31 Center for Strategic and International Was Wasted by Bad Generals),” The Na- 297–300. Studies, “What Does China Really Spend on Its tional Interest, February 10, 2017, available at 23 Martin Gilbert, The First World War: Military?” ChinaPower, available at . france-had-tank-could-have-crushed-hitlers- 1994), 341, 378, 400, 419–21, 426, 452; 32 Ibid. best-was-wasted-19410>. Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, For the Common 33 “Chapter Six: Asia,” 2013, 256. 50 CBO’s Interactive Force Structure Tool Defense, 317. 34 Report to Congress on the Annual Long- (Washington, DC: CBO, n.d.), available at 24 COW Project, “National Material Capa- Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for . Amounts bilities (v5.0).” Fiscal Year 2019 (Washington, DC: Office of are in 2017 dollars. 25 Ibid. the Chief of Naval Operations, February 2018), 51 Patrick M. Dallosta and Thomas A. 26 Ibid. available at ; “Fleet Size,” U.S. Naval Vessel 2012), 34–35. (Washington, DC: CBO, January 2019), 63, Register, available at . O’Connor, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Back- files/2019-03/54918-Outlook-3.pdf>. 35 “Lockheed Martin Hits 2019 F-35 De- ground, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, 28 Gompert, Cevallos, and Garafola, War livery Target of 131 Jets,” Reuters, December R41293 (Washington, DC: Congressional with China, 35. 30, 2019, available at . Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, Balance 117, no. 1 (2017), 45–62; “Chapter 36 CBO, The Cost of Replacing Today’s Air Report to President Donald J. Trump by Three: North America,” The Military Balance Force Fleet (Washington, DC: CBO, December the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment 116, no. 1 (2016), 27–54; “Chapter Three: 11, 2018), 7, available at . DC: Department of Defense, September no. 1 (2015), 29–56; “Chapter Three: North 37 Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon 2018), available at . “Chapter Three: North America,” The Military FY2019_Weapons.pdf>. Balance 111, no. 1 (2011), 41–72; “Chapter 38 Gompert, Cevallos, and Garafola, War One: North America,” The Military Balance with China, 21, 35, 37, 40. 110, no. 1 (2010), 15–52; “Chapter One: 39 Ibid., 21. North America,” The Military Balance 109, 40 For example, the indirect fire Lanchester no. 1 (2009), 13–52; “Chapter One: North equations predict linear losses in air and naval America,” The Military Balance 108, no. 1 combat. See Michael E. O’Hanlon, The Science (2008), 135–154; “Chapter Six: Asia,” The of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technol- Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018), 219–314; ogy, Logistic, and Combat Outcomes (Princeton: “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance 117, Princeton University Press, 2009), 70–71.

110 Features / Mobilization in the 21st Century JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf crewmembers watch from cutter’s forecastle as Bertholf navigates toward Hong Kong, April 15, 2019 (U.S. Coast Guard/Matthew S. Masaschi)

.S. Coast Guard (USCG) A Globally Integrated domestic competencies can help U achieve a globally integrated national security strategy, including counteracting Chinese aggression U.S. Coast Guard on a and influence in the South China Sea as well as Chinese and Russian expansionism into Africa. Global World Stage integration transcends the U.S. functional and geographic combat- By Michael N. St. Jeanos ant command construct, allowing for lines of effort across all instruments of national power and domains without geographic constraints. The recent The Coast Guard is a global force with broad authorities and COVID-19 pandemic, for example, underscores our increasingly global- unique capabilities. . . . We are an instrument of national power ized threat posture—and the corre- at home and abroad, providing solutions across the full spectrum sponding need for globally integrated response capabilities. of operations, from security cooperation up to armed conflict.

—Admiral Karl L. Schultz, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard Captain Michael N. St. Jeanos, USCGR, currently serves on Active duty at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC, as Coordinator to the International Maritime Organization for an upcoming member state audit.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 St. Jeanos 111 Coastguardsman assigned to Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement Teal, Law Enforcement Detachment 108, right, Palauan law enforcement official, and Sailor assigned to USS Spruance inspect foreign fishing vessel as part of DOD Maritime Security Initiative, designed to protect partner-nations’ waterways and fisheries, Pacific Ocean, June 3, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Will Gaskill)

Although the USCG is best known an instrument of national power both competition with China and Russia, for its domestic proficiencies, it also sup- domestically and abroad.1 Fully leverag- which challenges our ability to operate ports Department of Defense (DOD) ing these Coast Guard competencies can freely across all domains (land, sea, air, operations worldwide through its cut- bring a valuable nonmilitary, interagency and cyberspace) and thereby allows ter fleet and deployable specialized skill set to the DOD playbook. violent extremism and other asymmetric operations teams. Its nonmilitary capa- threats to proliferate throughout the bilities—particularly its vast interagency Global Integration in Africa global environment. General Dunford experience—can help shape the maritime and the South China Sea confirmed that we will need to adapt operating environment abroad, offering The concept of global integration is to ensure we can project power where an asymmetric advantage in locales sensi- not new. In 1951, Chairman of the and when needed in current and future tive to U.S. military presence and where a Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General threat environments.3 less threatening and more nuanced foot- Omar N. Bradley discussed addressing Historically, we have employed a print might prove advantageous. the worldwide strategic situation in regional or functional approach to ad- In a May 6, 2019, article published in a globalized construct through Joint dress global strategic threats, operating The Hill, Admiral Karl L. Schultz, com- Chiefs of Staff coordination.2 More in a linear and binary framework. This is mandant of the USCG, stated that “illicit than 67 years later, CJCS General no longer possible, and we must address networks, natural disasters, competing Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., addressed Joint current and emerging adversaries by great powers, and hostile adversaries do Staff personnel at the Pentagon on the operating transregionally, often without a not respect borders, and in some cases need for global integration to maintain clear endstate, through application of all rules-based order.” He went on to say a competitive advantage with limited instruments of national power and across that the USCG, as a global force with resources. The context of his talk cen- all domains.4 “broad authorities and unique capabili- tered on a changing national security U.S. global integration has lagged ties,” has never been more significant as dynamic involving a Great Power in Africa and the South China Sea. In

112 Features / A Globally Integrated U.S. Coast Guard JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Africa, the China-Africa partnership pairing 14 African nations with 11 U.S. USCG is, in fact, ideal to be employed for employs a regional and transcontinental states and the District of Columbia, cre- lower intensity conflict. Ward concludes approach toward infrastructure develop- ates ongoing relationships with African that the USCG’s “wealth of capabilities” ment, engaging in bilateral agreements partners for building and improving directly linked to stability operations— such as development of the Tanzanian peacekeeping capacity, disaster manage- particularly those within the civil affairs port of Dar es Salaam.5 China has also ment competency, and partner readiness. arena with a focus on maritime, coastal, demonstrated strong interest in leverag- It has the potential to expand to several and riverine environments—provides skill ing Africa’s rich mineral resources while more African nations that have requested sets not found elsewhere within DOD or opening trading markets and accessing partnerships, and such growth offers the the U.S. Government.10 naval ports on the continent. African sig- USCG an opportunity to engage from a Furthering this theme, Rear Admiral natory nations to China’s Belt and Road maritime interagency perspective. David Callahan, USCG, in testimony be- Initiative gain Chinese development and In 2018, U.S. Naval Forces Europe- fore the House Armed Services Military investment in return for this increased ac- Africa continued an annual exercise series Personnel Subcommittee in 2011 cess; however, predatory lending practices with exercises Phoenix Express, Cutlass concerning USCG Reserve integration have created a patron-client relationship Express, and Obangame Express to build with DOD, discussed not only the use from which these nations will not be able maritime capabilities of African partner na- of deployable Coast Guard Port Security to easily extricate themselves.6 As China tions, marking the first time in almost 30 Units but also the Deepwater Horizon oil has made great strides in securing port years that Somalia participated in a security spill response and the strong interagency access in key developing areas in Africa event outside its borders. In 2018, U.S. skills the USCG Reserve displayed during and moves aggressively to expand its Naval Forces Europe-Africa conducted that event.11 exclusive economic zone and exert naval Operation Junction Rain as part of the The USCG is currently engaged in- dominance in the South China Sea, the African Maritime Law Enforcement ternationally outside of traditional DOD United States has not been able to fully Partnership Program, partnering USCG and security-related roles. The Arctic is contain or counter Chinese efforts.7 personnel with Cape Verdeans and perhaps one of the most visible examples, Russia is also exerting influence in Senegalese to counter illegal activities. with polar and member- underdeveloped nations, particularly Capacity-building through U.S.-facilitated ship in an Arctic Council composed of those on the resource-abundant African exercises, conferences, and operations has the United States, , , continent. Though many African coun- offered a strong return on investment.9 Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and tries are mineral and hydrocarbon rich, the Russian Federation.12 This resource- their populaces have failed to realize the Fully Leveraging the rich environment is somewhat atypical, benefit of these resources because of cor- USCG Globally as it lacks an appreciable population ruption and governmental ineptitude; Although the United States has made and clear ownership under international the results are a lack of economic oppor- some progress through these partner- maritime law. It is an outlier. And yet the tunities and a large and disenfranchised ships, more can be done to counter and specter of global warming opening this youth population, both of which have contain Chinese and Russian efforts. In once impassible maritime trade route led to the rise of violent extremist orga- addition to USCG support for DOD will entail manifest changes in USCG nizations. In his 2019 testimony before through cutters and expeditionary spe- engagement. The Coast Guard is already the Senate Armed Services Committee, cialized forces, Coast Guard nonmilitary moving to recapitalize its polar icebreak- General Thomas Waldhauser, USMC, competencies such as fisheries enforce- ing capabilities and increase visibility in commander of U.S. Africa Command, ment, marine safety operations, and this emerging maritime corridor.13 discussed Russia’s increased influence disaster response could be employed In April 2019, the USCG Bertholf vis- and militaristic approach in Africa within asymmetrically to counteract Chinese ited Hong Kong—the first USCG cutter the context of the U.S.-Africa Command aggression in the South China Sea and to visit in 17 years. A state-of-the-art 418- Strategic Approach. General Waldhauser Chinese and Russian influence in Africa. foot national security cutter operating indicated countering this threat will re- Daniel Ward, in a 2017 Military under tactical control of the commander, quire all instruments of national power in Review article, assesses the USCG as a U.S. Navy 7th Fleet, its mission centered a whole-of-government approach, includ- highly valuable but underutilized coun- on professional exchange and capacity- ing strengthening partner capabilities.8 terterrorism and counterinsurgency asset building with partner nations in addition U.S. Africa Command does not have due to its dual law enforcement and to directed maritime patrols.14 In con- robust dedicated resources, though, military roles. He proposes enhanced trast to President Theodore Roosevelt’s and has relied on outside support. The USCG engagement with DOD for these “Great White Fleet” circumnavigation U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership types of operations, though perception of 1907, intended to project U.S. naval Program, for example, has proved itself of the Coast Guard in a more nonmili- might, this “White Ship” is taking a more one of U.S. Africa Command’s most tary posture often hampers its inclusion. nuanced approach to reshaping the mari- valuable endeavors. The program, The author makes a strong case that the time operational environment.15

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 St. Jeanos 113 Seychelles coastguardsmen simulate boarding vessel during subject matter expert exchange with U.S. Coast Guard as part of Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Program while in Victoria, Seychelles, September 24, 2019 (U.S. Coast Guard/Augustus Manzi)

Asymmetric Application of in South China Sea nations and in Africa the Coast Guard, affirming not only Fisheries Enforcement as these areas struggle for economic and the domestic importance of effective Global integration in fisheries enforce- food security.16 domestic fisheries management and ment provides an excellent example of Due to limited worldwide resources, enforcement but also its international the USCG partnering to help shape the the USCG serves as a global fisher- implications. He emphasized the need maritime operating environment in a ies enforcement integrator. The U.S. for the Coast Guard to take a leader- subtle and less threatening manner than Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century ship role with the Department of State, might be possible by the other Armed Sea Power partners the USCG with the the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Forces—and although the primary goal Navy and Marine Corps to provide an Administration, nongovernmental or- lies in resource protection, fisheries enforcement presence in areas otherwise ganizations, industry, and international enforcement also offers a mechanism lacking this deterrence. In West Africa, partners to reduce the illegal, unre- to support U.S. strategic policy. for example, the USCG deploys law ported, and unregulated fishing threat. Jay Caputo’s 2017 U.S. Naval enforcement detachments (LEDs) and While countering this threat, “we can Institute Proceedings article, “A Global host-nation shipriders on Navy ships to increase maritime domain awareness on Fish War Is Coming,” predicts a dire sit- conduct fishery-enforcement boardings. the high seas and more effectively re- uation for the world’s fisheries as a result In 2015, an LED was deployed on two spond to a range of transnational threats, of overharvest. Climate change, bring- Senegalese vessels during the Africa upholding global order in the maritime ing increasingly arid conditions to Asia, Maritime Partnership, run by U.S. Africa domain and asserting American influ- Africa, and , has resulted Command. A similar program, though ence through presence.”18 in reduced crop yields, while fish con- limited in scope, places LEDs on Navy Although USCG fisheries enforce- sumption has increased from an average ships moving through the Pacific Ocean ment demonstrates strong international of 9.9 kilograms per person in the 1960s under the Oceania Maritime Security application in partnering with at-risk to 19.7 kilograms in 2013—and de- Initiative.17 African and South China Sea nations for mand is projected to grow. Effective fish Daniel B. Abel, resource protection, the value-added of management will require multinational USCG, Deputy Commandant for building relationships, gathering intel- cooperation to ensure a sustainable food Operations, testified in September 2018 ligence, and helping shape the maritime stock for developing, at-risk nations. before the Senate Subcommittee on operating environment could have a This food source is particularly critical Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and positive impact on U.S. national security

114 Features / A Globally Integrated U.S. Coast Guard JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 4 interests. And while recent trade wars Providing 24/7 maritime first re- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3050.01, Implementing Global may have influenced direct cooperation sponse, from inland navigable waters Integration (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, with China in this regard, potential ex- to the littoral and high seas, the Coast December 31, 2018), A-1–C-13. ists to expand U.S. maritime influence Guard projects presence around the 5 Clayton H. Vhumbunu, “Enabling with other South China Sea nations globe in support of U.S. national in- African Regional Infrastructure Renaissance through global application of fisheries terests. In addition to its cutter fleet, Through the China-Africa Partnership: A Trans-Continental Appraisal,” International enforcement as well as other USCG Tactical Law Enforcement Teams Journal of China Studies 7, no. 3 (December nonmilitary and primarily domestic deployed aboard Navy or allied ves- 2016). competencies. sels conduct interdiction-based law 6 Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States enforcement operations, including ves- Africa Command and United States South- Recommendation sel boardings in offshore locales, while ern Command, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong., 1st deployable small-boat Port Security Moving Forward sess., February 7, 2019, available at . the South China Sea requires a glob- The USCG develops partnerships 7 Ken Bredemeier, “Obama Sternly Warns ally integrated approach that could at all levels to help ensure unity of ef- China about South China Sea Expansion,” News, June 1, 2015, available at benefit from enhanced USCG involve- fort, routinely interfacing with global . of nonmilitary capabilities typically advance U.S. national interests at home 8 Waldhauser, United States Africa Com- employed domestically, such as disaster and abroad. The force is proud to be mand and United States Southern Command. prevention and response, marine safety, “Always Ready,” reflected in its motto, 9 Ibid. 10 Daniel E. Ward, “An Underutilized and fisheries enforcement. Coupled Semper Paratus.20 Counterinsurgency Asset: The U.S. Coast with the Coast Guard’s strong history Effectively mitigating global threats Guard,” Military Review, May–June 2017. of interagency and private-sector requires a globally integrated approach 11 David Callahan, The Reserve Components collaboration, these competencies employing all instruments of national as an Operational Force: Potential Legislative and could be employed to help strengthen power. Containing and countering Policy Changes, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommit- relationships with nations subject to Chinese expansion and influence in the tee, 112th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 2011. Chinese and Russian influence in a South China Sea as well as Chinese and 12 Melissa Renee Pegna, “U.S. Arctic Policy: less-threatening and more nuanced way Russian influence on the African conti- The Need to Ratify a Modified UNCLOS and than may be possible through other nent, for example, could be facilitated by Secure a Military Presence in the Arctic,” Jour- DOD resources alone. This expan- leveraging unique, nonmilitary USCG nal of Maritime Law and Commerce 44, no. 2 (April 2013), 169–194. sion, however, may come at a cost to competencies. This asymmetric applica- 13 The author draws on his knowledge existing Coast Guard missions, given tion would serve the dual purpose of of Coast Guard Arctic operations and future finite funding and already stretched improving host-nation capabilities while strategies. resources. Balance is required to ensure also subtly shaping the maritime opera- 14 “Coast Guard Ship Visits Hong Kong,” an acceptable level of risk to existing tional environment in a less provocative news release, U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong and Macau, U.S. Department of mission sets, in what is essentially a manner than might be possible by DOD Homeland Security, April 14, 2019, avail- zero-sum game. alone. JFQ able at . Conclusion 15 Mike McKinley, “Cruise of the Great Although the USCG serves as one of Notes White Fleet,” Naval History and Heritage Command, September 5, 2017, available at the Nation’s five forces capable of joint 1 . 16 ment of Homeland Security. The com/opinion/national-security/442064-near- Jay Caputo, “A Global Fish War Is Com- smallest of the Armed Forces—with ing-a-tipping-point-coast-guard-needs-lasting- ing,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 143, no. change>. 8 (August 2017). approximately 41,000 Active-duty per- 17 2 “Joint Staff History,” Joint History Office Ibid. sonnel, 8,000 Reservists, 8,000 civil- 18 Web site, available at . tion of Conflicts over Ocean Resources, Testi- auxiliarists—the Coast Guard enjoys 3 Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Global Integra- mony Before the Senate Oceans, Atmosphere, a robust set of domestic nonmilitary tion: Maintaining a Competitive Advantage,” Fisheries, and the Coast Guard Subcommittee, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018. missions, serving as a maritime law speech delivered at the Pentagon, October 30, 19 U.S. Coast Guard Publication 3-0, Op- enforcement, regulatory, environmen- 2018, available at . February 2012), 1–8. 20 Ibid.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 St. Jeanos 115 Aviation electronics technician 3rd class conducts maintenance on aircraft targeting systems in aircraft intermediate maintenance department maintenance shop on USS Ronald Reagan, Philippine Sea, July 25, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Jason Tarleton)

principles for shows of force, deter- Differentiating rence, proportionality, and rules for warfare that rely on predictable and repeatable characteristics of the physical weapons employed. The advent of cyber Kinetic and Cyber warfare in the modern era, however, has illustrated that the assumptions used for the employment of kinetic weapons Weapons to Improve do not necessarily apply to the employ- ment of cyber capabilities. For example, unlike a physical missile or bomb, it is Integrated Combat difficult to predict the precise effects, measure the resulting proportionality, or estimate the collateral effects atten- By Josiah Dykstra, Chris Inglis, and Thomas S. Walcott dant to the use of a computer virus. As we discuss, the differences between kinetic weapons and cyber weapons arfare, with a history as old are discernible, manageable, and have as humanity itself, has been far-reaching implications for strate- Dr. Josiah Dykstra is a Technical Fellow in the predominantly conducted gic military doctrine, planning, and Cybersecurity Collaboration Center at the National W Security Agency. Chris Inglis is the Robert and through the application of physical operational employment in both power Mary M. Looker Professor in Cyber Security Studies force to disrupt, degrade, or destroy projection and defense. at the U.S. Naval Academy. Thomas S. Walcott is the Technical Director in the Cyber National physical assets. That long history has In order to wage and win modern Mission Force at U.S. Cyber Command. led to well-developed doctrine and conflict, the attributes of kinetic and

116 Features / Differentiating Kinetic and Cyber Weapons JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 cyber weapons must be fully understood • Is it possible to limit the weapon’s that are grouped as differences in weap- singly and in combination. To date, dis- effects to those desired with accept- ons characteristics, targeting, and policy cussion and debate about the attributes able impact to innocent parties and and practice between cyber weapons and of cyber weapons have focused on a few assets? their kinetic counterparts. The table sum- basic characteristics, such as perishabil- • Will the use of the weapon contrib- marizes these differences. ity—that is, making it difficult to achieve ute to, or risk undermining, stability, the same precision, let alone confidence, the ability of the employing organi- Differences in Weapons that typically results from the use of ki- zation to manage escalation, and/ Characteristics netic weapons. For military leaders, and or other desired characteristics of Many discussions about cyber weapons the policymakers who determine the pur- adversary engagement? have focused on the basic attributes of poses and applications of military power, the cyber domain, such as the global The answers to these questions depend, the differences between kinetic and cyber interconnected network; the highly fluid in part, not only on situational factors weapons prompt a reevaluation of how interplay of its constituent components but also on a firm understanding of these individuals employ weapons and of hardware, software, and configura- weapon nuances. We draw out those measure their effectiveness, which foun- tion; and the resulting fragility of access details in the following sections. dationally relies on a clear articulation of paths needed by cyber operators to To frame the discussion, we must differences and similarities between the reach their intended targets. Contem- consider the weapons’ definitions. kinetic and cyber environments. We pro- porary discussions of cyber weapons Unfortunately, the Department of pose and describe a strategic framework, have also explored their high degree of Defense (DOD) does not explicitly define though not exhaustive, that could be perishability and rapid obsolescence.5 weapon in doctrine, though DOD does applied to any instrument of power em- These traits are becoming commonly use the word within other definitions. We ployed by a nation-state; we then describe understood today but are alone insuffi- start, therefore, with a dictionary defini- distinctions between kinetic and cyber cient to allow for a comparison of cyber tion for weapon as “an instrument of any weapons to draw out both differences and kinetic weapons. The additional kind used in warfare or in combat to at- and strategic implications. differences below can aid tactical and tack and overcome an enemy.”2 Notably, This article compares instruments of strategic thinking. weapons are traditionally employed to offensive kinetic and cyber power across Kinetic weapons typically gener- create both lethal and nonlethal effects. three key areas: weapons characteristics, ate access and effect (by force) nearly Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, Cyberspace targeting, and policy/practice.1 These instantaneously, while cyber weapons Operations, defines cyberspace capability as thematic categories emerged as we identi- necessarily separate access and effect into “a device or computer program, including fied 18 individual differences between two distinct actions, often divided by any combination of software, firmware, or kinetic and cyber weapons. The weapons a significant expanse of time (in some hardware, designed to create an effect in characteristics category includes differ- cases, cyber access is developed weeks or through cyberspace.”3 For the purposes ences in the inherent properties of the or months in advance of the intended of this discussion, we consider a cyberspace weapons as well as in the effects they can effect). In the Joint Operational Access capability distinct from (yet predicated deliver. The targeting category highlights Concept, the phrase operational access is on) some mechanism that enables access divergences in how the weapon influences defined as “the ability to project military to the system within which the intended target selection and pursuit. The policy force into an operational area with suf- effect will be achieved. JP 3-0, Joint and practice category covers differences ficient freedom of action to accomplish Operations, acknowledges that cyberspace in the current environment and maturity the mission.”6 Kinetic weapons can pro- attack is one capability that could create of the weapons. duce such access for force projection and nonlethal effects; other examples include As we unpack these areas, military provide antiaccess and area denial against electronic attack, military information sup- leaders should keep in mind three - opposing forces. Cyber weapons typically port operations, and nonlethal weapons. ing questions that can help guide the separate access from effect, and they often The military action known as fires, states selection and application of any weapon require a significant effort to construct JP 3-0, is to “use available weapons and and that apply equally well to kinetic and access tailored to the given target and other systems to create a specific effect on cyber: its environment. For example, denial- a target.”4 Cyberspace attack actions are a of-service attacks leverage the access Is the weapon able to achieve the form of fires and “create noticeable denial • provided by a path from the aggressor desired effect within the constraints effects (that is, degradation, disruption, or to functioning networks. Data destruc- of time available for planning and destruction) in cyberspace or manipulation tion attacks control access provided by execution, the professional skills of that leads to denial effects in the physical another means, such as remote exploita- the human operators, and materiel domains.” tion or social engineering, but the key to resources? In the following sections we intro- their success remains an access path from duce and differentiate 18 characteristics the attacker to the intended target. The

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Dykstra, Inglis, and Walcott 117 Gunner and cannon crewmember, assigned to Chaos Battery, 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, dials in target of M777 Howitzer during live-fire exercise as part of Saber Junction 19, at 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, September 11, 2019 (U.S. Army/Thomas Mort) implication is that cyber weapons require correct decryption key. Indeed, ransom- be observed and copied using playback significant tailoring, prepositioning, and/ ware relies on reversibility in order to be capabilities of digital systems designed or bundling with a target-specific, access- effective; demonstration of the capability to monitor the flow and storage of data creating capability. to deny access and the subject’s belief and software, even if it requires the cyber Kinetic weapons almost always pro- that it can be undone are the predicate attack to highlight the significance of duce irreversible physical effects, whereas to the victim’s willingness to pay ransom. a recorded session. The result is a high cyber weapons can produce completely Importantly, reversibility can be an asset likelihood that the cyber weapon will be reversible effects. Although a small frac- or limitation of cyber weapons, depend- copied intact and studied by an adversary, tion of weapons (for example, rubber ing on the objective of their use.7 even if the capture itself is after the attack. bullets) can deliver a quickly recoverable It is difficult to reverse-engineer Some experts have compared this situ- outcome, most are intended to produce and reuse kinetic weapons, since they ation to living in a glass house, arguing permanent or slow-recovery effects. are typically damaged beyond reuse as a that the use of cyber for offense neces- While cyber weapons can produce perma- condition of their employment. Because sitates the preparation and deployment of nent damage to the physical world—such cyber weapons are often comprised of defenses from the adversary repurposing as in the case of Stuxnet, which caused easily replicable software, they offer more the weapon against the attacker.8 In the physical destruction of centrifuges—other ability for others to observe, analyze, physical world, weapons platforms can cyber effects can be completely reversed and reuse the weapon by simply copying be kept at a distance from their target by either the attacker or the victim. the software and replaying the context and thereby protected from harm. For example, when a denial-of-service of its employment. Given the previously Ammunition from kinetic weapons is attack stops, the target systems return described time delay in constructing expendable and, once expended, is gener- to normal. Encryption, such as used in access and effecting employment of the ally difficult, impossible, or pointless to ransomware, is also reversible given the cyber weapon, many cyber attacks can reconstruct and replay.9

118 Features / Differentiating Kinetic and Cyber Weapons JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Although in the physical world some Table. Differences Between Kinetic and Cyber Weapons weapons—including nuclear, biological, Kinetic Weapons Cyber Weapons and chemical—challenge weaponeers’ Generate access Leverage access abilities to precisely constrain the physical Difficult to reverse-engineer and impacts when employed, kinetic weapons Use may result in others adopting it too repurpose typically have a quantifiable local effect Permanent effect Potentially reversible effects governed by attributes of the physical world. And while a nuclear device cannot Weapon Local effect Possible global effect be configured to destroy only the brick Consistent effect Variable effect buildings in a particular area, it could be Scale with volume Scale with use configured and employed to constrain Fixed effect Tailorable effect its effects to a physical region. Cyber ef- Predictable effect and effectiveness Sensitive to environmental changes fects, however, may deliver both local and High barriers for entry Low barriers for entry cascading effects, determined through configuration of the weapon, the target, One weapon, one target One weapon, many targets Can be significant prepositioning and the domain of cyberspace. Across Minimal geographic prepositioning the relatively brief span of the history of Targeting (system-specific) cyber weapons’ employment, seemingly Positive control Opportunistic localized domain and network hijacking Coarse targeting Surgical targeting attacks have often affected the global Significant experience Little experience Internet. The Petya attack attributed to Unambiguous intent Potentially ambiguous intent Russia in summer 2017 is an excellent Policy and Limited value below level of armed conflict Useful in all levels case in point. Though generally assessed Practice to be an attack by Russia on govern- Overtly attributable Tailorable attribution ment systems operated by Ukraine,10 Confident Mixed confidence the strike quickly spread to nongovern- mental systems across Europe—in one number, or volume of the payload, of imagine that a weapon capable of delet- case knocking out most of the global weapons deployed. Because ammunition ing a specific file could be rapidly and information technology system and as- is expendable, one kinetic weapon at the easily tailored to delete any or many other sociated global command and control of point of delivery impacts one target. And files. A consequence is that more prepara- the Maersk shipping line, among many while the number of kinetic payloads tion may be necessary to offer equivalent other widespread effects felt well outside delivered in an area can be increased, preparedness and confidence in defend- Ukraine.11 there is generally a correlation between ing against the cyber weapon. Kinetic weapons deliver consistent, payload mass, velocity, and kinetic effect. Kinetic weapons can yield predictable fixed effects that correspond with the at- A single cyber weapon could be used outcomes because the relevant variables tributes of the weapon in a world where against one or many targets simply by influencing the outcomes are well under- the physical properties of the target and coding the weapons effects, thus enabling stood. The laws of physics and their effect its environs, such as gravity and air den- inherent and impressively responsive scal- on kinetic weapons have been studied sity, are relatively stable. The same cyber ability. Ransomware is one example of the and documented, and environmental weapon could potentially be used for same cyber weapon reused against many changes have highly predictable and variable effect, depending on the nuances targets. A defensive corollary is that de- quantifiable impacts on the effective- of coding from subtle (so-called spyware) fending against kinetic weapons requires ness of a kinetic weapon. Cyber effects to dramatic (ransomware). Similarly, a a per-instance cost. Scaling defense for are extremely sensitive to changes in the fixed kinetic effect means that outcomes many targets against a cyber weapon, environment, from subtle changes in the cannot be tailored to a target. Cyber such as with antivirus software, is com- target’s software, hardware, or user set- weapons are malleable and can be easily paratively more cost effective.12 tings, to dynamic global networking that changed or tailored with high granular- Military planners likewise benefit serves as the connection between attacker ity to produce a custom effect on only a when given choices across a spectrum of and target. Small, potentially unobserved specific device or chip. effects. Kinetic weapons offer fixed ef- changes to software or networking could Modern military operations require fects; that is, the effect is predetermined significantly impact the effectiveness of a agility and adaptability in plans and crisis at the time a given weapon is created. cyber weapon that relies on very specific response, including the flexibility to Cyber weapons could also be created software settings. scale operations up and down. Scaling with a prescribed action or outcome but Finally, we note the difference in the the effects from kinetic attacks gener- are likely to offer a tailorable effect at accessibility of kinetic and cyber weapons. ally comes from increasing the literal the time of employment. One can easily Today, entry-level cyber weapons are

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Dykstra, Inglis, and Walcott 119 Marines with Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command in operations center at Lasswell Hall aboard Fort Meade, Maryland, February 5, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jacob Osborne) increasingly common as a commodity conversely, continue to remain out of Another important distinction is the widely shared by aggressors of vary- reach in cost, expertise, or availability to standoff range from the target. Kinetic ing technical capability. The pervasive many adversaries. weapons can be effective with minimal availability, low cost, and low expertise prepositioning relative to the target—this necessary to operate them mean that Differences in Targeting is particularly true for kinetic weapons of cyber weapons could be employed by The first difference in the targeting long geographic range. Physical geog- many state and nonstate actors. Tools category is in the weapon-to-target raphy matters much less in cyberspace, that are freely available (for example, the ratio. At the point of impact, a kinetic but the complex digital environment widely available Metasploit) or on the weapon is intended for a single target. often demands significant prepositioning open market (Core Impact) are easily Although the scope and scale of the and initial preparation of the battlespace weaponized for cyber attack. For the target may vary, even kinetic weapons of before the cyber weapon can reach the United States, this situation is both a mass destruction are limited in time and target. liability, in effectively arming more ad- space. Conversely, cyber weapons offer Targeting is affected by the degree versaries through the increased exposure an ability to affect many targets across of control over the target (the find and of U.S. cyber weapons, and a potential time and space, in some cases leverag- fix problem) and the weapon (the finish opportunity, by raising the cost to ad- ing each target as the launch platform problem). Precise targeting and posi- versaries of conducting cyber attacks by for the next. Cyber weapons are not tive control over the selection of targets forcing them to counter the greater num- expended on use unless someone devel- for delivery of effects are important to ber of platforms that economies of scale ops an inoculation, such as a patch— achieving military objectives and avoid- allow the United States to bring to bear. and even in that case, the inoculation ing collateral damage. Cyber weapons In general, large-scale kinetic weapons, may not be global. may require a mix of opportunistic and

120 Features / Differentiating Kinetic and Cyber Weapons JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 discriminating targeting. Stuxnet is a case modern nations. Cyber weapons, how- the experience necessary to grow confi- study where the weapon was designed ever, can convey ambiguous messaging, dence in their effectiveness. to roam across many systems, infecting either in their intended effect or in their those that met the target criteria while linkage to a particular actor (the attacker) Evolution of Cyber Weapons bypassing those that did not.13 This is an or a discernible campaign. This situation as a Strategic Capability example of opportunistic access as op- might be preferred if the cyber weapon Comprehensive national security posed to positive control over the systems was an enabler for an integrated kinetic requires the consideration and coordi- infected. It further illustrates the differ- attack; it could be most undesirable if nated use of all instruments of power ence between access and effect. the cyber attack was the main effort in a across every phase of conflict. It is Drawing distinctions in the granular- campaign designed to impose costs and important to highlight that cyber has ity and precision allowed by kinetic or message the adversary. only recently emerged as a full instru- cyber weapons makes it easy to highlight Cyber weapons offer unique value in ment of power and strategic capability the difference between the coarse target- all stages of conflict and confrontation, for the United States. This development ing and surgical effect of cyber weapons. and they can be particularly effective was possible given a confluence of delib- Stuxnet had a surgical effect against spe- when employed below the level of armed erate thought and exploration, as well cific targets, coupled with (comparatively) conflict. Continuous global gray zone as significant milestones in law, policy, coarse targeting for access. Precise target- conflict in cyber exchanges is likely to and strategy, but much work remains to ing requires good technical design and occur for the foreseeable future.15 Kinetic elevate cyber’s maturity to the level long good intelligence.14 There are few, if any, weapons, conversely, are by definition not enjoyed by the kinetic realm of warfare. kinetic weapons that can operate with employed outside of armed conflict—this The growing maturity, especially in the coarse access and surgical effect. may be the most distinguishing and area of policy and practice, will con- important difference between kinetic and tinue to shape the future of integrated Differences in Policy cyber weapons. In June 2019, the press warfare. and Practice reported that U.S. Cyber Command In 2018, the Defense Science Board Today, the accumulated experience with (USCYBERCOM) carried out cyber at- (DSB) Task Force on Cyber as a Strategic cyber weapons has not yet achieved tacks against Iran in response to Iranian Capability determined that DOD “must the same maturity as that with kinetic aggression.16 Although the attack was co- move beyond tactical applications for weapons. There is a robust wealth of ordinated with plans for kinetic weapons, cyber and realize cyber as a strategic ca- experience in the development, analy- the cyber option was executed because pability.”18 The task force was also asked sis, and use of kinetic weapons; most the United States apparently elected not to compare cyber with kinetic capabilities, have evolved slowly over decades or to exercise kinetic options. This scenario including unintended consequences and centuries of refinement and applica- may demonstrate that cyber was a less collateral damage. Key conclusions of the tion. The Joint Technical Coordinating escalatory, nonkinetic option that still DSB’s final report were that, regardless of Group for Munitions Effectiveness, for provided a response and message to Iran. the means employed to generate a given example, was established in 1964 to For nation-states, kinetic weapons effect, a strategic capability had the fol- provide weapons effectiveness data in carry an overt attribution of the instiga- lowing generic attributes: joint munitions effectiveness manuals. tor. Attribution in cyberspace remains The capability can create a discern- No such structure exists for cyber a difficult problem, as tools and in- • ible, and preferably enduring, effect weapons. Furthermore, militaries have frastructure are easily obfuscated and on a target’s materiel, efficiency, extensive experience, including train- manipulated.17 Cyber weapons, therefore, and/or will (that is, the adversary ing, in employing kinetic weapons. The offer customized attribution. Revealing respects and is influenced by the relatively recent emergence of cyber attribution at a time of the attacker’s capability). weapons has not yet had sufficient choosing is a powerful capability. The capability is sufficiently well time to produce the same amount of Humans, including leaders and • developed and mature that it can experience. As a result, hesitance and decisionmakers, weigh their choices, in generate the desired effect within uncertainty about integrating cyber as a part, according to their confidence in the a reasonable time of a stated need strategic weapon remain. options available. Modern military leaders (that is, it is responsive to policy and When weapons are deployed, their have high confidence in kinetic weapons, combatant commander needs). use conveys a message to the adversary. owing to experience and training. Today, The capability can be regenerated The intent behind the use of kinetic cyber weapons bring mixed confidence in • within a reasonable time (that is, it weapons is nearly always unambiguous. the effects and effectiveness of the weap- can support campaigns in addition to The escalation of conflict means that both ons. Persistent operational engagement, one-time [tactical] strikes). sides understand, on some level, what the combined with science and technology in other seeks to achieve through the con- modeling and simulation, will help build Four milestones over the past 2 years flict. The use of force is the last resort for were instrumental in transforming this

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Dykstra, Inglis, and Walcott 121 Air Force special tactics operators cross field to approach second target building during operability training at Eglin Range, Florida, April 22, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Rose Gudex) aspiration to reality. National Security of integrated kinetic and cyber warfare. generally most effective when integrated Presidential Memorandum 13, U.S. Cyber attacks, independent from kinetic with other fires.”23 At present, there is in- Cyber Operations Policy, provided the action, are increasingly common, sup- sufficient experience to validate that claim necessary policy,19 the National Defense ported by nation-states, and undertaken other than intuition. Cyber and kinetic Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 by independent actors. Yet even conven- weapons can be incredibly powerful on provided the statutory basis,20 and the tional warfare is beginning to integrate their own and can achieve a desired mili- DOD Cyber Strategy provided the doc- cyber capability—for example, Russia’s tary outcome independently. If the ideal trine.21 Furthermore, USCYBERCOM invasion of Ukraine was preceded by of military dominance is to avoid armed was elevated to a combatant command, cyber attacks against critical infrastruc- conflict altogether, cyber capabilities pres- and its present commander, General Paul ture. The United States must quickly ent unique opportunities to produce a Nakasone, USA, has begun to employ learn to integrate cyber capabilities to wide range of effects. these newly assigned authorities under the greatest possible effect. Nuanced insight about the differences the doctrine of persistent engagement.22 The differences between kinetic and between weapons allows military leaders These milestones demonstrate that cyber weapons explored in this article to more fully integrate kinetic and cyber. the United States is willing and able to demonstrate that the capabilities are dis- Apart, the kinetic and cyber domains may employ cyber capabilities, albeit in combi- tinct but complementary and potentially not deter or stop a modern adversary. nation with other capabilities, to protect multiplicative in impact when applied in New options must be made with respect itself in and through cyberspace. combination. Some researchers have hy- to the differences between the domains. pothesized that integrating the weapons The military is beginning to learn how, The Future of Integrated will even present new and expanded op- where, and when to use cyber weapons. Kinetic and Cyber Combat tions for military power. JP 3-12 appears That knowledge will then allow leaders The ability to win and prevent modern to support this assertion, stating that “cy- to determine if these domains could be wars brings an urgent need to under- berspace attack capabilities, although they leveraged in a complementary fashion. stand the unique risks and opportunities can be used in a stand-alone context, are

122 Features / Differentiating Kinetic and Cyber Weapons JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Many open questions remain about focus of significant academic and governmental understood and defenses are known). Second, research, making it an area where both practice cyber weapons represent the code that produces the integration of kinetic and cyber and theory are rapidly evolving. See, for ex- the effect and are distinct from the access vector combat. By presenting an even broader ample, Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. that enables the effect; defenses against the full scope of possible effects, hybrid kinetic- Harknett, “Deterrence Is Not a Credible Strat- spectrum of possible access vectors can be quite cyber weapons systems and operations egy for Cyberspace,” Orbis 61, no. 3 (2017), costly and might not scale well. raise new questions about the practice of 381–393, available at . Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators warfare. Unmanned systems are an illus- See also Defense Science Board, Task Force on Tried to Achieve (Arlington, VA: The Lang- trative example of an integrated weapon: Cyber Deterrence (Washington, DC: Depart- ner Group, November 2013), available at cyber control systems with kinetic effects. ment of Defense, February 2017), available . the corresponding kinetic characteris- imo/media/doc/DSB%20CD%20Report%20 14 Steven M. Bellovin, Susan Landau, 2017-02-27-17_v18_Final-Cleared%20Secu- and Herbert S. Lin, “Limiting the Undesired tics, including a fixed, predictable, and rity%20Review.pdf>. Impact of Cyber Weapons: Technical Require- permanent effect. Targeting, policy, and 2 “Weapon,” OED Online, Oxford Univer- ments and Policy Implications,” Journal of practice likewise seem to correspond sity Press, June 2019. Cybersecurity 3, no. 1 (March 2017), 59–68, with the offensive attributes of kinetic 3 Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, Cyberspace available at . June 8, 2018), I-4, available at . (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, reversible, misattributable effect. Unlike 4 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, December 2016), available at . attributes complicate the ability to prove III-30, available at . New York Times, June 22, 2019, available at unmanned system; this could delay a de- 5 Christopher A. Bartos, “Cyber Weapons . raise questions about what constitutes a tute Proceedings 142/6/1 (2016), 30–33, 17 See Alexander Kott, Norbou Buchler, valid military target: Is it the remote op- available at . in Cyber Defense and Situational Awareness, erator? The location of the operator? The 6 Joint Operational Access Concept, Version ed. A. Kott, C. Wang, and R.F. Erbacher carriers of communications between the 1.0 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January (New York: Springer International Publishing, operator and the drone? The developers 17, 2012), ii, available at . Whether separately or combined, cepts/joac_2012.pdf>. 18 Task Force on Cyber as a Strategic 7 See also N.C. Rowe, “Towards Reversible Capability: Executive Summary (Washing- cyber and kinetic weapons are now avail- Cyberattacks,” in Proceedings of the 9th European ton, DC: Department of Defense, June able as strategic instruments of power and Conference on Information Warfare Security, 2018), available at . national objectives. Given the short his- versity of Macedonia, 2010). 19 Joint Hearing to Receive Testimony tory of cyber warfare, many opportunities 8 Eric Rosenbach, Living in a Glass House: on the Cyber Operational Readiness of the The United States Must Better Defend Against Department of Defense, Committee on Armed remain for future work to deepen the un- Cyber and Information Attacks, Testimony Services, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, derstanding of cyber weapons. As leaders Before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- September 26, 2018, available at . zone options will be strengthened. The 12, 2017, available at . 2019,” available at . the unique and integrated qualities of It is hard to imagine fully re-creating a missile 21 Summary: Department of Defense Cyber cyber capabilities. JFQ after it has exploded. Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC: Department 10 “Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransom- of Defense, 2018), available at . www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A>. 22 Paul M. Nakasone, “A Cyber Force for 1 While we principally focus on offensive 11 “Global Ransomware Attack Causes Persistent Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly (deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, and manipu- Turmoil,” BBC News, June 28, 2017, available 92 (1st Quarter 2019). late) capabilities throughout this article, cyber at . and deterrence; these are widely discussed in 12 Two important notes: First, this presumes the literature. Cyber deterrence has been the known weaponry (that is, the parameters are

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Dykstra, Inglis, and Walcott 123 James Meredith walks to class at University of Mississippi accompanied by U.S. Marshal James McShane (left) and John Doar of Justice Department, October 1, 1962 (Library of Congress/ U.S. News & World Report/Marion S. Trikosko)

Calling Forth the Military A Brief History of the Insurrection Act

By Michael R. Rouland and Christian E. Fearer

n the literal sense, the Insurrection codified in current Title 10 U.S. Code part, local authorities—many armed Act does not exist. Rather than a sin- 251–255, serve as the primary rationale and equipped to military standards— I gular piece of legislation, it is a broad, for the delegation of authority to the have proved more capable of handling overarching concept for a series of acts President to use military forces domes- disturbances and other crises. Addition- dating to the 1790s that concern the tically. In the past 50 years, only one ally, domestic military deployments use of American military forces within President, George H.W. Bush, has used have proved politically difficult for the United States.1 These statutes, later these emergency powers: in the Virgin Presidents whose critics have attacked Islands in 1989 and in Los Angeles such actions as gross usurpations of in 1992. The 28 years since the Los local authority by an overreaching Angeles riots mark the longest period Federal executive. Michael R. Rouland and Christian E. Fearer are Senior Historians in the Joint History and in American history without a domestic Our intention in this article is to Research Office. deployment of troops under the act. In outline the key historical events and

124 Recall / Calling Forth the Military JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 decisions that frame the discussion of the grant unequivocal or explicit authority to threat. This authority did not permit Insurrection Act, which we will refer to one branch but gave overlapping authori- the President to act unilaterally. Rather, henceforth as the militia acts, and the do- ties to the President and Congress to use permission to call forth the militia was mestic use of military force. Rather than the military to quell domestic unrest. dependent on a request for assistance by parse legal terms and interpretations, this The Constitution guaranteed the either a state’s legislature or governor.6 historical discussion underlines the semi- United States would protect its con- While Congress generally supported nal events, laws, and court decisions that stituent states “against Invasion; and emergency executive powers to confront outline the broad Presidential authorities on Application of the Legislature, or invasions and insurrections, Members granted by the Constitution and Congress of the Executive (when the Legislature of the Second Congress remained con- from our republic’s earliest days. cannot be convened) against domestic cerned over the prospect of using the Violence.” Article I granted this authority militias to enforce the laws domestically.7 Constitution of the to Congress in two distinct clauses on the There were very few Federal officers United States use of the militia. Congress was granted in the new republic to enforce Federal Apprehension over the use of military the power “to provide for calling forth law, and those few were ill-equipped to force is rooted in America’s inherited the Militia to execute the Laws of the compel compliance. Using martial force political culture, which held a deep Union, suppress Insurrections and repel to that end made many uncomfortable, distrust of standing armies and their Invasions” and “provide for organizing, presenting what more modern critics potential for domestic misuse. The arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and might call a slippery slope to overreach founding generation was especially sen- for governing such Part of them as may and abuse. To guard against this pos- sitive to this possibility and worked to be employed in the Service of the United sibility, Congress included judicial, alleviate such concerns in the Constitu- States, reserving to the States respec- legislative, and temporal checks on the tion.2 The framers were in part spurred tively.” At the same time, the President President’s new emergency powers. to action by the revolt of Daniel Shays was granted military authority in Article Before a President could employ military in western Massachusetts in 1786, an II: “The President shall be Commander force to enforce Federal law, an associate economic and civil rights protest that in Chief of the Army and Navy of the justice of the Supreme Court or Federal revealed the weakness of the new central United States, and of the Militia of the district judge had to certify that routine government under the Articles of Con- several States, when called into the actual enforcement would be insufficient. federation. While there was discomfort Service of the United States.” As com- Furthermore, anticipating that members at the notion of a regular Federal force mander in chief, the President would of state militias might be unwilling to or a means to draw state militias into lead and direct those forces called forth impose order within their own states, the Federal service, this revolt proved a by Congress. With respect to domes- President was granted the power to call serious threat to order and stability. The tic unrest, Article II charges that the forth militia from neighboring states and challenge was to equip the new Federal President “shall take Care that the Laws to keep them in the field up to 30 days Government with the means to enforce be faithfully executed.” Whether this after Congress returned to session.8 the law and maintain order without cur- responsibility refers to broad powers of Still, after granting the President these tailing the citizens’ rights or infringing enforcement or “duty of fidelity” remains powers, Congress required additional on states. debated by legal scholars.4 measures to avoid a confrontation with Delegates to the Constitutional rioters and irascible citizens. Rather than Convention accepted the premise that Militia Acts of 1792, having troops march straight to the place the national government must possess 1795, and 1807 of unrest, the act required the President a coercive emergency power the earlier Understanding the possibility that to issue a notification ordering the un- articles lacked. A common view, espoused certain events may require swift action ruly body—insurgents, as described in by , argued that while Congress is in recess, the Second the bill’s language—to disperse.9 With “the power of regulating the militia and Congress temporarily delegated its all these precautions and protections, of commanding its services in times of authority under the First Militia Clause however, Congress was unwilling to per- insurrection and invasion are natural to the President by passing a statute manently cede these powers, including in incidents to the duties of superintending “for calling forth the Militia” in May the bill’s final section an expiration by the the common defence, and of watching 1792.5 Under this law, Congress end of the next Congress.10 over the internal peace of the confed- granted a President the authority to Two years later, in July 1794, eracy.”3 The central point of contention “call forth such number of the militia President relied on in Philadelphia concerning the domestic of the state or states” closest to the this authority when responding to armed use of military force was over who would problem—in this case, invasion by a farmers protesting the new Federal ex- be responsible for invoking it. A standing foreign power, conflict with Native cise tax in western during military was a powerful instrument. To Americans, or an insurrection in a given what is known as the Whiskey Rebellion, allay concerns, the Constitution did not state—judged necessary to repel the thereby demonstrating the will of the

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Rouland and Fearer 125 Within 1 hour of President Eisenhower’s decision on September 24, 1957, Soldiers from 1st Airborne Battle Group, 327th Infantry Regiment, deployed to Little Rock, Arkansas, to escort nine Black high school students into formerly segregated Central High School amid racial protests (U.S. Army) newly established Federal Government over potential abuses by the army, explicit support of a Federal judge, the to suppress violent resistance to its laws. Washington disbanded the federalized Third Congress made the delegation of After negotiations failed to resolve the force, its purpose achieved. At the time, authority permanent and eliminated three dispute, Washington requested certi- critics generally praised Washington for key checks on the President’s authority: fication from a Supreme Court justice his actions against the whiskey rebels the antecedent court order, the limits on that local law enforcement could no and reaffirmed the validity of the Militia out-of-state militia, and the time require- longer enforce the law. He then issued a Act.12 Washington demonstrated clear ments on the notification for dispersal.14 proclamation in August indicating that and persuasive deference to both the The President could now act quickly and he would raise a militia and demanded courts and the legislature in committing unilaterally. As amended in 1795, this the Pennsylvania insurgents disperse armed forces to dispel the largest incident iteration of the Militia Act provided the by September 1. Washington, with the of armed resistance to Federal authority foundation for the current law for 10 U.S. governor’s support, assembled 13,000 between the Constitution’s ratification Code, Section 251. militiamen from Pennsylvania and three and the Civil War. The next century brought new chal- other states. As the army marched west, The Third Congress replaced the orig- lenges, prompting new laws. Thirteen the rebels dispersed.11 When the army inal statutes in the Calling Forth Act with years after Washington marched against remained in the field as Congress came a new Militia Act in February 1795.13 the whiskey rebels, President Thomas into session, legislators reauthorized While the Second Congress intended the Jefferson sought to use Federal troops— the calling forth of the militia for an ad- delegation of authority to call forth the distinct from state militias—to challenge ditional 3 months. Yet, to allay concerns militia to be temporary and required the Spanish border incursions along the new

126 Recall / Calling Forth the Military JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 frontier at Natchitoches, Louisiana, and court shared the opinion “that the au- Taney’s opinion in Luther v. Borden, to intercept his former Vice President, thority to decide whether the exigency writing that “the duty to suppress Aaron Burr, who was suspected of has arisen, belongs exclusively to the the insurrection, being obvious and organizing a filibuster expedition into President, and that his decision is con- imperative, the two acts of Congress, Mexico.15 Jefferson himself drafted a new clusive upon all other persons.” Story of 1795 and 1807, come to his aid, law authorizing the employment of the continued that the power was confided and furnish the physical force which land and naval forces of the United States, to the President as commander in chief he needs, to suppress the insurrection in cases of insurrections that was approved and whose duty is to “take care that the and execute the laws. Those two acts by the Ninth Congress in March 1807, laws be faithfully executed” and “whose authorize the president to employ, for one of several bills passed on its last responsibility for an honest discharge that purpose, the Militia, the Army and day.16 This legislation was an important of his official obligations is secured by the Navy.”22 expansion of emergency powers by add- the highest sanctions.”17 Ultimately, the Lincoln issued further proclamations ing Federal forces to the state militias court confirmed a broad and unchal- closing Southern ports, calling for a lim- available to quell insurrections and do- lenged authority for the President when ited number of volunteers to serve for 3 mestic unrest. acting appropriately in calling forth the years, increasing the size of the Regular Congress refrained from passing militia. Moreover, the court sided with Army and Navy, and suspending the writ any similar law for the next 50 years, the President over the states in deciding of habeas corpus in certain areas. These although Federal Soldiers were used do- when to call forth the militia.18 actions were a tremendous expansion of mestically for a variety of purposes and Luther v. Borden was another early the use of armed forces and executive almost always in support of state govern- test for the Supreme Court to evaluate power itself. Yet when the Thirty- ments that simply required additional the legality of the President’s “calling Seventh Congress convened on July 4, forces. Cases included the putting down forth of the militia.” Writing for the it ratified Lincoln’s actions and passed of slave revolts, enforcing fugitive slave court, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney additional laws that would enable him to laws, combatting vigilantism, and en- argued, “It is said that this power mount a full-scale effort to compel the forcing Federal laws governing relations in the President is dangerous to lib- rebellious states’ return to the Union. with American Indians. erty, and may be abused. All power In particular, in late July 1861, may be abused if placed in unworthy Congress approved An act to provide Instrumental Supreme Court hands.”19 The court did not suggest for the Suppression of Rebellion against Decisions of the 19th Century that such power was without a check. and Resistance to the Laws of the United While constitutional authority for the “Undoubtedly,” Taney wrote, “if the States. Grounded in the 1795 Militia use of military force was clearly articu- President in exercising this power shall Act, this measure expanded the discre- lated in Articles I and II, the judiciary fall into error, or invade the rights of the tion of the President to call forth both likewise weighed in on the subject. In people of the State, it would be in the the militia and Regular Army to suppress the first half of the 19th century, two power of Congress to apply the proper insurrections and execute the laws of Supreme Court cases, Martin v. Mott remedy. But the courts must administer the Union. The trend of the multiple (1827) and Luther v. Borden (1849), the law as they find it.”20 Scholars have versions of the militia acts since 1792 provided additional context for the generally agreed that this decision codi- was one of increasing the authority of statutory discussion of the President’s fied the President’s emergency powers as the President to call forth the militia. authority to call forth the militia and well as their basis in the militia acts.21 (The current language in 10 U.S. would validate the President’s broad Code, Sections 252 and 254, remains powers derived from the militia acts. The 1860s and 1870s: virtually unchanged since July 1861.) In both cases, the courts ultimately Suppression of the Rebellion Lincoln secured a definitive expansion of deferred to the executive to establish to the Third Enforcement Act Presidential authority in the first section the limits on this authority. Immediately after the attack on Fort of the 1861 Militia Act with the addition Martin v. Mott adjudicated whether Sumter and the seizure of other of the President’s ability to call forth the a citizen could be court-martialed for Federal property in the South, Presi- militia to “enforce the faithful execu- failure to report to the New York militia dent Abraham Lincoln issued a proc- tion of the laws of the United States.”23 when the President called it up during lamation closely following the formula According to James Randall, author of the . Justice Joseph Story, laid down by the 1795 law, calling on the most comprehensive legal analysis writing for the court, rejected the ar- the states for a militia of 75,000 men of Lincoln’s actions, “the emergency, as gument that the President lacked the to oppose combinations too power- interpreted by the Lincoln administra- authority to call forth individual citizens ful to be suppressed by the ordinary tion, was precisely that for which the use in their state militias, arguing that such course of judicial proceedings. Attor- of militia had been expressly authorized. authority came from the 1795 Militia ney General Edward Bates justified the To execute the laws, to suppress an Act. Specifically, Story argued that the administration’s measures by citing insurrection, to put down combinations

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Rouland and Fearer 127 too powerful for judicial methods— recent modification to the militia acts The Posse Comitatus Act of these were the purposes for which the in 1871, Congress approved An Act to 1878 and Domestic Disputes Government needed troops.”24 enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth into the Early 20th Century While this 1861 act was drafted with Amendment to the Constitution of the The 1861 and 1871 revisions of the the rebellious states in mind, Lincoln United States, and for other Purposes. 1795 Militia Act granted the President relied on these authorities to suppress This act allowed the President to use broad statutory discretion to use state disorder within the loyal states during the military when domestic violence militias or the Regular Army to con- the war as well, most infamously dur- or an insurrection resulted in the front domestic unrest. Congress and ing the 1863 New York City draft riots. denial of citizenship rights or equal the courts were both complicit in this Bloodshed in the city’s streets, wrought protection conferred to citizens by the expansion of executive power. With the by the military and rioters, caused con- new Fourteenth Amendment.26 And Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, Con- siderable consternation for the Lincoln although the 1871 Militia Act specifi- gress introduced a new check on the administration. His critics in Congress, cally targeted violence instigated by the use of the military to enforce civil law. as well as in the South, argued that Klan, the delegation of authority was More recently, this has been viewed by the deployment of troops to suppress broader than the 1861 version, includ- military leaders as an important check the riots was further evidence that the ing not only calling forth the militia and on the military’s role in domestic law President was a tyrant. Regular Army but also “other means” to enforcement, but it was not viewed Once more, the Supreme Court enforce the protections granted by the in this manner by Presidents at its would ultimately judge the boundaries Fourteenth Amendment. This act is also inception. of the President’s authority in the Prize noteworthy in that the President did Congress intended the Posse Cases (1863) decision. Justice Robert not require a request or approval from Comitatus Act to correct a specific set of Cooper Grier wrote on behalf of the the state government to call forth the military law enforcement issues emerging court, and this opinion remains a de- military when Federal laws or civil rights from an opinion expressed by Attorney finitive statement of war powers under were at stake. As updated, this militia act General Caleb Cushing in May 1854, the laws of the United States. Grier provided the foundation for the current during Franklin Pierce’s administration. explained that Congress did not need to law for 10 U.S. Code, Section 253. At the time, Cushing argued that under give the President the authority to act Critics argued that this latest law Section 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, unilaterally in 1861 because congres- blurred distinctions between insurrec- U.S. could raise a posse comita- sional authority was already granted in tion and lesser forms of civil unrest. tus of men regardless of their 1795 and 1807. “Whether the President They worried that such provisions al- in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in- lowed the President to deploy forces to occupation, whether civilian or not, and chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has combat minor incidents of civil disorder including the military of all denomina- met with such armed hostile resistance, that they argued were state affairs tions, militia, soldiers, marines, all of whom and a civil war of such alarming propor- regardless of whether state authorities are alike bound to obey the commands of a tions as will compel him to accord to requested Federal assistance. More sheriff or marshal. The fact that they are them the character of belligerents, is a than a reflection on the President’s organized as military bodies, under the im- question to be decided by him,” Grier evolving authority to deploy the mediate command of their own officers, does wrote, “and this Court must be gov- military domestically, the 1871 Militia not in any way affect their legal character. erned by the decisions and acts of the Act reflected changes in the ways the They are still the posse comitatus.27 political department of the Government courts and Congress were applying the to which this power was entrusted. He Constitution as a check against abuses Twenty-four years later, President must determine what degree of force the by states after the Civil War. Taking ad- Rutherford B. Hayes’s attorney general crisis demands.”25 While confirming the vantage of the broad affirmation of the was advancing similar arguments, and President had considerable powers, the President’s authority to quell unrest and Congress responded with a legal rem- court ultimately deferred to Congress, as enforce Federal law, Presidents began to edy in the Posse Comitatus Act.28 This that body had established the legal prec- call on the military for a variety of rea- law, driven by Southern Members of edent and the broad parameters for the sons beyond Reconstruction. The end Congress responding to the widespread President to call forth the military. of the 19th century was a tumultuous and unconstrained use of Regular Army After the war, Federal military forces period, one in which a rapidly industrial- forces during Reconstruction, specifically were garrisoned throughout the South izing America witnessed widespread stated that during Reconstruction and were relied social strife. Presidents increasingly on to uphold Federal law in the former called on military forces to protect prop- it shall not be lawful to employ any part Confederate states and check violence erty, aid in enforcing Federal laws, and of the Army of the United States as a posse perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan and protect victimized minorities from mob comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose other white supremacists. In its most violence. of executing the laws, except in such cases

128 Recall / Calling Forth the Military JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 The Evacuation of Fort Sumter, albumen silver print from glass negative, J.M. Osborn, April 1861 (Metropolitan Museum of Art/Gilman Collection)

and under such circumstances as such presence of the Regular Army was often brought the courts to adjudicate the use employment of said force may be expressly enough to restore order without using of the military as well. authorized by the Constitution or by act of the formal process for direct Federal In the In re Debs decision of 1895, the Congress.29 military intervention. After the first major Supreme Court confirmed unanimously Regular Army intervention in a labor dis- that the government had broad powers Ultimately, the Posse Comitatus Act pute during the Great Railroad Strike of under the Sherman Antitrust Law to confirmed that only Congress or the 1877, Presidents felt increasingly secure protect the mail and interstate commerce. President could authorize the military to deploying military forces—both state and The court sustained the President’s use of execute or enforce the law. Federal—to confront domestic unrest. the military and explained that “the strong By century’s end, despite the mul- A critical test was the Pullman Strike arm of the national government may be tiple and flexible legislative options in May and June 1894, which involved put forth to brush away all obstructions for the President to use Federal forces 250,000 striking rail workers in 27 states to the freedom of interstate commerce in aiding civil authorities, state and shutting down most of the railways west or to the transportation of the mails. If Federal authorities often had difficulty of Detroit, Michigan. When President the emergency arises, the army of the in determining which statutes applied to Grover Cleveland demanded strikers stop Nation, and all its militia, are at the service their unusual circumstances of domestic interfering with trains carrying mail, they of the Nation to compel obedience to its unrest. In numerous cases, Presidents refused, and Cleveland sent in thousands laws.”31 As the Posse Comitatus Act sug- simply dispatched units to the proxim- of marshals and 12,000 Soldiers.30 The gested, there are limits on the domestic ity of a disturbance without seeking a following year, organizer Eugene V. Debs use of the military, but “insurrection, specific state request or statutory justifica- challenged the Federal Government’s domestic violence, unlawful combinations, tion. The threat of intervention or mere authority to intervene and in so doing or conspiracies” provided the President

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Rouland and Fearer 129 essentially unfettered authority to respond tently proved controversial. However, it authority over civilian affairs.”38 Justice in preservation of the law. before the civil rights era began in Robert H. Jackson concluded in his For instance, in 1903, President earnest, the Supreme Court weighed concurrence, “Congress . . . authorized Theodore Roosevelt sent military forces in for the first time to check the Presi- the President to use the army to enforce to pacify labor disputes in Arizona dent’s seemingly unfettered militia act certain civil rights. On the other hand, and Colorado; 4 years later, he acted authorities in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Congress has forbidden him to use the similarly in Nevada. In the summer of Co. v. Sawyer (1952). army for the purpose executing general 1919, President Woodrow Wilson sup- In April 1952, President Harry S. laws except when expressly authorized by pressed race riots in Washington, DC; issued an executive order direct- the Constitution or Act of Congress.”39 Omaha, ; Elaine, Arkansas; ing Secretary of Commerce Charles W. He observed that “when the President acts and Lexington, Kentucky.32 Wilson also Sawyer to seize most of the Nation’s in absence of either a congressional grant quelled labor unrest with Federal forces steel mills and avert a potential strike or denial of authority, he can only rely in Butte, Montana; Seattle, Washington; that could undermine the national upon his own independent powers, but Gary, Indiana; Knoxville, Tennessee; and defense and military operations in the there is a zone of twilight in which he and Denver, Colorado, in 1919 and 1920.33 Korean War, citing his authorities in the Congress may have concurrent authority, And the National Guard and Regular Constitution and laws of the United or in which its distribution is uncertain.”40 Army took part in West Virginia’s mine States. This action was immediately chal- Finally, reflecting on the many military wars in 1920–1921. The military proved lenged in the courts. In Youngstown Sheet emergencies of the past century, Jackson largely effective, and it consequentially & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court cautioned that our forefathers “knew what became a Presidential tool of first (rather addressed the power of the President to emergencies were, knew the pressures they than last) resort in these complex cases. act without express constitutional or stat- engender for authoritative action, knew, Effective as it may have been, the use uary authority. By a vote of six to three, too, how they afford a ready pretext for of the military in this capacity continued the court resolved that the President usurpation. We may also suspect that they to provoke criticism. While public at- acted unconstitutionally.35 suspected that emergency powers would titudes toward strikers and protestors Justice Hugo L. Black wrote the tend to kindle emergencies.”41 varied, reports of Federal military forces majority opinion, but six other justices Civil rights legislation brought new using brutal—and at times lethal—force also wrote opinions, offering insights challenges to Federal authority akin to were met with stern criticism within into the constitutional authorities of the those encountered in the wake of the Congress and among the people, espe- President on military matters. Black’s Fourteenth Amendment. The passage cially among those groups against whom opinion stated that “the President’s of the 1957 Civil Rights Act and the the force was directed, whether they power, if any, to issue the order must Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Brown were labor organizations, citizens of a stem either from an act of Congress or v. Board of Education (1954), mandat- particular region, or some broader class. from the Constitution itself.”36 Truman ing school desegregation, prompted a Meanwhile, in January 1903, Congress had contended that “presidential power harsh backlash across the South. In 1957, sought “to promote the efficiency of the should be implied from the aggregate Arkansas’s governor vowed to resist de- militia,” thereby redefining the militia of his powers under the Constitution” segregation and used his state’s police and and establishing tighter Federal control and that based on provisions in Article II National Guard to prevent black students of the National Guard, which had by this which state that “he shall take Care that from accessing Little Rock Central High time developed a reputation for harsh the Laws be faithfully executed” and that School. President Dwight D. Eisenhower anti-labor attitudes and practices.34 The he “shall be Commander in Chief of the believed that a failure to act by the Federal Regular Army, on the other hand, was Army and Navy of the United States.” Government would be tantamount to ac- regarded as inherently nonpartisan, more Black wrote that Truman’s commander- quiescence to anarchy. He argued that the reliable, and generally more efficient. in-chief argument “cannot properly be governor’s actions were a direct obstruc- sustained. . . . The Government attempts tion of Federal law, signed a proclamation The Apogee and Abandonment to do so by citing a number of cases commanding Arkansas police to disperse, of the Militia Acts in upholding broad powers in military com- federalized portions of the state’s guard, the 20th Century manders engaged in day-to-day fighting and sent five rifle companies of the 101st The decades following World War II in a theater of war.”37 Commanding in Airborne Division to the state capital to saw significant unrest throughout the a theater of war was far different from enforce the court order. Segregationist United States, prompted by issues of “commanding” private businesses within Arkansans were irate. Rather than deseg- race and an unpopular war in Vietnam. the United States. regate at the point of the bayonet, the Presidents continued to deploy military Justice William O. Douglas noted in governor closed the state’s high schools forces to compel adherence to Federal his concurring opinion that “our history for the following year. law and to support local authorities and tradition rebel at the thought that A more dramatic episode unfolded 5 in restoring order. The former consis- the grant of military power carries with years later in Oxford, Mississippi, when

130 Recall / Calling Forth the Military JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 The Riots at New York—The Rioters Burning and Sacking the Colored Orphan Asylum, 5th Avenue and 46th Street, New York City draft riot in 1863, wood engraving in Harper’s Pictorial History of the Civil War, ca. 1866–1868 (Library of Congress) a black student sought to enroll at the by deep-rooted racial antagonisms, the likewise deployed to Detroit, , University of Mississippi. The state’s gov- civil rights movement, and opposition to and Chicago that month after violent riots ernor vowed to defy a court order that the Vietnam War. Federal troops were in those cities. Eventually, 23,000 Regular the student be allowed to matriculate, deployed on a number of occasions to Army and 15,600 federalized National prompting President John F. Kennedy to help local authorities quell unrest and Guard Soldiers were collectively used in utilize U.S. marshals, federalized national restore order. For example, Federal forces these responses. In each case, Presidents guardsmen, and deployed Regular Army were sent to the Nation’s capital for issued a proclamation ordering dispersal soldiers; their combined force numbered the March on Washington for Jobs and forthwith in recognition of the legal ob- nearly 30,000. Segregationists reacted Freedom in 1963 in the event protests ligations established by the 1795 Militia violently in a 2-day riot dubbed the Battle turned violent and to Detroit in 1967 to Act. of Oxford, shooting at Army convoys and help local authorities subdue a violent race Responding 20 years later to “condi- attacking troops and marshals. Federal riot. Antiwar demonstrations gathered tions of domestic violence and disorder” forces remained in Oxford for 9 months. momentum in October 1967 when a that resulted from Hurricane Hugo, As in Arkansas, local citizens and their po- major rally in Washington turned toward President George H.W. Bush deployed litical leaders argued that Federal troops the Pentagon and was met by military 1,200 military police and Federal mar- were the tools of an abusive, overreaching police, Federal marshals, and Active-duty shals to St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin Federal Government intent on forcing its Soldiers. Federal forces were used in that Islands in September 1989, when local will on a matter of local concern. case to maintain order and returned 6 police could not contain an outbreak The clash in Oxford was one of many months later to help restore order during of violence. The most recent use of the instances of unrest during the 1960s, a the 1968 riots following the assassination militia acts occurred in May 1992 when decade of social disruption prompted of Martin Luther King, Jr. Troops were Bush deployed troops to restore order

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Rouland and Fearer 131 Washington Reviewing the Western Army at Fort Cumberland, Maryland [before their march to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania], oil painting, attributed to Frederick Kemmelmeyer, after 1795 (Metropolitan Museum of Art) in Los Angeles when rioting broke out have accompanied the increasing political Importantly, this emergency power is after white police officers were acquitted opposition to using Federal troops for not inherent in the Constitution and of using excessive force against Rodney the same purposes, rendering the Federal thus subject to judicial review and leg- King, an unarmed black man. Nearly Government’s involvement unnecessary islative action. Supreme Court cases— 10,000 California National Guardsmen and perhaps coercive. For the last three de- especially Martin v. Mott (1827), mobilized. When they could not quell cades, Presidents appear to have accepted Luther v. Borden (1849), and the Prize unrest, California’s governor requested that calling in Federal forces is a measure Cases (1863)—affirmed the founda- Federal assistance. Bush then deployed to be saved for truly grave crises in which tional authority of the militia acts as 2,000 Soldiers from the 7th Infantry there is no serious dispute over the need well as the President’s all-encompass- Division and 1,500 Marines from the 1st for Federal intervention. ing, congressionally delegated author- Marine Division to help local and state ity to act appropriately. Youngstown authorities. In both cases, governors re- Conclusion Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), quested Federal support. Since our nation’s founding, Congress however, raised the concern that No President since then has deployed has seen fit to support the need for domestic use of the military requires Federal forces in the United States to emergency powers for the President to congressional authorization and that a enforce Federal law and restore civil order confront “insurrection, domestic vio- President cannot act with impunity on under the terms of calling forth the mili- lence, unlawful combinations, or con- military matters. tary. Political considerations have weighed spiracies.” There has been no congres- The Civil War had a profound influ- heavily in recent Presidential decisions not sional effort to revoke the authority to ence on the militia law, and subsequent to use Federal military forces domesti- call forth the militias. Congress instead Presidents called forth the military on cally; the evolution of the all-volunteer expanded the President’s powers on more than 125 occasions before World force since the 1970s may also play a four occasions. History demonstrates War II to quell violent labor disputes and role. Increasing capabilities of local law how both Congress and the courts race riots. The use of Federal military enforcement to handle domestic disorders have repeatedly deferred to Presidents. forces provided valuable social stability

132 Recall / Calling Forth the Military JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Special patrolling train Rock Island Railroad, with Company C, 15th U.S. Infantry, at Blue Island, Illinois, during great railroad strike, 1894 (Foss Etching & Photo Company)

(January 1993), 1–74; Clayton D. Laurie and and assured that changes in American Notes institutions were evolutionary and not Ronald H. Cole, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945 (Wash- 1 revolutionary in nature during an era of The five statutes are the Calling Forth Act ington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military His- 42 radical economic and social changes. of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, tory, 1997); Stephen I. Vladeck, “Emergency Again, in the 1950s and 1960s, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and c 331- Power and the Militia Acts,” The Yale Law Presidents called on military forces to 335 [2000]); the Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. Journal 114, no. 1 (October 2004), 149–194; 39, 2 Stat. 443 (331-335 [2000]); the Suppres- maintain order during the movement for and Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Federal Military sion of the Rebellion Act of 1861, version at 10 Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992 (Wash- and reactions against civil rights. Over U.S. Code 331-335 [2000]); and specific parts ington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military the course of a century, military leaders of the Act of 1871, ch. 22, 3-4, 17 Stat. 13, History, 2005). emphasized tactical restraint, military 14-15 (expired in part 18 U.S. Code 333). 3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 29 2 command and control of federal troops, See Frederick T. Wilson, Federal Aid (January 9, 1788). in Domestic Disturbances, 1787–1903, Senate 4 For opposing views on its applicability strict adherence to legal guidelines, and nd Document 57-209 (2 sess., 1903); Frederick to Presidential action in domestic disorders, discipline that would prove valuable T. Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbanc- see Monaghan, “The Protective Power of the nd in the effective use of this emergency es, 1903–1922, Senate Document 67-263 (2 Presidency”; Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules: power. Although no President has exer- sess., 1922); Frederick Bernays Wiener, “The Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be cised these authorities since 1992, it is Militia Clause of the Constitution,” Harvard Constitutional?” Yale Law Journal 112, no. Law Review 54, no. 2 (December 1940), reasonable to assume a future President 5 (February 2003), 1011–1134; and Andrew 181–220; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: Kent, Ethan J. Leib, and Jed Handelsman could, although Congress would deter- The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Shugerman “Faithful Execution and Article II,” mine the parameters and restrictions for Establishment in America, 1783–1802 (New Harvard Law Review 132, no. 8 (June 2019), calling forth the military. For its part, the York: Free Press, 1975); Robert W. Coakley, 2111–2192. military—Active, Guard, and Reserve— The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic 5 For the discussion in the House of Rep- Disorders, 1789–1878 (Washington, DC: U.S. should understand the legal framework resentatives, see Annals of Congress, House of Army Center of Military History, 1988); Henry Representatives, 2nd Cong., 1st sess., 574–580. that supports the lawful orders of a P. Monaghan, “The Protective Power of the On May 2, 1792, Congress approved “An Act President. JFQ Presidency,” Columbia Law Review 93, no. 1

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Rouland and Fearer 133 to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 36 Ibid. Black suggested that the govern- the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections 1789–1878, 34–36. ment had two relevant statutory mechanisms and repel invasions,” Acts of the Second Congress 22 Edward Bates, “Suspension of the Privi- through the Selective Service Act (1948) and of the United States (Philadelphia: Francis Childs lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,” 10 Ops. of Defense Production Act (1950) to take action, and John Swaine, 1793), 264–265. This act is Att. Gens., 74–92 (1861); Bates letter, July 5, but the government did not pursue them for known as the Calling Forth Act. 1861. Emphasis added. expediency reasons. 6 “An Act to provide for calling forth the 23 James G. Randall, Constitutional Prob- 37 U.S. Reports: Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, Militia to execute the laws of the Union, sup- lems Under Lincoln (New York: D. Appleton & 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 587. press insurrections and repel invasions,” 264. Co., 1926), 48–73, would describe this as part 38 Ibid., 632. 7 David E. Engdahl, “Soldiers, Riots, and of Lincoln’s dual theory of the war, both an 39 Ibid., 644–645. Revolution: The Law and History of Military insurrection and an international conflict. 40 Ibid., 637. Troops in Civil Disorders,” Iowa Law Review 24 Ibid., 243. 41 Ibid., 644–645. 57, no. 1 (October 1971), 1–73, quoted on 44. 25 U.S. Reports: Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 42 Laurie and Cole, The Role of Federal Mili- 8 “An Act to provide for calling forth the Black) 635 (1863), 670. tary Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945, Militia to execute the laws of the Union, sup- 26 On April 20, 1871, Congress approved 421–425. press insurrections and repel invasions,” 264. “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Four- 9 Ibid. teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 10 Ibid., 265. United States, and for other Purposes,” Acts of 11 See Leland D. Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels: the Forty-Second Congress of the United States The Story of a Frontier Uprising (Pittsburgh: (Washington, DC: Government Printing Of- University of Pittsburgh Press, 1939), for the fice, 1872), 13–15. This is known as the Third most authoritative account. Enforcement Act, the Ku Klux Klan Act, and 12 Vladeck makes the important point that the Civil Rights Act of 1871. each branch abided by its roles and responsibili- 27 C.C. Andrews, ed., The Attorneys General ties in the 1792 militia in “Emergency Power of the United States, Advising the President and and the Militia Acts,” 161. Heads of Departments, in Relation to Their Of- 13 On February 28, 1795, Congress ap- ficial Duties, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: W.H. & proved “An Act to provide for calling forth O.H. Morrison, 1871), 473. Also see Coakley, the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic suppress insurrections and repel invasions; and Disorders, 1789–1878, 132–133. to repeal the Act now in force for those provi- 28 See the culminating discussion in the sions,” Acts of the Third Congress of the United Senate on June 7, 1878, in 7 Congressional States Philadelphia: Francis Childs and John Record, 4239-4248. Also, Laurie and Cole, Swaine, 1794), 424–425. This act is known as The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic the Calling Forth Act. Disorders, 1877–1945, 18–21. The entire body 14 See Vladeck, “Emergency Power and of Federal law was codified in the 1874 Revised the Militia Acts,” 163, for a discussion on the Statutes. Four of these statutes (5297, 5298, removal of these checks on authority. 5299, and 5300) dealt with Federal aid to civil 15 Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Distur- authorities and insurrections against either state bances, 1787–1903, 45–49; Coakley, The Role or Federal authority. of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 29 Acts of the Forty-Fifth Congress of the 1789–1878, 77–83; George M. Dennison, United States (Washington, DC: Government “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory Printing Office, 1878), 144. of Emergency Powers, 1776–1861,” American 30 Laurie and Cole, The Role of Federal Mili- Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 (January tary Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945, xx. 1974), 56–59. 31 U.S. Reports: In re Debs, Petitioner, 158 16 Coakley, The Role of Federal Military U.S. 564 (1895), 582. Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789–1878, 83 32 Laurie and Cole, The Role of Fed- n46. Also see Dumas Malone, Jefferson the eral Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, President, Second Term, 1805–1809 (Boston: 1877–1945, 277–301; , “Riots, Little, Brown, Co., 1974), 252–253. The full Racism, and Hysteria: The Response of Fed- text is available in Acts of the Ninth Congress of eral Investigative Officials to the Race Riots of the United States (Washington, DC: Authority, 1919,” Massachusetts Review (Summer 1972), 1807), 443. 373–400. 17 U.S. Reports: Martin v. Mott., 25 U.S. 33 Laurie and Cole, The Role of Federal Mili- (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), 31. tary Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945, 18 Alan Hirsch, “The Militia Clauses of the 255–275. Constitution and the National Guard,” Univer- 34 Acts of the Fifty-Seventh Congress of the sity of Cincinnati Law Review, No. 59 (1988), United States (Washington, DC: Government 950–956. Printing Office, 1902), 775–780. In 1916, 19 U.S. Reports: Luther v. Borden et al., 48 Congress further distinguished the militia as U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), 44. organized (National Guard and Naval Militia) 20 Ibid., 45. and unorganized. This latter definition remains 21 Dennison, “Martial Law,” 76; Wil- in 10 U.S. Code 246 today. son, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, 35 U.S. Reports: Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 1787–1903, 291–292; and Coakley, The Role of 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

134 Recall / Calling Forth the Military JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 United Nations forces withdraw from North Korean capital, Pyongyang, recrossing 38th parallel, ca. 1950 (U.S. Information Agency/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)

ollaboration with other countries is an integral part of the U.S. More Afraid of C National Security Strategy. Its most recent version notes that “allies and partners are a great strength of the Your Friends Than United States” that “add directly to U.S. political, economic, military, intel- ligence, and other capabilities.”1 Since the Enemy the end of the Cold War, countries have preferred to collaborate through coalitions rather than formal alliances Coalition Dynamics in the because the latter are more liable to impose political constraints. Coalitions, Korean War, 1950–1951 according to Patricia Weitsman, are “ad

By Fideleon O. Damian Fideleon O. Damian is a Military Analyst working in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Damian 135 Men and equipment parachute to ground in operation conducted by United Nations airborne units, ca. 1951 (DOD/U.S. Information Agency/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) hoc multinational undertakings that are coalition partners and be ready to manage winter of 1950 to 1951 and the following forged to undertake a specific mission them; it uses as a case study the relation- spring, to maintain coalition cohesion, the and dissolve once that mission is com- ship between the United States and its United States had to reassure its partner plete.”2 Weitsman claims that coalitions primary Western coalition partner, the that it would prosecute the conflict within tend to be more cohesive than formal United Kingdom (UK), during the military and diplomatic parameters ac- military alliances because of their ad Korean War. The United States and the ceptable to the British. hoc nature, the ability of the coalition UK joined the United Nations (UN) Given the importance of international leader to tailor membership to suit coalition during the summer of 1950 partnerships to U.S. security strategy, pol- the mission, and, most relevant to this with their interests initially aligned around icymakers and scholars should look to the article, the absence of formal institu- a common goal: the defense of South past for lessons on how to form and run tions and consultative processes found Korea from communist aggression. By the coalitions. Studies of coalition dynamics in formal alliances.3 This viewpoint end of 1950, however, the UK concluded often gravitate toward models of success suggests that coalition members do not that U.S. actions that could intentionally rather than failure for their insights. Of need to prepare for cases where stra- or unintentionally escalate or broaden the the prior century, the two most promi- tegic divergences occur or to develop conflict posed a more imminent threat nent successes often cited as models to mechanisms to manage a member’s than communist military operations.4 In emulate are the Allied coalition to defeat internal dynamics. response, the UK acted to prevent any Germany and Japan in World War II and This article argues that military and U.S. operational or diplomatic initia- the U.S.-led coalition to expel Iraq from civilian leaders should recognize the po- tives that the British judged as harmful Kuwait in the Gulf War.5 In both cases, tential for strategic divergences between to their national aims. Throughout the the outcomes were unqualified successes,

136 Recall / Coalition Dynamics in the Korean War, 1950–1951 JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 and the coalition members managed to peripheral issue into a Cold War litmus men—compared with the two UK bri- maintain general alignment at least until test of Western resolve and solidarity.6 gades of less than 10,000 men total who the coalition achieved its military goals. The United States and the UK viewed depended on U.S. logistics and supply However, cases that produced more Korea as a bellwether for Anglo-American assistance.9 Outside of Korea, the UK ambiguous results and internal tensions cohesion on more critical issues at the be- also needed U.S. assistance to advance over the conduct and direction of the ginning of the war. Both nations assessed its nuclear weapons research, to rebuild conflict, such as the Korean War, merit that Korea would test the credibility of its its shattered economy, and to defend the equal attention for the insights they can commitment to anticommunism. Each European continent against potential provide in today’s more complex strategic government judged that the failure to Soviet aggression.10 environment. counter communist aggression in Asia The British did have reservations Between 1951 and 1953, the United would encourage even bolder activity by about aligning themselves too closely with States and the UK fought as part of a the Soviet Union elsewhere. The United the Americans, but those concerns were UN coalition to prevent a communist States and the UK also recognized that secondary in the British strategic calculus takeover of the entire Korean Peninsula. although Korea was a peripheral global until the Chinese intervention. As much The war began with Soviet-sponsored interest, the absence of a coordinated as the UK valued the Anglo-American North Korea invading south of the 38th response would serve as an unfortunate relationship and its access to U.S. military parallel in June 1950 and nearly succeed- omen for future cooperation on higher and economic support, the British were ing in conquering the whole of South stakes issues. The two nations considered equally uncertain whether U.S. leadership Korea save a small enclave near Pusan. A the Korean crisis a test of the principle would prevent a third world war or insti- UN counterattack in September 1950 of collective security and the legitimacy gate it. Differences over the legitimacy of shattered the North Korean military’s of the newly established UN as the guar- the Chinese communist government was fighting capabilities and liberated all the antor of the post–World War II order. another area of departure that would have territory lost the previous summer. The Lastly, neither nation wanted a war in consequences for Anglo-American rela- UN decision to advance north of the Korea to expand into a broader conflict tions as the war progressed. The United 38th parallel, however, prompted China with China or the Soviet Union.7 States still considered Chiang Kai-shek’s to intervene on North Korea’s behalf Anglo-American cooperation in nationalists in Taiwan the legitimate gov- and raised fears that UN forces would Korea was based as much on self- ernment of China; however, the UK, in evacuate the peninsula. By spring 1951, interest as it was on shared interests. The order to maintain its economic interests in UN forces had recovered sufficiently, Americans wanted additional partners China and its control over Hong Kong, and the conflict settled into a protracted in the coalition in order to reduce the recognized Mao Zedong’s government in war of attrition that ended after 2 years demands on their military resources. January 1950.11 Once the Chinese entered of negotiations produced, in July 1953, British participation also strengthened the the conflict, the British feared that Mao an armistice that restored the status quo U.S. message that the intervention was would move against their Asian interests, antebellum. an internationally sanctioned response and such concerns likely contributed to Korea itself was a largely peripheral to a threat to global stability, providing the resistance to provoking him directly. strategic issue to both the United States the Harry S. Truman administration and the UK in summer 1950, and both with domestic and international politi- Chinese Intervention nations joined the UN coalition less cal legitimacy. The British expected that Catalyzes a Strategic Rift concerned with the outcome on the pen- their support in Korea would prompt the The Chinese counterattack in the winter insula itself than with its implications for Americans to reciprocate with a stronger of 1950–1951 shattered UN hopes of Anglo-American global cooperation and commitment to the defense of Western an imminent victory and triggered the the opportunity to advance their national Europe. The British also calculated that British loss of confidence in U.S. leader- ambitions. For the UK, Asia ranked lower despite unquestionable U.S. military and ship, which prompted the UK to act than continental Europe in national pri- economic superiority, participation would to protect its strategic interests. After orities; within Asia, the survival of South build political capital and goodwill that the entire Korean Peninsula was nearly Korea ranked below continued control they could use to steer the Americans to lost in summer 1950, a successful UN over its two imperial colonies, Hong Kong act responsibly and in ways that did not counterattack—combining an amphibi- and Malaya. Similarly, for the United jeopardize British interests.8 ous assault at Inchon with an Eighth States, Asia ranked lower than Europe, On paper, though, the British Army breakout from the Pusan perim- and ranked lower than appeared unlikely to challenge U.S. coali- eter that September—broke the North the security of Japan, Taiwan, and the tion leadership against the balance of Korean military’s back. Buoyed by this Philippines in the region. Kim Il-sung’s overwhelming U.S. political and military drastic reversal of fortune and seeing an invasion and the possible reunification of power and shared objectives. For exam- opportunity to roll back communism, the peninsula under the communist ban- ple, the United States supplied an entire President Truman secured UN approval ner, however, transformed Korea from a field army of several hundred thousand to expand the conflict beyond the

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Damian 137 defense of South Korea. The new aim • the lack of preparation by the UN about MacArthur’s influence over deci- was to reunite the peninsula under the coalition for drastic changes to the sions and its uncertainty of whether aegis of a U.S.-sponsored government strategic environment Truman or MacArthur was dictating instead of merely containing the spread • UN Supreme Commander MacAr- Washington’s Korea policy and strategy. of communism. thur’s influence in decisionmaking The British probably feared that the Beginning in October 1950, Chinese • the minimal weight given to British Truman administration’s inability to “volunteers” entered Korea to prevent input into coalition decisionmaking control the general left the door open the consolidation of the peninsula under • the U.S. domestic political for MacArthur or his allies to force an a U.S.-backed government.12 Although environment escalation. Following a meeting with the first skirmishes occurred in late • British perceptions that Washington Secretary of State in October, the most serious blows fell on was vulnerable to strategic mistakes. mid-November, British ambassador November 27, when a Chinese coun- Oliver Franks assessed that internally The British feared that these factors terattack caught complacent UN forces the Secretary of State lacked the power would lead to a miscalculation that would off guard and sparked a panicked retreat or will to convince the Joint Chiefs draw the coalition into a direct war against south. The next day, General Douglas of Staff (JCS) to pay less deference to the Chinese and possibly a more openly MacArthur announced that he faced MacArthur’s decisionmaking.21 In a and directly involved Soviet Union. an “entirely new war” with the entry of November 22 telegraph, British foreign The UN coalition’s collective inability more than 200,000 Chinese troops.13 secretary Ernest Bevin told Franks that to anticipate a Chinese intervention or By mid-January 1951, UN forces had the British House of Commons was con- prepare responses probably played no retreated across the 38th parallel and cerned that MacArthur’s actions could small part in British fears that additional abandoned Seoul, undoing much of the produce a general war with China.22 miscalculations were in play. Although previous autumn’s gains. Further contributing to London’s lack Truman and his senior advisors had raised The UN military position stabilized of confidence, Acheson told Bevin on the possibility that the Chinese could after a change of command in the Eighth November 24 that a British proposal to enter the conflict if UN forces pressed Army and the loss of momentum in the UN establishing a demilitarized zone beyond the 38th parallel, MacArthur the Chinese offensive due to overtaxed in North Korea would hurt the morale assured them that a large-scale interven- logistics.14 After assuming command of of UN forces and that it was important tion was unlikely.16 Neither back-channel the Eighth Army following Lieutenant all UN members show every possible communications from Mao’s govern- General Walton Walker’s death in an support to the troops.23 ment nor U.S. intelligence assessments accident, Lieutenant General Matthew The British also assessed that the warning of a possible Chinese interven- Ridgway replaced ineffective unit com- Chinese intervention resulted from tion was deemed of sufficient specificity manders and restored troop morale, Washington not paying sufficient atten- to challenge the field consensus that enabling the UN coalition to steady its tion to British perspectives and concerns the People’s Republic of China would battlefield positions. By mid-January, it in their decisions, despite British military not respond with a significant military was clear that the Chinese were having contributions to the coalition. Air Chief action.17 London had passed on to difficulty sustaining their advance after Marshal Sir William Elliot, the chief Washington warnings, received through weeks of combat and needed time to re- staff officer to the Ministry of Defence, New Delhi as early as September 27, organize their personnel and logistics. By informed Prime Minister Clement Atlee that the Chinese would enter the conflict late January, UN forces had sufficiently after the November 20 meeting that the if the United States crossed the 38th recovered under Ridgway, launching British chiefs of staff had concluded it parallel.18 It appears, however, that up offensives that would eventually retake was necessary to start presenting their until the Chinese intervened in force in Seoul and return UN positions to the views to the Americans in the “most November, London and Washington 38th parallel. forcible and unequivocal terms.”24 In his were uncertain whether it would occur.19 November 22 telegraph to Franks, Bevin While Washington and London agreed The UK Fears the United informed him that as foreign secretary, an intervention would risk escalating the States More than China he was placed in an awkward situation war, the focus of discussion was how to Despite the improved military situation because British troops fought under dissuade the Chinese from entering it.20 by February 1951, the British ceased UN authority, but London had little say The two governments also do not appear showing Washington deference and in how the UN commander would use to have substantively discussed how the began taking action to protect their those troops. Bevin assessed that the UK coalition would deal with the fallout of national interests; they had lost confi- needed to press the United States to con- Chinese actions or the implications for dence that the Truman administration sult more with those UN member states the coalition itself. would not expand the conflict.15 Five supplying forces for the war.25 Another factor behind London’s factors contributed to this strategic British assessment of U.S. domestic loss of confidence was its discomfort divergence: politics further reinforced doubts the

138 Recall / Coalition Dynamics in the Korean War, 1950–1951 JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur inspects troops of 24th Infantry on his arrival at Kimpo Airfield for tour of battlefront, February 21, 1951 (U.S. Information Agency/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)

Truman administration could keep the Washington’s public messaging prob- his administration’s policy and Truman war limited. During a November 20 ably further raised London’s concerns subsequently clarified his statements, meeting of the British chiefs of staff that its coalition leader could make a many in the international community in- committee, William Slim, chief of the strategic miscalculation under pressure. terpreted them as a threat to escalate and Imperial General Staff, expressed his During a press conference on November use the bomb.29 The haste with which concerns that internal U.S. politics were 30, Truman made statements that espe- Truman spoke and then backtracked his undercutting the Truman administra- cially troubled the British and other allies. statements probably did little to reassure tion’s ability to contain the scope of First, he stated, “We will take whatever British decisionmakers that they could the conflict and exercise greater control steps are necessary to meet the military unconditionally rely on Washington to over MacArthur’s operations.26 By situation, just as we always have.”28 A have the internal clarity and prudence to November 25, the British chiefs of follow-on question asked whether this make sound strategic decisions. staff told Arthur Tedder, the head of included the use of the atomic bomb, the British Joint Services Mission in to which Truman replied, “There has The Consequences of Washington, that the U.S. domestic always been active consideration of its Strategic Divergence: climate made it difficult for British dip- use.” Truman went even further when he Preventing a Wider War lomats to moderate American behaviors, stated that the decision to employ atomic It was clear that by late November, despite a shared interest in preventing weapons rested with the field com- the UK had lost confidence that the an expansion.27 mander. Although this was certainly not United States could keep the war

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Damian 139 Clockwise from lower left, President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, at the White House, Washington, DC, December 6, 1950, autographed by President Truman (Courtesy Harry S. Truman Library & Museum/ /Abbie Rowe) limited and would not escalate by More important, British fears had risen engaging with the United States to force design or accident. The UK had also to the point that the UK was willing it to address their concerns, they could at lost confidence that its strategic inter- to risk damage to Anglo-American least stall—and, if necessary, block—the ests were safe. The fear and uncertainty relations by publicly breaking with the United States from taking actions that created by the American response to United States in the UN. London viewed as damaging. From the the Chinese intervention was the final Between December 1950 and May British perspective, these actions would straw that prompted the UK and other 1951, the UK took action to counter or compel the Americans to consider an allies to move to protect their national delay potential American actions, two in alternative view of the risks they were interests against any U.S. actions that the military sphere and one in the politi- taking and the possible unintended had the potential to escalate the war.30 cal, that could harm its strategic interests. consequences. Truman’s press conference on Novem- First, the British worried that the United The British leveraged the Truman- ber 30, 1950, especially catalyzed the States would employ atomic weapons. Atlee meetings of December 3–8, 1950, British to take more active and direct Second, the Atlee government feared to voice concerns over the use of atomic measures. From December 1950 that the Truman administration would weapons and to enhance British pres- to May 1951, as long as the British succumb to MacArthur’s demands to tige in the relationship.31 Although the feared that their coalition leader could bomb Manchuria. Finally, London was United States had no immediate inten- control the situation, the UK exercised concerned that the United States could tions to employ the atomic bomb at the what influence it could to prevent the push for punitive UN resolutions against time of Atlee’s visit, Truman’s November United States from expanding the war. China. The British concluded that by 30 statements had made it necessary for

140 Recall / Coalition Dynamics in the Korean War, 1950–1951 JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 the UK to seek assurances on U.S. inten- avoid discussing the matter publicly until While some scholars have argued that tions regarding atomic weapons. The Washington had notified its allies. By British efforts had minimal influence on minimum American concession Atlee insisting any decisions regarding airstrikes U.S. decisionmaking or consequences hoped for, initially, was Truman’s com- in Manchuria involve other coalition regarding China, these claims do not give mitment that any use of atomic weapons partners, the British had gained some ad- the British sufficient credit in reducing would involve consultations with the ditional ability to influence and prevent a the prospects of a U.S. miscalculation. British government. After being informed hasty action that could drag them into a For example, Callum MacDonald has of the domestic unfeasibility of such a wider war. argued that the United States had no proposal by Acheson, Atlee was satisfied Equally concerning to the British was intention of expanding the war and that with a public commitment by Truman an American demand for a UN resolu- the UK would have had little capability that expressed his hope that circum- tion to condemn China as an aggressor to prevent the United States from doing stances would “never call for the use” of and impose punitive sanctions. Passage so even if it had.40 Although Peter Lowe atomic weapons. Truman also promised of such a resolution risked hardening has argued that British fears were valid he would “keep the Prime Minister Chinese resolve and undercutting efforts and the winter of 1950–1951 was the at all times informed of developments by the British and others to negotiate closest the United States ever came to which might bring about a change in the a ceasefire.35 The British became aware using atomic weapons in Korea, he also situation.”32 of the U.S. intent to call for a UN claims that British dependency on the While the Truman-Atlee conference resolution condemning China at the Americans hindered UK capacity for seemed to assuage immediate concerns end of December 1950 after the State independent action.41 William Stueck, over atomic weapons, the British still Department began soliciting support however, contends British and UN mem- feared they would find themselves in from member states for the measure. bers did reduce the chances of expanding a broader war if the United States ex- Working together with Canada, the UK the war because they sufficiently delayed panded the air conflict into Manchuria. started building support within the UN the United States from a hasty overreac- Of particular concern to the British were and with its Commonwealth to delay tion and created the space and time for U.S. proposals to give the UN com- passage of such a resolution.36 First, the the military situation to stabilize. These mander permission to conduct “hot British delayed the resolution’s proposal improved battlefield conditions reduced pursuit” of communist aircraft attacking until January 20 by convincing the the pressure on Truman to authorize a UN troops over the Yalu River and into United States to allow China to accept a drastic action to salvage the U.S. posi- Manchuria. MacArthur was still the UN UN statement of principles for a ceasefire tion.42 Though British actions alone were commander when the British rejected first.37 Next, the British stalled passage not decisive in ensuring the Korean War an additional U.S. proposal on April of the U.S.-backed UN resolution by did not escalate further, they did make it 6, 1951, to allow retaliatory bombings objecting to language that implied more difficult for the more powerful ally of airbases in Manchuria that were the authorization for economic sanctions to drag the UK into a broader conflict origin of Chinese air attacks. London against China, which the British feared unintentionally and without at least con- requested that Washington instead first would only provoke the Chinese. The sidering the ramifications of such actions. consult its allies and issue a warning to British were sufficiently concerned about Another important consequence of the Chinese to cease air attacks before the resolution that they were willing to the UK actions was that U.S. political crossing into Manchuria.33 The British publicly break with the United States and military strategic decisionmaking assessed that giving MacArthur the and vote against its passage unless the in the war became less unilateral and authority to conduct either kind of air United States addressed their concerns.38 paid more attention to internal coalition action risked widening the war.34 Even Recognizing that a public “no” vote strategic concerns to maintain cohesion. after MacArthur’s removal later that by the British could prompt a domestic According to Stueck, after the winter month, the British refused to accept political backlash and undermine U.S. of 1950–1951, the Truman administra- American proposals unconditionally and congressional support for the more tion probably lost the latitude to employ insisted on having some input out of fear strategically important rearmament of measures that could have forced the com- that Truman could authorize a drastic Europe, the Truman administration munists to agree to an armistice earlier, action in response to domestic pressure. amended the resolution with additional because of the Atlee government’s resis- Although the Pentagon would later give language to assure the British that any tance.43 Although using atomic weapons, MacArthur’s replacement, Ridgway, au- proposed sanctions against China would bombing Manchuria, or other militarily thority to conduct retaliatory air attacks, be brought to the UN first.39 expedient actions could have changed the instructions the JCS issued acknowl- The most important outcome of the military balance, the British by their edged allied sensitivities. Ridgway had to British actions was that London was able actions made it clear the United States consult with the JCS before authorizing to protect national interests by diminish- would have to risk paying a high political any strikes; if this was not feasible, he was ing the possibility that the United States cost if the Truman administration acted to inform the JCS as soon as possible and could unilaterally escalate the conflict. unilaterally and without deliberation.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Damian 141 If the United States was willing to go this recognition, the American imperative both the United States and the UK beyond what its allies deemed prudent, to address British concerns might not considered the possibility of Chinese in- it would have to consider whether the have emerged. tervention and recognized it would have action merited a public break with its Interagency Cooperation Will Be significant strategic implications. Despite partners that would undermine U.S. Crucial to Managing Complexity. A such mutual concern, apparently no claims that it was acting in Korea to de- coalition is as much a diplomatic relation- in-depth discussion took place on what fend the international order. ship as it is a military one—and needs Chinese intervention would mean for strategic leaders who are comfortable the broader coalition or how it would Recommendations operating in both realms. Warfighters respond. When a coalition member Although they occurred nearly seven will need to pay as much attention to raises a possible strategic development of decades ago, the tensions in the diplomatic initiatives as they do to mili- concern, the prospects and the implica- U.S.-UK coalition during the winter of tary operations in the field (and vice versa tions should be deliberated with some 1950–1951 offer several salient lessons for diplomats). Furthermore, proper rigor. In their strategic planning, coali- on what future warfighters and policy- management of this complexity will likely tions should at least have mechanisms in makers should consider when attempt- require coordination across the spectrum place to consider the conditions under ing to mitigate strategic divergences of government to ensure all activities which these developments could occur, among coalition members. It is impos- complement each other. Effective strate- how such an event would influence their sible to prevent all friction; however, gic leadership will require leaders who are participation, and what modifications to devoting more time and attention to educated in thinking broadly about issues overall strategy and operations members managing coalition relationships in and capable of working across govern- would accept. strategy formation and execution could ment agencies. Coalitions Members Should Work reduce the risk of members working at Address Partner Concerns over to Reinforce Harmony, Even Among cross-purposes during periods of acute Politically Driven Changes to Coalition Historical Partners—Absent Effort, crisis. These lessons are equally valid for Dynamics. Military and civilian strategic Relationships Risk Decaying. Dominant ad hoc groupings assembled for a spe- decisionmakers alike should recognize members of a coalition should not take cific objective and permanent formal- that coalition partners pay attention to for granted that past goodwill will persist ized alliances. domestic politics and need to be reas- indefinitely. When deciding how much Embrace the Complexity of sured once differences emerge. Planners to consult with coalition partners, pru- Coalitions to Manage Them Better. and policymakers must be ready to take dence dictates erring on the side of more Quantifiable aspects such as money, preemptive actions to assuage and reas- consultation, reassurance, and engage- troops, and weapons platforms provide sure coalition partners when domestic ment. When circumstances require rapid readily identifiable metrics to understand trends seen as harmful for the coalition’s responses that prevent extensive delibera- relative importance within a coalition cohesion and partners’ interests emerge. tions, the preexisting trust and goodwill and the advantages gained from being in The British astutely observed that a U.S. built by earlier engagements become one; however, policymakers and planners President’s ability to control policy had all the more vital in providing reassur- must appreciate the complex nature of limits and that, with sufficient public ance that members will act responsibly coalitions to manage them effectively. As outcry, political opponents in Congress and to the coalition’s benefit. Despite the Korean War example illustrates, the or military leaders such as MacArthur a recent history of close collaboration, influence and importance of a coalition could compel Truman to take measures close cultural ties, and close personal ties member are not gauged in quantifiable, he did not want to employ or in haste. If among senior leaders, disagreements proportionate, or direct terms. Current political forces of a coalition partner are and tensions still developed between the strategic leaders should recognize that driving events in a direction that could Americans and British. Both the United quantifiable factors mask other dynamics affect the broader coalition, then that States and the UK had domestic political that carry with them outsize benefits and coalition member should do what it can considerations and their national interests costs. When working with a coalition to include partners in shaping a collective to factor into their respective strategic partner, choices should be made based on response. calculus, and when one party perceived the strategic value of the relationship, of Coalitions Should Have the two were falling out of alignment, which military forces are only one dimen- Contingency Plans and Processes to it acted to protect those interests. While sion. Both parties in the Anglo-American Deal with Major Recognized Potential the United States did wield tremendous relationship recognized the value of the Strategic Shifts. Much of the tension political and economic levers to influence British participation as being more than between the United States and the UK behavior, it is essential not to underesti- just men and materiel, and this meant emerged because of the sudden strategic mate the effects of constant engagement the consequences of failed cooperation in shock of China’s entry into the war. across all levels of government in easing Korea would extend into immediate and Although it is impossible to predict British fears. longer term strategic matters. Without everything that could happen in war,

142 Recall / Coalition Dynamics in the Korean War, 1950–1951 JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Conclusion House, December 2017), 37. 22 Ibid., 93. 2 Patricia A. Weitsman, “Wartime Alliances 23 Ibid., 96. Although the United States is unlikely Versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional 24 Ibid., 91. to experience an imminent, direct Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecu- 25 Ibid., 93. military challenge to its hyperpower tion of Wars,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 26 Ibid., 90. status, cooperation with other friendly 2 (Summer 2010). 27 Ibid., 98. nations in U.S.-led coalitions will be 3 Ibid. 28 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, 395. 4 Thomas Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War: 29 Ibid. vital to our ability to respond when that Cold War Diplomacy, Strategy, and Security, 30 Stueck, The Korean War, 130–132. moment arrives. What this study has 1950–53 (Manchester: Manchester University 31 Ibid., 138. shown is that even disproportionately Press, 2015), 3–4, 108–166; William Stueck, 32 Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, powerful nations can face challenges to The Korean War: An International History 127–128; Truman, Memoirs, 413. their leadership and limitations to their (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 33 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 129. 127–157, 330–347. 34 Ibid. ability to act unilaterally when their 5 For examples, see Mark A. Stoler, “The 35 Stueck, The Korean War, 151–153. actions pose a risk to their partners. Grand Alliance in World War II,” and Richard 36 Ibid., 151–152. Cases such as Korea could be useful for Swain, “The Gulf War, 1990–1991: A Coali- 37 Ibid., 152–154. anticipating the security challenges that tion of Convenience in a Changing World,” 38 Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, lie ahead because the volatility, uncer- in Grand Strategy and Military Alliances, ed. 159–166. Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray 39 Stueck, The Korean War, 155–156. tainty, complexity, and ambiguity that (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 40 For an example, see Callum MacDonald, shaped Anglo-American relations seven 2016), 136–165, 343, 375. Britain and the Korean War (Oxford: Basil decades ago will continue to define the 6 Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New Blackwell, 1990). strategic environment. Furthermore, York: Norton, 1971), 16–34; Anthony Farrar- 41 Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in future conflicts will almost certainly Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, East Asia: British Policies Towards Japan, China, vol. 1: A Distant Obligation (London: Her and Korea, 1948–53 (Manchester: Manchester involve the United States working with Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1991), 1–33, University Press, 1997). multiple coalition partners, who in some 83–105; Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, 42 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 129. cases will have longstanding histories of 17–44, 331–348; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 43 Peter Stueck, “The Korean War,” in The mutual antagonism and mistrust of one vol. 2 (Garden City, NY: and Com- Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 3, ed. other. pany, 1956). Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cam- 7 Acheson, The Korean War, 16–34; Farrar- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Leading coalitions will place heavy Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, 285–287. burdens on the United States, but the vol. 1, 1–33, 83–105; Hennessey, Britain’s current reality is that it cannot meet Korean War, 17–44, 331–348. the looming challenges of transnational 8 Acheson, The Korean War, 16–34; Farrar- threats, regional upstart regimes, and Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 2, 1–44, 83–105; Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, revisionist peer/near-peer challengers 331–348. alone. Prudence dictates that rather than 9 Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies waiting until the actual crisis occurs, and the Korean War: An Alliance Study (Man- future leaders should begin preparing chester: Manchester University Press, 1990), and asking difficult questions now about 167–181. 10 Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the how we can better manage our coalitions Korean War, 1–33, 83–105. against these threats. History shows us 11 Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, 12. that a better understanding of the nature 12 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, 376. of the challenges that lie ahead is essential 13 Quoted in Acheson, The Korean War, 73; to being prepared to deal with them Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, 100. 14 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean when the time comes. Moreover, as this War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History article has shown, looking at cases of (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), friction and difficulty between partners 126–127. can provide insights that just looking at 15 Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, 3–4, unambiguous strategic successes cannot. 108–166; Stueck, The Korean War, 127–157. 16 Allan R. Millett, The War for Ko- Further study into other such cases could rea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North help better inform our ability to antici- (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), pate and manage these challenges. JFQ 297–299. 17 Ibid. 18 Stueck, The Korean War, 90–91. 19 Notes Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 117; Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, 69–104. 20 Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War, 1 National Security Strategy of the United 69–104. States of America (Washington, DC: The White 21 Ibid., 90.

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Damian 143 saw and lop off all the undergrowth that might be interested in reordering that conceals the forest floor. It is that the world in terms of a socialism “with much-needed task that Keith Payne Chinese characteristics” or another that undertakes in Shadows on the Wall in wants to introduce weapons based on the long-established cottage industries “new physical principles.” The problem surrounding nuclear deterrence and is further complicated when blind tribal disarmament. commitment to pro forma political party Instead of examining the merits or positions du jour obscures the reality that demerits of myriad policy proposals re- questions such because how or whether cycled over decades, Payne returns to first to deploy nuclear weapons rests on as- principles—not only to the genesis of the sumptions about human nature that have nuclear age but also to the foundations almost nothing to do with contemporary of the international system. He identifies politics. Hence, Payne suggests that three divergent philosophical paths—each undue focus on these distractions renders with its own a priori assumptions—from almost impossible a proper focus on the which flow deterrence theories and basic propositions he reasserts. eventually deterrence policies. While all While Payne’s argument constitutes a paths acknowledge the anarchic state of good reminder for those who wish to en- the international system, each contem- gage in serious policy discourse, his focus plates different reactions to that anarchy is on nuclear weapons. Not unlike Alfred vis-à-vis nuclear weapons: one idealistic, North Whitehead’s famous observation holding that, despite systemic anarchy, that “The safest general characterization Shadows on the Wall: national interests can be subordinated of the European philosophical tradition Deterrence and Disarmament in such a way that all parties would is that it consists of a series of footnotes deem nuclear weapons unnecessary; to Plato,” Payne argues compellingly that By Keith B. Payne one realistic, holding that, while flawed 75 years of nuclear policy debates are re- National Institute Press, 2020 human nature underlies all expressions of ally footnotes to the philosophical views 204 pp. $12.00 national interest, nuclear deterrence can set out by some of the greatest minds of ISBN: 978-0985555320 be achieved relatively easily; and a second the mid-20th century and the purveyors Reviewed by John Mark Mattox brand of realist that regards nuclear of nuclear policy change, but nothing is deterrence as difficult to achieve as it is really new. necessary. Payne argues that to the extent However, Payne’s purpose is not to espite pretentions to the contrary, policy discussions lose sight of these bed- hinge a critique on this point. Rather, it is the academic mind rarely makes rock assumptions, those who disagree on to demonstrate that incommensurability D room for discussions of first policy directions cannot understand why within positions on nuclear policy stems principles—those basic assumptions they and their interlocutors cannot agree not from the personalities or parties in taught in first-semester undergradu- or make concessions that would alter power at any given time but from the ate classes that undergird any given landscapes dictated by Weltanschauung. most fundamental divergences: “Can one discipline. Instead, the traditional path In short, the answer to “Why can’t you entertain serious idealistic assumptions for the aspiring academic is to obtain a see nuclear policy my way?” must essen- leading to the disarmament of the inter- terminal degree, carve out an esoteric tially be “Because my foundational views national system, or not?” “If one cannot, research niche, and demonstrate talent about human nature and the system of and assuming that nuclear deterrence is by identifying the nuances of the niche. nations in which it operates is fundamen- preferable to nuclear war, is deterrence This approach, which the academy has tally different.” relatively easy or difficult to achieve?” taken ever since there was such a thing This confusion is compounded by the These questions are not trivial, and if as a “terminal degree,” is not without pseudo-philosophy of the transactional joint force planners miss this point, they merit. The academy does aim to create “deal-making” approach to international will be missing the point. One might be new knowledge, some of which turns relations, which ignores the reality that tempted to respond to Payne by stating, out to be useful. On the other hand, it some who pull the levers of power in the “Yes, but deterrence and disarmament are also breeds cottage industries churning world’s different polities simply see the more complicated than that.” However, out new, nuanced knowledge for new, world differently. Thus, what may seem Payne does not suggest that there are no nuanced knowledge’s (and tenure’s) obvious from the perspective of the na- details to work out or compromises to be sake in a way that can obscure first tion that introduced the world to nuclear made. He simply reminds us not to miss principles. As a result, once in a while, weaponry may not be so obvious from the forest for the trees. someone needs to come in with a chain other vantage points—especially ones

144 Book Reviews JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Payne supplements his discussion of extensions of the state poised to inflict first principles with useful tables compar- violence. Preexisting inequalities cre- ing policies and their outcomes based ate friction, promote division, diminish on the fundamental positions outlined. organizational cohesion, and undercut These comparisons will aid the novice battlefield performance to varying and the expert alike and reveal that de- degrees. Military inequality, a measur- terrence discourse is not necessarily as able construct introduced by Lyall, is a burdened with nuance as some cottage function of identity as it relates to group industrialists assumed. The clarity of this membership and relational standing comparative work goes hand in hand with within the political community weighted the dutifully researched and well-sourced by inclusion, discrimination, or repres- argumentation. Payne’s sweeping com- sion. This concept includes all group mand of the full constellation of political members who enjoy full standing, those science and deterrence theory literature who are marginalized, those who suffer makes him an excellent guide through sanctioned discrimination, and those who the undergrowth-cluttered forest, beyond experience collective repression. Lyall’s which one must see in order to home in extensive, detailed, and well-crafted book on essential principle. effectively demonstrates the validity of his Shadows on the Wall provides the hypothesis and how high levels of military reader with a rare occurrence—a clear inequality negatively affects battlefield view of the fundamental principles that performance. Armies rife with politically form the basis of deterrence discourse. sanctioned inequalities, therefore, are Payne does the entire field a service Divided Armies: Inequality flawed by their very design. by acknowledging that there is a lot of and Battlefield Performance The evidence Lyall presents is original undergrowth to be removed if one is to in Modern War and compelling. The opening chapter understand the essence of what might overviews the genesis of his thinking By Jason Lyall otherwise seem to be a bewildering array while detailing essential concepts, terms, Princeton University Press, 2020 of nuanced policy choices. Joint force and definitions. The balance of the book, 528 pp. $35.00 policymakers, planners, and national se- eight chapters and two appendices, is ISBN: 978-0691192444 curity practitioners would be wise to take organized under three major headings: up this book and absorb its first principles Reviewed by Larry D. Miller “Theory and Initial Evidence,” “Historic before any other that claims to expand on Battlefield Evidence, and “Extensions the merits or demerits of nuclear deter- and Conclusions.” The chapters pres- rence and disarmament policy. JFQ hy armies win wars or suffer ent detailed historiography, quantitative battlefield defeats has long analyses of data drawn from Project Mars, W piqued the curiosity and and case studies purposefully selected Dr. John Mark Mattox is a Senior Research Fellow interest of military historians, war plan- to challenge and assess the strength in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute for National Strategic ners, and strategists alike. Theorists of his argument from various angles. Studies, at the National Defense University. commonly attribute military effective- Project Mars, the culmination of a 7-year ness (or not) to force ratios, firepower, research effort, documents direct force- technological superiority, material/ on-force conflicts between 1800 and resourcing advantages, or exceptional 2011. Building the Project Mars database leadership (possibly aided by surprise required the support and expertise of 134 or dumb luck). Jason Lyall, however, coders tracking primary documents and advances a groundbreaking analysis for secondary sources across 21 languages. understanding who wins, who loses, The goal was to construct a global and why. In the process, he suggests military database documenting armed equality as a key element in better conflicts in the modern era. Containing designing military forces positioned for 825 observations of belligerence, the battlefield success. database complements, and will possibly His argument is that political com- supersede, portions of the Correlates of munities necessarily and invariably import War Project database. existing ethnic, racial, religious, and/or Throughout the book, Lyall employs societal hierarchies into military organiza- statistical analyses and historiography—a tions—organizations that are political potent combination of quantitative and

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Book Reviews 145 qualitative methods—to assess cross-na- the case data; however, the conclusions tional military inequality against measures are applicable across the joint force. of battlefield performance. Hypothesized Regardless, the book is well-written expectations include, for example, that and worth the intellectual bandwidth as the coefficient of force inequality required to parse through the meticulous increases, tactical and operational sophis- research. tication will decrease, battlefield fatalities The joint force will find much to con- will increase, defections will increase, and sider in Divided Armies as the national coercion and fratricidal violence within security enterprise adjusts to confront the force will rise. 21st-century challenges. Lyall’s work Lyall’s detailing of a well-researched suggests inclusivity as a way forward, conflict in the latter 1800s is particularly especially in uncertain times. The future illustrative and serves as a preliminary test of war is unknown in many respects, but of his hypothesis. In brief, absent full-on technological destruction, Ahmad (known as the ) built one can predict that the tensions between an inclusive and egalitarian political globalization and nationalism will con- community from diverse tribes, clans, tinue, variously propelling and repelling and ethnic groups in what is primar- the desirability of diversity within national ily present-day . He assembled and international communities. Yet Lyall an army that defeated Egyptian and has convincingly demonstrated that the Anglo-Egyptian forces during the first most successful armies will not only be di- Mahdist war (1881–1885). Following verse, but they will also embrace diversity the Mahdi’s early and unexpected death as strength and use that strength to repel Command: The Twenty- in 1885, his successor initiated sweeping and defeat armies unable to overcome First-Century General changes that infused poisonous identity their own inequalities. JFQ By Anthony King politics into the community. Some tribes Cambridge University Press, 2019 and ethnic groups were favored, some 504 pp. $79.99 were not, and some experienced state- Dr. Larry D. Miller is the Director and Professor of Communicative Arts at the U.S. Army War ISBN: 978-1108476409 sanctioned repression. In due course, College. the Anglo-Egyptian forces returned and Reviewed by Allan R. Millet claimed a resounding victory during the second Mahdist war (1896–1899). Numerous accounts for this reversal of ommand is two loosely con- events exist, including arguments about nected books. One book is about improved weaponry and technologi- C generalship in combat in the 21st cal advantages that favored the British. century with a focus on hybrid con- Lyall’s careful matching of covariates flicts. The second is about imagining and contextual variables, however, along generalship as a collective enterprise with insights from primary and secondary and the challenges of employing a source material, successfully illustrates division of differently sized units with the “relationship between inequality and unique capabilities. A division might battlefield performance.” be limited to units that shoot and Divided Armies is an inviting and destroy and heavy in units that simply challenging read, one that necessitates collect and process information with and rewards thoughtful investment. such speed that no single commander Readers who are unfamiliar with notions could possibly make timely decisions. of independent variables, covariates, Drawing on his prior work on unit paired comparisons, and regression cohesion and military culture as a analysis may find some elements of the British army contractor, Dr. Anthony discussion obscure and possibly off- King offers an updated look at gener- putting despite the author’s solid and alship and division command for an generally successful efforts to deliver increasingly complex battlefield. a book with minimal technical jargon. Command provides a review of how Some will also undoubtedly critique the ground combat divisions developed from emphasis on land-based operations in World War I to the present, spiced with

146 Book Reviews JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 examples of “good” division commanders asserts that focused staff training makes Another complication King might and, less convincingly, why some gener- the dispersion and reduction of head- have addressed is the domination of rules als were not so good. King does useful quarter staffs more effective and allows of engagement (ROE). I had the good comparative work on the armies of Great better intercommand communications. fortune to participate in the exercises Britain, the United States, France, and Command has many laudable features. Bold Guard and Northern Wedding as Germany, stressing system problems not One theme deals with a real problem: the a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic rooted in generals’ personal style. He em- evolving exercise of command in complex watch officer (twice), to observe the phasizes operational challenges in actual operational environments that cannot annual Ulchi Focus Lens exercise at combat, and he acknowledges that differ- be easily characterized as force-on-force Command Post Tango in South Korea, ent enemies pose different challenges to a engagements decided by massed firepower to go on patrol with a British battal- division commander. and/or technological advantages (for ion in Ulster, and to discuss at length The second part of Command applies example, information domination). King’s operations in Bosnia and Kosovo with multiple theories of leadership and staff guidance to senior commanders is to use General Wesley K. Clark while he was still organization to the difficulties of plan- decisionmaking systems that produce use- Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In ning and controlling current operations. ful, timely information before crises occur. all these situations, however diverse, the King does not offer up technological However, King fails to address several ROE shaped operations, not strategy— silver bullets as solutions, although he important 21st-century issues that divi- and for no apparent reason. is rooted in a cyber world, so he cannot sion commanders do not face often, for Written with senior leaders in mind, quite dismiss the notion that we will example, questions of appropriateness Command offers useful waypoints for someday pin stars on an artificial intelli- and proportionality in waging war. A a further discussion of the evolution of gence device and salute it—but the HAL division commander would certainly be generalship, decisionmaking, and divi- 9000 is not yet here. aware of his own casualties and would try sion command in increasingly complex Professor King recognizes the power to estimate the effect of enemy casualties. environments. It also provides useful of personality and example by making Commander’s intent is derivative from nuggets for less senior joint force officers a distinction between command and strategy, which depends on the goals of as they consider their own leadership leadership. However, this is a distinction the highest political authority. It might and command style on the 21st-century without a difference. Lower ranks and be far easier to remove a dictator than to battlefield. JFQ citizen soldiers do not know enough replace him, as General Smith learned to judge professional-operational com- in Basra. Smith became an arbiter of an petence, so sheer courage impresses. Iraqi civil war, a role no amount of gam- Colonel Allan R. Millett, USMCR (Ret.), Ph.D., is the Ambrose Professor of History and Director of Professional troops want a steady flow of ing could have solved. I believe General the Eisenhower Center for American Studies at ammunition and accurate, prompt artil- Mattis would agree that his command of the University of New Orleans. lery fire. They know that even generals in the 1st Marine Division during the Iraq hovering helicopters can be shot down. War was a drive in the sun compared to Today’s OH-58 is yesterday’s white horse. General Carter’s problems in Afghanistan. Professor King has his own Valhalla Command would also benefit from of modern major generals, who com- a more thorough assessment of the manded through delegated authority and problems of air mission tasking. King undelegated responsibility, shaped by admires the Marine Corps system of team building. It resembles British battal- force integration (protected by Title 10, ion “O” groups at a higher level. King’s U.S. Code) without explaining that the exemplars are General Rupert Smith, headquarters of a Marine Air-Ground General Nick Carter, and General James Task Force provides a single commander Mattis. All three, according to King, cre- for three elements: a ground combat ated centralized decisionmaking systems element, an air combat element, and a that still provided subordinate command- Service-support element. The operational ers with decisionmaking latitude through capabilities of each element depend vertical and horizontal networks for on the mission. They may range from information-sharing. King champions the destroying an enemy armored force to “Decision Point” system, which stresses rescuing flood victims in a foreign coun- the constant measurement of operations try. King’s national system of command, against the newest Rosetta Stone, the as conceptualized, might allow rapid commander’s intent. The social science deployment but does not provide air- jargon aside, all this sounds like “feel ground integration. good” decision by committee, but King

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Book Reviews 147 call for entries for the 2021 Secretary of Defense and 2021 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions

Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners.

Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows.

What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college.

When? Anytime during the 2020–2021 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 2021, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.

For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/ New from NDU Press A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms Edited by Timothy S. Mallard and Nathan H. White 2020 • 412 pp.

Since “the war to end all wars” witnessed the rise of global war among competing nation- states conducted in often tenuous alliances with nascent professional militaries—characteristics that continue to mark contemporary warfare a century later—then studying that conflict’s impact seems a relevant method to decide ways in which the profession of arms will develop in the next 25 to 50 years. Indeed, like a smoldering, persistent fire that threatens to re-erupt into a fresh conflagration, World War I continues to deeply shape and guide the profession of arms today.

Download the EPUB, MOBI, or PDF version for free.

Scan the QR Code above or go to: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/ Books/A-Persistent-Fire JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-NINE, 4TH QUARTER 2020 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit

articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, Authors include scholars from National the National Defense University and the Institute for Strategic Assessment 2020 providesStrategic Assessment an expert of the most and nuanced understanding Strategic Studies who have been directly pioneers engaged as thought leaders and policymaking the new era of GPC. Chapters and combinations ofgrappling with the strategic contours of , and of national security, chapters will be not only useful for students foreign affairs academic setting, but also of great in an to policy practitioners. value important between the three dimensions of GPC emerging Great the United Powers in 2020: stands atop the triumvirate, with It establishes that the United States States, China, and Russia. for top-level prestigeChina a rising competitor and Russia vying signs of while facing clear dyad is likely to be the dominant Greatdecline. The Sino-American competitive rivalry Power into the future. Great Chapters focus on the critical activities among these Powers and develop nonstate actors, and global institutions. major implications for other state actors, Coming Soon from NDU Press Soon from NDU Coming Competition 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Strategic Assessment III Lynch Edited by Thomas F. Great relations is a framework for understanding interstate Power competition that dominated Past GPC eras have featured II. multiple powerful War prior to World geopolitics for centuries states jockeying for relative status and position. After lying dormant period during a two-decade of GPC the dynamics globalization and American international primacy, of post–Cold War returned to international relations security studies in earnest and during the late 2010s. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked